Cameroon

During the reporting period, two ongoing non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) persisted in the Republic of Cameroon:

Cameroon v Ambazonian Separatists
Cameroon v Boko Haram

Cameroon is a State Party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law (IHL) applies to all the NIACs in Cameroon. Cameroon is also a State Party to Additional Protocol II of 1977, but neither NIAC to which it is a party meet the requirements of its Article 1(1), which requires a non-State armed group to have territorial control enabling them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations.¹

Cameroon gained its independence in 1961 when the English- and French-speaking colonies were combined.² The Government of Cameroon preferred French as its national language and its systematic enforcement of French in traditionally Anglophone parts of the nation, including systematically displacing the English legal system with the French system, triggered violence between Cameroon and Ambazonian separatist forces.³ English-speaking Cameroon comprises one in five of all Cameroonians. This minority considers itself marginalized and discriminated against by the French majority. The ruling party in Cameroon is composed of French Cameroonians.⁴ In 2016, Anglophone Cameroonians began protesting against the Cameroonian government. The protests lasted for more than a year before violence took hold.⁵

On 1 October 2017, ‘Ambazonian Separatist’ groups declared the independence of the English-speaking parts of Cameroon in the north- and south-west regions of the country, coining the area ‘Ambazonia’.⁶ The NIAC between Cameroon and Ambazonian Separatists ignited in the latter part of 2017,⁷ and this NIAC continued throughout the reporting period.

With the Atlantic Ocean to its south-west, Cameroon is a coastal State in the Gulf of Guinea that straddles Central and West Africa.⁸ Nigeria lies to its north-west, Chad is to its north-east, with the Central African Republic to its east. It also has borders with the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. Cameroon’s geographic location has made it subject to regional jihadist instability, a factor contributing to its most recent NIAC.

The jihadist-driven NIACs in neighbouring States of Chad and Nigeria have spread to Cameroonian territory with the involvement of Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Cameroon has been engaged in a NIAC with Boko Haram for more than two decades; this conflict persists to this day.⁹ Boko Haram’s expanded geographical footprint led to the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council re-activating the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) on 29 January 2025¹⁰ to counter Boko Haram activities.¹¹ The MNJTF was composed of members of the armed forces of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria (although Niger withdrew in March 2025).¹²The MNJTF remains active in Cameroon.

Cameroon’s geographic proximity to the Central African Republic has also led to an influx of refugees.¹³ In June 2025, the Norwegian Refugee Council declared that Cameroon was the most overlooked internal displacement crisis globally, a claim which is largely attributed to the two NIACs on its territory.¹⁴

Renewal of the mandate of the MNJTF

At the 1254^th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council on 12 January 2025, the African Union expressed its concerns regarding the continuing activity of Boko Haram, reaffirming that the regional collective security response needs to be well-coordinated, multipronged, and sustained. The African Union renewed the MNJTF’s mandate for an additional twelve months from 1 February 2025.¹⁵ In his remarks of 9 June 2025 at a United Nations (UN) Security Council briefing on the Central African region, the Deputy Political Counsellor of the United States (US) raised concern about the continuing violence generated by Boko Haram and encouraged African States and the MNJTF to remain engaged in tackling the group.¹⁶ The European Union pledged €20 million to support the fight against Boko Haram for 2025.¹⁷

Operation ‘Ghost Town’

Operation ‘ghost town’ is a method Ambazonian separatists employ to shut down the economy, schooling, and other services, to illustrate their ongoing influence to the Cameroonian government.¹⁸ Restrictions imposed by the ‘ghost town’ lockdown have further impeded on much needed humanitarian access.¹⁹

ADF spokesperson marked as traitor

Around May 2024, Capo Daniel, a prominent figure and former spokesperson of the Ambazonia Defence Force (ADF) (see below) denounced the group and announced he intended to pursue a peaceful approach towards Ambazonian self-determination.²⁰ Immediately after this announcement, Daniel announced the creation of the Ambazonia People’s Rights Advocacy group, urging all ADF fighters to cease hostilities.²¹ He was consequently declared a traitor by the ADF²² who fuelled a narrative that his actions were a strategic move to enable collaboration with the Cameroonian government.²³

Intercommunal violence

Intercommunal violence persisted throughout the reporting period, predominantly taking place in the far north of Cameroon. Drivers of violence include competition over access to resources, including grazing land, as well as ideological differences, ethnic violence, and competing religious views. The Musgum people of Mulwi, who are subsistence fishermen and vegetable and crop farmers, often clash with the pastoralist Arab Choa people, who are mainly herders, over land and natural resources in the far north of Cameroon.²⁴ Since 2021, the scarcity of water because of climate change has exacerbated armed clashes. ²⁵

Clashes between the Fulani Bororo and Gbaya communities are also resource driven.²⁶ ‘Fulani Bororo’ translates to ‘Cattle Bororo’ an apt description for these pastoral herders who travel with their cattle throughout Cameroon.²⁷ The Gbaya people traditionally cultivate staple foods such as maize, cassava, yams, and peanuts, as well as tobacco, coffee, and rice.²⁸ They employ a slash-and-burn farming technique,²⁹ Joshua Project which entails the burning of parts of forests, cultivating the land for farming, and then moving on for a few years before returning to the land.³⁰ The Fulani Bororo and Gbaya people often clash over the Bororo’s cattle grazing on Gbaya land. The groups compete over the same land and natural resources.³¹

Intercommunity violence is further triggered owing toreligious differences.In July 2023, the Christian community in Hourza and the Muslim community in Mandara clashed.The violence killed many and resulted in extensive property destruction, resulting in over 4,500 people being displaced. The security forces were deployed to the area to de-escalate the situation.³²

Xenophobia has also triggered intercommunal violence during the reporting period.In the south of Cameroon, recurring hate speech against other ethnic communities has spread on social media.³³ The government condemned the hate speech and called for national unity to be preserved. Xenophobic attacks in February 2025 ignited after two people were killed with a machete in Meyo-Centre.³⁴ A reconciliation meeting involving the local government, civil society, and local chiefs was convened to broker peace in the communities concerned.³⁵

Humanitarian Crisis

UNICEF reported that more than 3.3 million people needed humanitarian assistance in Cameroon as of the end of 2025.³⁶ This is due to a combination of factors including not only the ongoing NIACs, but also flooding and outbreaks of infectious diseases.³⁷

In August 2024, Cameroon experienced heavy rainfall, which caused severe flooding in four different regions. This had catastrophic effects on people in the far north and west of the State.³⁸ On 5 November 2024, in the west of Cameroon, heavy rainfall triggered a landslide which destroyed property and roads, leading to numerous missing persons.³⁹ An estimated 500,000 people were severely affected by the flooding.⁴⁰ The same month, in part provoked by the floods, Cameroon’s Ministry of Health declared an outbreak of cholera ⁴¹ followed by an outbreak of other health emergencies affecting the population in 2025, including polio, measles, and Mpox.⁴²

The 2025 Presidential Elections

In 2008, the Cameroonian government amended legislation to remove a minimum presidential term limit, paving the way for its sitting President, Joseph Biya, to stay in power indefinitely. Biya, who first came into power in 1982, announced in July 2025 that he would run for an eighth term. He was by then 92 years of age.⁴³There were mixed reactions, with some Cameroonians supporting his bid while thought it was time to hand over the reins to someone younger.⁴⁴

The lead-up to the presidential elections was riddled with allegations of election fraud, leading to protests by supporters of opposition candidates.⁴⁵ Opposition leaders have been intimidated. In June 2025, Maurice Kamto, the main opposition figure, was placed under house arrest in Douala, preventing him from attending a meeting of his political party.⁴⁶ Thereafter, the Constitutional Council rejected Kamto’s candidacy to run for President under the African Movement for the New Independence and Democracy (MANIDEM).⁴⁷ Kamto alleged that the ban was instigated by the ruling party.⁴⁸

Issa Tchiroma Bakary, a longtime ally of President Biya who had served in his cabinet in various capacities, resigned in June 2025 in order to run for president.⁴⁹ Immediately after the announcement, in regions where Bakary was considered to have influence, the government banned all political activities involving his political party.⁵⁰

The presidential elections were held on 12 October 2025.⁵¹ On 27 October, the Constitutional Council⁵² declared President Biya the winner with 53 per cent of the vote.⁵³ His new term was due to run for seven years.⁵⁴ Biya’s win triggered protests on 26 October that lasted for several days and which led to a lockdown imposed from 4 to 7 November.⁵⁵

The government responded to the protests by using force against protesters, killing at least five,⁵⁶ although the opposition claimed a higher death toll. Others were injured and/or arrested.⁵⁷ Issa Tchiroma, the opposition leader, called for the release of those arrested.⁵⁸

Non-International Armed Conflict between Cameroon and Ambazonian Separatists

Background

The NIAC between Cameroon and Ambazonian separatists was triggered as early September and October 2017 in the north- and south-west of Cameroon.¹ There are multiple non-State actors in the region, ranging from organized armed groups fighting across the region under ideological commanders to smaller groups fighting at village level. Although fighting for a common cause – an independent Ambazonia – competition over resources and ideological differences has seen fragmentation between the groups.²

The most prominent of the Ambazonian separatist groups is said to be the Ambazonia Defence Force (ADF).³ The ADF is the armed wing of the Ambazonia Governing Council. The other dominant armed group is the Ambazonian Self Defence Council (ASDC), which is the armed wing of the Interim Government of Ambazonia.⁴ Other non-State armed groups identified as party to the conflict in Ambazonia include the Bui Warriors, the Southern Cameroons Defence Forces, and the Bui Unity Warriors.⁵ Despite evidence of coordination between the various groups, their splintering has resulted in clashes and in-fighting.⁶ The ADF and the ASDC are considered umbrella groups for other smaller militias.⁷

The multiplicity of the often fragmented groups impedes clear understanding of the organizational structure of each.⁸

Intensity

Although it is problematic to attribute indicators of violence to specific members of a coalition, it is possible to aggregate the violence generated between the enemies if multiple organized armed groups fight in a coalition that is sufficiently organized against a common enemy.⁹ This section thus assesses whether the violence generated by the fighting between Cameroon and the Ambazonian separatists equates to ‘protracted’ armed violence.

Intensity generated in the fighting between Cameroon and Ambazonian separatists increased in the latter half of 2023¹⁰ and continued throughout the reporting period. Violent events were thus reported during July,¹¹ August,¹² September,¹³ October,¹⁴ November,¹⁵ and December 2023.¹⁶

The parties also clashed throughout 2024, in January,¹⁷ February,¹⁸ March,¹⁹ April,²⁰ May,²¹ June,²² July,²³ August,²⁴ September,²⁵ October,²⁶ November,²⁷ and December.²⁸

Clashes during 2025 occurred in January,²⁹February,³⁰ March,³¹ April,³² May,³³ June,³⁴ July,³⁵ August,³⁶ October,³⁷ November,³⁸ and December.³⁹

Violence between the Cameroonian Armed Forces and the ADF occurred in September 2023,⁴⁰ October,⁴¹ and December 2023,⁴² and in January 2024,⁴³ August,⁴⁴ and November 2024.⁴⁵

Weapons employed by Ambazonian separatist groups include improvised explosive devices (IEDs)⁴⁶ often in the form of car bombs.⁴⁷ IEDs are also planted at checkpoints.⁴⁸

The use of IEDs by Ambazonian separatist groups significantly increased during 2025 with at least 131 such incidents reported.⁴⁹ The groups use rifles ⁵⁰ including hunting rifles in combat.⁵¹ Rifles are often taken from dead government soldiers.⁵²

To date, this NIAC has resulted in at least 6,500 casualties.⁵³ As deaths are often under-reported, the death toll is likely higher. The UN Refugee Agency estimated that by April 2025 at least 969,000 people were internally displaced in Cameroon, of which the Ambazonian conflict remains a major driver.⁵⁴ The violence generated from fighting between Cameroon and the Ambazonian separatist groups continued to meet the notion of intensity as demanded by IHL throughout the reporting period.

Organization

Although multiple non-State actors and splinter factions are operating in the Anglophone zones of Cameroon, these groups fight for the same purpose – an independent Ambazonia.⁵⁵ The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) set out factual considerations that are necessary for a collective of non-State armed groups who are sufficiently organized to meet in order to qualify as an alliance.⁵⁶ These factors are used to determine, on a case-by-case basis, if there is sufficient coordination in a coalition or alliance to become a party to a NIAC and to allow for the aggregation of intensity.⁵⁷

A shared ideology or common enemy does not automatically suggest that the necessary level of coordination for a coalition has been met. Relevant factual indicators include the establishment of a coordination structure for the alliance as a whole, the sharing of operational tasks between organized armed groups who are members of the alliance, common rules of engagement, the coordination of simultaneous attacks against the opposing party, and the launching of joint military operations.⁵⁸ Information on coordination is under-reported. Coordination is suggested but specifics on the nature of coordination escapes public record.⁵⁹ What is known is that there is not necessarily an overarching command structure but that organized armed groups fighting a common enemy, the Cameroonian Defence Force, form loose alliances.⁶⁰

The ADF

The ADF, which emerged in late 2017 as the armed wing of the ‘Ambazonia Governing Council’, is the largest of several insurgency groups fighting for an independent Ambazonia.⁶¹ The ADF started its opposition to the Cameroonian government and subsequent fight against the Cameroonian Armed Forces on 9 September 2017 when the Ambazonia Governing Council declared its war of independence for Southern Cameroon.⁶²

The ADF has a tiered command structure. This is evident from key leadership figures in distinct hierarchical roles.⁶³ These leadership positions include the ranks of a Commander in Chief⁶⁴ and his deputy,⁶⁵ a US-based spokesperson⁶⁶ and commanders in charge of their own ‘batallions’.⁶⁷

At the time of reporting, the two highest ranking officials in the ADF were Lucas Cho Ayaba and Benedict Kuah. Ayaba served as the Commander in Chief of the ADF while Kuah served as the Chairman of the Ambazonia War Council.⁶⁸ Kuah’s deputy was Capo Daniel until he left the ADF (see above).⁶⁹ Ayaba is also the leader of the Ambazonia Governing Council and, until 2024, he was in exile in Norway.⁷⁰ As the Commander in Chief is geographically remote, he often disseminates battlefield instructions to ‘battalion’ commanders who execute orders at the ‘village’ level.⁷¹

The ability of the ADF to implement IHL is further illustrated by its War Crime Catalog⁷² and Eyewitness Reporting portal for suspected war crimes,⁷³ which forms part of the official website of the Ambazonia Governing Council website. The Ambazonia Governing Council has also, on occasion, accused the Cameroonian government of specific violations of IHL, including of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.⁷⁴ It has also addressed a letter listing violations of IHL committed by the Cameroonian Armed Forces to the ICRC.⁷⁵ The ADF ‘domesticates’ IHL and expands on IHL in instruments such as The Charter of Ambazonia on the Protection of Women, Children and People with Disabilities During Wartime or Armed Conflict (April 2022).⁷⁶

ADF fighters must follow a code of conduct.⁷⁷ Discipline is imposed by commanders through corporal punishments such as whippings.⁷⁸ Commanders often invoke fear among fighters to achieve discipline and compliance. For example a journalist reported that a commander told his fighters that if they fell asleep while on watch duty, he would shoot them in the leg.⁷⁹

The ADF itself describes its military tactics as rapid guerilla warfare, which includes urban warfare capabilities.⁸⁰ The group often ambushes the Cameroonian Armed Forces to minimize its own losses.⁸¹

The Ambazonia Governing Council has implemented the ‘Liberation Tax Law’ which introduced what is essentially a levy for civilians over the age of twenty-one living in the English-speaking regions of southern Cameroon where the ADF is active. Funds are used to sustain the fighting.⁸² Chapter 8 of the Liberation Tax Law exempts fighters and their spouses, widows of fallen fighters, educators, and the disabled from paying tax.⁸³ Liberation tax exemption is thus a recruitment tool for the ADF. Funds are also raised through illicit activities such as kidnappings for ransom.⁸⁴

Bui Warriors

Samual Ikome Sako serves as the leader of the Bui Warriors.⁸⁵ This group has a tiered structured built around the group’s leader, General Sako. This is the case for the majority of the Ambazonian separatists.⁸⁶ The existence of a tiered leadership structure enables discipline and the ability to implement IHL.⁸⁷

Insufficient information is available on this group to draw a conclusion on whether it independently satisfies the organizational threshold demanded by IHL.

Bui Unity Warriors

The Bui Unity Warriors splintered from the Bui Warriors in January 2022. The Bui Unity Warriors were led by General ‘Mad Dog’ until his death on 24 April 2024.⁸⁸ This group appears to have a tiered command structure because in a video published by them, reference was made to a General Newsman and a Vice-General Viper.⁸⁹ Similar to other Ambazonian separatist groups, the hierarchy of this group revolves around one prominent general.⁹⁰ The existence of a leadership structure enables the non-State actor to discipline its fighters and implement IHL.⁹¹

The Bui Unity Warriors successfully carried out several attacks against the Cameroonian Armed Forces, suggesting that the group has the ability to engage in military operations.⁹² These attacks also confirm that the Bui Unity Warriors are sufficiently organized under IHL. In the Katanga case, the International Criminal Court (ICC) found that, at a minimum, a group needs to be able to organize itself to the extent that it can execute a military attack.⁹³

Weapons and ammunition are partly obtained by raiding military bases of the Cameroonian Armed Forces,⁹⁴ and by ambushing soldiers.⁹⁵ The Bui Unity Warriors also speak with one voice, often using videos to reach their audience.⁹⁶

The Bui Unity Warriors are sufficiently organized as demanded by IHL.

Restoration Forces

Public information concerning the internal leadership structure of the Restoration Forces (often referred to as the Amba Boys), the military wing of the Ambazonian Self-Defense Council,⁹⁷ is scarce. What is known is that the Restoration Forces’ leadership mimics a basic hierarchical structure.⁹⁸ Ideological leaders give orders to Generals based in the Ambazonia region.⁹⁹ Generals then disseminate information to deputy Generals who then inform mission commanders who, in turn, give orders to unit or camp commanders. Experienced Generals control various units (composed of unit commanders and fighters) and mission commanders.¹⁰⁰ Camps are often geographically dispersed. Owing to fragmentation, there are instances where control over camps is decentralized and some fighters act rather autonomously.¹⁰¹ Separate units tend to be compiled of less than thirty fighters each.¹⁰² Regional units tend to choose their own names, for example the Mountain Fako Lions or the Lebialem Red Dragons.¹⁰³

This group also employs motorcyclists to move arms and avoid checkpoints.¹⁰⁴ Funding is raised through donations (often from international sympathizers) predominantly garnered by the ideological leader who then transfers money to Generals via Western Union, Money Gram, or cell phone wallets (such as MTN Mobile Money). Kidnappings and other illicit activities are also used to raise funds.¹⁰⁵ Fighters are recruited through social media platforms including WhatsApp, YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, blogs and video blogs.¹⁰⁶ Fighters are also recruited through forced recruitment; children are also forcibly recruited.¹⁰⁷

The Restoration Forces are sufficiently organized as required by IHL.

Southern Cameroons Defence Forces

The Southern Cameroons Defence Forces (SOCADEF) are the military wing of the African People’s Liberation Movement.¹⁰⁸ The Commander in Chief of the SOCADEF is Ebenezer Akwanga,¹⁰⁹ a remote commander living in exile in the United States.¹¹⁰ Units are divided into twenty-five to thirty fighters each.¹¹¹

The SOCADEF have guidelines within their code of conduct that reflect IHL principles, for example, the duty to treat the wounded and to not target schools and hospitals. These guidelines also impose sanctions for non-compliance, the purpose of which is to promote discipline. The guidelines are promoted through training exercises.¹¹²

In the Katanga case, the ICC found that, at a minimum, a group needs to be able to organize itself to the extent that it can execute a military attack.¹¹³ Successful attacks against soldiers lasting several hours confirm that SOCADEF is able to engage in military operations and that it is, as a result, sufficiently organized under IHL.¹¹⁴

SOCADEF speaks with one voice, for examples the group’s political wing issued a press statement to the Secretary General of the UN,¹¹⁵ and took responsibility for ‘Operation No Rest for You’, a military attack executed against the Cameroonian Defence Force.¹¹⁶

The Southern Cameroons Defence Forces are sufficiently organized as demanded by IHL.

In sum, the Ambazonian separatists remain sufficiently organized under IHL and the existing NIAC with the Cameroonian authorities continued throughout the reporting period.

1
R. Maxwell Bone, ‘Ahead of peace talks, a who’s who of Cameroon’s separatist movements’, The New Humanitarian, 8 July 2020.
2
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 13.
3
A. Gillis, ‘‘This is a genocide’: villages burn as war rages in blood-soaked Cameroon’, The Guardian, 30 May 2018.
4
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 13 and 16.
5
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 14.
6
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 16.
7
R. Maxwell Bone, ‘Ahead of peace talks, a who’s who of Cameroon’s separatist movements’, The New Humanitarian, 8 July 2020.
8
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 16.
9
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 17; S. D’Cunha et al, ‘Defining armed conflict: some clarity in the fog of war’, International Committee of the Red Cross: Humanitarian Law and Policy, 2 May 2024; J. Nikolic et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, International Committee of the Red Cross Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020.
10
K. Feh, ‘Violence escalates in Cameroon’s troubled regions – Human Rights Watch Report’, Mimi Mefo Info, 16 January 2024
11
W. Musa, ‘Mbonge Separatists kill two in Kombone’, Cameroon News Agency, 7 July 2023; ‘Separatists kill man in Essimbi accused of links with military’, Mimi Mefo Info, 7 July 2023; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, July 2023
12
‘Gov’t forces kill two Amba fighters in Bafut’, Cameroon News Agency, 7 August 2023; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, August 2023
13
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, September 2023; ‘Cameroon militants set cars on fire, shoot passengers in village attack’, Reuters, 8 September 2023
14
‘Cameroon kills General RK commander of Ambazonia separatist group’, PM News Nigeria, 23 September 2023; N. H. Nchanji, ‘South West region: Gov’t forces kill FM Bitter Kola, others’, Cameroon News Agency, 20 September 2023; ‘Four separatist fighters killed in Cameroon’s restive Anglophone region’, News Ghana, 8 October 2023; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, October 2023
15
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, November 2023
16
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, December 2023.
17
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, January 2024; ‘5 Separatist in Cameroon killed in Military operation’, News Ghana, 11 January 2024; ‘Amba fighters brutally attack man for alleged collaboration with military’, Mimi Mefo Info, 13 January 2024; ‘Gov’t forces capture ADF supreme commander’, Cameroon News Agency, 20 January 2024
18
‘Cameroon Blast Kills at Least One Person During Youth Day Event’, Voice of America, 12 February 2024; ‘Kidnapped Cameroonian official released’, Xinhua, 7 February 2024; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, February 2024
19
‘Cameroun. Mort d’un élu local dans une attaque revendiquée par des séparatistes anglophones’, Ouest France, 23 March 2024; J. Essama, ‘Crise anglophone: le commandant séparatiste Barack tué par le BIR’, Mimi Mefo Info, 13 March 2024; K. Bih, ‘Separatist Attack on Brasseries Truck Leaves Two Dead’, Mimi Mefo Info, 13 March 2024; T. Mbunwe, ‘Military raids leave several separatist fighters dead’, Mimi Mefo Info, 29 March 2024; ‘7 separatist fighters killed in military offensive in Cameroon’, Xinhua, 25 March 2024; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, March 2024
20
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, April 2024; ‘Gov’t forces on rampage kill three civilians in Jumbo, burn houses’, Cameroon News Agency, 11 April 2024; A. N. Rene, ‘Ndian: Self-styled general mad dog killed in military operation’, Cameroon News Agency, 24 April 2024
21
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, May 2024; C. Nginyu, ‘Bambui: Separatist attack leaves two gov’t forces, two civilians dead’, Cameroon News Agency, 15 May 2024; ‘Separatists ambush six government forces in Eyomujock’, Cameroon News Agency, 10 May 2024
22
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, June 2024; ‘Cameroonian official killed in ambush by suspected separatist fighters’, Xinhua, 3 June 2024; C. Nginyu, ‘Menchum: Councillor Mathias Bang killed by Separatist fighters’, Cameroon News Agency, 5 June 2024; K. Bih, ‘Vehicle Attacks by Separatists Increase, Intensify Bamenda’s Nightmare’, Mimi Mefo Info, 9 June 2024; D. Atangana, ‘Gunmen kill bike rider, abduct passenger in Bamenda’, Mimi Mefo Info, 10 June 2024; ‘IED explosion rocks Oshum village, Batibo’, Cameroon News Agency, 27 June 2024
23
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, July 2024; ‘Two soldiers killed in Munyenge’, Cameroon News Agency, 2 July 2024; D. Atangana, ‘Soldier Killed, Gun Seized by separatists in Bui After Epaulette Award’, Mimi Mefo Info, 3 July 2024; D. Atangana, ‘Internally Displaced Man Fatally Shot in Bamenda’, Mimi Mefo Info, 9 July 2024; K. Bih, ‘Separatist Leader “Commander Iron”, One other Killed in Bamenda’, Mimi Mefo Info, 10 July 2024; ‘4 armed separatists killed in Cameroon’s restive Anglophone region’, Xinhua, 20 July 2024
24
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, August 2024; D. Atangana, ‘Bomb Explosion at Checkpoint in Bamenda Claims Lives of Two Police Officers’, Mimi Mefo Info, 9 August 2024; D. Atangana, ‘Mbororo Militia Strikes Sop Again: Homes Burned and Shops Looted’, Mimi Mefo Info, 7 August 2024
25
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, September 2024; ‘Separatists kill biker, burn taxi in Buea’, Cameroon News Agency, 2 September 2024; ‘Former separatists fighter killed in suspected military attack in Bamenda’, Mimi Mefo Info, 9 September 2024; E. Ndi, ‘BIR Operation Leads to Deaths of Three Ambazonia Separatists’, Mimi Mefo Info, 17 September 2024; ‘IED detonation, gunfire in Bamenda’, Cameroon News Agency, 19 September 2024
26
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, October 2024; D. Atangana, ‘Separatists Kill Two Cameroonian Soldiers in Mbingo’, Mimi Mefo Info, 10 October 2024; ‘Separatist commander killed in Cameroon’s restive Anglophone region’, Xinhua, 9 October 2024
27
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, November 2024; ‘Three Killed, One Injured in Separatists Ambush in Ndu’, Mimi Mefo Info, 18 November 2024
28
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, December 2024; D. Atangana, ‘At Least One Dead as Gunshots Rock Bamenda’, Mimi Mefo Info, 7 December 2024; K. Bih, ‘Two Separatist Fighters Killed in Military Operations’, Mimi Mefo Info, 31 December 2024.
29
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, January 2025; K. Bih, ‘Separatist Activist Capo Daniel Laments Burning of Family Home’, Mimi Mefo Info, 8 January 2025; ‘Three separatist fighters killed, others arrested in Bamenda’, Cameroon News Agency, 19 January 2025; D. Atangana, ‘Two Civilians Killed, Eight Injured in Less than 24 Hours in Bamenda’, Mimi Mefo Info, 16 January 2025
30
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, February 2025; E. Ndi, ‘Pinyin Mob Justice Results in Killing of Two Ambazonia Fighters’, Mimi Mefo Info, 16 February 2025
31
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, March 2025; ‘2 soldiers killed in suspected separatist attack in Cameroon’, Xinhua, 19 March 2025; E. Ndi, ‘Ambazonia Separatist Attack in Mbingo Leaves Soldier Dead, Three Abducted’, Mimi Mefo Info, 23 March 2025; ‘Cameroon military ambushes, Kills alleged separatist in Bamenda’, Cameroon News Agency, 24 March 2025
32
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, April 2025; E. Ndi, ‘Officer Dies, Another Wounded in Shooting at Hospital Roundabout in Bamenda’, Mimi Mefo Info, 9 April 2025; E. Ndi, ‘Four Separatists Fighters Killed in Ekona: Extrajudicial Executions by Military Suspected’, Mimi Mefo Info, 11 April 2025; ‘9 separatist fighters killed in clashes in Cameroon’, Xinhua, 13 April 2025; E. Ndi, ‘Two Separatists Killed, Hostages Freed in BIR Raid in Ndu’, Mimi Mefo Info, 19 April 2025
33
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, May 2025; K. Bih, ‘Bike Rider Shot Dead in Nkwen, Bamenda’, Mimi Mefo Info, 6 May 2025; T. Mbunwe, ‘Two BIR Soldiers Killed, Three Injured in IED Attack in Muyuka, Cameroon’, Mimi Mefo Info, 5 May 2025; ‘Soldiers survive bomb attack after responding to flag incident’, Cameroon News Agency, 21 May 2025
34
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, June 2025; E. Ndi, ‘Three Injured in Mile 3, Nkwen as Ambazonia Separatists Open Fire’, Mimi Mefo Info, 18 June 2025; J. Ndome, ‘Three Soldiers Killed, Two Injured in Attack at Military Post in Maloun le Petit’, Mimi Mefo Info, 18 June 2025; T. Mbunwe, ‘One Killed, Two Injured, Vehicles Burnt in Mile 16 Shooting’, Mimi Mefo Info, 13 December 2025
35
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, July 2025; ‘4 separatist fighters killed in Cameroon’s restive Anglophone region’, Xinhua, 8 July 2025; E. Ndi, ‘Cameroonian Soldier Killed in IED Attack by Separatists in Mile 12 Bafia, Dozens Arrested’, Mimi Mefo Info, 14 July 2025
36
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, August 2025 September,‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, September 2025
37
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, October 2025
38
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, November 2025
39
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, December 2025.
40
‘Military accused of killing young man, dumping body on street’, Mimi Mefo Info, 3 September 2023
41
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, October 2023
42
A. Kabir, ‘Ambazonian Insurgents Ravage Nigerian Community For Housing Refugees From Cameroon’, HumAngle, 15 December 2023; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, December 2023
43
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, January 2024 April,‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, April 2024
44
D. Atangana, ‘Separatists kill two police officers, seize rifles in Bamenda’, Mimi Mefo Info, 8 August 2024
45
D. Atangana, ‘ADF’s ‘General Weapon’, Four Others Killed in Bamenda’, Mimi Mefo Info, 25 November 2024.
46
‘IED explosion rocks Oshum village, Batibo’, Cameroon News Agency, 27 June 2024; ‘IED detonation, gunfire in Bamenda’, Cameroon News Agency, 19 September 2024; ‘Galim: IED detected, destroyed by security elements’, Cameroon News Agency, 27 February 2024; D. Atanagana, ‘Bamenda: No casualties reported in Separatist bomb blast’, Mimi Mefo Info, 29 April 2024; T. Mbunwe, ‘Two BIR Soldiers Killed, Three Injured in IED Attack in Muyuka, Cameroon’, Mimi Mefo Info, 5 May 2025; ‘Soldiers survive bomb attack after responding to flag incident’, Cameroon News Agency, 21 May 2025
47
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, August 2024; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, May 2025; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, October 2025.
48
D. Atangana, ‘Bomb Explosion at Checkpoint in Bamenda Claims Lives of Two Police Officers’, Mimi Mefo Info, 9 August 2024.
49
‘Cameroon’, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 16 March 2026.
50
‘Ambazonia Defense Forces (ADF)’, Ambazonia Governing Council
51
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 10.
52
D. Atanagana, ‘Rights Group Urges Investigations After Soldiers Execute Teacher in Ngoketujia’, Mimi Mefo Info, 19 November 2024; D. Atangana, ‘Separatists Kill Two Cameroonian Soldiers in Mbingo’, Mimi Mefo Info, 10 October 2024.
53
‘Cameroon’, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 16 March 2026.
54
‘Cameroon’, UNHCR.
55
M. E. Kindzeka, ‘Cameroon’s Separatists Say Splinter Groups Kill, Abduct Fighters’, Voice of America, 26 September 2022.
56
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, 2024, 17; J. Nikolic et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, ICRC Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020.
57
J. Nikolic et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, ICRC Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020.
58
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, 2024, 17; J. Nikolic, et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, ICRC Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020.
59
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 16.
60
H. Maack, ‘Cameroon Rattled by Twin Insurgencies Amid Presidential Elections’, Jamestown, 20 November 2025.
61
‘“These Killings Can Be Stopped”: Government and Separatist Groups Abuses in Cameroon’s Anglophone Regions’, Human Rights Watch, July 2018, 20.
62
‘Ambazonia Defense Forces (ADF)’, Ambazonia Governing Council; A. Brimbal, ‘Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF)’, Modern Insurgent, 20 September 2022.
63
M. E. Kindzeka, ‘Cameroon’s Separatists Say Splinter Groups Kill, Abduct Fighters’, Voice of America, 26 September 2022.
64
P. Nje, ‘Cameroonian separatist leader arrested in Norway’, BBC, 26 September 2024
65
M. E. Kindzeka, ‘Cameroon’s Separatists Say Splinter Groups Kill, Abduct Fighters’, Voice of America, 26 September 2022
66
M. E. Kindzeka, ‘Cameroon’s Anglophone Separatists Turn to Infighting’, Voice of America, 22 January 2020
67
E. Freudenthal, ‘Cameroon’s anglophone war, part 2: Inside the separatist conflict’, The New Humanitarian, 2 August 2018.
68
‘Ambazonia Defense Forces (ADF)’, Ambazonia Governing Council.
69
M. E. Kindzeka, ‘Cameroon Separatists Enforce Curfew After President Says Troops Crushing Rebellion’, Voice of America, 2 January 2023.
70
L. Mudge, ‘Arrest of Cameroonian Separatist Leader Sends Important Message’, Human Rights Watch, 27 September 2024.
71
E. Freudenthal, ‘Cameroon’s anglophone war, part 2: Inside the separatist conflict’, The New Humanitarian, 2 August 2018.
72
‘Archives for War Crime Catalog’, Ambazonian Governing Council
73
‘Eye Witness Report’, Amabazonian Governing Council
74
‘Urgent Alert: Severe Violation Of International Law And Imminent Threat to Civilians In Bamenda’, Ambazonian Governing Council, 8 August 2024
75
‘Urgent Appeal Regarding Violations of International Humanitarian Law In Ambazonia by Cameroon Occupation Forces’, Ambazonian Governing Council, 2 April 2024.
76
‘The Charter of Ambazonia on the Protection of Women, Children and People With Disabilities During Wartime or Armed Conflict’, Ambazonian Governing Council, 10 July 2024.
77
E. Freudenthal, ‘Cameroon’s anglophone war, part 2: Inside the separatist conflict’, The New Humanitarian, 2 August 2018.
78
E. Freudenthal, ‘Cameroon’s anglophone war, part 2: Inside the separatist conflict’, The New Humanitarian, 2 August 2018.
79
E. Freudenthal, ‘Cameroon’s anglophone war, part 2: Inside the separatist conflict’, The New Humanitarian, 2 August 2018.
80
‘Ambazonia Defense Forces (ADF)’, Ambazonia Governing Council.
81
E. Freudenthal, ‘Cameroon’s anglophone war, part 2: Inside the separatist conflict’, The New Humanitarian, 2 August 2018.
82
P. Nje, ‘Cameroonian separatist leader arrested in Norway’, BBC, 26 September 2024; ‘Ambazonian Tax Law Signed and Commissioned’, Ambazonian Governing Council.
83
‘Ambazonian Tax Law Signed and Commissioned’, Ambazonian Governing Council.
84
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, pp 22–24.
85
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 14.
86
‘With or Against Us: People of the North-West Region of Cameroon Caught Between the Army, Armed Separatists and Militias’, Amnesty International, 2023, 13.
87
T. Rodenhäuser, ‘Organizing Rebellion Symposium: Four Points to Conceptualize Armed Groups under International Law’, Opinio Juris, 16 September 2019.
88
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 14.
89
D. Atangana, ‘Soldier Killed, Gun Seized by Separatists in Bui After Epaulette Award’, Mimi Mefo Info, 3 July 2024.
90
‘With or Against Us: People of the North-West Region of Cameroon Caught Between the Army, Armed Separatists and Militias’, Amnesty International, 2023, 13.
91
M. M. Bradley, ‘Revisiting the Notion of ‘Organised Armed Group’ in Accordance with Common Article 3: Exploring the Inherent Minimum Threshold Requirements’, African Yearbook on International Humanitarian Law, 2018, 72; T. Rodenhäuser, ‘Organizing Rebellion Symposium: Four Points to Conceptualize Armed Groups under International Law’, Opinio Juris, 16 September 2019.
92
S. Buba, ‘Cameroon Soldiers Free 11 Captives From Separatists in Bui’, Mimi Mefo Info, 4 October 2023.
93
ICC, ‘The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga’, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber II,7 March 2014, para 681.
94
E. Ndi, ‘Separatist Unity Warriors Claim Responisbility for Deadly Attack on Military Post in Mbonso’, Mimi Mefo Info, 18 June 2025.
95
D. Atangana, ‘Soldier Killed, Gun Seized by Separatists in Bui After Epaulette Award’, Mimi Mefo Info, 3 July 2024.
96
E. Ndi, ‘Separatist Unity Warriors Claim Responisbility for Deadly Attack on Military Post in Mbonso’, Mimi Mefo Info, 18 June 2025.
97
A. Purcell, ‘Amba Boys: Transforming Pacifists into Warmongers?’, Grey Dynamics, 28 November 2023
98
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 16.
99
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 16.
100
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 16.
101
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 16.
102
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 17.
103
A. Purcell, ‘Amba Boys: Transforming Pacifists into Warmongers?’, Grey Dynamics, 28 November 2023.
104
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 17.
105
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 20.
106
A. Purcell, ‘Amba Boys: Transforming Pacifists into Warmongers?’, Grey Dynamics, 28 November 2023.
107
A. Purcell, ‘Amba Boys: Transforming Pacifists into Warmongers?’, Grey Dynamics, 28 November 2023.
108
L Serwat and E. Beevor, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa: Anglophone Separatists’, ACLED, September 2024, 14.
109
‘Country Policy and Information Note: Cameroon: North-West/South-West Crisis’, United Kingdom Home Office, December 2020, 23
110
‘About the CEO’, Ebenezer Akwanga Human Rights and Humanitarian Institute.
111
‘SOCADEF Claims Responsibility for Ikiliwindi Attack on Military’, Mimi Mefo Info, 22 October 2021.
112
Cameroon News Agency, Facebook, 19 June 2022.
113
ICC, ‘The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga’, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber II,7 March 2014, para 681.
114
‘SOCADEF Claims Responsibility for Ikiliwindi Attack on Military’, Mimi Mefo Info, 22 October 2021.
115
‘SOCADEF Hees to UN”s Call, Agrees to Stand Down for 14 Days’, Mimi Mefo Info, 26 March 2020
116
‘SOCADEF Claims Responsibility for Ikiliwindi Attack on Military’, Mimi Mefo Info, 22 October 2021.

Non-International Armed Conflict between Cameroon (supported by the MNJTF) and Boko Haram

Background

Boko Haram has been present in northern Cameroon since at least 2009¹ or 2011.² The first armed confrontation registered between Boko Haram and the Cameroonian Armed Forces within its borders took place in March 2014.³ This NIAC continues.

Intensity

In his report on the situation in Central Africa, the UN Secretary-General found a slight increase in Boko Haram-related activities during the first half of 2025 when compared to 2024. Boko Haram was involved in 351 violent incidents resulting in fifty-four civilian casualties between 1 December 2024 and 15 May 2025. Between 1 December 2023 and 15 May 2024, sixty-six incidents resulted in eighty-two civilian deaths.⁴ The latter half of 2025, however, saw a decrease in violent activities attributable to Boko Haram. Between 1 June and 15 November 2025, 317 Boko Haram-related incidents were reported in the course of which seventy-two civilians were killed compared to the same period in 2024 when 365 incidents involved the deaths of 109 civilians.⁵ The continued reporting by the UN Secretary-General serves as an indicator that the conflict between Cameroon and Boko Haram remains intense.

Specific clashes between the Cameroonian Armed Forces and Boko Haram on the territory of Cameroon during the reporting period continued to occur frequently, including in September,⁶ and December 2023,⁷ January,⁸February,⁹ March,¹⁰ April,¹¹ May,¹² June,¹³ July,¹⁴ August,¹⁵ September,¹⁶ October,¹⁷ and December 2024,¹⁸ and January,¹⁹ March,²⁰ April,²¹ July,²² September,²³ and November 2025.²⁴

The weapons Boko Haram use include assault rifles and heavy machine guns.²⁵ They are also able to gain military grade weapons by ambushing Cameroonian soldiers or attacking their bases at night.²⁶ Boko Haram often employs IEDs,²⁷ including car bombs.²⁸

Reports also suggest that Boko Haram has acquired drone technology, which the group uses to drop improvised grenades.²⁹

The violence generated in the NIAC between Cameroon and Boko Haram remained sufficiently intense to equate to protracted armed violence governed by IHL throughout the reporting period.

Organization

At the time of reporting, the leader of Boko Haram is Imam Ibrahim Bakura Doro (aka Bakura Buduma).³⁰ His deputy is Imam is Abu Issa.³¹ Other key leadership positions include the Chief of Police (Hisbah), held by Kannay; Chief Cleric, held by Mallam Mamman; and Chief Judge, held by Mallam Abdurahmane.³² Ibrahim Bakura Doro often acts as the group’s unofficial spokesperson on social media.³³ Boko Haram has a military and a civilian wing.³⁴ There is uncertainty around exactly how many fighters belong to Boko Haram, but a common estimate is several thousand.³⁵

As its leader, Imam Bakura Doro serves as the overall commander of the military wing and has direct command over the territory held by Boko Haram on the islands of Lake Chad.³⁶ Commander Aliyu Ngulde, in turn, commands a Boko Haram-controlled enclave, Gwoza Hills, located along the Nigeria-Cameroon border.³⁷ A smaller territory held by Boko Haram is commanded by Commander Alhai Kale.³⁸ The hills in the vicinity of the Shiroro reservoir in Kaduna state are commanded by Commander Sadiku.³⁹ Owing to its deployment of regional commanders and large militia-style units with, on average, 100 to 200 fighters,⁴⁰ Boko Haram has the capability to respect and implement IHL.

The leadership style of the military commanders is described as akin to patronage as the fighters are permitted a modicum of independence under regional command.⁴¹ Boko Haram has a de facto Shura Council to offer religious guidance when required.⁴²

Boko Haram’s ideology informs its actions in that it considers as a legitimate target Muslims or Christians who do not support them or are perceived to support the government.⁴³ Boko Haram employs extreme violence including suicide attacks against civilians it views as ‘infidels’ or ‘apostates’.⁴⁴ Reports indicate that the group launches attacks into the Far North region of Cameroon.⁴⁵

Boko Haram often plunders or kidnaps for ransom to obtain resources.⁴⁶ In particular, the kidnapping of foreigners and wealthy Nigerian nationals has been lucrative.⁴⁷ Each regional leader controls a treasury but the administrative capacity of the group is limited.⁴⁸

A high unemployment rate enables recruitment.⁴⁹ It has been claimed, at times, that Boko Haram forcibly conscripts members or, at other times, offers financial incentives.⁵⁰ Historically, training has been in camps located on Nigerian territory under the control of Boko Haram, including Borno state,⁵¹ as well as in Cameroon,⁵² and Somalia.⁵³

Boko Haram continues to meet the minimum requirements of organization as demanded by IHL.

The existing NIAC between Cameroon (supported by the MNJTF) and Boko Haram continued throughout the reporting period.

1
H. De Marie Heungoup, ‘Q&A: Boko Haram in Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, 6 April 2016
2
‘Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram’, International Crisis Group, 16 November 2016.
3
‘Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram’, International Crisis Group, 16 November 2016; H. De Marie Heungoup, ‘Q&A: Boko Haram in Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, 6 April 2016.
4
‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/342, 30 May 2025, para 22.
5
UNSC, ‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/772, 28 November 2025, para 27.
6
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, September 2023 November,‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, November 2023; L. Serwat, et al, ‘Regional Overview: Africa: November 2023’, ACLED, 7 December 2023
7
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, December 2023; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, December 2023
8
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, January 2024
9
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, February 2024
10
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, March 2024
11
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, April 2024
12
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, May 2024
13
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, June 2024
14
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, July 2024
15
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, August 2024
16
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, September 2024
17
L. Serwat and J. G. Birru, ‘Africa Overview: November 2024’, ACLED, 9 December 2024; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, October 2024
18
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, December 2024
19
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, January 2025
20
‘Cameroon, Nigeria Face ‘Advanced Weaponry’ from Terrorists’, African Defense Forum, 13 May 2025; B. E. Bdo, ‘Borno Governer Zulum Visits Cameroonian Troops After Boko Haram Attack in Wulgo’, Mimi Mefo Info, 29 April 2025; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, March 2025
21
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, April 2025
22
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, July 2025; B. E. Bdo, ‘Maroua Mourns Fallen Soldier in Boko Haram Attack’, Mimi Mefo Info, 28 July 2025
23
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, September 2025
24
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, November 2025.
25
‘Troops Eliminate Boko Haram Commander Abba Alai, Crush Terrorists in Gwoza and Garin Fallujah’, Zagazola, 3 March 2025; ‘MNJTF Force Commander’s Text Speech: International Press Conference For Progress Of Operation Lake Sanity II by Major General Ibrahim Sallau Ali Gss psc(++) fdc Naphm Ftam Gom Fcmh Naim MSc Force Commander Multinational Joint Task Force Held 4 June 2024 At Maiduguri’, Multinational Joint Task Force, 4 June 2025.
26
B. E. Bdo, ‘Boko Haram Militants Kill Atleast 20 Cameroonian Troops in Deadly Raid on Wulgo’, Mimi Mefo Info, 25 March 2025.
27
I. Ojo, ‘Troops kill B’Haram chief bomb maker, eight others in Sambisa’, Punch, 6 March 2025; ‘Communiqué of the 1254th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, held on 13 January 2025 on the Consideration Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram Terrorist Group and Renewal of its Mandate’, African Union, 3 February 2025, para 6; R. Hoinathy and C. Delanga, ‘Capitalising on Operation Lake Sanity’s success against Boko Haram’, Institute for Security Studies, 16 September 2024
28
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, February 2024.
29
‘Boko Haram Militants Attack Two Nigerian Army Bases with Grenade-strapped Drones’, Defense Mirror, 26 December 2024; N. Roll et al, ‘Nigeria, Sahel Militants Embrace DIY Drone’, eNCA, 27 March 2025; and ‘Nigerian Army Confirms Boko Haram’s Use Of Armed Drones In Borno, Similar To Israeli, Ukrainian Types’, Sahara Reporters, 14 May 2025.
30
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024; ‘Fighting among Boko Haram Splinters Rages On’, International Crisis Group, 30 May 2023.
31
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
32
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
33
‘Boko Haram – Video Reaffirming Loyalty to Abu Umaima and Rejecting ISWAP, translation by Sufyan Musah’, Unmasking Boko Haram: Exploring Global Jihad in Nigeria, 12 May 2022.
34
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
35
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
36
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
37
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
38
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
39
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
40
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024
41
‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024.
42
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
43
‘Boko Haram, including JAS and ISIS-WA’, European Union Agency for Asylum, February 2019.
44
‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024; ‘Boko Haram’, Counter Terrorism Guide.
45
R. Hoinathy and R.S. Tayo, ‘Decades of security cooperation under threat in Lake Chad Basin’, Institute for Security Studies, 27 January 2025; African Union Peace and Security Council, ‘Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the Multinational Joint Task Force Against Boko Haram and the Renewal of its Mandate’, AU Doc PSC/PR/RPT.1254 (2025), 13 January 2025, para 5.
46
‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024.
47
‘Boko Haram’, Counter Extremism Project. To fund its activities, it also taxes fishermen and herders in areas under its control.V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
48
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
49
D. Mbachu, ‘Nigeria’s revamp of economic indicators sparks debate’, African Business, 13 February 2025.
50
‘Boko Haram’, Counter Extremism Project.
51
‘Cameroon, Nigeria Face ‘Advanced Weaponry’ from Terrorists’, African Defense Forum, 13 May 2025
52
‘Cameroon army says dismantles Boko Haram training camp’, Reuters, 22 December 2014; ‘Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram’, International Crisis Group, 16 November 2016; M. E. Kindzeka, ‘Former Boko Haram Fighters Wait for Rehabilitation Facility’, Voice of America, 17 December 2017
53
‘Nigerian Boko Haram fighters trained in Somalia: president’, Reuters, 15 February 2016; S. Busari, ‘Boko Haram sought terror training in Somalia, security chief says’, CNN, 25 February 2016; ‘Boko Haram’, Counter Extremism Project.

Background

Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) is an affiliate of Islamic State.⁵⁹ Boko Haram pledged allegiance to Islamic State in March 2015.⁶⁰ After Boko Haram splintered into two factions during 2016, one faction retained the name ISWAP.⁶¹ ISWAP, along with the Mali-based Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), reports to the Al-Furqan office, an office of Islamic State Central.⁶²

ISWAP activity in the northern parts of Cameroon was reported as early as 2021.⁶³ ISWAP for the first time directed attacks against theMNJTF and the Cameroonian Armed Forces in Cameroon in March 2023.⁶⁴

Intensity

Cameroonian Armed Forces targeted ISWAP fighters during August 2023 killing four fighters.⁶⁵ ISWAP retaliated on 5 November by targeting a Cameroonian military base, killing one soldier.⁶⁶ ISWAP again launched an attack on 12 January 2025 against a Cameroonian Army base at Ngouma in the Logone-et-Chari division, killing three soldiers and wounding four.⁶⁷

ISWAP launched a drone attack against the MNJTF during the night of 24 to 25 March 2025 in Wulago, Nigeria. Wulago is in proximity to Soueram which is in the far north of Cameroon. This ISWAP attack killed nineteen Cameroonian soldiers.⁶⁸ ISWAP again clashed with soldiers, this time on 6 May 2025, when attacking an army post in Hile Alifa town in Logone-et-Chari division. Three soldiers and two civilians were killed.⁶⁹ On 10 June 2025, ISWAP launched an attack against a Cameroonian army base in Fotokol in the north of the country, killing four soldiers and leaving another seriously injured.⁷⁰ The Cameroonian Armed Forces repelled ISWAP attacks on 15 and 18 September 2025 near Fotokol town in Logone-et-Chari division⁷¹, this time in the Gouma village in Logone-et-Chari division.⁷²

Although ISWAP activity in Cameroon increased during 2025,⁷³ the number of casualties resulting from clashes between ISWAP and the Cameroonian Armed Forces remained low.

At the end of the reporting period, the fighting between Cameroon (supported by MNJTF) and ISWAP did not satisfy the intensity benchmark of protracted armed violence as demanded by IHL.

Organization

The military wing of ISWAP is estimated at between 5,000,⁷⁴ and 10,400 fighters.⁷⁵ At operational level, ISWAP units are constituted from smaller units, which have been described as being well-controlled and well-trained.⁷⁶ The breakdown into units and the exercise of control make it possible for unit commanders to impose an internal disciplinary system.

ISWAP adheres to an extreme Salafi interpretation of Islam.⁷⁷ ISWAP possesses an internal security service, called amniyya, and exercises control over its fighters during combat and in interacting with communities.⁷⁸ Amniyya gathers information in respect of the fighters and reports back at the highest level to an overall amir ul amniyya.⁷⁹ The measure of control ensures that fighters can be disciplined if they do not follow instructions on the battlefield or adhere to ISWAP’s religious code. A further element in enforcing discipline and limiting the infliction of violence against Muslim civilians is a policy to control the circulation of weapons and to issue weapons to fighters only in advance of a large-scale military operation.⁸⁰

ISWAP keeps weaponry and munitions in a central arsenal and, if not deployed to an active operation, it forbids fighters from retaining weapons.⁸¹ The group’s tactics have significantly evolved. In 2025, the group demonstrated a capacity to use territory under its control to launch near-simultaneous attacks on geographically remote military objectives.⁸² ISWAP frequently attacks at night, which suggests they have night-vision equipment.⁸³

As a part of ISWAP’s military tactics, the group actively attempts to improve relations with civilians living in territory under its control.⁸⁴. On 20 December 2024, ISWAP released a video aimed at recruiting and training fighters, who are often under eighteen years of age.⁸⁵ ISWAP relies on social media platforms, including WhatsApp and Telegram, to recruit fighters.⁸⁶It has a system akin to reservists; rijal (male reservists) live as civilians, farmers, traders, or craftsmen but can be called up to fill the ranks of fighters if losses are suffered in battle.⁸⁷

ISWAP has a sophisticated logistics system and benefits from advice and support from Islamic State.⁸⁸ It raises funds through kidnapping for ransom, arms and drug trafficking, fuel smuggling, and the taxation of fishermen and cattle farmers.⁸⁹ It is estimated ISWAP generates approximately US$5 million each month.⁹⁰Its commanders and administrators are paid fixed salaries, but fighters are compensated from war spoils (‘ghanima’).In the camps, the fighters are fed and they can ask for financial assistance.⁹¹

ISWAP assures unity of messaging through a media team which has the primary function of showcasing ISWAP as a successful jihadist group.⁹²

It is clear that ISWAP meets the threshold of organization as demanded by IHL. But as the intensity of violence between ISWAP and Cameroon (supported by MNJTF) does not meet the intensity threshold required for the application of IHL, this situation does not constitute a NIAC.Domestic law and human rights law is used to address the sporadic violence between ISWAP and Cameroon.

State

Cameroon (supported by MNJTF)

Non-State

Boko Haram
Ambazonian separatists

ISWAP

1
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), IHL Databases.
2
‘Cameroon country profile’, BBC, 9 March 2023.
3
A. Cascais, ‘5 years of violent civil war in Cameroon’, Deutsche Welle, 1 October 2021.
4
R. Orock, ‘Cameroon: how language plunged a country into deadly conflict with no end in sight’, The Conversation, 17 March 2022.
5
A. Cascais, ‘5 years of violent civil war in Cameroon’, Deutsche Welle, 1 October 2021.
6
‘Cameroon country profile’, BBC, 9 March 2023.
7
A. Cascais, ‘5 years of violent civil war in Cameroon’, Deutsche Welle, 1 October 2021
8
‘Cameroon country profile’, BBC, 9 March 2023.
9
African Union Peace and Security Council, ‘Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the Multinational Joint Task Force Against Boko Haram and the Renewal of its Mandate’, AU Doc PSC/PR/RPT.1254 (2025), 13 January 2025, para 5.
10
‘MNJTF Mandate’, Multinational Joint Task Force
11
‘About the Force’, Multinational Joint Task Force.
12
‘The Islamic State West Africa Province’s Tactical Evolution Fuels Worsening Conflict in Nigeria’s Northeast’, The Soufan Center, 21 May 2025; and ‘About the Force’, Multinational Joint Task Force.
13
‘Meagre funding for CAR refugee influx’, ReliefWeb, 6 June 2014.
14
‘Cameroon: the world’s most neglected displacement crisis’, Norwegian Refugee Council, 3 June 2025.
15
‘Communiqué of the 1254th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, held on 13 January 2025 on the Consideration Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram Terrorist Group and Renewal of its Mandate’, African Union, 3 February 2025, para 15.
16
‘Central African Region – Security Council, 9931^st meeting’, United Nations Audiovisual Library, 9 June 2025.
17
O. Oshoko, ‘European Union Pledges 300 Million Euros to Support Fight Against Terrorism, Violent Extremism in North East, North West in 2025’, Security King, 7 April 2025.
18
‘Separatist Lockdowns Turn Cities into Ghost Towns in Cameroon’, African Security Analysis, 21 September 2025.
19
‘Cameroon: North-West and South-West – Situation Report No 64 (April 2024)’, ReliefWeb, 18 June 2024.
20
D. Atangana, ‘Capo Daniel dumps Ambazonia armed struggle, embraces diplomacy’, Mimi Mefo Info, 6 May 2024.
21
D. Atangana, ‘Capo Daniel dumps Ambazonia armed struggle, embraces diplomacy’, Mimi Mefo Info, 6 May 2024.
22
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, May 2024.
23
D. Atangana, ‘Capo Daniel dumps Ambazonia armed struggle, embraces diplomacy’, Mimi Mefo Info, 6 May 2024.
24
‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/342, 30 May 2025, para 18.
25
International Monetary Fund Africa Department, ‘Climate Change in Chad: Challenges and Opportunities’, International Monetary Fund eLibrary, 12 December 2024.
26
‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/342, 30 May 2025, para 18.
27
Ypavlov, ‘Meeting the Fulani Bororo in Chad’, World Heritage Sights, 29 November 2016.
28
‘Gbaya/Gbeya/Baya’, Africa: 101 Last Tribes.
29
‘Gbaya, Northwest in Cameroon’,
30
‘Gbaya/Gbeya/Baya’, Africa: 101 Last Tribes.
31
C. B. Etahoben, ‘Cameroon: Calm Returns to Ngaoundal After Deadly Clashes Between Bororo and Gbaya Communities’, HumAngle, 7 February 2025.
32
‘2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Cameroon’, US Department of State.
33
‘Urgent Alert and Advocacy for Free, Credible and Peaceful Elections in Cameroon’, International Peace Bureau.
34
‘Urgent Alert and Advocacy for Free, Credible and Peaceful Elections in Cameroon’, International Peace Bureau; ‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, February 2025.
35
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, February 2025.
36
‘Cameroon’, UNICEF, 5 February 2026.
37
‘Cameroon: Humanitarian Dashboard (as of 31 December 2025)’, ReliefWeb, 5 February 2026 (Updated 12 March 2026); ‘Mpox outbreak in Cameroon with 22 confirmed cases linked to enhanced transmission subvariants’, Beacon, 20 February 2026.
38
‘Cameroon: Floods – Aug 2024’, ReliefWeb.
39
‘Cameroon: Floods – Aug 2024’, ReliefWeb.
40
‘Cameroon: Floods 2024 Emergency Appeal Operation Update 1: MDRCM039’, ReliefWeb, 18 November 2024, Updated 29 January 2025.
41
CrisisWatch Database | International Crisis Group ( November 2024)
42
‘Cameroon’, UNICEF, 25 July 2025, 2.
43
‘Cameroon’s Paul Biya, 92, says he will seek eighth presidential term’, Al Jazeera, 14 July 2025.
44
‘Cameroon: Mixed reactions in Yaoundé after Biya announces bid for another term’, Africa News, 14 July 2025.
45
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, May 2024
46
N. Booty and N. Négoce, ‘Ally of Cameroon president, 92, quits “broken” government to challenge him’, BBC, 26 June 2025; ‘Cameroonian opposition leader Kamto returns to Yaoundé after house arrest’, France 24, 11 June 2025.
47
‘Cameroon opposition figure Kamto rejects ‘abitrary’ election ban’, France 24, 8 August 2025.
48
‘Cameroon opposition figure Kamto rejects ‘abitrary’ election ban’, France 24, 8 August 2025.
49
‘Cameroon minister Bakary announces presidential run after breaking with Biya government’, France 24, 27 June 2025; N. Booty and N. Négoce, ‘Ally of Cameroon president, 92, quits ‘broken’ government to challenge him’, BBC, 26 June 2025.
50
N. Booty and N. Négoce, ‘Ally of Cameroon president, 92, quits “broken” government to challenge him’, BBC, 26 June 2025.
51
‘Cameroon President Biya declared election victor; challenger protests’, Al Jazeera, 27 October 2025.
52
‘Cameroon’s Biya declared vote winner, opposition reports gunfire’, Polity, 27 October 2025
53
‘Cameroon’s Biya, world’s oldest ruler at 92, sworn in for eighth term’, Al Jazeera, 6 November 2025; J. Siegle and H. Wahila, ‘Cameroon: Change is Coming but More of the Same?’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 13 January 2025
54
‘Cameroon’s Biya, world’s oldest ruler at 92, sworn in for eighth term’, Al Jazeera, 6 November 2025.
55
H. Kinkoh and R. Dideberg, ‘Suppression of post-election protests in Cameroon will not solve the country’s looming succession crisis’, Chatham House, 31 October 2025; ‘Cameroon: Violence erupts following Paul Biya’s election victory’, France 24, 28 October 2025; ‘Cameroon: Killings, Mass Arrests Follow Disputed Elections’, Human Rights Watch, 12 November 2025.
56
‘Cameroon’s Biya, world’s oldest ruler at 92, sworn in for eighth term’, Al Jazeera, 6 November 2025
57
‘Cameroon: Killings, Mass Arrests Follow Disputed Elections’, Human Rights Watch, 12 November 2025.
58
‘Cameroon: Opposition candidate Issa Tchiroma Bakary calls for release of protesters’, France 24, 11 November 2025.
59
M. Samuel, ‘Boko Haram factional violence worries Islamic State’, Institute for Security Studies, 25 April 2024.
60
‘Islamic State West Africa Province’, Australian Government: Australian National Security, 22 September 2024; ‘Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)’, United Nations Security Council.
61
‘Boko Haram, including JAS and ISIS-WA’, European Union Agency for Asylum, February 2019; See ‘Islamic State West Africa Province’, Australian Government: Australian National Security, 22 September 2024.
62
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024; See L. Karr and Brian Carter, ‘The Islamic State’s Global Long Game and Resurgence in Syria Poses an Evolved Threat to the West’, Institute for the Study of War, 9 January 2025.
63
AN. Fru and T. T. Tayo, ‘ISWAP takes aim at the state in Cameroon’, Institute for Security Studies, 22 July 2021.
64
J. Zenn, ‘Brief: Cameroonian President Holds Emergency Meeting to Address ISWAP Attacks’, Jamestown, 6 September 2023; Humanity Purpose, X, 4 April 2023.
65
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, August 2023.
66
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, November 2023.
67
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, January 2025.
68
‘The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/342, 30 May 2025, para 24.
69
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, May 2025.
70
E. Ndi, ‘Four Cameroonian Soldiers Killed by ISWAP in Fotokol’, Mimi Mefo Info, 10 June 2025; Deutsche Welle Africa, Facebook, 10 June 2025.
71
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, September 2025 and again on 17 December 2025
72
‘Africa: Cameroon’, International Crisis Group, December 2025.
73
M. Samuel, ‘ISWAP’s emergence as epicentre of jihadism in West Africa’, Good Governance Africa, 9 July 2025
74
‘Islamic State West Africa Province’, Australian Government: Australian National Security, 22 September 2024; ‘ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, April 2025; M. Cengiz, ‘Column: Terrorist Threat Assessment: Boko Haram and ISWAP in Nigeria’, Homeland Security Today, 4 June 2024
75
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
76
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
77
‘Islamic State West Africa Province’, Australian Government: Australian National Security, 22 September 2024.
78
‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024; V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
79
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
80
‘Fighting among Boko Haram Splinters Rages On’, International Crisis Group, 30 May 2023.
81
‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024.
82
M. Samuel and E. Stoddard, ‘Resurgent jihadist violence in northeast Nigeria part of a worrying regional trend’, The New Humanitarian, 2 June 2025.
83
M. Samuel and E. Stoddard, ‘Resurgent jihadist violence in northeast Nigeria part of a worrying regional trend’, The New Humanitarian, 2 June 2025.
84
M. Samuel and E. Stoddard, ‘Resurgent jihadist violence in northeast Nigeria part of a worrying regional trend’, The New Humanitarian, 2 June 2025
85
‘Islamic State In West Africa (ISWAP) Releases Video Showing ‘Cubs’ Executing Captives, Vowing To Carry The Caliphate’s Banner Generation After Generation’, Memri, 20 December 2024.
86
A. Dahiru, ‘Media Jihad: Social Media Use Shows Islamic State’s Increasing Interest In Africa’, HumAngle, 14 September 2022.
87
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
88
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024.
89
‘Islamic State West Africa Province’, Australian Government: Australian National Security, 22 September 2024.
90
S. M. Zuffa, ‘Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)’, Grey Dynamics, 22 February 2023; See M. Samuel, ‘Boko Haram’s deadly business: an economy of violence in the Lake Chad Basin’, Institute for Security Studies, 5 October 2022.
91
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 16 September 2024; See ‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, International Crisis Group, 28 March 2024.
92
M. Samuel, ‘ISWAP’s use of tech could prolong Lake Chad Basin violence’, Institute for Security Studies, 13 April 2023.

Cameroon

Reporting period: July 2024 - June 2025

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (between 2023 and 2025)

Renewal of the mandate of the MNJTF

Operation ‘Ghost Town’

ADF spokesperson marked as traitor

Intercommunal violence

Humanitarian Crisis

The 2025 Presidential Elections

Non-International Armed Conflict

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Below the threshold situation

Background

Intensity

Organization

Parties to the Conflict

State

Non-State

Other Main actors