Cameroon (2026-11-11)

As of September 2026, three non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) were ongoing in the Republic of Cameroon:

Cameroon v Ambazonian Separatists
Cameroon v Boko Haram
Cameroon v Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) (from March 2026)

Cameroon is a State Party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law (IHL) applies to all the NIACs in Cameroon. Cameroon is also a State Party to Additional Protocol II of 1977, but neither NIAC to which it is a party meet the requirements of its Article 1(1), which requires a non-State armed group to have territorial control enabling them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations.¹

Cameroon gained its independence in 1961 when the English- and French-speaking colonies were combined.² The Government of Cameroon preferred French as its national language and its systematic enforcement of French in traditionally Anglophone parts of the nation, including systematically displacing the English legal system with the French system, triggered violence between Cameroon and Ambazonian separatist forces.³ English-speaking Cameroon comprises one in five of all Cameroonians. This minority considers itself marginalized and discriminated against by the French majority. The ruling party in Cameroon is composed of French Cameroonians.⁴ In 2016, Anglophone Cameroonians began protesting against the Cameroonian government. The protests lasted for more than a year before violence took hold.⁵

On 1 October 2017, ‘Ambazonian Separatist’ groups declared the independence of the English-speaking parts of Cameroon in the north- and south-west regions of the country, coining the area ‘Ambazonia’.⁶ The NIAC between Cameroon and Ambazonian Separatists ignited in the latter part of 2017,⁷ and this NIAC continues as of September 2026.

With the Atlantic Ocean to its south-west, Cameroon is a coastal State in the Gulf of Guinea that straddles Central and West Africa.⁸ Nigeria lies to its north-west, Chad is to its north-east, with the Central African Republic to its east. It also has borders with the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. Cameroon’s geographic location has made it subject to regional jihadist instability, a factor contributing to its most recent NIAC.

The jihadist-driven NIACs in neighbouring States of Chad and Nigeria have spread to Cameroonian territory with the involvement of Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Cameroon has been engaged in a NIAC with Boko Haram for more than two decades; this conflict persists as of September 2026.⁹ Boko Haram’s expanded geographical footprint led to the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council re-activating the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) on 29 January 2025¹⁰ to counter Boko Haram activities.¹¹ The MNJTF was composed of members of the armed forces of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria (although Niger withdrew in March 2025).¹²The MNJTF remains active in Cameroon as of September 2026.

Cameroon’s geographic proximity to the Central African Republic has also led to an influx of refugees.¹³ In June 2025, the Norwegian Refugee Council declared that Cameroon was the most overlooked internal displacement crisis globally, a claim which is largely attributed to the two NIACs on its territory.¹⁴ By the end of 2025, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) recorded approximately 954,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Cameroon.¹⁵

Renewal of the mandate of the MNJTF

At the 1254^th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council on 12 January 2025, the AU expressed its concerns regarding the continuing activity of Boko Haram, reaffirming that the regional collective security response needs to be well-coordinated, multipronged, and sustained. The organization renewed the MNJTF’s mandate for an additional twelve months from 1 February 2026.¹⁶ In his remarks of 9 June 2025 at a United Nations (UN) Security Council briefing on the Central African region, the Deputy Political Counsellor of the United States (US) raised concern about the continuing violence generated by Boko Haram and encouraged African States and the MNJTF to remain engaged in tackling the group.¹⁷ In April 2025, the European Union pledged €20 million to support the fight against Boko Haram for 2025.¹⁸

‘Ghost Town’ lockdowns imposed by Ambazonian separatists

‘Ghost town’ is a method Ambazonian separatists employ to shut down the economy, schooling, and other services in Anglophone areas, to illustrate their ongoing influence to the Cameroonian government.¹⁹ Restrictions imposed by the ‘ghost town’ lockdowns have further impeded on much-needed humanitarian access.²⁰ The separatists frequently rely on this tactic to disrupt national celebrations, such as National Youth Day around 11 February 2026²¹ and National Day celebrations on 18 May 2026.²² They further imposed a ‘ghost town’ lockdown in several areas in the north-west and south-west regions starting on 7 September 2026 in order to disrupt the beginning of the school year.²³

Intercommunal violence

Intercommunal violence persisted throughout 2025 and 2026, predominantly taking place in the far north of Cameroon. Drivers of violence include competition over access to resources, including grazing land, as well as ideological differences, ethnic violence, and competing religious views. The Musgum people of Mulwi, who are subsistence fishermen and vegetable and crop farmers, often clash with the pastoralist Arab Choa people, who are mainly herders, over land and natural resources in the far north of Cameroon.²⁴ Since 2021, the scarcity of water because of climate change has exacerbated armed clashes.²⁵

Clashes between the Fulani Bororo and Gbaya communities are also resource driven.²⁶ ‘Fulani Bororo’ translates to ‘Cattle Bororo’ an apt description for these pastoral herders who travel with their cattle throughout Cameroon.²⁷ The Gbaya people traditionally cultivate staple foods such as maize, cassava, yams, and peanuts, as well as tobacco, coffee, and rice.²⁸ They employ a slash-and-burn farming technique,²⁹ which entails the burning of parts of forests, cultivating the land for farming, and then moving on for a few years before returning to the land.³⁰ The Fulani Bororo and Gbaya people often clash over the Bororo’s cattle grazing on Gbaya land. The groups compete over the same land and natural resources.³¹ In early July 2026, intercommunal clashes occurred in the aftermath of a land demarcation operation in Cameroon’s far northern region.³²

Xenophobia has also triggered intercommunal violence.In the south of Cameroon, recurring hate speech against other ethnic communities has spread on social media.³³ The government condemned the hate speech and called for national unity to be preserved. Xenophobic attacks in February 2025 ignited after two people were killed with a machete in Meyo-Centre.³⁴ A reconciliation meeting involving the local government, civil society, and local chiefs was convened to broker peace in the communities concerned.³⁵

Humanitarian crisis

The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reported that more than 3.3 million people needed humanitarian assistance in Cameroon as of the end of 2025.³⁶ This is due to a combination of factors including not only the ongoing NIACs, but also flooding and outbreaks of infectious diseases.³⁷ In 2025, the country witnessed an outbreak of health emergencies affecting the population, including polio, measles, and Mpox.³⁸

The 2025 Presidential elections

In 2008, the Cameroonian government amended legislation to remove a minimum presidential term limit, paving the way for its sitting President, Joseph Biya, to stay in power indefinitely. Biya, who first came into power in 1982, announced in July 2025 that he would run for an eighth term. He was by then 92 years of age.³⁹There were mixed reactions, with some Cameroonians supporting his bid while thought it was time to hand over the reins to someone younger.⁴⁰

The lead-up to the presidential elections was riddled with allegations of election fraud, leading to protests by supporters of opposition candidates.⁴¹ Opposition leaders have been intimidated. In June 2025, Maurice Kamto, the main opposition figure, was placed under house arrest in Douala, preventing him from attending a meeting of his political party.⁴² Thereafter, the Constitutional Council rejected Kamto’s candidacy to run for President under the African Movement for the New Independence and Democracy (MANIDEM).⁴³ Kamto alleged that the ban was instigated by the ruling party.⁴⁴

Issa Tchiroma Bakary, a longtime ally of President Biya who had served in his cabinet in various capacities, resigned in June 2025 in order to run for president.⁴⁵ Immediately after the announcement, in regions where Bakary was considered to have influence, the government banned all political activities involving his political party.⁴⁶

The presidential elections were held on 12 October 2025.⁴⁷ On 27 October, the Constitutional Council⁴⁸ declared President Biya the winner with 53 per cent of the vote.⁴⁹ His new term was due to run for seven years.⁵⁰ Biya’s win triggered protests on 26 October that lasted for several days and which led to a lockdown imposed from 4 to 7 November 2025.⁵¹

The government responded to the protests by using force against protesters, killing at least five,⁵² although the opposition claimed a higher death toll. Others were injured and/or arrested.⁵³ Issa Tchiroma, the opposition leader, called for the release of those arrested.⁵⁴ Mr Tchiroma was placed under house arrest and Interior Minister Paul Atanga Nji warned he would be prosecuted for ‘incitement to public disorder’ over his calls for street protests. Citing threats to his safety, Mr Tchiroma left Cameroon in early November and went into exile in The Gambia.⁵⁵

Delays in government formation and postponement of parliamentary and municipal council elections

Following the disputed presidential elections in October 2023 (see above), President Biya promised on New Year’s Eve to form a new government within days. The promise remained unfulfilled. Opposition leader Tchiroma, on 15 January 2026, ruled out talks with President Biya unless his victory was recognized and declared that his party, the Cameroon National Salvation Front (FSNC), would not participate in the upcoming parliamentary and municipal council elections.⁵⁶ On 10 February 2026, President Biya signaled a further postponement of parliamentary and municipal elections, which had been expected between March and May 2026, setting no new date. The elections had already been postponed once.⁵⁷ From exile, on 27 February 2026, opposition leader Tchiroma called on Cameroonians abroad to rally behind a political transition toward a ‘new Cameroon’.⁵⁸

On 17 March 2026, the members of the parliament elected ruling-party figures Théodore Datouo and Aboubakary Abdoulaye to lead the National Assembly and Senate respectively, while Naomie Begala Mikel was named the Senate’s first woman vice president.⁵⁹ Only a few days later, on 23 March 2026, the National Assembly adopted a government bill extending the parliamentary deputies’ mandate to 20 December 2026, effectively delaying parliamentary elections until then. Some analysts suggested the postponement may be tied to plans to amend the constitution, notably to create a vice-presidency (see below), amid ruling-party concerns that it could lose its parliamentary majority in the next elections.⁶⁰

From exile, on 12 June 2026, opposition leader Tchiroma filed two complaints with the Paris Judicial Court against President Biya and around twenty senior officials over the lethal crackdown on post-election protests in October 2025 (see above), based on the principle of universal jurisdiction.⁶¹ In a parallel development, on 17 June 2026, the Constitutional Council rejected the opposition Cameroon Renaissance Movement (MRC)’s bid to overturn President Biya’s 4 May 2026 decree extending municipal councillor terms to 28 February 2027.⁶² On 8 September 2026, the MRC’s leaders, Maurice Kamto and Mamadou Mota, stepped down from their positions, citing ‘constant harassment by the regime’ ahead of the 2027 municipal and legislative polls.⁶³ Before this, on 2 September 2026, detained MRC official Alain Fogué cautioned that animosity toward Kamto and his ethnic Bamiléké support base threatened to stoke ethnic tensions.⁶⁴

Judicial developments related to the Anglophone crisis

On 15 January 2026, a military court in Yaoundé convicted three government soldiers of murder, arson, and destruction of property, in addition to charges related to disobeying orders over the February 2020 massacre of at least twenty-one civilians in Ngarbuh village, Donga-Mantung division, in Cameroon’s Anglophone north west region. Security forces and members of local vigilance groups had conducted an operation in the village on the night of 13 February 2020 and soldiers had tried to conceal the killings of civilians by setting houses on fire and filing a false report.⁶⁵ The three soldiers were sentenced to between five and ten years in prison on 19 February 2026. Victim families and rights groups denounced the sentences as too lenient.⁶⁶

In a parallel development, on 15 January 2026, the Cameroonian Supreme Court heard defence submissions seeking to overturn terrorism and secession convictions of ten Anglophone separatist leaders, among them self-styled Ambazonian leader Sisiku Julius Ayuk Tabe, detained since his 2018 transfer from Nigeria. The hearing was postponed to 19 March 2026.⁶⁷ On this date, the Supreme Court overturned the 2020 appeal ruling that had upheld life sentences imposed in 2019, citing procedural flaws, and sent the case back to the Centre Regional Court of Appeal for a fresh appeal hearing.⁶⁸ A renewed appeal hearing for ten jailed separatist leaders did not occur as planned on 20 August 2026 before the Centre Court of Appeal due to an incomplete judicial bench.⁶⁹

On the international level, the Belgian Federal Prosecutor’s Office announced on 3 March 2026 that four people had been arrested in Antwerp and Londerzeel in a probe into alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by separatists in Cameroon since 2020. The investigation targets Belgium-based individuals suspected of leading the Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF), who allegedly raised funds for weapons and directed attacks from Belgium.⁷⁰

Papal visit brought temporary truce in Anglophone regions

Pope Leo XIV toured Cameroon between 15 and 18 April 2026, visiting Yaoundé, Bamenda, and Douala. He called for swift peace and reconciliation in Anglophone regions and held talks with President Biya, adding pressure on authorities to respond to calls for dialogue. In Bamenda, the Pope chaired a peace gathering that brought together faith leaders, traditional chiefs and victims of the conflict. A coalition of separatist groups, including the Ambazonia Governing Council, declared a three-day ‘safe travel passage’ ceasefire for the period between 15 and 17 April 2026 to allow civilians and pilgrims to move freely during the papal visit. Attacks nevertheless resumed after the Pope’s departure.⁷¹

Constitutional amendment and speculation over Biya’s succession

On 4 April 2026, the Cameroonian parliament approved an amendment to the 1996 constitution establishing the post of vice president, who will be named by the president and will serve out the remainder of the presidential term should the office fall vacant. The ruling party-dominated parliament fast-tracked the bill over the Easter weekend with little public consultation. Opposition leaders, including Tchiroma, denounced the reform as a violation of democratic principles and a bid to entrench power. Maurice Kamto’s MRC called it a ‘constitutional coup’ and petitioned the African Union on 20 April 2026.⁷² Over the ensuing months, critics of the government kept raising concerns that the new constitutional provision could open the door to dynastic succession, with speculation that President Biya might name his son Franck as vice president.⁷³

Reports emerged that President Biya briefly fainted on 20 May 2026 during National Day celebrations. After he departed for Switzerland on 7 June 2026, local outlets reported that he was receiving medical care, reviving worries over his health, his succession, and the unfinished appointment of a new government following the October 2025 elections (see above).⁷⁴ In mid-June 2026, security forces detained a man accused of trying to get state broadcaster CRTV to air a forged presidential decree naming a new government and vice president in Cameroon’s capital Yaoundé.⁷⁵

President Biya stayed out of the country for weeks, fuelling mounting speculation about his health. Authorities maintained he was in good health, with Labour and Social Security Minister Grégoire Owona saying on 28 July 2026 that Biya was simply on annual leave. Opposition leaders denounced the President’s absence as having left an institutional void.⁷⁶ From abroad, on 3 August 2026, Biya reshuffled the top military command, notably naming Major General Hippolyte Ebaka as deputy Chief of Defence Staff and Brigadier General Elie Romance Mezui Zo’o as head of the Rapid Intervention Brigade (BIR). Critics accused Biya of tightening his grip on the armed forces by favouring his Beti-Bulu ethnic constituency, while exiled opposition leader Tchiroma challenged the lawfulness of decrees signed in Switzerland.⁷⁷ Biya eventually returned to Cameroon on 20 August 2026 after an unprecedented seventy-four-day stay in Switzerland. By that time, he had still not named a vice president as successor.⁷⁸

Deaths of opposition and Anglophone detainees

On 9 May 2026, the funeral of opposition leader Anicet Ekane, head of the Mouvement Africain pour la Nouvelle Indépendance et la Démocratie (MANIDEM), was marked by tensions. Mr Ekane died in custody on 1 December 2025 after he had been arrested in Douala on 24 October 2025 amid the post-election crackdown (see above). According to his family, he was denied medication for a severe respiratory condition while in detention. Authorities conducted an autopsy without the family’s participation and withheld his body for nearly three months. On 24 February 2026, the Ministry of Defence concluded he died of natural causes, which the family and MANIDEM disputed.⁷⁹

In a similar case, Anglophone businessman Patrick Ndango Asah, who was detained during Anglophone protests in 2016 in Bamenda, died in custody on 9 May 2026, deepening anger over the treatment of Anglophone prisoners. A military court in Yaoundé had cut his twenty-year sentence for secession and terrorism to nine years in March 2026, making him eligible for early release in October 2026. He had reportedly spent weeks in a military hospital and repeatedly fallen into a coma before being returned to Kondengui prison.⁸⁰

Increased US involvement

After stepping up its military involvement in neighbouring Nigeria from late 2025, Washington began examining options to deepen military cooperation with Cameroonian forces in the Far North, an area where ISWAP and Boko Haram fighters regularly withdraw to and regroup in order to escape military offensives in Nigeria. On 7 May 2026, President Biya received US Africa Command (AFRICOM) Deputy Commander Lieutenant General John W. Brennan Jr. to discuss bilateral security cooperation, including maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea and the fight against Boko Haram. A month later, a US delegation headed by the embassy’s Deputy Chief of Mission John Robinson and US Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) commander Major General Claude Tudor visited Cameroon, amid reports that Washington was finalizing plans to redeploy troops to the Salak base in Cameroon’s Far North regional capital Maroua, roughly seven years after US forces left the country. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), closer joint operations between Washington and Yaoundé could result in expanded intelligence sharing, airstrikes, the presence of US troops, the provisions of equipment, and more training for Cameroon’s armed forces, mirroring the pattern of US military involvement in neighbouring Nigeria.⁸¹

Non-International Armed Conflict between Cameroon and Ambazonian Separatists

Background

The NIAC between Cameroon and Ambazonian separatists was triggered as early September and October 2017 in the north- and south-west of Cameroon.¹ There are multiple non-State actors in the region, ranging from organized armed groups fighting across the region under ideological commanders to smaller groups fighting at village level. Although fighting for a common cause – an independent Ambazonia – competition over resources and ideological differences has seen fragmentation between the groups.²

The most prominent of the Ambazonian separatist groups is said to be the Ambazonia Defence Force (ADF).³ The ADF is the armed wing of the Ambazonia Governing Council. The other dominant armed group is the Ambazonian Self Defence Council (ASDC), which is the armed wing of the Interim Government of Ambazonia.⁴ Other non-State armed groups identified as party to the conflict in Ambazonia include the Bui Warriors, the Southern Cameroons Defence Forces, and the Bui Unity Warriors.⁵ Despite evidence of coordination between the various groups, their splintering has resulted in clashes and in-fighting.⁶ The ADF and the ASDC are considered umbrella groups for other smaller militias.⁷

The multiplicity of the often fragmented groups impedes clear understanding of the organizational structure of each.⁸

Intensity

Although it is problematic to attribute indicators of violence to specific members of a coalition, it is possible to aggregate the violence generated between the enemies if multiple organized armed groups fight in a coalition that is sufficiently organized against a common enemy.⁹ This section thus assesses whether the violence generated by the fighting between Cameroon and the Ambazonian separatists equates to ‘protracted’ armed violence.

Intensity generated in the fighting between Cameroon and Ambazonian separatists increased in the latter half of 2023¹⁰ and continued throughout the reporting period. Violent events were thus reported during July,¹¹ August,¹² September,¹³ October,¹⁴ November,¹⁵ and December 2023.¹⁶

The parties also clashed throughout 2024, in January,¹⁷ February,¹⁸ March,¹⁹ April,²⁰ May,²¹ June,²² July,²³ August,²⁴ September,²⁵ October,²⁶ November,²⁷ and December.²⁸

Clashes between Cameroon and Ambazonian separatists during 2025 occurred in January,²⁹February,³⁰ March,³¹ April,³² May,³³ June,³⁴ July,³⁵ August,³⁶ October,³⁷ November,³⁸ and December.³⁹

Fighting between Cameroon and Ambazonian separatists continued throughout 2026. Clashes specifically occurred during January,⁴⁰ March,⁴¹ April,⁴² May,⁴³ June,⁴⁴ July,⁴⁵ August,⁴⁶ and September 2026.⁴⁷

Weapons employed by Ambazonian separatist groups include improvised explosive devices (IEDs)⁴⁸ often in the form of car bombs.⁴⁹ IEDs are also planted at checkpoints.⁵⁰

The use of IEDs by Ambazonian separatist groups significantly increased during 2025 with at least 131 such incidents reported.⁵¹ The groups use rifles ⁵² including hunting rifles in combat.⁵³ Rifles are often taken from dead government soldiers.⁵⁴

As of March 2026, this NIAC had resulted in at least 6,500 casualties.⁵⁵ As deaths are often under-reported, the death toll is likely higher. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that by April 2025 at least 969,000 people were internally displaced in Cameroon, of which the Ambazonian conflict remains a major driver.⁵⁶ The violence generated from fighting between Cameroon and the Ambazonian separatist groups continued to meet the notion of intensity as demanded by IHL as of September 2026.

Organization

Although multiple non-State actors and splinter factions are operating in the Anglophone zones of Cameroon, these groups fight for the same purpose – an independent Ambazonia.⁵⁷ The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) set out factual considerations that are necessary for a collective of non-State armed groups who are sufficiently organized to meet in order to qualify as an alliance.⁵⁸ These factors are used to determine, on a case-by-case basis, if there is sufficient coordination in a coalition or alliance to become a party to a NIAC and to allow for the aggregation of intensity.⁵⁹

A shared ideology or common enemy does not automatically suggest that the necessary level of coordination for a coalition has been met. Relevant factual indicators include the establishment of a coordination structure for the alliance as a whole, the sharing of operational tasks between organized armed groups who are members of the alliance, common rules of engagement, the coordination of simultaneous attacks against the opposing party, and the launching of joint military operations.⁶⁰ Information on coordination is under-reported. Coordination is suggested but specifics on the nature of coordination escapes public record.⁶¹ What is known is that there is not necessarily an overarching command structure but that organized armed groups fighting a common enemy, the Cameroonian Defence Force, form loose alliances.⁶²

The ADF

The ADF, which emerged in September 2017 as the armed wing of the Ambazonia Governing Council (AGovC), is the largest of several insurgency groups fighting for an independent Ambazonia.⁶³ The ADF started its opposition to the Cameroonian government and subsequent fight against the Cameroonian Armed Forces on 9 September 2017 when the AGovC declared its war of independence for Southern Cameroon.⁶⁴

The ADF has a tiered command structure. This is evident from key leadership figures in distinct hierarchical roles.⁶⁵ These leadership positions include the ranks of a Commander in Chief⁶⁶ and his deputy,⁶⁷ a US-based spokesperson (Lucas Asu),⁶⁸ and commanders in charge of their own ‘batallions’.⁶⁹

Before their arrests in 2024 and 2025 respectively, the two highest ranking officials in the ADF were Lucas Cho Ayaba and Benedict Kuah. Ayaba served as the Commander in Chief of the ADF while Kuah served as the Chairman of the Ambazonia War Council.⁷⁰ Kuah’s deputy was Capo Daniel until he left the ADF ⁷¹. Mr Ayaba, who directed the ADF from Norway, was arrested there in September 2024 and remains in pretrial detention on suspicion of incitement to crimes against humanity and war crimes.⁷² Prosecutors reportedly believe Ayaba directed fighters in Cameroon remotely via encrypted communication channels and online command structures.⁷³ AGovC vice president Julius Nyih has led the AGovC and ADF on an interim basis since late September 2024.⁷⁴ Kuah, together with Pascal Kikishy Wongbi, the War Council’s Head of Defence, was arrested in the US in September 2025 and charged with directing and financing ADF attacks.⁷⁵ International Crisis Group observed that the ADF has maintained a stable command structure even as it has faced sackings, defections and the killing of senior commanders.⁷⁶

The ability of the ADF to implement IHL is further illustrated by its War Crime Catalog⁷⁷ and Eyewitness Reporting portal for suspected war crimes,⁷⁸ which forms part of the official website of the AGovC website. The AGovC has also, on occasion, accused the Cameroonian government of specific violations of IHL, including of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.⁷⁹ It has also addressed a letter listing violations of IHL committed by the Cameroonian Armed Forces to the ICRC.⁸⁰ The ADF ‘domesticates’ IHL and expands on IHL in instruments such as The Charter of Ambazonia on the Protection of Women, Children and People with Disabilities During Wartime or Armed Conflict (April 2022).⁸¹

ADF fighters must follow a code of conduct.⁸² Discipline is imposed by commanders through corporal punishments such as whippings.⁸³ Commanders often invoke fear among fighters to achieve discipline and compliance. For example a journalist reported that a commander told his fighters that if they fell asleep while on watch duty, he would shoot them in the leg.⁸⁴

The ADF itself describes its military tactics as rapid guerilla warfare, which includes urban warfare capabilities.⁸⁵ The group often ambushes the Cameroonian Armed Forces to minimize its own losses.⁸⁶ In addition to ‘battalions’, ADF field units are also referred to as ‘brigades’, such as the ADF Bamenda Brigade, whose commander, ‘General Weapon’, was killed by Cameroonian forces in November 2024.⁸⁷

The AGovC has implemented the ‘Liberation Tax Law’ which introduced what is essentially a levy for civilians over the age of twenty-one living in the English-speaking regions of southern Cameroon where the ADF is active. Funds are used to sustain the fighting.⁸⁸ Chapter 8 of the Liberation Tax Law exempts fighters and their spouses, widows of fallen fighters, educators, and the disabled from paying tax.⁸⁹ Liberation tax exemption is thus a recruitment tool for the ADF. Funds are also raised through illicit activities such as kidnappings for ransom.⁹⁰ Beyond local revenue, the ADF’s financing relies heavily on its diaspora network. According to a 2025 US indictment, Kuah and Wongbi raised money online through campaigns such as ‘The Takeover Fund’ and ‘Operation 200Aks’, which solicited donations for AK-47 rifles and explosives.⁹¹ Similarly, Belgian authorities detained three suspected ADF leaders in March 2026, with prosecutors alleging that funds for weapons and ammunition had been raised in Belgium.⁹²

Bui Warriors

Samual Ikome Sako serves as the leader of the Bui Warriors.⁹³ This group has a tiered structured built around the group’s leader, General Sako. This is the case for the majority of the Ambazonian separatists.⁹⁴ The Bui Warriors were led by field commanders such as ‘General Insobu’, who was reportedly killed in 2022 during clashes with the rival Bui Unity Warriors, and subsequently by commanders such as ‘General Talk and Do’ of the Ambazonia State Army.⁹⁵ The existence of a tiered leadership structure enables discipline and the ability to implement IHL.⁹⁶

Insufficient information is available on this group to draw a conclusion on whether it independently satisfies the organizational threshold demanded by IHL.

Bui Unity Warriors

The Bui Unity Warriors splintered from the Bui Warriors in January 2022. The Bui Unity Warriors were led by General ‘Mad Dog’ until his death on 24 April 2024⁹⁷ and later by Henry Njimbogwe (‘General No Mercy’), who was killed by Cameroonian forces in Bambalang on 3 July 2026. It is unclear who has led the group since July 2026.⁹⁸ This group appears to have a tiered command structure because in a video published by them, reference was made to a General Newsman and a Vice-General Viper.⁹⁹ Similar to other Ambazonian separatist groups, the hierarchy of this group revolves around one prominent general.¹⁰⁰ The existence of a leadership structure enables the non-State actor to discipline its fighters and implement IHL.¹⁰¹

The Bui Unity Warriors successfully carried out several attacks against the Cameroonian Armed Forces, suggesting that the group has the ability to engage in military operations.¹⁰² These attacks also confirm that the Bui Unity Warriors are sufficiently organized under IHL. In the Katanga case, the International Criminal Court (ICC) found that, at a minimum, a group needs to be able to organize itself to the extent that it can execute a military attack.¹⁰³

Weapons and ammunition are partly obtained by raiding military bases of the Cameroonian Armed Forces,¹⁰⁴ and by ambushing soldiers.¹⁰⁵ The Bui Unity Warriors also speak with one voice, often using videos to reach their audience.¹⁰⁶

The Bui Unity Warriors are sufficiently organized as demanded by IHL.

Ambazonia Restoration Forces (ARF)

Public information concerning the internal leadership structure of the ARF, also known as the Ambazonia Self-Defence Council (ASDC), the collective name for the militias affiliated with Samuel Ikome Sako’s faction of the Interim Government of Ambazonia (IG)¹⁰⁷ is scarce. Their fighters, like Anglophone separatist fighters generally, are often referred to as ‘Amba Boys’.¹⁰⁸ What is known is that the leadership in larger separatist armed groups, including the ASDC’s, mimics a basic hierarchical structure.¹⁰⁹Ideological leaders give orders to Generals based in the Ambazonia region.¹¹⁰ Generals then disseminate information to sub-generals or mission commanders, who then inform mission commanders who, in turn, give orders to unit or camp commanders. Experienced Generals control various units (composed of unit commanders and fighters) and mission commanders.¹¹¹ Camps are often geographically dispersed. Owing to fragmentation, there are instances where control over camps is decentralized and some fighters act rather autonomously.¹¹² Separate units tend to be compiled of less than thirty fighters each.¹¹³ Regional units tend to choose their own names, for example the Fako Mountain Lions or the Lebialem Red Dragons.¹¹⁴ Human Rights Watch has, however, described the ARF as lacking a clear command structure.¹¹⁵

This group also employs motorcyclists to move arms and avoid checkpoints.¹¹⁶ Funding is raised through donations (often from international sympathizers) predominantly garnered by the ideological leader who then transfers money to Generals via Western Union, Money Gram, or cell phone wallets (such as MTN Mobile Money). Kidnappings and other illicit activities are also used to raise funds.¹¹⁷ Fighters are recruited through social media platforms including WhatsApp, YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, blogs and video blogs.¹¹⁸ Fighters are also recruited through forced recruitment; children are also forcibly recruited.¹¹⁹

The ARF is sufficiently organized as required by IHL.

Southern Cameroons Defence Forces

The Southern Cameroons Defence Forces (SOCADEF) are the military wing of the African People’s Liberation Movement.¹²⁰ The Commander in Chief of the SOCADEF is Ebenezer Akwanga,¹²¹ a remote commander living in exile in the United States.¹²² Units are divided into twenty-five to thirty fighters each.¹²³ SOCADEF’s leader claims more than 3,500 active fighters, although other sources report no more than 500.¹²⁴

The SOCADEF have guidelines within their code of conduct that reflect IHL principles, for example, the duty to treat the wounded and to not target schools and hospitals. These guidelines also impose sanctions for non-compliance, the purpose of which is to promote discipline. The guidelines are promoted through training exercises.¹²⁵

In the Katanga case, the ICC found that, at a minimum, a group needs to be able to organize itself to the extent that it can execute a military attack.¹²⁶ Successful attacks against soldiers lasting several hours confirm that SOCADEF is able to engage in military operations and that it is, as a result, sufficiently organized under IHL.¹²⁷

SOCADEF speaks with one voice, for examples the group’s political wing issued a press statement to the Secretary General of the UN,¹²⁸ and took responsibility for ‘Operation No Rest for You’, a military attack executed against the Cameroonian Defence Force.¹²⁹

The Southern Cameroons Defence Forces are sufficiently organized as demanded by IHL.

In sum, the Ambazonian separatists remain sufficiently organized under IHL and the existing NIAC with the Cameroonian authorities continued as of September 2026.

1
R. Maxwell Bone, ‘Ahead of peace talks, a who’s who of Cameroon’s separatist movements’, The New Humanitarian, 8 July 2020. ↩︎
2
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 13. ↩︎
3
A. Gillis, ‘‘This is a genocide’: villages burn as war rages in blood-soaked Cameroon’, The Guardian, 30 May 2018. ↩︎
4
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 13 and 16. ↩︎
5
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 14. ↩︎
6
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 16. ↩︎
7
R. Maxwell Bone, ‘Ahead of peace talks, a who’s who of Cameroon’s separatist movements’, The New Humanitarian, 8 July 2020. ↩︎
8
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 16. ↩︎
9
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 17; S. D’Cunha et al, ‘Defining armed conflict: some clarity in the fog of war’, International Committee of the Red Cross: Humanitarian Law and Policy, 2 May 2024; J. Nikolic et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, International Committee of the Red Cross Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020. ↩︎
10
K. Feh, ‘Violence escalates in Cameroon’s troubled regions – Human Rights Watch Report’, Mimi Mefo Info, 16 January 2024 ↩︎
11
W. Musa, ‘Mbonge Separatists kill two in Kombone’, Cameroon News Agency, 7 July 2023; ‘Separatists kill man in Essimbi accused of links with military’, Mimi Mefo Info, 7 July 2023; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, July 2023 ↩︎
12
‘Gov’t forces kill two Amba fighters in Bafut’, Cameroon News Agency, 7 August 2023; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, August 2023 ↩︎
13
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, September 2023; ‘Cameroon militants set cars on fire, shoot passengers in village attack’, Reuters, 8 September 2023 ↩︎
14
‘Cameroon kills General RK commander of Ambazonia separatist group’, PM News Nigeria, 23 September 2023; N. H. Nchanji, ‘South West region: Gov’t forces kill FM Bitter Kola, others’, Cameroon News Agency, 20 September 2023; ‘Four separatist fighters killed in Cameroon’s restive Anglophone region’, News Ghana, 8 October 2023; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, October 2023 ↩︎
15
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, November 2023 ↩︎
16
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, December 2023. ↩︎
17
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, January 2024; ‘5 Separatist in Cameroon killed in Military operation’, News Ghana, 11 January 2024; ‘Amba fighters brutally attack man for alleged collaboration with military’, Mimi Mefo Info, 13 January 2024; ‘Gov’t forces capture ADF supreme commander’, Cameroon News Agency, 20 January 2024 ↩︎
18
‘Cameroon Blast Kills at Least One Person During Youth Day Event’, Voice of America, 12 February 2024; ‘Kidnapped Cameroonian official released’, Xinhua, 7 February 2024; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, February 2024 ↩︎
19
‘Cameroun. Mort d’un élu local dans une attaque revendiquée par des séparatistes anglophones’, Ouest France, 23 March 2024; J. Essama, ‘Crise anglophone: le commandant séparatiste Barack tué par le BIR’, Mimi Mefo Info, 13 March 2024; K. Bih, ‘Separatist Attack on Brasseries Truck Leaves Two Dead’, Mimi Mefo Info, 13 March 2024; T. Mbunwe, ‘Military raids leave several separatist fighters dead’, Mimi Mefo Info, 29 March 2024; ‘7 separatist fighters killed in military offensive in Cameroon’, Xinhua, 25 March 2024; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, March 2024 ↩︎
20
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, April 2024; ‘Gov’t forces on rampage kill three civilians in Jumbo, burn houses’, Cameroon News Agency, 11 April 2024; A. N. Rene, ‘Ndian: Self-styled general mad dog killed in military operation’, Cameroon News Agency, 24 April 2024 ↩︎
21
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, May 2024; C. Nginyu, ‘Bambui: Separatist attack leaves two gov’t forces, two civilians dead’, Cameroon News Agency, 15 May 2024; ‘Separatists ambush six government forces in Eyomujock’, Cameroon News Agency, 10 May 2024 ↩︎
22
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, June 2024; ‘Cameroonian official killed in ambush by suspected separatist fighters’, Xinhua, 3 June 2024; C. Nginyu, ‘Menchum: Councillor Mathias Bang killed by Separatist fighters’, Cameroon News Agency, 5 June 2024; K. Bih, ‘Vehicle Attacks by Separatists Increase, Intensify Bamenda’s Nightmare’, Mimi Mefo Info, 9 June 2024; D. Atangana, ‘Gunmen kill bike rider, abduct passenger in Bamenda’, Mimi Mefo Info, 10 June 2024; ‘IED explosion rocks Oshum village, Batibo’, Cameroon News Agency, 27 June 2024 ↩︎
23
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, July 2024; ‘Two soldiers killed in Munyenge’, Cameroon News Agency, 2 July 2024; D. Atangana, ‘Soldier Killed, Gun Seized by separatists in Bui After Epaulette Award’, Mimi Mefo Info, 3 July 2024; D. Atangana, ‘Internally Displaced Man Fatally Shot in Bamenda’, Mimi Mefo Info, 9 July 2024; K. Bih, ‘Separatist Leader “Commander Iron”, One other Killed in Bamenda’, Mimi Mefo Info, 10 July 2024; ‘4 armed separatists killed in Cameroon’s restive Anglophone region’, Xinhua, 20 July 2024 ↩︎
24
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, August 2024; D. Atangana, ‘Bomb Explosion at Checkpoint in Bamenda Claims Lives of Two Police Officers’, Mimi Mefo Info, 9 August 2024; D. Atangana, ‘Mbororo Militia Strikes Sop Again: Homes Burned and Shops Looted’, Mimi Mefo Info, 7 August 2024 ↩︎
25
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, September 2024; ‘Separatists kill biker, burn taxi in Buea’, Cameroon News Agency, 2 September 2024; ‘Former separatists fighter killed in suspected military attack in Bamenda’, Mimi Mefo Info, 9 September 2024; E. Ndi, ‘BIR Operation Leads to Deaths of Three Ambazonia Separatists’, Mimi Mefo Info, 17 September 2024; ‘IED detonation, gunfire in Bamenda’, Cameroon News Agency, 19 September 2024 ↩︎
26
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, October 2024; D. Atangana, ‘Separatists Kill Two Cameroonian Soldiers in Mbingo’, Mimi Mefo Info, 10 October 2024; ‘Separatist commander killed in Cameroon’s restive Anglophone region’, Xinhua, 9 October 2024 ↩︎
27
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, November 2024; ‘Three Killed, One Injured in Separatists Ambush in Ndu’, Mimi Mefo Info, 18 November 2024 ↩︎
28
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, December 2024; D. Atangana, ‘At Least One Dead as Gunshots Rock Bamenda’, Mimi Mefo Info, 7 December 2024; K. Bih, ‘Two Separatist Fighters Killed in Military Operations’, Mimi Mefo Info, 31 December 2024. ↩︎
29
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, January 2025; K. Bih, ‘Separatist Activist Capo Daniel Laments Burning of Family Home’, Mimi Mefo Info, 8 January 2025; ‘Three separatist fighters killed, others arrested in Bamenda’, Cameroon News Agency, 19 January 2025; D. Atangana, ‘Two Civilians Killed, Eight Injured in Less than 24 Hours in Bamenda’, Mimi Mefo Info, 16 January 2025 ↩︎
30
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, February 2025; E. Ndi, ‘Pinyin Mob Justice Results in Killing of Two Ambazonia Fighters’, Mimi Mefo Info, 16 February 2025 ↩︎
31
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, March 2025; ‘2 soldiers killed in suspected separatist attack in Cameroon’, Xinhua, 19 March 2025; E. Ndi, ‘Ambazonia Separatist Attack in Mbingo Leaves Soldier Dead, Three Abducted’, Mimi Mefo Info, 23 March 2025; ‘Cameroon military ambushes, Kills alleged separatist in Bamenda’, Cameroon News Agency, 24 March 2025 ↩︎
32
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, April 2025; E. Ndi, ‘Officer Dies, Another Wounded in Shooting at Hospital Roundabout in Bamenda’, Mimi Mefo Info, 9 April 2025; E. Ndi, ‘Four Separatists Fighters Killed in Ekona: Extrajudicial Executions by Military Suspected’, Mimi Mefo Info, 11 April 2025; ‘9 separatist fighters killed in clashes in Cameroon’, Xinhua, 13 April 2025; E. Ndi, ‘Two Separatists Killed, Hostages Freed in BIR Raid in Ndu’, Mimi Mefo Info, 19 April 2025 ↩︎
33
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, May 2025; K. Bih, ‘Bike Rider Shot Dead in Nkwen, Bamenda’, Mimi Mefo Info, 6 May 2025; T. Mbunwe, ‘Two BIR Soldiers Killed, Three Injured in IED Attack in Muyuka, Cameroon’, Mimi Mefo Info, 5 May 2025; ‘Soldiers survive bomb attack after responding to flag incident’, Cameroon News Agency, 21 May 2025 ↩︎
34
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, June 2025; E. Ndi, ‘Three Injured in Mile 3, Nkwen as Ambazonia Separatists Open Fire’, Mimi Mefo Info, 18 June 2025; J. Ndome, ‘Three Soldiers Killed, Two Injured in Attack at Military Post in Maloun le Petit’, Mimi Mefo Info, 18 June 2025; T. Mbunwe, ‘One Killed, Two Injured, Vehicles Burnt in Mile 16 Shooting’, Mimi Mefo Info, 13 December 2025 ↩︎
35
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, July 2025; ‘4 separatist fighters killed in Cameroon’s restive Anglophone region’, Xinhua, 8 July 2025; E. Ndi, ‘Cameroonian Soldier Killed in IED Attack by Separatists in Mile 12 Bafia, Dozens Arrested’, Mimi Mefo Info, 14 July 2025 ↩︎
36
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, August 2025 September,‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, September 2025 ↩︎
37
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, October 2025 ↩︎
38
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, November 2025 ↩︎
39
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, December 2025. ↩︎
40
‘Crise Anglophone : Deux gendarmes tombent dans une embuscade à Bafmeng’, Alwihda Info, 4 January 2026; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, January 2026; ‘Cameroun : 11 séparatistes tués par l’armée dans le Nord-Ouest du pays’, Tchad Infos, 8 January 2026 ↩︎
41
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, March 2026; M. Fokwen, ‘Fako: Security officers feared killed, others abducted in Muyuka’, The Guardian Post Cameroon, 3 April 2026; ‘Separatist commander killed in Cameroon’s restive Anglophone region’, Xinhua, 15 March 2026; ‘Other MoA event in Nord-Ouest, Djichami area, Cameroon on Fri 6th March 2026’, METIS, 6 March 2026 ↩︎
42
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, April 2026; ‘Cameroon: Separatists announce pause of hostilities for Pope’s visit’, Vatican News, 14 April 2026; A. Zondi, ‘Renewed violence shatters fragile ceasefire hopes in Cameroon’, Channel Africa, 22 April 2026; ‘14 suspected separatist fighters killed in military offensive in Cameroon’, Xinhua, 27 April 2026; C. A., ‘Jakiri military raid : Rights group disputes army version, maintain civilian death’, Lebledparle, 1 May 2026; N. Tabi, ‘At Least 14 Killed as Military Operation Hits Cultural Festival in Jakiri’, Cameroon Concord,27 April 2026; ‘Anglophone Crisis: At least 14 killed in military raid in Ndzerem-Nyam’, Beta Tinz, 29 April 2026 ↩︎
43
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, May 2026; C. A., ‘Deadly assault on military position in Muyuka leaves two soldiers dead’, Lebledparle, 18 May 2026 ↩︎
44
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Groups, June 2026; ‘Suspected separatist fighters kill two students in Cameroon’, Xinhua, 9 June 2026; ‘4 killed in bar shooting in Cameroon’s Northwest region’, Xinhua, 11 June 2026; ‘Cameroun : Deux gendarmes tombent à Belo dans une attaque armée’, Koaci, 12 June 2026 ↩︎
45
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, July 2026; AC. Ndom, ‘Deuil : le fils du ministre Momo tombe dans le Nord-Ouest’, 237Online, 12 July 2026, Updated 13 July 2026; A. Diarra, ‘Cameroon Separatist Leader Sagat Killed in Army Strike’, The Rio Times, 19 July 2026 ↩︎
46
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, August 2026 ↩︎
47
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, September 2026. ↩︎
48
‘IED explosion rocks Oshum village, Batibo’, Cameroon News Agency, 27 June 2024; ‘IED detonation, gunfire in Bamenda’, Cameroon News Agency, 19 September 2024; ‘Galim: IED detected, destroyed by security elements’, Cameroon News Agency, 27 February 2024; D. Atanagana, ‘Bamenda: No casualties reported in Separatist bomb blast’, Mimi Mefo Info, 29 April 2024; T. Mbunwe, ‘Two BIR Soldiers Killed, Three Injured in IED Attack in Muyuka, Cameroon’, Mimi Mefo Info, 5 May 2025; ‘Soldiers survive bomb attack after responding to flag incident’, Cameroon News Agency, 21 May 2025 ↩︎
49
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, August 2024; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, May 2025; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, October 2025. ↩︎
50
D. Atangana, ‘Bomb Explosion at Checkpoint in Bamenda Claims Lives of Two Police Officers’, Mimi Mefo Info, 9 August 2024. ↩︎
51
‘Cameroon’, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 16 March 2026. ↩︎
52
‘Ambazonia Defense Forces (ADF)’, Ambazonia Governing Council ↩︎
53
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 10. ↩︎
54
D. Atanagana, ‘Rights Group Urges Investigations After Soldiers Execute Teacher in Ngoketujia’, Mimi Mefo Info, 19 November 2024; D. Atangana, ‘Separatists Kill Two Cameroonian Soldiers in Mbingo’, Mimi Mefo Info, 10 October 2024. ↩︎
55
‘Cameroon’, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 16 March 2026. ↩︎
56
‘Cameroon’, UNHCR. ↩︎
57
M. E. Kindzeka, ‘Cameroon’s Separatists Say Splinter Groups Kill, Abduct Fighters’, Voice of America, 26 September 2022. ↩︎
58
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, 2024, 17; J. Nikolic et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, ICRC Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020. ↩︎
59
J. Nikolic et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, ICRC Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020. ↩︎
60
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, 2024, 17; J. Nikolic, et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, ICRC Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020. ↩︎
61
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 16. ↩︎
62
H. Maack, ‘Cameroon Rattled by Twin Insurgencies Amid Presidential Elections’, Jamestown, 20 November 2025. ↩︎
63
‘“These Killings Can Be Stopped”: Government and Separatist Groups Abuses in Cameroon’s Anglophone Regions’, Human Rights Watch, July 2018, 20. ↩︎
64
‘Ambazonia Defense Forces (ADF)’, Ambazonia Governing Council; A. Brimbal, ‘Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF)’, Modern Insurgent, 20 September 2022. ↩︎
65
M. E. Kindzeka, ‘Cameroon’s Separatists Say Splinter Groups Kill, Abduct Fighters’, Voice of America, 26 September 2022. ↩︎
66
P. Nje, ‘Cameroonian separatist leader arrested in Norway’, BBC, 26 September 2024 ↩︎
67
M. E. Kindzeka, ‘Cameroon’s Separatists Say Splinter Groups Kill, Abduct Fighters’, Voice of America, 26 September 2022 ↩︎
68
A. B. Atabong, ‘Cameroon separatists declare three-day ceasefire for papal visit’, Reuters, 13 April 2026; M. E. Kindzeka, ‘Cameroon’s Anglophone Separatists Turn to Infighting’, Voice of America, 22 January 2020 ↩︎
69
E. Freudenthal, ‘Cameroon’s anglophone war, part 2: Inside the separatist conflict’, The New Humanitarian, 2 August 2018. ↩︎
70
‘Ambazonia Defense Forces (ADF)’, Ambazonia Governing Council; ‘Defendants Indicted for Directing Kidnappings, Bombings, and Killings Overseas’, United States Attorney’s Office: District of Minnesota, 5 September 2025; ‘Norway extends detention of Cameroon separatist leader’, JusticeInfo.Net, 20 November 2024. https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/138481-norway-extends-detention-of-cameroon-separatist-leader.html. ↩︎
71
(see previous version: 15 April 2026).M. E. Kindzeka, ‘Cameroon Separatists Enforce Curfew After President Says Troops Crushing Rebellion’, Voice of America, 2 January 2023 ↩︎
72
L. Mudge, ‘Arrest of Cameroonian Separatist Leader Sends Important Message’, Human Rights Watch, 27 September 2024. ↩︎
73
F. Ngong, ‘Norway Puts the Ambazonian Struggle on Trial — But What Exactly Is Being Judged?’, Cameroon Concord, 12 May 2026. ↩︎
74
A. E. Ntui, ‘Arrest of Separatist Leader Puts Spotlight on Cameroon’s Anglophone Conflict’, International Crisis Group, 16 October 2024; D. Atangana, ‘Julius Nyih Rises After Ayaba Cho’s Arrest, Promises Continuity’, Mimi Mefo Infos, 27 September 2024; L. Muma, ‘Ambazonia: Lockdown, Independence Day, New School Year Date Known’, Bareta News, 24 August 2026. ↩︎
75
‘Two Minnesota Men Arrested for Funding and Directing Kidnappings, Bombings, and Killings Overseas’, Office of Public Affairs: U.S. Department of Justice, 5 September 2025. ↩︎
76
A. E. Ntui, ‘Arrest of Separatist Leader Puts Spotlight on Cameroon’s Anglophone Conflict’, International Crisis Group, 16 October 2024. ↩︎
77
‘Archives for War Crime Catalog’, Ambazonian Governing Council ↩︎
78
‘Eye Witness Report’, Amabazonian Governing Council ↩︎
79
‘Urgent Alert: Severe Violation Of International Law And Imminent Threat to Civilians In Bamenda’, Ambazonian Governing Council, 8 August 2024 ↩︎
80
‘Urgent Appeal Regarding Violations of International Humanitarian Law In Ambazonia by Cameroon Occupation Forces’, Ambazonian Governing Council, 2 April 2024. ↩︎
81
‘The Charter of Ambazonia on the Protection of Women, Children and People With Disabilities During Wartime or Armed Conflict’, Ambazonian Governing Council, 10 July 2024. ↩︎
82
E. Freudenthal, ‘Cameroon’s anglophone war, part 2: Inside the separatist conflict’, The New Humanitarian, 2 August 2018. ↩︎
83
E. Freudenthal, ‘Cameroon’s anglophone war, part 2: Inside the separatist conflict’, The New Humanitarian, 2 August 2018. ↩︎
84
E. Freudenthal, ‘Cameroon’s anglophone war, part 2: Inside the separatist conflict’, The New Humanitarian, 2 August 2018. ↩︎
85
‘Ambazonia Defense Forces (ADF)’, Ambazonia Governing Council. ↩︎
86
E. Freudenthal, ‘Cameroon’s anglophone war, part 2: Inside the separatist conflict’, The New Humanitarian, 2 August 2018. ↩︎
87
D. Atangana, ‘ADF’s ‘General Weapon,’ Four Others Killed in Bamenda’, Mimi Mefo Infos, 25 November 2024. ↩︎
88
P. Nje, ‘Cameroonian separatist leader arrested in Norway’, BBC, 26 September 2024; ‘Ambazonian Tax Law Signed and Commissioned’, Ambazonian Governing Council. ↩︎
89
‘Ambazonian Tax Law Signed and Commissioned’, Ambazonian Governing Council. ↩︎
90
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, pp 22–24. ↩︎
91
‘Two Minnesota Men Arrested for Funding and Directing Kidnappings, Bombings, and Killings Overseas’, Office of Public Affairs: U.S. Department of Justice, 5 September 2025. ↩︎
92
J. Thorne, ‘Belgian Authorities Detain Suspects in Cameroon Separatist Conflict Probe’, Bode Living, 3 March 2026; M. Ramsay, ‘Belgium Detains Three in Cameroon Secessionist War Crimes Probe’, Bloomberg, 3 March 2026. ↩︎
93
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 14. ↩︎
94
‘With or Against Us: People of the North-West Region of Cameroon Caught Between the Army, Armed Separatists and Militias’, Amnesty International, 2023, 13. ↩︎
95
D. Atangana, ‘Southern Cameroons Independence Day Marked by Mixed Celebrations’, Mimi Mefo Infos, 2 October 2024; ‘Insobu Dies: Why Infighting Keeps Taking Away Ambazonia Best Front Warriors’, Cameroon News Agency, 9 April 2022. ↩︎
96
T. Rodenhäuser, ‘Organizing Rebellion Symposium: Four Points to Conceptualize Armed Groups under International Law’, Opinio Juris, 16 September 2019. ↩︎
97
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 14. ↩︎
98
AC. Ndom, ‘Nord-Ouest : le séparatiste « General No Mercy » tué à Bambalang par l’armée’, 237Online, 4 July 2026. ↩︎
99
D. Atangana, ‘Soldier Killed, Gun Seized by Separatists in Bui After Epaulette Award’, Mimi Mefo Info, 3 July 2024. ↩︎
100
‘With or Against Us: People of the North-West Region of Cameroon Caught Between the Army, Armed Separatists and Militias’, Amnesty International, 2023, 13. ↩︎
101
M. M. Bradley, ‘Revisiting the Notion of ‘Organised Armed Group’ in Accordance with Common Article 3: Exploring the Inherent Minimum Threshold Requirements’, African Yearbook on International Humanitarian Law, 2018, 72; T. Rodenhäuser, ‘Organizing Rebellion Symposium: Four Points to Conceptualize Armed Groups under International Law’, Opinio Juris, 16 September 2019. ↩︎
102
S. Buba, ‘Cameroon Soldiers Free 11 Captives From Separatists in Bui’, Mimi Mefo Info, 4 October 2023. ↩︎
103
ICC, ‘The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga’, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber II,7 March 2014, para 681. ↩︎
104
E. Ndi, ‘Separatist Unity Warriors Claim Responisbility for Deadly Attack on Military Post in Mbonso’, Mimi Mefo Info, 18 June 2025. ↩︎
105
D. Atangana, ‘Soldier Killed, Gun Seized by Separatists in Bui After Epaulette Award’, Mimi Mefo Info, 3 July 2024. ↩︎
106
E. Ndi, ‘Separatist Unity Warriors Claim Responisbility for Deadly Attack on Military Post in Mbonso’, Mimi Mefo Info, 18 June 2025. ↩︎
107
A. Purcell, ‘Amba Boys: Transforming Pacifists into Warmongers?’, Grey Dynamics, 28 November 2023; L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 13, 14, 16 ↩︎
108
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 16. ↩︎
109
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 16. ↩︎
110
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 16. ↩︎
111
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 16. ↩︎
112
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 16. ↩︎
113
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 17. ↩︎
114
A. Purcell, ‘Amba Boys: Transforming Pacifists into Warmongers?’, Grey Dynamics, 28 November 2023. ↩︎
115
‘“They Are Destroying Our Future”: Armed Separatist Attacks on Students, Teachers, and Schools in Cameroon’s Anglophone Regions’, Human Rights Watch, 16 December 2021. ↩︎
116
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 17. ↩︎
117
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 20. ↩︎
118
A. Purcell, ‘Amba Boys: Transforming Pacifists into Warmongers?’, Grey Dynamics, 28 November 2023. ↩︎
119
A. Purcell, ‘Amba Boys: Transforming Pacifists into Warmongers?’, Grey Dynamics, 28 November 2023. ↩︎
120
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 14. ↩︎
121
‘Country Policy and Information Note: Cameroon: North-West/South-West Crisis’, United Kingdom Home Office, December 2020, 23 ↩︎
122
‘About the CEO’, Ebenezer Akwanga Human Rights and Humanitarian Institute. ↩︎
123
‘SOCADEF Claims Responsibility for Ikiliwindi Attack on Military’, Mimi Mefo Info, 22 October 2021. ↩︎
124
‘Country Policy and Information Note – Cameroon: North-West/South-West crisis’, Version 2, UK Home Office, December 2020. ↩︎
125
Cameroon News Agency, Facebook, 19 June 2022. ↩︎
126
ICC, ‘The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga’, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber II,7 March 2014, para 681. ↩︎
127
‘SOCADEF Claims Responsibility for Ikiliwindi Attack on Military’, Mimi Mefo Info, 22 October 2021. ↩︎
128
‘SOCADEF Hees to UN”s Call, Agrees to Stand Down for 14 Days’, Mimi Mefo Info, 26 March 2020 ↩︎
129
‘SOCADEF Claims Responsibility for Ikiliwindi Attack on Military’, Mimi Mefo Info, 22 October 2021. ↩︎

Non-International Armed Conflict between Cameroon (supported by the MNJTF) and Boko Haram

Background

Boko Haram, also known as Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal Jihad (JAS), has been present in northern Cameroon since at least 2009¹ or 2011.² The first armed confrontation registered between Boko Haram and the Cameroonian Armed Forces within its borders took place in March 2014.³ This NIAC as of September 2026.

Intensity

In his report on the situation in Central Africa, the UN Secretary-General found a slight increase in Boko Haram-related activities during the first half of 2025 when compared to 2024. Boko Haram was involved in 351 violent incidents resulting in fifty-four civilian casualties between 1 December 2024 and 15 May 2025. Between 1 December 2023 and 15 May 2024, sixty-six incidents resulted in eighty-two civilian deaths.⁴ The latter half of 2025, however, saw a decrease in violent activities attributable to Boko Haram. Between 1 June and 15 November 2025, 317 Boko Haram-related incidents were reported in the course of which seventy-two civilians were killed compared to the same period in 2024 when 365 incidents involved the deaths of 109 civilians.⁵ The continued reporting by the UN Secretary-General serves as an indicator that the conflict between Cameroon and Boko Haram remains intense.

Specific clashes between the Cameroonian Armed Forces and Boko Haram on the territory of Cameroon during the reporting period continued to occur frequently, including in September,⁶ and December 2023,⁷ January,⁸February,⁹ March,¹⁰ April,¹¹ May,¹² June,¹³ July,¹⁴ August,¹⁵ September,¹⁶ October,¹⁷ and December 2024,¹⁸ and January,¹⁹ March,²⁰ April,²¹ July,²² September,²³ and November 2025.²⁴

Fighting between the Cameroonian Armed Forces and Boko Haram continued throughout 2026, including in January,²⁵ February,²⁶ March,²⁷ May,²⁸ July,²⁹, August 2026 and September 2026.³⁰

The weapons Boko Haram use include assault rifles and heavy machine guns.³¹ They are also able to gain military grade weapons by ambushing Cameroonian soldiers or attacking their bases at night.³² Boko Haram often employs IEDs,³³ including car bombs.³⁴

Reports also suggest that Boko Haram has acquired drone technology, which the group uses to drop improvised grenades.³⁵

As of September 2026, it was estimated that Boko Haram held around 60,000 weapons across its Lake Chad, Mandara Mountains, and mainland formations. These range from assault rifles and machine guns to RPG launchers, pump-action shotguns, and IEDs.³⁶

The violence generated in the NIAC between Cameroon and Boko Haram remained sufficiently intense to equate to protracted armed violence governed by IHL as of September 2026.

Organization

As of September 2026, the leader of Boko Haram is Imam Ibrahim Bakura Doro (aka Bakura Buduma).³⁷ His deputy is Imam is Aliyu Ngulde.³⁸ Other key leadership positions include the Chief of Police (Hisbah), held by Kannay; Chief Cleric, held by Mallam Mamman; and Chief Judge, held by Mallam Abdurahmane.³⁹ Ibrahim Bakura Doro often acts as the group’s unofficial spokesperson on social media.⁴⁰ In a September 2026 video, Sharia judge Mallam Abdulrahman also spoke on behalf of the group.⁴¹ Boko Haram has a military and a civilian wing.⁴² There is uncertainty around exactly how many fighters belong to Boko Haram, but a common estimate is several thousand.⁴³ By September 2026, it was reported that Boko Haram had a total of 80,000 boys and men available for mobilisation if the need arises. Boko Haram systematically recruits children into its ranks.⁴⁴

As its leader, Imam Bakura Doro serves as the overall commander of the military wing and has direct command over the territory held by Boko Haram on the islands of Lake Chad.⁴⁵ Boko Haram is structured into three broad factions, all under the general command of Bakura Doro.⁴⁶ Commander Aliyu Nguldecommands a Boko Haram-controlled enclave, Gwoza Hills, located along the Nigeria-Cameroon border.⁴⁷ A smaller territory held by Boko Haram in southeastern Borno is commanded by Commander Alhai Kale.⁴⁸ The hills in the vicinity of the Shiroro reservoir in Kaduna state, north-central Nigeria, are commanded by Commander Abubakar Sadiku Saidu.⁴⁹ Boko Haram’s strongholds are the Mandara Mountains and northern and central Borno state in Nigeria. According to HumAngle, Boko Haram formations are led by at least 16 kaids (senior commanders), nine based on the mainland and seven in the Lake Chad area.⁵⁰

Cameroonian fighters are increasingly being promoted to senior posts within Boko Haram. These commanders contribute directly to the group’s resilience by securing access to local resources and supplying intelligence on targets for attacks and extortion. As a result, these leaders can influence the group’s internal decisions as well as its field operations in Cameroon. Drawing on their familiarity with the local terrain and communities, they are well-placed to organize attacks in their areas of origin, bring in new recruits, and maintain supply lines from Cameroon.⁵¹ Owing to its deployment of regional commanders and large militia-style units with, on average, 100 to 200 fighters,⁵² Boko Haram has the capability to respect and implement IHL.

The leadership style of the military commanders is described as akin to patronage as the fighters are permitted a modicum of independence under regional command.⁵³ In contrast to ISWAP, Boko Haram does not have distinct internal security (amniyya) and police (shurta) bodies organized along the same lines.⁵⁴ Boko Haram does, however, have a de facto Shura Council to offer religious guidance when required.⁵⁵

Boko Haram’s ideology informs its actions in that it considers as a legitimate target Muslims or Christians who do not support them or are perceived to support the government.⁵⁶ Boko Haram employs extreme violence including suicide attacks against civilians it views as ‘infidels’ or ‘apostates’.⁵⁷ Reports indicate that the group launches attacks into the Far North region of Cameroon.⁵⁸

Boko Haram often plunders or kidnaps for ransom to obtain resources.⁵⁹ In particular, the kidnapping of foreigners and wealthy Nigerian nationals has been lucrative.‘Boko Haram’, Counter Extremism Project. To fund its activities, it also taxes fishermen and herders in areas under its control.⁶⁰ The high volume of cross-border trade between Nigeria and Cameroon makes it easy for Boko Haram to obtain essential supplies such as food, clothing, medicine, and fuel.⁶¹ Boko Haram permits its units to combine criminal predation with jihadist activity and to raise funds independently.⁶² Each regional leader controls a treasury but the administrative capacity of the group is limited.⁶³ The group has been reported to face repeated shortages of weaponry.⁶⁴

A high unemployment rate enables recruitment.⁶⁵ It has been claimed, at times, that Boko Haram forcibly conscripts members or, at other times, offers financial incentives.⁶⁶ Historically, training has been in camps located on Nigerian territory under the control of Boko Haram, including Borno state,⁶⁷ as well as in Cameroon,⁶⁸ and Somalia.⁶⁹

Boko Haram continues to meet the minimum requirements of organization as demanded by IHL.

The existing NIAC between Cameroon (supported by the MNJTF) and Boko Haram continued as of September 2026.

1
H. De Marie Heungoup, ‘Q&A: Boko Haram in Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, 6 April 2016 ↩︎
2
‘Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram’, International Crisis Group, 16 November 2016. ↩︎
3
‘Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram’, International Crisis Group, 16 November 2016; H. De Marie Heungoup, ‘Q&A: Boko Haram in Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, 6 April 2016. ↩︎
4
‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/342, 30 May 2025, para 22. ↩︎
5
UNSC, ‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/772, 28 November 2025, para 27. ↩︎
6
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, September 2023 November,‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, November 2023; L. Serwat, et al, ‘Regional Overview: Africa: November 2023’, ACLED, 7 December 2023 ↩︎
7
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, December 2023; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, December 2023 ↩︎
8
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, January 2024 ↩︎
9
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, February 2024 ↩︎
10
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, March 2024 ↩︎
11
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, April 2024 ↩︎
12
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, May 2024 ↩︎
13
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, June 2024 ↩︎
14
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, July 2024 ↩︎
15
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, August 2024 ↩︎
16
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, September 2024 ↩︎
17
L. Serwat and J. G. Birru, ‘Africa Overview: November 2024’, ACLED, 9 December 2024; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, October 2024 ↩︎
18
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, December 2024 ↩︎
19
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, January 2025 ↩︎
20
‘Cameroon, Nigeria Face ‘Advanced Weaponry’ from Terrorists’, African Defense Forum, 13 May 2025; B. E. Bdo, ‘Borno Governer Zulum Visits Cameroonian Troops After Boko Haram Attack in Wulgo’, Mimi Mefo Info, 29 April 2025; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, March 2025 ↩︎
21
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, April 2025 ↩︎
22
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, July 2025; B. E. Bdo, ‘Maroua Mourns Fallen Soldier in Boko Haram Attack’, Mimi Mefo Info, 28 July 2025 ↩︎
23
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, September 2025 ↩︎
24
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, November 2025. ↩︎
25
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, January 2026 ↩︎
26
‘Cameroun : au moins cinq morts dans une nouvelle attaque de Boko Haram à Bargaram’, Journal du Cameroun, 26 February 2026 ↩︎
27
‘Cameroun : Deux soldats camerounais tombent dans une embuscade de Boko Haram près de Waza’, Koaci, 6 March 2026; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, March 2026 ↩︎
28
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, May 2026 ↩︎
29
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, July 2026; ‘Cameroun : quatre militaires blessés et une civile tuée dans une attaque de Boko Haram dans l’Extrême-Nord’, Journal du Cameroun, 15 July 2026 August,‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group ↩︎
30
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, September 2026. ↩︎
31
‘Troops Eliminate Boko Haram Commander Abba Alai, Crush Terrorists in Gwoza and Garin Fallujah’, Zagazola, 3 March 2025; ‘MNJTF Force Commander’s Text Speech: International Press Conference For Progress Of Operation Lake Sanity II by Major General Ibrahim Sallau Ali Gss psc(++) fdc Naphm Ftam Gom Fcmh Naim MSc Force Commander Multinational Joint Task Force Held 4 June 2024 At Maiduguri’, Multinational Joint Task Force, 4 June 2025. ↩︎
32
B. E. Bdo, ‘Boko Haram Militants Kill Atleast 20 Cameroonian Troops in Deadly Raid on Wulgo’, Mimi Mefo Info, 25 March 2025. ↩︎
33
I. Ojo, ‘Troops kill B’Haram chief bomb maker, eight others in Sambisa’, Punch, 6 March 2025; ‘Communiqué of the 1254th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, held on 13 January 2025 on the Consideration Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram Terrorist Group and Renewal of its Mandate’, African Union, 3 February 2025, para 6; R. Hoinathy and C. Delanga, ‘Capitalising on Operation Lake Sanity’s success against Boko Haram’, Institute for Security Studies, 16 September 2024 ↩︎
34
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, February 2024. ↩︎
35
‘Boko Haram Militants Attack Two Nigerian Army Bases with Grenade-strapped Drones’, Defense Mirror, 26 December 2024; N. Roll et al, ‘Nigeria, Sahel Militants Embrace DIY Drone’, eNCA, 27 March 2025; and ‘Nigerian Army Confirms Boko Haram’s Use Of Armed Drones In Borno, Similar To Israeli, Ukrainian Types’, Sahara Reporters, 14 May 2025. ↩︎
36
A. Salkida, ‘Nigeria Says the War Is Ending. Boko Haram Is Building the Next Generation to Fight It’, HumAngle, 14 October 2026. ↩︎
37
O. Anyadike, ‘EXCLUSIVE: Nigerian government and Boko Haram strike secret ceasefire deal’, The New Humanitarian, 7 September 2026; A. Dahiru, ‘Boko Haram Rejects Ceasefire, Ransom Deal With Nigerian Government in New Video’, HumAngle, 14 September 2026; V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024; ‘Fighting among Boko Haram Splinters Rages On’, International Crisis Group, 30 May 2023. ↩︎
38
C. Delanga, ‘Boko Haram’s Cameroonian commanders are extending the group’s reach’, Institute for Security Studies, 3 August 2026. ↩︎
39
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024. ↩︎
40
‘Boko Haram – Video Reaffirming Loyalty to Abu Umaima and Rejecting ISWAP, translation by Sufyan Musah’, Unmasking Boko Haram: Exploring Global Jihad in Nigeria, 12 May 2022. ↩︎
41
A. Dahiru, ‘Boko Haram Rejects Ceasefire, Ransom Deal With Nigerian Government in New Video’, HumAngle, 14 September 2026. ↩︎
42
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024. ↩︎
43
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024. ↩︎
44
A. Salkida, ‘Nigeria Says the War Is Ending. Boko Haram Is Building the Next Generation to Fight It’, HumAngle, 14 October 2026. ↩︎
45
O. Anyadike, ‘EXCLUSIVE: Nigerian government and Boko Haram strike secret ceasefire deal’, The New Humanitarian, 7 September 2026; V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024. ↩︎
46
O. Anyadike, ‘EXCLUSIVE: Nigerian government and Boko Haram strike secret ceasefire deal’, The New Humanitarian, 7 September 2026. ↩︎
47
O. Anyadike, ‘EXCLUSIVE: Nigerian government and Boko Haram strike secret ceasefire deal’, The New Humanitarian, 7 September 2026; V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024. ↩︎
48
O. Anyadike, ‘EXCLUSIVE: Nigerian government and Boko Haram strike secret ceasefire deal’, The New Humanitarian, 7 September 2026; V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024. ↩︎
49
O. Anyadike, ‘EXCLUSIVE: Nigerian government and Boko Haram strike secret ceasefire deal’, The New Humanitarian, 7 September 2026; V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024. ↩︎
50
A. Salkida, ‘Nigeria Says the War Is Ending. Boko Haram Is Building the Next Generation to Fight It’, HumAngle, 14 October 2026. ↩︎
51
C. Delanga, ‘Boko Haram’s Cameroonian commanders are extending the group’s reach’, Institute for Security Studies, 3 August 2026. ↩︎
52
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024 ↩︎
53
‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024. ↩︎
54
A. Salkida, ‘Nigeria Says the War Is Ending. Boko Haram Is Building the Next Generation to Fight It’, HumAngle, 14 October 2026. ↩︎
55
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024. ↩︎
56
‘Boko Haram, including JAS and ISIS-WA’, European Union Agency for Asylum, February 2019. ↩︎
57
‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024; ‘Boko Haram’, Counter Terrorism Guide; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, July 2026; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, August 2026. ↩︎
58
R. Hoinathy and R.S. Tayo, ‘Decades of security cooperation under threat in Lake Chad Basin’, Institute for Security Studies, 27 January 2025; African Union Peace and Security Council, ‘Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the Multinational Joint Task Force Against Boko Haram and the Renewal of its Mandate’, AU Doc PSC/PR/RPT.1254 (2025), 13 January 2025, para 5; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, April 2026; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, May 2026. ↩︎
59
O. Anyadike, ‘EXCLUSIVE: Nigerian government and Boko Haram strike secret ceasefire deal’, The New Humanitarian, 7 September 2026; ‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024. ↩︎
60
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024. ↩︎
61
C. Delanga, ‘Boko Haram’s Cameroonian commanders are extending the group’s reach’, Institute for Security Studies, 3 August 2026. ↩︎
62
T. Adebayo, ‘JAS resurgence deepens Lake Chad Basin’s complex security crisis’, Institute for Security Studies, 11 September 2025. ↩︎
63
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024. ↩︎
64
S. B. Owonikoko, ‘Boko Haram on the rise again in Nigeria: how it’s survived and how to weaken it’, The Conversation, 6 October 2025. ↩︎
65
D. Mbachu, ‘Nigeria’s revamp of economic indicators sparks debate’, African Business, 13 February 2025. ↩︎
66
‘Boko Haram’, Counter Extremism Project. ↩︎
67
‘Cameroon, Nigeria Face ‘Advanced Weaponry’ from Terrorists’, African Defense Forum, 13 May 2025 ↩︎
68
‘Cameroon army says dismantles Boko Haram training camp’, Reuters, 22 December 2014; ‘Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram’, International Crisis Group, 16 November 2016; M. E. Kindzeka, ‘Former Boko Haram Fighters Wait for Rehabilitation Facility’, Voice of America, 17 December 2017 ↩︎
69
‘Nigerian Boko Haram fighters trained in Somalia: president’, Reuters, 15 February 2016; S. Busari, ‘Boko Haram sought terror training in Somalia, security chief says’, CNN, 25 February 2016; ‘Boko Haram’, Counter Extremism Project. ↩︎

Non-International Armed Conflict between Cameroon and ISWAP New

Background

Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) is an affiliate of Islamic State.¹ Boko Haram pledged allegiance to Islamic State in March 2015.² After Boko Haram splintered into two factions during 2016, one faction retained the name ISWAP.³ ISWAP, along with the Mali-based Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), reports to the Al-Furqan office, an office of Islamic State Central.⁴

ISWAP activity in the northern parts of Cameroon was reported as early as 2021.⁵ ISWAP for the first time directed attacks against the MNJTF and the Cameroonian Armed Forces in Cameroon in March 2023.⁶ In the course of 2026, ISWAP has shown a growing interest in Cameroon’s border areas, as sustained Nigerian air campaigns against ISWAP and Boko Haram have increased pressure on the group’s strongholds in north-eastern Nigeria. Not only does the border region of Cameroon offer refuge to ISWAP fighters, but illicit cross-border trading activities benefit ISWAP economically. This includes selling stolen cattle from Nigeria in Cameroon.⁷

Intensity

ISWAP launched an attack against a Cameroonian Army base at Ngouma in the Logone-et-Chari division on 12 January 2025, killing three soldiers and wounding four.⁸ Two months later, ISWAP launched a drone attack against the MNJTF during the night of 24 to 25 March 2025 in Wulago, Nigeria. Wulago is in proximity to Soueram which is in the far north of Cameroon. This ISWAP attack killed nineteen Cameroonian soldiers.⁹ ISWAP again clashed with Cameroonian soldiers, this time on 6 May 2025, when attacking an army post in Hile Alifa town in Logone-et-Chari division. Three soldiers and two civilians were killed.¹⁰ On 10 June 2025, ISWAP launched an attack against a Cameroonian army base in Fotokol in the north of the country, killing four soldiers and leaving another seriously injured.¹¹ The Cameroonian Armed Forces repelled ISWAP attacks on 15 and 18 September 2025 near Fotokol town in Logone-et-Chari division¹² and again on 17 December 2025, this time in the Gouma village in Logone-et-Chari division.¹³ Although ISWAP activity in Cameroon increased during 2025,¹⁴ the number of casualties resulting from clashes between ISWAP and the Cameroonian Armed Forces remained low.

Clashes between ISWAP and the Cameroonian Armed Forces increased in frequency and intensity during 2026. Fighting was reported during February,¹⁵ March,¹⁶ June,¹⁷ and September 2026.¹⁸ The number of clashes between ISWAP and the Cameroonian Armed Forces may be higher than reported, as media coverage frequently attributes ISWAP attacks to Boko Haram.

On 26 February, ISWAP and the Cameroonian Armed Forces clashed in the Far North region.¹⁹ The attack was executed at night and resulted in at least five casualties – four fighters and one soldier.²⁰ On 18 February, ISWAP attacked a Cameroonian Armed Forces military outpost in Bargaram in Far Northern Cameroon. The Cameroonian Armed Forces managed to capture an ISWAP fighter during the violent encounter.²¹ One Cameroonian soldier was also killed.²² On 5 March 2026, ISWAP and Boko Haram clashed with patrolling Cameroonian soldiers in Waza in the Far North of Cameroon.²³

ISWAP’s arsenal is believed to include heavy weapons, assault rifles, M21 sniper rifles, PKM machine guns, anti-tank rocket launchers, and hand grenades.²⁴ As of late 2025, ISWAP expanded its stock of unmanned aerial vehicles by buying components through ordinary commercial channels and then reassembling them.²⁵ In mid-February 2026, ISWAP reportedly bought around 35 drones.²⁶ As of May 2026, however, there was no evidence that ISWAP was using fibre optic-controlled drones or that it had adopted drone swarm attacks.²⁷

It is clear that the frequency of fighting between ISWAP and the Cameroonian Armed Forces increased throughout 2025 and 2026. The frequency of clashes suggests that the threshold of protracted armed violence was met by March 2026. It is also significant to note that the government of Cameroon has deployed its armed forces to ward off ISWAP rather than its police force.²⁸

Since March 2026, the violence between Cameroon and ISWAP was sufficiently intense to meet the threshold required by IHL.

Organization

The military wing of ISWAP is estimated at between 5,000,²⁹ and 10,400 fighters.³⁰ As of September 2026, ISWAP was being led by Ba’a Shuwa, also known as Abu Musa al-Mangawi, despite rumours that he had died.³¹ On 16 May 2026, ISWAP suffered a significant leadership loss when the group’s deputy head and chief operations planner for the Lake Chad Basin, Abu Bilal al-Minuki, was killed in a joint Nigerian-US operation in the Metele area of Borno state, Nigeria. Several other key ISWAP officials were killed in the strike, including those coordinating ISWAP’s communications and propaganda apparatus. As of September, Mr Al-Minuki’s successor has not yet been publicly disclosed, although the names of Abu Salem and Bana Chingori have been circulated.³² It is not clear whether, as of September 2026, these developments will lead to a comprehensive restructuring of ISWAP’s command and leadership.³³ As of September 2026, ISWAP was reported to have twenty-five active senior commanders (kaids) within its structure. Every identified command under a kaid reportedly has at least 310 fighters, made up of subordinate commanders (munzirs and naqeebs) and rank-and-file members. The number of ISWAP fighters with access to firearms was estimated at roughly 7,750.³⁴

Notwithstanding these setbacks, ISWAP continued to be the most operationally active Islamic State affiliate, conducting more attacks between January and May 2026 than any other affiliate. ISWAP carried out more than 174 attacks during this period, a higher figure than for the same months of 2025.³⁵ At operational level, ISWAP units are constituted from smaller units, which have been described as being well-controlled and well-trained.³⁶ ISWAP has active cells in Kogi, Zamfara, Sokoto, and Katsina states in Nigeria.³⁷ In addition, ISWAP reportedly assigned Abu Zara, a Cameroonian from the Mayo-Sava department, to establish a new cell in the vicinity of Waza National Park in Cameroon’s Far North Region.³⁸ However, in 2026 internal tensions were reported within ISWAP’s ranks as well as between foreign fighters and the local leadership.³⁹The breakdown into units and the exercise of control make it possible for unit commanders to impose an internal disciplinary system.

ISWAP adheres to an extreme Salafi interpretation of Islam.⁴⁰ The group has a religious authority (Hisbah) which enforces rules and moral codes.⁴¹ ISWAP possesses an internal security service, called amniyya, and exercises control over its fighters during combat and in interacting with communities.⁴² Amniyya gathers information in respect of the fighters and reports back at the highest level to an overall amir ul amniyya.⁴³ In addition to the amniyya, ISWAP has an internal policing and security apparatus (shurta).⁴⁴ The measure of control ensures that fighters can be disciplined if they do not follow instructions on the battlefield or adhere to ISWAP’s religious code. A further element in enforcing discipline and limiting the infliction of violence against Muslim civilians is a policy to control the circulation of weapons and to issue weapons to fighters only in advance of a large-scale military operation.⁴⁵ Similarly, ISWAP restricts the use of smartphones due to security concerns. By mid-2026, reports emerged that fighters who took photographs on their devices were executed.⁴⁶ By prioritising training and discipline, and by maintaining defined commands, specialised institutions, intelligence structures and trained units, ISWAP is able to generate an organized fighting force from a smaller base.⁴⁷

ISWAP keeps weaponry and munitions in a central arsenal and, if not deployed to an active operation, it forbids fighters from retaining weapons.⁴⁸ ISWAP’s arsenal and mobility assets grew through a mix of external supply and battlefield capture as of late 2025. The group relied on illicit arms trafficking facilitated by organized criminal networks in parts of Libya and Sudan. It further seized equipment in raids on Nigerian and Cameroonian military positions. Weapons reached the Lake Chad Basin mainly via the Chad–Cameroon–Nigeria and Niger–Nigeria corridors, as well as through broader logistics routes such as cattle corridors.⁴⁹ As of mid-2026, the appearance of Sudanese-made assault rifles in ISWAP propaganda heightened concerns about the flow of weapons into the Sahel via criminal trafficking networks.⁵⁰ The group’s tactics have significantly evolved since early 2025. Earlier patterns consisted of ambushes and hit-and-run attacks. Now, the group carries out complex, rapid sequences of attacks on military bases, seizing weapons from armouries and isolating the targeted camps from relief forces. Together with its growing use of drones and a resurgence in IED attacks, this suggests that ISWAP is regrouping and has gained commanders with the tactical expertise to direct such operations.⁵¹ The use of drones strengthened ISWAP’s capacity to conduct coordinated and simultaneous attacks.⁵² In 2025, the group demonstrated a capacity to use territory under its control to launch near-simultaneous attacks on geographically remote military objectives.⁵³ ISWAP frequently attacks at night, which suggests they have night-vision equipment.⁵⁴

As a part of ISWAP’s military tactics, the group actively attempts to improve relations with civilians living in territory under its control.⁵⁵ ISWAP divides its territory into provinces that it calls wilaya, which are further subdivided into five mantiqas (districts), namely Sambisa, Timbuktu (or Faruq), Kangarwa, Tumbun Gini (Lake Chad region), and Tumbuma. In November 2025, ISWAP raised its Sambisa base in north-east Nigeria to the status of a wilaya under its own wali.⁵⁶ The group asserts its authority through a range of means: taxation, courts and dispute resolution, preaching and religious administration, the regulation of farming and fishing access, market relationships, intelligence gathering, checkpoints, logistics, and punishment of those who fail to comply.⁵⁷

On 20 December 2024, ISWAP released a video aimed at recruiting and training fighters, who are often under eighteen years of age.⁵⁸ According to HumAngle, approximately 8,000 children across ISWAP’s five mantiqas are undergoing ideological indoctrination and military training as of September 2026.⁵⁹ ISWAP relies on social media platforms, including WhatsApp and Telegram, to recruit fighters.⁶⁰ It has a system akin to reservists; rijal (male reservists) live as civilians, farmers, traders, or craftsmen but can be called up to fill the ranks of fighters if losses are suffered in battle.⁶¹ Some ISWAP fighters receive specialised training at the group’s Kingarwa and Toumbouma camps.⁶² ISWAP issued repeated calls for foreign terrorist fighters to join the group. However, local reporting suggests that the flow of fighters from Iraq and Syria was effectively paused following the May 2026 strike that killed al-Minuki (see above).⁶³

ISWAP has a sophisticated logistics system and benefits from advice and support from Islamic State.⁶⁴ It raises funds through kidnapping for ransom, arms and drug trafficking, fuel smuggling, and the taxation of fishermen and cattle farmers.⁶⁵ It is estimated ISWAP generates approximately US$5 million each month.⁶⁶ Its commanders and administrators are paid fixed salaries, but fighters are compensated from war spoils (‘ghanima’).In the camps, the fighters are fed and they can ask for financial assistance.⁶⁷

ISWAP assures unity of messaging through a media team which has the primary function of showcasing ISWAP as a successful jihadist group.⁶⁸

It is clear that ISWAP meets the threshold of organization as demanded by IHL.

A new NIAC between Cameroon and ISWAP existed at the least from the beginning of March 2026.

1
M. Samuel, ‘Boko Haram factional violence worries Islamic State’, Institute for Security Studies, 25 April 2024. ↩︎
2
‘Islamic State West Africa Province’, Australian Government: Australian National Security, 22 September 2024; ‘Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)’, United Nations Security Council. ↩︎
3
‘Boko Haram, including JAS and ISIS-WA’, European Union Agency for Asylum, February 2019; See ‘Islamic State West Africa Province’, Australian Government: Australian National Security, 22 September 2024. ↩︎
4
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024; See L. Karr and Brian Carter, ‘The Islamic State’s Global Long Game and Resurgence in Syria Poses an Evolved Threat to the West’, Institute for the Study of War, 9 January 2025. ↩︎
5
AN. Fru and T. T. Tayo, ‘ISWAP takes aim at the state in Cameroon’, Institute for Security Studies, 22 July 2021. ↩︎
6
J. Zenn, ‘Brief: Cameroonian President Holds Emergency Meeting to Address ISWAP Attacks’, Jamestown, 6 September 2023; Humanity Purpose, X, 4 April 2023. ↩︎
7
C. Delanga, ‘Boko Haram’s Cameroonian commanders are extending the group’s reach’, Institute for Security Studies, 3 August 2026. ↩︎
8
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, January 2025. ↩︎
9
‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/342, 30 May 2025, para 24. ↩︎
10
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, May 2025. ↩︎
11
E. Ndi, ‘Four Cameroonian Soldiers Killed by ISWAP in Fotokol’, Mimi Mefo Info, 10 June 2025; Deutsche Welle Africa, Facebook, 10 June 2025. ↩︎
12
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, September 2025 ↩︎
13
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, December 2025. ↩︎
14
M. Samuel, ‘ISWAP’s emergence as epicentre of jihadism in West Africa’, Good Governance Africa, 9 July 2025 ↩︎
15
T. Jacques, ‘Cameroun: Attaque de Bargaram – Un terroriste Boko Haram capturé après l’assaut du camp militaire’, All Africa, 19 February 2026; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, February 2026; ‘Other MoA event in Cameroon on Thu 26th February 2026’, METIS, 26 February 2026 ↩︎
16
‘Cameroun : Deux soldats camerounais tombent dans une embuscade de Boko Haram près de Waza’, Koaci, 6 March 2026 ↩︎
17
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Groups, June 2026 ↩︎
18
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, September 2026. ↩︎
19
‘Other MoA event in Cameroon on Thu 26th February 2026’, METIS, 26 February 2026. ↩︎
20
‘Cameroun : au moins cinq morts dans une nouvelle attaque de Boko Haram à Bargaram’, Journal du Cameroun, 26 February 2026. ↩︎
21
T. Jacques, ‘Cameroun: Attaque de Bargaram – Un terroriste Boko Haram capturé après l’assaut du camp militaire’, All Africa, 19 February 2026. ↩︎
22
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, February 2026. ↩︎
23
‘Cameroun : Deux soldats camerounais tombent dans une embuscade de Boko Haram près de Waza’, Koaci, 6 March 2026. ↩︎
24
‘Cameroun : au moins cinq morts dans une nouvelle attaque de Boko Haram à Bargaram’, Journal du Cameroun, 26 February 2026; A. Carboni et al, ‘Jihadist groups pose a growing and expanding threat in Africa’, ACLED, 13 May 2026. ↩︎
25
UNSC, ‘Thirty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2026/44,4 February 2026, para 132. ↩︎
26
UNSC, ‘Thirty-eighth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2026/651, para 29. ↩︎
27
UNSC, ‘Thirty-eighth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2026/651, para 129. ↩︎
28
ICTY, ‘Prosecutor v Boskoski and Tarculovski’, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 10 July 2008, para 178; K. Ambos, ‘Chapter III: War Crimes’ in K Ambos Treatise on International Criminal Law; Volume II; The Crimes and Sentencing (Oxford University Press 2014) 128. ↩︎
29
‘Islamic State West Africa Province’, Australian Government: Australian National Security, 22 September 2024; ‘ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, April 2025; M. Cengiz, ‘Column: Terrorist Threat Assessment: Boko Haram and ISWAP in Nigeria’, Homeland Security Today, 4 June 2024 ↩︎
30
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024. ↩︎
31
‘Thirty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2026/44,4 February 2026, para 23; A. Salkida, ‘The Men Lining Up to Replace Al-Minuki’, HumAngle, 31 May 2026; A. Salkida, ‘ISWAP Loses Key Buduma Unit Following Internal Clash’, HumAngle, 26 September 2026. ↩︎
32
UNSC, ‘Thirty-eighth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2026/651, paras 27-28; A. Salkida, ‘The Men Lining Up to Replace Al-Minuki’, HumAngle, 31 May 2026; R. S. Tayo, ‘Will the US-Nigeria targeting of ISWAP’s deputy weaken terrorism?’, Institute for Security Studies, 27 May 2026. ↩︎
33
‘ISWAP Reeling From Heavy Losses, Moves to Overhaul Leadership Structure — sources’, Zagazola, 1 May 2026. ↩︎
34
A. Salkida, ‘Nigeria Says the War Is Ending. Boko Haram Is Building the Next Generation to Fight It’, HumAngle, 14 October 2026. ↩︎
35
UNSC, ‘Thirty-eighth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2026/651, para 29; A. Dahiru, ‘ISWAP Used Theology to Absorb the Shock of Its Deadliest Week’, HumAngle, 10 June 2026. ↩︎
36
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024. ↩︎
37
UNSC, ‘Thirty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2026/44,4 February 2026, para 24. ↩︎
38
C. Delanga, ‘Boko Haram’s Cameroonian commanders are extending the group’s reach’, Institute for Security Studies, 3 August 2026. ↩︎
39
A. Salkida, ‘The Men Lining Up to Replace Al-Minuki’, HumAngle, 31 May 2026; ‘ISWAP Shows Signs of Fracturing After Al-Minuki Raid’, Africa Defense Forum, 30 June 2026. ↩︎
40
‘Islamic State West Africa Province’, Australian Government: Australian National Security, 22 September 2024. ↩︎
41
A. Salkida, ‘Nigeria Says the War Is Ending. Boko Haram Is Building the Next Generation to Fight It’, HumAngle, 14 October 2026. ↩︎
42
A. Salkida, ‘Nigeria Says the War Is Ending. Boko Haram Is Building the Next Generation to Fight It’, HumAngle, 14 October 2026; ‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024; V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024. ↩︎
43
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024. ↩︎
44
A. Salkida, ‘Nigeria Says the War Is Ending. Boko Haram Is Building the Next Generation to Fight It’, HumAngle, 14 October 2026. ↩︎
45
‘Fighting among Boko Haram Splinters Rages On’, International Crisis Group, 30 May 2023. ↩︎
46
A. Salkida, ‘The Men Lining Up to Replace Al-Minuki’, HumAngle, 31 May 2026. ↩︎
47
A. Salkida, ‘Nigeria Says the War Is Ending. Boko Haram Is Building the Next Generation to Fight It’, HumAngle, 14 October 2026. ↩︎
48
‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024. ↩︎
49
UNSC, ‘Thirty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2026/44,4 February 2026, para 133; A. Carboni et al, ‘Jihadist groups pose a growing and expanding threat in Africa’, ACLED, 13 May 2026. ↩︎
50
UNSC, ‘Thirty-eighth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2026/651, para 54. ↩︎
51
A. Carboni et al, ‘Jihadist groups pose a growing and expanding threat in Africa’, ACLED, 13 May 2026. ↩︎
52
UNSC, ‘Thirty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2026/44,4 February 2026, para 132. ↩︎
53
M. Samuel and E. Stoddard, ‘Resurgent jihadist violence in northeast Nigeria part of a worrying regional trend’, The New Humanitarian, 2 June 2025. ↩︎
54
M. Samuel and E. Stoddard, ‘Resurgent jihadist violence in northeast Nigeria part of a worrying regional trend’, The New Humanitarian, 2 June 2025. ↩︎
55
M. Samuel and E. Stoddard, ‘Resurgent jihadist violence in northeast Nigeria part of a worrying regional trend’, The New Humanitarian, 2 June 2025. ↩︎
56
‘Country of Origin Information – Nigeria: Security Situation: 1.1.3. Non-state armed actors’, European Union: Agency for Asylum, 5 September 2025; UNSC, ‘Thirty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2026/44,4 February 2026, para 25; A. Salkida, ‘Nigeria Says the War Is Ending. Boko Haram Is Building the Next Generation to Fight It’, HumAngle, 14 October 2026. ↩︎
57
A. Salkida, ‘Nigeria Says the War Is Ending. Boko Haram Is Building the Next Generation to Fight It’, HumAngle, 14 October 2026. ↩︎
58
‘Islamic State In West Africa (ISWAP) Releases Video Showing ‘Cubs’ Executing Captives, Vowing To Carry The Caliphate’s Banner Generation After Generation’, Memri, 20 December 2024. ↩︎
59
A. Salkida, ‘Nigeria Says the War Is Ending. Boko Haram Is Building the Next Generation to Fight It’, HumAngle, 14 October 2026. ↩︎
60
A. Dahiru, ‘Media Jihad: Social Media Use Shows Islamic State’s Increasing Interest In Africa’, HumAngle, 14 September 2022. ↩︎
61
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, UNIDIR, 16 September 2024. ↩︎
62
‘Thirty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2026/44,4 February 2026, para 25. ↩︎
63
‘Thirty-eighth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2026/651, para 123; A. Dahiru, ‘ISWAP Used Theology to Absorb the Shock of Its Deadliest Week’, HumAngle, 10 June 2026. ↩︎
64
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024; ‘Thirty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2026/44,4 February 2026, para 7. ↩︎
65
‘Islamic State West Africa Province’, Australian Government: Australian National Security, 22 September 2024. ↩︎
66
S. M. Zuffa, ‘Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)’, Grey Dynamics, 22 February 2023; See M. Samuel, ‘Boko Haram’s deadly business: an economy of violence in the Lake Chad Basin’, Institute for Security Studies, 5 October 2022. ↩︎
67
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024; See ‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024. ↩︎
68
M. Samuel, ‘ISWAP’s use of tech could prolong Lake Chad Basin violence’, Institute for Security Studies, 13 April 2023. ↩︎

State

Cameroon (supported by MNJTF)

Non-State

Boko Haram
Ambazonian separatists
ISWAP

1
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), IHL Databases. ↩︎
2
‘Cameroon country profile’, BBC, 9 March 2023. ↩︎
3
A. Cascais, ‘5 years of violent civil war in Cameroon’, Deutsche Welle, 1 October 2021. ↩︎
4
R. Orock, ‘Cameroon: how language plunged a country into deadly conflict with no end in sight’, The Conversation, 17 March 2022. ↩︎
5
A. Cascais, ‘5 years of violent civil war in Cameroon’, Deutsche Welle, 1 October 2021. ↩︎
6
‘Cameroon country profile’, BBC, 9 March 2023. ↩︎
7
A. Cascais, ‘5 years of violent civil war in Cameroon’, Deutsche Welle, 1 October 2021 ↩︎
8
‘Cameroon country profile’, BBC, 9 March 2023. ↩︎
9
African Union Peace and Security Council, ‘Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the Multinational Joint Task Force Against Boko Haram and the Renewal of its Mandate’, AU Doc PSC/PR/RPT.1254 (2025), 13 January 2025, para 5. ↩︎
10
‘MNJTF Mandate’, Multinational Joint Task Force ↩︎
11
‘About the Force’, Multinational Joint Task Force. ↩︎
12
‘The Islamic State West Africa Province’s Tactical Evolution Fuels Worsening Conflict in Nigeria’s Northeast’, The Soufan Center, 21 May 2025; and ‘About the Force’, Multinational Joint Task Force. ↩︎
13
‘Meagre funding for CAR refugee influx’, ReliefWeb, 6 June 2014. ↩︎
14
‘Cameroon: the world’s most neglected displacement crisis’, Norwegian Refugee Council, 3 June 2025. ↩︎
15
‘Cameroon’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 19 May 2022. ↩︎
16
‘Communique of the 1318th meeting of the PSC held on 15 December 2025, on Consideration of the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against the Boko Haram terrorist group and Renewal of its Mandate’, African Union, 23 December 2025, para 12. ↩︎
17
‘Central African Region – Security Council, 9931^st meeting’, United Nations Audiovisual Library, 9 June 2025. ↩︎
18
O. Oshoko, ‘European Union Pledges 300 Million Euros to Support Fight Against Terrorism, Violent Extremism in North East, North West in 2025’, Security King, 7 April 2025. ↩︎
19
‘Separatist Lockdowns Turn Cities into Ghost Towns in Cameroon’, African Security Analysis, 21 September 2025. ↩︎
20
‘Cameroon: North-West and South-West – Situation Report No 64 (April 2024)’, ReliefWeb, 18 June 2024. ↩︎
21
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, February 2026; ‘Youth Day in a region seeking stability’, Hilltop Voices, 11 February 2026 ↩︎
22
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, May 2026. ↩︎
23
A.K. Assane, ‘Cameroon: Separatist lockdown disrupts back-to-school in anglophone regions’, Benin Web TV, 9 September 2026; C. Mbeumo, ‘Cameroon: police officer killed and five teachers abducted in Wum’, Benin Web TV, 10 September 2026; ‘Separatists enforce weeklong lockdown in Cameroon’s Anglophone regions’, New Kerala, 8 September 2026. ↩︎
24
‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/342, 30 May 2025, para 18. ↩︎
25
International Monetary Fund Africa Department, ‘Climate Change in Chad: Challenges and Opportunities’, International Monetary Fund eLibrary, 12 December 2024. ↩︎
26
‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/342, 30 May 2025, para 18. ↩︎
27
Ypavlov, ‘Meeting the Fulani Bororo in Chad’, World Heritage Sights, 29 November 2016. ↩︎
28
‘Gbaya/Gbeya/Baya’, Africa: 101 Last Tribes. ↩︎
29
‘Gbaya, Northwest in Cameroon’, Joshua Project ↩︎
30
‘Gbaya/Gbeya/Baya’, Africa: 101 Last Tribes. ↩︎
31
C. B. Etahoben, ‘Cameroon: Calm Returns to Ngaoundal After Deadly Clashes Between Bororo and Gbaya Communities’, HumAngle, 7 February 2025. ↩︎
32
‘Cameroun : quatre morts dans des affrontements liés à un différend foncier dans l’Extrême-Nord’, Journal du Cameroun, 7 July 2026. ↩︎
33
‘Urgent Alert and Advocacy for Free, Credible and Peaceful Elections in Cameroon’, International Peace Bureau. ↩︎
34
‘Urgent Alert and Advocacy for Free, Credible and Peaceful Elections in Cameroon’, International Peace Bureau; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, February 2025. ↩︎
35
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, February 2025. ↩︎
36
‘Cameroon’, UNICEF, 5 February 2026. ↩︎
37
‘Cameroon: Humanitarian Dashboard (as of 31 December 2025)’, ReliefWeb, 5 February 2026 (Updated 12 March 2026); ‘Mpox outbreak in Cameroon with 22 confirmed cases linked to enhanced transmission subvariants’, Beacon, 20 February 2026. ↩︎
38
‘Cameroon’, UNICEF, 25 July 2025, 2. ↩︎
39
‘Cameroon’s Paul Biya, 92, says he will seek eighth presidential term’, Al Jazeera, 14 July 2025. ↩︎
40
‘Cameroon: Mixed reactions in Yaoundé after Biya announces bid for another term’, Africa News, 14 July 2025. ↩︎
41
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, May 2024 ↩︎
42
N. Booty and N. Négoce, ‘Ally of Cameroon president, 92, quits “broken” government to challenge him’, BBC, 26 June 2025; ‘Cameroonian opposition leader Kamto returns to Yaoundé after house arrest’, France 24, 11 June 2025. ↩︎
43
‘Cameroon opposition figure Kamto rejects ‘abitrary’ election ban’, France 24, 8 August 2025. ↩︎
44
‘Cameroon opposition figure Kamto rejects ‘abitrary’ election ban’, France 24, 8 August 2025. ↩︎
45
‘Cameroon minister Bakary announces presidential run after breaking with Biya government’, France 24, 27 June 2025; N. Booty and N. Négoce, ‘Ally of Cameroon president, 92, quits ‘broken’ government to challenge him’, BBC, 26 June 2025. ↩︎
46
N. Booty and N. Négoce, ‘Ally of Cameroon president, 92, quits “broken” government to challenge him’, BBC, 26 June 2025. ↩︎
47
‘Cameroon President Biya declared election victor; challenger protests’, Al Jazeera, 27 October 2025. ↩︎
48
‘Cameroon’s Biya declared vote winner, opposition reports gunfire’, Polity, 27 October 2025 ↩︎
49
‘Cameroon’s Biya, world’s oldest ruler at 92, sworn in for eighth term’, Al Jazeera, 6 November 2025; J. Siegle and H. Wahila, ‘Cameroon: Change is Coming but More of the Same?’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 13 January 2025 ↩︎
50
‘Cameroon’s Biya, world’s oldest ruler at 92, sworn in for eighth term’, Al Jazeera, 6 November 2025. ↩︎
51
H. Kinkoh and R. Dideberg, ‘Suppression of post-election protests in Cameroon will not solve the country’s looming succession crisis’, Chatham House, 31 October 2025; ‘Cameroon: Violence erupts following Paul Biya’s election victory’, France 24, 28 October 2025; ‘Cameroon: Killings, Mass Arrests Follow Disputed Elections’, Human Rights Watch, 12 November 2025. ↩︎
52
‘Cameroon’s Biya, world’s oldest ruler at 92, sworn in for eighth term’, Al Jazeera, 6 November 2025 ↩︎
53
‘Cameroon: Killings, Mass Arrests Follow Disputed Elections’, Human Rights Watch, 12 November 2025. ↩︎
54
‘Cameroon: Opposition candidate Issa Tchiroma Bakary calls for release of protesters’, France 24, 11 November 2025. ↩︎
55
‘Gambia grants refuge to Cameroonian opposition leader amid safety concerns’, Gambiana, 23 November 2025; ‘Gambia takes in Cameroon opposition leader after election-linked protests’, Daily Nation, 24 November 2025. ↩︎
56
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, January 2026; A. N. Mawel, ‘Cameroun : Paul Biya s’adresse à la Nation à 19 heures ce 31 décembre’, Journal du Cameroun, 31 December 2026; A. N. Mawel, ‘Cameroun : « le FSNC n’ira ni aux élections législatives ni aux élections municipales » de 2026’, Journal du Cameroun, 15 January 2026. ↩︎
57
‘Cameroun: Le nouveau report des élections législatives et municipales pose de nombreuses questions’, All Africa, 13 February 2026; F. K, ‘Cameroun : Paul Biya reporte encore les législatives et municipales et promet un nouveau gouvernement’, Afrik.com, 11 February 2026; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, February 2026. ↩︎
58
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, February 2026; P. Moutila, ‘Issa Tchiroma Bakary dénonce 50 morts et lance un appel à la diaspora’, Camber.Be, 27 February 2026. ↩︎
59
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, March 2026; B. Bangda, ‘Cameroun : Théodore Datouo, un opérateur économique, élu président de l’Assemblée nationale’, Financial Afrik, 17 March 2026; B. Batana, ‘Après les changements à l’Assemblée nationale et au Sénat, à quand le nouveau gouvernement ?’, Camer.Be, 19 March 2026. ↩︎
60
A. N. Mawel, ‘Cameroun : l’Assemblée nationale adopte le projet de loi portant prorogation du mandat des députés’, Journal du Cameroun, 24 March 2026; ‘Cameroun : Le mandat des deputes prolongé une nouvelle fois, jusqu’au 20 décembre 2026’, Koaci, 25 March 2026; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, March 2026. ↩︎
61
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Groups, June 2026; P. Moutila, ‘Cameroun : Issa Tchiroma porte plainte à Paris’, Camer.Be, 13 June 2026; ‘L’opposant Issa Tchiroma Bakary en justice contre Paul Biya’, Wakat Séra, 15 June 2026. ↩︎
62
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Groups, June 2026; G. E. Tsayid, ‘Conseillers municipaux: En poste jusqu’en février 2027’, Cameroon Tribune, 6 May 2026; ‘Affaire MRC vs Paul Biya : le Conseil constitutionnel déclare la requête irrecevable’, Journal du Cameroun, 17 June 2026. ↩︎
63
E. Dione, ‘Maurice Kamto : démission ou exclusion du Mouvement de la Renaissance du Cameroun ?’, Afrik.com, 9 September 2026; P. Moutila, ‘Mota démissionne à son tour : le MRC plonge dans l’inconnu’, Camer.Be, 8 September 2026; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, September 2026. ↩︎
64
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, September 2026; A. N. Mawel, ‘Cameroun : de Kondengui, Alain Fogue annonce un « génocide bamiléké programmé » et accuse le clan Biya de préparer la royauté’, Journal du Cameroun, 14 September 2026; P. Moutila, ‘Cameroun: Kondengui – La lettre qui accuse Biya de préparer un génocide’, All Africa, 14 September 2026. ↩︎
65
‘Cameroon: Massacre Trial Short on Justice’, Human Rights Watch, 24 February 2026; T. Jacques, ‘Cameroun: Verdict Ngarbuh – La justice camerounaise face à ses responsabilités militaires’, All Africa, 16 January 2026; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, January 2026. ↩︎
66
‘Cameroon: Massacre Trial Short on Justice’, Human Rights Watch, 24 February 2026; P. Moutila, ‘Cameroun: Massacre de Ngarbuh – 3 soldats condamnés à 10 ans après le meurtre de 22 civils au Cameroun’, All Africa, 20 February 2026; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, February 2026. ↩︎
67
O. Berhuse, ‘Cameroun: Renvoi au 15 janvier par la cour suprême de l’examen du pourvoi en cassation de Sisiku Ayuk Tabe’, All Africa, 18 December 2025; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, January 2026. ↩︎
68
K. Hilton, ‘New Legal Chapter Opens: Supreme Court Orders Fresh Hearing For Imprisoned Separatist Leaders’, Cameroon Tribune, 19 March 2026; A. Ngo, ‘Cameroun : La Cour suprême annule le verdict des “NERA 10” et ordonne un nouveau procès, un camouflet retentissant pour la justice militaire’, Cameroun 24, 19 March 2026; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, March 2026. ↩︎
69
‘Cameroun : NERA 10, l’ONU avait demandé leur libération il y a quatre ans, ils sont toujours en prison’, Koaci, 2 September 2026. ↩︎
70
I. Allegrozzi, ‘Cameroonian Separatist Leaders Arrested in Belgium’, Human Rights Watch, 6 March 2026; ‘Cameroon: Belgian Police Detain Three Linked to Cameroonian Separatist Group’, All Africa, 3 March 2026. ↩︎
71
C. Mares, ‘Pope Leo XIV arrives in Cameroon as ‘a servant of dialogue’ amid violent separatist conflict’, Angelus, 15 April 2026; ‘Pope heads to Cameroon with message of peace for conflict zone’, Arab News, 15 April 2026; Y. Tankeu, ‘Visite du Pape Léon XIV au Cameroun: La ville de Bamenda quadrillée par les forces de l’ordre’, Camer.Be, 14 April 2026; Z. Coulibaly, ‘Côte d’Ivoire-AIP/Inter/ Cameroun: le pape Léon XIV se rend à Bamenda, chef lieu de la «crise anglophone»’, Agence Ivoirienne de Presse, 16 April 2026;‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, April 2026. ↩︎
72
R. Onanena, ‘Cameroun: Révision constitutionnelle – Le Parlement approuve la création du poste de vice-président’, All Africa, 4 April 2026; P. Moutila, ‘Cameroun: La constitution modifiée, Biya se choisit un successeur sans urnes’, All Africa, 4 April 2026; P. Moutila, ‘Cameroun: Tchiroma dénonce la dérive monarchique de Biya et appelle à la résistance’, All Africa, 3 April 2026; ‘Un poste de vice-président renaît au Cameroun’, Wakat Séra, 6 April 2026; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, April 2026. ↩︎
73
P. Moutila, ‘Deux Franck, un trône : la bataille dynastique qui déchire le pouvoir camerounais’, Camer.Be, 3 June 2026; P. Moutila, ‘Cameroun : Tchiroma rejette la succession dynastique’, Camer.Be, 2 August 2026; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, May 2026. ↩︎
74
R. Joel, ‘Anafoot: les modalités d’admission connues’, Cameroon Tribune, 21 May 2026; ‘Cameroun : 20 mai 2026, Paul Biya fragilisé, le général Meka absent, les zones d’ombre de la fête de l’unité’, Koaci, 20 May 2026; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Groups, June 2026. ↩︎
75
P. Moutila, ‘Cameroun: Vice-présidence – Le communiqué qui devait calmer… et qui relance tout’, All Africa, 30 June 2026; P. Moutila, ‘Faux décrets à la CRTV : manipulation politique ou tentative de putsch?’, Camer.Be, 26 June 2026; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Groups, June 2026. ↩︎
76
P. Moutila, ‘Cameroun: « Biya a droit à 80 jours de congé » – La sortie d’Owona’, All Africa, 29 July 2026; P. Moutila, ‘Vacance du pouvoir : ce que cache la Constitution’, Camer.Be, 23 July 2026; H. Bailly, ‘Cameroun : l’absence de Paul Biya relance le débat sur sa succession au sein du RDPC’, Afrik.com, 22 July 2026; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, July 2026. ↩︎
77
‘Cameroun : voici les cinq nouveaux généraux promus ce 03 août 2026’, Journal du Cameroun, 3 August 2026; C. T. Engo, ‘Décret Paul Biya : nominations militaires majeures au ministère de la Défense’, 237Online, 3 August 2026; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, August 2026. ↩︎
78
P. Biya, ‘Cameroun : neuf mois après sa promesse, Paul Biya n’a toujours pas annoncé de nouveau gouvernement’, Benin Web TV, 26 August 2026; O. Nestor, ‘Succession dynastique au Cameroun : le scénario secret’, Camer.Be, 4 September 2026; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, August 2026. ↩︎
79
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, May 2026; P. Moutila, ‘Anicet Ekane : Douala en deuil pour le martyr de la présidentielle camerounaise de 2025’, Camer.Be, 9 May 2026; P. Essomba, ‘Cameroun: Bras de fer autour de l’autopsie de l’opposant décédé Anicet Ekane’, All Africa, 4 December 2025. ↩︎
80
K. Hilton, ‘Kondengui, Yaounde Principal Prison: Ndango Patrick Asah Jailed Until 2026 After Sentence Reduction’, Cameroon Tribune, 21 March 2026; P. Moutila, ‘Cameroun: Ndangoh Patrick, prisonnier politique anglophone, mort en détention le 9 mai 2026’, All Africa, 9 May 2026; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, May 2026. ↩︎
81
L. Serwat et al, ‘Africa Overview: July 2026’, ACLED, 6 July 2026; ‘President Paul BIYA discusses Military Cooperation with AFRICOM commander’, Republic of Cameroon: Presidency of the Republic, 19 September 2025; ‘President Paul BIYA Receives US AFRICOM Deputy Commander at Unity Palace’, Republic of Cameroon: Presidency of the Republic, 7 May 2026; R. Onuoha, ‘U.S. Forces return to Cameroon, prioritizing ISR’, Military Africa, 20 June 2026, Updated 23 June 2026. ↩︎

Cameroon

Overview

Armed Conflicts Overview

Major Developments (events between January 2025 and September 2026)

Renewal of the mandate of the MNJTF

‘Ghost Town’ lockdowns imposed by Ambazonian separatists

Intercommunal violence

Humanitarian crisis

The 2025 Presidential elections

Delays in government formation and postponement of parliamentary and municipal council elections

Judicial developments related to the Anglophone crisis

Papal visit brought temporary truce in Anglophone regions

Constitutional amendment and speculation over Biya’s succession

Deaths of opposition and Anglophone detainees

Increased US involvement

Non-International Armed Conflict

Background

Intensity

Organization

The ADF

Bui Warriors

Bui Unity Warriors

Ambazonia Restoration Forces (ARF)

Southern Cameroons Defence Forces

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Parties to the Conflict

State

Non-State