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Non-international armed conflict between Myanmar and Kachin Independence Army (KIA)

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Non-international armed conflict between Myanmar and Kachin Independence Army (KIA)

By eugenie

Background

The Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) is a political group representing the Kachin ethnic minority in northern Myanmar.1 C. Stutte, ‘Who is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 4 February 2025. The KIA is the armed wing of the KIO.2 ‘Kachin Independence Organisation/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA)’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 5 September 2024.

The KIA was founded on 5 February 1961 with the goal of establishing an autonomous state for the Kachin people.3 M. Martin, ‘Update on the Armed Resistance in Myanmar’s Kachin State’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 17 July 2024; C. Stutte, ‘Who is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 4 February 2025. Over time, KIA objectives evolved from seeking independence to demanding meaningful autonomy and the protection of Kachin rights and resources.4 M. Martin, ‘Update on the Armed Resistance in Myanmar’s Kachin State’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 17 July 2024. The term ‘Kachin’ encompasses a diverse group of ethnicities, notably the Jingpo, Rawang, Lisu, Zaiwa, Lashi (Lachik), and Lawngwaw (Maru) peoples.5 ‘The Kachin Independence Army: A Comprehensive Overview’, A Complicated War.

A ceasefire agreement between the KIA and the Myanmar government was reached in 1994.6 ‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024; ‘Memoirs of Kachin Peace Efforts (1994)’, Kachinland News, 31 October 2024. In 2010, the military junta issued an ultimatum to all EAOs in Myanmar to transform into a border guard force under command of the military junta or face a resumption of conflict.7 H. Beech, ‘On Burmese New Year, a String of Attacks’, Time Magazine, 19 April 2010. The ultimatum was rejected by the KIA and KIO, and the ceasefire broke down in June 2011.8 M. Martin, ‘Update on the Armed Resistance in Myanmar’s Kachin State’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 17 July 2024. As a consequence, the KIA has been fighting the Tatmadaw as of 2011, resulting in significant internal displacement and a continued humanitarian crisis in Kachin state.9 ‘The Kachin Independence Army: A Comprehensive Overview’, A Complicated War.

Intensity

According to the Myanmar Peace monitor, the KIA and allied forces have clashed with the Tatmadaw more than 602 times between January 2021 and 9 July 2024.10 ‘Kachin Independence Organisation/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA)’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 5 September 2024. In April 2025, clashes between the KIA and Tatmadaw continued to escalate. 11‘Heavy fighting erupts as KIA ambushes advancing Myanmar junta troops near Hpakant’, Mizzima, 27 April 2025; M. Maung, ‘Battles resume in Kachin State’, Myanmar Now, 28 April 2025; M. Maung and M. Shwe Wah, ‘Myanmar military attacks KIA-controlled territories, including Laiza, with aircraft and drones’, Myanmar Now, 27 February 2025; ‘KIA Resumes Bhamo Attacks on Myanmar Junta After Quake Ceasefire’, The Irrawaddy, 30 April 2025. Following the expiration of KIA’s earthquake-related unilateral ceasefire on 22 April 2025, there was an escalation in fighting between KIA and the military in the Bhamo and Hpakant regions.12 ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group. Notably, the KIA attempted to capture the regime’s last significant stronghold in Bhamo town.13 ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group.

The KIA continues to launch sustained and concerted military operations against the Tatmadaw. At the time of reporting, the KIA controlled thirteen of eighteen townships in Kachin.14 Z. Abuza and N. N. Thant Aung, ‘Too Little, Too Late: China Steps Up Military Aid to Myanmar’s Junta’, Stimson, 4 March 2025; S. M. Thazin Aung, ‘Reinventing Territorial Self-Governance in Myanmar: Kachin’s New Approach and Its Dilemma in Post-Coup Myanmar’, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 7 March 2025; ‘Kachin Special Region 1 now under Kachin Independence Army control’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 21 November 2024. The fighting between the Tatmadaw and the KIA was sufficiently intense to be of concern to China to the extent that in the first quarter of 2025, it was committed to negotiating a ceasefire.15 M. Micheals, ‘Crossing the Rubicon: Are Myanmar’s ethnic armies prepared to go all in?’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2025.

The Tatmadaw’s choice of attack against the KIA is often aerial strikes, including sophisticated drone attacks.16 M. Maung and M. Shwe Wah, ‘Myanmar military attacks KIA-controlled territories, including Laiza, with aircraft and drones’, Myanmar Now, 27 February 2025; M. Maung and M. Shwe Wah, ‘Myanmar junta strikes Kachin armed group’s stronghold as clashes in Bhamo continue’, Myanmar Now, 27 January 2025. The use of aerial bombardment against the KIA signals an assessment that the KIA is a serious military opponent.17 ‘Junta Airstrike Kills Nearly 40 Trainees at KIA Camp Amid Crisis’, Kachin News, 1 April 2025; ‘Myanmar’s junta seeks to regain air edge with foreign night vision drones’, Radio Free Asia, 15 March 2025.

Weaponry used by the KIA includes AK47s and improvised explosive devices and they are capable of producing weaponry which includes single shot rifles.18 War Noir, ‘Manufacturing the Revolution: Weapons and Explosives Craft-Produced by Myanmar’s Anti-Junta Fighters’, Militant Wire, 31 October 2022. Among the military tactics of the KIA is the forming of alliances with other EAGs, which includes the successful alliance with the TNLA, and one with the CNDF.19 ‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, March 2025, 22.

The number of internally displaced persons in Kachin state as of 28 April 2025 was estimated at 227,200 people – a direct result of the severity of fighting in this region.20 ‘Myanmar’ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Operational Data Portal.

The intensity of fighting between the KIA and the Tatmadaw is sufficiently intense to equate to protracted armed violence.

Organization

The KIA and KIO are led by General N/Ban and the second in command is General Gam Shawng.21 ‘Kachin Independence Organisation/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA)’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 5 September 2024. The precise organizational structure of the KIA is unclear. The Kachin People’s Defence Force (KPDF) operates under the command of the KIA, as is the case with various other PDFs in Kachin.22 ‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, 4 March 2025. An executive decision has been taken to subsume PDFs active in areas in which the KIA operates in the command structure of the KIA. An example of this integration is presented by the Myo Hla PDF which was integrated into KIA’s Battalion 28 under its 11th Brigade. 23‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, 13 March 2025.

The KIA headquarters are based in Laiza, Kachin state.24 ‘Kachin Independence Organisation/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA)’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 5 September 2024. It is reported the KIA has some 12,000 active fighters organized into between eight and eleven brigades.25 ‘Kachin Independence Organisation/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA)’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 5 September 2024; ‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, 13 March 2025. Little information is available on the group’s disciplinary system, but the organization into battalions headed by brigades could ensure enforcement of discipline among fighters and enable the system of command to implement IHL. The KIA is well-trained,26 ‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024. which should ensure the ability to comply with IHL.

Its military tactics include guerrilla warfare, with claims that the KIA excels in hit-and-run tactics and ambushes, leveraging its knowledge of the terrain in Kachin state.27 ‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024; C. Stutte, ‘Who is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 4 February 2025. In recent years, however, the KIA has demonstrated increased capacity for conventional military operations, including the use of artillery and the capture of major military bases.28 C. Stutte, ‘Who is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 4 February 2025. This development suggests an evolution in military tactics akin to the type employed by conventional armies.29 ‘The Long War Pt. 4; The Kachin Independence Army (KIA)’, Military Matters, 30 November 2020.

The KIA has sufficient logistical capacity to meet the criteria of organization. For example, the group produces small arms as well as a range of modified AK47s and self-made landmines.30 ‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, 22 March 2025. The KIA has built up an arsenal of small arms, mortars, and light artillery captured during clashes with the military junta or procured on the black market.31 ‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024.

The KIA is described as well-equipped and well-supplied.32 ‘The Long War Pt. 4; The Kachin Independence Army (KIA)’, Military Matters, 30 November 2020. Its operations are funded from the profits of the group’s interests in jade mining,33 ‘The Kachin Independence Army: A Comprehensive Overview’, A Complicated War; M. Micheals, ‘Myanmar regime brings significant escalation to the doorstep of key opponent’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2023. as well as trade in timber and gold.34 ‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024; ‘The Kachin Independence Army: A Comprehensive Overview’, A Complicated War. The ‘taxation’ collected in territories under its control further contributes to financing military operations.35 ‘Dossier: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar’, Global Counter-Terrorism Institute, 7 September 2024; ‘The Kachin Independence Army: A Comprehensive Overview’, A Complicated War. In the past, the KIA has trained and armed other EAGs which adds to its income.36 ‘A Scalable Typology of People’s Defence Forces in Myanmar: Research Report’, Centre on Armed Groups, 22 March 2025.

The KIA has an official spokesperson, who acts as the spokesperson for the KIO as well, Colonel Naw Bu, allowing the EAG to speak with a unified voice.37 ‘KIA Expects Kachin State Conflicts to Escalate in 2025’, Burma News International, 3 January 2025. The KIA employs sophisticated media strategies to promote its cause and to maintain support in the Kachin population.38 C. Stutte, ‘Who is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 4 February 2025.

Clearly, the KIA is sufficiently organized to constitute an organized armed group under IHL.