Burkina Faso

Two non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) are ongoing in Burkina Faso between Burkina Faso and a non-State armed group:

Burkina Faso (supported by Africa Corps and, in certain instances, by Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP) units) v Jama’at Nasr Al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM)
Burkina Faso(supported by Africa Corps) v Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP)

Burkina Faso is a State Party to Additional Protocol II of 1977. The NIAC between Burkina Faso and JNIM continues to meet the additional requirements of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II, and this treaty is applicable.

Since gaining its independence in 1960, Burkina Faso has experienced eight coups d’état, multiple constitutional suspensions, and prolonged periods of authoritarian and military rule.¹ Burkina Faso’s turbulent history of political instability and conflict is rooted in both the colonial legacy and post-independence failures of governance. As a French colony for sixty-four years following the Berlin Conference of 1884, the country – then known as Upper Volta – endured a colonial rule characterized by exploitation, repression, and underdevelopment.² This legacy has contributed to the fragility of its post-colonial institutions while the presence of gold deposits fuels conflict in the region and provides a significant revenue stream for militant groups.³

In 1966, the first in a series of military coups took place when the army, responding to strikes and unrest, overthrew President Maurice Yaméogo. The Chief of Staff, Aboubakar Sangoulé Lamizana, assumed power.⁴ In 1980, Lamizana was deposed in another coup led by Colonel Saye Zerbo.⁵ Colonel Zerbo was overthrown in 1982 by Major Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo and the Council for the Salvation of the People (CSP), which included a rising figure, Captain Thomas Sankara.⁶ Captain Sankara seized power on 4 August 1983 in a popular coup, forming the National Council of the Revolution (CNR).⁷ His government launched radical reforms that improved literacy, reduced infant mortality, and advanced gender equality.⁸ In 1987, however, Sankara was assassinated in a coup led by his former ally Blaise Compaoré, who ruled until 2014.⁹ Sankara’s presidency is remembered for its revolutionary spirit and the social gains, but Marxist policies, the rejection of foreign aid, and the alienation of traditional power structures led to Burkina Faso’s international isolation and internal divisions. His failure to build enduring political institutions left the State vulnerable to future shocks.¹⁰ After twenty-seven years in charge, popular protests on 31 October 2014 ousted President Compaoré after he attempted to amend the constitution to extend his rule.¹¹

Following Compaoré’s ouster, hopes for a transition to democracy were quickly overshadowed by escalating jihadist activity. Since 2015, Burkina Faso has faced persistent violence generated by the conflict with non-State armed groups, fuelled by its strategic location near Mali, Niger, and the coast of West Africa. An attack in 2016 on the capital, Ouagadougou, marked the beginning of a worsening security crisis as the conflict tormenting northern Mali spilled into Burkina Faso.¹² Mass protests against jihadist violence erupted in November 2021.

In an attempt to quell public anger, President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré reshuffled the military command and dismissed his prime minister. These measures proved ineffective. On 24 January 2022, Kaboré was overthrown in a coup led by Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba, a former counterterrorism commander. Damiba’s reluctance to sever ties with French counterterrorism forces and the failure to stem the insurgency led to his ousting in September 2022 by Captain Ibrahim Traoré.¹³ Unlike earlier coups, Traoré’s takeover was met with support and anti-French rallies, which highlighted a shift in public sentiment and an increased openness to Russian influence.¹⁴

Captain Traoré’s military junta suspended the constitution, dissolved the legislature, and pledged to prioritize national security before holding elections.¹⁵ Initially, the regime promised a democratic transition by July 2024 to appease the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). By September 2023, however, Traoré stated that elections were ‘not a priority’, asserting that security must come first.¹⁶ In May 2024, the junta extended military rule until July 2029, paralleling a decision in neighbouring Mali.¹⁷

Under Traoré, repression has intensified, with increased targeting of civil society, media restrictions, and the expulsion of critical foreign journalists. Despite assurances, the return to military rule has failed to restore stability – 2022 was recorded as the Sahel’s most unstable year in a decade by ACLED.¹⁸

By 2025, nearly 10 per cent of the population – more than two million people – were internally displaced, and an additional 39,000 refugees and asylum seekers, mainly from Mali, were harbouring in Burkina Faso. Armed groups – principally Jama’at Nasr Al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISIP) – control roughly 40 per cent of the territory, restricting humanitarian access and isolating 800,000 people.¹⁹ Conflict, inflation, and the decline in agricultural production have worsened food insecurity, with millions facing severe shortages in 2024.

Increasing levels of civilian harm due to conflict and insecurity

From July to December 2023, insecurity in Burkina Faso was widespread, and civilians were trapped between jihadist violence and government counterinsurgency efforts. In July, jihadist attacks across various provinces targeted individuals suspected of state collaboration. Government forces and their auxiliaries, the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (in French ‘Les Volontaires pour la défense de la Patrie’, VDP), were accused of committing atrocities against Fulani communities.²⁰

Civilians remain highly vulnerable. Several massacres have been recorded, including one in Zaongo village in November, where at least seventy people were killed.²¹ November also saw deadly attacks around Djibo when about 3,000 JNIM militants launched a wave of attacks in an attempt to seize the town, killing several Burkinabe soldiers and forty civilians at the cost of more than 400 of their number.²² Human Rights Watch reported that drone strikes between August and November 2023 killed at least sixty civilians, raising concerns about ongoing IHL violations. Violence persisted throughout 2023, and civilians continued to pay an extremely heavy price in the intensifying conflict.²³

During 2024, violence reached an unprecedented level – the highest since the beginning of the jihadist insurgency in 2015. The escalation of violence was particularly evident when, on 25 February, militants affiliated with JNIM and ISSP launched nine coordinated attacks across the country.²⁴ These attacks included a raid on a mosque in Natiaboani that killed up to 100 people²⁵ and an attack on a Catholic church in Essakane village that left at least fifteen dead.²⁶ Government forces and their civilian auxiliaries, the VDPs, were implicated in the commission of atrocities, with reports of large-scale massacres in Yatenga province and the Gayéri area, where hundreds of civilians were allegedly killed.²⁷ In August, 200 people were killed in Barsalogho Department in an attack for which JNIM claimed responsibility.²⁸

The first half of 2025 saw sustained violence across Burkina Faso, with jihadist groups intensifying attacks in the North, Sahel, Centre-North and East. In March, government forces and auxiliaries were accused of massacring hundreds of Fulani civilians in Solenzo and surrounding areas, reports that jihadists exploited to launch further deadly attacks across multiple regions.²⁹ In April, ISSP attacked Timboulel village and killed a number of civilians. In June, a relative lull emerged after months of relentless attacks, though violence against civilians remained widespread.³⁰

Human rights and humanitarian developments

The transitional authorities progressively tightened control of the civic space in the second half of 2023. In July, civil society organizations criticised the exclusionary nature of governance and by August, the government had suspended Radio Omega and harassed journalists and opposition figures.³¹ On 18 October, Burkina Faso’s Ministry of Health declared a dengue fever epidemic following the country’s deadliest outbreak in years, with more than 200 fatalities reported.³²

In November 2023, the military government ordered the forced conscription of journalists, activists, and opposition members, provoking condemnation from civil society and international organizations. The courts upheld the measure, further limiting avenues for dissent. Media freedom was curtailed with the suspension of the French newspaper Le Monde following reporting critical of the regime. These actions silenced independent voices at a time of high insecurity and humanitarian need.³³

Civic space continued to contract in 2024. The arrest of Guy-Hervé Kam and the forced enrolment of opposition figures in the auxiliary forces exemplified the regime’s repression. In February, lawyers staged a nationwide strike demanding Kam’s release and civil society organizations decried the increasingly authoritarian environment. Freedom of expression was further curtailed; journalists, lawyers and activists were targeted for arbitrary arrest and intimidation.³⁴ In April, the Burkinabe government banned BBC Radio and Voice of America from broadcasting in the country for two weeks over their reporting on massacres by the army,³⁵ and, in June, TV5 Monde was banned for six months for alleged disinformation.³⁶ On 12 July, Justice Minister Edasso Rodrigue Bayala announced a ban on homosexual acts.³⁷

Repression has intensified in 2025. Arbitrary detention continued in January, in particular of Guy-Hervé Kam and, in February, unions protested forced conscription and detentions. In March, Idrissa Barry, leader of the Servir et Non Se Servir (SENS) movement, was unlawfully detained along with several colleagues. The Association of Journalists of Burkina Faso was dissolved and journalists faced harassment and detention. These actions further curtailed freedom of expression and silenced opposition voices. Trade unions and civil society groups faced increased pressure as a result of the atmosphere of fear created by the Burkinabé government and its suppression of potential criticism.³⁸

Governance and political developments

Throughout 2024 and into the first half of 2025, Burkina Faso’s transitional authorities focused on consolidating power amid persistent insecurity and internal instability. In July 2023, public demonstrations supported constitutional reforms amid speculation that the military sought to delay elections scheduled for 2024. By September, the government had announced it had thwarted a coup attempt, arrested several officers, and appointed new heads of the security services. In October, further purges targeted the gendarmerie and Captain Traoré strengthened his personal security.³⁹ In December, the cabinet was reshuffled and key ministers, including for education and mining, were replaced.⁴⁰

The regime has continued to consolidate power amid deep-rooted insecurity across the country. In January 2024, authorities foiled another alleged coup involving military officers, civilians, and activists, an event that underscored the fragility of the government.⁴¹ The forced enlistment in the VDP of political figures and activists such as Daouda Diallo and the former Foreign Minister Ablassé Ouédraogo highlighted attempts under the 2023 conscription decree to silence dissent.⁴² President Traoré’s government forced through unpopular fiscal reforms, introducing new taxes on salaries and bonuses while increasing benefits for auxiliaries.⁴³ In December 2024, the junta dissolved the cabinet of Appollinaire J. Kyelem de Tembela and appointed Jean Emmanuel Ouedraogo as prime minister, and granted amnesty to those convicted of participating in the 2015 coup.⁴⁴

In early 2025, the government faced internal instability with repeated attempts to stage coups. Arbitrary detentions, abductions, and forced VDP enrolment intensified in February and March. In April, authorities claimed to have foiled a coup plotted from Côte d’Ivoire, prompting pro-government demonstrations. Tensions persisted in May and June with reports of disappeared soldiers and requests from Traoré for reinforcements from Chad. At the same time, during a troop visit, he reiterated his rejection of dialogue with insurgents and vowed to intensify operations.⁴⁵ The government also pursued a policy of nationalizing the mining sector. In April 2025, authorities announced plans to extend State control over foreign-owned industrial mines, a policy that was implemented in June with the transfer of five mines to the State-owned SOPAMIB.⁴⁶ Investor withdrawal continues and is exemplified by TotalEnergies ceasing operations in February. This reflects Burkina Faso’s deepening isolation and fragile investment climate, signalling a broader shift in the country’s external partnerships.⁴⁷

Developments in international relations

Relations with France had deteriorated sharply during the latter half of 2023, while Burkina Faso deepened ties with other military-led regimes in the Sahel and signalled openness to Russian influence. In September, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger signed the charter of the Alliance of Sahel States, establishing a framework for collective defence.⁴⁸ By December, the three States had announced their withdrawal from the G5 Sahel and outlined plans for a confederation, including a stabilization fund, an investment bank, and a common currency.⁴⁹ At the same time, relations with France worsened; aid was suspended in August, and, in September, diplomatic expulsions occurred.⁵⁰ In December, four French citizens were arrested on suspicion of espionage.⁵¹ Ouagadougou welcomed closer ties with Russia; it held talks on military cooperation in August and, after a thirty-one-year absence, reopened the Russian embassy in December. Russian military personnel reportedly deployed to Burkina Faso in November; officially, to assist in counterinsurgency operations but also to strengthen Traoré’s personal security.⁵²

In 2024, Burkina Faso’s relations with regional and international partners continued to shift. The country, alongside Mali and Niger, formally withdrew from ECOWAS in January, citing “inhumane” sanctions and, in February, confirmed the move was irreversible amid discussions on a Sahelian federation. ECOWAS leaders, including Nigerian President Tinubu, appealed without success for a reconsideration of the position. Russian influence deepened with the arrival of around 100 troops in January, part of a planned 300-strong military deployment.⁵³ In April, Burkina Faso expelled three French diplomats for alleged subversive activities.⁵⁴ In June, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, pledged military supplies and instructors to strengthen Burkinabé defence capabilities.⁵⁵ By July, ECOWAS was warning of the bloc’s potential disintegration if Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger persisted in leaving the confederation following the implementation of sanctions and severing of diplomatic relations after a military coup in each country.⁵⁶

In early 2025, relations with neighbours and external powers remained tense. In January, ECOWAS formally recognized the exit of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.⁵⁷ The tension in relations with France escalated with Traoré condemning Macron’s remarks about African ‘ingratitude’ and calling for the closure of French military bases. Relations with Côte d’Ivoire were also strained by the arrest of a Burkinabé activist linked to the junta, and in April, Burkina Faso accused Ivorian authorities of harbouring coup plotters, a claim denied by Abidjan.⁵⁸ The three countries withdrew ambassadors from Algeria in protest over claims of the shooting down of a drone near Mali.⁵⁹ Additionally, in April, Burkina Faso granted a Russian firm, Nordgold, a mining licence for the Niou gold deposit.⁶⁰ In May, Traoré visited Moscow for talks with President Putin and in Tehran, met with Iranian and Afghan officials, fuelling speculation about indirect channels to JNIM via the Taliban. In June, five Ivorian gendarmes were briefly detained by Burkinabé auxiliaries at the border but were subsequently released preventing a further deterioration.⁶¹

Creation of the ‘Alliance of Sahel States’ (AES) between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger

Following an ECOWAS threat of military intervention in Niger, the military authorities in Bamako and Ouagadougou jointly stated on 1 August 2023 that any military intervention by ECOWAS would be considered a declaration of war against Mali and Burkina Faso.⁶² The next day, a senior junta leader in Niger, General Salifou Modi, met the transitional presidents of Mali and Burkina Faso in their respective capitals to discuss a potential for cooperation between the three States.⁶³ Following these talks, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso signed a charter on 16 September 2023 to establish the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) as part of an initiative to create a framework for collective defence and mutual assistance.⁶⁴

On 1 December 2023, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger announced the decision to form a three-State confederation, establish a stabilization fund and an investment bank, and eventually introduce a common currency.⁶⁵ The next day, Burkina Faso and Niger followed Mali’s lead in leaving the G5 Sahel anti-jihadist alliance. Mauritania and Chad, the two remaining members, acknowledged on 6 December 2023 that the three founding members had left the alliance, paving the way for its dissolution.⁶⁶

The foreign ministers of the AES convened in Niamey, the capital of Niger, on 17 May 2024 to finalize the documents establishing the alliance.⁶⁷ On 20 May 2024, AES initiated joint military exercises in conjunction with Chadian and Togolese troops in Niger’s western region.⁶⁸ An AES summit was held on 6 July 2024 in Niamey to deliberate on joint military operations and reaffirmed the decision to exit ECOWAS.⁶⁹

In early 2025, the governments of the three member States in the alliance began issuing a common biometric passport.⁷⁰ On 21 January 2025, the Nigerien Defence Minister, Salifou Modi, announced the formation of a 5,000-strong military unit, known as the ‘unified force’, to fight terrorism.⁷¹ Between late February and the middle of March 2025, the unified force conducted Operation ‘Yereko 2’ in the tri-border area, which includes Tillabéri, which seemingly targeted IS Sahel, though the number of casualties is unknown.⁷²

A rebranded support force: the Russian Federation’s Africa Corps

Africa Corps is currently operating in Burkina Faso.⁷³ A fully equipped contingent arrived in Ouagadougou on 24 January 2024. ⁷⁴ Initially, 100 Africa Corps personnel were deployed for the purpose of providing security, including patrolling dangerous areas, and to train Burkinabé forces. Reports at the time suggested that at least 200 additional personnel would be deployed to strengthen the force.⁷⁵

The relationship between Wagner Group and Africa Corps remains murky.⁷⁶ In 2023, the head of Wagner, Yevgeny Prigozhin, mutinied against Russia’s military leadership, before being killed in a bombing of his plane in August. In the aftermath, the Kremlin moved swiftly to prevent further insurrection by tightening control over Wagner and other paramilitary groups. Since then, these forces have been integrated more formally into Russia’s military structure, with the newly established Africa Corps emerging as the dominant vehicle for overseas operations.⁷⁷ The newly identified entity appears either to be independent of the pre-existing Russian private military company Redut or to have absorbed Redut, and is now overseen by the deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov.⁷⁸

The opaque relationship that exists between the Wagner Group and now Africa Corps and the Russian State complicates conflict classification and assigning accountability; specifically, does Wagner and now Africa Corps function as an organ of the Russian State or were/are otherwise under Russia’s effective control, or did/do they operate independently?⁷⁹ The uncertain status affects whether Wagner and now Africa Corps personnel should be viewed as combatants or mercenaries and, consequently, whether the Russian State bears responsibility for their actions.⁸⁰

The personnel of PMSCs may be considered combatants in an international armed conflict if they are incorporated into a State’s armed forces or into groups under a command responsible to a party to the conflict; if not incorporated in either, they are civilians. Pursuant to Article 4A(4) of Geneva Convention III, civilians formally accompanying armed forces upon capture may be entitled to prisoner-of-war status.⁸¹ When States contract with PMSCs, they gain responsibility for regulating and supervising their services and ensuring that contracted personnel respect IHL. In certain circumstances under international law, the conduct of PMSC personnel may be attributable to the contracting State, for example, if the company is incorporated into the armed forces or is entrusted with governmental authority.⁸² States can determine which services PMSCs are authorized to perform, for example, by limiting them to support roles without allowing them to participate directly in hostilities including through intelligence activities.⁸³

Groups such as the Wagner Group raise further legal questions, particularly as the legal structure of these groups remains unclear. They may not fit a conventional PMSC definition that requires its expression in a corporate form.⁸⁴ Conversely, Africa Corps is under supervision from the Russian Ministry of Defence⁸⁵ and, as a result, its members may be considered as State agents.

Increasingly frequent and diverse VDP activity

In response to the security landscape in Burkina Faso, the National Assembly adopted legislation titled ‘Volunteers of the Defence of the Homeland Act’ on 21 January 2020.⁸⁶ This legislation created the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP), placing pre-existing militias under the government’s authority.⁸⁷ Bellal and Maslen observe that although the term ‘militia’ is not defined under IHL, it can be understood to mean a ‘military or paramilitary unit or group, which is not composed of professional soldiers but of regular citizens who are trained for their military duty in cases of emergency to support regular troops’ and that such groups do not usually form part of the State’s armed forces despite playing a supplementary role.⁸⁸

Article 2 of the Volunteers of the Defence of the Homeland Act qualifies VDPs as an auxiliary to Burkina Faso’s armed forces (FABF).⁸⁹ The VDP’s mission is to serve the security interests of villages or residential areas in accordance with contracts entered into by each such VDP and the Burkinabe State.⁹⁰ Villagers recruited into the VDPs receive a renewable contract⁹¹ that details the benefits the fighters receive, including remuneration, health insurance, and funeral costs.⁹² It is, however, suggested that compensation is insufficient, leading to low morale and motivation among VDP fighters.⁹³ The Burkinabe government responded on 10 January 2024 by approving pay raises for VDP fighters.⁹⁴ VDPs are also sent to undergo at least two weeks of training at regional military garrisons or the National Patriotic Watch Brigade (BNVP) training centre in Ouagadougou, where candidates also receive weapons.⁹⁵ It is suggested that not all militia members of the VDP complete training or even receive training at all despite training being mandatory. VDPs have occasionally been labelled as “ill-disciplined and poorly trained”.⁹⁶ Despite receiving training, VDPs are often accused of committing violations against the civilians they are tasked with protecting.⁹⁷

Article 15 of the of the Volunteers of the Defence of the Homeland Act states that the VDPs owe allegiance to the FABF and are required to collaborate when so needed. The Article further goes on to state that VDPs are bound by IHL (“customs and usages of war”) which also binds Burkina Faso.⁹⁸ Once established, the VDP units are placed under the command of the nearest military detachment, specialized police units, gendarmerie brigade, or, if none of these units is available, the nearest police station.⁹⁹ Thus, not all VDPs are placed under the command of the military for combat purposes. Indeed, VDPs operate both independently and alongside military and security forces, occupying auxiliary roles and acting as village defense forces but also engaging in direct confrontations, ambushes, and large-scale coordinated operations with air and ground forces.¹⁰⁰

These different roles can result in a classification conundrum. Those VDPs who operate alongside the Burkinabe military and are incorporated under the command of the military may qualify as auxiliary armed forces. Article 43(3) of Additional Protocol I determines that incorporated militia might become part of the armed forces.¹⁰¹ In practice, however, support by militias to armed forces does not always qualify militias as part of the armed forces.¹⁰² As VDPs do not meet the organization criteria to qualify as non-State actors, the support-based approach¹⁰³ cannot be used to qualify it as a party to the pre-existing NIAC in which is the militias are playing a role. Other VDPs act independently from military units deployed in Burkina Faso and specifically defend their own villages,¹⁰⁴ much like the traditional understanding of pure self-defence groups.

Despite the exact nature of the different VDPs being unclear, what is clear is that these actors are increasingly relied on by the Burkinabe government in its fight against JNIM.¹⁰⁵ In terms of Aticle 4 of Geneva Convention III, when engaging in an offensive role, VDPs should have the status of militia who belong to Burkina Faso and, as such, are bound by IHL.¹⁰⁶ At other times when these groups are acting in self-defence or to defend their communities from attacks which are unlawful, in accordance with Article 13(3) of Additional Protocol II their fighters will be civilians unless and for such time as they participate directly in hostilities.¹⁰⁷ Nonetheless, VDP militia are often accused of causing civilian harm.¹⁰⁸

Non-International Armed Conflict between Burkina Faso (supported by Africa Corps and, in certain instances, by VDP units) and Jama’at Nasr Al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM)

Background

JNIM, which was founded in March 2017, is the product of a merger of four established groups: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s Sahara Emirate, Al-Murabitun, Ansar Dine, and Katiba Macina.¹ Ansarul Islam, which was once believed to be an independent actor in Burkina Faso, has been absorbed into JNIM as the Burkinabe wing of JNIM.² JNIM’s growing influence is reflected in a rising death toll which increased by 68 per cent in 2023.³

Intensity

Capturing all engagements between jihadist groups in Burkina Faso and the Burkina Faso Armed Forces (FABF) is difficult, as reports often only refer to the generic ‘unnamed alleged jihadist insurgents’.⁴ The United Nations Secretary-General, in his January 2024 report on the activities of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel, stated that ‘Burkina Faso remained the epicentre of attacks by violent extremists in the Sahel’ in 2023.⁵

Clashes between FABF and JNIM were recorded in November 2023,⁶ December 2023,⁷ January 2024,⁸ February 2024,⁹ June 2024,¹⁰ July 2024,¹¹ August 2024,¹² December 2024,¹³ January 2025,¹⁴ February 2025,¹⁵ April 2025,¹⁶ May 2025,¹⁷ and June 2025.¹⁸ It is clear that throughout the reporting period, the FABF and JNIM clashed frequently, with multiple clashes reported almost every month.

Notable clashes include a military offensive launched by JNIM on 26 November 2023.¹⁹ JNIM attacked a Burkinabe military base in the city of Djibo in the Sahel region.²⁰ JNIM also concurrently attacked homes and internally displaced persons camps, killing at least forty civilians.²¹

Another notable attack by JNIM against a Burkinabe army base occurred on 11 June 2024.²² This clash between JNIM and the FABF took place in Mansila, Yagha and was the deadliest single incident since August 2021, killing 114 soldiers.²³ This clash included fighters attached to the VDP. ²⁴ This attack killed approximately 250 civilians.²⁵

During August 2024, JNIM launched major attacks against the FABF. This includes an attack launched on 9 August 2024 against a Burkinabe defence convoy near Nassougou that killed 148 soldiers, and a subsequent attack in Barsalogo on 24 August that killed 200 people and left 140 injured.²⁶ As a result of the escalating violence, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger entered into an agreement with the Russian aerospace agency on 23 September 2024 for better access to satellite imagery in order to enhance their ability to fight against JNIM and other regional actors.²⁷ JNIM again launched large-scale attacks during May 2025 against Burkinabe strongholds in Djibo and Diapaga, killing at least 200 soldiers.²⁸ Despite not all deaths being recorded, most clashes between the FABF and JNIM resulted in significant casualties which includes soldiers, fighters, and civilians.²⁹ JNIM, in regularly launching large-scale offensives, also often engage in mass killings of soldiers.³⁰

JNIM, as is the case with other Salafi Jihadist groups operating in the tri-border area, mostly relies on military grade weapons, including assault rifles, battle rifles, grenade launchers, machine guns, mortars, and rocket launchers. Often, their rifles are said to have been manufactured in China.³¹

Most weapons are acquired through opportunism; JNIM takes weapons from FABF in the aftermath of a successful clash.³² JNIM increasingly relies on IEDs as its choice of weapon.³³ As of September 2023, JNIM has upgraded its arsenal to include quadcopter drones, which are modified to be able to launch IEDs.³⁴ JNIM’s ability to modify drones provides it with a tactical advantage to execute precision strikes.³⁵

Although internal displacement figures are not attributable to JNIM’s activities specifically, this is the most active non-State actor in Burkina Faso. Reporting suggests that in 2023 alone approximately 983,000 people were categorised as newly internally displaced.³⁶ The conflict in Burkina Faso is flagged as one of the situations with the highest number of forced displacements primarily driven by conflict.³⁷

Burkinabe authorities claim to control about 70 percent of its national territory,³⁸ however, JNIM retains control over large parts of Burkinabe territory, with current external estimates indicating that as much as 60 per cent of Burkina Faso’s territory is outside military control.³⁹ This enables JNIM to launch planned and persistent military operations against the FABF. Despite achieving dominance over extensive areas of Burkina Faso, it is not essential to JNIM’s governance strategy to maintain a complete monopoly of force over a given territory. Instead, units seek sufficient local support so that populations choose cooperation over reliance on other armed or political actors.⁴⁰

JNIM has the necessary capacity to conduct sustained, coordinated, and complex military operations across large areas of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. It has assaulted military bases, engaged in ambushes and urban seizures, uses IEDs, and destroyed infrastructure. The group actively targets national armies, international peacekeepers, allied militias, and rival groups such as the ISSP.⁴¹ It engages in multi-front attacks and deploys reinforcements from other regions, a tactic that allows the group to engage in sustained armed conflict, thereby demonstrating its compliance with the organizational criteria for IHL.⁴² The territorial control the group exercises allows it to engage in sustained military operations. As its activities have expanded, JNIM’s military operations have become more frequent and expanded both its geographic reach and scope, placing it on the same level as other violent actors in the region.⁴³

The nature of attacks initiated by JNIM is clearly planned and executed frequently and thus sustained and concerted military operations as demanded by Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II of 1977.⁴⁴

The intensity of violence generated by the engagements between JNIM and FABA satisfies the requirements for a NIAC under IHL.

Organization

JNIM is the Sahel branch of al-Qaeda. It is a Salafi-jihadist group that has as a parent organization al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which was established in the 1990s Algerian civil war.⁴⁵

JNIM has an organized command structure which resembles a top-down hierarchy. Essentially, there are three overall hierarchical tiers: central leadership, regional commanders and local commanders.⁴⁶ Central leadership includes its emir, Iyad Ag Ghaly(aka Abu al-Fadl), who founded Ansar Dine.⁴⁷ Deputy leaders include Yahya Abu Hammam (Djamel Okacha), the leader of AQIM Sahara, Amadou Koufa, the leader of the Katibat Macina (Macina Liberation Front or FLM), and Abu Hassan al-Ansari, the deputy leader of al-Mourabitoun.⁴⁸ Abu Abdul Rahman Ali al-Sanhaji (Ali Maychou) who is a representative of AQIM Sahara is another deputy leader of JNIM who also acts as a senior judge and religious advisor, known as a ‘Koufa’, for the group.⁴⁹ This arrangement provides strategic cohesion and operational coordination across dispersed regions. Though strategic decisions emanate from the centre, local commanders possess a degree of autonomy in daily operations. Cross-regional deployment of senior military and religious cadres reinforces internal cohesion and control.⁵⁰

Different subgroups are at the disposal of top leadership but operate with some flexibility as the subgroups are divided into regionally separate areas.⁵¹ These subgroups are organized to facilitate coordination and deepen cooperation in the group.

JNIM’s organizational structure has been described as ‘strategically coherent’ with senior regional commanders deployed to external subgroups to ensure cooperation and discipline. ⁵² Some analysts, though, dispute whether this level of coherence exists between subgroups,⁵³ instead describing JNIM as essentially an umbrella group.⁵⁴ The group’s operational capabilities include conducting multi-front attacks which utilize reinforcement units (noussoura) from other regions. A high operational tempo and strategic flexibility enable JNIM to outmanoeuvre its opponents and to sustain prolonged combat engagements, thus meeting the IHL criteria of organizational capacity and be able to sustain armed conflict.⁵⁵ This hierarchical organizational structure is akin to responsible command as required by Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II.

Discipline is enforced at the highest level by a ‘Majlis Shura’ (Consultative Council) which publicly responds to accusations of atrocities. JNIM’s Shura council ensures Islamic governance and strict adherence to Islamic law in areas under JNIM control.⁵⁶ These bodies, as well as the tiered command structure, enable JNIM to implement IHL. Training is offered to fighters by highly mobile units using motorcycles to facilitate training where and when needed across the Sahel region.⁵⁷ Training camps located in JNIM strongholds create the opportunity to implement IHL and enhance discipline among fighters. Territorial control, as depicted above and below, enables ISSP to implement IHL, including Additional Protocol II, as required by Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. Article 1(1) demands the ability to implement Additional Protocol II, not its actual implementation.⁵⁸

JNIM’s military tactics include purposefully encircling isolated strategic zones, weakening the state presence, and creating a power vacuum.⁵⁹ JNIM prefers remote violence, such as using explosives, artillery and mortar fire over swarming tactics and ambushes, which are the typical modus operandi of ISSP.⁶⁰ Part of its military tactics includes the use of IEDs to destroy military and other infrastructure.⁶¹

JNIM facilitates logistics through an extended network across central Sahel into the West African littoral states including parts of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin, Ivory Coast, and Togo.⁶² Weapons and munitions are replenished through large-scale attacks on garrisons or auxiliary camps belonging to state armed forces in the operational area.⁶³ Weapons and other military needs are also met by the profits from a combination of artisanal mining, livestock theft, fundraising, taxation, and looting.⁶⁴ The group has been reported to repurpose seized humanitarian-use vehicles, including ambulances and UN vehicles, highlighting its capability to effectively manage and integrate commandeered resources.⁶⁵

JNIM‘s vast territorial reach⁶⁶ gives it a large recruitment pool.⁶⁷ It is reported that JNIM has between 5,000 and 6,000 fighters in its ranks.⁶⁸ JNIM uses its media wing, al-Zallaqa,⁶⁹ and propaganda channels⁷⁰ to communicate with the outside world and to control its narrative. JNIM’s official spokesperson is, at the time of reporting, Mahmoud Barry.⁷¹

Territorial control is a requirement of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. As mentioned above, JNIM continues to control territory in Burkina Faso. JNIM specifically exercises consolidated control over rural areas in Ouro Gueladjo, which is in the south-west of Niger.⁷² In Burkina Faso, the group is believed to control or exert significant influence across large swathes of territory, with activity reported in eleven of the country’s thirteen regions.⁷³

Lastly, from the intensity assessment above, clearly the territory controlled by JNIM facilitates the planning of military operations, fulfilling the final requirement in Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II, which requires JNIM to be sufficiently organized to launch sustained and concerted attacks.⁷⁴

The organizational structure of JNIM is sophisticated and complies with the four organizational requirements under Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. Hence, the NIAC between Niger and JNIM constitutes an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC.

1
L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel’, Critical Threats, 20 November 2024; ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin’, Australian Government: Australian National Security; H. Nsaibia, ‘New frontlines: Jihadist expansion is reshaping the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands’, ACLED, 27 March 2025.
2
Africa Center for Strategic Studies, ‘The shifting front of militant Islamist Violence in the Sahel’, DefenceWeb, 20 May 2025; E. Beevor, ‘JNIM Burkina Faso: A strategic criminal actor’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, August 2022.
3
N. Wilén, ‘Silence in the Sahel does not Equal Stability’, Egmont Policy Brief 374, April 2025.
4
‘At least 14 members of Burkina Faso security forces killed in terror attack’, France 24, 23 March 2023.
5
‘Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel’, UN Doc S/2023/1075, 2 January 2025, para 24.
6
‘Dozens killed in attack by armed groups in Burkina Faso, UN says’, France 24, 28 November 2023
7
L. Serwat et al, ‘Regional Overview: Africa: December 2023’, ACLED, 12 January 2024; Wassim Nasr, X, 28 December 2023
8
‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, January 2024
9
‘Burkina Faso: une série d’attaques terroristes dans plusieurs localités du pays’, RFI, 26 February 2024; ‘ECHO Daily Flash’, European Commission, 27 February 2024; ‘Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/521, 1 July 2024, para 23 May 2024, ‘Statement by the Humanitarian Coordinator ad interim in Burkina Faso on the recent violence in Séguénéga, Nord region’, Reliefweb, 27 May 2024; H. Sourou, ‘Attaques Terroristes au Burkina Faso : Deuil et Désolation’, Journal du Niger, 24 May 2024; ‘New evidence shows atrocities committed by army in Burkina Faso’, France 24, 17 May 2024
10
‘Al-Qaeda affiliate claims responsibility for June attack in Burkina Faso’, Al Jazeera, 16 June 2024; ‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, June 2024
11
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group; ‘Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/521, 1 July 2024, para 23
12
‘Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel’, UN Doc S/2024/871, 2 December 2024, para 22
13
‘Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/187, 26 March 2025, para 19
14
‘Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/187, 26 March 2025, para 19
15
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group March 2025,‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group
16
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group
17
‘Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/495, 31 July 2025, para 25; ‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group
18
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group.
19
‘Dozens killed in attack by armed groups in Burkina Faso, UN says’, France 24, 28 November 2023.
20
‘Dozens killed in attack by armed groups in Burkina Faso, UN says’, France 24, 28 November 2023.
21
‘Dozens killed in attack by armed groups in Burkina Faso, UN says’, France 24, 28 November 2023; ‘Burkina Faso: jihadist attack in the north, against the town of Djibo’, Africa News, 13 August 2024.
22
‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, June 2024; ‘Al-Qaeda affiliate claims responsibility for June attack in Burkina Faso’, Al Jazeera, 16 June 2024.
23
‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, June 2024; L. Serwat et al, ‘Africa Overview: June 2024’, ACLED, 5 July 2024.
24
Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, June 2024.
25
‘Global Overview’, International Crisis Group, June 2024.
26
‘Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel’, UN Doc S/2024/871, 2 December 2024, para 22.
27
‘Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel’, UN Doc S/2024/871, 2 December 2024, para 27.
28
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group.
29
‘Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel’, UN Doc S/2023/1075, 2 January 2025, para 24; ‘Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel’, UN Doc S/2024/871, 2 December 2024, para 22; ‘Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/495, 31 July 2025, para 25.
30
H. Nsaibia, ‘Conflict intensifies and instability spreads beyond Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger’, ACLED, 12 December 2024.
31
‘Point-Blank: Weapons Seized from Salafi-Jihadist Groups in the Central Sahel – Issue 02’, ReliefWeb, April 2025, 5.
32
‘Point-Blank: Weapons Seized from Salafi-Jihadist Groups in the Central Sahel – Issue 02’, ReliefWeb, April 2025, 9.
33
‘Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/187, 26 March 2025, para 18; H. Nsaibia, ‘Conflict intensifies and instability spreads beyond Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger’, ACLED, 12 December 2024.
34
L. Serwat et al, ‘Africa Overview: April 2025’, ACLED, 4 April 2025.
35
H. Nsaibia, ‘Conflict intensifies and instability spreads beyond Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger’, ACLED, 12 December 2024; ‘ACLED Regional Overview Africa: May 2025’, ReliefWeb, 10 May 2025.
36
‘ECHO Daily Flash’, European Commission, 27 February 2024.
37
‘A hyper-prioritized Global Humanitarian Overview 2025: the cruel math of aid cuts’, Humanitarian Action, 10 June 2025.
38
‘Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/187, 26 March 2025, para 19
39
‘Africa’s Constantly Evolving Militant Islamist Threat’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 13 August 2024; P. Sippy and J. Boswall, ‘How an al-Qaeda offshoot became one of Africa’s deadliest militant groups’, BBC, 7 July 2025
40
E. Beevor, ‘JNIM Burkina Faso: A strategic criminal actor’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, August 2022.
41
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
42
H. Nsiabia et al ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and ACLED, October 2023.
43
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
44
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, ICRC International Humanitarian Law Databases.
45
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023; L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel’, Critical Threats, 20 November 2024.
46
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
47
J. Thompson, ‘Examining Extremism: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 July 2021; ‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
48
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
49
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
50
H. Nsiabia et al, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and ACLED, October 2023, 17-20.
51
L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel’, Critical Threats, 20 November 2024; H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023; J. Thompson, ‘Examining Extremism: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 July 2021; ‘Mapping armed groups in Mali and the Sahel’, European Council on Foreign Relations; ‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
52
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
53
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025; D. Eizenga and W. Williams, ‘The Puzzle of JNIM and Militant Islamist Groups in the Sahel’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, December 2020
54
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
55
H. Nsiabia et al., ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and ACLED, October 2023.
56
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025; H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
57
‘JNIM Training Camp in Burkina Faso Shows Terror Group’s Deadly Ambition’, Africa Defense Forum, 18 June 2024; C. Weiss, ‘JNIM documents training camp in Burkina Faso’, Online Article, Long War Journal, 25 May 2024.
58
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.38.
59
‘After Tillabéri, Is Niamey the Next Target?’, Zagazola, 9 April 2025; ‘Le JNIM frappe au Niger: offensive éclair contre la base militaire de Mossipaga, l’AES en difficulté’, Daily Motion, 20 May 2025.
60
J. G. Birru, ‘IS Sahel’s tactics cause mass, indiscriminate violence’, ACLED, 13 January 2023.
61
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
62
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
63
‘Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/556, 22 July 2024, para 18.
64
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
65
H. Nsiabia et al, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and ACLED, October 2023.
66
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023
67
‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/71/Rev.1, 6 February 2025, para 12.
68
‘Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/556, 22 July 2024, para 10.
69
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025
70
M. Laplace, ‘Al‑Qaeda affiliate JNIM claims attack near Niamey’, The Africa Report, 19 October 2024; ‘Mapping armed groups in Mali and the Sahel’, European Council on Foreign Relations
71
LSI Africa, X, 26 November 2024; ‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
72
H. Bori, ‘Africa File, November 7, 2024: Niamey Threatened; Boko Haram Fallout in Chad; M23 Marches on Eastern DRC; Somalia-Jubbaland Tensions’, Critical Threats, 7 November 2024.
73
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
74
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.40; M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021.

Non-international armed conflict between Burkina Faso (supported by Africa Corps) and Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP)

Background

ISSP operates predominantly in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, specifically in the state border region (Liptako-Gourma) where the three countries meet.¹ ISSP, formerly Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), is an Islamist militant group that adheres to the Salafi jihadist ideology. ISSP was formed on 15 May 2015 following a split in the militant group Al-Mourabitoun, triggered by one of its leaders, Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, pledging allegiance to Islamic State. From March 2019 to 2022, the group was formally a part of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), during which it was referred to as ISWAP Greater Sahara. In March 2022, Islamic State declared the group an autonomous province, separating it from ISWAP and renaming it ISSP.² ISSP carried out its first attacks in Burkina Faso in 2016.³

Intensity

By July 2024, it was estimated that ISSP had 2,000 to 3,000 fighters in its ranks.⁴ ISSP has been less active in Burkina Faso than in Mali and Niger during this reporting period⁵ which is consistent with previous activity in this tri-border region.⁶ In conformity with earlier reports that ISSP’s influence was geographically limited in Burkina Faso, it has been reported that the group is largely confined to the northern Sahel province.⁷ ACLED describes ISSP in Burkina Faso to be ‘stagnant’ as a consequence of the military dominance of JNIM, the Burkinabe Armed Forces and VDPs across the country.⁸

Activity attributed to ISSP during this reporting period includes an August 2024 attack against the Catholic Diocese of Nouna church by a Salafi Jihadist group in Burkina Faso’s Sanaba village. Twenty-six people died in this attack.⁹ ISSP ambushed a military convoy near Katchirga village in the Sahel region on 11 January 2025, killing eighteen soldiers and three civilians.¹⁰ The first significant military operations launched by ISSP in the tri-border area during 2025 occurred between late May and mid-June; the attack was near the Burkinabe border but not inside Burkina Faso itself.¹¹

ISSP produces its own IEDs¹² which include vehicle-borne IEDs.¹³ Its arsenal also includes mortars¹⁴ and small arms, including assault rifles.¹⁵ Its tactics include the ambushing of military convoys.¹⁶

The conflict in Burkina Faso is flagged as one of the situations with the highest number of forced displacements primarily driven by conflict. While it is not possible to attribute exact numbers to specific actors, the violent activities of the ISSP may contribute to displacement in areas of operation.¹⁷

Although attacks between FABF and ISSP are infrequent, they remain deadly, and the notion of intensity in IHL remains satisfied. Infrequency of attacks does not lead to the declassification of pre-existing NIACs; these conflicts only end when lasting peace without the risk of resumption of fighting is achieved.¹⁸

Organization

ISSP is a Salafi-jihadist militant group and the Sahelian affiliate of Islamic State.¹⁹ ISSP’s leadership structure integrates foreign and local leadership from diverse ethnic backgrounds, including from the Arab, Dawsahak, Djerma Fulani, Songhai, and Tuareg ethnic groups.²⁰ ISSP has a consolidated chain of command and senior leadership roles are held by Western Saharan and Malian Arabs. One such senior official is Abu al-Bara al-Sahrawi, who, in addition to serving as the current governor, is the emir (leader) in one of the core military zones operating out of the In-Araban area of Mali.²¹

ISSP’s organizational structure is divided into four regions, which are Burkina Faso, Muthalath (the tri-state border region), Anderamboukane, and Azawagh (Mali/Niger borderlands between Menaka, Tillabéri, and Tahoua). Five distinct military zones (at an operational level) are spread across the four regions with each military zone given specific geographical operational tasks. The military zones all have a similar operational command structure. At the head of each zone is the emir who governs the zone. Other senior leadership roles mirrored in each zone include a cadi (judge) and military commanders. Zone 1 covers areas in Burkina Faso and the Gourma; Zone 2 covers the Haoussa area; Zone 3 extends to the area between Amalaoulou, Akabar, and In-Delimane; Zone 4 constitutes the area between Menaka, Anderamboukane, and Abala; and Zone 5 (the Eastern zone) covers Azawagh.²² ISSP’s command structure is therefore sophisticated.

The ISSP is operated by a majlis al-shura or central leadership council. Under the majlis al shura are four offices: the Law and Sanctions Office, the Military and Operations Office, Logistics Office, and the Foreign Fighters Office. The group can discipline fighters through the Law and Sanctions Office which is composed of judges and the Islamic police. This Office operates under al-Sahrawi, Youssof Ould Chouaib, Talha al-Jazairi, and Dadi Ould Chouaib.²³

Logistical support for ISSP operations depends on a series of strongholds in the Sahel. The group has support bases in Tillabéri and a control hub in Mali’s Ménaka region, a region that includes the border town adjacent to Niger, Andéramboukane.²⁴ The Malian border villages of Akabar, Tabankort and In-Araban in the Menaka region, and Amalaoulou and In-Delimane in the Gao region along the border with Niger constitute key ISSP bases and are the group’s traditional stronghold. ISSP has various supply routes and support zones over a vast area²⁵ to facilitate logistics. For example, the routes are used to ensure the supply and resupply of weapons and ammunition and to allow for the movement of fighters. Such support zones and critical supply corridors cover the area between Tillabéri, Tahoua and Dosso in south-western Niger and areas in Sokoto and Kebbi states in north-western Nigeria.²⁶

ISSP is organized to maintain close geographic proximity ensuring a fluidity between military zones as a means of maintaining high levels of interconnectedness. This organization enables the coordination of major attacks and offensives between military zones. Often, the strategy of concentration of forces between different zones enables ISSP to deploy large numbers of fighters from different zones in the same general operation if the need arises.²⁷ ISSP fighters set up camp in dense forest areas to escape aerial surveillance.²⁸ When ISSP mounts a large-scale attack seeking to take control over enemy military bases or territory, vehicle-borne IEDs are employed to overrun the defences.²⁹ ISSP also conducts multi-front attacks to put pressure on its enemy. This level of organization shows the ability of the group to execute planned military operations.³⁰

Motorcycles enable fighters to move around swiftly and gives greater mobility in reaching a military objective as well as in retreat. ISSP fights an ‘asymmetric’ conflict, largely relying on ambushes using IEDs planted where military patrols are expected to pass and attacking once the IEDs are remotely detonated.³¹ Other tactics employed by ISSP include mortar attacks, roadside bombs, suicide bombings and attaching explosive devices to vehicles.³²

Operating in marginalized communities with weakened resistance offers ISSP a ripe opportunity to recruit. ISSP has been accused of actively recruiting children as fighters, training and deploying them on the front line.³³ Also, there has been active recruitment in north-western Nigeria.³⁴ ISSP unifies communication through its media branch, responsible for the Islamic State-run Al-Naba, a news platform on which official communiqués are released.³⁵

Primarily, ISSP is motivated by an extremist ideological narrative but also focuses on the pursuit of greater territorial control and in Niger, specifically, it aims to control more territory than its rival JNIM.³⁶ During the period under review, ISSP increased its territorial footprint across the tri-border area, called the Liptako-Gourma tri-border region, which covers parts of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.³⁷ ISSP’s territorial reach in Burkina Faso, however, remains limited and does not yet meet the additional requirements necessitated by Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II to consider the conflict between Burkina Faso and the ISSP to be an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC. However, the nature of organization of the ISSP continues to fulfil the minimum organizational requirements demanded under IHL.

The pre-existing NIAC between Burkina Faso and ISSP continued throughout the reporting period.

1
L. Serwat et al, ‘Q&A: The Islamic State’s pivot to Africa’, ACLED, 4 September 2025.
2
K. Chestnutt and K. Zimmerman, ‘The State of al Qaeda and ISIS Around the World’, Critical Threats, 8 September 2022; T. Bacon and J. Warner, ‘The Threat in Africa – the New Epicenter of Global Jihadi Terror’, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point: Sentinel, September 2021, 80; J. Zenn, ‘Islamic State in West Africa Province and the Battle With Boko Haram’, Terrorism Monitor, 20 March 2020, 6.
3
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
4
‘Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/556, 22 July 2024; A. Shtuni, ‘The Islamic State in 2025: an Evolving Threat Facing a Waning Global Response’, International Center for Counter-Terrorism, 11 July 2025.
5
P. Van Ostaeyen et al, ‘Sahel Monitoring May 2025’, Counter Extremism Project, 30 July 2025
6
R. Chason, ‘Why the Islamic State is surging in Africa’, The Washington Post, 4 December 2023; ‘Burkina Faso: Violence Against Health Care in Conflict’, Insecurity Insight, 2023; ‘Burkina Faso: At least 44 killed in ‘despicable and barbaric’ attacks’, Sky News, 9 April 2023.
7
‘Burkina Faso’, Clingendael, 2024, 173.
8
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
9
‘Catholic Charity Condemns Massacre of 26 Christians after Attack on Church in Burkina Faso, Appeals for Prayer for Peace’, Association for Catholic Information in Africa, 30 August 2024.
10
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group.
11
‘West Africa and the Sahel’, Security Council Report, 30 July 2025.
12
M. Bere, ‘The Islamic State in the Sahel: Understanding its Internal and External Dynamics and Attack Modalities’, Perspectives on Terrorism, June 2024; ‘At least 23 Niger soldiers killed in ambush, defence ministry says’, Reuters, 22 March 2024; ‘Six Nigerien Soldiers Killed in Landmine Blast’, Voice of America: Africa, 11 April 2024
13
‘ISIS-Sahel’, Director of National Intelligence: Counter Terrorism Guide, September 2024; ‘At least 23 Niger soldiers killed in ambush, defence ministry says’, Reuters, 22 March 2024; M. Bere, ‘The Islamic State in the Sahel: Understanding its Internal and External Dynamics and Attack Modalities’, Perspectives on Terrorism, June 2024.
14
‘ISIS-Sahel’, Director of National Intelligence: Counter Terrorism Guide, September 2024
15
M. Bere, ‘The Islamic State in the Sahel: Understanding its Internal and External Dynamics and Attack Modalities’, Perspectives on Terrorism, June 2024.
16
O. Badiane, ‘Comment comprendre les récentes attaques coordonnées de groupes armés au Sahel?’, BBC News Afrique, 6 June 2025.
17
‘A hyper-prioritized Global Humanitarian Overview 2025: the cruel math of aid cuts’, Humanitarian Action, 10 June 2025.
18
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” is Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, 2024, 18–19.
19
J. G. Birru, ‘IS Sahel’s tactics cause mass, indiscriminate violence’, ACLED, 13 January 2023.
20
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
21
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
22
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
23
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
24
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
25
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024
26
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
27
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
28
M. Bere, ‘The Islamic State in the Sahel: Understanding its Internal and External Dynamics and Attack Modalities’, Perspectives on Terrorism, June 2024.
29
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024; ‘West Africa and the Sahel’, Security Council Report, 30 July 2025; ‘ISIS-Sahel’, Director of National Intelligence: Counter Terrorism Guide, September 2024.
30
L. Serwat et al, ‘Africa Overview: July 2025’, ACLED, 4 July 2025.
31
M. Bere, ‘The Islamic State in the Sahel: Understanding its Internal and External Dynamics and Attack Modalities’, Perspectives on Terrorism, June 2024.
32
M. Bere, ‘The Islamic State in the Sahel: Understanding its Internal and External Dynamics and Attack Modalities’, Perspectives on Terrorism, June 2024; ‘ISIS-Sahel’, Director of National Intelligence: Counter Terrorism Guide, September 2024; J. G. Birru, ‘IS Sahel’s tactics cause mass, indiscriminate violence’, ACLED, 13 January 2023.
33
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
34
J. Barnett et al, ‘Northwestern Nigeria: A Jihadization of Banditry, or a “Banditization” of Jihad?’, Online Article, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, January 2022.
35
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
36
M. Bere, ‘The Islamic State in the Sahel: Understanding its Internal and External Dynamics and Attack Modalities’, Perspectives on Terrorism, June 2024.
37
A. Shtuni, ‘The Islamic State in 2025: an Evolving Threat Facing a Waning Global Response’, International Center for Counter-Terrorism, 11 July 2025.

State Parties

Burkina Faso

Non-State parties

Jama’at Nasr Al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM)
Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP)

Other Non-State Actors

Several independent self-defence groups
Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDPs)

Regional Organizations and Alliances

Joint Force of the Group of Five of the Sahel (G5 Sahel: Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania, and Chad) [Burkina Faso withdrew in December 2023; G5 was then dissolved]
Alliance of Sahel States (AES: Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso)

Foreign involvement

Africa Corps (Russia)

1
S. Hardadou, ‘A history of insurgencies: the case of Burkina Faso’, London School of Economics Blog, 4 October 2023.
2
S. Michalopoulos and E. Papaioannou, ‘The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for Africa’, The American Economic Review, July 2016.
3
J. Boswall, ‘How ‘blood gold’ is fuelling conflict in West Africa’, BBC, 2 July 2025.
4
‘People’s Uprising (Burkina Faso)’, EBSCO, 2023; ‘1960 – 2022: The long history of coups d’état in Burkina Faso’, Africa News, 13 August 2024.
5
‘1960 – 2022: The long history of coups d’état in Burkina Faso’, Africa News, 13 August 2024; A. Sawo, ‘The Chronology of Military Coup d’états and Regimes in Burkina Faso: 1980–2015’, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 2017.
6
‘1970–1983 Engagement’, Blaise Compaoré; ‘1960–2022: The long history of coups d’état in Burkina Faso’, Africa News, 13 August 2024.
7
‘August 4, 1983’, Operndorf Afrika, 4 August 2022; ‘1960–2022: The long history of coups d’état in Burkina Faso’, Africa News, 13 August 2024.
8
‘1960–2022: The long history of coups d’état in Burkina Faso’, Africa News, 13 August 2024.
9
‘The assassination of Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso, October 15, 1987’, Ξεκίνημα, 16 October 2024; ‘1960–2022: The long history of coups d’état in Burkina Faso’, Africa News, 13 August 2024.
10
S. Hardadou, ‘A history of insurgencies: the case of Burkina Faso’, London School of Economics Blog, 4 October 2023.
11
‘Burkina Faso’, Accord, 23 October 2025; ‘1960–2022: The long history of coups d’état in Burkina Faso’, Africa News, 13 August 2024.
12
‘Burkina Faso’s crisis, explained’, Concern Worldwide US, 23 September 2024.
13
T. Ndiaga and A. Mimault, ‘Burkina Faso soldiers announce overthrow of military government’, Reuters, 1 October 2022.
14
J. Chin et al., ‘What Burkina Faso’s Tragic History Teaches Us’, Journal of Democracy, October 2024.
15
‘In Burkina Faso, transitional government dissolved and constitution suspended after second coup this year’, Constitution.net, 3 October 2023; ‘Burkina Faso: Military officers remove President Damiba in a coup’, Al Jazeera, 30 September 2022.
16
‘Burkina Faso leader says elections are not a priority and plans constitutional changes’, Le Monde, 20 September 2023.
17
J. Chin et al., ‘What Burkina Faso’s Tragic History Teaches Us’, Journal of Democracy, October 2024.
18
S. Hardadou, ‘A history of insurgencies: the case of Burkina Faso’, London School of Economics Blog, 4 October 2023.
19
‘Country Analysis: Burkina Faso’, ACAPS.
20
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group.
21
‘At least 70 killed in attack on northern Burkina Faso village on Nov. 5 – prosecutor’, Reuters, 13 November 2023.
22
‘Dozens killed in attack by armed groups in Burkina Faso, UN says’, France 24, 28 November 2028.
23
‘Burkina Faso: Drone Strikes on Civilians Apparent War Crimes’, Human Rights Watch, 25 January 2024.
24
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group.
25
‘Dozens dead after mosque attack in southern Burkina Faso, sources say’, Al Jazeera, 26 February 2024
26
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group; C. Ewokor, ‘Burkina Faso: At least 15 dead in Catholic church attack’, BBC, 25 February 2024.
27
‘Burkina Faso: Army Massacres 223 Villagers’, Human Rights Watch, 25 April 2025; ‘Burkina Faso army executed over 220 villagers in February, HRW says’, CNN, 26 April 2024.
28
‘Up to 200 people killed in attack in central Burkina Faso’, Al Jazeera, 25 August 2024.
29
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group.
30
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group.
31
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group.
32
‘Dengue Fever Kills Hundreds in Burkina Faso as Cases Spike’, Voice of America, 19 October 2023; ‘Dengue fever kills hundreds in Burkina Faso as cases spike’, Reuters, 19 October 2023.
33
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group.
34
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group.
35
J. Donati, ‘Burkina Faso suspends BBC and Voice of America after they covered a report on mass killings’, AP News, 26 April 2024
36
‘Burkina Faso suspends French international station TV5 for six months’, France 24, 19 June 2024.
37
R. Kagoe, ‘Burkina Faso’s military junta to ban homosexual acts’, BBC, 11 July 2024.
38
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group.
39
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group.
40
‘Burkina Faso replaces mining minister as gold output drops’, Mining.com, 18 December 2023; J. Tasamba, ‘Burkina Faso’s military leader sacks foreign minister’, AA, 18 December 2023.
41
‘Burkina Faso 2024’, Amnesty International; ‘Human Rights Defender@Risk: Verification Report on the Unlawful Detention of Maitre Guy Herve Kam’, West Africa Democracy Solidarity Network.
42
‘More than 50 Days Since the Enforced Disappearance of Dr. Daouda Diallo’, Closing Spaces.
43
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group.
44
‘Burkina Faso’s military junta sacks the prime minister and dissolves the government’, AP News, 7 December 2024; ‘Burkina Faso junta appoints new prime minister’, AP News, 8 December 2024; ‘Burkina Faso adopts amnesty law for 2015 putschists’, Africa News, 21 December 2024.
45
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group.
46
This nationalization drive not only reflected Burkina Faso’s pursuit of economic sovereignty but also reshaped its international engagement. Discovery Alert_Burkina Faso’s Mining Nationalization, 29 April 2025.
47
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group.
48
‘Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso sign Sahel security pact’, Reuters, 16 September 2023.
49
W. Ross, ‘G5 Sahel: Niger and Burkina Faso leave anti-Islamist force’, BBC, 3 December 2023.
50
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group.
51
‘Burkina Faso detains four French civil servants, says diplomatic source’, Reuters, 20 December 2023.
52
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group.
53
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group.
54
‘Burkina Faso kicks out three French diplomats over ‘subversive activities’’, Al Jazeera, 18 April 2024.
55
‘Russia to provide more military aid, instructors to Burkina Faso’, Reuters, 5 June 2024.
56
O. Adetayo and F. Onuah, ‘West African bloc says it risks disintegration if junta-led states leave’, Reuters, 7 July 2024.
57
‘Thousands rally in Burkina, Mali and Niger to cheer ECOWAS exit’, France 24, 28 January 2025.
58
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group.
59
W. McMakin et al., ‘Drone downing sparks diplomatic fallout between Algeria and Sahel countries’, AP News, 7 April 2025.
60
‘Burkina Faso grants mining lease to Russia’s Nordgold for gold project’, Reuters, 25 April 2025.
61
‘Africa: Burkina Faso’, International Crisis Group.
62
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Burkina Faso, Mali say military intervention in Niger would be ‘declaration of war’’, France 24, 1 August 2023; ‘Mali, Burkina Faso Warn Niger Intervention Considered ‘Declaration of War’’, Voice of America: Africa, 1 August 2023; A. Wadia, ‘Is Niger the “Ukraine of the Sahel”?’, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 23 August 2023.
63
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; E. Peltier, ‘A Leader of Niger’s Coup Visits Mali, Raising Fears of a Wagner Alliance’, The New York Times, 2 August 2023.
64
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso sign Sahel security pact’, Reuters, 16 September 2023; ‘Liptako-Gourma Charter establishing the Alliance of Sahel States’, in Letter dated 22 September 2023 from the Permanent Representative of Mali to the United Nations addressed to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc S/2023/695, 3 October 2023.
65
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso to move toward monetary alliance, Niger leader says’, Reuters, 11 December 2023.
66
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Burkina Faso and Niger to quit G5 Sahel anti-jihadist force following Mali move’, France 24, 12 February 2023; ‘Burkina Faso, Niger Withdraw from G5 Anti-Jihadist Alliance’, Voice of America: Africa, 6 December 2023; W. Ross, ‘G5 Sahel: Niger and Burkina Faso leave anti-Islamist force’, BBC, 3 December 2023.
67
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger finalise regional alliance project’, The Hindu, 19 May 2024; ‘Intel Report: Formation of the Confederation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)’, Special Eurasia, 24 May 2024.
68
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger hosts military exercise involving central Sahel states, Chad and Togo’, West Africa Democracy Radio, 27 May 2024; ‘Alliance of Sahel States holds military exercises in Niger’, Voice of America: Africa, 27 May 2024; A. R. Dossavi, ‘Togo Takes Part in Joint Military Exercises with Sahel Alliance and Chad’, Togo First, 28 May 2024.
69
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; D. Sow and H. Koné, ‘As AES and ECOWAS drift apart, dialogue on the fundamentals is vital’, Institute for Security Studies, 23 July 2024; ‘«Nos peuples ont irrévocablement tourné le dos à la Cedeao», affirme le chef du régime nigérien’, Le Figaro, 6 July 2024.
70
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘AES : common biometric passports from 29 January 2025’, Africa News Agency, 26 January 2025; ‘Mali, Burkina and Niger to launch biometric passports under new alliance’, Reuters, 15 September 2024; B. Rukanga, and P. Nije, ‘Junta-led West African states to launch new passport’, BBC, 16 September 2024; N. Mwangi, ‘Sahel states exit ECOWAS, launch regional passport and joint military’, Peoples Dispatch, 29 January 2025.
71
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; D. Wabwireh, ‘Alliance of Sahel States to form 5,000-troop military unit’, Africa News, 22 January 2025; ‘Alliance of Sahel States to form 5,000-troop military unit’, West Africa Democracy Solidarity Network; ‘Junta-led Sahel states ready joint force of 5,000 troops, says minister’, Reuters, 22 January 2025.
72
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Confederation of Sahel States (AES) Deploys Unified Military in Tri-Border Region’, West African Voice Network, 7 March 2025; ‘Opération Conjointe des FDS de l’AES Yéréko 2 : Plusieurs terroristes affiliés à l’EIGS tués dans la zone des trois frontières’, Le Sahel, 5 March 2025; I. K. Djitteye, ‘Opération Yereko 2 : une démonstration de force réussie de l’Alliance des États du Sahel’, Sahel Tribune, 10 March 2025.
73
N. Princewill, ‘In Africa, Russia is swapping a ruthless paramilitary for a replica it can control. What’s Putin’s game plan?’, CNN, 25 August 2025.
74
‘Burkina Faso Opens Door for Russia’s Africa Corps’, Africa Defense Forum, 20 February 2024.
75
‘Burkina Faso Opens Door for Russia’s Africa Corps’, Africa Defense Forum, 20 February 2024.
76
C. Faulkner et al., ‘Africa Corps: Has Russia Hit a Ceiling in Africa?’, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Online Article, December 2024.
77
N. Vorobyov, ‘Wagner vs Africa Corps: The future of Russian paramilitaries in Mali’, Al Jazeera, 16 June 2025; S. Daniel ‘Mali: le groupe paramilitaire russe Wagner annonce son départ et est remplacé par Africa Corps’, RFI, 7 June 2025.
78
G. Borshchevskii, ‘Qu’est-ce que l’Africa Corps russe et remplace-t-il le groupe Wagner?’, BBC News Afrique, 12 June 2025.
79
A. Rácz, ‘Band of Brothers: The Wagner Group and the Russian State’, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 21 September 2023; T. Neethling, ‘Russian Para-Military Operations in Africa: The Wagner Group as a De Facto Foreign Policy Instrument’, Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies 51(1), 2023; J. Maddocks, ‘Russia, the Wagner Group, and the Issue of Attribution’, Lieber Institute West Point, 28 April 2021.
80
W. Letrone and T. Cabus, ‘The Wagner Group and the Question of the Legal Attribution of the Acts of Private Actors to a State’, Cambridge Core Blog, 24 July 2023.
81
‘Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict’, European Parliament, 17 September 2008, 36.
82
‘Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict’, European Parliament, 17 September 2008, 32-33, 35.
83
‘Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination: Regulatory environment for mercenaries, mercenary-related actors, and private military and security companies: a call to action’, UN Doc A/78/535, 17 October 2023.
84
‘The Wagner Group: Options for Justice’, Geneva Academy, 9 June 2022.
85
S. Ritter, ‘The New “Africa Corps”: Russia’s Wagner Rebranding’, Energy Intelligence, 24 May 2024
86
D. Wenk, ‘Burkina Faso, Creation of Self-Defence Militias’, International Committee of the Red Cross: Casebook.
87
M. DeAngelo, ‘Lessons from Burkina Faso’s Fight Against al-Qaeda and the Islamic State’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 18 September 2025; ‘Burkina Faso: Arming Civilians at the Cost of Social Cohesion?’, International Crisis Group, 15 December 2023; H. Nsaibia, ‘Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP)’, ACLED, 26 March 2024.
88
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 17.10.
89
D. Wenk, ‘Burkina Faso, Creation of Self-Defence Militias’, International Committee of the Red Cross: Casebook.
90
D. Wenk, ‘Burkina Faso, Creation of Self-Defence Militias’, International Committee of the Red Cross: Casebook.
91
D. Wenk, ‘Burkina Faso, Creation of Self-Defence Militias’, International Committee of the Red Cross: Casebook, Article 6
92
D. Wenk, ‘Burkina Faso, Creation of Self-Defence Militias’, International Committee of the Red Cross: Casebook, Articles 7,8 and 11.
93
M. DeAngelo, ‘Lessons from Burkina Faso’s Fight Against al-Qaeda and the Islamic State’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 18 September 2025; R. Chason, ‘Civilians in Africa’s Sahel join militias as Islamist extremism surges’, The Washington Post, 19 February 2025.
94
A.K. Saidou and L. Honig, ‘Legitimising regimes and legalising self-defence groups: the case of Burkina Faso’s VDPs’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 2024, 276.
95
H. Nsaibia, ‘Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP)’, ACLED, 26 March 2024.
96
‘Burkina Faso’s Volunteer Militia Implicated in ‘Systematic Extermination’’, Africa Defense Forum, 15 April 2025.
97
R. Chason, ‘Civilians in Africa’s Sahel join militias as Islamist extremism surges’, The Washington Post, 19 February 2025; ‘Burkina Faso: Arming Civilians at the Cost of Social Cohesion?’, International Crisis Group, 15 December 2023.
98
D. Wenk, ‘Burkina Faso, Creation of Self-Defence Militias’, International Committee of the Red Cross: Casebook.
99
H. Nsaibia, ‘Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP)’, ACLED, 26 March 2024; F. R. Koné and H. Koné, ‘Risks of Burkina Faso’s new military approach to terrorism’, Institute for Security Studies, 9 January 2023.
100
H. Nsaibia, ‘Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP)’, ACLED, 26 March 2024.
101
‘Article 43 – Armed Forces’, ICRC International Humanitarian Law Databases.
102
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 17.10.
103
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” is Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, 2024, 16 and 17
104
H. Nsaibia, ‘Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP)’, ACLED, 26 March 2024.
105
R. Chason and A. B. Ramos, ‘A powerful, opaque al-Qaeda affiliate is rampaging across West Africa’, The Washington Post, 8 June 2025.
106
‘Article 4 – Prisoners of War (Commentary of 2020)’, ICRC International Humanitarian Law Databases, paras 1005–08.
107
‘Article 13 – Protection of the Civilian Population’, ICRC International Humanitarian Law Databases; ‘Customary Rule 6 – Civilians’ Loss of Protection from Attack’.
108
R. Chason, ‘Civilians in Africa’s Sahel join militias as Islamist extremism surges’, The Washington Post, 19 February 2025.

Burkina Faso

Reporting period: July 2024 - June 2025

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (between 2023 and 2025)

Increasing levels of civilian harm due to conflict and insecurity

Human rights and humanitarian developments

Governance and political developments

Developments in international relations

Creation of the ‘Alliance of Sahel States’ (AES) between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger

A rebranded support force: the Russian Federation’s Africa Corps

Increasingly frequent and diverse VDP activity

Non-International Armed Conflicts

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

Non-State parties

Other Main actors

Other Non-State Actors

Regional Organizations and Alliances

Foreign involvement