Central African Republic

During the reporting period, multiple armed conflicts were ongoing in the Central African Republic (CAR).

At least five non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) took place, to which CAR was a party:

CAR v Return, Reclamation, and Rehabilitation (3R)
CAR v Unity for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC)
CAR v Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC – Coalition des patriotes pour le changement)
CAR v CPC-Fondamentale (CPC-F)
CAR v Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG) (supported by Wagner Ti Azande (WTA))

At least one other NIAC was ongoing:

UPC v AAKG

CAR is a State Party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law (IHL) applies to all the NIACs in CAR.

CAR is also a State Party to Additional Protocol II of 1977, but none of the NIACs to which it is a party meet the requirements of its Article 1(1), which requires a non-State armed group to have territorial control enabling them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations. The NIAC between the WTA and the UPC cannot be regulated by the Protocol as it requires one of the parties to be the territorial State. The Protocol applies to armed conflicts ‘which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups’.¹

Since gaining independence from French colonial rule in 1960, CAR has experienced prolonged periods of violence and instability, including five coups d’état – in 1966, 1979, 1981, 2003, and 2013, along with an attempted coup in late 2022.² The most recent successful unconstitutional change of power, which took place in 2013, has been the basis for the ongoing hostilities.³ In March 2013, Séléka forces – a coalition of armed, predominantly Muslim groups – led an insurgency that culminated in the seizure of the capital, Bangui, and the ousting of the government of François Bozizé.⁴ Subsequently, the Séléka leader, Michel Djotodia, proclaimed himself president.⁵

In response to the brutality exercised by Séléka forces, ‘Anti-Balaka’ (‘invincible’ in Sango) coalitions of Christian fighters were established to initiate violent attacks on Séléka forces and Muslim civilians, reigniting violence with a strong religious aspect, killing many thousands and displacing hundreds of thousands of people.⁶ Following a joint initiative by France and Chad, President Djotodia was removed from office on 10 January 2014.⁷ The National Transitional Council elected the mayor of Bangui, Catherine Samba-Panza, as interim president on 20 January 2014 and established a transitional government of members of the Séléka and the Anti-Balaka groups as well as members of the deposed Bozizé government.⁸

The transitional government failed to achieve a peaceful resolution to the crisis.⁹ Séléka groups were known to roam the country and engage in marauding activities.¹⁰ The clashes rapidly escalated into conflict, leading to a witch hunt which targeted Muslims.¹¹ The Muslim population were suspected of supporting the Séléka and, as a result, they were brutally persecuted, with many murdered or expelled.¹²

Reflecting the depth of the crisis, in April 2014, the United Nations Security Council authorized the deployment of a peacekeeping force, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), comprising African Union (AU) and French forces that had been deployed in CAR previously.¹³ MINUSCA was created to protect civilians and disarm militia groups.¹⁴ As of June 2025, MINUSCA remained in CAR with troops from Rwanda, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Zambia, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Burundi, and Cameroon. More than 18,000 peacekeepers are currently engaged in operations in CAR.¹⁵ Since the start of the mission, numerous attacks have been perpetrated against UN peacekeepers and humanitarian workers from other humanitarian agencies, resulting in the death of 208 MINUSCA peacekeepers by February 2025.¹⁶

After elections in 2016, Faustin Archange Touadéra assumed office on 30 March, thereby bringing to a conclusion the transition period and leading to the departure of the French forces initially deployed alongside MINUSCA.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the installation of the new president did not signify a new beginning, as he previously had served as prime minister under Bozizé from 2008 to 2013.¹⁸

Despite the initial optimism that followed Touadéra’s election, the crisis continued to intensify throughout 2016 and 2017.¹⁹ A peace agreement that was signed in June 2017 between the government and thirteen of the fourteen primary armed factions had minimal impact.²⁰ Evidence is that ex-Séléka and anti-Balaka militias, along with hundreds of additional local groups, were able to engage in open operations and exercise control over a significant portion of CAR territory.²¹

Between 2018 and 2020 sporadic armed confrontations took place between the government and the increasingly fragmented armed groups.²² In February 2019, a renewed peace agreement (Bangui Peace Agreement) was signed by the government and fourteen armed groups.²³ However, the majority of its provisions have not been implemented.²⁴ Additionally, reports by human rights organizations and UN agencies indicate that violence perpetrated by both ex-Séléka forces and anti-Balaka groups may constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity.²⁵

In opposition to the December 2020 elections, six armed groups, including former Séléka and anti-Balaka militia, united to establish the CPC, a unified coalition committed to challenging the government.²⁶ Touadéra declared himself the winner of the election, having received 53 per cent of the vote.²⁷ The opposition contested the result, and on 13 January 2021 the CPC launched an offensive on the capital but were defeated by government forces with the support of MINUSCA.²⁸

Since late 2020, there has been a discernible shift in the balance of power in the government’s favour, with the assistance of Rwandan soldiers and Africa Corps, and formerly Wagner Group, proving instrumental in this transition.²⁹ Adopting a very forceful approach, Africa Corps have facilitated the government’s re-acquisition of a significant portion of the west of the country but have also been accused of committing human rights and IHL violations.³⁰ In recent years, CAR has been the subject of fierce competition for influence in the region between Russia and Western nations, particularly France and the United States.³¹ Moscow exerts significant influence over national institutions and controls the extraction of natural resources, including at the Ndassima gold mine, while also exercising oversight over smuggling and trade networks.³²

In 2023, changes occurred in CAR; a new wave of attacks with improved weaponry was launched by CPC against the government, two armed groups, and three other militant factions were dissolved, and a referendum on removing presidential term limits was held.³³ Elections were scheduled to take place in December 2025.³⁴ Despite being weakened and experiencing internal division, the non-State armed groups now use guerrilla tactics, often ambushing government forces, and precipitate violence in rural areas.³⁵ As in the past, the conflict fluctuates between low-level fighting and high-level escalation.³⁶

The humanitarian crisis in CAR is also persisting, with around 70 per cent of the population subsisting in extreme poverty and 3.4 million individuals requiring assistance.³⁷ The armed conflict in neighbouring Sudan has also had a significant impact on the situation in CAR, with reports of air strikes and recruitment of fighters by Sudanese forces affecting the ongoing violence and provoking further instability.³⁸ Additionally, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) reported 469,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) within CAR at the end of 2024.³⁹ The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has documented an almost steady number of 700,000 refugees outside CAR for years now.⁴⁰

A continued Wagner Group/Africa Corps involvement and the struggle for influence between Western countries and Russia

During the reporting period, the Russian paramilitary group known as the Wagner Group was largely rebranded to ‘Africa Corps’ after the death of Wagner leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in August 2023.⁴¹ Some Wagner Group fighters have remained and have not joined Africa Corps. Following Prigozhin’s death, Colonel-General Yanous Bek Evrourov, the Russian Deputy Defence Minister, met with Touadéra in Bangui on 2 September 2023, as part of an unparalleled tour of African countries in collaboration with the then Wagner Group.⁴²

In December 2023, rumours disseminated throughout Bangui concerning the imminent departure of Vitali Perfilev, formerly responsible for Wagner Group military operations in CAR, and his replacement by the secret intelligence agent, Vladimirovich Denis Pavlov, who arrived in Bangui in September.⁴³ This development has been interpreted as an indication that the Russian defence ministry is assuming a more active role in the oversight of paramilitary organizations.⁴⁴

Concurrently with Russia consolidating its ties with the CAR government and augmenting its on-the-ground presence through the Wagner Group, Western nations have sought to diminish Russian influence in the country.⁴⁵ On 13 September 2023, French President Emmanuel Macron and CAR President Touadéra met in Paris.⁴⁶ The meeting addressed the presence of the Wagner Group and its potential withdrawal, which, according to Macron, would be a precondition for a rapprochement between France and CAR.⁴⁷ In a similar vein, and as part of its strategy to mitigate the influence of the Wagner Group in Bangui, Washington continued to negotiate alternative security arrangements.⁴⁸ In late December 2023, the US-based private military company Bancroft Global Development denied deploying to Bangui but admitted to contacting President Touadéra’s government to discuss cooperation.⁴⁹ Subsequently, the Presidency confirmed that the government is working to diversify security partnerships and that the United States is offering to train soldiers.⁵⁰

The allegations of Bancroft operations in the CAR have led to a notable escalation in Russia’s military support for President Touadéra.⁵¹ In early 2024, Russia transferred seven fighter jets to CAR, and a presidential adviser confirmed the opening of a Russian military base with the capacity to accommodate up to 10,000 troops in Berengo (Lobaye prefecture), where Africa Corps already operates a training camp for the CAR armed forces/Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA).⁵² Meanwhile, Russia’s propaganda campaign against the United States intensified.⁵³ In a parallel development, President Touadéra met with President Macron in Paris on 17 April 2024 to seek to ease tensions over the CAR government’s growing ties with Russia.⁵⁴ On 11 July 2024, the French delegation met CAR Prime Minister Moloua in Bangui to discuss the resumption of aid payments three years after they were suspended due to anti-French propaganda instigated by Russia.⁵⁵ In a sign of the improving relations between the two states, on 13 November 2024, the French government announced a €10 million aid package to support governance, education, and electoral processes.⁵⁶

In the following months there was a marked intensification of the rivalry between the foreign security allies.⁵⁷ The government’s plans to establish a 35,000-strong army by 2030 have been a contributing factor to the ongoing competition between Rwanda and Russia in the domain of military training.⁵⁸ In an endeavour to consolidate Moscow’s standing as the primary security partner of CAR, Russia delivered 400 bulletproof vests to FACA on 1 March 2025.⁵⁹ The French Embassy in Bangui conducted a selection examination on 6 March 2025 for twenty army officers who were seeking scholarships in France.⁶⁰ Paris’ renewed engagement has prompted a fresh surge in anti-French rhetoric emanating from Russia.⁶¹

Lifting of the UN Security Council arms embargo on CAR

In December 2013, in response to the breakdown of law and order in CAR, which was characterized by escalating violence and extensive human rights violations and abuses, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2127 which imposed an arms embargo on CAR.⁶² The CAR government long contended that the necessity for advance approval by the relevant UN sanctions committee, required by Resolution 2127 for arms supplies to government forces, was an impediment to resolving the nation’s security crisis, especially in light of the peace agreement signed with fourteen non-State armed groups in February 2019.⁶³

In July 2024, the initial embargo was formally revoked and substituted with a new embargo, in place until 31 July 2025, that explicitly prohibited the provision of arms to armed groups and associated individuals operating within the country.⁶⁴ Bangui expressed strong disapproval of the decision and demanded an immediate and complete lifting of the embargo.⁶⁵ Finally, the Security Council adopted a resolution on 30 July 2024, by which it was decided that the arms embargo on CAR should be lifted completely.⁶⁶ The CAR authorities expressed their satisfaction with this decision, whereas the reaction of the opposition has been mostly negative.⁶⁷

Mixed transitional justice record and an ICC arrest warrant

A UN-backed Special Criminal Court (SCC) with hybrid jurisdiction was formed in 2015 under legislation enacted by the National Assembly of the CAR.⁶⁸ The court’s mandate is to prosecute the most severe crimes committed on CAR territory since 2003, with a particular focus on war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of human rights.⁶⁹ In a significant step towards ending impunity, on 7 September 2023 the former Front populaire pour la renaissance de Centrafrique/Popular Front for the Renaissance of the Central African Republic (FPRC) leader, Abdoulaye Hissène, was apprehended and charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in 2017.⁷⁰

In a development that was met with a certain degree of scepticism, on 8 May 2024, President Touadéra ordered the dissolution of the Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation Commission (CVJRR), which had been established in accordance with the peace agreement signed in 2019 between the government and fourteen armed groups.⁷¹ In a statement on 14 May 2024, the Minister of Communication attributed the dissolution to governance, operational, and financial deficiencies within the CVJRR.⁷² In the meantime, on 30 April 2024, the SCC issued a warrant for the arrest of former President Bozizé, who is accused of ordering crimes against humanity committed by the army and the presidential guard between February 2009 and March 2013.⁷³ On 1 May 2024, however, President Umaro Embaló Sissoco of Guinea-Bissau, where Bozizé is currently exiled, stated that he would not extradite the former president, citing the absence of a legal framework to facilitate such an action.⁷⁴

In the second half of 2024, financial reparations totalling $27,000 were awarded by the SCC on 17 September to five direct victims and thirty-two families of those killed in the Return, Reclamation and Rehabilitation (3R) rebel attack, which took place in the country’s north-west in 2019 and resulted in the deaths of thirty-two civilians.⁷⁵ On the global stage, on 7 November, judges at the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Edmon Beina, a rebel figure accused of committing war crimes against Muslims in 2014.⁷⁶ On 15 November, the government formally requested that the UN-backed SCC be permitted to assume leadership of the judicial proceedings in Beina’s case.⁷⁷

Renewal of MINUSCA mandate

MINUSCA has been deployed in CAR since 2014 with an approximate strength of 18,500 personnel.⁷⁸ The top five troop contributing countries are Rwanda, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, and Zambia.⁷⁹ On 14 November 2024, the UNSC agreed to a one-year extension of MINUSCA’s mandate until 15 November 2025.⁸⁰ The mandate requires MINUSCA to develop a multi-year strategic vision to establish the political, security, and institutional conditions necessary for national reconciliation and lasting peace.⁸¹

Limits on opposition ahead of the December 2025 elections

On 10 July 2023, President Touadéra presented a proposed new constitution that removes the two-term limit for presidents, and which stipulates that the president must be a citizen of the CAR.⁸² Despite calls for a boycott by the opposition coalition, Republican Bloc for the Defence of the Constitution (BRDC), a referendum was held on 30 July 2023 and the new constitution was adopted after the Constitutional Court validated the voting results on 20 August 2023.⁸³ On the international level, on 22 August 2023, the United States expressed ‘deep reservations’ about the referendum vote which took place without the presence of independent electoral observers.⁸⁴

Following months of political tension, the government announced on 22 August 2024 that the local and municipal elections, which originally were scheduled for October 2024, would be postponed until April 2025, with the decision reportedly related to funding challenges as the electoral body had raised only around half of the required budget.⁸⁵ Although some opposition parties supported the decision and pressed for dialogue, the BRDC opposition coalition continued to call for a boycott of the polls and demanded the reform of the electoral body.⁸⁶ Subsequently, amid continuing financial constraints, the electoral body postponed the local polls for the fourth time on 25 February 2025, pushing them back from April to August 2025 and then for a fifth time to December 2025.⁸⁷

In the run-up to the presidential vote, due to take place in December 2025, a voter registration process took place in nine prefectures on 11 March 2025.⁸⁸ On 4 April 2025, the BRDC opposition coalition held the biggest protest of its kind since 2022 in Bangui, which took place against the backdrop of speculation about Touadéra’s possible candidacy in the presidential election scheduled for December 2025.⁸⁹ However, the ruling party is unlikely to face a serious threat from several coalition leaders as they are ineligible under the new constitution and have limited mobilization capacity.⁹⁰ In an apparent bid to appease the opposition, the government proposed a political dialogue on 21 April 2025, to which the opposition coalition responded on 23 April 2025 by signalling its openness to talks.‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group. The government, however, failed to follow through on its announcement of political dialogue.‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.

Internal friction in the rebel coalition led to a split between CPC and CPC-F

In a document circulated publicly on 4 August 2024, General Ali Darassa, the founder of the UPC, a Fulani-led armed group, declared a ceasefire and stated his willingness to seek a compromise with the government.⁹¹ The decision made by Darassa, however, resulted in a rift in the CPC, a rebel alliance which, until then, had comprised the UPC and five other armed groups.⁹² As a consequence, CPC general coordinator and former president Bozizé, who is in exile in Guinea-Bissau, dismissed Darassa as the alliance’s Chief of Staff for high treason on 5 August 2024.⁹³

On 30 August, four armed factions from the original CPC declared their decision to leave the CPC in order to establish a new alliance, the CPC-F, with Ali Darassa as Chief of Staff.⁹⁴ As a consequence, on 9 September 2024, former president and CPC leader Bozizé reorganized the CPC alliance by appointing members of his Gbaya ethnic group, including his two sons, to significant leadership positions.⁹⁵

Government truce with armed groups 3R and UPC

In an effort to improve the security situation in rural areas ahead of the presidential elections scheduled for December 2025, the government signed an agreement with two predominantly Fulani armed groups on 19 April 2025, namely the UPC and 3R.⁹⁶ As part of the deal, the groups agreed to commit to reintegration into the peace process and immediately to cease hostilities.⁹⁷ This agreement came about despite the fact that 3R is part of the CPC alliance, and the UPC belongs to the CPC-F alliance, neither of which is open to peace talks with the government.⁹⁸ Tensions have remained high between the signatories since the agreement.⁹⁹

Sudan civil war spill-over

On 13 June 2025, UN Secretary-General António Guterres reported the presence of Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the Am Dafok and Aouk areas of the Vakaga Prefecture.¹⁰⁰ A few days later, on 20 June 2025, armed individuals attacked a UN peacekeeping patrol in Am-Sissia village in CAR, near the country’s border with Sudan, killing a Zambian peacekeeper.¹⁰¹ Blaming this attack on ‘suspected Sudanese armed elements’, the UN warned that the conflict in Sudan was spilling across the border into CAR and further destabilising the region.¹⁰²

In the months predating this incident and during 2024, MINUSCA repeatedly reported incursions of RSF fighters into Vakaga prefecture, specifically around the areas of Am Dafok and Aouk.¹⁰³ Additionally, the RSF reportedly has ties with several Central African armed groups, such as the UPC, the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique/Central African Patriotic Movement (MPC) and the FPRC.¹⁰⁴ It typically recruits fighters and mercenaries from the ranks of these Central African groups in exchange for support, especially in the form of arms and ammunition.¹⁰⁵

The Military Coalition for the Salvation of the People and Redress (CMSPR)

On 20 November 2024, a press statement was issued announcing the formation of the Military Coalition for the Salvation of the People and Redress (CMSPR), led by Armel Sayo, a former leader of the now-defunct Révolution et Justice-Sayo and a signatory of the Political Agreement.¹⁰⁶ The CMSPR’s main objectives are ‘restoring peace, security and order in the Central African Republic’ and ‘establishing an inclusive national rescue policy for institutional recovery, national reconciliation, national cohesion and the overall reconstruction of the Central African Republic’.¹⁰⁷ The CMSPR, not affiliated with the CPC or CPC-F, conducted its first attack on FACA in Ouham in November 2024.¹⁰⁸ Accused of war crimes and orchestrating a coup against the Government of CAR in 2021, Armel Sayo was arrested in Douala, Cameroon, on 17 January 2025 and transferred to Bangui in May 2025.¹⁰⁹

Since its creation in November 2024, the CMSPR has mounted three recorded attacks against FACA, notably in November 2024,¹¹⁰ in January 2025,¹¹¹ and in February 2025.¹¹² As these attacks were sporadic in nature, they fall below the threshold of intensity required for a NIAC to exist.

Non-international armed conflict between Central African Republic and Return, Reclamation, and Rehabilitation (3R)

Background

The pre-existing NIAC between FACA, supported by Africa Corps and MINUSCA, against 3R continued throughout the reporting period. While Africa Corps has fought alongside FACA and has been attacked by 3R,¹ MINUSCA has provided security assistance, including by deploying temporary operating bases to the areas in which FACA was fighting 3R, but does not possess a combat role.²

3R was established in 2015³ with the initial purpose of protecting herds which were constantly plundered by anti-balaka groups.⁴ The full name ‘Return, Reclamation and Rehabilitation’ captures this Fulani non-state actor’s overarching purpose, which is to return to CAR after being displaced throughout the region by anti-balaka militias.⁵

3R has been a part of the CPC since the coalition’s creation in December 2020.⁶ The armed groups that formed the coalition did so as a consequence of their joint denial of the Bangui Political Peace Agreement (APPR-RCA) signed between the CAR government and several armed groups in 2019.⁷ They further aimed to oust President Touadéra and drive out the Russian paramilitaries operating in CAR.⁸

However, the NIAC between CAR and 3R predates the formation of the CPC.⁹ 3R also launched several attacks¹⁰ outside the coalition it belongs to during the reporting period. The CPC also perpetrated separate attacks against FACA.¹¹

On 19 April 2025, the CAR government and 3R signed the ‘N’Djamena Agreement’, which obligates 3R fighters to cease fighting and rejoin the peace process.¹² Following its signature, the 3R leadership ordered the group’s fighters to lay down arms and adhere to the implementation of the agreement.¹³ Meetings between the CAR government and 3R continued throughout the end of the reporting period, including one held on 19 June 2025 to ensure implementation of the agreement at local level.¹⁴ Despite this commitment to peace, tensions remained between the parties.¹⁵ As a resumption of hostilities remains possible, and 3R has not ceased to exist, the N’Djamena Agreement is not in itself sufficient to declare that this pre-existing NIAC has ended.¹⁶ The 7 June 2025 announcement that 3R will fight alongside FACA serves as evidence that 3R continues to exist.¹⁷

Intensity

Indeed, 3R is considered one of the most active non-State armed groups in CAR,¹⁸ launching frequent attacks throughout the reporting period.¹⁹ Specific attacks between FACA (and support forces) and 3R, which resulted in casualties (often civilian victims) and destruction of infrastructure, included clashes during September 2023,²⁰ October, ²¹ November,²² and December 2023,²³ as well as March,²⁴ April,²⁵ August,²⁶ September,²⁷ and November 2024,²⁸ and January,²⁹ March,³⁰ May,³¹ and June 2025.³²

3R has increasingly been targeted by FACA and its support forces since 2021. As a result, it gave up several of its key logistical bases, including Koui, Borodoul, Kowone, and Nzakoundou in Ouham-Pendé prefecture, and Idéré in Nana-Mambéré prefecture, during the reporting period. This has, however, led to 3R now controlling a network of smaller bases in remote areas of the same regions. One of these camps, over which 3R maintains control, is Ngoukala in Ouham-Pendé prefecture.³³

Despite 3R being able to acquire higher-calibre weaponry, such as 14.5mm and 12.7mm machine guns through their support networks, the shifting nature of its operations has led them to rely mostly on weapons that can easily be transported or carried in hand while walking through thick bush.³⁴ Apart from using rifles and grenade launchers,³⁵ 3R frequently relies on remotely detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and landmines as their choice of weaponry.³⁶

Approximately one third of the CAR’s population has been displaced as a result of the conflict and humanitarian crisis facing the State. By the end of 2024, the IDMC and UNHCR reported that 469,000 individuals were internally displaced.³⁷ Although not all displacement is a direct result of fighting between FACA and 3R, and attribution of cause is complicated in a battle space where multiple conflicts are ongoing, 3R’s tactics of burning down entire villages after an attack contributes significantly to the high number of IDPs.³⁸

In sum, the violence generated in the hostilities between FACA and 3R continued to meet the criterion of intensity demanded by IHL during the reporting period. Despite the ‘N’Djamena Agreement’ between the CAR and 3R concluded on 19 April 2025, and 3R agreeing to fighting alongside FACA (see above), tensions remained high between the parties.³⁹

Organization

Information concerning the internal command structure of 3R is scarce, although it is known that it has both political and military divisions.⁴⁰ The UN Panel of Experts on CAR have also confirmed that 3R has a tiered (hierarchical) command structure which enables it to mobilize fighters. Cells differ in size and levels of organization, but each have their own commanders.⁴¹ The hierarchical command structure⁴² gives 3R the capacity to impose discipline and apply IHL.

Known leadership includes the overall commander of 3R, Ramadhane Abdelkader (also known as Sembé Bobbo) who also acts as the deputy to François Bozizé in the CPC alliance.⁴³ The Chief of Staff, based in north-western CAR, is Doborodjé Goska. Goska leads 3R operations while serving as the military Chief of Staff of the CPC coalition as a whole.⁴⁴ Other high-ranking officials in the 3R military wing include the military advisor, Abakar, and the Chief of Operations, Ardo Abba, as well as General Sangalisé and Colonel Koya.⁴⁵ Colonel Hammadou Rawandou, who serves as the political coordinator of 3R, issues press statements on behalf of 3R.⁴⁶

3R is capable of launching both large-scale⁴⁷ and guerrilla-style attacks.⁴⁸ Guerrilla attacks include, for example, ambushing FACA soldiers on patrol or early in the morning.⁴⁹ The group’s military tactics include using intelligence gained from familiarity with the combat space and a network of local informants to launch surprise attacks against FACA.⁵⁰ Resources are replenished through illicit activities such as illegal mining and looting and ambushing FACA and foreign mineworkers.⁵¹ Logistics, such as food and fuel supplies, are supported by small paths between Cameroon and Chad.⁵² 3R also imposed a cattle and protection taxation system to fund weapons purchases.⁵³ The activities of Africa Corps have, however, hindered weapon supply networks and routes. Nevertheless, as a means of mitigating logistical disruptions, 3R maintained stockpiles in underground weapon caches located at secret sites.⁵⁴

It is, therefore, clear that 3R satisfies the notion of organization as demanded by IHL. The pre-existing NIAC between CAR and 3R continued throughout the reporting period.

1
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Markounda, une opération des Wagner sur des sites miniers locaux tourne au fiasco, plusieurs morts’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 15 August 2024; ‘Nouvelles frappes meurtrières de Wagner à la frontière tchado-centrafricaine’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 11 September 2024,
2
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/383, 13 June 2025, including para 26; ‘Mandate’, MINUSCA.
3
‘Return, Reclamation, Rehabilitation (3R) – Central African Republic (CAR)’, Tracking Terrorism; ‘Dozens of civilians killed in CAR violence: HRW’, Al Jazeera, 2 May 2017
4
‘La CPC condamne le massacre de Bozoum et appelle à l’unité’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 17 June 2025; M. E. Kindzeka, ‘CAR pleads with fleeing civilians to return after rebels attack villages’, Voice of America, 5 July 2024.
5
‘3R rebel group in the Central African Republic loses territory and control over the illicit cattle economy, damaging legitimacy and offering entry points for state intervention’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, November 2023.
6
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025.
7
‘La CPC condamne le massacre de Bozoum et appelle à l’unité’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 17 June 2025.
8
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025.
9
A. Essa and News Agencies, ‘Newly formed 3R rebel group inflicts horrors in CAR: UN’, Al Jazeera, 23 December 2016.
10
‘CrisisWatch, Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Global Overview June 2023’, International Crisis Group; ‘Nana-Mambéré: un Violent affrontement entre les hommes de Wagner et les rebelles de 3R à Nguia-Bouar, plusieurs morts’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 11 September 2023; ‘Centrafrique: nouvelle attaque des positions des soldats FACA à Besson, débandade générale’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 24 September 2023; ‘Centrafrique: une base des Faca visée par une attaque rebelle non-loin de Bocaranga’, Radio Ndekeluka, 12 October 2023; ‘Attaque meurtrière à Ndim et Létélé: Deux civils tués et un soldat FACA blessé’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 30 November 2023; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: une dizaine de civils enlevés par des hommes armés non loin de Yaloké’, Radio Ndekeluka, 6 March 2024; ‘Flash info: Embuscade à Bocaranga: Bilan tragique pour les mercenaires russes et les FACA’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 14 April 2024; ‘Centrafrique: la psychose règne encore à Gazi-Béa malgré la présence de l’armée’, Radio Ndekeluka, 7 May 2024
11
‘Violente attaque de la base de Wagner par les CPC à Baoro: un bilan catastrophique dévoilé’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 5 June 2023; ‘CrisisWatch, Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Global Overview June 2023’, International Crisis Group; ‘Dramatique confrontation près de Bossangoa: Les mercenaires de Wagner en difficulté’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 23 June 2023; ‘Centrafrique: Les rebelles de la CPC attaquent la base des mercenaires de Wagner à Awaka’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 11 June 2023; ‘Centrafrique: plus de 40 morts dans un affrontement entre deux groupes armés dans le sud-est du pays’, Xinhua, 22 June 2023; ‘Centrafrique: 3 rebelles de la CPC tués dans une attaque repoussée par les FACA à Nana Bakassa’, Radio Ndekeluka, 25 July 2023; ‘Centrafrique: Attaque meurtrière à Thiri, une dizaine des personnes tuées’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 1 August 2023; ‘Attaque de la CPC dans le Bamingui-Bangoran: Une journée tragique pour l’armée nationale’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 21 October 2023; ‘Bamingui-Bangoran: le poste avancé de l’armée nationale à Tiri attaqué par la CPC’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 10 January 2024; ‘Centrafrique: attaque d’hommes armés signalée au village Boungou non loin de Bria’, Radio Ndekeluka, 15 January 2024; ‘Centrafrique: la localité de Sikikédé attaquée par des hommes armés’, Radio Ndekeluka, 7 March 2024; ‘Attaque surprise des rebelles à Djayri: 2 soldats FACA tués et des armes récupérées’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 12 February 2024; ‘Centrafrique: près d’une vingtaine de civils tués par des hommes armés non loin du village Kella-Maoulé dans l’Ouham-Pendé’, Radio Ndekeluka, 3 April 2024; ‘14 killed, several wounded in latest raid on CAR villages: UN’, Big News Network, 18 April 2024; ‘Centrafrique: 2 militaires et un civil tués dans une attaque de la CPC repoussée par les Faca à Kadjama’, Radio Ndekeluka, 16 April 2024; JF. Koena, ‘Rebels kill at least 4 people during an attack on a Central African Republic mining town’, AP News, 12 May 2024; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: au moins 5 morts, don’t 4 burkinabés, dans une attaque sur un chantier minier’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 June 2024.
12
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; J. G. Birru and L. Serwat, ‘Africa Overview: May 2025’, ACLED, 9 May 2025; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/383, 13 June 2025.
13
‘Centrafrique: mise en œuvre de l’accord entre le gouvernement, l’UPC et les 3R’, RFI, 26 April 2025.
14
‘Centrafrique: rebelles de l’UPC et paramilitaires de Wagner se sont rencontrés à Maloum’, RFI, 20 June 2025; F. Mazet, ‘Centrafrique: accord avec les 3R et l’UPC, deux mois après des «progrès» mais pas de désarmement’, RFI, 18 June 2025.
15
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
16
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024.
17
‘La CPC condamne le massacre de Bozoum et appelle à l’unité’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 17 June 2025.
18
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025
19
M. E. Kindzeka, ‘CAR pleads with fleeing civilians to return after rebels attack villages’, Voice of America, 5 July 2024.
20
‘Centrafrique: l’armée repousse une attaque d’hommes armés à Béloko’, Radio Ndekeluka, 18 September 2023
21
‘Centrafrique: une base des Faca visée par une attaque rebelle non-loin de Bocaranga’, Radio Ndekeluka, 12 October 2023
22
‘Attaque meurtrière à Ndim et Létélé: Deux civils tués et un soldat FACA blessé’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 30 November 2023
23
‘Au moins 16 morts dans un affrontement entre des hommes armés et des soldats FACA dans le nord-ouest’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 21 December 2023; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group
24
‘Centrafrique: une dizaine de civils enlevés par des hommes armés non loin de Yaloké’, Radio Ndekeluka, 6 March 2024; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group
25
‘Flash info: Embuscade à Bocaranga: Bilan tragique pour les mercenaires russes et les FACA’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 14 April 2024
26
‘Markounda, une opération des Wagner sur des sites miniers locaux tourne au fiasco, plusieurs morts’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 15 August 2024; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group
27
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Une nouvelle offensive des mercenaires russes et des FACA sur le site minier de Roquette, près de Markounda’,Corbeau News Centrafrique, 2 September 2024; ‘Nouvelles frappes meurtrières de Wagner à la frontière tchado-centrafricaine’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 11 September 2024
28
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group
29
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation (January 2025)’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
30
‘Incendie et assassinat : nouveau drame au village Boforo près de Bozoum au nord de Centrafrique’, Radio Ndekeluka, 6 March 2025; ‘Centrafrique : deux personnes tuées et des maisons incendiées par des hommes armés dans le nord-ouest du pays’, Xinhua, 7 March 2025; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/383, 13 June 2025, para 25
31
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group
32
‘RCA: des coups de tirs retentissent à Bozoum’, Jornal Du Faso, 3 July 2020.
33
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 62.
34
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 81.
35
M. Kabatanya, ‘Central African Republic: ‘3R’ combatants in the northwest lay down their arms’, United Nations News, 17 October 2025; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 81
36
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 81.
37
‘Central Africa Republic’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 27 August 2024; ‘Central African Republic’, UNHCR.
38
‘CAR: CCCM Cluster, IDPs Sites Map, Avril 2025’, Reliefweb, 18 June 2025.
39
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
40
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, Annex 7.
41
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 61.
42
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 61
43
‘La CPC condamne le massacre de Bozoum et appelle à l’unité’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 17 June 2025; ‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, Annex 7.
44
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 60 and Annex 7.
45
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 90 and Annex 7.
46
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 68.
47
‘Au moins 16 morts dans un affrontement entre des hommes armés et des soldats FACA dans le nord-ouest’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 21 December 2023; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group
48
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025.
49
‘Attaque meurtrière à Ndim et Létélé: Deux civils tués et un soldat FACA blessé’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 30 November 2023; ‘Flash info:Embuscade à Bocaranga: Bilan tragique pour les mercenaires russes et les FACA’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 14 April 2024.
50
‘Une nouvelle offensive des mercenaires russes et des FACA sur le site minier de Roquette, près de Markounda’,Corbeau News Centrafrique, 2 September 2024.
51
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 27; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, paras 110–16.
52
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 62.
53
‘3R rebel group in the Central African Republic loses territory and control over the illicit cattle economy, damaging legitimacy and offering entry points for state intervention’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, November 2023.
54
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 82.

Non-international armed conflict between CAR and Unity for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC)

Background

Transhumance (moving livestock seasonally for grazing purposes) is one of the dominant conflict drivers in CAR. The Muslim Fulani ethnic group is a nomadic or semi-nomadic herding community who has been subjected to violence by anti-balaka groups in CAR since 2013. During that time, the anti-balaka militias consisted of members of the local population who took up arms to fight against the Muslim Séléka rebel coalition and Muslim civilians.¹ As a consequence of these attacks, the group Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC), who are mostly of the Fulani ethnic group and an offshoot of the Séléka coalition, was formed to defend its herding community.²

The UPC organized itself into a militia during 2014 under the leadership of Ali Darassa. Since its formation, the UPC has dominated swathes of territory in Ouaka, Haute-Kotto, and Mbomou prefectures, which blocked access by government administrators to these territories, causing conflict with FACA. Fighting escalated between FACA and the UPC in 2021, when the UPC’s second-in-command defected to the CAR authorities, which prompted successful government offensives against it.³

FACA has received military support from Africa Corps and its so-called ‘Black Russians’ – a militia constituted from former CAR non-State fighters – in their operations against the UPC. Conversely, UPC has mounted attacks against both FACA and Africa Corps fighters.⁴ FACA have also benefited from security assistance provided by MINUSCA, which has established temporary operating bases in areas where FACA was fighting the UPC.⁵

Prior to April 2025, the AAKG militia was also acting in support of FACA and the Africa Corps in their fight against the UPC.⁶ Unfulfilled promises regarding the integration of their fighters into the army, and disagreements over peace talks with the UPC, however, led to the AAKG turning against, and then actively fighting, FACA from April 2025.⁷

The UPC used to be a member of the CPC, which was established in December 2020 with the aim of overthrowing President Touadéra.⁸ However, since the split of the CPC-F from the CPC in April 2025 (see above), the UPC has been a member of the newly formed CPC-F.⁹

On 19 April 2025, the UPC and 3R (see above) signed a peace agreement with the CAR government aimed at disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation (DDRR).¹⁰ Despite this commitment to peace, tensions remained between the parties.¹¹ As a resumption of hostilities remains possible, and the UPC has not ceased to exist, the N’Djamena Agreement is not sufficient to declare that this NIAC has ended.¹²

Intensity

Despite the UPC belonging first to the CPC, and later to the CPC-F alliance (see above), FACA and the UPC frequently engaged bilaterally outside clashes between FACA and the alliances to which the UPC belonged.

Clashes during this reporting period between the UPC and FACA include those which occurred in August,¹³ October,¹⁴ and November 2023,¹⁵ January,¹⁶ June,¹⁷ July,¹⁸ October,¹⁹ and November 2024,²⁰ and May 2025.²¹

The UPC mostly concentrated its military operations against FACA military bases during the period under review. For example, the UPC stormed FACA positions on 20 October 2023 in the village of Mbo.According to information reported to Radio Ndekeluka, the village consequently came under the control of this armed group.²² On 24 November 2023, UPC rebels launched a coordinated attack on FACA positions in Moyenne Sido and Mbo village.²³

FACA, supported by Africa Corps, similarly launched successful military operations against UPC strongholds during the reporting period. Examples include the military operation launched on 26 August 2023. During this operation, FACA, with the support of the Africa Corps and ‘Black Russians’, attacked a position held by rebels from the UPC at the entrance to the town of Goya. FACA relied on air support for these operations, intensifying destruction on the ground.²⁴ Another example includes the military operations launched on 8 January 2024 by FACA, again supported by Africa Corps, against the UPC in Kabo town in the Ouham-Fafa prefecture.²⁵ The International Crisis Group reported a total of nineteen fatalities – fifteen rebels and four soldiers.²⁶ FACA regained control over UPC strongholds in the Haut-Mbomou prefecture on 5 June 2024. FACA also captured two key leaders and seized approximately 100 weapons while disarming eighty UPC soldiers.²⁷ In response to these operations, UPC rebels attacked FACA positions in Goya on 28 June 2024.²⁸ On 2 July 2024, FACA attacked the UPC stronghold in Ouadda town, killing seven fighters.²⁹ Africa Corps has intensified its offensive in support of FACA against the UPC, the CPC-F, and 3R in the hinterland since November 2024.³⁰

UPC’s arsenal includes PKM machine guns and RPG-7 rocket launchers.³¹

Another indicator of regular and intense armed violence is that FACA continues to rely on Africa Corps to support CAR in its fight against UPC and other non-State actors on its territory.³²

By the end of June 2025, approximately 446,000 IDPs were reported in CAR. While it is impossible to attribute specific numbers of IDPs to the conflict between specific actors, the conflict is a prominent driver of these IDP figures.³³

The violence generated from fighting between FACA and the UPC continued to meet the notion of intensity as demanded by IHL throughout the reporting period.

Organization

Limited information is available concerning the organization of the UPC. Some information of the prominent leadership is, however, in the public domain. General Ali Darassa is both the founder³⁴ and leader of the UPC.³⁵ General Darassa also served as the military Chief of Staff of the CPC alliance,³⁶ and since this alliance splintered, (see above) as the Chief of Staff of the CPC-F alliance.³⁷ Other high-ranking UPC generals include Garga, Moussa, and Abdu.³⁸ The command structure of the UPC is described as having an effective military command of thousands of fighters in different ranks.³⁹ The existence of a hierarchical command structure enables the UPC to impose discipline and promote IHL.

The UPC sources weaponry and equipment from the Tamboura province in South Sudan, confirming its logistical capacity.⁴⁰

The UPC does have unity of voice. An example of this is a UPC delegation who travelled to Tullus and Nyala in South Darfur to broker mercenary support agreements with the RSF.⁴¹ The UPC has a designated spokesperson, Ousmanou Mohamadou.⁴²

The UPC, therefore, remains sufficiently organized to meet this IHL criterion. The existing NIAC between FACA and the UPC continued throughout the reporting period.

1
‘Violence and Herding in the Central African Republic: Time to Act’, International Crisis Group, 28 May 2025.
2
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025; ‘Violence and Herding in the Central African Republic: Time to Act’, International Crisis Group, 28 May 2025.
3
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025; ‘Violence and Herding in the Central African Republic: Time to Act’, International Crisis Group, 28 May 2025.
4
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2648 (2022)’, UN Doc S/2023/360, 18 May 2023, para 109; A. C. Agenonga, ‘L’UPC, nouveau groupe armé étranger présent dans le Bas-Uélé’, Ebuteli, 12 September 2024; ‘Centrafrique: Violents affrontements meurtriers près de Bambari entre mercenaires Wagner et rebelles de la CPC-F, plusieurs morts’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 17 November 2024.
5
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 30.
6
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025; ‘Grande offensive des Wagner ti Azandé et les russes contre l’UPC à Mboki, Zémio et Djema’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 25 May 2024; ‘Centrafrique: les Faca et leurs alliés lancent une importante opération militaire à Mboki’, Radio Ndekeluka, 27 May 2024.
7
L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: June 2025’, ACLED, 6 June 2025; ‘Tensions dans le Haut-Mbomou: le CRSP accuse le gouvernement dans le conflit avec les combattants Azandé’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 14 May 2025; ‘Le sud-est de la Centrafrique secoué par une nouvelle flambée de violences’, RFI, 8 May 2025.
8
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025.
9
‘October – December 2024: Human Rights Quarterly Brief on the Central African Republic’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, fn 8.
10
T. Abhasakun, ‘Central African Republic Sees Major Progress on Disarmament and Reintegration of Former Fighters’, Peace News, 15 September 2025; ‘Agreement between the Transitional Government and the armed groups on the principles of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation and of integration into the uniformed State forces of the Central African Republic (DDRR Agreement)’, The University of Edinburgh: Peace Agreements.
11
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
12
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024.
13
‘Un Violent affrontement opposant les forces gouvernementales et les rebelles dans la Ouaka: Tensions et destructions persistent’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 26 August 2023
14
‘Centrafrique: des positions de l’armée visées par une attaque rebelle dans le Nord’, Radio Ndekeluka, 20 October 2023
15
‘Conflit persistant à Sido: La CPC maintient le contrôle de la ville, les FACA en attente de renforts’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 25 November 2023
16
‘Centrafrique: des morts et des blessés dans l’attaque de la base des Faca à Kabo’, Radio Ndekeluka, 8 January 2024; ‘L’Aube Sanglante à Kabo: Un violent affrontement entre les rebelles et les soldats FACA en cours’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 8 January 2024; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group
17
‘Offensive Rebelle en cours à Goya : Les FACA Pris au Piège’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 28 June 2024; ‘Centrafrique: l’armée repousse une attaque rebelle proche de Bambari’, Radio Ndekeluka, 29 June 2024; ‘Centrafrique: l’armée reconquiert les localités de Ouadda et Mouka’, Radio Ndekeluka, 5 June 2024
18
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/730, 11 October 2024, para 27,
19
‘Centrafrique: des combats signalés proche de Bakouma entre l’armée et des rebelles’, Radio Ndekeluka, 9 October 2024; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 29; ‘Centrafrique: des combats signalés proche de Bakouma entre l’armée et des rebelles’, Pravda RCA, 9 October 2024; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group
20
Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: Violents affrontements meurtriers près de Bambari entre mercenaires Wagner et rebelles de la CPC-F, plusieurs morts’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 17 November 2024; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 30
21
‘Bria: Trois rebelles de l’UPC et deux commerçants tués par des mercenaires russes’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 8 May 2025; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
22
‘Centrafrique: des positions de l’armée visées par une attaque rebelle dans le Nord’, Radio Ndekeluka, 20 October 2023.
23
‘Conflit persistant à Sido: La CPC maintient le contrôle de la ville, les FACA en attente de renforts’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 25 November 2023.
24
‘Un Violent affrontement opposant les forces gouvernementales et les rebelles dans la Ouaka: Tensions et destructions persistent’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 26 August 2023.
25
‘Centrafrique: des morts et des blessés dans l’attaque de la base des Faca à Kabo’, Radio Ndekeluka, 8 January 2024; ‘L’Aube Sanglante à Kabo: Un violent affrontement entre les rebelles et les soldats FACA en cours’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 8 January 2024.
26
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
27
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: l’armée reconquiert les localités de Ouadda et Mouka’, Radio Ndekeluka, 5 June 2024.
28
‘Offensive Rebelle en cours à Goya : Les FACA Pris au Piège’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 28 June 2024; ‘Centrafrique: l’armée repousse une attaque rebelle proche de Bambari’, Radio Ndekeluka, 29 June 2024; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
29
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
30
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
31
‘MINUSCA/CAR Ex-combatant Disarmament’, UNifeed, 5 August 2025.
32
‘Mapping Conflict: Russia’s Growing Influence in Africa’, International Crisis Group, 2 October 2025; ‘Russia Pushes CAR to Choose Africa Corps Over Wagner Mercenaries’, African Defense Forum, 28 October 2025; J. F. Koena et al, ‘Wagner’s Successors Wage Campaign Of Terror In Central African Republic’, Radio Free Europe, 9 February 2025 (Updated 28 March 2025); Y. Adegoke, ‘Why Wagner is winning hearts in the Central African Republic’, BBC, 11 December 2023; D. Ehl, ‘How the Russian Wagner Group is entrenching itself in Africa’, Deutsche Welle, 27 October 2024; A. Soltes, ‘Wagner Group in CAR: Not Quite a Success Story’, Geopolitical Monitor, 2 January 2025.
33
UNFPA CAR, ‘Central African Republic Situation Report – June 2025’, United Nations Population Fund, June 2025.
34
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group
35
‘Centrafrique: rebelles de l’UPC et paramilitaires de Wagner se sont rencontrés à Maloum’, RFI, 20 June 2025; ‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025.
36
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 6
37
‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation (October 2024)’, MINUSCA, fn 2; ‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 15.
38
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 35.
39
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025.
40
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025.
41
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 35.
42
‘Centrafrique: la paix, une nécessité’, Sidwaya, 19 August 2024; Cercle de Réflexion pour l’essor de la Centrafrique, ‘Conversation entre l’espion Figeira et Ousmanou Mohamadou’, Facebook, 25 July 2024.

Non-international armed conflict between CAR and the (CPC) Coalition of Patriots for Change

Background

In December, the CPC came together as a coalition of several of the most influential armed groups with the purpose of ousting President Touadéra and chasing the Russian paramilitaries out of CAR.¹ Another driver for the composition of the CPC was the denunciation by other groups of the Bangui Political Peace agreement signed in 2019.² At the time of its formation, the founding membership of the CPC consisted of the FPRC, 3R, the UPC, the MPC and two anti-balaka factions (Mokom and Ngaissona).³ The CPC mounted sporadic attacks in different regions of the country in late December 2020.⁴ In January 2021, the CPC carried out its first coordinated attack in Bangui.⁵ In early 2023, the CPC rebels initiated a new wave of offensives.⁶

The CPC alliance has changed membership since its inception and has been impacted by internal disagreements.⁷ On 3 November 2023, the MPC announced it was leaving the CPC.⁸ A year later, on 8 November 2024, the MPC joined the newly formed CPC-F.⁹

On 30 August 2024, internal tensions resulted in further fragmentation of the CPC, leading to the establishment of the CPC-F dissident faction (see below).¹⁰ After the August 2024 split, the CPC comprised three organized armed groups – 3R, the Anti-Balaka (Ndale’s faction), and the MPC-Renouveau (MPC-R).¹¹

On 19 April 2025, the N’Djamena Agreement was signed, and 3R committed to reintegrate into the peace process and to cease fighting.¹² At the end of the reporting period, 3R honoured this agreement and the integration process into FACA was undergoing.¹³ The decision of 3R to rejoin the political peace agreement was strongly opposed by the CPC.¹⁴

FACA is supported by the Africa Corps, and formerly Wagner Group, in their fight against the CPC.¹⁵

Intensity

As it is problematic to bilaterally attribute indicators of violence to any specific members of a coalition, it is possible to aggregate the violence generated between the enemies, if multiple organized armed groups who are sufficiently organized fight in a coalition against an enemy.¹⁶ This section thus assesses whether the violence generated in this pre-existing NIAC between the CPC and CAR continued to equate to protracted armed violence.

Frequent and intense fighting between the CPC and FACA continued throughout the reporting period. Clashes include those which occurred during July,¹⁷ August,¹⁸ and October 2023,¹⁹ January,²⁰ February,²¹ March,²² April,²³ May,²⁴ June,²⁵ and November 2024,²⁶ and January 2025.²⁷ Attacks were not reported from January to June 2025, and it is unclear if the peace negotiations and April 2025 signing of the peace agreement between 3R and the Government of CAR impacted the CPC’s military readiness to fight FACA. It may have resulted in a temporary pause in violence as the CPC may have needed to regroup. The lull in fighting between the CPC and FACA since January 2025, does not, however, necessarily equate to the end of a NIAC.²⁸

Apart from attacks often resulting in a high number of casualties, including civilians,²⁹ the CPC frequently burns down huts, houses, and villages³⁰ forcing civilians to flee and hide in the bush.³¹

The CPC coalition intensified its reliance on the use of IEDs on roads in CAR leading to the Chadian and Cameroonian borders since 2023.³² The CPC coalition also relies on the use of conventional hand grenades and landmines against FACA.³³

During the reporting period, the NIAC between FACA (supported by Africa Corps) and the CPC continued to satisfy the intensity requirement demanded by IHL.

Organization

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), for an alliance to become party to a NIAC, and to aggregate violence generated by such an alliance under IHL, all non-State actors that are members of the alliance must meet the organizational criteria under IHL.³⁴ Therefore, the threshold of organization of all members of the CPC alliance must individually be examined to meet the minimum requirements demanded by IHL. The below examination focuses on the key groups; there may be others who might be sufficiently organized but information on this is scarce.

The ICRC also sets out factual considerations that are necessary for a collective of non-State armed groups who are sufficiently organized to qualify as an alliance.³⁵ These factors are used to determine, on a case-by-case basis, if there is a sufficient level of coordination in a coalition or alliance to become a party to a NIAC.³⁶ The examination below illustrates that the CPC alliance continues to meet a sufficient level of coordination.

CPC Alliance

A shared ideology or common enemy does not automatically suggest that the necessary level of coordination for a coalition has been met. The ICRC suggests that the indicators should be considered on a case-by-case basis. These include the establishment of a coordination structure for the alliance as a whole, the sharing of operational tasks between organized armed groups who are members of the alliance, common rules of engagement, the coordination of simultaneous attacks against the opposing party, and the launching of joint military operations.³⁷

The exiled former president of CAR, President Bozizé, is the general coordinator and initiator of the CPC alliance. He delivers instructions from Guinea-Bissau.³⁸ In response to the establishment of the CPC-F faction, President Bozizé reorganized and appointed new key leaders in the CPC alliance on 9 September 2024.³⁹ Bozizé’s deputy, until 3R started its peace process with government in April 2025,⁴⁰ was 3R commander Sembé Bobo.⁴¹

New high-ranking appointments include Jean-Francis Bozizé, President Bozizé’s son, filling the post-split vacancy as the CPC’s military coordinator.⁴² The vacancy of the deputy military coordinator was filled by Sylvain Béorofé Ngoyasse,⁴³ and the deputy Chief of Staff, who might now serve as acting Chief of Staff, is Teddy Gbenengaina.⁴⁴ Gbenengaina is advised by the special advisor to the Chief of Staff, Papi Bozizé,⁴⁵ and Bernard Bonda was appointed to serve as the CPC’s Secretary General⁴⁶ Léopold Bara acts as the head of external relations,⁴⁷ and Ousmane Mohamadou is the liaison for relations with humanitarian organizations.⁴⁸

The CPC retains a sophisticated common coalition structure at the end of the reporting period, despite the fracturing which occurred during the reporting period. The assessment of intensity (see above) for the period under review demonstrates that the CPC continued to coordinate simultaneous attacks against and launch joint military operations against FACA. The CPC continued to meet the coordination threshold expected to constitute a coalition.

1
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 August 2025.
2
‘La CPC condamne le massacre de Bozoum et appelle à l’unité’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 17 June 2025.
3
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 August 2025.
4
A. Surprenant, ‘In Pictures: Panic grips Bangui residents after rebel attack’, Al Jazeera, 14 January 2021; E. Murray and R. Sullivan, ‘Central African Republic’s Disputed Elections Exacerbate Rising Tensions’, United States Institute of Peace, 7 January 2021; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’, Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’, Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024.
5
A. Surprenant, ‘In Pictures: Panic grips Bangui residents after rebel attack’, Al Jazeera, 14 January 2021; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’, Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024.
6
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’, Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; E. Picco, ‘Ten Years After the Coup, Is the Central African Republic Facing Another Major Crisis?’, International Crisis Group, 22 March 2023.
7
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 6.
8
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, fn 5; ‘Centrafrique: le groupe armé MPC annonce quitter la coalition rebelle CPC‘, RFI, 3 November 2023.
9
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 9.
10
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
11
‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation (October 2024)’, MINUSCA, fn 2; ‘October–December 2024: Human Rights Quarterly Brief on the Central African Republic’, MINUSCA, fn 8.
12
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; L. Serwat and J. G. Birru, ‘Africa Overview: May 2025’, ACLED, 9 May 2025; F. Mazet, ‘Centrafrique: accord avec les 3R et l’UPC, deux mois après des «progrès» mais pas de désarmement’, RFI, 18 June 2025.
13
L. Serwat and J. G. Birru, ‘Africa Overview: May 2025’, ACLED, 9 May 2025; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/383, 13 June 2025, para 29.
14
‘La CPC condamne le massacre de Bozoum et appelle à l’unité’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 17 June 2025.
15
‘La CPC revendique une attaque contre des paramilitaires russes dans la région de Bozoum’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 21 January 2025.
16
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 17; J. Nikolic et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, International Committee of the Red Cross: Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020; S. D’Cunha, et al, ‘Defining armed conflict: some clarity in the fog of war’, International Committee of the Red Cross: Humanitarian Law and Policy, 2 May 2024.
17
‘Centrafrique: 4 soldats FACA tués dans une embuscade à Gobolo’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 3 July 2023; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘CrisisWatch, Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Global Overview June 2023’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: 3 rebelles de la CPC tués dans une attaque repoussée par les FACA à Nana Bakassa’, Radio Ndekeluka, 25 July 2023
18
‘Centrafrique: Attaque meurtrière à Thiri, une dizaine des personnes tuées’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 1 August 2023
19
‘Attaque de la CPC dans le Bamingui-Bangoran: Une journée tragique pour l’armée nationale’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 21 October 2023
20
‘RCA: les FACA ont repoussé une attaque d’hommes armés à Boulot’, Ndjoni Sango, 25 November 2024; ‘Bamingui-Bangoran: le poste avancé de l’armée nationale à Tiri attaqué par la CPC’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 10 January 2024; ‘Centrafrique: attaque d’hommes armés signalée au village Boungou non loin de Bria’, Radio Ndekeluka, 15 January 2024
21
‘Attaque surprise des rebelles à Djayri: 2 soldats FACA tués et des armes récupérées’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 12 February 2024
22
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: la localité de Sikikédé reprise par les Faca et leurs alliés russes’, 8 March 2024; ‘Centrafrique: l’armée annonce l’élimination de plus d’une quarantaine de rebelles dans le Nord-est’, Radio Ndekeluka, 11 March 2024; ‘Centrafrique: la localité de Sikikédé attaquée par des hommes armés’, Radio Ndekeluka, 7 March 2024
23
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: près d’une vingtaine de civils tués par des hommes armés non loin du village Kella-Maoulé dans l’Ouham-Pendé’, Radio Ndekeluka, 3 April 2024; ‘Centrafrique: nouveau massacre de civils non loin de Bakouma’, Radio Ndekeluka, 15 April 2024; ‘14 killed, several wounded in latest raid on CAR villages: UN’, Ground News, 17 April 2024; ‘14 killed, several wounded in latest raid on CAR villages: UN’, Xinhua, 18 April 2024; ‘Centrafrique: 2 militaires et un civil tués dans une attaque de la CPC repoussée par les Faca à Kadjama’, Radio Ndekeluka, 16 April 2024
24
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; JF. Koena, ‘Rebels kill at least 4 people during an attack on a Central African Republic mining town’, AP News, 12 May 2024
25
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘April – June 2024: Human Rights Quarterly Brief on the Central African Republic’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, 7; ‘Centrafrique: au moins 5 morts, dont 4 burkinabés, dans une attaque sur un chantier minier’, Radio Ndekeluka, 22 June 2024
26
‘RCA: les FACA ont repoussé une attaque d’hommes armés à Boulot’, Ndjoni Sango, 25 November 2024; ‘La rébellion d’Armel SAYO attaque un poste des FACA à Boulo’, Centrafrica, 25 November 2024; ‘Centrafrique: un poste avancé de l’armée visé par une attaque rebelle près de Markounda’, Radio Ndekeluka, 25 November 2024
27
‘La CPC revendique une attaque contre des paramilitaires russes dans la région de Bozoum’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 21 January 2025.
28
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee for the Red Cross, 2024, 19.
29
‘Centrafrique: près d’une vingtaine de civils tués par des hommes armés non loin du village Kella-Maoulé dans l’Ouham-Pendé’, Radio Ndekeluka, 3 April 2024; ‘Centrafrique: la localité de Sikikédé reprise par les Faca et leurs alliés russes’, 8 March 2024
30
‘Centrafrique: la localité de Sikikédé reprise par les Faca et leurs alliés russes’, 8 March 2024
31
‘Centrafrique: 4 soldats FACA tués dans une embuscade à Gobolo’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 3 July 2023.
32
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2648 (2022)’, UN Doc S/2023/360, 18 May 2023, Annex 26; ‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2648 (2022)’, UN Doc S/2023/87, 10 February 2023, para 35.
33
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2648 (2022)’, UN Doc S/2023/360, 18 May 2023, Annex 26.
34
‘International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts: Recommitting to Protection in Armed Conflict on the 70^th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions’, International Committee of the Red Cross, October 2019, 40 – 41.
35
J. Nikolic, et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, International Committee of the Red Cross: Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020.
36
J. Nikolic et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, ICRC Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020.
37
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 17; J. Nikolic et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, ICRC Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020.
38
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 August 2025; ‘Central African Republic agrees peace deals with two rebel groups’, News24, 25 April 2025.
39
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
40
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 11
41
‘Centrafrique: l’ex-président Bozizé réplique à la création d’une branche dissidente du groupe rebelle CPC’, RFI, 10 September 2025; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 60; ‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 8.
42
‘Centrafrique: l’ex-président Bozizé réplique à la création d’une branche dissidente du groupe rebelle CPC’, RFI, 10 September 2025; ‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 9.
43
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, Annex 5
44
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, Annex 5.
45
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, Annex 5
46
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, Annex 5.
47
‘Centrafrique: l’ex-président Bozizé réplique à la création d’une branche dissidente du groupe rebelle CPC’, RFI, 10 September 2025; ‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, Annex 5
48
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, Annex 5.

Non-international armed conflict between CAR and CPC-Fondamentale (CPC-F)

Background

The CPC-F is a splinter from the CPC that was established on 30 August 2024 (see above).¹ This split occurred in the aftermath of several months of internal tensions within the CPC coalition.² Ali Darassa, the leader of the UPC and former Chief of Staff of the CPC, made an announcement in early August 2024, declaring a ceasefire and the willingness of the CPC to reach an agreement with the CAR government.³ This announcement was met with resistance from the CPC’s general coordinator, former CAR President, François Bozizé, who dismissed Darassa from his post in the CPC for high treason.⁴

After the CPC-F, with Ali Darassa as its Chief of Staff, had split from the CPC, Darassa failed to comply with the government’s demands to participate in the DDRR process.⁵ This led to suspicions about the genuineness of Darassa’s commitment to the peace process.⁶

The CPC-F officially resumed hostilities against government forces following an announcement made on 25 October 2024, in which the coalition accused the government of continuously assaulting its positions.⁷ The CPC-F’s commitment to oust the CAR government was reiterated in an official communiqué by the coalition’s spokesperson on 28 November 2024.⁸

The Africa Corps has been supporting CAR by fighting alongside FACA against the CPC-F.⁹

Intensity

As it is problematic to bilaterally attribute indicators of violence to any specific members of a coalition, it is possible to aggregate the violence generated between the enemies if multiple organized armed groups that are sufficiently organized fight in a coalition against an enemy.¹⁰ This section thus assesses whether the violence generated by the fighting between the CPC-F and CAR equates to protracted armed violence.

Several clashes between CAR and the CPC-F were reported during November 2024.¹¹ Clashes also occurred during December 2024.¹² FACA, supported by the Africa Corps, also clashed with members of the CPC-F alliance during this period. Clashes include those that transpired in May 2025.¹³

On 6 November 2024, the CPC-F launched a coordinated attack against a FACA outpost in the Farazala village, a commune in the Ouham-Fafa prefecture. Fighters set alight houses, kiosks, and shops causing high levels of structural damage. Businesses were also looted. Villagers fled into the bush to hide from fights.¹⁴This attack contributed to internal displacement.¹⁵ Another synchronised attack occurred on the same day against another FACA outpost 12km from Nzako in the Mbomou prefecture. A deputy commander belonging to FACA was killed in this attack.¹⁶ The CPC-F launched another attack on 10 November 2024 as a consequence of which Africa Corps refocused its operations to the areas where the CPC-F is active.¹⁷ On 12 November 2024, Africa Corps, fighting alongside its so-called Black Russians militia, launched a ‘sweep operation’ against the CPC-F rebels on the Bambari road through the bush near the village of Gbenga. Although the casualty and injury figures have not been made public, reports suggest that losses occurred also on the side of the Africa Corps and that multiple wounded and killed Russians were evacuated by helicopter.¹⁸

The December 2024 attack was launched against FACA in the village of May-Mbaya, which allowed the CPC-F to seize military equipment.¹⁹

The Anti-Balaka Mokom faction, a CPC-F coalition members (see below), is lightly armed with artisanal weapons, assault rifles, and a few grenades and rocket launchers.²⁰ This Anti-Balaka faction often relies on hunting rifles or guns seized from enemy forces.²¹ Other members of the coalition are, however, more heavily armed – for example the FPRC and the MPC, who receive weapons from the RSF.²²

The NIAC between FACA and the CPC-F meets the intensity requirement demanded under IHL.

Organization

According to the ICRC, for an alliance to become party to a NIAC, and to aggregate violence generated by such an alliance under IHL, all non-State actors party to the alliance must meet the organizational criteria under IHL.²³ Therefore, the threshold of organization of all members of the CPC-F alliance must individually be examined to meet the minimum requirements demanded by IHL. See an examination below of the nature of organization of all four members of the CPC-F alliance. There is some contention with regard to the membership of the CPC-F alliance. While MINUSCA and local news report that the CPC-F is made up of the UPC, the FPRC, the Anti-Balaka (Mokom faction), and the MPC,²⁴ the UN Expert report lists the Front de défense pour les libertés publique, instead of the MPC as a member of the coalition.²⁵

The ICRC also sets out factual considerations that are necessary for a collective of non-State armed groups who are sufficiently organized to meet in order to qualify as an alliance.²⁶ These factors are used to determine, on a case-by-case basis, if there is a sufficient coordination in a coalition or alliance to become a party to a NIAC and to allow for the aggregation of intensity.²⁷

A shared ideology or common enemy does not automatically suggest that the necessary level of coordination for a coalition has been met. The ICRC suggests that factual indicators should be considered on a case-by-case basis. These indicators include the establishment of a coordination structure for the alliance as a whole, the sharing of operational tasks between organized armed groups who are members of the alliance, common rules of engagement, the coordination of simultaneous attacks against the opposing party, and the launching joint military operations.²⁸

CPC-F alliance

The CPC-F does have a coordination structure, with Ali Darassa serving as the CPC-F’s overall Chief of Staff.²⁹ The general coordinator of the CPC-F is Haroun Gaye.³⁰ Other senior leaders in the CPC-F coordinator structure include Bernard Mokom (First Vice Coordinator), Aliou Amadou Bi (Second Vice Coordinator), Jean Blaise Kachala (Military Coordinator), Kouloum Kalam (Secretary-General), Marie Reine Hassen (Head of External Relations), Saidou Bello Mamadou (Head of Internal Relations) and Ali Aboubakar Sidick (Spokesperson).³¹ The CPC-F aims to establish an ad hoc committee to redefine its objectives and manage its current affairs.³²

As mentioned above, the CPC-F issued a communiqué threatening the resumption of hostilities against FACA on 25 October 2024³³ and released a communiqué reiterating its intent to overthrow the government of CAR on 28 November 2024.³⁴ The intensity analysis (see above) confirms that the CPC-F coordinates attacks and launches joint military operations. The synchronised attacks against two remote FACA bases on 6 November 2024 serve as evidence of such coordinated attacks.³⁵ Another example is the CPC-F’s statement following its December 2024 attack on May-Mbaya village (see above). The CPC-F not only claimed responsibility for this attack but also confirmed that the attack was part of a broader strategy orchestrated by its Chief of Staff.³⁶

The CPC-F has a sufficient level of coordination to constitute an alliance.

Anti-Balaka (Mokom faction)

Historically very little is known about the leadership structure of Anti-Balaka factions in general.³⁷These non-State actors arose from self-defence groups who have fought predominantly against Muslim groups, including of ethnic Fulani.³⁸

The leader of the Anti-Balaka (Mokom faction) is Maxime Mokom.³⁹Mokom resumed leadership of his faction after charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity against him were dropped by the International Criminal Court (ICC) during October 2023.⁴⁰ This faction is composed mostly of ethnic Gbaya, Sara, and Mandja peoples⁴¹ who are animists or Christian.⁴² This non-State actor joined the CPC-F in August 2024.⁴³

The judgment of 24 July 2025 concerning the Situation in the Central African Republic⁴⁴ provides insight into the organization of the Anti-Balaka and Mokom’s leadership style. Mokom was instrumental in liaising with self-defence groups in Cameroon, the DRC, and in CAR to coordinate activities.⁴⁵ These previously autonomous pre-existing self-defence group, now with a common enemy, organized themselves into military-like structures with shared command, and forming one movement called the ‘Anti-Balaka’.⁴⁶ The Anti-Balaka has zone commanders who report to the group’s operational coordinator.⁴⁷ Anti-Balaka leadership operates from different countries and different locations within countries. The group is, however, sufficiently organized because the overall leader is able to communicate with dispersed leaders to launch coordinated attacks from different locations.⁴⁸ The foregoing information attests to a tiered command structure that enables Anti-Balaka factions to enforce discipline and impose IHL.

Although not much information on logistics is revealed in this judgment, it is clear that Anti-Balaka seized military weapons from encounters against Séléka or other enemies. Anti-Balaka fighters also made makeshift bladed weapons, used hunting rifles and, where possible, service weapons retained from members of FACA.⁴⁹ Anti-Balaka factions rely on illegal activities to sustain their conflict efforts including looting civilian property, extorting civilians, illegal trade in natural resources in territories where they are active, and fundraising from opponents of the Séléka coalition.⁵⁰

The Anti-Balaka Mokom faction is sufficiently organized as demanded under IHL.

FPRC

The FPRC survived a heavy setback in 2019, after FACA successfully broke the alliance between the Roungas and the Goulas, the two primary ethnic groups represented in the FPRC. The FPRC subsequently split into two factions, with the splinter belonging to the Goulas community defecting from the FPRC and joining the Kara community militia to fight against the Roungas.⁵¹

A further FPRC faction, called the ‘Révolution et justice Belanga’ faction, under the leadership of Abdoulaye Hissène splintered from the FPRC in 2022.⁵² This faction was, however, dissolved in 2023, after Hissène had been charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity, and placed under arrest following a warrant issued by the UN-backed Special Criminal Court (SCC) in Bangui.⁵³

The mainstream FPRC remains intact and is now lead by the overall leader, Noureddine Adam.⁵⁴Haddo Adam Bachar acts as an emissary to Nourredine Adam.⁵⁵ Other senior leadership includes Ali Hamid and Kadher Kenengar.⁵⁶ The FPRC spokesperson is Aboubakar Sidiki,⁵⁷ ensuring there is unity of voice.

Noureddine Adam uses his extensive network in Sudan for recruitment drives (mostly RSF fighters) and moves vehicles and military equipment from Sudan into CAR for the benefit of FPRC.⁵⁸ Adam also occasionally supplies FPRC fighters to RSF so that these fighters can be trained by and gain combat experience alongside the RSF before returning back to the FPRC after completing their rotation.⁵⁹

Access to training camps promotes discipline among fighters and creates the opportunity to train fighters in IHL. The RSF has also, on occasion, rotated its fighters to join the FPRC.⁶⁰

UN Experts report that the FPRC has an impressive weapons collection with arsenals based in Bria, Ndélé, and Ouanda-Djallé in north-eastern CAR which shows the logistical capacity of this non-State armed group. The group also has strategically placed bases close to supply routes through the borders with Sudan and South Sudan.⁶¹

The FPRC is sufficiently organized as demanded under IHL.

MPC

The MPC was founded in 2015.⁶² The group withdrew from the CPC coalition on 3 November 2023⁶³ and announced its decision to join the CPC-F instead on 8 November 2024.⁶⁴

The overall leader and military commander of the MPC is Mahamat Al-Khatim.⁶⁵ Al-Khatim unofficially serves as the spokesperson of this group⁶⁶ and signs agreements on its behalf.⁶⁷

Idriss Al Bachar acts as Al-Khatim’s political advisor⁶⁸ while Ali Al-Habib Jeddo is in charge of coordinating arms transfers.⁶⁹ The residence of Mahamat Al-Khatim in N’Djamena seemingly serves as headquarters, as members of the leadership reside with Al-Khatim.⁷⁰ Beyond key leadership, little is known about the exact nature of the organizational structure of this non-State actor. The existence of these leadership positions, however, indicates a hierarchical command structure which, in turn, would allow for disciplinary action and the ability to impose compliance with IHL.

Military tactics are shared with other CPC-F members, in that the UPC, the MPC, the FPRC, and Anti-Balaka factions have repositioned themselves in a strategic zone between Batangafo, Kabo, Bossangoa, and Markounda, specifically in localities such as Bede, Bakassa and Hama, close to the border with Chad.⁷¹ With the MPC being dominant in Ouham-Fafa and Nana-Grebizi,⁷² MPC fighters were spotted in the border area with Chad, called Moyenne-Sido, at the end of this reporting period.⁷³

MPC logistics include the movement of fighters from CAR to Sudan, specifically into El-Fasher.⁷⁴ The contribution of this combat to the RSF⁷⁵ was a strategic logistical tactic to gain RSF support for arms and ammunition transfers from Sudan to CAR.⁷⁶ Weapon transfers from Sudan to MPC included approximately 170 AK-pattern assault rifles and ammunition, as well as thirty-seven foreign fighters recruited to reinforce the MPC.⁷⁷ The MPC raises funds through illicit activities such as extortion, kidnapping, exploitation, and opportunistic gains during transhumance periods.⁷⁸

The FPRC is sufficiently organized as demanded under IHL.

UPC (see above)

The FPRC, the Anti-Balaka (Mokom faction), the MPC, and the UPC are sufficiently organized under IHL, and the CPC-F is sufficiently coordinated to constitute an alliance (see above). Therefore, a new NIAC between CAR and the CPC-F ignited during the period under review.

1
‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation (October 2024)’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, fn 2; ‘October – December 2024: Human Rights Quarterly Brief on the Central African Republic’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, fn 8.
2
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/730, 11 October 2024, para 5.
3
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/730, 11 October 2024, para 5.
4
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/730, 11 October 2024, para 5; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
5
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 15.
6
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 14.
7
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 29.
8
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 9.
9
‘La CPC-F revendique une attaque contre les FACA et Wagner près de May-mbaya’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 7 December 2024; ‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, Annex 7.
10
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 17; S. D’Cunha et al, ‘Defining armed conflict: some clarity in the fog of war’, International Committee of the Red Cross: Humanitarian Law and Policy, 2 May 2024; J. Nikolic et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, International Committee of the Red Cross Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020.
11
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: situation sécuritaire préoccupante à Farazala, localité située à 37 km au sud de Kabo’, Radio Guira, 19 November 2024; ‘Nouvelle attaque meurtrière contre un poste des FACA à la frontière tchado-centrafricaine’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 12 November 2024; ‘Farazala: violente attaque des hommes armés, population en débandade, village incendié’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 7 November 2024; ‘Centrafrique: Violents affrontements meurtriers près de Bambari entre mercenaires Wagner et rebelles de la CPC-F, plusieurs morts’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 17 November 2024; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 29.
12
‘La CPC-F revendique une attaque contre les FACA et Wagner près de May-mbaya’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 7 December 2024; ‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 15.
13
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘RCA: les FACA repoussent une importante attaque de rebelles à Ouadda’, Ndjoni Sango, 14 May 2025; ‘Bria: Trois rebelles de l’UPC et deux commerçants tués par des mercenaires russes’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 8 May 2025.
14
‘Centrafrique: situation sécuritaire préoccupante à Farazala, localité située à 37 km au sud de Kabo’, Radio Guira, 19 November 2024.
15
‘Farazala: violente attaque des hommes armés, population en débandade, village incendié’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 7 November 2024.
16
‘Nouvelle attaque meurtrière contre un poste des FACA à la frontière tchado-centrafricaine’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 12 November 2024.
17
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: Violents affrontements meurtriers près de Bambari entre mercenaires Wagner et rebelles de la CPC-F, plusieurs morts’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 17 November 2024.
18
‘Centrafrique: Violents affrontements meurtriers près de Bambari entre mercenaires Wagner et rebelles de la CPC-F, plusieurs morts’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 17 November 2024.
19
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 15.
20
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2536 (2020)’, UN Doc S/2021/569, 25 June 2021, Annex 2.6.
21
ICC, ‘In the Case of the Prosecutor v Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona’, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 24 July 2025, para 44.
22
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 76; ‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 August 2025.
23
‘International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts: Recommitting to Protection in Armed Conflict on the 70^th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions’, International Committee of the Red Cross, October 2019, 40 – 41.
24
‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation (December 2024)’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, fn 30; ‘Centrafrique: création d’une nouvelle coalition des groupes armés… la CMSPR’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 19 November 2024
25
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 7. This entry takes the former, majority view as a basis.
26
J. Nikolic et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, ICRC Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020.
27
J. Nikolic et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, ICRC Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020.
28
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, 2024, 17; J. Nikolic, et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, ICRC Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020.
29
‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation (October 2024)’, MINUSCA, fn 2.
30
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 7.
31
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, Annex 4.
32
‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation (August 2024)’, MINUSCA, para 1.
33
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 29
34
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 9.
35
‘Nouvelle attaque meurtrière contre un poste des FACA à la frontière tchado-centrafricaine’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 12 November 2024.
36
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 15.
37
‘Who are the anti-balaka of CAR?’, The New Humanitarian, 12 February 2014.
38
L. Serwat et al, ‘Africa Overview: March 2025’, ACLED, 7 March 2025; ‘Central African Republic: Muslims Forced to Flee’, Human Rights Watch, 12 February 2014.
39
‘Who are the anti-balaka of CAR?’, The New Humanitarian, 12 February 2014.
40
‘Ex-CAR militia leader freed by ICC after all charges dropped’, France 24, 20 October 2023.
41
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 August 2025
42
L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: March 2025’, ACLED, 7 March 2025; ‘Central African Republic: Muslims Forced to Flee’, Human Rights Watch, 12 February 2014.
43
‘October – December 2024: Human Rights Quarterly Brief on the Central African Republic’, MINUSCA, fn 8.
44
ICC, ‘In the Case of the Prosecutor v Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona’, Judgment, Trial Chamber V, 24 July 2025
45
ICC, ‘In the Case of the Prosecutor v Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona’, Judgment, Trial Chamber V, 24 July 2025, para 37.
46
ICC, ‘In the Case of the Prosecutor v Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona’, Judgment, Trial Chamber V, 24 July 2025, paras 42 – 43.
47
ICC, ‘In the Case of the Prosecutor v Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona’, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 24 July 2025, para 62.
48
ICC, ‘In the Case of the Prosecutor v Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona’, Judgment, Trial Chamber V, 24 July 2025, para 51.
49
ICC, ‘In the Case of the Prosecutor v Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona’, Judgment, Trial Chamber V, 24 July 2025, para 44.
50
I. Asef, ‘Anti-Balaka Militias’, Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition, 24 August 2025.
51
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 August 2025.
52
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, fn 3.
53
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, fn 3; ‘Abdoulaye Hissène, un ancien chef rebelle, inculpé de crimes contre l’humanité en Centrafrique’, Le Temps, 8 September 2023; ‘Central African Republic ex-strongman charged with crimes against humanity’, Al Jazeera, 8 September 2023.
54
F. Mazet, ‘Centrafrique: accord avec les 3R et l’UPC, deux mois après des «progrès» mais pas de désarmement’, RFI, 18 June 2025; ‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 August 2025; ‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, Annex 10.
55
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, para 44.
56
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 9.
57
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, para 44
58
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 August 2025.
59
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, para 21; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 75; ‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 36.
60
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, para 42.
61
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 65.
62
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 August 2025; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
63
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/473, para 17; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 9
64
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 9.
65
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 9; ‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 August 2025.
66
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/473, para 17; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, fn 5
67
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, fn 5.
68
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 49
69
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 76.
70
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 77.
71
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 63.
72
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 22 August 2025
73
F. Mazet, ‘Centrafrique: accord avec les 3R et l’UPC, deux mois après des «progrès» mais pas de désarmement’, RFI, 18 June 2025; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
74
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025, para 36.
75
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 75
76
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, paras 49 and 78.
77
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 76.
78
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 63.

Non-international armed conflict between CAR and Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG) (supported by Wagner Ti Azande (WTA))

Background

AAKG fighters who opted not to be incorporated into FACA, continue to fight under the AAKG moniker.¹ The AAKG fighters not integrated into FACA are locally referred to by some as ‘AAKG non-formés’, translating to ‘the non-trained AAKG’. They were given this name because they did not undergo training by FACA or the Wagner Group, as opposed to the AAKG fighters integrated into FACA (see below), referred to as ‘Wagner Ti Azande’ (WTA).² Tensions between the AAKG and FACA reportedly arose following promises made by President Touadéra to integrate the AAKG to the military; members of the AAKG perceived this to be a false promise.³ Additionally, the AAKG were opposed to the government’s negotiations with its rival, the UPC. The negotiations concerned the distribution of grazing areas for the cattle of Fulani herders in areas in the Mbomou and Haut-Mbomou prefectures which the AAKG claimed for itself.⁴

There were calls for fighters of AAKG to disarm or reintegrate into FACA during May 2025 in response to violence between the AAKG and FACA.⁵ The continuation of clashes illustrates that this was not a successful drive. Reportedly, about 200 fighters who were initially integrated into FACA’s WTA unit have returned to the bush (referred to as ex-WTA in this entry) to rejoin the AAKG and fight against FACA and their Russian support force.⁶

In this NIAC, FACA has received military support from Africa Corps and security assistance from MINUSCA.⁷ In particular, the AAKG mount attacks against both FACA and Africa Corps.⁸ MINUSCA has been involved through establishing a Quick Reaction Force and deploying additional armoured personnel to the areas in which FACA and Africa Corps are fighting the AAKG.⁹ Suspected AAKG members have, in return, attacked MINUSCA.¹⁰

Intensity

Clashes between the AAKG, supported by ex-WTA elements, and the FACA, benefiting from military support from Africa Corps and security assistance from MINUSCA, occurred during March,¹¹ April, P. Kum, ¹² May,¹³ and June 2025.¹⁴

The military operations between the AAKG and FACA in late April and early May 2025 around Zemio lasted for several days, resulting in multiple casualties. There were a series of attacks and counterattacks. MINUSCA was deployed to provide security assistance to FACA as the latter tried to repel the AAKG non-formés. Subsequently, additional support and security forces were deployed to the area to offer some security and humanitarian assistance to the civilians displaced due to the ferocity of fighting.¹⁵

It is clear that the ferocity of fighting between CAR and the AAKG satisfied the notion of intensity as demanded under IHL.

Organization

AAKG

During 2024, approximately 500 AAKG fighters were integrated into FACA (see above).¹⁶ Originally, the AAKG consisted of more than 1,000 fighters.¹⁷ It is, therefore, evident that not all AAKG fighters were integrated into FACA. The others continue operating under the AAKG moniker and are now called AAKG non-formés by the local population (see above). Even though not all AAKG fighters were integrated into FACA, the main leadership was (see above).¹⁸

There is limited information available on the internal leadership and disciplinary structure of the AAKG non-formés. What is known is that the AAKG had a tiered structure before its split (see above), and the AAKG continues to have a tiered hierarchy, as several senior leaders, ranked as commanders, exercise authority over fighters in the region under their command.¹⁹ Additionally, two AAKG leaders were arrested by CAR authorities on 24 January 2025, following an attack on Fulani civilians. This indicates that the AAKG established a new leadership after the AAKG’s five core leaders had been integrated into FACA in May 2024, even though their identities remain unknown (see above).²⁰ It is also known that senior AAKG leaders who exercise command over battalions in Obo are Celestin Bakayogo Leman (aka ‘General Leman’) and Elie Gomengue (aka ‘Elie Pasteur’).²¹ General Leman’s deputy is Marcelin Kangoyessi (aka ‘Maxon’).²² Another senior leader is Cedric Parfait Agbia (aka ‘Baloko’ or ‘Boloko’).²³ Michel Koumboki is the official AAKG spokesperson.²⁴ The tiered command structure of the AAKG and the availability of training enables the AAKG to impose discipline and implement IHL.

The pre-split AAKG operated from the Haut-Mbomou prefecture, which is still the operational base of the AAKG non-formés.²⁵ Bambouti serves as a logistical entry point from South Sudan into CAR which is of strategic importance for the AAKG. The AAKG received direct logistical support from Yambio.²⁶ AAKG may still receive support from South Sudan. Financial support was also received by the AAKG from members of the CAR parliament as a strategy to benefit from the AAKG’s opposition to the UPC.²⁷ Prior to the incorporation of a part of the AAKG into FACA (see above), the military tactics of AAKG included forming an alliance with FACA and Wagner Group/Africa Corps to oppose the UPC and the CPC alliance.²⁸

Plans to incorporate parts of the AAKG into FACA as WTA began in early 2024.²⁹ During mid-2024, some, but not all, members of the AAKG were incorporated into FACA structures.³⁰ On 6 May 2024, the first group of AAKG fighters were formally integrated into FACA by the CAR Ministry of Defense and the Restructuring of the Army as ‘soldat[s] de 2eme classe’ in a ‘Battalion Hors Rang’ for a period of three years through the ‘Decision regarding the incorporation of young recruits into the Central African Armed Forces’.³¹ Former AAKG fighters incorporated into FACA structures, who earn salary as members of FACA, wear FACA uniforms and use FACA weaponry, are, according to the Ministry of Defence decision dated 6 May 2024, officially members of the CAR armed forces.³² These so-called WTA, or AAKG formés, elements were trained by FACA or its Russian support elements³³ to continue combat against the UPC and other opposition forces. All five senior AAKG commanders who previously comprised its core AAKG leadership were integrated into FACA in mid-2024.³⁴ The AAKG was, therefore, not fully demobilized by the integration of a part of its fighters into FACA, leaving the AAKG non-formés fighting under the AAKG moniker.

After their integration into FACA, however, tensions arose between FACA and WTA, as numerous integrated fighters disobeyed their commanders’ instructions.³⁵ This led to the cancellation of a third round of training for the integrated AAKG fighters in August 2024,³⁶ thereby effectively halting the integration of AAKG fighters into FACA.³⁷ Reportedly, about 200 AAKG fighters who were initially integrated into FACA’s WTA unit have returned to the bush (as ex-WTA) to join the AAKG’s fight against FACA and their Russian support elements as of May 2025, indicating that their integration did not last (see above).³⁸ Those WTA soldiers who did not defect to rejoin AAKG were later disarmed by FACA.³⁹

The AAKG is sufficiently organized to engage in planned military operations that equate to protracted armed violence. The intensity of fighting between these enemies confirms that the AAKG is sufficiently organized under IHL.⁴⁰

The AAKG remains sufficiently organized to meet the organizational criteria demanded by IHL.

Therefore, a new NIAC between CAR and the AAKG ignited during the period under review.

1
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
2
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 120.
3
L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: June 2025’, ACLED, 6 June 2025; ‘Tensions dans le Haut-Mbomou: le CRSP accuse le gouvernement dans le conflit avec les combattants Azandé’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 14 May 2025.
4
L. Serwat et al, ‘Africa Overview: June 2025’, ACLED, 6 June 2025; Tensions dans le Haut-Mbomou: le CRSP accuse le gouvernement dans le conflit avec les combattants Azandé’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 14 May 2025.
5
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
6
‘Reprise des combats à Koumboli et la montée de tension à Obo’, Africa Press, 11 May 2025; ‘Le sud-est de la Centrafrique secoué par une nouvelle flambée de violences’, RFI, 8 May 2025.
7
‘Zémio: après les affrontements, des milliers de déplacés vivent dans des conditions précaires’, Radio Ndekeluka, 6 May 2025; P. Kum, ‘République Centrafricaine: Zémio au bord du gouffre face à l’intensification des conflits’, Alwihda Info, 2 May 2025; ‘Le sud-est de la Centrafrique secoué par une nouvelle flambée de violences’, RFI, 8 May 2025; ‘Flash Info: Reprise des combats à Koumboli et la montée de tension à Obo’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 9 May 2025; ‘URGENT: Koumboli ravagé, les Mercenaires russes incendient la quasi-totalité des habitations, faisant un mort au passage’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 5 June 2025.
8
‘URGENT: Koumboli ravagé, les Mercenaires russes incendient la quasi-totalité des habitations, faisant un mort au passage’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 5 June 2025; R. S. Domia-Ieu, ‘Centrafrique: le nord-ouest et le sud-est du pays en proie à une situation sécuritaire inquiétante’, RFI, 30 June 2025; ‘Flash Info: Reprise des combats à Koumboli et la montée de tension à Obo’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 9 May 2025.
9
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/383, 13 June 2025, para 34.
10
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/383, 13 June 2025, para 34; ‘Centrafrique: un Casque bleu kenyan tué dans une embuscade’, Ouragan, 29 March 2025; ‘Un casque-bleu de la Minusca tué dans une embuscade près de Zémio dans le sud-est de Centrafrique’, Radio Ndekeluka, 29 March 2025; C. Danimbe, ‘Centrafrique: Deux casques bleus blessés dans une attaque à Zémio, la MINUSCA appelle à la retenue’, Trace Infos, 17 June 2025.
11
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/383, 13 June 2025, para 34
12
‘République Centrafricaine: Zémio au bord du gouffre face à l’intensification des conflits’, Alwihda Info, 2 May 2025
13
‘Zémio: après les affrontements, des milliers de déplacés vivent dans des conditions précaires’, Radio Ndekeluka, 6 May 2025; ‘Dernières minutes: Les miliciens Azandés progressent à Zémio, les soldats FACA et les mercenaires russes en déroute’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 2 May 2025; ‘Centrafrique: le calme revient à Zémio après les violents affrontements’, Radio Guira, 12 May 2025; P. Kum, ‘République Centrafricaine: Zémio au bord du gouffre face à l’intensification des conflits’, Alwihda Info, 2 May 2025
14
‘MINUSCA condemns an attack against its peacekeepers near Zémio in Haut-Mbomou’, MINUSCA, 17 June 2025; C. Danimbe, ‘Centrafrique: Deux casques bleus blessés dans une attaque à Zémio, la MINUSCA appelle à la retenue’, Trace Infos, 17 June 2025; ‘Dernières minutes: Les miliciens Azandés progressent à Zémio, les soldats FACA et les mercenaires russes en déroute’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 2 May 2025; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘URGENT: Koumboli ravagé, les Mercenaires russes incendient la quasi-totalité des habitations, faisant un mort au passage’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 5 June 2025; Philip Obaji Jr., X, 9 June 2025.
15
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/383, 13 June 2025, para 35.
16
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, paras 118 – 121.
17
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025.
18
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, Annex 25.
19
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, para 48; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, Annex 25.
20
UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 34.
21
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 124 and Annex 25; ‘Crise imminente dans le Haut-Mbomou: Les AZANDE ANI KPI GBE menacent de déclencher de grandes hostilités’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 26 February 2024.
22
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 124 and Annex 25.
23
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, Annex 25; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, para 59.
24
‘Centrafrique: A Zandé Ani Kpi Gbé dément avoir changé de nom et être fusionné avec le CRSP’, Radio Ndekeluka, 26 May 2025; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, para 56.
25
‘Background Note – The situation in the Haut-Mbomou Prefecture’, United Nations Peacebuilding, March 2025, 1.
26
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, para 39.
27
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, Annex 25.
28
L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: October 2024’, ACLED, 8 November 2024; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
29
‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation (April 2024)’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, para 6; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/730, 11 October 2024, para 30.
30
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 118 – 121.
31
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, Annex 25.
32
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 122.
33
Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 120–21
34
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, Annex 25.
35
‘Central African Republic: Reining in the Zandé Militia’, International Crisis Group, 20 November 2025.
36
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, Annex 25
37
‘Central African Republic: Reining in the Zandé Militia’, International Crisis Group, 20 November 2025.
38
‘Le sud-est de la Centrafrique secoué par une nouvelle flambée de violences’, RFI, 8 May 2025; ‘Reprise des combats à Koumboli et la montée de tension à Obo’, Africa Press, 11 May 2025; ‘Central African Republic: Reining in the Zandé Militia’, International Crisis Group, 20 November 2025.
39
‘Central African Republic: Reining in the Zandé Militia’, International Crisis Group, 20 November 2025.
40
ICC, ‘In the Case of the Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 14 March 2012, para 537; ICTY, ‘Prosecutor v Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski’, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 10 July 2008, para 200.

Non-International Armed Conflict between Unity for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) and Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG)

Background

The moniker ‘Azande Ani Kpi Gbe’ (AAKG) translates to ‘the Zandé community has suffered too much/has experienced too many deaths’.¹ The AAKG, which was formed in 2023,² claims its existence serves to protect the Azande people, who have endured atrocities committed by the UPC and the Lords’ Resistance Army for many years. Most Azande live in the Mbomou and Haut-Mbomou prefectures in CAR.³ This non-State actor is fighting to achieve two overall objectives – to free Haut-Mbomou from the territorial control of the UPC and to persuade FACA and the CAR internal security forces to take control of ‘liberated towns’.⁴

A recent shift in fighting has been detected – the AAKG became radicalized on religious grounds, targeting not only Fulani, but also Zandé people of Muslim faith.⁵ The UPC, conversely, responded to heightened AAKG attacks against Muslim Fulani communities in CAR.⁶

This NIAC initially ignited between the UPC and the AAKG. However, around 500 AAKG fighters were integrated into FACA during 2024.⁷ This group of fighters that split from the former AAKG has since been described as a special unit within FACA called ‘WTA’ or ‘AAKG formés’.⁸ These WTA forces were trained by then-Wagner Group fighters and wore uniforms with shoulder sleeve insignia similar to those worn by the Wagner Group, hence the name.⁹ The remaining AAKG fighters, not integrated into FACA, are called ‘AAKG non-formés’ by the local population.¹⁰ The AAKG is the remnant of the former AAKG and, therefore, the pre-existing NIAC between the UPC and the AAKG now continues between the UPC and the AAKG (‘non-formés’).

Intensity

The pre-existing NIAC between the AAKG and the UPC continued during the reporting period. (see below). Since the split of the AAKG into the AAKG formés and the AAKG non-formés, the NIAC continued between the UPC and the AAKG (non-formés) (see above). Both groups clashed frequently during 2023.¹¹ Specific clashes during the reporting period include those during August 2023,¹² and January,¹³ May,¹⁴ and June 2024.¹⁵

AAKG fighters are equipped with automatic rifles.¹⁶ The UPC arsenal includes PKM machine guns and RPG-7 rocket launchers.¹⁷

Fighting remained protracted in nature until the integration of a part of the AAKG fighters into FACA forces (see above).¹⁸ There has been a lull in fighting between the AAKG and the UPC since July 2024, but this does not necessarily equate to the end of a NIAC.

For a NIAC to end, it is required that one of two requirements is satisfied. First, one of the parties to the NIAC ceases to exist, for example, the non-State actor is completely defeated or demobilized.¹⁹ As noted above, despite the integration of about 500 fighters into FACA during 2024, the AAKG has not ceased to exist as a large percentage of fighters remained part of the AAKG ‘non-formés’ military wing.²⁰ The second situation in which a NIAC comes to an end is if there is a lasting cessation of fighting without any real risk of resumption.²¹ The lull in fighting between the AAKG and the UPC can partially be attributed to the integration of some AAKG members into FACA during 2024 (see above) ²² or possibly under reporting. Additionally, since April 2025, the AAKG has focused its efforts on fighting FACA and Africa Corps, taking up most of its combat capacity.²³ Despite the lull in direct fighting between the AAKG and the UPC, the AAKG, supported by ex-WTA fighters has, nevertheless, continued to target Fulani civilians over their suspected association with the UPC during the reporting period, indicating a high risk of resumption of fighting between both armed groups.²⁴

Organization

UPC (see above)

AAKG (see above) The NIAC between the UPC and the remnants of the former AAKG continued throughout the reporting period

1
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025.
2
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025; L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: October 2024’, ACLED, 8 November 2024; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, para 35
3
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025; L. Serwat et al, ‘Africa Overview: October 2024’, ACLED, 8 November 2024; L. Serwat et al, ‘Africa Overview: June 2025’, ACLED, 6 June 2025.
4
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, Annex 23.
5
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024, paras 58 – 61.
6
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2023/769, 16 October 2023, paras 25 and 40.
7
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
8
‘Human Rights Division: Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation (April 2024)’, MINUSCA, para 6; ‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/730, 11 October 2024, para 30; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 120; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/730, 11 October 2024, para 30.
9
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 120.
10
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 120.
11
‘Bambouti, violent affrontement entre la milice d’autodéfense AZANDE ANI KPI GBE et les rebelles de l’UPC’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 15 March 2023; ‘Centrafrique: situation humanitaire alarmante à Bambouti après des affrontements’, Radio Ndekeluka, 22 March 2023; ‘Bambouti, nouvel affrontement entre les groupes armés’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 2 April 2023; ‘Mboki: Un nouvel épisode sanglant oppose les miliciens Azandé Ani Kpi Gbe aux rebelles de l’UPC’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 20 June 2023;‘CrisisWatch, Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Global Overview June 2023’, International Crisis Group.
12
‘Attaque violente en cours à Mboki : Milice contre Rebelles, la Terreur s’installe’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 29 August 2023; ‘Centrafrique: Nouvelle Attaque Meurtrière de la Milice Azandé anikpigbé proche de Zémio’,Corbeau News Centrafrique, 31 August 2023
13
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group
14
‘Centrafrique: les Faca et leurs alliés lancent une importante opération militaire à Mboki’, Radio Ndekeluka, 27 May 2024; ‘Grande offensive des Wagner ti Azandé et les russes contre l’UPC à Mboki, Zémio et Djema’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 25 May 2024
15
‘Centrafrique: Trois rebelles de l’UPC abattus par des miliciens Azandé à Zemio’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 16 June 2024.
16
‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025.
17
‘MINUSCA/CAR Ex-combatant Disarmament’, UNifeed, 5 August 2025.
18
‘Central African Republic’, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 15 July 2025.
19
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, 2024.
20
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 120; ‘Central African Republic’, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 15 July 2025.
21
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024. A lull in fighting does not equate to no real risk of resumption.‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 19.
22
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group
23
‘Zémio: après les affrontements, des milliers de déplacés vivent dans des conditions précaires’, Radio Ndekeluka, 6 May 2025; P. Kum, ‘République Centrafricaine: Zémio au bord du gouffre face à l’intensification des conflits’, Alwihda Info, 2 May 2025; ‘Central African Republic: Wagner sends 50 mercenaries to southeast to battle militiamen’, Africa Intelligence, 15 May 2025; ‘Flash Info: Reprise des combats à Koumboli et la montée de tension à Obo’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 9 May 2025; R. S. Domia-Ieu, ‘Centrafrique: le nord-ouest et le sud-est du pays en proie à une situation sécuritaire inquiétante’, RFI, 30 June 2025.
24
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025, para 34.

State Parties

Non-State Actors

3R
UPC
CPC
CPC-F
AAKG
WTA

Foreign Involvement

Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group) [in combat alongside FACA]
MINUSCA [mandate extended until 15 November 2025; no active combat role]
Russia [military support: fighter jets, weapons, training]
United States [training soldiers]
France [offering scholarships to army officers for training in France]
Rwanda

Other actors

Bancroft Global Development [US PMSC, no active combat reported]
Rapid Support Forces (RSF) [repeated incursions into CAR, recruiting efforts]

1
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases.
2
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; D. Clouatre, ‘Military Coup Brings Dictatorship to Central African Republic’, EBSCO, 2023; ‘Bokassa Is Reported Overthrown In Coup in Central African Empire’, The New York Times, 21 September 1979; V. Aboudi, ‘Coups D’état in the Central African Republic and Political Instability in Central Africa Sub-Region’, On Policy, 30 June 2021; E. Picco, ‘Ten Years After the Coup, Is the Central African Republic Facing Another Major Crisis?’, International Crisis Group, 22 March 2023; T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024.
3
J. Lechner and V. Ingasso, ‘Wagner woes and a rebel crackdown: A briefing on the Central African Republic’s shifting conflict’, The New Humanitarian, 7 September 2023; ‘Central African Republic: A Conflict Mapping’, International Peace Information Service, August 2018; ‘Bringing Lasting Peace to the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, 15 October 2024.
4
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘Political and Ethnic Violence in Central African Republic’, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2024.
5
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024.
6
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; ‘Bringing Lasting Peace to the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, 15 October 2024; ‘Central African Republic: Sectarian Atrocities Escalate’, Human Rights Watch, 18 December 2013; ‘Central African Republic: Mapping human rights violations 2003-2015’, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); ‘Réfugiés et demandeurs d’asile de la République centrafricaine’, Operational Data Portal, 30 September 2025; ‘Briefing: Who are the anti-balaka of CAR?’, Reliefweb, 12 February 2014.
7
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; J. S. F. van Hoogstraten, ‘Central African Republic: The 21^st century’, Britannica, 11 October 2025.
8
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; J. S. F. van Hoogstraten, ‘Central African Republic: The 21^st century’, Britannica, 11 October 2025.
9
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘Political and Ethnic Violence in Central African Republic’, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2024; J. S. F. van Hoogstraten, ‘Central African Republic: The 21^st century’, Britannica, 11 October 2025.
10
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘Political and Ethnic Violence in Central African Republic’, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2024.
11
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘Political and Ethnic Violence in Central African Republic’, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2024.
12
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024.
13
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; ‘Bringing Lasting Peace to the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, 15 October 2024; ‘About’, MINUSCA.
14
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘About’, MINUSCA; ‘Mandate’, MINUSCA; ‘MINUSCA Fact Sheet’, United Nations Peacekeeping, 2014.
15
‘MINUSCA Fact Sheet’, United Nations Peacekeeping, 2014; ‘MINUSCA condemns an attack against its peacekeepers near Zémio in Haut-Mbomou’, MINUSCA, 17 June 2025.
16
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘MINUSCA Fact Sheet’, United Nations Peacekeeping, 2014.
17
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘Bringing Lasting Peace to the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, 15 October 2024; ‘Central African Republic: Touadera wins election’, Al Jazeera, 21 February 2016.
18
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; M. Benn, ‘Newly Elected Central African Republic Leader Faces Hard Realities’, The New York Times, 21 February 2016; ‘Ex-PM Touadera takes lead in CAR vote’, Deutsche Welle, 4 January 2016.
19
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; ‘Central African Republic: Events of 2016’, Human Rights Watch; T. Skarstein, ‘Central African Republic spiralling into new crisis’, Norwegian Refugee Council, 17 July 2017.
20
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; ‘New fighting in CAR leaves dozens dead’, Deutsche Welle, 21 June 2017; Z. Baddorf, ‘Pessimism About CAR Peace Deal Widespread’, Voice of America, 23 June 2017.
21
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; N. Dukhan, ‘Splintered Warfare: Alliances, affiliations, and agendas of armed factions and politico-military groups in the Central African Republic’, Enough, 10 August 2017; ‘Challenges ahead for the AU roadmap on the CAR’, Reliefweb, 12 October 2017.
22
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024.
23
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; E. Murray and R. Sullivan, ‘Central African Republic Struggles to Implement Peace Deal’, US Institute of Peace, 17 October 2019.
24
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’, Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; E. Murray and R. Sullivan, ‘Central African Republic Struggles to Implement Peace Deal’, US Institute of Peace, 17 October 2019.
25
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; K. Larson, ‘UN report shows hundreds of Central African Republic abuses’, AP News, 30 May 2017.
26
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’, Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; ‘CAR says ex-president attempting ‘coup’ as rebels form coalition’, Al Jazeera, 19 December 2020.
27
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; ‘Central African Republic President Touadera wins new term, says electoral commission’, France 24, 4 January 2021.
28
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; K. Ahmed, ‘Central African Republic suffers food shortages as rebels cut off capital’, The Guardian, 25 January 2021; A. Suprenant, ‘In Pictures: Panic grips Bangui residents after rebel attack’, Al Jazeera, 14 January 2021.
29
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘Bringing Lasting Peace to the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, 15 October 2024; I. R. Mugisha, ‘Rwanda deploys troops to CAR under bilateral arrangement’, The East African, 22 December 2020; L. Serwat, et al, ‘Wagner Group Operations in Africa: Civilian Targeting Trends in the Central African Republic and Mali’, ACLED, 30 August 2022; ‘Rwanda’s Growing Role in the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, 7 July 2023.
30
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; J. Lechner and V. Ingasso, ‘Wagner woes and a rebel crackdown: A briefing on the Central African Republic’s shifting conflict’, The New Humanitarian, 7 September 2023; P. Bax, ‘Russia’s Influence in the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Groups, 3 December 2021; ‘CAR: Russian Wagner Group harassing and intimidating civilians – UN experts’, OHCHR, 27 October 2021.
31
‘Bringing Lasting Peace to the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, 15 October 2024.
32
‘Bringing Lasting Peace to the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, 15 October 2024; P. Bax, ‘Russia’s Influence in the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Groups, 3 December 2021; J. Inwood and J. Tacchi, ‘Wagner in Africa: How the Russian mercenary group has rebranded’, BBC, 20 February 2024.
33
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; E. Picco, ‘Ten Years After the Coup, Is the Central African Republic Facing Another Major Crisis?’, International Crisis Group, 22 March 2023; ‘Bringing Lasting Peace to the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, 15 October 2024; ‘MINUSCA chief to Security Council: Decade-long cycle of conflict can be broken’, United Nations News, 20 June 2023; ‘Central African Republic plans referendum on scrapping presidential term limits’, Reuters, 30 May 2023; J. Siegle and H. Wahila, ‘Central African Republic: Elite Capture becoming State Capture’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 13 January 2025.
34
J. Siegle and H. Wahila, ‘Central African Republic: Elite Capture becoming State Capture’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 13 January 2025; ‘Central African Republic: UN Expert calls for urgent institutional reform of electoral authority ahead of 2025 elections’, OHCHR, 26 June 2025; ‘Upcoming elections ‘crucial opportunity’ for Central African Republic, UN top official tells Security Council’, United Nations News, 26 June 2025.
35
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘Bringing Lasting Peace to the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, 15 October 2024.
36
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024.
37
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘Bringing Lasting Peace to the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, 15 October 2024; ‘Critical humanitarian situation in Central African Republic’, United Nations News, 5 June 2023; R. S. Domia-leu, ‘Centrafrique: 70% des ménages vivent dans la pauvreté, selon une étude’, RFI, 19 February 2025.
38
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in the Central African Republic’ Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2024; ‘Background: The Varied Causes of Conflict in CAR’, Human Rights Watch, September 2007; ‘Conflict in Sudan is spilling into Central African Republic: UN’, TRT World, 27 June 2025.
39
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘Central Africa Republic’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 27 August 2024.
40
T. Glawion and H. Dickow, ‘Zentralafrikanische Republik’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 27 June 2024; ‘Réfugiés et demandeurs d’asile de la République centrafricaine’, OHCHR Operational Data Portal, 30 September 2025.
41
J. Stanyard, ‘Mercenaries and illicit markets: Russia’s Africa Corps and the business of conflict’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 14 February 2025; D. Ehl, ‘How the Russian Wagner Group is entrenching itself in Africa’, Deutsche Welle, 27 October 2024.
42
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; B. Zambo, ‘Le vice-ministre Russe de la Défense en visite de travail en Rca’, Actu Cameroun, 6 September 2023; Jdbangui, ‘Coopération: Moscou et Bangui discutent du retour définitif de la paix en RCA’, Journal du Faso, 4 September 2023; ‘Echanges fructueux entre le président Touadera et le vice ministre de la défense russe sur le retour définitif de la paix en RCA’, aBangui.com, 2 September 2023.
43
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; A. McGregor, ‘Wagner’s Influence in Central African Republic Wanes as American PMC Enters the Scene’, The Jamestown Federation: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 7 February 2024; ‘Denis Pavlov, the man in Bangui’, All Eyes on Wagner, 7 December 2023; ‘L’infiltration russe en Centrafrique: Denis Pavlov, le nouveau visage de Wagner dans le pays’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 11 December 2023.
44
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; C. Faulkner, et al, ‘Africa Corps: Has Russia Hit a Ceiling in Africa?’, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, December 2024; J. Epstein, ‘A new Russian military formation in Africa with the same name as a Nazi unit is trying to recruit former Wagner fighters and Ukraine war vets’, Business Insider, 22 December 2023.
45
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
46
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘À Paris, la question de Wagner en Centrafrique abordée lors de la rencontre Macron-Touadéra’, RFI, 16 September 2023; ‘Entretien avec le Président de la République française Emmanuel Macron’, Ambassade de la République Centrafricaine en France, 14 September 2023.
47
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘À Paris, la question de Wagner en Centrafrique abordée lors de la rencontre Macron-Touadéra’, RFI, 16 September 2023; ‘Entretien avec le Président de la République française Emmanuel Macron’, Ambassade de la République Centrafricaine en France: République Centrafricaine, 14 September 2023.
48
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
49
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; M. Chemam, ‘CAR in talks with US security firm as West eyes Wagner’s ground in Africa’, RFI, 30 December 2023; J. F. Koena, ‘US firm Bancroft eyes Wagner Group’s influence in CAR’, DW, 4 January 2024.
50
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; M. Chemam, ‘CAR in talks with US security firm as West eyes Wagner’s ground in Africa’, RFI, 30 December 2023; ‘Centrafrique: l’implantation de la SMP américaine Bancroft Global Development confirmée par les autorités’, Radio Ndekeluka, 23 December 2023.
51
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
52
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Russian Military Base may Appear in Central African Republic’, Defense Mirror, 20 April 2024; T. Lister, et al, ‘Putin’s Private Army’, CNN, August 2019; E. Teslova, ‘Russia negotiates establishment of military base with Central African Republic’, AA, 19 January 2024; M. Schwikowski et al, ‘After Wagner, Russia makes new military plans in Africa’, Deutsche Welle, 9 February 2024.
53
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
54
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘France, Central African Republic agree to work toward ‘constructive partnership’’, Voice of America: Africa, 17 April 2024; ‘President Touadera urges Macron to stop interfering in CAR’s internal affairs’, Vanguard News, 20 April 2024.
55
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘France lifts suspension of budgetary aid to the CAR’, Centrafrica, 11 July 2024.
56
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘France has allocated €10 million in budgetary support to the CAR’, African Initiative, 14 November 2024; ‘Central African Republic: How the €10m in budgetary aid from Paris is being used’, Africa Intelligence, 27 May 2025.
57
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
58
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Central African Republic enrols new soldiers trained by RDF’, Rwanda: Ministry of Defence, 24 November 2023; K. K. Klomegah, ‘Russia Offers Central African Republic Security Guarantee and Broader Economic Partnership’, Modern Diplomacy, 20 January 2025; ‘Over 400 soldiers trained by RDF join Central African Armed Forces’, Igihe, 7 March 2025.
59
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
60
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
61
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
62
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2127 (2013)’, 5 December 2013; ‘UN arms embargo on the Central African Republic’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 16 October 2025.
63
‘UN arms embargo on the Central African Republic’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 16 October 2025; ‘UN sets course towards easing CAR arms embargo’, Al Jazeera, 31 January 2019; E. M. Lederer, ‘UN lifts last restriction on arms for Central African Republic government, but not for mercenaries’, AP News, 28 July 2023.
64
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘UN arms embargo on the Central African Republic’, SIPRI, 16 October 2025; ‘Security Council Lifts Arms Embargo on Central African Republic, Extends Mandate of Expert Panel for 13 Months, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Press eelease, 30 July 2024.
65
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; E. M. Lederer, ‘UN lifts last restriction on arms for Central African Republic government, but not for mercenaries’, AP News, 28 July 2023.
66
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘La Centrafrique salue la levée de l’embargo sur les armes décrété par l’ONU en 2013’, RFI, 31 July 2024; ‘Security Council lifts arms embargo on Central African Republic forces’, United Nations News, 30 July 2024; UNSC, ‘Resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/Res/2745 (2024), 30 July 2024.
67
‘La Centrafrique salue la levée de l’embargo sur les armes décrété par l’ONU en 2013’, RFI, 31 July 2024; ‘Centrafrique: réactions partagées après la levée par les Nations unies de l’embargo sur les armes’, RFI, 1 August 2024; ‘Observers Worry About Impact of Lifting CAR Arms Embargo’, Africa Defense Forum, 17 September 2024.
68
‘Background Note – Special Criminal Court’, United Nations Peacebuilding.
69
‘Background Note – Special Criminal Court’, United Nations Peacebuilding.
70
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; R. le Roi Benga, ‘Central African Republic: Abdoulaye Hissène caught in Special Criminal Court’, Justice Info, 14 September 2023; L. Mudge, ‘Rearrest Sparks Hope in Central African Republic’, Human Rights Watch, 8 September 2023.
71
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique : la CVJRR dissoute par le gouvernement pour « détournement et conflit interne »’, Radio Ndekeluka, 14 May 2024; R. le Roi Benga, ‘Central African Republic: why the Truth Commission was dismissed’, Justice Info, 21 June 2024.
72
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: la CVJRR dissoute par le gouvernement pour « détournement et conflit interne »’, Radio Ndekeluka, 14 May 2024.
73
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Arrest warrant issued for Central African Republic’s former president over crimes against humanity’, The Guardian, 30 April 2024; ‘CAR: Former President François Bozizé must face trial for crimes against humanity’, Amnesty International, 30 April 2024; ‘Arrest warrant issued for CAR ex-leader Bozizé’, The New Humanitarian, 1 May 2024.
74
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Umaro Sissoco Embalo: «Je ne vais pas extrader Bozizé je veux que cela soit clair»’, RFI, 9 May 2024; ‘Guinea-Bissau president rejects extradition of CAR’s former leader’, The Sudan Times, 8 May 2024; ‘Guinea-Bissau President Says Will Not Extradite C. Africa Ex-leader’, Barron’s, 8 May 2024.
75
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: les réparations financières pour les crimes contre l’humanité de 2019 ont été remises aux victimes’, RFI, 18 September 2024; R. le Roi Benga, ‘Central African Republic reparations: what victims say about first payments’, Justice Info, 15 October 2024.
76
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: bras de fer entre la CPI et la CPS à propos d’un chef anti-balaka arrêté’, RFI, 19 November 2024; ‘Situation in the Central African Republic: Warrant of Arrest for Edmond Beina’, International Criminal Court: Pre-Trial Chamber II, 7 December 2018; ‘International Criminal Court Unveils Arrest Warrant for Central Africa Militia Leader’, International Center for Transitional Justice, 11 December 2024; ‘ICC judges unseal an arrest warrant for an alleged Central African Republic rebel’, AP News, 7 November 2024.
77
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: bras de fer entre la CPI et la CPS à propos d’un chef anti-balaka arrêté’, RFI, 19 November 2024 [ML1] [MB2] ; On the same matter, see ICC, ‘Decision on the Central African Republic’s challenge to the admissibility of the case against Edmond Beina’, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 12 September 2025.
78
‘MINUSCA Fact Sheet’, United Nations Peacekeeping, 2014; ‘Facts and Figures’, MINUSCA; ‘Security Council Extends United Nations Mission in Central African Republic, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2759 (2024)’, UN Press release, 14 November 2024.
79
‘MINUSCA Fact Sheet’, UN Peacekeeping, 2014.
80
‘Security Council Extends United Nations Mission in Central African Republic, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2759 (2024)’, United Nations Meetings and Press Releases, 14 November 2024; UNSC, ‘Resolution 2759 (2024)’, UN Doc S/Res/2759 (2024), 14 November 2024.
81
‘Security Council Extends United Nations Mission in Central African Republic, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2759 (2024)’, UN Press release, 14 November 2024; UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 2759 (2024)’, 14 November 2024.
82
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Central African Republic president submits draft constitution for referendum’, TRT Global, 11 July 2023; ‘CAR president delivers draft constitution ahead of referendum’, Africa News, 13 August 2024.
83
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; C. Valade, ‘Central African Republic’s new constitution makes permanent Touadéra presidency possible’, Le Monde, 9 August 2023; ‘CAR top court approves referendum result, allowing president to seek third term’, France24, 21 August 2023.
84
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; M. Miller, ‘The Central African Republic’s Constitutional Referendum’, US Department of State, 22 August 2023.
85
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
86
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
87
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Forty years and counting: CAR once again postpones local elections’, Africa News, 13 July 2025; B. Mbuthia, ‘Central African Republic’s long-awaited elections pushed back yet again’, The Eastleigh Voice, 13 July 2025.
88
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Voter registration starts in Central African Republic’, Pana Press, 15 March 2025; ‘Central African Republic’, Security Council Report, 30 June 2025.
89
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘In the Central African Republic, the Hired Guns Wear Out Their Welcome’, Global Post, 23 April 2025; ‘Central African opposition leads mass protest against Touadéra’s third-term bid’, Africa News, 4 April 2025.
90
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group.
91
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: les divisions entre chefs de la CPC éclatent après l’appel à cesser les hostilités’, RFI, 7 August 2024; ‘Centrafrique: un des principaux chefs de la rébellion CPC demande la fin de toutes les hostilités’, RFI, 5 August 2024.
92
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: les divisions entre chefs de la CPC éclatent après l’appel à cesser les hostilités’, RFI, 7 August 2024.
93
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: désaccord au sein de la coalition CPC sur la cessation des hostilités’, RFI, 6 August 2024.
94
‘October – December 2024: Human Rights Quarterly Brief on the Central African Republic’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic; ‘Monthly Report: Human Rights Situation’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, October 2024.
95
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘RCA: la CPC change de nom, se sépare de Bozizé et définit de nouveaux objectifs’, RFI, 4 September 2024; ‘Centrafrique: l’ex-président Bozizé réplique à la création d’une branche dissidente du groupe rebelle CPC’, RFI, 10 September 2024.
96
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: les autorités détaillent comment les groupes rebelles UPC et 3R ont signé un cessez-le-feu’, RFI, 25 April 2024; ‘Central African Republic at ‘Delicate Juncture’ ahead of Election Cycle, Peacekeeping Chief Tells Security Council, Urging International Support to Strengthen Democracy’, United Nations Press release, 26 June 2025.
97
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Centrafrique: les autorités détaillent comment les groupes rebelles UPC et 3R ont signé un cessez-le-feu’, RFI, 25 April 2024; ‘Central African Republic at ‘Delicate Juncture’ ahead of Election Cycle, Peacekeeping Chief Tells Security Council, Urging International Support to Strengthen Democracy’, UN Press release, 26 June 2025; ‘Centrafrique: mise en oeuvre de l’accord entre le gouvernement, l’UPC et les 3R’, RFI, 26 April 2025.
98
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘October – December 2024: Human Rights Quarterly Brief on the Central African Republic’, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.
99
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Central African Republic at ‘Delicate Juncture’ ahead of Election Cycle, Peacekeeping Chief Tells Security Council, Urging International Support to Strengthen Democracy’, UN Press release, 26 June 2025.
100
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/383, 13 June 2025.
101
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Secretary-General Condemns Attack against Mission in Central African Republic’, United Nations Press release, 22 June 2025; ‘MINUSCA condemns deadly attack against peacekeepers in Vakaga’, UN Peacekeeping, 21 June 2025.
102
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Security Council Press Statement on Attack against Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic’, UN Press release, 24 June 2025; ‘Central African Republic: Briefing and Consultations’, Security Council Report, 25 June 2025.
103
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/383, 13 June 2025; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025.
104
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024; ‘Série Centrafrique (7), l’incroyable constellation des groupes armés’, Mondafrique, 22 August 2025.
105
‘Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/384, 13 June 2025; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/444, 10 June 2024; ‘Guerre au Soudan: les Forces de soutien rapide recrutent des combattants en Centrafrique’, RFI, 15 June 2024.
106
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025; ‘“Armel Sayo est là, bien vivant, en bonne santé”, rassure Maxime Balalou ministre Centrafricain de la Communication’, BBC, 31 July 2025.
107
‘Centrafrique: création d’une nouvelle coalition des groupes armés… la CMSPR’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 19 November 2024.
108
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025.
109
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/97, 14 February 2025; ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025; ‘”Armel Sayo est là, bien vivant, en bonne santé”, rassure Maxime Balalou ministre Centrafricain de la Communication’, BBC, 31 July 2025.
110
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Ouham: violant affrontement près de Kouki entre les CMSPR et les Wagner, débandade générale’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 24 November 2024; ‘La rébellion d’Armel SAYO attaque un poste des FACA à Boulo’, Centrafrica, 25 November 2024
111
‘Africa: Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group; ‘Dernières heures: Affrontements armés en cours à Benamkor près de Paoua’, Corbeau News Centrafrique, 8 January 2025
112
‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/383, 13 June 2025, para 30.

Central African Republic

Reporting period: July 2023 - June 2025

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (2023-2025)

Non International Armed Conflict

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

Non-State Actors

Foreign Involvement

Other actors