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Non-international armed conflict between Myanmar and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)

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Non-international armed conflict between Myanmar and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)

By eugenie

Background

The TNLA was founded in January 2009.1 ‘Palaung State Liberation Front/ Ta’ang National Liberation Army – PSLF/TNLA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024; ‘Rising dragon: TNLA declares ‘victory’ in northern Shan’, Frontier Myanmar, 4 February 2022. It is the armed wing of the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF).2 C. Schutte, ‘Who is the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 5 February 2025. It has engaged in a NIAC with the Tatmadaw since at least 2011.3 ‘Sixty-one Years of Ta’ang Revolution’, PeaceRep, 12 January 2024.

The ideology of the TNLA is to establish a Ta’ang state that includes all of Namhsan and Mantong townships, and parts of Namhkam, Mongyai, Tangyan, Kyaukme, Hsipaw, Lashio, and Namtu townships in northern Shan state, as well as Mogok township in the northern Mandalay region.4 ‘Rising dragon: TNLA declares ‘victory’ in northern Shan’, Frontier Myanmar, 4 February 2022. Other EAGs, including the KIO and the UWSA, supported the evolution of the TNLA by training its fighters and providing it with weapons. The TNLA has capitalized on the aftermath of the 2021 coup, strengthening its control over territory in northern Shan state and becoming one of the most powerful EAGs in Myanmar.5 ‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023.

In the direct aftermath of the coup, the TNLA infrequently engaged the military junta and on occasion covertly supported anti-junta forces in a bid to achieve its long-term goal, which is autonomy. It already functions as a quasi-state.6 ‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023. The TNLA joined the 3BHA and played a significant role in Operation 1027. This successful alliance enabled the TNLA to gain control over fifteen of seventeen townships in its operational area.7 C. Schutte, ‘Who is the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)?’, Geopolitical Report, 5 February 2025.

Intensity

Fighting between the Tatmadaw and the TNLA is frequent and intense.8 Z. Abuza, ‘Tiny ethnic Ta’ang army is a bellwether for opposition fight against Myanmar junta’, Radio Free Asia, 29 August 2023. At the time of reporting, the most recent attacks have been an aerial bombardment by the Tatmadaw against the TNLA on 3 May 2025 after the collapse of ceasefire negotiations.9 ‘Myanmar Junta Bombs TNLA Territory After Peace Talks Fail’, The Irrawaddy, 3 May 2025. The Tatmadaw often employs aerial assaults, including drone attacks, against the TNLA. 10‘Myanmar junta continues attacks in northern Shan State despite ceasefire’, Myanmar Now, 23 April 2025; M. Pan, ‘Military attacks ethnic Ta’ang armed group’s base in northern Shan State using aircraft and drones’, Myanmar Now, 25 September 2023. These aerial assaults consistently cause casualties among both TNLA fighters and civilians,11 Z. Abuza, ‘Tiny ethnic Ta’ang army is a bellwether for opposition fight against Myanmar junta’, Radio Free Asia, 29 August 2023; ‘Junta’s Drones an Airstrikes Inflict Casualties on TNLA Fighters and Civilians Northern Shan State’, Burma News International, 21 June 2024. and inflict significant destruction on property, including civilian homes.12 ‘Myanmar Junta Airstrikes Kill 20 in TNLA Territory’, The Irrawaddy, 13 November 2024; ‘Ta’ang National Liberation Army claims 5 killed by airstrikes; Myanmar experts support Argentina arrest warrants’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 24 February 2025. Aerial assaults also contribute to an already significant number of internally displaced persons.13 N. Swe, ‘Myanmar army drops massive aerial bombs during northern Shan State clashes, TNLA says’, Myanmar Now, 13 December 2022.

Successful attacks against the Tatmadaw by the 3BHA, of which the TNLA is a member, have resulted in mass casualties on the side of the Tatmadaw.14 T. M. Thet and T. Kyaw, ‘Civilian casualties high in Kyaukme by TNLA’s military assaults’, NP News, 8 July 2024; ‘Inside ‘Operation 1027’, the anti-junta offensive in Myanmar’, Firstpost, 15 December 2023. On various occasions the TNLA seized military-grade weaponry following successful assaults.15 I. Naing, ‘Myanmar resistance captures strategic town near Mandalay’, Voice of America, 12 July 2024. Weaponry in its arsenal includes man-portable air defence systems,16 A. Davis, ‘China’s mobile missiles on the loose in Myanmar’, Asia Times, 28 November 2019. other anti-aircraft weapons, radar systems, RPGs, and various types of landmines.17 ‘TNLA Seizes Anti-Aircraft Weapons in Battle at Nawnghkio’, Independent Mon News Agency, 11 July 2024.

The intensity of fighting between the TNLA and the Tatmadaw is of such a nature that the TNLA continues to control several territories in the Shan state.18 ‘Territories Under PSLF/TNLA Control’, ISP Myanmar, 22 March 2024. However, the military advanced in Shan state (North) against the TNLA in mid-2025, approaching the strategic town of Nawnghkio on the Mandalay-Muse Highway, which the TNLA had captured in July 2024. In the intense fighting to the south and west of the town, the military achieved gradual but steady progress by combining drones, artillery and air strikes with ground troops.19 ‘Asia-Pacific: Myanmar’, International Crisis Group. The nature of the fighting reached such a level of intensity during the first quarter of 2025 that China unsuccessfully tried to broker a ceasefire between the TNLA and the military junta.20 ‘Myanmar Junta Bombs TNLA Territory After Peace Talks Fail’, The Irrawaddy, 3 May 2025.

Clearly, the ferocity of the fighting between the TNLA and Tatmadaw is sufficiently intense to equate to protracted armed violence.

Organization

The TNLA and its political wing, the PSLF, at the time of reporting, are headed by the Chairman, General Tar Aik Phone (aka Tar Aik Bong).21 ‘What is Myanmar’s Three Brotherhood Alliance that’s resisting the military?’, Al Jazeera, 16 January 2024. As the organization’s armed wing, the TNLA is officially part of the PSLF’s defence department.22 ‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023. The TNLA command is structured to include various high-ranking officers, including two vice-command chairs, a General Secretary major-general,23 ‘Palaung State Liberation Front/ Ta’ang National Liberation Army – PSLF/TNLA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024; ‘An Upturn of Ta’ang’s Non-Royal Leadership (Ngattapa Min)’, ISP Myanmar, 21 March 2024. a commander-in-chief major-general,24 ‘Rising dragon: TNLA declares ‘victory’ in northern Shan’, Frontier Myanmar, 4 February 2022. and a deputy commander-in-chief head of the Central General Administration Department (with the rank of brigadier-general).25 ‘TNLA says it will make a revolutionary government emerge in 2025’, Channel News Independent, 27 August 2024. The TNLA are well-trained and provide training services to other organized armed groups.26 See ‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023. Clearly, owing to a sophisticated command structure and the existence of training centres, the TNLA is capable of implementing IHL.

The TNLA’s command includes a Central Executive Committee and a Central Committee.27 ‘An Upturn of Ta’ang’s Non-Royal Leadership (Ngattapa Min)’, ISP Myanmar, 21 March 2024. It is estimated the TNLA has between 5,000 and 10,000 fighters,28 ‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023; A. Graceffo, ‘Backgrounder: Ethnic Armies in Myanmar Civil War’, Geopolitical Monitor, 27 February 2024; ‘What is Myanmar’s Three Brotherhood Alliance that’s resisting the military?’, Al Jazeera, 16 January 2024. which are divided into seven brigades and more than thirty battalions.29 ‘Rising dragon: TNLA declares ‘victory’ in northern Shan’, Frontier Myanmar, 4 February 2022. In 2018, the TNLA established a police force30 ‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023. as well as a legal department that acts as a judiciary.31 ‘Rising dragon: TNLA declares ‘victory’ in northern Shan’, Frontier Myanmar, 4 February 2022. Thus, the TNLA is in a position to discipline its fighters.

The TNLA’s military success and the stable control over territory confirms a capacity to engage in military tactics. At the time of reporting, the TNLA exercises active control over Kutkai, Kyaukme, Mongton, Namkham, Namhsan, Namtu, Naungcho, and Thibaw, Muse and Mongmit in northern Shan state and Mogok in Mandalay region.32 ‘Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta’ang National Liberation Army – PSLF/TNLA’, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 9 September 2024. The TNLA employs guerilla-style operations as a part of its military tactics.33 ‘Myanmar Junta Seizes Key Village Near TNLA Stronghold in Northern Shan’, The Irrawaddy, 27 March 2025. Another feature of the TNLA’s military tactics is to co-operate in and co-ordinate alliances. It is a member of the United Nationalities Federal Council, the 3BHA, the Northern Alliance, and the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee. The TNLA governs the Pa Laung Self-Administered Zone located in northern Shan state, which was established under the 2008 constitution to meet the territorial demands of the Palaung/Ta’ang ethnic group.34 ‘Understanding Inter-ethnic Conflict in Myanmar’, Reliefweb, 28 September 2018; A. Graceffo, ‘Backgrounder: Ethnic Armies in Myanmar Civil War’, Geopolitical Monitor, 27 February 2024.

The TNLA financially benefits from exploiting ruby mines located in Mogoke in the Mandalay Region which is under its control,35 ‘Ta’ang rebels renew vow to crush Myanmar’s junta despite earlier ceasefire offer’, Radio Free Asia, 13 January 2025. as well as from its training activities.36 ‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023. These lucrative financial streams enhance its logistical capacity. The TNLA has sufficient command of logistics not only to train other resistance groups but also to equip and to arm such groups. As the TNLA controls several towns,37 H. H. Zan, ‘Ta’ang Rebels Start Talks With Myanmar Junta in China’, The Irrawaddy, 17 February 2025. its territory is often used to move weapons and other supplies.38 ‘Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State’, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2023.

Lastly, the TNLA has a spokeswoman, Lway Yay Oo, and thus the group speaks with one voice.39 S. Naing, ‘Myanmar rebel army ready for dialogue with junta, with China’s help’, Reuters, 26 November 2024; ‘Myanmar Junta Seizes Key Village Near TNLA Stronghold in Northern Shan’, The Irrawaddy, 27 March 2025.

Clearly, the TNLA is sufficiently organized to constitute an organized armed group under IHL.