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Non-international armed conflict between Myanmar and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)

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Non-international armed conflict between Myanmar and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)

By eugenie

Background

The KNLA is the military wing of the political movement, the Karen National Union (KNU).1 M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024. Formed in 1949, it is the oldest EAG in Myanmar.2 S. Loong, ‘The Karen National Union in Post-Coup Myanmar’, Stimson, 7 April 2022. Post-World War II, the situation reflected the fact that the Karen people had sided with British forces, whereas the Burmese had co-operated with Imperial Japan.3 M. H. Aung and D. I. Steinberg, ‘The British in Burma, 1885–1948’, Britannica. Since Myanmar’s independence from Britain, the KNLA has engaged in a conflict against the military junta. This NIAC between the KNLA and the Tatmadaw (and previous versions of the military junta) has lasted for more than seventy-five years.4 M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024.

The KNU’s objectives include ensuring the autonomy and self-determination of the Karen people through the establishment of a democratic Karen state.5 ‘About KNU’, Karen National Union. The KLNA describes its mission as being to serve as a self-defence force for the protection of the Karen people and the KNU.6 ‘Department of Defence’ Karen National Union. The KLNA believes that to be able successfully to act in self-defence it must defend against Tatmadaw aggression, aim to ban narcotics, provide village security, and provide security for humanitarian relief missions.7‘Department of Defence’ Karen National Union.

Intensity

KNLA brigades control their own territory in a relatively autonomous way under a central command.8 H. M. Kyed and M. Gravers, ‘Non-state armed groups in the Myanmar peace process: What are the future options?’, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2014. Stable territorial control confirms the KNLA has the capacity to oppose the Tatmadaw by its military operations and the territory to evade government control. The military tactics the KNLA employs include maintaining a defensive force and engaging in guerilla warfare and ambush tactics suited to the jungle environment.9 M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024; A. Nachemson, ‘How the Karen became crucial to Myanmar’s anti-coup resistance’, Al Jazeera, 6 May 2022. The junta, too, deploys special forces for special operations against the KNLA.10 M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024; S. Y. Naing, ‘‘Special Force’ Joins KNLA on High Alert’, The Irrawaddy, 19 October 2010.

Part of the KNLA strategy is to form alliances. As of 2023, the KNLA was associated with more than a dozen other insurgent groups; it is a part of the 4K Coalition which consists of the Karenni Army, the Karenni National People’s Liberation Front and the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force. Other allies are the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO), the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, the AA, the Bamar People’s Liberation Army, DKBA-5, the KIA, and the PDF.11 M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024. The KNLA/KNU openly allies with the NUG, which was founded on 31 January 2007 by Major-General Saw Htein Maung, the commander of the KNLA’s 7th Brigade.12 M. Hughey, ‘Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)’, Modern Insurgent, 11 June 2024.

Similarly, in the south-eastern Tanintharyi region, the KNLA and the KNDO, in collaboration with other resistance forces, captured the last remaining regime position at the Htee Khee base on 9 May 2025, which serves as the overland route from Thailand to the regional capital, Dawei. On 7 May 2025, regime bases along the Thai border came under attack from KNLA and KNDO forces in neighbouring Kayin State.13 ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group. On 6 and 10 June 2025, the KNLA and allied resistance forces gained further ground against the regime by capturing bases in Kyaukkyi township (Bago region) and Dawei township (Tanintharyi region). Additionally, the large Thay Baw Boe base in Kayin state was seized by the KNLA on 3 June 2025 following a ten-day offensive, with forty government troops reportedly killed.14 ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group.

Organization

The KNLA is a part of the sophisticated organizational structure of the KNU. The Karen Defence Department was formed in 1956 and comprises the KNLA and the KNDO, as well as militia and home guard units.15‘Department of Defence’ Karen National Union. The KNLA command structure is as follows: seven brigades and three battalion headquarters. Each brigade is divided into five battalions, each battalion consists of four companies, and each company has three platoons. A majority of the PDFs operating in Karen are under the KNLA umbrella. Each brigade has a joint coalition committee. In this case, where a PDF is a part of a KNLA brigade, the commander is from the KNLA, and the deputy is from the PDF.16 A. Nachemson, ‘How the Karen became crucial to Myanmar’s anti-coup resistance’, Al Jazeera, 6 May 2022. The KLNA has three central branches: the General Staff Office, an Adjutant General Office and a Quartermaster Office.17 ‘Department of Defence’ Karen National Union. The organizational structure of the KNLA corresponds to that of a modern military.

The KNLA/KNU’s organizational structure satisfies the requirement that it has the capacity to comply with IHL and enforce discipline amongst its fighters. The KNU’s declared core values, which include honesty and equality, further support discipline in all departments 18‘About KNU: Values’, Karen National Union. and are published on its website as an expression of humanitarian policy.19 ‘Policies’, Karen National Union.

In 2015, Geneva Call presented and explained the international norms pertaining to children affected by armed conflict and exposed sexual and gender-based violence and gender discrimination to nearly forty officers from the KNLA, from six of the seven KNU brigade areas, as well as from the associated KNDO and the Karen National Police Force. Geneva Call demonstrated how these norms are refined and appear in a condensed form in its Deeds of Commitment protecting children in armed conflict and prohibiting sexual violence and gender discrimination. These commitments were agreed to by the KNU in 2013.20 ‘Burma/Myanmar: 40 high-ranking officers from the Karen National Liberation Army are trained on child protection’, Geneva Call, 25 November 2015.

The proper functioning of the disciplinary system was evident when, in 2022, KNU suspended Nerdah Bo Mya, at the time the commander-in-chief of an armed force, for killing twenty-five civilians. It was explicitly stated that his suspension was the result of the accused contravening the Geneva Conventions.21 S. Loong, ‘Southeast Myanmar: a shared struggle for federal democracy’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 23 September 2022.

The KNU has an official website22 Karen National Union. on which it releases official statements,23 ‘Statements’, Karen National Union. hosts official documents such as ceasefire agreements,24 ‘Peace Process’, Karen National Union. and posts news related to the KNLA.25 ‘News’, Karen National Union.

Clearly, the KNLA is sufficiently organized to constitute an organized armed group under IHL.