Benin

A single non-international armed conflict (NIAC) is ongoing in the Republic of Benin between the Beninese Armed Forces and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal – Muslimin (JNIM). Benin is a party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to Additional Protocol II of 1977. The current NIAC, however, does not satisfy the requirements set out in article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II to trigger its application.

Benin is a coastal country in the Sahel region of West Africa.¹ The Sahel is notorious for terrorist activity and is a NIAC hotspot.² Two non-State actors, JNIM and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), are dominant and in competition over territory; both are gaining supremacy in the region.³

Countries neighbouring Benin are involved in ongoing NIACs. Often these conflicts are concentrated in border regions, increasing the chances of violence spilling-over, and causing cross-border violence on the territory of Benin. The States concerned are Nigeria (to the east) and Burkina Faso and Niger (to the north).⁴ Benin’s geographic location (bordering Nigeria and Burkina Faso in the north) as well as the fact that it is a coastal state offers non-State armed groups a logistical advantage as it could serve as smuggling corridor for illicit weapons and goods. Benin is systematically being infiltrated by non-state actors based in neighbouring countries.⁵ The United Nations Security Council has reported an increase in violent cross-border activity in northern Benin during the first half of 2025.⁶

To understand events ongoing in Benin, it is necessary to be aware of Benin’s post-independence history. The Republic of Benin, formerly Dahomey, gained independence from France on 1 August 1960. Previously, Benin’s security situation was considered stable until 2019 when it witnessed its first extremist attack. In May 2019, two French nationals were kidnapped, and their Beninese guide was killed.⁷ Since this attack, the country has experienced frequent attacks. In December 2021, there was a second attack around Porga which is in the northern border area. The attack was not claimed by JNIM. A statement issued by Beninese Army Chief, Colonel Fructueux Gbaguidi, confirmed insurgents attacked an army patrol vehicle. A day later insurgents attacked a border security post killing two soldiers and injuring several more.⁸ The attack provided the insurgents with the opportunity to move around freely in the provinces of Atacora and Alibori.⁹

After 2021, JNIM expanded its activities in Benin and aimed to establish a consolidated position in northern Benin. As of 2024, its territory includes the W National Park on the Benin-Niger border.¹⁰ As a consequence of the incursion by JNIM, the national parks located in the northern region are closed to tourists.¹¹

JNIM strongholds in the Sahel region are located specifically in Burkina Faso and Niger, and as such, in proximity to Benin (see above). Consequently, the pre-existing NIACs in the Sahel have spilled into Benin in line with the expansionary aim of the armed group to extend its activities into other areas in Africa.¹²

The period under review demonstrates a significant expansion of actions by the JNIM and, possibly, an increased interest by ISSP in northern Benin.¹³ Most violent attacks are attributed to JNIM.¹⁴

Likely increase in ISSP activity

Despite the activities of ISSP being under-reported, sources suggest that as of the beginning of 2024, ISSP was focusing its efforts on the littoral borderlands of the Sahel (coastal West African states), including the Republic of Benin.¹⁵ The southern expansion by ISSP is in line with Islamic State’s mission to establish a consolidated caliphate in Africa.¹⁶ The unconfirmed expansion by ISSP into Benin is calculated to take advantage of Benin’s coastline to activate illicit smuggling and trade routes¹⁷ and possibly to use it as an entry point for weapons and munitions that supply their activities in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Nigeria.

For the most part, during the reporting period ISSP has maintained covert operations on the Beninese border.¹⁸ Although, in terms of international humanitarian law (IHL) the ISSP is considered to display sufficient organization, the violent activity on the Benin border during the reporting period is viewed as sporadic. However, War Watch continues to monitor an unfolding situation.

Operation Mirador

In response to an attack by the JNIM against a military post near the border with Burkina Faso, in January 2022, the Beninese Armed Forces launched Operation Mirador deploying 3,000 troops to secure the northern border against an incursion by the insurgents.¹⁹ In 2023, an additional 5,000 troops were recruited to strengthen the Operation Mirador force.²⁰

On 8 January 2025, JNIM launched a military operation against the Operation Mirador base causing significant casualties among the Armed Forces.²¹ In February 2025, and as a consequence, the government reviewed the security approach underlying Operation Mirador.²²

Breakdown in Military Cooperation Agreement with Niger

The Government of Benin signed a military cooperation agreement with Niger to strengthen cross border security, but the military-led unconstitutional change of government in Niger led to the collapse of the agreement, and in July 2023 the military junta reneged on the agreement.²³

On 12 September 2023, Niger ended military cooperation with Benin on the basis that Benin was host to troops deployed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to intervene militarily and counter the junta in Niger. The military pact was cancelled after ECOWAS informed the leaders of the 26 July 2023 coup in Niger that the organization will explore the use of force to restore the constitutional government in Niger if diplomatic negotiations fail.²⁴ The actions of the junta have the potential to weaken the broader response of Sahel States to the insurgency in the region.²⁵

By January 2025, relations between Niger and Benin remained fragile despite President Talon’s repeated invitation to the Nigerien military authorities to enter into a dialogue and to conduct an inspection of its territory.²⁶ On 1 February 2025, in an attempt to repair relations, the ambassador of Benin to Niger publicly asked for the forgiveness of the Nigerien people. The Benin government recalled the ambassador, Gildas Agonkan, on the ground that his comment does not reflect the official position of the Benin government.²⁷ Relations between the two states further worsened after Niger accused Benin of collaborating with armed groups operating on the border, a claim Benin’s President, Patrice Talon, denied on 14 March 2025.²⁸ On 31 May 2025, the Nigerien junta stated the border between Niger and Benin will remain closed citing its concerns regarding the presence of “destablising French troops” on the territory of Benin.²⁹ However, the Benin government has denied the allegation that it hosts a French military base in the Alibori department.³⁰

Coup Attempt and Sentencing

Two days before it was set to be executed, an attempted coup against Benin’s President Talon was thwarted in September 2024. The alleged masterminds of the coup were Oliver Boko, Oswald Homeky (a former minster), and Djimon Dieudonne Tevoedjre (a commander in the Republican Guard Unit assigned to the president’s security). They were arrested on suspicion of plotting a coup.³¹

On 2 October 2024, Boko and Homeky were indicted by the court for conspiracy against state security and corrupting state public officials. Furthermore, Boko’s social media handler, Hosee Houngnibo, was arrested on 7 October 2024 for inciting rebellion and electronic harassment.³²

On 30 January 2025, the alleged conspirators were sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. The accused were denied a fair hearing after their lawyers collectively withdrew from the case on the grounds of procedural inconsistencies and an alleged conflict of interest owing to a close relationship between the judges and President Talon.³³

US Africom offers Benin support

US Africa Command has offered Benin support through training and capacity building.³⁴ On 22 January 2025, the United States and Benin signed a bilateral agreement according to which the US undertakes to capacitate and support Benin in its counter-terrorism efforts.³⁵

Benin upcoming elections

On various occasions, the term of the president has been extended.³⁶ Further, Benin amended the constitution to reform the Senate ahead of 2026 elections.³⁷ The presidential term has been extended from five to seven years.³⁸

Climate crises fueling conflict

An estimated seventy per cent of Benin’s workforce are involved in agriculture. Food security through agricultural production is climate sensitive. Adverse climate events such as extreme heat and a shift in the pattern of precipitation occurring in Benin can be a conflict driver, therefore the connection between climate change and violence must be monitored.³⁹

Non-international armed conflict between Benin and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)

Background

JNIM, which was founded in March 2017, is the result of a merger of four established groups: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s Sahara Emirate, Al-Murabitun, Ansar Dine, and Katiba Macina.¹ JNIM increased its operations in the border regions between Benin, Niger, and Nigeria in 2023.² In 2022, Benin posted approximately 3,000 troops in the northern Beninese border areas to curb cross border jihadist incursions.³ This decision was made as a result of the increasing spillover of fighting jihadist groups in the Sahel region into Benin.⁴ Beninese authorities reported that approximately twenty border incursions occurred between 2021 and April 2023.⁵

Intensity

The Beninese Armed Forces and JNIM clashed from at least October 2023,⁶ with at least one incident reported per month throughout the reporting period. The severity of clashes also increased during the first half of 2025. Despite this conflict being underreported and receiving scarce media attention, violence generated between Benin and JNIM that was captured includes clashes which occurred in October 2023,⁷ December 2023,⁸ January 2024,⁹ February,¹⁰ March,¹¹ April,¹² May,¹³ June,¹⁴ July,¹⁵ August,¹⁶ September,¹⁷ October,¹⁸ November,¹⁹ and December 2024,²⁰ January 2025,²¹ February,²² March,²³ April,²⁴ May,²⁵ and June 2025.²⁶

In JNIM’s January 2025 attack against the Beninese Armed Forces in northern Benin, twenty-eight Beninese soldiers were killed.²⁷ The deadliest attack by JNIM was on 17 April 2025 when the group attacked soldiers deployed as part of Operation Mirador in W National Park. At least fifty-four soldiers were killed in these clashes.²⁸ JNIM claimed a higher casualty count of seventy soldiers.²⁹

Weaponry used by JNIM fighters includes those taken during ambushes against State armed forces where JNIM is active such as Kalashnikov assault rifles,³⁰ and 12.7mm machine guns.³¹ Drones,³² improvised explosive devices (IEDs), rockets and mortars have also been employed in this NIAC.³³ It has frequently been reported that Beninese soldiers were killed as they stepped on or drove over IEDs planted by JNIM.³⁴

The humanitarian situation that the insecurity in the north of Benin has caused remains underreported.³⁵ What is, however, captured is the sharp increase of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Benin and its link to the conflict in the north of Benin.³⁶ By the end of the reporting period, at least 8,785 IDPs were reported in Benin.³⁷

International reaction to this situation includes the United State of America which sent armoured vehicles worth approximately 6.6 million US dollars to Benin in November 2024 and the European Union launching a €47 million fund to assist Benin in opposing terrorism on its territory.³⁸ US AFRICOM has also offered its support in response to the increasing violence generated by JNIM in Benin.³⁹

The intensity of violence generated by the engagements between Benin and JNIM satisfies the requirements for a NIAC under IHL.

Organization

JNIM is the Sahel branch of al-Qaeda. It is a Salafi-jihadist group that has as a parent organization al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) whose origins are found in the 1990s Algerian civil war.⁴⁰

JNIM has an organized command structure which resembles a top-down hierarchy. Essentially, there are three overall hierarchical tiers: central leadership, regional commanders, and local commanders.⁴¹ Central leadership includes its emir, Iyad Ag Ghaly(aka Abu al-Fadl), who founded Ansar Dine.⁴² Deputy leaders include Yahya Abu Hammam (Djamel Okacha), the leader of AQIM Sahara, Amadou Koufa, the leader of the Katibat Macina (Macina Liberation Front or FLM), and Abu Hassan al-Ansari, the deputy leader of al-Mourabitoun.⁴³ Another deputy leader is Abu Abdul Rahman Ali al-Sanhaji (Ali Maychou) who is a representative of AQIM Sahara, as well as being a senior judge in JNIM and its religious advisor, ‘Koufa’.⁴⁴

Different subgroups are at the disposal of top leadership but are able to operate with some flexibility as subgroups are divided into regionally separate areas.⁴⁵ These subgroups are organized so as to facilitate coordination and deepen cooperation in the group.

Its organizational structure has been described as ‘strategically coherent’ with senior regional commanders deployed to external JNIM subgroups to ensure cooperation and discipline.⁴⁶ Some analysts, though, dispute whether this level of coherence exists between subgroups,⁴⁷ instead describing JNIM as essentially an umbrella group.⁴⁸

Discipline is enforced at the highest level by a ‘Majlis Shura’ (Consultative Council) which publicly responds to accusations of atrocities. JNIM’s Shura Council ensures Islamic governance and strict adherence to Islamic law in areas under JNIM control.⁴⁹ These bodies, as well as the tiered command structure, enable JNIM to implement IHL. Training is offered to fighters by highly mobile units using motorcycles to facilitate training where and when needed across the Sahel region.⁵⁰ Training camps create the opportunity to implement IHL and enhance discipline among fighters.

Military tactics employed by JNIM are described as purposeful encircling of isolated strategic zones, weakening state presence and creating power vacuums.⁵¹ JNIM also relies on motorcycles for manoeuvrability during ambushes.⁵² JNIM prefers remote violence such as using explosives, artillery and mortar fire over swarming tactics and ambushes, which are the modus operandi of ISSP.⁵³ Part of its military tactics include using IEDs to destroy military and other infrastructure.⁵⁴ JNIM also maintains a high operational tempo to ensure it outpaces its adversaries as part of its military strategy.⁵⁵

JNIM is able to facilitate logistics through an extended network across central Sahel into the West African littoral states including parts of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin, Ivory Coast, and Togo.⁵⁶Weapons and munitions are replenished through large-scale attacks on garrisons or auxiliary camps belonging to state armed forces in the operational area.⁵⁷ Weapons and other military needs are also met using profits from artisanal mining, livestock theft, fundraising, taxation, and looting.⁵⁸

JNIM’s vast territorial reach⁵⁹ gives it a larger recruitment pool.⁶⁰ It is reported that JNIM has between 5,000 and 6,000 fighters in its ranks.⁶¹ JNIM uses its media wing, al-Zallaqa,⁶² and propaganda channels⁶³ to communicate with the outside world and to control its narrative. JNIM also has an official spokesperson, who, at the time of reporting, was Mahmoud Barry.⁶⁴

JNIM is sufficiently organized under IHL.

Having satisfied both the notions of intensity and organization, it is concluded that a new NIAC erupted between Benin and JNIM during the reporting period.

1
L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel’, Critical Threats, 20 November 2024; ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin’, Australian Government: Australian National Security; H. Nsaibia, ‘New frontlines: Jihadist expansion is reshaping the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands’, ACLED, 27 March 2025.
2
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025; H. Nsaibia, ‘New frontlines: Jihadist expansion is reshaping the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands’, ACLED, 27 March 2025.
3
P. Nije and W. Muia, ‘Beninese army suffers ‘hard blow’ in border attack’, BBC, 10 January 2025.
4
‘Death toll in Benin national park attacks rises as France opens terror probe’, France24, 11 February 2022.
5
‘28 Beninese soldiers killed in attack near Burkina Faso border’, Punch, 9 January 2025.
6
‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, October 2023.
7
‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, October 2023 November 2023, ‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, November 2023; M. M, Phillips, ‘Militants Take Cover Amid Elephants, Lions in West Africa’s National Parks’, Wall Street Journal, 19 November 2023.
8
‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, December 2023.
9
‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, January 2024.
10
‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, February 2024.
11
‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, March 2024.
12
‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, April 2024.
13
‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, May 2024.
14
‘Seven Benin soldiers killed by gunmen in national park attack, army source says’, France24, 5 June 2024.
15
‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, July 2024; ‘Statement Regarding Incident at the W National Park in Benin’, African Parks, 27 July 2024; ‘West and Central Africa: Latest events at a glance (23 to 29 July 2024)’, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
16
J. E. Abatan, ‘Can West African nations come together to stop terrorism spreading?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 March 2025.
17
‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, September 2024.
18
J. E. Abatan, ‘Can West African nations come together to stop terrorism spreading?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 March 2025; ‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, October 2024.
19
‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, November 2024.
20
‘28 Beninese soldiers killed in attack near Burkina Faso border’, Punch, 9 January 2025.
21
P. Nije and W. Muia, ‘Beninese army suffers ‘hard blow’ in border attack’, BBC, 10 January 2025; ‘28 Beninese soldiers killed in attack near Burkina Faso border’, Punch, 9 January 2025; P. Adjoha, ‘Benin army suffers heavy losses in northern attack’, Reuters, 9 January 2025; ‘Al-Qaeda-linked jihadist group claims deadly Benin attack’, The Times of India, 10 January 2025; ‘Benin Reels From Deadliest Terror Attack’, African Defense Forum, 4 February 2025.
22
‘Militant attack kills six Benin soldiers, army spokesperson says’, Reuters, 17 February 2025.
23
‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, March 2025; S. Ouitona, ‘Bénin: neuf soldats blessés dans une attaque à Tanguiéta’, Afrik.com, 5 March 2025; Fabian, X, 5 March 2025.
24
‘Au Bénin, plus de cinquante militaires tués dans une récente attaque jihadiste’, France24, 24 April 2025; ‘Al Qaeda affiliate says it killed 70 soldiers in Benin, SITE reports’, Reuters, 20 April 2025.
25
‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, May 2025.
26
‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, June 2025.
27
‘Bénin : au moins 28 soldats tués dans une attaque terroriste revendiquée par le JNIM’, France24, 11 January 2025; P. Nije and W. Muia, ‘Beninese army suffers ‘hard blow’ in border attack’, BBC, 10 January 2025.
28
‘Au Bénin, plus de cinquante militaires tués dans une récente attaque jihadiste’, France24, 24 April 2025; ‘Jihadist attack in Benin kills at least 54, government says’, Le Monde, 23 April 2025.
29
‘Al Qaeda affiliate says it killed 70 soldiers in Benin, SITE reports’, Reuters, 20 April 2025.
30
M. Laplace, ‘Al‑Qaeda affiliate JNIM claims attack near Niamey’, The Africa Report, 19 October 2024 M80 rifles, ‘Attaque à Assamaka: une offensive des Forces Armées Libres (FAL) fait sept morts et cinq blessés, trente-sept suspects interpellés’, ActuNiger, 19 October 2024.
31
‘Opération Damissa: Une attaque terroriste vaillamment repoussé à Falmey’, Le Sahel, 18 March 2025.
32
Hamid Amadou N’gadé, Facebook, 18 May 2025.
33
H. Nsaibia, ‘Conflict intensifies and instability spreads beyond Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger’, ACLED, 12 December 2024.
34
‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, December 2023; ‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, March 2024; ‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, November 2024; ‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, March 2025; S. Ouitona, ‘Bénin: neuf soldats blessés dans une attaque à Tanguiéta’, Afrik.com, 5 March 2025.
35
‘Benin Population Movement 2025 – DREF Operation (MDRBJ022)’, ReliefWeb, 26 June 2025.
36
‘Benin Population Movement 2025 – DREF Operation (MDRBJ022)’, ReliefWeb, 26 June 2025; ‘Benin’, ACAPS; ‘Benin’, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee.
37
‘Benin’, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Operational Data Portal, 30 June 2025.
38
‘28 Beninese soldiers killed in attack near Burkina Faso border’, Punch, 9 January 2025.
39
‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, April 2024; B. Dixon, ‘US Defense Officials Conclude Visit to Benin and Côte d’Ivoire’, United States Africa Command; T. Rüttershoff and U. Laessing, ‘The US strategy in West Africa under Trump’, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 12 June 2025.
40
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023; L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel’, Critical Threats, 20 November 2024.
41
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
42
J. Thompson, ‘Examining Extremism: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 July 2021; ‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
43
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
44
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
45
L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel’, Critical Threats, 20 November 2024; H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023; J. Thompson, ‘Examining Extremism: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 July 2021; ‘Mapping armed groups in Mali and the Sahel’, European Council on Foreign Relations; ‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
46
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
47
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025; D. Eizenga and W. Williams, ‘The Puzzle of JNIM and Militant Islamist Groups in the Sahel’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, December 2020.
48
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
49
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025; H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
50
‘JNIM Training Camp in Burkina Faso Shows Terror Group’s Deadly Ambition’, Africa Defense Forum, 18 June 2024; C. Weiss, ‘JNIM documents training camp in Burkina Faso’, Online Article, Long War Journal, 25 May 2024.
51
‘After Tillabéri, Is Niamey the Next Target?’, Zagazola, 9 April 2025.
52
‘Le JNIM frappe au Niger: offensive éclair contre la base militaire de Mossipaga, l’AES en difficulté’, Daily Motion, 20 May 2025.
53
J. G. Birru, ‘IS Sahel’s tactics cause mass, indiscriminate violence’, ACLED, 13 January 2023.
54
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
55
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
56
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
57
‘Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/556, 22 July 2024, para 18.
58
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
59
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
60
‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/71/Rev.1, 6 February 2025, para 12.
61
‘Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/556, 22 July 2024, para 10.
62
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
63
M. Laplace, ‘Al‑Qaeda affiliate JNIM claims attack near Niamey’, The Africa Report, 19 October 2024; ‘Mapping armed groups in Mali and the Sahel’, European Council on Foreign Relations.
64
LSI Africa, X, 26 November 2024; ‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.

State Parties

Benin

Non-State parties

Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)

1
T.C. McCaskie, ‘Western Africa’, Britannica, 18 November 2025; ‘Benin’, US Department of State, September 2009.
2
A. Jamiu, ‘Sahel-based terror groups expand to coastal West Africa’, DW, 8 November 2025.
3
H. Nsaibia, ‘New frontlines: Jihadist expansion is reshaping the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands’, ACLED, 27 March 2025.
4
T. C. McCaskie, ‘Western Africa’, Britannica, 18 November 2025.
5
‘Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/495, 31 July 2025, paras 4 and 24 ; A. Jamiu, ‘Sahel-based terror groups expand to coastal West Africa’, DW, 8 November 2025.
6
‘Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/495, 31 July 2025, para 24.
7
M. Lagrange, ‘Dans le nord du Bénin, l’opération militaire Mirador face à la pression terroriste’, RFI, 25 September 2023.
8
‘Two Soldiers Killed in Militant Attack in Benin, Army Says’, Voice of America, 2 December 2021; N. Wilén, ‘What’s Brewing in Benin? Security Collaboration in the Gulf of Guinea’, Egmont Institute, October 2024, 2.
9
‘Benin Boosts Military Presence in North to Stop Cross-Border Attacks’, African Defense Forum, 26 July 2022.
10
H. Nsaibia, ‘New frontlines: Jihadist expansion is reshaping the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands’, ACLED, 27 March 2025.
11
N. Wilén, ‘What’s Brewing in Benin? Security Collaboration in the Gulf of Guinea’, Egmont Institute, October 2024.
12
I. U. Ajay, ‘The Growing Influence of JNIM in West Africa: Threats to Benin, Togo and Ghana’, Indian Council of World Affairs, 6 February 2025.
13
H. Nsaibia, ‘New frontlines: Jihadist expansion is reshaping the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands’, ACLED, 27 March 2025.
14
‘ACAPS Briefing Note: Benin – Conflict in Alibori and Atacora (07 February 2025)’, Reliefweb, 7 February 2025.
15
H. Nsaibia, ‘New frontlines: Jihadist expansion is reshaping the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands’, ACLED, 27 March 2025.
16
K. Mustapha and C. O. ‘Extremism in the Sahel – Focus on Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP)’, Intelligensis, 10 March 2024; A. Shtuni, ‘The Islamic State in 2025: an Evolving Threat Facing a Waning Global Response’, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 11 July 2025.
17
H. Nsaibia, ‘New frontlines: Jihadist expansion is reshaping the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands’, ACLED, 27 March 2025.
18
H. Nsaibia, ‘New frontlines: Jihadist expansion is reshaping the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands’, ACLED, 27 March 2025; ‘Extremist Violence in Northern Benin and Border Areas’, African Security System, 23 March 2025.
19
M. Lagrange, ‘Dans le nord du Bénin, l’opération militaire Mirador face à la pression terroriste’, RFI, 25 September 2023; ‘Benin receives military plane from European Union’, TRT Afrika, 6 March 2025; ‘Al-Qaeda-Linked Jihadist Group Claims Deadly Benin Attack’, The Defense Post, 11 January 2025.
20
‘Bénin: l’armée neutralise deux terroristes recherchés et déploie 3500 recrues tout juste formées’, RFI, 22 January 2024; C. O. Mbardounka, ‘Comment le Bénin compte faire face aux attaques djihadistes sur son territoire’, BBC, 10 January 2025 (updated 17 January 2025).
21
‘A Bulwark Against Extremism’, African Defense Forum, 6 August 2025, Updated 11 August 2025; J. E. Abatan, ‘Can West African nations come together to stop terrorism spreading?’, Institute for Security Studies, 31 March 2025.
22
‘Africa: Benin’, International Crisis Group.
23
‘Benin Grapples With Spread of Sahel Violence’, African Defense Forum, 10 September 2024.
24
‘Niger junta ends military accord with Benin amid regional standoff’, Reuters, 13 September 2023.
25
‘Africa: Benin’, International Crisis Group.
26
‘Africa: Benin’, International Crisis Group.
27
‘Africa: Benin’, International Crisis Group.
28
‘Africa: Benin’, International Crisis Group.
29
‘Africa: Benin’, International Crisis Group.
30
‘Africa: Benin’, International Crisis Group.
31
‘Africa: Benin’, International Crisis Group.
32
‘Africa: Benin’, International Crisis Group.
33
‘Africa: Benin’, International Crisis Group.
34
‘U.S. Africa Command Special Operations Forces train alongside partners in Benin’, US Africa Command, 29 September 2022; ‘AFRICOM Commander Visits Benin to Strengthen Bilateral Security Partnership’, US Embassy in Benin, 6 May 2024.
35
‘Benin Bolsters Defense With U.S. Partnership’, African Defense Forum, 25 March 2025.
36
A. Zondi, ‘Benin approves constitutional revision extending presidential term’, Channel Africa, 17 November 2025; ‘Benin postpones presidential election to March 6’, Africa News, 13 August 2024; D. Koter, ‘Democracy on the Line in Benin’, Democracy in Africa, 3 September 2025.
37
‘Benin’s parliament approves extending presidential terms and creating a senate’, The Washington Post, 16 November 2025; ‘Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/495, 31 July 2025, paras 20.
38
K. O. Kyekyeku, ‘With 2026 election looming, Benin adopts major political overhaul’, Face 2 Face Africa, 17 November 2025.
39
‘Climate Risk Country Profile: Benin’, The World Bank, 2025, 3.

Benin

Reporting period: 2023- 2025

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (between 2023 and 2025)