Afghanistan

The following armed conflicts are taking place on the terrSeveral non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) are ongoing in the territory of Afghanistan.

A NIAC between the Taliban and the National Resistance Front (NRF)
A NIAC between the Taliban and the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF)
A NIAC between the Taliban and Islamic State – Khorasan Province (IS-K)

Although Afghanistan is a party to Additional Protocol II of 1977, none of the NIACs taking place in Afghanistan reached the threshold of application of Article 1(1), because none of the armed groups exercised territorial control of a nature to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement the Protocol. Relevant provisions of Additional Protocol II of 1977 remain applicable to ‘all the persons who have been deprived of their liberty or whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related to the armed conflict’ that opposed the Taliban and the security forces of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan before the takeover of Kabul, as well as ‘those deprived of their liberty or whose liberty is restricted after the conflict for the same reasons’.¹

Other non-state armed groups were also reportedly active on Afghan territory, committing sporadic acts of violence against the authorities. Publicly available information indicates that their violent acts did not cross the threshold of intensity of violence to qualify as armed conflicts.

In addition to this, a low-intensity international armed conflict persisted between Afghanistan and Pakistan throughout the reporting period.

First Afghan Civil War (1978-1992)

Since the late 1970s, Afghanistan has been almost constantly embroiled in armed conflict. The first Afghan Civil War erupted in 1978 between the Afghan communist government established in the wake of the overthrow of President Mohammad Daud Khan and Islamist anti-communist forces, also known as the mujahideen. From 1979, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics intervened in the conflict and invaded Afghanistan. The mujahideen received support, in particular in the form of arms deliveries, from the United States of America, most notably Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.² On the occasion of peace talks held in Geneva in April 1988, the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its armed forces from the territory of Afghanistan.³ The Soviet withdrawal was completed in February 1989. The conflict eventually ended in April 1992, with the resignation of President Najibullah followed by the transfer of power to the mujahideen, which had been joined by dissident Afghan armed forces.⁴

Second and Third Afghan Civil Wars (1992–96 and 1996–2001)

The Second Afghan Civil War broke out in August 1992 due to the incapacity of mujahideen factions to comply with a power-sharing agreement concluded in Peshawar on 26 April 1992.⁵ In 1994, the Taliban, a jihadist militia led by former mujahideen Mohammad Omar, emerged as a potent force and rapidly asserted control over vast sections of Afghanistan’s territory. The ascent of the Taliban culminated on 27 September 1996 with the takeover of Kabul which put an end to the Second Afghan Civil War. The Taliban soon renamed Afghanistan as the ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’.⁶

Hostilities continued, however, as the Taliban was opposed by a loose coalition of mujahideen forces and former officials of the interim government under the banner of the Northern Alliance, officially known as the United National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, which retained control over some parts of northern Afghanistan, including the Panjshir Valley. The Northern Alliance was led by former mujahideen commander and Minister of Defence Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was subsequently assassinated by the Taliban on 9 September 2001.⁷

Afghanistan War (2001-2021)

The Taliban regime had close relations with and provided a haven to Al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden, including after the terror attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001. The following month, after the Taliban regime had failed to meet US requests for cooperation in the fight against Al-Qaeda, including the handing over of bin Laden, the United States and the United Kingdom invaded. With the support provided to the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban Pashtun groups, the Taliban government had fallen by December 2001.⁸ A transitional government headed by Hamid Karzai was established under the Bonn Agreement.9. Afghan interim and transitional administrations were replaced in 2004 with the creation of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Presidential elections were held on 9 October 2004, resulting in the election of Hamid Karzai.¹⁰ In the 2009 elections, President Karzai was re-elected for a second five-year mandate, running until 2014.

The United States and other contributing States retained a military presence in Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan authorities, to fight the Taliban insurgents alongside Afghan security forces, including in the framework of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), under a UN Security Council mandate.¹¹ The conflict continued for many years with varying degrees of intensity. Afghanistan became a State Party to Additional Protocol II of 1977 in December 2009, and from its entry into force, it applied to the non-international armed conflict between the government and the Taliban insurgents on account of the territorial control the latter exercised over some regions of Afghanistan.¹².

ISAF ended its mission at the end of 2014, as the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) assumed full responsibility for security in Afghanistan.¹³ Foreign troops did, however, remain in Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan government, in the framework of NATO’s Resolute Support Mission.¹⁴

Highly contested presidential elections in 2014 led to the election of Ashraf Ghani.15. In 2016, the Taliban launched major attacks on important cities, such as the regional capitals of Helmand and Kunduz.¹⁶ Armed confrontations intensified in 2018. On 14 February 2018, following a particularly intense wave of violence between the Taliban and government forces, the Taliban expressed their intention to negotiate with the government. On 28 February 2018, President Ghani said he was ready to start peace talks, keeping open the possibility of recognizing the Taliban as a legitimate political party and granting amnesty to its fighters. In March 2018, Taliban media dismissed the offer and requested direct talks with the United States.¹⁷ In April 2018, the intensity of violence sharply increased, with the Taliban attempting to move closer to provincial capitals, Ghazni and Sar-e Pul.¹⁸

On 21–28 January 2019, the United States and the Taliban held bilateral talks in Doha, which revolved around the US and NATO troops’ withdrawal, counter-terrorism measures, and a ceasefire.¹⁹ In February 2020, President Ghani was re-elected for a second term.²⁰ A comprehensive peace agreement was concluded between the Taliban and the United States on 29 February 2020. The Agreement provided a timeline for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan in exchange for guarantees that the territory of Afghanistan ‘will not be used against the security of the United States and its allies’ and a commitment of the Taliban to negotiate a permanent ceasefire in the context of an intra-Afghan dialogue.²¹ In another agreement concluded the same day with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the United States agreed to a phased withdrawal of its military forces from Afghanistan – a process planned to be completed by the end of May 2021.²²

Peace talks between representatives of the Taliban and the Afghan government, which began on 12 September 2020 in Doha and continued in the following months, failed to reach an agreement on an end to the fighting. Instead, hostilities continued to escalate, resulting in the further seizure of territory by the Taliban.²³. While the May 2021 deadline for a complete withdrawal was not met, the withdrawal of US troops started on 1 May 2021. On 14 April 2021, newly elected US President Joseph Biden announced his intention to withdraw all US troops from Afghanistan by 11 September 2021.²⁴

On 4 May 2021, as soon as US troops started leaving the country, the Taliban launched a major offensive in Helmand and six other provinces. On 2 July 2021, US forces left Bagram airbase, their most important military presence in the country, and handed it over to the ANDSF. By 21 July 2021, the Taliban controlled half of Afghanistan’s provinces.²⁵ In August 2021, the Taliban continued their rapid advance: Afghan provinces fell one by one, until the armed group reached Kabul on 16 August. President Ghani fled the country, and a few hours later, the Taliban entered the Presidential palace. The former government of President Ghani effectively ceased to exist,²⁶. subsequently bringing to an end the NIAC between the Taliban and the Afghan authorities. Moreover, the complete withdrawal of US troops put an end to the long-standing NIAC between the United States and the Taliban.

Taliban Rule and the Emergence of Resistance Movements

On 17 August 2021, a Taliban spokesperson held the first press conference, where he affirmed that they ‘don’t want any internal or external enemies’ and that they ‘wished for peaceful relations with other countries’.²⁷ On 7 September 2021, the Taliban announced the formation of an interim government in Afghanistan, led by Mohammad Hasan Akhund. The Taliban restored the country’s name to the ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’.²⁸

The assertion of authority over the territory of Afghanistan and the repressive policies of the Taliban authorities left little room for the expression of political opposition. Opposition movements in exile were also reportedly fragmented.²⁹ Two groups distinguished themselves through their armed resistance to the Taliban regime: the National Resistance Front (NRF) and the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF). Both movements seek to topple the Taliban and reinstate democratic authorities in Afghanistan.

The NRF was launched as a political movement in 2019 by Ahmad Massoud, the son of the prominent anti-Soviet (later anti-Taliban) leader of the Northern Alliance, Ahmad Shah Massoud. The movement is based on elements of the Northern Alliance, incorporating some of its former guerrilla commanders of various ethnic origins.³⁰ Their forces consist of local militias from the Panjshir Valley, newly recruited people, and former members of the Afghan armed forces,³¹. although the NRF’s Head of Foreign Relations, Ali Maisam Nazary, has claimed that the NRF is mainly ‘composed of former Afghan security forces, trained by US and international forces over the past 20 years to combat terrorism’.³² It was reported in 2021 that the force had several thousand fighters.33. The NRF aims for an inclusive government in Afghanistan, an objective endorsed by the National Resistance Council for the Salvation of Afghanistan, a political umbrella for several organizations opposing the Taliban regime.³⁴

After the takeover of Kabul by the Taliban in August 2021, the NRF briefly retained control over the Panjshir Valley until Autumn 2021, when the group was expelled by Taliban forces.³⁵ The Taliban were reportedly assisted by Al-Qaeda fighters on this occasion.³⁶ Massoud was said to have escaped to neighbouring Tajikistan, where he was joined by former vice-president and head of intelligence services Amrullah Saleh.³⁷ Since then, the NRF has been conducting attacks against Taliban forces across Afghanistan, although without ever seriously challenging their territorial control.

The Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) was founded in the aftermath of the 2021 fall of Kabul and is led by General Yasin Zia, a former Chief of Staff of the ANDSF, deputy minister of defence, and governor of Takhar province. It is mainly composed of former members of the ANDSF.³⁸ The AFF aims to overthrow the Taliban regime and restore Afghanistan’s sovereignty ‘to the people’.³⁹ AFF fighters have regularly been engaged in fighting against Taliban forces.⁴⁰ However, they have also failed to assert their territorial control over any region of Afghanistan.

The Taliban continue to have particularly tense relations with Pakistan, due to the presence of the TTP in the border areas populated by the Pashtuns. On various occasions, the longstanding NIAC opposing Pakistani authorities and the TTP spilt over into Afghanistan’s territory. The TTP was formed in 2007, to ‘overthrow […] the elected government of Pakistan in order to establish an emirate based on its interpretation of Islamic law’.⁵⁸ The TTP has long entertained close links with the Afghan Taliban, who share a similar ideology. In 2014, it was reported that splinter groups of the Pakistan Taliban joined ranks with the Afghan Taliban and used Pakistani territory as a safe haven from which to participate in the NIAC in Afghanistan.⁵⁹

More recently, the TTP reportedly conducted operations within Pakistan from its bases inside Afghanistan. In October 2021, border skirmishes took place between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Tensions between the two nations persisted over the following years, as TTP renewed its attacks in Pakistan from their bases in the border region of Afghanistan in both 2022 and 2023.⁶⁰ On 16 April 2022, Pakistan launched an airstrike against Afghanistan, which resulted in civilian casualties in Kunar and Khost provinces.⁶¹ Furthermore, Pakistani and Afghan troops clashed across the border on 8 and 22 August 2022,⁶² and several times in November 2022.⁶³

Armed Clashes with Iran and the Water Crisis as a Cause of Regional Tensions

Another cause of tensions is the scarcity of water resources in the region and the management of transboundary watercourses by Afghan authorities. Tensions arose with Iran over the diversion of water from the Helmand River in connection with the completion and inauguration of the Kamal Khan Dam in early 2021. On repeated occasions, Afghan and Iranian border guards became engaged in armed confrontations.⁶⁴ A deadly armed clash took place at the Sasoli border checkpoint on 27 May 2023.⁶⁵

Similarly, the construction by the Taliban regime of a large canal fed by the Amu Darya River in northern Afghanistan for the purpose of irrigating an arid region is a cause of tensions with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan – two States that are already facing water shortages due to the aridity of the climate, compounded by the effects of climate change. These States are concerned that the completion of work and the resulting diversion of water from the Amu Darya River could result in a substantive diminution of water flow downstream.⁶⁶

For the whole reporting period, the level of armed violence and civilian casualties remained relatively low compared with earlier phases of the conflict in Afghanistan.⁶⁷ This was related to the fact that the Taliban regime reportedly ‘strengthened its control as de facto authorities in Afghanistan’.⁶⁸ The UN Secretary-General repeatedly reported that ‘neither ISIL-K nor the opposition groups seriously threatened the Taliban’s hold on power and territory.’⁶⁹

With the exception of a border incident on 30 October 2023, in Kang district, Nimroz province, ‘reportedly between de facto security forces and Iranian border forces’ which resulted in the death of one civilian and two de facto officers,⁷⁰ tensions with neighbouring Iran somewhat eased until the very end of the reporting period, when expulsions of Afghan refugees from Iran added to existing tensions.⁷¹ A preliminary agreement was reportedly reached on water sharing of the Helmand River in August 2023.⁷² No other armed clashes between Iranian and Afghan security forces were documented during the reporting period.

However, the Taliban authorities had to face various security threats, due to continuing operations from armed opposition groups and because of armed clashes with Pakistan.

It is first necessary to clarify the legal status of the Taliban regime for the purposes of the application of IHL. Some of the policies of the so-called ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ are highly controversial, especially concerning the rights of women and girls. At the time of writing, the policy pursued by most States is to refuse to formally recognize the Taliban as the de jure government of Afghanistan until significant progress is made in protecting human rights, particularly the rights of women and girls.⁷³

While some States have informally engaged with the Afghan Taliban and, in some cases even arguably implicitly recognized the Taliban authorities through the reciprocal appointments of ambassadors,⁷⁴ only the Russian Federation appears to have explicitly recognized them as the de jure government of Afghanistan.⁷⁵ The Afghan Taliban have also not been authorized to represent Afghanistan in the UN General Assembly.⁷⁶

Under general international law, the State is effectively represented by the authority that is in effective control of the national territory and national institutions. As the ICRC has written in its commentary on Article 2 of Geneva Convention III: ‘Under international law, the key condition for the existence of a government is its effectiveness, that is, its ability to exercise effectively functions usually assigned to a government within the confines of a State’s territory.’⁷⁷ This is so, irrespective of international recognition of that government. ⁷⁸

With respect to IHL, as the ICRC states: ‘The very fact that the said government is effective and in control of most of the territory of the State concerned means that it is the de facto government and its actions have to be treated as the actions of the State it represents with all the consequences this entails for determining the existence of an international armed conflict.’⁷⁹

Thus, even though the Taliban have not been widely recognized as the de jure government of Afghanistan, the control that they have apparently asserted over the entirety of the territory of Afghanistan suffices to qualify them as the de facto government of Afghanistan for purposes of the application of IHL.⁸⁰

International armed conflict with Pakistan

According to the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), an international armed conflict ‘exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States’.¹ Armed clashes between de facto Afghan security forces and Pakistani forces amount to an IAC. In addition to this, Pakistani attacks against TTP fighters or hideouts in Afghan territory took place without the consent of the de facto Afghan authorities. As a result, they may also as such have triggered an IAC between Afghanistan and Pakistan.² There is thus an ongoing IAC between Afghanistan and Pakistan due to both direct armed confrontations between the security forces of both States and the use of armed force by Pakistan in Afghanistan without the consent of the de facto government. The frequent repetition of such incidents and the repeated movements of troops on both sides of the border indicate that this IAC is ongoing on a continuous basis rather than composed of multiple ‘instant’ armed conflicts separated by peaceful intervals. To this day, there is indeed no prospect of a ‘general close of military operations’ that would bring the conflict to an end, according to Article 6(2) Geneva Convention IV.³

1
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) IT-94-1-A, A Ch (2 October 1995), para 70.
2
See eg ICRC (ed), Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention: Treatment of Prisoners of War, Vol 1, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2021, para 294.
3
ICRC (ed), Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Cambridge University Press, 2016, para 277.

Non-international armed conflict between the Taliban and the Islamic State – Khorasan Province (IS-KP)

To the best of our knowledge, no international actor has recently adopted a clear and firm view on the classification of the violence opposing IS-K to the Taliban under IHL. However, both the UN Secretary-General and the UN Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict have continued to include IS-K among the ‘parties’ involved in violations against children in armed conflict, thus indicating that they consider that IS-K is bound by IHL, which presupposes that the group is involved in a NIAC.¹ Moreover, as in the case of the conflict opposing resistance groups to the Taliban authorities, the EUAA concluded that there is an ‘internal armed conflict’ between the de facto government and IS-K.²

Very limited information is available on the organization of IS-K due to the secretive nature of the group and its activities. It may be inferred from the group’s continuing ability to conduct high-profile operations in Afghanistan – albeit at a more reduced frequency than in earlier periods – and, especially, abroad – as exemplified by the 2024 attacks in Russia and Iran – that it functions based on a tightly coordinated structure. Attacks by IS-K also permit the inference that the group can procure weapons. Numerous reports also attest to its ability to recruit new personnel (in addition to a substantive number of fighters) and to cooperate with other ‘provinces’ of the Islamic State, which seems to indicate that the group has the ability to speak with one voice.³

Turning to the criterion of intensity, there is no denying that IS-K attacks have decreased in number during the reporting period. However, attacks continue to happen and, in some cases, have resulted in substantial human casualties among the members of the Taliban authorities. IS-K is still considered an important security threat to the de facto government. It would therefore appear premature to conclude that there has been a lasting absence of armed confrontations without real risk of resumption. It thus may be concluded that IS-K remains involved in a NIAC with the de facto authorities, which is a continuation of the NIAC with the Taliban that pre-existed the takeover of Kabul, in August 2021. On account of the lack of territorial control exercised by IS-K, Additional Protocol II of 1977 is not applicable to this NIAC.

Non-International Armed Conflict between the Taliban Government and the National Resistance Front (NRF)

To the best of our knowledge, no international actor has recently adopted a clear and firm view on the classification of the violence opposing the NRF and the AFF to the Taliban authorities under IHL. However, both the UN Secretary-General and the UN Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict have included the NRF among the ‘parties’ involved in violations against children in armed conflict. This fact seems to indicate that these organs consider that this armed group is bound by IHL, a fact that itself presupposes that the group is currently involved in a NIAC with the Taliban authorities.¹ The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has indicated that it was continuing to monitor the situation but had refrained from taking a ‘final view’ on the issue.²

Notably, the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) reached the conclusion that an ‘internal armed conflict’ is taking place in Afghanistan ‘between the Taliban de facto government and resistance groups, including the NRF and AFF’ for the purpose of assessing whether individual persons may benefit from subsidiary protection under relevant EU law.³

However, the assessment of the EUAA is based on the application of the notion of ‘internal armed conflict’ enshrined in Article 15(c) of the European Union’s Qualification Directive (QD), which does not use the same criteria as those required by IHL. The assessment of the EUAA cannot, therefore, be equated with a classification of the situation as a NIAC for the purposes of the application of IHL .

Two criteria need to be assessed in order to answer the question of whether a situation of armed violence amounts to a non-international armed conflict:

First, the level of armed violence must reach a certain degree of intensity that goes beyond internal disturbances and tensions.
Second, in every non-international armed conflict, at least one side in the conflict must be a non-state armed group that exhibits a certain level of organization in order to qualify as a party to the non-international armed conflict. Government forces are presumed to satisfy the criteria of organization.

International jurisprudence and the ICRC have identified a number of indicative factors of an armed groups’ organization, including ‘the existence of a command structure and disciplinary rules; the existence of a headquarters; the fact that the group controls a certain territory; the ability of the group to gain access to weapons or other military equipment, recruits and military training; the group’s ability to establish a unified military strategy and use military tactics; the group’s ability to plan, coordinate and carry out military operations, including troop movements and logistics; the group’s ability to speak with one voice and negotiate and conclude agreements such as ceasefires or peace accords’.⁴ It is not necessary to demonstrate that all indicative factors are present. A Chamber of the ICC has stressed that the assessment must be conducted in a ‘holistic manner’, taking into account all the facts established on credible evidence.⁵

Concerning the criterion of organization, the NRF claims to have a strength of more than 5,000 fighters.⁶ Although this claim has not been verified, the nature and frequency of verified attacks indicate that the number of fighters belonging to the NRF is substantial, a fact that tends to indicate that the group has the ability to recruit and equip them. These facts also indicate that the group has the ability to move troops and to plan military operations, albeit on a relatively small scale. It also appears that the NRF has an organized command structure with two leadership figures: Amrullah Saleh and Ahmad Massoud. Within this structure, specific functions are assigned to various individuals, going from spokespersons to the head of foreign relations (currently, this position is in the hands of Ali Maisam Nazary) and multiple military commanders.⁷ This hierarchical structure enables the NRF to speak with one voice, which is also reflected in its communication style. Through social media accounts on X (formerly Twitter), the NRF regularly disseminates statements aimed at their members and also tries to rally the international community behind them. This is also reflected by the group’s capacity to enter into negotiations and conclude agreements.⁸ At some point in the conflict, Russia had expressed its willingness to act as a mediator between the NRF and the Taliban.⁹

Although more limited information is available on the AFF, similar inferences may also reasonably be made as to the capacity of the group to recruit and train fighting personnel, to provide them with weapons, and to plan and carry out coordinated military operations. It also appears that the AFF has an organized command structure, under the leadership of General Yasin Zia. The fact that it is mainly composed of former ANDSF members and its stated intention to comply with IHL also tend to indicate that the AFF functions with a hierarchical structure. The AFF’s manifesto thus includes, among the AFF’s principles, a ‘[c]ommitment to the full observance of international humanitarian law, especially the four Geneva Conventions, during military operations and armed struggle to overthrow the autocratic and oppressive Taliban Emirate.’¹⁰ It also appears that the AFF has the ability to speak with one voice, either on its website or through its leader.¹¹

Based on available evidence, it may thus be concluded that even though not all the indicative factors identified in the jurisprudence are present, especially in light of the absence of territorial control by the NRF or the AFF, both the NRF and the AFF fulfil the requirement of a certain level of organization.

Various indicative factors are used to assess whether a given situation has met the required intensity threshold, such as, for instance, the number, duration and intensity of individual confrontations; the types of weapons and military equipment used; the number of persons and types of forces participating in the fighting; the number of casualties; the extent of material destruction; the number of civilians fleeing and the involvement of the UN Security Council.¹²

In light of the announced decision of the NRF and AFF to coordinate their efforts in the fight against the de facto authorities, an argument could also be made that the criterion of intensity may be assessed by aggregating the acts attributable to both groups, following an approach suggested by the ICRC. Based on available information, it is, however, unclear whether any of the factual indicators formulated by the ICRC – such as ‘the establishment of a coordination structure, the sharing of operational tasks, the existence of common standard operating procedures and/or rules of engagement, the coordination of simultaneous attacks against the opposing party and the conduct of joint military operations’ – are met in the present case.¹³

The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor noted that ‘fighting continued after 15 August 2021 in some regions, including by the National Resistance Front in the Panjshir valley, and in the context of sporadic attacks against the Taliban in locations such as Kabul, Kandahar, and Helmand, attributed to the Afghanistan Freedom Front’. It also recalled that ‘interruptions or fluctuations in the intensity of the hostilities, or changes in the configuration of the parties involved, do not necessarily imply the termination of a conflict’ and that what is rather required is ‘is a “peaceful settlement”, such as the complete victory of a party to the conflict, or a “lasting absence of armed confrontations” between the parties “without real risk of resumption”’.¹⁴ The Geneva Academy agrees with this position on the classification of an ongoing situation previously classified as an NIAC.¹⁵

Despite their relatively limited scale, attacks by the NRF and AFF have remained a constant threat throughout the reporting period for the Taliban authorities. Heavy weaponry, including rockets, was used in some cases. Hostilities have entailed substantial material damages, and human losses, both in terms of civilians and members of the Taliban’s security forces. Although the operations themselves are generally characterized by their brevity – often taking the form of hit-and-run attacks – both the NRF and the AFF have demonstrated their ability to repeat such operations with frequency over a protracted period. It therefore appears that the criterion of intensity is fulfilled both in the case of the NRF and the AFF, taken individually. This would, of course, apply a fortiori if the intensity of their military operations were aggregated. On account of the lack of territorial control exercised by these groups, Additional Protocol II of 1977 does not apply to the NIAC.

Given the limited number of confirmed attacks of other claimed resistance groups and the dearth of information as to their identity and organization, the Geneva Academy considers that none of the other groups mentioned above can be considered parties to a NIAC against the de facto authorities.

To the best of our knowledge, the exact modalities of the cooperation between armed groups such as Al-Qaeda or the Tajik Taliban, and the Afghan Taliban authorities, in the context of the fight against the NRF and AFF are not clearly established. There is no evidence that the relevant armed groups or their members have been formally incorporated into the Taliban’s armed forces or empowered by law to conduct hostilities on their behalf. It seems, however, that such armed groups operated under the command of the Taliban or on instructions from the latter. It appears that Al-Qaeda in particular is heavily reliant on the support of the Taliban to ensure its safety. For instance, a UN report described the relationships with the Taliban as ‘close and symbiotic’.¹⁶

According to the ICRC, ‘[a]rmed groups that are otherwise under a command responsible to a state form part of the state’s irregular armed forces, for the purposes of classification.’¹⁷. Considering available information, and because nothing indicates that groups such as Al-Qaeda or the Tajik Taliban have engaged the NRF or AFF autonomously, it thus appears that these groups cannot be considered as parties to separate NIACs opposing the NRF and/or the AFF.

Non-International Armed Conflict between the Taliban Government and the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF)

Two criteria need to be assessed in order to answer the question of whether a situation of armed violence amounts to a non-international armed conflict:

First, the level of armed violence must reach a certain degree of intensity that goes beyond internal disturbances and tensions.
Second, in every non-international armed conflict, at least one side in the conflict must be a non-state armed group that exhibits a certain level of organization in order to qualify as a party to the non-international armed conflict. Government forces are presumed to satisfy the criteria of organization.

State Parties

Afghanistan
Pakistan

Non-State parties

Islamic State – Khorasan Province (IS-K)
National Resistance Front (NRF)
Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF)

Other Resistance Movements

Afghanistan Liberation Movement
People’s Sovereignty Front
Freedom or Death Front, created on 4 December 2023 and later renamed the Martyrdom or Freedom Front
National Mobilization Front
Afghanistan National Guard Front
National Battle Front
Afghanistan United Front

Foreign involvement

Non-exhaustive list of transnational armed groups with a presence in Afghanistan:

Al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda in South Asia (AQIS)
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, also known as the Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIM/TIP)
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Jamaat Ansarullah (JA), also known as Tehrik-e-Taliban Tajikistan or Tajik Taliban
Khatiba Imam al-Bukhari (KIB)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

1
Article 2(2) Additional Protocol II of 1977.
2
‘Afghan War’, Encyclopedia Britannica (last updated 30 August 2025); J.K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America, and International Terrorism, 3^rd ed, London, Pluto Press, 2002, p 144.
3
Letter dated 22 April 1988 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/19835, 26 April 1988, Annex I: Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan, Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan, paras 5-6.
4
‘Afghan War’, Encyclopedia Britannica (last updated 30 August 2025; J. Murphy, ‘Afghanistan: Hard Choices and the Future of International Law’, International Law Studies, Vol 85 (2009), 81; ‘The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/47/705–S/24831, 27 November 1992, paras 13–22.
5
‘The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/47/705–S/24831, 27 November 1992, paras 23–28.
6
‘Afghan War’, Encyclopedia Britannica (last updated 30 August 2025); ‘The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/51/698–S/1996/988, 26 November 1996, paras 5–22.
7
‘Afghan War’, Encyclopedia Britannica (last updated 30 August 2025); ‘The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/56/681–S/2001/1157, 6 December 2001, para 34.
8
‘Afghanistan War’, Encyclopedia Britannica (last updated 25 August 2025); The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/56/681–S/2001/1157, 6 December 2001, paras 35-41.
9
Letter dated 5 December 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2001/1154, 5 December 2001, Annex
10
‘Afghanistan War’, Encyclopedia Britannica (last updated 25 August 2025).
11
See, for the initial authorization of ISAF, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001), UN Doc S/RES/1386 (2001) 20 December 2001, para 1; see also Y. Arai-Takahashi, ‘Disentangling legal quagmires: the legal characterisation of the armed conflicts in Afghanistan since 6/7 October 2001 and the question of prisoner of war status’, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Vol 5 (2002) 69–74.
12
See eg D. Akande, ‘Afghanistan accedes to Additional Protocols to Geneva Conventions: Will AP II govern the conflict in Afghanistan?’, EJIL Talk!, 30 June 2009; A. Bellal, G. Giacca and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘International Law and Armed Non-State Actors in Afghanistan’, (2011) 93 International Review of the Red Cross, Vol 93, No 881 (2011) 57-9; J. Plamenac, Unravelling Unlawful Confinement in Contemporary Armed Conflicts: Belligerents’ Detention Practices in Afghanistan, Syria and Ukraine, Leiden, Brill Nijhoff, 2022, pp 94–95
13
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2189 (2014), UN Doc S/RES/2189 (2014) 12 December 2014, preamble; ‘NATO and Afghanistan’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (last updated on 31 August 2022.
14
‘NATO and Afghanistan’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (last updated on 31 August 2022).
15
‘Ashraf Ghani declared winner of Afghan poll’, Al Jazeera, 22 September 2014
16
The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc A/71/932-S/2017/508, 15 June 2017, paras 14–18.
17
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, March 2018.
18
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, April 2018.
19
International Crisis Group, Afghanistan Peace Talks Since 2018: A Timeline, 11 August 2020.
20
‘Afghanistan presidential election: Ashraf Ghani re-elected’, BBC News, 18 February 2020.
21
Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America, 29 February 2020.
22
Joint Declaration between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan, 29 February 2020, Part One, para 2.
23
A. Chughtai and S. Qazi, ‘From the 2001 fall of the Taliban to 2020 Afghan peace talks’, Al Jazeera, 12 September 2020; E. Mehrdad, ‘Even as Peace Talks Resume, Killing Soars in Afghanistan’, The Diplomat, 26 February 2021
24
A. Watkins, How the U.S. Withdrawal Decision Will Affect the Afghan Conflict, International Crisis Group, 15 April 2021.
25
‘Timeline: Taliban’s rapid advance across Afghanistan’, Al Jazeera, 12 August 2021; ‘US forces leave Afghanistan’s Bagram airbase after 20 years’, Al Jazeera, 2 July 2021; ‘Mapping the advance of the Taliban in Afghanistan’, BBC, 16 August 2021.
26
J. Bjelica, ‘Whose Seat Is It Anyway: The UN’s (non)decision on who represents Afghanistan’, Afghanistan Analysts Network – English, 7 December 2023; F. Poya, ‘Legitimacy Revisited: Can the Government in Exile Overcome Afghanistan’s Challenges?’, Fair Observer, 10 March 2024
27
C. Ward, T. Lister, A. Dewan, S. Mehsud, ‘Afghan President Ashraf Ghani flees the country as Taliban forces enter the capital’, CNN, 16 August 2021; ‘“At the gates”: Taliban ready to take Afghan capital’, Al Jazeera, 15 August 2021; ‘Taliban spokesperson hosts first press conference in Kabul: Live’, Al Jazeera, 17 August.
28
‘Taliban announces new government in Afghanistan’, Al Jazeera, 7 September 2021.
29
The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/78/628-S/2023/941, 1 December 2023, para 9.
30
J. Glasse, ‘Son of Famed Afghan Resistance Fighter Launches New Political Movement’, CBC News, 11 September 2019.
31
‘Rebels hold out in Afghan valley as Taliban set up government in Kabul’, Reuters, 2 September 2021; P. Bergen, ‘The leader of the anti-Taliban resistance speaks out’, CNN, 1 September 2021
32
‘US State Department: No Support for Armed Conflict in Afghanistan’, Afghanistan International, 1 September 2024.
33
Paul Kerley and Lucia Blasco, ‘Afghanistan: The “undefeated” Panjshir Valley – an hour from Kabul’, BBC, 26 August 2021
34
Charter of the Supreme Council of National Resistance for the Salvation of Afghanistan, 8 April 2023.
35
‘Taliban Say Afghan Resistance Force “Besieged” in Panjshir Valley’, Arab News, 23 August 2021; ‘Taliban claim to have taken Panjshir, resistance says not’, Deutsche Welle, 6 September 2021; J. Huylebroek and V.J. Blue, ‘In Panjshir, Few Signs of an Active Resistance, or Any Fight at All’, The New York Times, 17 September 2021.
36
‘Al-Qaeda Joined Taliban in Panjshir Valley Offensive: Sources’, Al Arabiya English, 2 September 2021.
37
M. Cole and K. Klippenstein, ‘Afghan Resistance Leaders, Long Backed by CIA, Have Fled Following Taliban Takeover’, The Intercept, 21 September 2021.
38
‘AFF Claims Killing 229 Taliban Members in 87 Attacks Over the Past Year’, KabulNow, 27 February 2025.
39
Manifesto of the Freedom Front of Afghanistan: Political Narrative and the Struggle Outlook of the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), 2024, pp 2 and 4.
40
See eg ‘Senior Anti-Taliban Commander Akmal Ameer Killed in Parwan Province’, KabulNow, 11 April 2023.
41
Fourteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2665 (2022) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, UN Doc S/2023/370, 1 June 2023, para 51.
42
Fourteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2665 (2022) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, UN Doc S/2023/370, 1 June 2023, paras 39–43.
43
Fourteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2665 (2022) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, UN Doc S/2023/370, 1 June 2023, paras 52–54.
44
Fourteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2665 (2022) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, UN Doc S/2023/370, 1 June 2023, paras 55–57.
45
Fourteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2665 (2022) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, UN Doc S/2023/370, 1 June 2023, para 58.
46
Fourteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2665 (2022) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, UN Doc S/2023/370, 1 June 2023, para 59.
47
‘The death of al-Qaeda’s leader may not halt a jihadist resurgence’, The Economist, 1 August 2022.
48
Fourteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2665 (2022) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, 1 June 2023, UN Doc S/2023/370, para 55
49
Fourteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2665 (2022) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, UN Doc S/2023/370, 1 June 2023, para 59; R. Malhotra, ‘Chapter 60. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)’, in S. N. Romaniuk, A. Roul, A. P. H. Fabe, and J. Besenyő (eds), Handbook of Terrorist and Insurgent Groups: A Global Survey of Threats, Tactics, and Characteristics, CRC Press, Boca Raton, 2024, p 569.
50
Fourteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2665 (2022) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, UN Doc S/2023/370, 1 June 2023, paras 44–50.
51
E. Schmitt, ‘What We Know About ISIS-K, the Group That Has Been Linked to the Moscow Attack’, The New York Times, 22 March 2024; L.J. Campbell, P. Ligouri Bunker and R.J. Bunker, ‘The Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISK): an assessment of current operations’, Small Wars and Insurgencies (2024) 3-5.
52
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Afghanistan: Annual Report 2016: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, February 2017, p 50.
53
D. Azami, ‘IS in Afghanistan: How Successful Has the Group Been?’, BBC, 25 February 2017; B. Osman, ‘The Islamic State in “Khorasan”: How it Began and Where it Stands Now in Nangarhar’, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 27 July 2016.
54
A. Siddique and S. Furogh, ‘3 Years Later, Afghans Still Reeling From Impact Of Devastating Kabul Airport Attack’, Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty, 26 August 2024; N. P. Walsh and M. Krever, ‘Exclusive: New evidence challenges the Pentagon’s account of a horrific attack as the US withdrew from Afghanistan’, CNN, 24 April 2024.
55
See eg E. Ehsan and A. M. Latifi, ‘Blood and pieces: Kunduz residents describe blast aftermath’,Al Jazeera, 9 October 2021; ‘Afghanistan: Deadly blasts, gunfire hit Kabul military hospital’, Al Jazeera, 3 November 2021.
56
J. Landay, ‘U.N. envoy says Islamic State now appears present in all Afghan provinces’, Reuters, 17 November 2021.
57
The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/76/862–S/2022/485, 15 June 2022, para 19; The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/77/340–S/2022/692, 14 September 2022, para 18.
58
‘Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)’, United Nations; ‘Pakistan is losing patience with the Taliban’, The Economist, 30 April 2022.
59
D. Nelson, A. Yusufzai, ‘Pakistan Taliban Splits ‘Over War With Islamabad’, The Telegraph, 5 September 2014.
60
See eg The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/76/667–S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, para 16; The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/77/772-S/2023/151, 27 February 2023, para 21.
61
The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/76/862–S/2022/485, 15 June 2022, para 19.
62
The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/77/340–S/2022/692, 14 September 2022, para 18.
63
The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/77/772-S/2023/151, 27 February 2023, para 20.
64
The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/76/862–S/2022/485, 15 June 2022, para 19; The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/77/340–S/2022/692, 14 September 2022, para 18.
65
‘At least three killed in shooting at Iran-Afghan border’, Al Jazeera, 27 May 2023; ‘What caused deadly Afghan-Iran border clashes? What happens next?’, Al Jazeera, 30 May 2023; M. Faizee and S. Schmeier, ‘Troubled Waters between Afghanistan and Iran as Border Troops Clash over the Helmand River’, IHE Delft – Institute for Water Education under the Auspices of UNESCO, 6 June 2023; International Crisis Group, The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan, Asia Report, No 337, Brussels, 30 January 2024, pp 23–25.
66
‘The Taliban are digging an enormous canal’, The Economist, 16 February 2023; ‘Experts Talk about a Canal Being Built by Taliban and Its Tragic Consequences for Uzbekistan’, Kun.uz, 13 February 2023; International Crisis Group, The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan, Asia Report, No 337, Brussels, 30 January 2024, pp 21–23.
67
See eg, regarding the period between September 2023 and July 2024, Situation of human rights in Afghanistan: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/57/22, 4 February 2025, para 13.
68
See eg Fifteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2716 (2023) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan, UN Doc S/2024/499, 8 July 2024, para 1.
69
The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/79/797-S/2025/109, 21 February 2025, para 3; see also The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/79/947-S/2025/372, 11 June 2025, para 3.
70
The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/79/675-S/2024/876, 6 December 2024, para 16.
71
H. Haqiqatyar and R. Radan ‘“They Threw Us out like Garbage”: Iran Rushes Deportation of 4 Million Afghans before Deadline’, The Guardian, 7 July 2025; ‘UN experts appalled by mass forced returns of Afghan nationals’, OHCHR, 18 July 2025.
72
The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/78/628-S/2023/941, 1 December 2023, para 20.
73
See eg UNSC Verbatim Record (2 June 2024) UN Doc S/PV.9663, p 4 (Ms. Roza Otunbayeva, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNAMA); United Nations Security Council Resolution 2721 (2023), UN Doc S/RES/2721 (2023), 29 December 2023, paras 2–3; United Nations Security Council, Report of the independent assessment pursuant to Security Council resolution 2679 (2023), UN Doc S/2023/856, 9 November 2023, para 84; ‘International community must not normalise Taliban rule in Afghanistan’, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 14 August 2024; see also, for discussion, R. Kluijver, ‘Is it time to recognise the Taliban government in Afghanistan?’, The Conversation, 29 December 2024; G. Smith G and I. Bahiss, ‘The World Has No Choice But to Work With the Taliban’, Foreign Affairs, 11 August 2023.
74
M. E. Hayyar, ‘Does a Doorkeeper Stand Before the Law?: (Non-)Recognition of the Taliban and the HTS Administrations’, ESIL Reflections, Vol 14, No 2, p 7.
75
N. Smagin, ‘Russia Is the First Country to Recognize Afghanistan’s Taliban Government. Why?’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10 July 2025; R. Roy-Chaudhury, ‘Will Russia’s diplomatic recognition of the Afghan Taliban government have a domino effect?’, Institute for Strategic Studies, 8 August 2025.
76
United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Credentials Committee, UN Doc A/79/613, 20 November 2024, paras 9–10; see also, for background information, S. Zaman, ‘UN talks in Doha end; recognition remains distant dream for Taliban’, Voice of America English News, 1 July 2024.
77
ICRC (ed), Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention: Treatment of Prisoners of War, Vol 1, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2021, para 267.
78
Aguilar-Amory and Royal Bank of Canada claims – Tinoco Arbitration (Great Britain v. Costa Rica), Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol 1 (1923), p 381.
79
ICRC (ed), Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention: Treatment of Prisoners of War, Vol 1, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2021, para 268.
80
See, in the same sense, European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), Afghanistan – Country Focus, Country of Origin Information, November 2024, p 19.

Afghanistan

Reporting period: July 2023 - June 2025

Overview

Historical background

First Afghan Civil War (1978-1992)

Second and Third Afghan Civil Wars (1992–96 and 1996–2001)

Afghanistan War (2001-2021)

Taliban Rule and the Emergence of Resistance Movements

Afghanistan as a Safe Haven for Terrorist Groups

The Islamic State – Khorasan Province

Low-Intensity International Armed Conflict with Pakistan

Armed Clashes with Iran and the Water Crisis as a Cause of Regional Tensions

Key developments (between 2023 and 2025)

Legal Status of the Afghan Taliban

International Armed Conflict

Non-International Armed Conflict

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

Non-State parties

Other Main actors

Other Resistance Movements

Foreign involvement