Colombia

During the reporting period, multiple non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) were ongoing in Colombia. At least four NIACs took place to which Colombia was a party:

Colombia v. the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)
Colombia v. the Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC) (formerly Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC))
Colombia v. the Estado Mayor Central (EMC)
Colombia v. the Comandos de la Frontera (CDF)

Additionally, at least six other NIACs between armed groups were ongoing:

ELN v. the EGC
ELN v. the Frente 33 of the Estado Mayor de los Bloques y el Frente (EMBF)
EMC v. the Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez
EMC v. the EGC
EMC v. the ELN
EMC v. the Segunda Marquetalia (SM)

Colombia is a State Party to Additional Protocol II of 1977. All four of the NIACs to which Colombia is a party continue to meet the additional requirements of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II, meaning that this treaty is applicable in addition to the rules of customary international humanitarian law (IHL).

Additional Protocol II does not apply to the NIACs between organized armed groups who are not fighting the territorial state (Colombia in this case) as Article 1(1) of the Protocol is limited to situations where the territorial state is in a fighting relationship with a non-state armed group or a dissident armed group.¹ The law of NIAC, which includes Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and customary IHL, applies to these situations.

During the 1960s, Marxist campesino and student guerrilla groups emerged in Colombia in response to conditions of an unequal land distribution and land ownership policy that benefitted large landowning interests, multinational agribusiness, and mining companies.² Between 1948 and 1958, Colombia experienced a decade of political violence known as La Violencia. It is in this period that the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo(FARC-EP) and the ELN were established.³ Subsequently, landowners organized to protect themselves against guerrilla groups and, in turn, spurred the emergence of right-wing paramilitary groups in the 1980s. The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) was the largest of these paramilitary groups.⁴

The FARC-EP and the ELN have a history of relying on violence, abduction and extortion to raise revenue and gain leverage over their adversaries. Allegedly, Colombian guerrilla groups kidnapped more than 25,000 people between 1970 and 2010.⁵

Historically, the illicit trade in drugs has been a seminal driver of the conflict in Colombia.⁶ At the start of the twenty-first century, Colombia was responsible for up to 90% of global cocaine production. Simultaneously, multiple non-state armed groups profited from the cocaine trade and competition over territory among these groups provoked further armed violence.⁷

In 2002, Álvaro Uribe won the presidential elections and took a strong stance against the guerrilla groups. Uribe managed to reduce significantly the number of murders and kidnappings, although human rights groups accused the government of human rights abuses. In 2004, the AUC disarmed during the Uribe presidency. However, red flags were raised concerning possible ties between Uribe and the paramilitary groups.⁸

In 2010, Juan Manuel Santos, the Minister of Defence under President Uribe, was himself elected president of Colombia. In 2012, formal peace talks with the FARC-EP were initiated by his government. By the middle of 2016, the Colombian government under Santos and the FARC-EP led by Rodrigo Londoño had agreed to a ceasefire, which the leadership signed in Cartagena in September 2016.⁹

As a result of the peace agreement, more than 13,000 FARC-EP members have laid down their weapons. The FARC-EP formed a political party under the name ‘Comunes’ and was awarded five guaranteed seats in the Senate and the House of Representatives for the period of two subsequent legislative sessions.¹⁰

Post-peace agreement arrangements include the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, which is tasked with supporting the peace agreement.¹¹ The agreement included the creation of a transitional justice system called the Comprehensive System for Peace, which is comprised of the Truth Commission, the Unit for the Search of Missing Persons (UBPD), and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP).¹²

However, some members of the former FARC-EP did not participate in the peace agreement and set up dissident groups. In 2021, these groups engaged in violent attacks in different parts of Colombia despite the initial reduction in conflict-related violence resulting from the 2016 peace agreement.¹³ Further, 2021 marked the rise of historically large nationwide protests as a consequence of the stalled implementation of the peace agreement and tax reforms.

In August 2022, Gustavo Petro was elected Colombia’s first left-wing president. His election revived efforts to restart the peace process that had stalled.¹⁴ President Petro’s government announced a ‘Paz Total’ (‘Total Peace’) policy, which aims to achieve a full implementation of the 2016 peace agreement and ensure structural and social reform. At present, the government is negotiating with ten armed groups as part of this strategy. Despite reaching temporary bilateral ceasefires with select groups, no substantive peace agreements had been formalised at the time of reporting.¹⁵ Indeed, since the middle of 2024, the level of violence has escalated significantly.

Escalating tension between armed groups in Catatumbo

The Catatumbo region, which is rich in mineral resources and provides ideal climatic conditions for coca cultivation, has been a traditional stronghold of the ELN, whose control was recently threatened by the growing presence of the Frente 33 of the EMBF, leading to an increase in armed clashes.¹⁶ On 16 January 2025, the ELN initiated a coordinated offensive in Catatumbo during which the group undertook house-to-house searches for former FARC fighters and conducted attacks on Catatumbo-based encampments of the EMBF’s Frente 33. The offensive continued until the end of the month, and resulted in the killing of more than 80 people, the forcible confinement of 24,000, and the displacement of a further 48,000.¹⁷ In response to this heightened armed group activity, on 31 January 2025, the Colombian and Venezuelan governments announced a joint “anti-narcotics military operation” in Catatumbo.¹⁸

Operación Perseo (Operation Perseus)

On 12 October 2024, the Ejército Nacional de Colombia (Colombian National Army) launched ‘Operación Perseo’, aiming to retake the town of El Plateado in the municipality of Argelia, in southern Cauca, a region with a strong presence of the EMC and the ELN and a high concentration of drug production.¹⁹ This operation forms part of the so-called ‘Misión Cauca’, the government’s project for the profound transformation of territories ravaged by armed conflict.²⁰ El Plateado, a town with approximately 8,000 inhabitants, has been an EMC stronghold for several years. The EMC controls illegal economic activity in this town, especially the production and trafficking of cocaine in the Cañón del Micay area.²¹

Ceasefires and the ‘total peace’ process

During the reporting period, several ceasefires were agreed to, and hostilities were suspended as a part of President Petro’s ‘total peace’ policy. In respect of the bilateral ceasefires established between the government and various armed groups, notably, on 30 June 2023, the six-month bilateral ceasefires between the government and the Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada(ACSN), as well as with the Segunda Marquetalia (SM), which had been agreed upon in December 2022, ended without renewal.²² Both groups, however, subsequently initiated peace talks with the government – the SM in June 2024 and the ACSN in February 2025.²³ The talks with the ACSN remain ongoing, while the SM disengaged from the total peace process after its splintering in November 2024.²⁴

The Colombian government agreed to a bilateral ceasefire with the ELN for 180 days on 3 August 2023.²⁵ On 29 January 2024, the parties agreed on a seven-day extension after the expiration of the ceasefire to allow for discussions. This extension was contingent upon establishing specified terms.²⁶ Following protracted negotiations, an extension of a further six months was agreed on 5 February 2024, coming into effect the following day. ²⁷ This bilateral ceasefire expired on 3 August 2024 and was not extended by the parties.²⁸ After peace talks had initially resumed in November 2024, they were once again suspended in January 2025 following attacks carried out by the ELN in the Catatumbo region.²⁹

In addition to the agreement with the ELN, the government implemented a bilateral ceasefire with the EMC on 16 October 2023 for a period of three months.³⁰ This ceasefire agreement expired on 15 January 2024.³¹ The Government and the EMC agreed to an extension which came into effect on 16 January 2024 until 15 July 2024.³² However, after disagreements among members of the EMC, the EMBF formed as a splinter group.³³ The original EMC faction engaged with the government in a dialogue until 16 March 2024 when the government initiated a partial suspension of the ceasefire in the Cauca, Nariño and Valle del Cauca departments along the Pacific Coast.³⁴ This faction under the leadership of Iván Mordisco disengaged from peace talks following the April 2024 splintering.³⁵

A bilateral ceasefire with the EMBF, which remained at the negotiating table after the split from EMC, was extended until 15 October 2024 and again extended for a further six months until 15 April 2025.³⁶ On 17 April 2025, Petro’s government formally declared that the ceasefire with the EMBF would not be renewed, while emphasizing that the decision not to extend the truce under its original terms did not imply the suspension of or end to the peace talks.³⁷ However, only a few hours after the announcement of the end of the ceasefire, the Colombian president ordered a suspension of the offensive and of the special military operations by the police against members of the EMBF until 18 May 2025 and conditionally extended the previous ceasefire de facto.³⁸ In this context, President Gustavo Petro reached an agreement, called the Catatumbo agreement, with the EMBF’s Frente 33 early in May 2025 to create a ‘Temporary Location Zone’ in a rural area of Tibú.³⁹ This zone could operate in a manner analogous to the areas established for the surrender of weapons and a return to civilian life for former guerrillas of the FARC-EP.⁴⁰

On 19 December 2024, at the government’s dialogue table with Comuneros del Sur there was an agreement to introduce a 180-day ceasefire beginning in January 2025 and to implement a procedure to destroy the group’s weapons.⁴¹ At the end of a meeting with the Comuneros del Sur on 6 April 2025, during which the armed group agreed to progressively disarm, the President ordered the destruction of more than 500 explosive devices that were handed over as a part of the peace agreement. It is widely recognized as the first significant achievement of Gustavo Petro’s ‘total peace’ process.⁴² The remainder of the weapons were expected to be handed over and destroyed before the end of July 2025 and the process is subject to international verification.⁴³ The Comuneros del Sur further consented to replacing 5,000 hectares under coca cultivation (for cocaine) with an alternative crop.⁴⁴ The seventh round of talks between Gustavo Petro’s government and the Southern Comuneros was held in Nariño on 10 June 2025. During the talks, the group reached four agreements, one of which was the creation of a Temporary Location Zone in the municipality of Mallama, Nariño.⁴⁵

Currently, a peace process is underway with talks taking place between the Colombian government and a splinter group of SM, Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB). Even though the arrest of Geovany Andrés Rojas, alias Araña, by agents of the Attorney General’s Office acting on an Interpol Red Notice of Extradition at the close of a third round of talks in Bogotá on 12 February 2025 temporarily suspended negotiations, the CNEB agreed to renew talks in April 2025.⁴⁶ The preliminary agreements, reached at the fourth round of talks on 10 April 2025, include support for the voluntary substitution of illicit crops, the CNEB respecting IHL, and the definition of a ‘roadmap’ towards a definitive peace agreement.⁴⁷ The government also formally acknowledged the formation of so-called Temporary Location Zones on 25 May 2025 for demobilization, disarmament and reintegration programmes for dissident fighters and further aspects of the peace talks.⁴⁸ In July 2025, Agreement No. 12 was ratified, establishing the ‘Delivery, Verification and Progressive Destruction of War Material’ and approving the ‘Protocol on the Process of Destruction of War Material’.⁴⁹

The splintering of several armed groups on Colombian territory

During the review period, several armed groups in Colombia splintered, resulting in further fragmentation and an even greater number of factions. This part of the report highlights three of the most significant of these splintering processes.

First, the ELN fragmented. On 7 May 2024, the Comuneros del Sur faction declared its complete disassociation from the ELN Central Command.⁵⁰ It blamed its decision on the ELN’s refusal to engage in more aggressive actions and on the prevailing leadership model of political exile in ELN structures.⁵¹ Reports suggest, however, that the splintering of the group is primarily due to disagreements concerning the distribution of criminal finances – the ELN Central Command intended to assume complete control of the illegal funds and the resources generated by the Comuneros del Sur in Nariño.⁵² The Colombian government consented to enter into a peace negotiation with Comuneros del Sur as an autonomous entity, as a result of the splintering of the ELN. ⁵³

The EMC experienced two significant divisions during the review period. The EMC itself is a splinter group that split from the pre-2016 FARC-EP. The first fragmentation occurred when the ‘Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez’ broke away from the EMC’s ‘Adán Izquierdo Company’.⁵⁴ Their departure occurred after a video circulated via social media on 27 November 2023, in which an individual known as ‘Óscar Barreto’ declared the establishment of a new splinter group.⁵⁵ The rift between the two entities seemingly stemmed from their ideological disparity and disputes over territorial control.⁵⁶ The second split from the EMC during this period occurred on 6 April 2024 when the EMBF declared its separation from the EMC. This division is a result of tensions over the group’s participation in peace negotiations with Gustavo Petro’s government after the regional termination of the EMC’s March 2024 ceasefire. Following separation from the EMC, the EMBF continued to participate in peace negotiations with the government.⁵⁷

The third significant splinter event relates to the SM, which formerly was a part of the now defunct FARC-EP. The SM divided into two factions during November 2024.⁵⁸ The smaller faction continues to be designated the SM, whereas the larger breakaway group identifies as the CNEB. At the time of reporting, CNEB is engaged in peace talks with the government, whereas Segunda Marquetalia is not.⁵⁹ The other two major armed groups operating in Colombia, the EGC and the ACSN, also known as Los Pachenca, did not undergo significant splintering during the reporting period.

Unprecedented series of bombings by EMC in June 2025 following the attempted assassination of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe in Bogotá

On 10 June 2025, the FARC-EP dissident group EMC, led by a commander known as ‘Iván Mordisco’, launched an unparalleled series of synchronised bombings across the departments of Cauca and Valle de Cauca along the Pacific coast.⁶⁰ About twenty-six attacks, which included car bombs and drones, were directed at police stations and patrols, some of which took place in Colombia’s third-largest city, Cali.⁶¹

The towns of Buenos Aires, Caloto, Corinto, Jamundí, and Morales have been hit by further attacks, according to the Ministry of Defence.⁶² Carlos Fernando Triana, the national police chief, stated that the attackers had used a variety of weapons in their attack, including car bombs, motorcycle bombs, rifle fire, and a suspected drone.⁶³ At least two police officers and five civilians were killed in the attacks, and at least fifty people were wounded.⁶⁴ In response, operations were immediately launched by security forces against the EMC in the region. ‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group. The assaults occurred just days after an attempted assassination of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe on 7 June 2025 in Bogotá, which put the country on heightened alert and signalled an escalation in Colombia’s security crisis.⁶⁵

Increasing numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs)

It is reported that around 7.3 million people were internally displaced at the end of 2024 due to ongoing conflict and drug-related violence.⁶⁶ This figure represents a very large increase on the 5.1 million recorded in 2023.⁶⁷ However, some of the increase is attributable to the government’s adjustment of the number of individuals who continue to encounter vulnerabilities associated with their displacement.⁶⁸ Norte de Santander, the Catatumbo region that borders Venezuela, witnessed a substantial surge in violence and displacement, particularly towards the end of 2024, resulting in a significant influx of individuals into urban areas.⁶⁹ In Colombia, however, it is difficult to attribute IDPs exclusively to NIAC-related fighting or to the omnipresent gang violence associated with the drug trade.⁷⁰

Non-international armed conflict between Colombia and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)

Background

The ELN is an armed group founded in 1963 whose ideology is predicated on revolutionary terrorism, drawing inspiration from the ideas of Cuban leader Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, as well as the liberation theology of a Peruvian Catholic priest.¹ Although the Colombian military wiped out most of the ELN in 1973, the group was able to recover and rebuild itself from just sixty-five members.²

The first peace talks with the Colombian government were held in 1975.³ Further talks took place in 1994, 1998, 2005–08, and 2014, but were unsuccessful.⁴ In 2022, the ELN recommenced peace negotiations with the newly elected Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, under the auspices of his ‘total peace’ policy. The peace dialogues have experienced considerable turbulence but in May 2024, the parties reached agreement on a one-year ceasefire, representing the most substantial advancement in the history of the peace dialogues involving the ELN. The resurgence of violence in January 2025, however, prompted Colombian President Petro to suspend peace negotiations with the group.⁵

Intensity

Although there were lulls in fighting during the reporting period due to the peace negotiations that ultimately failed, in the absence of a ceasefire agreement and a lasting cessation of armed confrontations without real risk of resumption, the pre-existing⁶ Additional Protocol II-type NIAC between the parties to the conflict is ongoing.⁷

As of June 2024, it was reported that the ELN had 6,000 fighters and networks of militants infiltrating the civilian population.⁸ Its organizational structure and substantial membership allow the ELN to continue to exercise military control over substantial parts of the territory of Colombia.⁹ This also confirms that the ELN can execute sustained and concerted military operations to ensure that such territory escapes governmental control.¹⁰ These territories include parts of the Catatumbo region in Norte de Santander department,¹¹ specifically Ocaña and Sardinata,¹² as well as San José del Palmar in the Chocó department.

On 17 September 2024, and despite the peace talks, the ELN launched an attack against a Colombian military base. The ELN used artisanal explosives in the attack that killed two soldiers and injured a further twenty-four.¹³ The ELN also clashed with the Colombian National Army on 15 October 2024, resulting in the death of one soldier.¹⁴ During March 2025, this NIAC intensified with at least twenty clashes recorded, the highest frequency since January 2018.¹⁵

The ELN is equipped with AK-47 assault rifles,¹⁶ other small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, landmines, explosives and mortars.¹⁷ The ELN has used drones, both for surveillance but also to bomb the Colombian National Army.¹⁸

More than seven million IDPs were reported as of the middle of 2024 in Colombia.¹⁹ Part of the displacement is caused by conflict and the drug trade – two situations to which the ELN contributes. However, it is not possible to determine the exact number of IDPs whose displacement can be attributed directly to the activities of the ELN.

Organization

The ELN has a decentralized,²⁰ but complex command structure.²¹ The highest hierarchical structure of the ELN armed wing is the so-called Comando Central (COCE), which oversees all ELN operations, including military operations. The Dirección Nacional (National Directorate) is tasked by the COCE with coordinating ‘war fronts’, which are combat units that operate in parallel and are led by a commander, a political leader and a military leader.²² The Dirección Nacional is made up of 23 members elected by the eight war fronts.²³ Because the ELN follows a confederate structure, the war fronts remain financially and operationally independent.²⁴ The war front leadership-structures allow fighters to be disciplined and constitute evidence of the ELN’s ability to implement IHL. In the Akayesu case, a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) considered the notion of ‘responsible command’ and concluded that structured leadership is indicative of the fact that the organization of a group has reached a sophisticated level. The Trial Chamber found that the fact that the leadership was answerable to authority showed that leadership was sufficiently structured.²⁵ Responsible command is one of the requirements to trigger the application of Additional Protocol II.²⁶

The majority of the ELN leadership operate from Venezuela,²⁷ with other leaders operating from Cuba.²⁸ The ELN established its current headquarters in Havana.²⁹ At the time of reporting, the commander-in-chief of the ELN’s military wing and the overall leader of the group was Eliécer Erlinto Chamorro (or Eliecer Herlinto Chamorro Acosta), alias “Antonio García”.³⁰ The second-in-command of the military wing was Israel Ramírez Pineda, alias ‘Pablo Beltrán’, who fulfils various political roles in the organization, including being responsible for recruiting new fighters.³¹ Gustavo Aníbal Giraldo Quinchía, alias ‘Pablito’ or ‘Carlos Marín Guarín’, is third-in-command and oversees relations between the COCE and the war fronts.³²

The armed wing is funded through the ELN’s cross-border drug trade operations to Ecuador and Venezuela. The ELN grows coca and produces cocaine. Well-established drug routes and networks enhance the logistical capability of this group.³³

An example of a military tactic employed by the ELN is to use as escape routes the border routes between Colombia and Venezuela that typically are used by the drug trade when the Colombian National Army is in the area.³⁴ The group patrols in small groups of no more than thirty fighters. This practice, coupled with a growing membership, makes it a challenge for Colombia and Venezuela to address.³⁵ The ELN’s presence in Colombia and Venezuela makes the classification of the group complex but it is clearly adaptable. In Venezuela, the group is a paramilitary force that supports the Venezuelan government, whereas in Colombia, it is a guerrilla force fighting the Colombian government.³⁶ The ELN has installed anti-personnel mines around its camps as protection and a means of limiting access by law enforcement.³⁷ According to the CIA, the ELN’s typical military tactics include mortaring police stations and military bases; planting explosive devices on hard targets such as pipelines and electric pylons; and conducting ambushes, roadblocks and sniper attacks.³⁸

Pablo Beltrán is its chief negotiator, often representing the ELN in public and to the media.³⁹ The ELN has an official website which it uses to communicate with one voice.⁴⁰

Territorial control is a requirement of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. The ELN exercises control over parts of the territory of Casigua El Cubo, specifically south of Lake Maracaibo, which borders on Venezuela’s Zulia state.⁴¹ The ELN has managed to consolidate territory under its control over parts of the Catatumbo region in the Norte de Santander department,⁴² including Ocaña, Convención and Sardinata.The nature of control exercised by the ELN in this region is more sophisticated than military control, as it includes social control over the civilian population.⁴³ The ELN also exercises consolidated control over parts of the Chocó department, including the urban centre of San José del Palmar, parts of San Juan subregion, seventeen villages in the La Italia district, thirteen villages in the San Pedro de Ingará district, as well as the Embera Chamí Copé del Río Ingará, the Sabaletera San Onofre y El Tigre, and the Alto Bonito Vira Vira reservations.⁴⁴ Such consolidated control enables the ELN to launch sufficiently sustained and concerted operations,⁴⁵ and sufficiently dominate territory under its control so as to escape the control of the armed forces.⁴⁶ Control over territory confirms the sophisticated degree of organization of the ELN, which is confirmation that the status accorded to the leadership of the ELN is akin to responsible command.⁴⁷ The combination of responsible command and control over territory enables the ELN to implement Additional Protocol II. It must be stressed that Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II does not necessitate actual implementation but only such a capability.⁴⁸

The organizational structure of the ELN is sophisticated and complies with the four organizational requirements under Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. Hence, the NIAC between Colombia and the ELN constitutes an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC.

1
‘Ejército de Liberacion Nacional (ELN)’, Kennisbank Terrorisrische Organisaties, 20 January 2025; ‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, Colombia Reports, 14 May 2022; ‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024.
2
‘National Liberation Army (Colombia)’, Mapping Militants Project, 3 December 2024.
3
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024; S. Castillo, ‘Proceso de Paz con el ELN: diálogos regionales como alternativa histórica’, Indepaz, 30 April 2024.
4
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024; S. Castillo, ‘Proceso de Paz con el ELN: diálogos regionales como alternativa histórica’, Indepaz, 30 April 2024.
5
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024; S. Castillo, ‘Proceso de Paz con el ELN: diálogos regionales como alternativa histórica’, Indepaz, 30 April 2024; ‘Colombia halts peace talks with ELN rebels and accuses them of war crimes in northeastern region’, AP News, 18 January 2025; J. Freixes, ‘Colombia and ELN Guerrilla to Meet in Venezuela to ‘Unfreeze’ Peace Talks’, Colombia One, 1 November 2024; ‘¿En qué van los diálogos de paz con ELN? La línea de tiempo con los momentos clave’, El Espectador, 15 April 2024; S. Torrado, ‘Proceso de paz con el ELN: fin del cese al fuego, secuestro y suspensión de los diálogos con el Gobierno Petro’, El Pais, 6 June 2025.
6
‘Humanitarian Report 2024: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross; ‘Humanitarian Challenges 2025: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross.
7
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” is Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 19.
8
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024; S. Rodriguez Álvarez, ‘Cifras secretas del gobierno confirman que todos los grupos armados crecieron’, La Silla Vacía, 13 March 2024; A. Busch, ‘Kolumbiens Albtraum ist zurück: die ELN-Guerilla startet einen Grossangriff’, NZZ, 11 February 2025; ‘Terrorist Organizations’, Central Intelligence Agency.
9
A. Diaz Castro, ‘The ELN – Colombia’s last guerrilla’, London politica.
10
M. M. Bradley, ‘Additional Protocol II: Elevating the minimum threshold of intensity?’, International Review of the Red Cross, 2020.
11
R. Emblin, ‘ELN commanders claim Petro’s Total Peace is becoming “Total War”’, The City Paper, 10 March 2025.
12
‘El Catatumbo padece la emergencia humanitaria más grande desde que hay registro en Colombia, a causa del conflicto armado’, Defensoría del pueblo, 6 May 2025; ‘Consolidación territorial del ELN en San José del Palmar (Chocó) e interés del Ejército Gaitanista por la zona tienen en riesgo a su población’, Defensoría del pueblo, 6 June 2025.
13
A. Pérez, ‘Petro: Friedensprozess mit ELN in Kolumbien beendet’, Amerika21, 19 September 2024; ‘Colombia suspends peace talks with ELN rebels’, Deutsche Welle, 19 September 2024.
14
‘Francotirador del ELN asesinó a un soldado profesional e hirió otro en el departamento del Cesar’, Diario del Norte, 15 October 2024.
15
L. Calderón et al, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean, April 2025’, ACLED, 3 April 2025.
16
‘Ejército de Liberacion Nacional (ELN)’, Nationaal coördinator terrorismebestrijding en veiligheid, 20 January 2025.
17
‘Terrorist Organizations’, Central Intelligence Agency.
18
L. Bonilla, ‘Drones de guerra: así operan los grupos colombianos la nueva arma que siembra terror’, El Espectador, 24 April 2025.
19
‘Colombia situation’, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2025.
20
‘National Liberation Army (Colombia)’, Mapping Militants Project, 3 December 2024.
21
A. Diaz Castro, ‘The ELN – Colombia’s last guerrilla’, London politica; J. Jules, ‘Así está distribuido el ELN en Colombia, según informes de inteligencia’, RCN Radio, 30 January 2019.
22
‘Ejército de Liberacion Nacional (ELN)’, Nationaal coördinator terrorismebestrijding en veiligheid, 20 January 2025; ‘National Liberation Army (Colombia)’, Mapping Militants Project, 3 December 2024; ‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024.
23
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024.
24
J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025; A. Diaz Castro, ‘The ELN – Colombia’s last guerrilla’, London politica; J. Jules, ‘Así está distribuido el ELN en Colombia, según informes de inteligencia’, RCN Radio, 30 January 2019.
25
ICTR, ‘The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu’, Chamber I,Judgment, 2 September 1998, para 623.
26
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases.
27
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024.
28
L. Loaiza, ‘US Pressure on Cuba to Extradite ELN Leaders Unlikely to Succeed’, InSight Crime, 18 May 2020.
29
M. Romero, ‘Colombia exige a Cuba que entregue a los jefes guerrilleros del ELN’, France 24, 11 September 2019.
30
‘Eliecer Erlinto Chamorro, alias ‘Antonio Garcia’’, InSight Crime, 24 June 2021.
31
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, Counter terrorism guide, October 2022; ‘National Liberation Army (Colombia)’, Mapping Militants Project, 3 December 2024.
32
‘Gustavo Aníbal Giraldo, alias ‘Pablito’’, InSight Crime, 3 October 2022; ‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, October 2022; ‘National Liberation Army (Colombia)’, Mapping Militants Project, 3 December 2024.
33
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024; Unidad Investigative de Venezuela, ‘Rebels and Paramilitaries: Colombia’s Guerrillas in Venezuela’, InSight Crime, 3 October 2022; ‘Ejército de Liberacion Nacional (ELN)’, Nationaal coördinator terrorismebestrijding en veiligheid, 20 January 2025.
34
A. Diaz Castro, ‘The ELN – Colombia’s last guerrilla’, London politica.
35
L. J. Acosta and H. Murphy, ‘Violentos grupos rivales llenan vacío de las FARC en Colombia: Una paz quebrantada’, Reuters, 26 April 2018.
36
A. Diaz Castro, ‘The ELN – Colombia’s last guerrilla’, London politica.
37
M. V. Llorente and J. C. Garzón V., ‘¿Qué hacer con el ELN? Opciones para no cerrar la puerta a una salida negociada’, Fundación ideas para la paz, 28 January 2020.
38
‘Terrorist Organizations’, Central Intelligence Agency.
39
W. Grant and D. Pardo, ‘”El ELN y Maduro combaten un enemigo común”: entrevista con Pablo Beltrán, negociador de la guerrilla’, BBC, 20 August 2020.
40
See, ‘ELN Voces’, ELN Voces.
41
‘Colombia Defense Minister Vows ‘Full Force’ Against Guerrillas’, The defense post, 17 March 2025; ‘In Casigua El Cubo, No One Dares Speak of Those Who Rule: The ELN’, Connectas.
42
R. Emblin, ‘ELN commanders claim Petro’s Total Peace is becoming “Total War”’, The City Paper, 10 March 2025.
43
‘El Catatumbo padece la emergencia humanitaria más grande desde que hay registro en Colombia, a causa del conflicto armado’, Defensoría del pueblo, 6 May 2025.
44
‘Consolidación territorial del ELN en San José del Palmar (Chocó) e interés del Ejército Gaitanista por la zona tienen en riesgo a su población’, Defensoría del pueblo, 6 June 2025.
45
SCSL, ‘Prosecutor v Moimina Fofana and Allieu Kandewa’, Trial Chamber I, Judgement, 2 August 2007, para 126.
46
ICTR, ‘Prosecutor v Alfred Musema’, Trial Chamber I, Judgment and Sentence, 27 January 2000, para 258.
47
M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol ii in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021.
48
ICTR, ‘The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu’, Chamber I,Judgment, 2 September 1998, para 623; ICTR, ‘Prosecutor v Alfred Musema’, Trial Chamber I, Judgment and Sentence, 27 January 2000, para 258; A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.38.

Non-international armed conflict between Colombia and the Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC) (formerly Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC))

Background

The Colombian National Army and the Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC) have fought each other for almost two decades.¹ This pre-existing Additional Protocol II-type NIAC in Colombia continued throughout the reporting period.²

The EGC (also known as the Gulf Clan or Clan del Golfo),³ is active in both criminal activity and politics, and undertakes military-style operations.⁴ The EGC was established by dissidents from the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)),⁵ who opposed the 2006 demobilisation process. The EGC has since become a powerful transnational drug-trafficking operation, supported by its armed wing.⁶ The EGC is considered one of the largest international cocaine distributors.⁷ The EGC itself has no clear ideological origin story and its political ideals are said by commentators to be curated to fit its interests at any given time.⁸

Intensity

Several attacks occurred between the Colombian National Army and the EGC throughout the reporting period. Attacks include a 12 July 2023 Colombian National Army military operation launched against an EGC training camp in Lorica (Córdoba department). One EGC fighter was killed and a further five were captured.⁹ The Colombian National Army and the EGC clashed again on 22 July 2023, resulting in the death of one soldier.¹⁰ Two days of heavy fighting erupted between these enemies from 16 February to 17 February 2024 in Segovia (Antioquia department). One EGC fighter was killed and at least four army soldiers were killed and a further seven injured.¹¹ On 15 March 2025, the Colombian National Army and the EGC fought again in Mutatá (Antioquia department). Three EGC fighters were killed, and five fighters were arrested.¹² Fighting intensified just ten days later on 25 March 2025 when the Colombian National Army used drones to target the EGC in Segovia (Antioquia department). At least nine EGC fighters were killed.¹³ Military operations supported by police throughout April 2025 led to the arrest of more than 120 EGC fighters.¹⁴ Several airstrikes were launched by the Colombian National Army against the EGC on 8 April 2025. These strikes resulted in at least eight EGC casualties.¹⁵ The Colombian National Army launched another high-intensity military operation against the EGC in the Risaralda department on 3 May 2025, triggering several explosions.¹⁶

The EGC has retained control over territory key to its illegal activities despite the best efforts of the Colombian National Army.¹⁷ This is in despite of a presidential decree called the ‘Misión Cauca’ strategy,¹⁸ launched in May 2024 to combat armed groups and, specifically, EGC strongholds in Antioquia, Chocó and Córdoba.¹⁹ Territory under the EGC’s command enables it to launch planned and prolonged military operations. Such military operations, in turn, ensure that the EGC retains territorial control over key territories.²⁰

The EGC, among other weapons, deploys explosive devices and assault rifles.²¹ The EGC, by 2023, had an estimated 5,000 active fighters. Between 2019 and 2024, the group significantly expanded its territory, growing from 213 to 392 municipalities and expanded its presence into 24 of Colombia’s 32 departments.²²

Internal displacement remained at high levels throughout 2024.²³ However, it is difficult to attribute figures to the EGC specifically since multiple armed groups operate in multiple districts, all potentially contributing to the problem.

Organization

The EGC is divided into three overall branches: the political branch, the military branch and the economic branch.²⁴ The armed wing of the EGC consists of decentralized cells.²⁵. Essentially, local cells are directly commanded by its leadership in Urabá while other cells (mostly local criminal organizations using the EGC moniker) are expected to be activated when they receive instructions.²⁶

The structure of the military wing of the EGC is akin to that of a conventional armed force. The military commander of each cell is responsible for military operations executed by the squadrons, fronts and blocs under their direct command.²⁷ The smallest units are squadrons which consist of ten fighters, a commander, and a deputy commander. The size of these smaller groups facilitates its formation of linkages and fostering of relations with local communities. Sections consist of twenty fighters; a group comprises four squadrons; and companies consist of two groups. Fronts, at a minimum, are made up of two groups; blocs consist of at least two fronts.²⁸

The EGC’s armed wing is divided into five structured blocs.²⁹ The ‘Juan de Dios Úsuga’ Central Bloc of Urabá is the main bloc located in the Gulf of Urabá. Older blocs include the Jairo de Jesús Durango Bloc (in Chocó and south-western Antioquia) and the Roberto Vargas Bloc (in Córdoba, north-east Antioquia, and Bajo Cauca). Two newer blocs were established recently; one is called Arístides Meza Bloc, previously known under the name Erlin Pino.³⁰

The EGC achieves discipline not only owing to its organizational structure but also through social norms and rules of conduct imposed in regions it controls.³¹ The EGC’s approach to discipline is described as using a ‘carrot and stick’ approach.³² On the official website, the EGC publishes its disciplinary code and pledges its commitment to IHL.³³ The EGC boasts a sophisticated command structure which enables it to implement IHL. The combination of such sophisticated command structure and territorial control functionally enables the ELN to have the capacity to implement Additional Protocol II as demanded by Article 1(1) of this instrument.³⁴

Local cells are financially self-sufficient, a situation which enhances the EGCs logistical capacity.³⁵ It is reported that the EGC pays salaries to those in charge of armed and logistical operations through a sophisticated payroll system.³⁶ The EGC is known to follow a ‘franchise model’ in that they outsource services, including logistics.³⁷

The training of EGC fighters is made possible by a membership consisting of former guerillas who are in charge of training.³⁸ The military tactics employed by the EGC correspond to those of guerilla or paramilitary groups with a minor difference in that they do not set up large military camps. Territorial control is supported through a network of unpaid informers. Fighters are reported as being highly mobile – the EGC forces advance, engage the enemy, and leave. They employ checkpoints to secure territory under their control.³⁹

The EGC speaks with one voice through its website launched in 2024, ‘El Gaitanista’.⁴⁰ The editorial team publishes frequent communiqués.⁴¹

The EGC is sufficiently organized to exercise control over territory.⁴² Territory under the control of the EGC includes its headquarters and territorial stronghold around the Gulf of Urabá in the departments of Antioquia and Chocó, and stretching into the Córdoba department. The EGC also exercises control over parts of the Caribbean coast, in the city of Medellín, and in departments such as La Guajira, Santander, Valle del Cauca, and Norte de Santander,⁴³ as well as territory in the Upper, Middle and Lower Atrato regions.⁴⁴ The EGC’s military campaigns have been so successful that it expanded its territorial control throughout the reporting period.⁴⁵ This includes into territory in the Chocó region.⁴⁶In the Akayesu case, an ICTR Trial Chamber considered the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)’s ability to not only exercise control over Rwandan territory but to increase the size of the territory over which it exercised control to confirm the RPF had structured leadership akin to responsible command.⁴⁷ Similarly, the EGC has managed to obtain more territory. The sophisticated nature of the EGCs command structure and its ability to not only retain control over territory but to expand its territorial control confirms that the EGC has responsible command. This also enables the EGC to launch sustained and concerted military operations, to retain control over existing territory, and to gain control over more territory.⁴⁸ Similarly, the territorial control is functional in nature; the territories under the control of the EGC allow it to execute planned military operations on a frequent basis,⁴⁹ and the combination of territorial control and responsible command enables this group to implement Additional Protocol II.

The organizational structure of the EGC is sophisticated and complies with the four organizational requirements under Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. Hence, the NIAC between the EGC and Colombia constitutes an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC.

1
‘¿Qué es el Clan del Golfo? Historia y líderes de la nueva generación de narcos de Colombia’, CCN Español, 10 May 2022.
2
‘Humanitarian Report 2024: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross.
3
J. Freixes, ‘Gulf Clan, a History of Death and Crime in Colombia’, Colombia One, 16 February 2025.
4
‘The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas’, International Crisis Group, 19 March 2024; E. Dickinson, ‘Las Autodefensas Gaitanistas (AGC): ¿epílogo de la Paz Total?’, Razon Publica, 11 August 2024.
5
‘United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)’, InSight Crime, 11 June 2024.
6
L. Schmidt, ‘Power Play or Peace? AGC’s Role in Colombia’s Fragile Negotiations’, InSight Crime, 16 October 2024; ‘Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC) / Gulf Clan’, Colombia Reports, 21 October 2025.
7
J. Freixes, ‘Gulf Clan, a History of Death and Crime in Colombia’, Colombia One, 16 February 2025.
8
R. Badillo-Sarmiento and L. F. Trejos-Rosero, ‘Las Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia como grupo armado politizado’, Revista Científica, 1 April 2023.
9
T. Munevar, ‘Ejército ocupó un campo de entrenamiento del clan del Golfo en Córdoba: había tres personas secuestradas e importante arsenal de guerra’, Infobae, 12 July 2023.
10
‘El Ejército reportó el asesinato de un soldado en zona rural de Tierralta, Córdoba’, Caracol Radio, 23 July 2023; J. D. Rodríguez, ‘En medio de operativos contra el Clan del Golfo resultó muerto el soldado profesional Alexis Mosquera Ríos’, Infobae, 23 July 2023.
11
‘Al menos 4 militares muertos en combates contra las AGC en Segovia, Antioquia’, Bolívar El Heraldo, 16 February 2024; ‘Combates entre Ejercito y AGC dejan cuatro militares muertos en Segovia, Antioquia’, Caracol Radio, 16 February 2024.
12
P. Naranjo, ‘Tres miembros del Clan del Golfo fueron abatidos tras intensos combates con el Ejército en Antioquia’, Infobae, 15 March 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean’, International Crisis Group.
13
D. Alejandro Buitrago, ‘Fuerza pública intensifica operativos contra el Clan del Golfo en Segovia, Antioquía, tras el asesinato de Jaime Gallego, líder minero de la zona’, Infobae, 24 March 2025; M. Zapata Correa, ‘Ejército enfrenta al Clan del Golfo en Segovia, Antioquia’, La FM, 24 March 2025.
14
‘Plan pistola: van más de 120 integrantes del Clan del Golfo capturados’, El Espectador, 5 May 2025; J. D. Torres Lasso, ‘Autoridades, en alerta máxima por ‘plan pistola’ de grupos ilegales contra la Fuerza Pública: van 17 asesinados’, El Tiempo, 26 April 2025.
15
‘Mindefensa confirma 8 muertos y 2 capturados del Clan del Golfo en Antioquia’, País El Heraldo, 9 April 2025; Y. Gualdrón, ‘Revelan videos de bombardeos en el Bajo Cauca que dejaron 8 miembros del Clan del Golfo muertos’, Teleantioquia, 9 April 2025.
16
L. Usma, ‘Violentos enfrentamientos del Ejército y el Clan del Golfo en Risaralda: serían seis las bajas de los delincuentes’, El Tiempo, 4 May 2025.
17
‘Thirty-Seventh Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission of the Organization of American States to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS)’, Organisation of America States, 2025, 6.
18
A. Rodriguez, ‘Colombia Launches ‘Mission Cauca’ to Safeguard Communities’, Colombia One, 22 June 2024.
19
‘Thirty-Seventh Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission of the Organization of American States to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS)’, Organisation of America States, 2025, 9.
20
M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol ii in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021; A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.40.
21
S. Olivares Tobón, ‘Confrontaciones dentro de las minas de Buriticá dejaron dos personas lesionadas’, El Colombiano, 2 October 2023.
22
E. Franco V. ‘Newly designated terrorist organization the Gulf Clan expands presence across Colombia’, Entorno, 25 March 2025.
23
‘Humanitarian Challenges 2025: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross.
24
E. Dickinson, ‘Las Autodefensas Gaitanistas (AGC): ¿epílogo de la Paz Total?’, Razon Publica, 11 August 2024.
25
‘Gaitanistas – Gulf Clan’, InSight Crime, 18 March 2025; ‘Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC) o Clan del Golfo’, Indepaz, July 2017
26
‘Gaitanistas – Gulf Clan’, InSight Crime, 18 March 2025; ‘Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC) o Clan del Golfo’, Fundación ideas para la paz, July 2017.
27
E. Dickinson, ‘Las Autodefensas Gaitanistas (AGC): ¿epílogo de la Paz Total?’, Razon Publica, 11 August 2024.
28
‘The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas’, International Crisis Group, 19 March 2024.
29
S. Rodriguez Álvarez, ‘Cifras secretas del gobierno confirman que todos los grupos armados crecieron’, La Silla Vacía, 13 March 2024; S. Rodriguez Álvarez, ‘“La empresa” del Clan: así creció la mayor amenaza armada de Colombia’, La Silla Vacía, 2 February 2024; ‘Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia y la Paz Total: Informe sobre su actividad 2022-2023 (primer semestre)’ Indepaz, 2023.
30
S. Rodriguez Álvarez, ‘“La empresa” del Clan: así creció la mayor amenaza armada de Colombia’, La Silla Vacía, 2 February 2024.
31
J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025.
32
S. Rodriguez Álvarez, ‘“La empresa” del Clan: así creció la mayor amenaza armada de Colombia’, La Silla Vacía, 2 February 2024.
33
‘Estatutos de Constitución y Régimen Disciplinario’, El Gaitanista.
34
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases.
35
‘Gaitanistas – Gulf Clan’, InSight Crime, 18 March 2025.
36
S. Rodriguez Álvarez, ‘“La empresa” del Clan: así creció la mayor amenaza armada de Colombia’, La Silla Vacía, 2 February 2024.
37
S. Rodriguez Álvarez, ‘“La empresa” del Clan: así creció la mayor amenaza armada de Colombia’, La Silla Vacía, 2 February 2024.
38
S. Rodriguez Álvarez, ‘“La empresa” del Clan: así creció la mayor amenaza armada de Colombia’, La Silla Vacía, 2 February 2024.
39
S. Rodriguez Álvarez, ‘“La empresa” del Clan: así creció la mayor amenaza armada de Colombia’, La Silla Vacía, 2 February 2024.
40
El Gaitanista; S. Rodriguez Álvarez, ‘“La empresa” del Clan: así creció la mayor amenaza armada de Colombia’, La Silla Vacía, 2 February 2024.
41
‘Comunicados’, El Gaitanista.
42
‘Thirty-Seventh Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission of the Organization of American States to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS)’, Organization of America States, 2025, 8.
43
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; ‘Gaitanistas – Gulf Clan’, InSight Crime, 18 March 2025.
44
‘EGC en el Chocó: violencia, poder y miedo’, Cinep, June 2025.
45
‘Gaitanistas – Gulf Clan’, InSight Crime, 18 March 2025; J. Scotland, ‘Gold Rush: Organised Crime in Transition Mineral Supply Chains’, Rusi, 12 May 2025.
46
‘EGC en el Chocó: violencia, poder y miedo’, Cinep, June 2025; ‘Petro to announce security measures as Gulf Clan escalates violence across Colombia’, The City Paper, 5 May 2025.
47
ICTR, ‘The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu’, Chamber I,Judgment, 2 September 1998, para 623.
48
M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol ii in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021.
49
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.40.

Non-international armed conflict between Colombia and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC)

Background

The pre-existing¹ NIAC between Colombia and the EM continued during the reporting period.² The EMC is the largest dissident group of the former FARC-EP and self-identifies as its successor.³ It was founded in mid-2017 after the group rejected the peace negotiations accepted by the parent and now defunct FARC-EP group in 2016.⁴ At that time, Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández, also known as ‘Iván Mordisco’, opted not to take part in the negotiations, instead holding on to his command of around 400 members of the former FARC-EP and maintaining control of drug trafficking routes in several south-eastern Colombian regions.⁵ In 2022, the EMC entered into peace negotiations with the government following Gustavo Petro’s inauguration as president, but the negotiation process was marked by significant challenges.⁶ In late 2023, the Colombian National Army advanced in the Cauca region, a stronghold of the EMC, which caused rifts within the criminal group.⁷ The group then broke up. The faction under Ivan Mordisco after the split then disengaged from peace talks with the government while the other faction of the EMC (the EMBF) continued negotiations with the government.⁸ Repeated efforts by the Colombian Government to achieve a peace deal with the EMC have not been successful.⁹ Clashes between the two parties were particularly frequent in the departments of Cauca and Valle del Cauca.¹⁰

Intensity

The Colombian National Army and EMC continued to clash frequently throughout the reporting period.¹¹ Multiple violent engagements were reported during July 2023,¹² September 2023,¹³ January,¹⁴ May,¹⁵ June,¹⁶ August,¹⁷ October,¹⁸ and November 2024,¹⁹ and March,²⁰ April,²¹ May,²² and June 2025.²³

Violence escalated during April 2024, just one week after the EMC once again withdrew from peace negotiations.²⁴ The Colombian National Army and Air Force launched a military operation against the EMC in El Plateado, a rural area of Argelia in the southern department of Cauca. The Colombian National Army used heavy artillery, including howitzers and long-range mortars, killing at least fifteen fighters and injuring at least twelve others.²⁵ Another significant attack and counter operation occurred between the two parties on 12 October 2024.²⁶ The EMC launched a drone attack killing at least seventeen civilians.²⁷ In response, President Petro ordered an aerial campaign,²⁸ as part of ‘Operation Perseus’ in an attempt to regain control over El Plateado, an EMC stronghold in the municipality of Argelia.²⁹ Several Colombian National Army divisions were also involved, along with the National Police and special forces units.³⁰ The frequency and nature of military operations launched by the EMC clearly show that this group plans its military operations. Such planned attacks meet the requirement under Article (1)1 of Additional Protocol II that attacks are to be concerted in nature.³¹

It is difficult to determine the death toll as neither the EMC nor the media reported the losses incurred by the EMC in the majority of the clashes that took place. The media did, however, frequently report on the death of soldiers involved in these clashes. For example, the July 2023 attacks resulted in the death of at least five Colombian soldiers and between one and seven dissident fighters.³² At least five soldiers died and six others were injured during the operations against the EMC in September 2023.³³ Attacks during April 2024 killed another soldier and left three injured,³⁴ while clashes in May 2024 reportedly killed at least nine soldiers.³⁵ Another three soldiers were killed during June 2024.³⁶ Another soldier was killed in November.³⁷ On 11 March 2025, the EMC used a remotely detonated bomb against a vehicle transporting soldiers in Balboa municipality, killing five soldiers and leaving another sixteen wounded.³⁸ During April 2025, six soldiers were killed.³⁹

Internal displacement figures from territories where the EMC fought the Colombian National Army remain high.⁴⁰ The EMC, however, does not fight only against the Colombian National Army, and other organized armed groups also engage in combat in some of these territories. As such, it is impossible to attribute a percentage of internally displaced persons directly to the fighting between the EMC and the Colombian National Army.

The Colombian Air Force increasingly employed aerial strikes against the EMC during the reporting period.⁴¹ In response, the EMC has acquired drone technology, using remotely piloted aircraft in several attacks, dropping explosive devices, including grenades, on its military targets.⁴² The EMC has also used explosives called ‘tatucos’ against the Colombian National Army.⁴³ Tatucos are improvised explosives that need to be activated from a ramp and are often cylinder or car bombs that require remote or timed ignition.⁴⁴

The nature of the military opposition posed by the EMC enabled by territory under its control has led the Colombian National Army to increasingly deploy soldiers in areas controlled by the EMC. For example, the deployment of special forces and at least 1,000 other soldiers in October 2024,⁴⁵ and the deployment of 400 more soldiers in March 2025 in the districts of Huisitó, Playa Rica, Juntas, Fondas, and Pandiguando, in the municipality of El Tambo, Cauca.⁴⁶

It is clear that the notion of intensity demanded under IHL is met in the armed violence between Colombian National Army and the EMC. The frequency, high intensity, and planned nature of the attacks initiated by the EMC illustrates the ability of the EMC to launch sustained and concerted military operations from territory under its control as required by Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II to trigger its application.⁴⁷

Organization

The EMC has a decentralized structure to its leadership with commanders in charge of different factions that fight in certain geographic areas. Individual commanders exercise control over the Jorge Suárez Briceño Bloc, Commander Gentil Duarte bloc, the Magdalena Medio Bloc, and the Carolina Ramírez Front.⁴⁸ In April 2024, the EMC fractured, with 60 per cent of the fighters remaining with the original group under the command of Iván Mordisco.The remaining 40 per cent are now led by Alexander Díaz Mendoza, alias ‘Calarcá’, and carry out activities under the name of EMBF.⁴⁹ After the EMC disengaged from peace talks with the government in April 2024 following their split from EMBF, it internally restructured, and several of its blocs – the Western Bloc, the Amazonas Bloc, the Isais Pardo Bloc and the Eastern Joint Command – were brought under the command of different leaders.⁵⁰

As well as a decentralized command structure for various geographically dispersed battalions, the EMC has a secretariat and a central command which oversees the battalions.⁵¹ Other reports, however, suggest that Iván Mordisco has absolute control over the EMC and that the command is not effectively decentralized.⁵²

The group has rules that inform its disciplinary system. The EMC imposes a strict code of conduct and exercises social control in the communities under its influence and prohibits crimes such as rape and robbery. Its command structure permits the existence of internal disciplinary systems in each of the decentralised regional command units and this practice further facilitates a capacity to implement IHL.⁵³ EMC fighters receive intensive military training,⁵⁴ which facilitates their training in IHL. EMC recruits learn, among other skills, how to handle explosive-laden drones.⁵⁵ The EMC’s sophisticated leadership structure is akin to responsible command which in turn enables the EMC to have the ability to implement Additional Protocol II.

It is a part of the military tactics of the EMC to form alliances to execute military operations. The practice is not without a challenge in that the EMC battalions in various regions may be fighting an armed group which is part of an alliance elsewhere.⁵⁶ The EMC controls several militarily important corridors as well as territory in several municipalities and along the Venezuelan border, all of which enhances its logistical capacity.⁵⁷ It funds its military activities using some of the profits from its criminal activities which include drug trafficking, illegal gold mining, extortion, kidnappings, contraband and money laundering.⁵⁸

Often, forced recruitment is employed to ensure full strength in the ranks of the military wing. The EMC also recruits children.⁵⁹ Figures provided by the Colombian Ministry of Defense suggest that EMC membership is growing, its ranks growing from 3,545 in 2022 to 3,860 in the first half of 2023.⁶⁰ Reports suggest that as of December 2024, the group had 6,000 fighters in its military wing.⁶¹

The EMC speaks with one voice through Andrey Avendaño (an alias) who, at the time of reporting, was the group’s spokesperson and chief negotiator.⁶²

Territorial control is an organizational criterion under Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II.⁶³ The EMC has its stronghold in the Amazon region, including in the departments of Guaviare, Meta, Caquetá, Vaupés and Guainía.⁶⁴ The EMC controls areas which are key access points to the Colombian Massif such as the areas of El Boquerón, Mata de Puro, Lerma and La Parada.⁶⁵ The EMC’s territorial control in certain territories extends to traditional governmental functions such as the building and maintenance of clinics, roads and bridges.⁶⁶ The EMC expanded its territorial control during the reporting period to include eight new municipalities in the Colombian Massif which includes parts of Bolívar, Sucre, Almaguer, La Vega, Rosas, La Sierra, San Sebastián and Santa Rosa, all in the department of Cauca.⁶⁷

The organizational structure of the EMC is sophisticated and complies with the four organizational requirements under Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. Hence, the NIAC between Colombian National Army and the EMC constitutes an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC.

1
‘Humanitarian Report 2024: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross; ‘Humanitarian Challenges 2025: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross.
2
‘Iván Mordisco, el líder de las disidencias de las FARC que vuelve al ruedo en Colombia’, Sputnik: Mundo, 23 May 2023.
3
M. Pérez Gallardo, ‘El Gobierno colombiano lanza la ‘Operación Perseo’ contra disidentes de las FARC’, France 24, 13 October 2024.
4
K. Johnson, ‘¿Cómo funciona internamente la disidencia del Estado Mayor Central de las FARC?’, Fundación conflict responses, 5 June 2023; C. Cohecha, ‘Colombia, EMC armed group begin peace process, suspend offensive actions’, Reuters, 9 October 2023.
5
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; ‘Central General Staff – Ex-FARC Mafia’, InSight Crime, 14 June 2024.
6
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; H. Shuldiner and S. Saffon, ‘From Total to Partial Peace: Colombia’s Talks With Crime Groups Fragment’, InSight Crime, 3 May 2024.
7
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; H. Shuldiner and S. Saffon, ‘From Total to Partial Peace: Colombia’s Talks With Crime Groups Fragment’, InSight Crime, 3 May 2024; O. M. López, ‘Comandante del Ejército ratificó operaciones contra disidencias hasta llegar a El Plateado en Argelia, Cauca’, Infobae, 29 August 2023.
8
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; H. Shuldiner and S. Saffon, ‘From Total to Partial Peace: Colombia’s Talks With Crime Groups Fragment’, InSight Crime, 3 May 2024.
9
C. Cohecha, ‘Colombia, EMC armed group begin peace process, suspend offensive actions’, Reuters, 9 October 2023; M. Pérez Gallardo, ‘El Gobierno colombiano lanza la ‘Operación Perseo’ contra disidentes de las FARC’, France 24, 13 October 2024; ‘Gobierno de Colombia suspende cese al fuego con una parte del EMC’, Voice of America, 16 July 2024; R. Cué Barberena, ‘El Gobierno colombiano finaliza tregua con el EMC, aunque la mantiene con algunas facciones’, France 24, 17 July 2024.
10
‘Un disidente de las FARC muere en un enfrentamiento con el Ejército en Colombia’, Swiss Info, 24 June 2024; F. Agudelo, ‘Así fue como el frente Carlos Patiño de las disidencias de las Farc ejecutó el ataque en contra de tropas del Ejército en Balboa, Cauca’, Infobae, 15 March 2025; ‘Diez disidentes de las Farc murieron en el Cauca: cuidaban la “retaguardia” de la estructura Carlos Patiño’, Semana, 5 March 2025; V. Parada Lugo, ‘La Defensoría del Pueblo confirma la liberación de los 29 integrantes de la Fuerza Pública retenidos en El Plateado’, El Pais, 9 March 2025; J. Ríos Monroy, ‘El Plateado: así opera por dentro la disidencia de FARC que Petro ordenó destruir’, El Espectador, 13 March 2025; ‘Siete muertos en múltiples ataques con disparos y explosivos de guerrilleros en Colombia’, RFI, 10 June 2025 (Updated 11 June 2025).
11
‘Colombia anuncia inicio de negociaciones de paz con disidentes de FARC’, Swiss info, 13 March 2023.
12
M. A. Rodríguez Forero, ‘Dos militares y un disidente de las Farc murieron en combates en Caquetá’, RCN Radio, 16 July 2023; S. Olivares Tobón, ‘Tres soldados murieron en combates contra estructuras criminales en Caquetá y Bolívar’, El Combiano, 16 July 2023; J. C. Rodríguez Parrado, ‘Combates entre Ejército Nacional y disidencias de las Farc en Caquetá dejan dos militares muertos’, Infobae, 16 July 2023; G. Bajonero Vásquez, ‘Fuerte enfrentamiento entre el Ejército y disidencias Farc en Antioquia’, El Tiempo, 18 July 2023.
13
‘Latin America & Caribbean’, International Crisis Group; S. Rodríguez Rey, ‘Disidencias de las Farc asesinó a un teniente y tres soldados en Nariño’, Infobae, 16 September 2023; R. Irausquin, ‘Disidentes de FARC matan a cuatro soldados colombianos en vísperas de reunión con gobierno’, Extra, 17 September 2023; ‘Un militar muerto, seis heridos y uno desaparecido deja un combate con disidentes de las FARC’, Ecuavisa, 29 September 2023.
14
A. L. Méndez, ‘FF.MM. afirman que fueron atacados por las disidencias: dos soldados murieron’, El Tiempo, 29 January 2024; S. Rairán, ‘Dos soldados muertos dejaron combates entre disidencias de las Farc y el Ejército en Nariño’, Infobae, 29 January 2024, April 2024, ‘Colombia: 15 disidentes de las FARC mueren en “la mayor acción” de la ofensiva contra el EMC’, France 24, 26 April 2024; ‘Un soldado muerto y tres heridos tras enfrentamientos en El Plateado, Cauca’, Cambio, 17 April 2024; F. M. Guitérrez, ‘Murió un soldado tras enfrentamiento entre el Ejército y disidencias de las Farc en Cauca’, Radio Nacional de Colombia, 17 April 2024.
15
‘El Ejército colombiano denuncia que disidencia de FARC profanó cuerpos de soldados muertos’, Swiss info, 6 May 2024; H. Shuldiner and S. Garcia, ‘High-Level Attack Punctuates Security Crisis in Southwestern Colombia’, InSight Crime, 16 June 2024; J. C. Rodríguez Parrado, ‘Dos soldados fueron asesinados por las disidencias de las Farc en zona rural de Silvia, Cauca’, Infobae, 6 May 2024; ‘Control del cañón del Micay enfrenta de nuevo a Ejército con disidencia de Mordisco en Cauca’, El Espectador, 6 May 2024.
16
H. Shuldiner and S. Garcia, ‘High-Level Attack Punctuates Security Crisis in Southwestern Colombia’, InSight Crime, 16 June 2024; ‘Ataque con drones en El Plateado, Cauca, dejó dos personas heridas y tres viviendas destruidas’, Noticias RCN, 17 June 2024; M. F. Arocha and J. Coenen, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean: June 2024’, ACLED, 8 July 2024; L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Atacan con drones a militares en Argelia, Cauca: hay varios heridos’, Infobae, 12 June 2024; ‘Un disidente de las FARC muere en un enfrentamiento con el Ejército en Colombia’, Swiss info, 24 June 2024.
17
N. R. Matta Colorado, ‘Un presunto disidente de las Farc murió y tres quedaron heridos en combate en Cauca’, El Colombiano, 8 August 2024; ‘Disidencias de las Farc de Mordisco se metieron a un colegio en el Huila mientras los alumnos recibían clases violando en DIH. Huían del Ejército’, Semana, 15 August 2024.
18
M. Grautoff, ‘Operación Perseo: Éxito militar y fracaso del Gobierno’, LR, 18 October 2024; ‘Fuerzas Militares lanzan Operación Perseo para recuperar El Plateado – Cauca’, Defensa, 12 October 2024; D. E. Reyes Espinosa, ‘Disidencias de ‘Iván Mordisco’ se refirieron por primera vez a la Operación Perseo en el cañón del Micay: “Es el resultado del envenenamiento de la cúpula militar”’, Infobae, 31 October 2024.
19
J. E. Neira, ‘Ejército dio de baja a 10 disidentes de las Farc en el Meta que pretendían enfrentarse a ‘Calarcá’’, Infobae, 9 November 2024; M. F. Arocha, et al, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean: November 2024’, ACLED, 9 December 2024; ‘Un combate entre el Ejército colombiano y disidentes de las FARC deja un muerto y tres heridos en el Valle del Cauca’, El Debate, 24 November 2024.
20
‘Diez disidentes de las Farc murieron en el Cauca: cuidaban la “retaguardia” de la estructura Carlos Patiño’, Semana, 5 March 2025; J. Ríos Monroy, ‘El Plateado: así opera por dentro la disidencia de FARC que Petro ordenó destruir’, El Espectador, 13 March 2025; F. Agudelo, ‘Así fue como el frente Carlos Patiño de las disidencias de las Farc ejecutó el ataque en contra de tropas del Ejército en Balboa, Cauca’, Infobae, 15 March 2025.
21
‘Latin America & Caribbean’, International Crisis Group; L. C. Fuentes, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean: April 2025’, ACLED, 3 April 2025; ‘Muere el jefe de una disidencia de las FARC en enfrentamientos con el Ejército en Colombia’, Swiss info, 9 April 2025; ‘Mueren seis militares colombianos en un ataque de la facción del EMC de las FARC en el sudeste de Colombia’, Infobae, 27 April 2025.
22
‘«Triste muerte para un colombiano»: Petro lamentó baja de guerrillero en combates en el Meta’, Vive el Meta, 17 May 2025; N. R. Matta Colorado, ‘Murió “Gato Feo”, el azote de bases militares en Meta’, El Colombiano, 15 May 2025; M. F. Tarazona Martínez, ‘Petro afirma que “Iván Mordisco cayó herido en combate y por días estuvo herido en la selva”’, La FM, 31 May 2025; ‘Cuatro militares colombianos resultan heridos por ataque con drones de disidentes de FARC’, Swiss Info, 24 May 2025.
23
A. Alsema, ‘At least three killed in wave of bomb attacks in southwest Colombia’, Colombia Reports, 10 June 2025; ‘At least 7 killed in explosions and attacks outside police stations in southwest Colombia’, AP News, 11 June 2025; ‘At least seven dead and 50 wounded as Colombia hit with bombings and gun attacks’, The Guardian, 10 June 2025; K. Johnson, ‘Ataques en Cauca y Valle: ¿otra ronda de lo mismo’, Razon Publica, 15 June 2025;‘Siete muertos en múltiples ataques con disparos y explosivos de guerrilleros en Colombia’, RFI, 10 June 2025 (Updated 11 June 2025); ‘Latin America & Caribbean’, International Crisis Group.
24
‘Colombia: abatidos 15 guerrilleros de las disidencias FARC’, DW, 25 April 2024; Ejército Nacional de Colombia, X, 25 April 2025.
25
L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Golpe contundente contra disidencias de las Farc en Argelia, Cauca: 15 subversivos fueron neutralizados’, Infobae, 25 April 2024; L. Reynoso, ‘“Si es guerra, es guerra”: 15 muertos del Estado Mayor Central por un ataque con artillería del Ejército’, El Pais, 26 April 2024;‘Colombia: 15 disidentes de las FARC mueren en “la mayor acción” de la ofensiva contra el EMC’, France 24, 26 April 2024; ‘Duro golpe al Estado Mayor Central en el Cauca: Ejército dio de baja a 15 disidentes en El Plateado’, El Colombiano, 25 April 2024.
26
‘Petro ordenó bombardear a disidentes de las FARC tras ataque con drones’, Cooperativa, 12 October 2024.
27
‘[ATTACK] FARC Dissidents Escalate Drone Attacks in Colombia’, Modern insurgent, 20 April 2025; M. Pérez Gallardo, ‘El Gobierno colombiano lanza la ‘Operación Perseo’ contra disidentes de las FARC’, France 24, 13 October 2024.
28
Gustavo Petro, X, 12 October 2024.
29
‘Petro ordenó bombardear a disidentes de las FARC tras ataque con drones’, Cooperativa, 12 October 2024.
30
‘Fuerzas Militares lanzan Operación Perseo para recuperar El Plateado – Cauca’, Comando general: Fuerza militares de Colombia, 12 October 2024.
31
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para1.40.
32
S. Olivares Tobón, ‘Tres soldados murieron en combates contra estructuras criminales en Caquetá y Bolívar’, El Combiano, 16 July 2023; C. Salazar, ‘Denuncian combates entre disidencias Farc en Putumayo: encontraron ocho cuerpos’, Infobae, 18 July 2023; G. Bajonero Vásquez, ‘Fuerte enfrentamiento entre el Ejército y disidencias Farc en Antioquia’, El Tiempo, 18 July 2023.
33
S. Rodríguez Rey, ‘Disidencias de las Farc asesinó a un teniente y tres soldados en Nariño’, Infobae, 16 September 2023; R. Irausquin, ‘Disidentes de FARC matan a cuatro soldados colombianos en vísperas de reunión con gobierno’, Extra, 17 September 2023; ‘Un militar muerto, seis heridos y uno desaparecido deja un combate con disidentes de las FARC’, Ecuavisa, 29 September 2023.
34
F. M. Guitérrez, ‘Murió un soldado tras enfrentamiento entre el Ejército y disidencias de las Farc en Cauca’, Radio Nacional de Colombia, 17 April 2024; J. D. Rodríguez, ‘Combates entre Ejército y disidencias Farc en Cauca: un militar asesinado y tres heridos’, W Radio, 17 April 2024.
35
‘Control del cañón del Micay enfrenta de nuevo a Ejército con disidencia de Mordisco en Cauca’, El Espectador, 6 May 2024; ‘Dos soldados colombianos mueren en un ataque de disidentes de las FARC en el Cauca’, Swiss Info, 7 May 2024; J. C. Rodríguez Parrado, ‘Dos soldados fueron asesinados por las disidencias de las Farc en zona rural de Silvia, Cauca’, Infobae, 6 May 2024; ‘El Ejército colombiano denuncia que disidencia de FARC profanó cuerpos de soldados muertos’, Swiss Info, 6 May 2024; P. C. B., ‘Gustavo Petro, tras la muerte de cuatro soldados: “La ofensiva contra el EMC en el Cauca debe ser total”’, El Pais, 7 May 2024.
36
L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Atacan con drones a militares en Argelia, Cauca: hay varios heridos’, Infobae, 12 June 2024; ‘El Ejército colombiano denuncia que disidencia de FARC profanó cuerpos de soldados muertos’, Swiss info, 6 May 2024; P. C. B., ‘Gustavo Petro, tras la muerte de cuatro soldados: “La ofensiva contra el EMC en el Cauca debe ser total”’, El Pais, 7 May 2024.
37
J. E. Neira, ‘Ejército dio de baja a 10 disidentes de las Farc en el Meta que pretendían enfrentarse a ‘Calarcá’’, Infobae, 9 November 2024.
38
J. D. Rodríguez, ‘5 militares muertos y 16 más heridos, 3 de gravedad, deja atentado en Balboa (Cauca)’, Infobae, 12 March 2025; F. Agudelo, ‘Así fue como el frente Carlos Patiño de las disidencias de las Farc ejecutó el ataque en contra de tropas del Ejército en Balboa, Cauca’, Infobae, 15 March 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean’, International Crisis Group.
39
‘Mueren seis militares colombianos en un ataque de la facción del EMC de las FARC en el sudeste de Colombia’, Infobae, 27 April 2025; ‘Seis militares mueren en una emboscada en Colombia’, DW, 28 April 2025.
40
‘Colombia: Population Movement (internal displacement) – DREF Operation update (MDRCO029)’, Reliefweb, 21 July 2025; ‘Humanitarian Challenges 2025: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross; ‘ACAPS Thematic Report: Colombia – Anticipated implications of US stop-work orders and subsequent cuts (16 April 2025)’, Reliefweb, 16 April 2025.
41
‘Ejército Nacional refuerza operaciones en Huisitó, Cauca, con más de 400 soldados’, Defensa, 25 March 2025; L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Golpe contundente contra disidencias de las Farc en Argelia, Cauca: 15 subversivos fueron neutralizados’, Infobae, 25 April 2024; J. Ownby, ‘Drones que lanzan bombas: la nueva etapa del conflicto colombiano’, El Pais, 19 June 2024.
42
H. Shuldiner and S. Garcia, ‘High-Level Attack Punctuates Security Crisis in Southwestern Colombia’, InSight Crime, 16 June 2024; L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Atacan con drones a militares en Argelia, Cauca: hay varios heridos’, Infobae, 12 June 2024; J. Ownby, ‘Drones que lanzan bombas: la nueva etapa del conflicto colombiano’, El Pais, 19 June 2024; J. Bernal, ‘Sigue la violencia en el Cauca: este lunes se reportan fuertes combates entre Ejército y Disidencias en Argelia’, Infobae, 17 June 2024.
43
J. C. Rodríguez Parrado, ‘Dos soldados fueron asesinados por las disidencias de las Farc en zona rural de Silvia, Cauca’, Infobae, 6 May 2024.
44
‘The constant danger of explosive hazards’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 27 March 2025.
45
‘Fuerzas Militares lanzan Operación Perseo para recuperar El Plateado – Cauca’, Defensa, 12 October 2024; D. E. Reyes Espinosa, ‘Disidencias de ‘Iván Mordisco’ se refirieron por primera vez a la Operación Perseo en el cañón del Micay: “Es el resultado del envenenamiento de la cúpula militar”’, Infobae, 31 October 2024; V. P. Lugo, ‘La Defensoría del Pueblo confirma la liberación de los 29 integrantes de la Fuerza Pública retenidos en El Plateado’, El Pais, 9 March 2025.
46
‘Ejército Nacional refuerza operaciones en Huisitó, Cauca, con más de 400 soldados’, Defensa, 25 March 2025.
47
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases; M. M. Bradley, ‘Additional Protocol II: Elevating the minimum threshold of intensity?’, International Review of the Red Cross, 2020; A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para1.40.
48
‘¿En que está el “EMC” actualmente?’, Fundación conflict responses, 25 April 2024; H. Shuldiner and S. Saffon, ‘From Total to Partial Peace: Colombia’s Talks With Crime Groups Fragment’, InSight Crime, 3 May 2024; J. P. Contreras Ríos, ‘Así nació el grupo que se separó de Mordisco y que ahora negocia la paz con’, El Espectador, 4 December 2024.
49
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025.
50
‘¿En que está el “EMC” actualmente?’, Fundación conflict responses, 25 April 2024; ‘Mordisco está fuera de la mesa de diálogos, confirma jefe negociador del Gobierno’, El Espectador, 16 April 2024; S. Vanegas, ‘Cuánto poder tiene en Colombia el Estado Mayor Central, la disidencia de las FARC contra la que Petro declaró una “ofensiva total”’, BBC News Mundo, 23 May 2024.
51
K. Johnson, ‘¿Cómo funciona internamente la disidencia del Estado Mayor Central de las FARC?’, El Espectador, 5 June 2023; ‘Disidencias de las FARC-EP: dos caminos de una guerra en construcción – Partes 1 y 2’, Fundación Conflict Responses, 1 March 2024.
52
H. Shuldiner and S. Saffon, ‘From Total to Partial Peace: Colombia’s Talks With Crime Groups Fragment’, InSight Crime, 3 May 2024.
53
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; A. P. R, et al, ‘El Proyecto “Estado Mayor Central”: Un intento de unificación disidente’, Ideaspaz, October 2023.
54
J. C. Villaquirán Úsuga, ‘Así funcionan los campos de entrenamiento de las disidencias de ‘Iván Mordisco’’, El Pais, 26 November 2024; ‘Exclusivo: así son las ‘escuelas’ de enfermería y entrenamiento de las disidencias de Iván Mordisco’, Semana, 25 November 2024; ‘Las ‘escuelas’ de la muerte del temido Iván Mordisco: SEMANA revela imágenes secretas de los campos de entrenamiento para los menores de edad’, Semana, 23 November 2024.
55
J. C. Villaquirán Úsuga, ‘Así funcionan los campos de entrenamiento de las disidencias de ‘Iván Mordisco’’, El Pais, 26 November 2024; ‘Exclusivo: así son las ‘escuelas’ de enfermería y entrenamiento de las disidencias de Iván Mordisco’, Semana, 25 November 2024.
56
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025.
57
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025.
58
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; ‘Disidencias de las FARC-EP: dos caminos de una guerra en construcción – Partes 1 y 2’, Fundación conflict responses, 1 March 2024.
59
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; UNSC, ‘United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia’, UN Doc S/2025/188, 27 March 2025.
60
S. Rodríguez Álvarez, ‘Cifras secretas del gobierno confirman que todos los grupos armados crecieron’, La Silla Vacía, 13 March 2024.
61
J. P. Contreras Ríos, ‘Así nació el grupo que se separó de Mordisco y que ahora negocia la paz con’, El Espectador, 4 December 2024.
62
P. Carrillo, ‘Inicia en Colombia un nuevo intento de paz con la disidencia de las FARC’, RFI, 17 October 2023; D. M. Rodríguez Sevilla, ‘Excomandantes de las Farc encabezados por ‘Timochenko’, hoy líder de Comunes, no entregaron todos los bienes que recibieron ilegalmente en la guerrilla, dijo cabecilla de las disidencias’, Infobae, 30 December 2024.
63
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases.
64
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025.
65
J. P. C., ‘El conflicto en el Macizo Colombiano: ¿un nuevo frente de guerra en el país?’, Cambio, 3 July 2025.
66
‘Colombia calls off ceasefire with some units of EMC armed group’, Reuters, 16 July 2024.
67
J. P. C., ‘El conflicto en el Macizo Colombiano: ¿un nuevo frente de guerra en el país?’, Cambio, 3 July 2025.

Non-international armed conflict between Colombia and the Comandos de la Frontera (CDF)

Background

The NIAC between the Colombian National Army and the CDF continues despite ongoing peace talks between the parties. Although military operations are infrequent, a peace agreement has not yet been agreed. The group emerged in 2017 shortly after the 2016 peace agreement between the government and the now defunct FARC-EP.¹ The CDF formed out of dissidents from the 32^nd and 48^th fronts of the former FARC-EP.²

Initially, the group went by the name ‘La Mafia’ and sought to reactivate drug-trafficking activity in Putumayo.³ In 2020, however, the group rebranded itself as the CDF.⁴ Its main purpose remains drug trafficking, specifically in seeking to take over all drug trafficking at the Colombia-Ecuador border.⁵

The group operates mainly in the lower Putumayo department in Orito, San Miguel, Valle del Guamuéz, and Puerto Guzmán, which is on the border with Ecuador. In addition to Putumayo, CDF operates in the municipalities of Cartagena del Chairá, La Montañita and Solano, as well as in other municipalities in Cauca, Nariño and Amazonas.⁶ The group also operates out of Ecuador – Ecuadorian authorities have uncovered camps and propaganda which allude to the presence of the group in Sucumbíos.⁷ The group has also infiltrated Peru.⁸

Intensity

According to data released by the Attorney General’s Office in March 2023, the CDF, at that time, had approximately 1,000 fighters spread across territories under its control.⁹ The CDF is well equipped with military-grade arms and weaponry.¹⁰ Equipment includes 5.56mm calibre rifles, grenade launchers, explosives, drones, and tactical communication systems.¹¹ Colombia continues to employ its armed forces to fight the CDF.

It is reported that around 5.2 million people were internally displaced at the end of 2023 due to ongoing conflict and drug-related violence.¹² In Colombia, it is difficult to attribute internally displaced persons exclusively to hostilities in this NIAC or to the omnipresent gang violence associated with the drug trade.¹³ Military operations by the Colombian National Army against the CDF were infrequent during this reporting period, which may be attributed to the ongoing peace talks. However, on 16 October 2024, at least one soldier died during combat between the two parties. Although the exact number of casualties on the CDF side is not reported, several clashes occurred as part of the operation.¹⁴

The infrequency of military operations during the reporting period does not fall short of the requirement of ‘sustained and concerted’ military operations as this criterion refers to the group being capable of mounting operations of such nature owing to the fact that it controls territory.¹⁵ In addition, lulls in fighting do not necessarily lead to the end of a NIAC; a NIAC ends when a ‘lasting cessation of armed confrontations” is reached “without a real risk of resumption’, which was not the case here.¹⁶

Organization

Currently, the CDF is commanded by Giovanny Andres Rojas, alias ‘Araña’. Araña is not only in charge of criminal activity but also of the armed wing of his organization.¹⁷ On 12 February 2025, he was arrested on an Interpol Red Notice for Extradition Purposes on drug trafficking-related charges filed in a United States court.¹⁸ ‘Araña’s’ absence could generate a leadership dispute within the CDF, which may lead to a further splintering of the group.¹⁹

The organizational structure of the armed wing of the CDF is sophisticated. There are special combat commands, squads, platoons, companies and columns, and the group has a general directorate with a superior commander who oversees personnel in Caquetá, Putumayo, Amazonas, Nariño and Cauca.²⁰ CDF members live under a military regime and receive military training.²¹ The CDF is able to discipline fighters and is able to implement IHL. As the CDF controls territory and possesses a sophisticated command structure, it is able to implement Additional Protocol II.

On occasion, however, its military tactics constitute serious violations of IHL. For example, its modus operandi, according to military intelligence and local news reports, is based on a tactic of so-called fire, fear, and bloodshed. Captured enemies are tortured and killed and the bodies are then left in a horrendous state in order to send a message to potential hostile groups.²² It is, however, only the ability to implement Additional Protocol II that is demanded under Article 1(1) of this instrument and not actual implementation and compliance. ²³

As a part of its military tactics, the CDF forms a military alliance with other groups. At the time of reporting, the CDF together with the Pacific Guerrillas (Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacífico, CPG) is part of a group called Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB), a splinter group of Segunda Marquetalia (SM).²⁴

The CDF is sufficiently organized to exercise control over rural areas.²⁵ Areas under its control includes territory in the Putumayo department.²⁶ The CDF locates its military bases in the jungle in these territories.²⁷

For the purpose of identification and as a beneficial military tactic, the CDF wears military-green camouflage and a distinguishing black scarf embroidered with the word ‘Comandos’ in yellow. Two white skulls and a snake are embroidered on the lower part.²⁸ Funding for military activities is raised through the drug trade.²⁹

The overall CDF commander, Araña, acts as a spokesperson.³⁰ He continues to give interviews from prison on behalf of the CDF, although the group has a delegation tasked with negotiating peace on its behalf.³¹ The CDF effectively speaks with one voice.

The organizational structure of the CDF is sophisticated and complies with the four organizational requirements under Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. Hence, the NIAC between Colombian National Army and CDF constitutes an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC.

1
‘Border Command’, InSight Crime, 30 January 2025; ‘Comandos de Frontera: ¿dónde están ubicados y quiénes son?’, El Espectador, 14 March 2023.
2
A. Diaz Castro, ‘Who are the Comandos de Frontera (Border Command)?’, London Politica; ‘Border Command’, InSight Crime, 30 January 2025.
3
‘Border Command’, InSight Crime, 30 January 2025.
4
‘Border Command’, InSight Crime, 30 January 2025.
5
V. Parada Lugo, ‘Entrevista con los Comandos de la Frontera: “Pedimos amnistía, perdón y olvido”’, El Espectador, 12 March 2023.
6
‘Border Command’, InSight Crime, 30 January 2025.
7
‘Alerta en Sucumbíos por el grupo Comandos De Frontera, una mafia de Colombia’, El Comercio, 21 January 2021.
8
‘Border Command’, InSight Crime, 30 January 2025.
9
‘Comandos de Frontera: ¿dónde están ubicados y quiénes son?’, El Espectador, 14 March 2023.
10
J. Pappier and K. Johnson, ‘Challenges in Assessing Colombia’s ‘Post Conflict’: A follow-up’, Fundación conflict response, 27 June 2022.
11
L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Intelligence report revealed key roles in the structure of Border Commandos: alias Compadre was killed after ambush in Ecuador’, Infobae, 12 May 2025.
12
‘Colombia’, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 14 May 2025.
13
S. Rodriguez and Georgetown University Latin America & Caribbean Policy Association, ‘Internal Displacement in Colombia: Characterization and Relevant Research Findings’, Georgetown Public Policy Review, 25 January 2024; V. Sainz, ‘Forced to Flee: The Global Impact of Conflict-Driven Internal Displacement’, Atlas Institute for International Affairs, 14 April 2025.
14
P. Naranjo, ‘Enfrentamientos entre Comandos de Frontera y en Ejército en Puerto Leguízamo, Putumayo, dejan un muerto’, Infobae, 16 October 2024.
15
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, paras 1.38 and 1.39.
16
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” is Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 19.
17
‘Border Command’, InSight Crime, 30 January 2025.
18
S. Torrado, ‘Claves de los diálogos de paz con la Segunda Marquetalia y la Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano’, El Pais, 13 February 2025; N. R. Matta Colorado, ‘Alias Araña cayó por traficar mientras negociaba la paz’, El Colombiano, 14 February 2025.
19
‘La violenta sombra de los Comandos de la Frontera de Colombia se expande en Ecuador y Perú’, Ojo Público, 27 April 2025.
20
V. Parada Lugo, ‘Entrevista con los Comandos de la Frontera: “Pedimos amnistía, perdón y olvido”’, El Espectador, 12 March 2023.
21
‘Los Comandos de la Frontera ‘imponen su ley’ a punta de sangre y fuego en Sucumbíos’, Primicias, 7 November 2024.
22
‘Los Comandos de la Frontera “imponen su ley” a punta de sangre y fuego en Sucumbíos’, Primicias, 7 November 2024.
23
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, paras 1.38 and 1.39; Y. Dinstein, ‘Non-International Armed Conflicts in International Law, 2^nd Edition’, Cambridge University Press, 2021, para 177.
24
‘Lo que debe saber del grupo armado separado de Iván Márquez que negocia con el Gobierno’, El Espectador, 27 November 2024; S. Torrado, ‘Claves de los diálogos de paz con la Segunda Marquetalia y la Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano’, El Pais, 13 February 2025.
25
‘Border Command’, InSight Crime, 30 January 2025.
26
V. P. Lugo, ‘Los Comandos de la Frontera imponen nuevos controles en el Putumayo mientras negocian con el Gobierno’, El Pais, 10 April 2025; ‘La violenta sombra de los Comandos de la Frontera de Colombia se expande en Ecuador y Perú’, Ojo Publico, 27 April 2025; S. M. Ramos, ‘Comandos de Frontera y su presencia en el norte de Ecuador’, Pares, 16 May 2025.
27
V. Parada Lugo, ‘Entrevista con los Comandos de la Frontera: “Pedimos amnistía, perdón y olvido”’, El Espectador, 12 March 2023.
28
V. Parada Lugo, ‘Entrevista con los Comandos de la Frontera: “Pedimos amnistía, perdón y olvido”’, El Espectador, 12 March 2023.
29
V. Parada Lugo, ‘Entrevista con los Comandos de la Frontera: “Pedimos amnistía, perdón y olvido”’, El Espectador, 12 March 2023.
30
V. Parada Lugo, M. Alvarado Lozada, and A. Ortiz, ‘Video: Esto piden los Comandos de Frontera para entrar a la Paz Total de Petro’, El Espectador, 12 March 2023; V. Parada Lugo, ‘Entrevista con los Comandos de la Frontera: “Pedimos amnistía, perdón y olvido”’, El Espectador, 12 March 2023; ‘Lo que debe saber del grupo armado separado de Iván Márquez que negocia con el Gobierno’, El Espectador, 27 November 2024.
31
V. Parada Lugo, ‘Entrevista con los Comandos de la Frontera: “Pedimos amnistía, perdón y olvido”’, El Espectador, 12 March 2023.

Non-international armed conflict between the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) and the Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC) (formerly Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC))

Background

The pre-existing NIAC between the EGC (also known as the Gulf Clan) and the ELN continued throughout the reporting period.¹ Fighting between the EGC and ELN started in 2016 over a disputed territory in Bolívar, following the demobilization of the now defunct FARC-EP. The EGC wants to expand into the north-east of Colombia where the ELN has maintained a monopoly presence for decades. The area is rich in gold reserves, and both sides are fighting for dominance over a trafficking corridor between Antioquia and Southern Bolívar.² Despite agreeing to a ‘non-aggression’ pact in 2019, fighting extended to other departments including Chocó, Norte de Santander and Antioquia.³

The ELN has existed since 1964 and operates as a criminal organization,⁴ a political organization, and an armed group. It is considered transnational as it also operates in Venezuela.⁵ For an in-depth overview of the ELN see above. The EGC, too, is active in criminal activities, politics and military operations.⁶ The EGC was established by dissidents from the AUC,⁷ who opposed the 2006 demobilization process. The EGC has since become a powerful transnational drug-trafficking operation supported by an armed wing.⁸ The EGC is considered one of the world’s largest international cocaine distributors.⁹ The EGC does not have a clear ideological origin story and its political ideals are curated to fit its current interests.¹⁰

Intensity

During August 2024, the ELN and EGC clashed over military and social control of the Medio San Juan (Chocó department), killing at least twenty-seven people.¹¹ At least two clashes were reported during October 2024 – the first on 2 October in Buriticá (Antioquia department),¹² and the second on 9 October 2024 in the Bolívar department.¹³ The fighting between the parties on 2 October 2024 was the most severe with at least fifty-one explosive devices detonated and 110 shots fired from sniper rifles.¹⁴

Fighting between the ELN and the EGC continued throughout May 2025.¹⁵ Specifically, it erupted on 22 May 2024 following a military operation launched by the EGC that caused up to nineteen casualties.¹⁶

The ELN, EGC and EMC in September 2024 clashed over illegal activities such as drug trafficking and migrant smuggling, with EGC and EMC forces often combining against the ELN.¹⁷ Clashes reported in the villages of El Pescado and La América on 10 September 2024 killed at least two fighters.¹⁸ Fighting on September 16 displaced at least thirty-six families from the municipality of Antioquia.¹⁹ More than thirty-seven clashes occurred between the ELN and the EGC (at times fighting alongside the EMC) in February 2025.²⁰ Fighting intensified between 4 and 21 February 2025.²¹ Several families were displaced as a result of these clashes.²²

Several clashes occurred during March 2025. The first, in Llanogrande (Antioquia department) on 2 March 2025, resulted in three casualties.²³ The EGC and ELN clashed again in the Antioquia department (this time in Yondó) on 25 March, killing one ELN fighter.²⁴

As of February 2025, the ELN acquired drones as part of its arsenal of small arms and light weapons and engaged in aerial bombardment.²⁵ The frequency of attacks peaked in March.²⁶ The intensity of the attacks has assisted the ELN to retain territorial control in the Catatumbo region on the border between Colombia and Venezuela.²⁷

The types of weapons now used by the EGC include explosive devices and sniper rifles.²⁸ By 2023, the EGC was estimated to have at least 5,000 active fighters under its command. It significantly expanded its territory between 2019 and 2024 with an 84 per cent increase in territorial control as it grew from 213 to 392 municipalities and expanded operations in twenty-four of Colombia’s thirty-two departments.²⁹

Mass displacement and internal displacement figures in Colombia were particularly high throughout 2024.³⁰ However, as armed groups often operate in multiple districts it is difficult to attribute displacement to a specific group. It is possible that the ELN contributed to the displacement of approximately 20,000³¹ to 56,000 people in the north-east of Colombia along the border with Venezuela.³²

The fighting between the ELN and the EGC continues to equate to protracted armed violence, satisfying the notion of intensity as demanded under IHL.

Organization

Both non-state actors engaged in this NIAC are sufficiently organized under IHL. For analysis of the organization of the ELN, and for the EGC, see above.

As the intensity of the fighting is protracted in nature, the ELN and EGC have been engaged in an ongoing NIAC throughout the reporting period.

1
‘Humanitarian Report 2024: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross; ‘Humanitarian Challenges 2025: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross.
2
‘Por lo menos 10 muertos por combates del Clan del Golfo, Eln y disidencias en el nordeste antioqueño’, El Colombiano, 23 May 2024.
3
J. Manjarrés, ‘ELN and Gaitanistas War Again in Northern Colombia’, InSight Crime, 16 August 2022.
4
‘Country policy and information note: armed groups and criminal gangs, Colombia, November 2024 (accessible)’, Gov.UK, November 2024.
5
‘A History of the Armed Struggle of the ELN in Colombia’, Abolition media, 25 September 2022.
6
‘The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas’, International Crisis Group, 19 March 2024; E. Dickinson, ‘Las Autodefensas Gaitanistas (AGC): ¿epílogo de la Paz Total?’, Razon Publica, 11 August 2024.
7
‘United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)’, InSight Crime, 11 June 2024.
8
L. Schmidt, ‘Power Play or Peace? AGC’s Role in Colombia’s Fragile Negotiations’, InSight Crime, 16 October 2024; ‘Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC) / Gulf Clan’, Colombia Reports, 21 October 2025.
9
J. Freixes, ‘Gulf Clan, a History of Death and Crime in Colombia’, Colombia One, 16 February 2025.
10
R. Badillo-Sarmiento and L. F. Trejos-Rosero, ‘Las Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia como grupo armado politizado’, Revista Científica, 1 April 2023.
11
R. Davies, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America & the Caribbean, August 2023’, ACLED, 8 September 2023; ‘Defensoría del Pueblo le solicita al Gobierno Nacional atención inmediata para habitantes del Medio San Juan (Chocó), luego de enfrentamientos entre el ELN y las AGC – Clan del Golfo’, Defensoría del pueblo, 18 August 2023.
12
S. Olivares Tobón, ‘Confrontaciones dentro de las minas de Buriticá dejaron dos personas lesionadas’, El Colombiano, 2 October 2023.
13
‘Enfrentamientos entre grupos armados ilegales tienen en alto riesgo a comunidades del sur de Bolívar’, Defensoría del pueblo, 9 October 2023.
14
S. Olivares Tobón, ‘Confrontaciones dentro de las minas de Buriticá dejaron dos personas lesionadas’, El Colombiano, 2 October 2023; C. López, ‘Buriticá: registra nueva oleada violenta por cuenta de disputa minera’, El Tiempo, 15 October 2023.
15
J. Ríos Monroy, ‘Así se vive la guerra por el oro entre el Clan del Golfo y ELN en sur de Bolívar’, El Espectador, 19 May 2024; ‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group.
16
‘Por lo menos 10 muertos por combates del Clan del Golfo, Eln y disidencias en el nordeste antioqueño’, El Colombiano, 23 May 2024; ‘13 muertos en Antioquia por combates entre Clan del Golfo y disidencias de las FARC’, El Espectador, 24 May 2024.
17
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; J. D. Rodríguez, ‘Alert for displacements in Antioquia due to war between the ELN, Gulf Clan and FARC dissidents’, Infobae, 22 September 2024.
18
N. Valle David, ‘Combates entre EGC y disidencias ocasionaron desplazamientos internos en Briceño’, Caracol Radio, 11 September 2024.
19
‘“Vemos gente saliendo con los corotos”: en 4 municipios de Antioquia viven en zozobra por disputa de grupos armados’, El Colombiano, 16 September 2024.
20
J. Franciotti and M. Fernanda Arocha, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean, March 2025’, ACLED, 7 March 2025; ‘Guerra en límites entre Antioquia y Bolívar tiene en riesgo a 150.000 personas: alerta Fundación Sumapaz’, El Colombiano, 25 February 2025.
21
L. R. Jiménez Valencia, ‘La cruda guerra entre el Eln y el ‘clan del Golfo’ que se ha apoderado de los ríos de Chocó’, El Tiempo, 18 February 2025; C. Mayorga Alejo, ‘La guerra entre Agc y Eln al sur de Chocó mancha el proceso de paz’, Verdad Abierta, 17 February 2024; ‘Emergencias humanitarias en Colombia hoy’, Defensoría del pueblo, 16 February 2025.
22
C. Mayorga Alejo, ‘La guerra entre Agc y Eln al sur de Chocó mancha el proceso de paz’, Verdad Abierta, 17 February 2024.
23
D. A. Escobar Calle, ‘Tres personas muertas en Urrao, Antioquia, por enfrentamientos Clan del Golfo y el ELN’, Alerta Paisa, 2 March 2025; ‘Tres muertos hallaron tras enfrentamientos entre ELN y Clan del Golfo, en Urrao’, El Espectador, 2 March 2025.
24
J. Rodríguez, ‘Combates del ELN y Clan del Golfo dejan un muerto y un herido entre Santander y Antioquia’, BluRadio, 25 March 2025; ‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group.
25
J. Patino C, ‘Nueva modalidad: ELN usa drones de la disidencias en el Catatumbo’, Cambio, 4 March 2025.
26
L. Calderón et al, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean, April 2025’, ACLED, 3 April 2025.
27
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024; ‘Colombia: Armed Groups Batter Border Region’, Human Rights Watch, 26 March 2025.
28
S. Olivares Tobón, ‘Confrontaciones dentro de las minas de Buriticá dejaron dos personas lesionadas’, El Colombiano, 2 October 2023.
29
E. Franco V. ‘Newly designated terrorist organization the Gulf Clan expands presence across Colombia’, Entorno, 25 March 2025.
30
‘Humanitarian Challenges 2025: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross.
31
‘Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)’, Global Security.org.
32
‘Colombia: Armed Groups Batter Border Region’, Human Rights Watch, 26 March 2025.

Non-international armed conflict between the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) and the Frente 33 of the Estado Mayor de los Bloques y el Frente (EMBF)

Background

The ELN is a hybrid criminal, political and military organization that formed in 1964.¹ The Estado Mayor de Bloques y Frentes (EMBF) is a splinter group which separated from the general staff of the dissident organization of the former FARC-EP, now the EMC, in April 2024.²

The ELN and EMBF are competing for control over illicit trade, including but not only drugs.³ Catatumbo has a high concentration of mineral resources as well as being a centre for coca cultivation.⁴ As a consequence of the violence in January 2025 (see below under ‘intensity’), the Colombian government paused the bilateral ceasefire with the EMBF on 17 April 2025.⁵ The 33^rd Front of the EMBF and the government concluded the Catatumbo Agreement, which foresees the disarming of the 33^rd Front.⁶

Intensity

As of November 2024, the tension between the ELN and EMBF rose.⁷ On 15 January 2025, the ELN launched a military operation against the EMBF in the Catatumbo region in north-eastern Colombia close to the border with Venezuela.⁸ The fighting lasted for approximately a week and resulted in sixty casualties and the forcible displacement of more than 50,000 people.⁹ The UNHCR reported that by 5 March 2025, more than 91,400 people were affected by the ongoing clash between the ELN and EMBF, including more than 57,000 displaced persons, almost 18,000 persons facing ‘confinement’ (understood as ‘a situation of human rights violation where a community loses mobility, as a result of the actions of illegal armed groups, thus preventing access to essential goods for survival’)¹⁰ and a further 10,000 facing severe restrictions on their movement.¹¹

The 33^rd Front of the EMBF launched a counter offensive against the ELN in Catatumbo on 9 March 2025 with the aim of regaining control over territory it had lost in the January attacks.¹² The territory they are fighting over is a critical corridor for the drug trade between Colombia and Venezuela. In response to the latest attacks, the Colombian government deployed 10,000 members of its security forces to protect civilians in the area.¹³ On 3 May 2025, the government and the 33^rd Front of the EMBF agreed on a ‘peace zone’ in the Catatumbo region.¹⁴ The UN Security Council and UNHCR have expressed their concern over the humanitarian and security situation in Catatumbo.¹⁵

The fighting between the ELN and the EMBF equates to protracted armed violence, satisfying the notion of intensity as demanded under IHL.

Organization

The overall leader of the EMBF is Alexander Díaz, alias Calarcá Córdoba.¹⁶ The armed wing of the EMBF is led by Commander Jorge Suárez Briceño, Commander Gentil Duarte Magdalena Medio, and Commander Raúl Reyes.¹⁷ Although there is limited information about the internal structure of the EMBF, it is known that decisions are made by majority vote. Its command structure and the fact that fighters are former EMC fighters who are well trained, should enable it to impose discipline and implement IHL.¹⁸

The EMBF continues to exercise territorial control primarily over the Catatumbo region, but also areas in Antioquia and southern Bolívar.¹⁹ The control of territory is a confirmation of its organizational capacity. The group funds itself through its criminal enterprises which include the coca business.²⁰

The EMBF speaks with one voice through its chief negotiator who represents the group in peace negotiations,²¹ and in media interviews.²²

Both non-state armed groups engaged in this NIAC are sufficiently organized under IHL. For an analysis of the organization of the ELN, see above. The situation constituted a NIAC between the EMBF and ELN from around 15 January 2025.

1
‘A History of the Armed Struggle of the ELN in Colombia’, Abolition media, 25 September 2022.
2
UNSC, ‘United Nations Verifications Mission in Colombia’, UN Doc S/2025/188, 27 March 2025, para 4; ‘COI Focus: Colombia: Veiligheidssituatie’, CGRS, 10 April 2025, 2.
3
‘Remarks of Carlos Ruiz Massieu, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia Security Council’, UN Verification Mission in Colombia, 22 January 2025.
4
‘Major violence impacts Catatumbo region with former FARC members killed’, Justice for Colombia, 24 January 2025.
5
‘Gobierno Petro no renovará cese al fuego con disidencias de alias Calarcá, pero mantiene abierto el diálogo’, El Colombiano, 17 April 2025; V. Mishra, ‘Colombia: Catatumbo killings highlight fragility of peace process’, UN News, 22 January 2025.
6
A. Alsema, ‘Dissident FARC faction agrees to concentrate members in northeast Colombia’, Colombia Reports, 4 May 2025.
7
‘COI Focus: Colombia: Veiligheidssituatie’, CGRS, 10 April 2025, 24.
8
‘Major violence impacts Catatumbo region with former FARC members killed’, Justice for Colombia, 24 January 2025; ‘COI Focus: Colombia: Veiligheidssituatie’, CGRS, 10 April 2025, 16.
9
UNSC, ‘United Nations Verifications Mission in Colombia’, UN Doc S/2025/188, 27 March 2025, para 4.
10
‘Colombia: Confinements’, UNHCR Operational Data Portal, January 2022.
11
‘Colombia: Humanitarian emergency – The crisis continues in Catatumbo’, UNHCR Operational Data Portal, 2 April 2025.
12
L. Calderón Fuentes et al, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean, April 2025’, ACLED, 3 April 2025.
13
L. Reynoso, ‘La contraofensiva de las disidencias de las FARC reaviva la crisis en el Catatumbo’, El País, 26 March 2025; J. D. Rodríguez, ‘5 personas asesinadas en nueva masacre en El Catatumbo, esta vez en Ocaña’, Infobae, 5 March 2025.
14
‘Gobierno colombiano y Frente 33 de disidencias acuerdan una «zona de paz» en el Catatumbo’, Swiss Info, 4 May 2025; ‘Gobierno y Frente 33 de disidencia Calarcá acuerdan zona de preagrupamiento en Catatumbo’, El Espectador, 4 May 2025.
15
UNSC, ‘United Nations Verifications Mission in Colombia’, UN Doc S/2025/188, 27 March 2025, para 4; ‘Colombia: Humanitarian emergency – The crisis continues in Catatumbo’, UNHCR Operational Data Portal, 2 April 2025.
16
J. P. Contreras Ríos, ‘Así nació el grupo que se separó de Mordisco y que ahora negocia la paz con Petro’, El Espectador, 4 December 2024.
17
‘¿En que está el “EMC” actualmente?’, Fundación conflict responses, 25 April 2024; ‘Gobierno prorroga cese al fuego bilateral, únicamente con cuatro grupos del denominado Estado Mayor al mando de alias ‘Calarcá’: Mindefensa’, Presidencia, 19 April 2025.
18
J. C. Villaquirán Úsuga, ‘Así funcionan los campos de entrenamiento de las disidencias de ‘Iván Mordisco’’, El País, 26 November 2024; ‘Exclusivo: así son las ‘escuelas’ de enfermería y entrenamiento de las disidencias de Iván Mordisco’, Semana, 25 November 2024.
19
J. P. Contreras Ríos, ‘Así nació el grupo que se separó de Mordisco y que ahora negocia la paz con Petro’, El Espectador, 4 December 2024.
20
J. P. Contreras Ríos, ‘Así nació el grupo que se separó de Mordisco y que ahora negocia la paz con Petro’, El Espectador, 4 December 2024; ‘Central General Staff – Ex-FARC Mafia’, InSight Crime, 14 June 2024; El Espectador, ‘Entrevista a Calarcá: jefe disidente de FARC revela que no firmará la paz con Petro’, YouTube, 9 December 2024.
21
J. P. Contreras Ríos, ‘Así nació el grupo que se separó de Mordisco y que ahora negocia la paz con Petro’, El Espectador, 4 December 2024.
22
El Espectador, ‘Entrevista a Calarcá: jefe disidente de FARC revela que no firmará la paz con Petro’, YouTube, 9 December 2024; Revista Semana, ‘Alias Calarcá responde por los militares muertos en Guaviare, habla de Petro, Santos y el 2026’, YouTube, 3 May 2025.

Non-international armed conflict between the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) and the Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez

Background

The FARC-EP militant group demobilised in 2016, leading to a proliferation of ex-FARC-EP dissident groups consisting of former FARC-EP members who rejected the peace deal. Two major groups claiming to be the successors of the former FARC-EP rearmed themselves after the demobilisation of the FARC-EP: the Segunda Marquetalia (SM), and the EMC.¹ The EMC is an ‘umbrella organization’ comprised of former FARC-EP fighters.² The EMC was formed in mid-2017 after the demobilization of the FARC-EP, and the second major former FARC-EP splinter group, the SM, was created in 2019.³ The faction under Iván Mordisco still calls itself the EMC. In July 2024, Mordisco announced the creation of a new and restructured EMC.⁴ Unlike the former FARC-EP, the EMC seeks to co-opt local authorities and economies rather than seizing control through armed conflict.⁵

As part of President Gustavo Petro’s ‘Total Peace’ policy, the EMC renewed peace negotiations in 2022, but these were unsuccessful and resulted in a further disintegration of the group.⁶ This led to a group called Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez splintering from EMC in November 2023.⁷ The EMC is not exclusively a military organization; it is a criminal organization with a military wing that assures dominance of key coca-rich territory.⁸

The pre-existing NIAC between the EMC, before its April 2024 split from the EMBF, and the Frente 57 continued throughout the reporting period, with frequent clashes reported.

Intensity

Several armed confrontations occurred between the EMC and Frente 57 during the reporting period. In terms of assessing intensity, the EMC fragmented again in April 2024, 60 per cent of the fighters remained in the original group under the command of Iván Mordisco and a faction, comprising 40 per cent, now form part of the EMBF.⁹

This assessment focuses specifically on intensity after the fracture of EMC to determine if the fighting between the EMC faction under Mordisco and Frente 57 continues to equate to protracted armed violence. For a pre-existing conflict between parties to end post-fracturing requires that one of the parties ceases to exist or that a lasting peace follows the conclusion of a peace agreement. Even if the EMC fractured, the original group still exists and continues fighting.¹⁰ The EMC still controls territory in Colombia and in Venezuela as direct results of the intensity of the violence generated by its armed wing.¹¹ Both sides have access to heavy military weaponry which includes drones armed with bombs.¹²

The clash on 24 May 2024, over territorial control of Indigenous land in Tacueyo and San Francisco in Colombia resulted in the burning of multiple vehicles and the death of three fighters.¹³ On 7 August 2024, military operations launched by the EMC against the Frente 57 involved both parties in an aerial bombardment by drones.¹⁴ Armed clashes between the EMC and Frente 57 lasted from approximately 25 to 29 September 2024.¹⁵ The fighting was so intense that the already heavily burdened Colombian National Army was deployed to bring stability to the region.¹⁶

A further prolonged military engagement between these armed groups occurred between 1 and 18 February 2025. The conflict was about control of key drug- trafficking corridors.¹⁷ Fighting between the EMC and Frente 57 on 18 March 2025 resulted in a power outage in the region of Toribío (Cauca department).¹⁸

The fighting between the EMC and the Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez continues to equate to protracted armed violence, satisfying the notion of intensity as demanded under IHL.

Organization

At the time of reporting, the Frente 57 was led by of Luis Carlos Pinilla, alias ‘Óscar Barreto’.¹⁹ At least two senior figures lost their lives in combat between November 2024,²⁰ and March 2025.²¹ The senior leadership is experienced in guerrilla activity; Óscar Barreto specifically has over 15 years of fighting experience.²²

Although limited information is publicly available concerning the internal structure of the Frente 57, the group has a leadership structure that means it is able to enforce IHL and discipline its fighters. In March 2025, the group’s fighters were reported to number between fifty and eighty, but its influence exceeds this number due to its ability to intimidate and control territory.²³ The group exercises control over key territories, such as strategic corridors to the Pacific (via the Naya River) and municipalities in northern Cauca including Miranda and Corinto, which is evidence that it meets the requirement of a minimum level of organization.²⁴

The Frente 57 speaks with one voice through its website and an X account on which the group publishes statements, denies government-sourced information and issues ‘recommendations’ to the civilian population, such as prohibiting travel at certain times or using military vehicles.²⁵ The group, as of late 2024, has expanded its means of communication, releasing video and other visual content.²⁶

Clearly, Frente 57 is sufficiently organized as required under IHL.

Both non-state actors engaged in this NIAC are sufficiently organized under IHL. For an analysis of the organization of the EMC, see above.

The pre-existing NIAC between the EMC and the Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez was ongoing for the reporting period.

1
‘National Liberation Army (Colombia)’, Mapping Militants Projects, 3 December 2024.
2
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; ‘Central General Staff – Ex-FARC Mafia’, InSight Crime, 14 June 2024.
3
‘Central General Staff – Ex-FARC Mafia’, InSight Crime, 14 June 2024.
4
‘Iván Mordisco anuncia creación de nuevo Estado Mayor Central en Colombia’, La Opinión, 31 July 2024.
5
L. Benito, ‘La estructura del Estado Mayor Central representaría un problema para las negociaciones del Gobierno de Gustavo Petro, advierte informe’, Infobae, 16 October 2023.
6
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; H. Shuldiner and S. Saffon, ‘From Total to Partial Peace: Colombia’s Talks With Crime Groups Fragment’, InSight Crime, 3 May 2024.
7
M. Benavides Cadena, ‘Nueva disidencia en el Valle, ‘Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez’. ¿Quién la lidera?’, Caracol Radio, 2 April 2024.
8
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; ‘Disidencias de las FARC-EP: dos caminos de una guerra en construcción – Partes 1 y 2’, Fundación conflict responses, 1 March 2024.
9
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025.
10
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” is Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 19.
11
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; ‘Central General Staff – Ex-FARC Mafia’, InSight Crime, 14 June 2024.
12
‘Este es el nuevo frente de las disidencias de las Farc que llegó al norte del Cauca; es comandando por un sanguinario que asesinó a varios cabecillas para llegar al poder’, Semana, 10 August 2024; ‘Colombia’ International Crisis Group.
13
‘Colombia – Cuatro muertos en combates entre facciones de las FARC en Colombia’, Notici Argentina, 26 May 2024.
14
‘Este es el nuevo frente de las disidencias de las Farc que llegó al norte del Cauca; es comandando por un sanguinario que asesinó a varios cabecillas para llegar al poder’, Semana, 10 August 2024.
15
S. Neira, ‘Alerta por enfrentamiento de las disidencias de las Farc en el Valle del Cauca’, Infobae, 29 September 2024; M. Benavides Cadena, ‘Nueva disidencia en el Valle, ‘Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez’. ¿Quién la lidera?’, Caracol Radio, 2 April 2024.
16
C. Silva, ‘Tras enfrentamientos de disidencias en Tuluá, Ejército desplegó tropas’, Radio Nacional de Colombia, 29 September 2024.
17
‘Colombia’ International Crisis Group; ‘Emergencias humanitarias en Colombia hoy’, Defensoría del pueblo: Colombia, 16 February 2025; F. Calderón, ‘Escamoso y Viejo Comando, las nuevas víctimas de la cruenta guerra entre el frente 57 y las disidencias de las Farc en Corinto’, El País, 19 February 2025; ‘Dos militares heridos enfrentamientos entre el Ejército y el frente 57 Yair Bermúdez’, Informativo del Sur, 18 February 2025.
18
‘Una persona murió tras enfrentamientos entre el Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez y disidencias en Toribío’, W Radio, 18 March 2025; P. Naranjo, ‘En medio de combates, motobombas y sin energía eléctrica, indígenas expulsaron a tres disidentes del Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez’, Infobae, 19 March 2025.
19
A. L. Méndez, ‘Exclusivo: este es el dossier contra ‘Barreto’, el hombre al frente del grupo que se apartó de las disidencias y que retó a ‘Iván Mordisco’ y a ‘Calarcá’’, El Tiempo, 18 July 2024.
20
‘Eliminan a cabecilla del frente Yair Bermúdez de disidencia Farc en Tuluá’, El Nuevo Siglo, 1 December 2024.
21
A. Mesa, ‘Combates en Sevilla – Valle dejan dos bajas en la estructura Yair Bermúdez del Frente 57 de las FARC’, Caracol Radio, 23 March 2025.
22
M. Benavides Cadena, ‘Nueva disidencia en el Valle, ‘Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez’ ¿Quién la lidera?’, Caracol Radio, 2 April 2024.
23
‘Así opera el Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez, el grupo armado que genera terror en el Valle’, Extra, 30 March 2025; L. S. Cardona Ruiz, ‘Análisis: Así opera el Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez que genera zozobra en el Valle’, El Pais, 30 March 2025.
24
‘Así opera el Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez, el grupo armado que genera terror en el Valle’, Extra, 30 March 2025; L. S. Cardona Ruiz, ‘Análisis: Así opera el Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez que genera zozobra en el Valle’, El Pais, 30 March 2025.
25
‘Así opera el Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez, el grupo armado que genera terror en el Valle’, Extra, 30 March 2025; L. S. Cardona Ruiz, ‘Análisis: Así opera el Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez que genera zozobra en el Valle’, El País, 30 March 2025.
26
L. S. Cardona Ruiz, ‘Análisis: Así opera el Frente 57 Yaír Bermúdez que genera zozobra en el Valle’, El País, 30 March 2025; J. V. Cabezas Palacios, ‘Las dinámicas del conflicto en zonas con y sin cese al fuego: studio comparativo de Arauca, Cauca, Caquetá y Meta’, Indepaz, 2025.

Non-international armed conflict between the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)

Background

The pre-existing NIAC between the EMC and the ELN continued throughout the reporting period.¹ Initially, the EMC and the ELN fought over coca-rich territory in the northeastern Catatumbo region in Colombia which borders on Venezuela.² The conflict arose due to a power vacuum created when the now defunct FARC-EP signed a peace agreement in 2016.³ The fighting continues with the EMC and the ELN fighting for territorial dominance in coca-rich territory and key trafficking routes, predominantly in Arauca, Antioquia, Catatumbo and Chocó departments.⁴ In other departments, such as Bolívar, the ELN and the EMC have been fighting alongside each other against the EGC.⁵

The classification of the fighting relationship is complicated by the reality that both opposing armed groups, the EMC and the ELN, splintered, but for each, a faction has continued to fight.⁶ The EMC, a splinter of the former FARC-EP, further split into two factions during April 2024; one faction retains the moniker EMC (under ‘Iván Mordisco) and is engaging the ELN, while the other faction, the EMBF (under ‘Calarcá), is engaged in ongoing peace talks with the government.⁷ In turn, the ELN fragmented on 7 May 2024 into the ELN Central Command (retaining the moniker ELN) and the Comuneros del Sur.⁸ The Colombian government is in peace talks with the Comuneros del Sur, which handed over a share of their arms in April 2025.⁹ ¹⁰

Intensity

Fighting continues between the parties to this ongoing NIAC.¹¹ A selection of clashes which transpired during the reporting period are highlighted below to illustrate that intensity remains at a level of protracted armed violence throughout the reporting period.

Several armed confrontations took place between the EMC and the ELN between 1 and 5 September 2023 in Puerto Rondón (the Arauca department). At least nine fighters were killed and five injured.¹² Subsequently, ceasefire agreements were negotiated. These agreements are of a bilateral nature, first, between the Colombian government and the ELN, agreed to on 3 August 2023; and, second, between the Colombian government and the EMC, agreed to on 16 October 2023.¹³ Despite their bilateral nature, the ceasefires also led to a lull in fighting between these two armed groups.

After the end of the bilateral ceasefires between the Colombian government and the majority faction of the EMC on 16 July 2024,¹⁴ and between the government and the ELN on 3 August 2024,¹⁵ fighting between the ELN and the EMC resumed in the early morning of 13 August 2024 in Arauquita (Arauca department) claiming the lives of at least fourteen fighters and resulting in the internal displacement of approximately 100 families.¹⁶ The EGC and the EMC formed an alliance against counter attacks by the ELN in Briceño and Segovia (Antioquia department) throughout September 2024, the majority of clashes occurring between 10 and 30 September 2024.¹⁷ Fighting led to the mass displacement of the entire community of El Guamo.¹⁸

The EMC and the ELN again clashed in the Arauca department throughout December 2024 as the NIAC intensified. The ELN splintered during this period when a faction called the Comuneros del Sur agreed to a 180-day bilateral ceasefire agreement with the Colombian government,¹⁹ and the other ELN faction (the parent group) continued fighting the EMC.

The January 2025 clashes in the Catatumbo and Norte de Santander regions resulted in considerable internal displacement and at least 100 casualties.²⁰ The Colombian government declared a state of emergency and stationed 5,000 special forces members in the town of Tibu as a direct result of the January 2025 clash between the EMC and the ELN.²¹ The UN Secretary General called on the parties to cease attacking civilians.²²

In a surprise move, the ELN and the EMC combined against a common enemy, the EGC, in Antioquia and Bolívar departments in February 2025.²³ However, the ELN and the EMC continued to fight each other in Arauca during the month.²⁴ This example illustrates the volatility of alliances between these groups.²⁵

The conflict intensified as the EMC and the ELN continued to fight for territorial dominance throughout March 2025 in the Catatumbo region of Norte de Santander department. According to ACLED, confrontations peaked in March 2025 and were at the highest level since March 2022.²⁶

The fighting between the EMC and the ELN continues to equate to protracted armed violence, satisfying the notion of intensity as demanded under IHL.

Organization

Both non-state actors engaged in this NIAC are sufficiently organized under IHL. For an analysis of the organization of the EMC and the ELN, see above.

The pre-existing NIAC between the EMC and the ELN was ongoing during the reporting period.

1
‘Humanitarian Report 2024: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross;‘Humanitarian Challenges 2025: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross.
2
‘Colombia seeks to reassert control as rebel fighting kills over 100’, Al Jazeera, 22 January 2025.
3
‘Central General Staff – Ex-FARC Mafia’, InSight Crime, 14 June 2024.
4
‘Nine Killed as Colombia Guerrillas Clash Despite Peace Talks’, The Defense Post, 5 September 2023; J. Franciotti et al, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean, August 2024’, ACLED, 6 September 2024; ‘14 guerrilleros habrían muerto en combate entre ELN y FARC En zona rural del municipio de Arauquita’, News Radio, 13 August 2024; J. D. Rordríguez, ‘Alerta por desplazamientos en Antioquia por guerra entre el ELN, Clan del Golfo y disidencias de las Farc’, Infobae, 22 September 2024; L. R. Jiménez Valencia, ‘La cruda guerra entre el Eln y el ‘clan del Golfo’ que se ha apoderado de los ríos de Chocó’, El Tiempo, 18 February 2025; J. A. Blanquicet, ‘Atención: nuevas confrontaciones entre el Eln y disidencias en Catatumbo dejan dos heridos’, El Tiempo, 14 February 2025.
5
‘Enfrentamientos entre grupos armados ilegales generaron el desplazamiento de 1400 personas en el sur de Bolívar’, Defensoría del pueblo: Colombia, 25 November 2023; ‘Cientos de personas huyen de sus casas en medio de combates de grupos armados en Colombia’, Prensa Mercosur, 27 November 2023; I. Gómez Ramiírez, ‘Álvaro Uribe Vélez: Comunidades reportan combates de grupos armados al sur de Bolívar’, Diario Los Américas, 22 November 2023; J. Franciotti and M. Fernanda Arocha, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean, March 2025’, ACLED, 7 March 2025; ‘Guerra en límites entre Antioquia y Bolívar tiene en riesgo a 150.000 personas: alerta Fundación Sumapaz’, El Colombiano, 25 February 2025.
6
See above, under key developments.
7
‘Lo que debe saber del grupo armado separado de Iván Márquez que negocia con el Gobierno’, El Espectador, 27 November 2024; UNSC, ‘United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia: Report of the Secretary General’, UN Doc S/2024/986, 26 December 2024.
8
‘El Frente Comuneros del Sur, la primera disidencia del ELN’, Cambio, 9 May 2024.
9
See above, under key developments.
10
‘National Liberation Army (Colombia)’, Mapping Militants Project, 3 December 2024; ‘Colombia recognizes dissident ELN faction as independent organization’, Reuters, 8 May 2024.
11
‘Humanitarian Report 2024: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross;‘Humanitarian Challenges 2025: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross.
12
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group, September 2023; ‘Nueve muertos tras enfrentamientos entre ELN y disidencias de las Farc’, Portafolio, 4 September 2023; ‘Nine Killed as Colombia Guerrillas Clash Despite Peace Talks’, The Defense Post, 5 September 2023.
13
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group, July 2024; M. Pérez Gallardo, ‘Colombia: entra en vigor el cese al fuego de 180 días entre el Gobierno y la guerrilla del ELN’, France 24, 4 August 2023; D. Díaz, ‘El cese al fuego más esperado de la Paz Total entra en vigor’, El País, 3 August 2023; ‘Comunicado del Mecanismo de Monitoreo y Verificación – MMV, del Cese al Fuego Bilateral, Nacional y Temporal – CFBNT’, Misión de verificación de la onu en Colombia, 26 August 2023; ‘Con o sin protocolos Defensoría del Pueblo verificará acciones del ELN en el desarrollo del cese del fuego bilateral’, Defensoría del pueblo: Colombia, 3 August 2023; C. A. Morales Castillo and G. Castrillón Pulido, ‘Con decreto de cese al fuego, se instala mesa de diálogo con disidencia de Mordisco’, El Espectador, 17 October 2023; ‘Decreto de cese al fuego bilateral y temporal de carácter nacional entre el gobierno nacional y el autodenominado EMCFARC’, Indepaz, 16 October 2023.
14
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group, July 2024; R. Cué Barberena, ‘El Gobierno colombiano finaliza tregua con el EMC, aunque la mantiene con algunas facciones’, France 24, 17 July 2024; ‘Gobierno de Colombia suspende cese al fuego con una parte del EMC’, Voice of America, 16 July 2024.
15
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group, July 2024; B. F. Valencia Ríos, ‘Finalizó el cese al fuego con el ELN y no hubo prórroga, ¿diálogos de paz en veremos?’, El Colombiano,4 August 2024; J. Ríos Monroy, ‘El detrás de crisis que llevó al fin del cese al fuego con ELN: ¿hora de replantear?’, El Espectador, 4 August 2024; L. Loaiza and H. Shuldiner, ‘Cese al fuego con ELN expira y amenaza Paz Total en Colombia’, InSight Crime, 5 August 2024; S. Torrado, ‘Proceso de paz con el ELN: fin del cese al fuego, secuestro y suspensión de los diálogos con el Gobierno Petro’, El País, 6 June 2025.
16
‘14 guerrilleros habrían muerto en combate entre ELN y FARC En zona rural del municipio de Arauquita’, News Radio, 13 August 2024.
17
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group.
18
‘Disputa territorial entre disidencias de Iván Mordisco y Calarcá provocan desplazamiento masivo en Caquetá’, Defensoría del pueblo: Colombia’, 20 September 2024; ‘“Vemos gente saliendo con los corotos”: en 4 municipios de Antioquia viven en zozobra por disputa de grupos armados’, El Colombiano, 16 September 2024.
19
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group.
20
‘New bloody guerrilla clashes in Colombia: FARC and ELN fight fierce battles in the north-east’, Defense Magazine, 31 January 2025.
21
‘Colombia seeks to reassert control as rebel fighting kills over 100’, Al Jazeera, 22 January 2025.
22
‘ELN and FARC dissidents fight for control of Colombia’s Catatumbo’, The City Paper, 18 January 2025.
23
‘Guerra en límites entre Antioquia y Bolívar tiene en riesgo a 150.000 personas: alerta Fundación Sumapaz’, El Colombiano, 25 February 2025; J. Franciotti and M. Fernanda Arocha, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean, March 2025’, ACLED, 7 March 2025.
24
J. A. Blanquicet, ‘Atención: nuevas confrontaciones entre el Eln y disidencias en Catatumbo dejan dos heridos’, El Tiempo, 14 February 2025; ‘Emergencias humanitarias en Colombia hoy’, Defensoría del pueblo: Colombia, 16 February 2025; C. Mayorga Alejo, ‘La guerra entre Agc y Eln al sur de Chocó mancha el proceso de paz’, Verdad Abierta, 17 February 2024; J. D. Rodríguez, ‘Defensoría del Pueblo alerta por combates del ELN y disidencia de ‘Iván Mordisco’ en Arauca’, Infobae, 23 February 2025.
25
J. Franciotti and M. Fernanda Arocha, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean, March 2025’, ACLED, 7 March 2025.
26
J. Franciotti and M. Fernanda Arocha, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean, March 2025’, ACLED, 7 March 2025.

Non-international armed conflict between the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) and the Segunda Marquetalia (SM)

Background

The existing NIAC between the EMC and the Segunda Marquetalia(SM),¹ continued during the reporting period. The EMC was founded by dissident fronts of the former FARC-EP unwilling to join the 2016 Colombian Peace Accords.² The EMC established itself as the primary successor to the now demobilized FARC-EP.³ SM, similarly, was formed by dissident members of the former FARC-EP in 2019,⁴ and voiced displeasure with the Government of Colombia for not fulfilling its obligations under the peace accords.⁵

Initially, the EMC and SM maintained a neutral relationship, but they came into conflict in several regions over control of territory for cocaine production and drug-trafficking routes.⁶ The fighting relationship between the EMC and SM is complex, as in certain regions they cooperate whereas in others they are in conflict.⁷

SM split in November 2024, and only 20 per cent of the original membership of the group remained. The new splintered-off group operates under the name Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB) and consists of the Pacific Guerrilleros and the Comandos de la Frontera (Border Commands).⁸

Intensity

SM is equipped with small arms, machine guns, improvised explosive devices, and anti-personnel mines.⁹ The EMC has access to drones, enabling it to use aerial bombardment as a means of warfare.¹⁰ The EMC controls several territories in Colombia and Venezuela as a direct result of the intensity of violence its armed wing generates.¹¹

Little information as to the extent and the nature of each individual clash between the EMC and SM was recorded during the reporting period. Fighting between these two groups in the south-west of Colombia peaked in the middle of 2023 and resulted in at least 5,000 people being internally displaced.¹² During the reporting period, the EMC and SM continued to clash over disputed territory in the Caquetá Mountain range, along the Caquetá-Putumayo border, and on the Pacific coast of Nariño.¹³

It is not yet clear what the impact of the November 2024 disintegration of SM has had on the intensity of violence.¹⁴ This situation will be monitored, specifically, attention will be given to whether the factions engage in peace talks or engage in fighting and whether fighting meets the intensity requirement needed to trigger an additional NIAC. The pre-existing NIAC between SM and the EMC has not come to an end, as the SM’s parent group continues to exist and there has not yet been a ‘lasting cessation of armed confrontations without real risk of resumption’.¹⁵

Organization

Luciano Marín, alias Iván Márquez, is the overall leader of SM.¹⁶ Despite several reports of his death, recent intelligence suggests he is operating out of Venezuela.¹⁷ The group is described as an organization of old guerillas who returned to arms. Several members of the now defunct FARC-EP’s original leadership and fighters joined SM when it was established in 2019.¹⁸

SM has a stable and experienced leadership structure. The overall regional factions originally set up to form SM were the Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacifico (Pacific Guerrilleros), and Comandos de la Frontera (Border Commands).¹⁹ Each unit had a defined geographic area of operations.²⁰ In November 2024, however, SM experienced an internal disagreement between its overall leader, Iván Márquez, and SM chief negotiator, Walter Mendoza, which led to a split.²¹ The original SM remains under the control of Iván Márquez, whereas the regional factions Pacific Guerrilleros and Border Commands are now under the leadership of Walter Mendoza in the newly formed CNEB. ²²

Before the November 2024 split, regional factions operated in a decentralised manner but qualified as one party to the conflict due to two directorates that overarched both groups. The first, the National Directorate, serves as SM’s secretariat and is composed of high-ranking leaders and the second is the Intermediate Directorate which serves as the Central General Staff. The National Directorate receives instructions from the SM’s leadership which is based in Venezuela.²³ The Intermediate Directorate is in charge of relationships between regional structures and the National Directorate. Also, it exercises authority over urban cells.²⁴

As of December 2024, the military wing of SM was composed of eight guerrilla structures which in turn were composed of subgroups called fronts, companies, columns, commissions, and commandos.²⁵ Other reports suggest that up to fifteen SM units were operational. Each SM unit belonging to a regional faction was responsible for its own funding, logistics and military operations.²⁶ The impact of the November 2024 split on SM’s internal organizational structure remains uncertain.

Further, even before the split in November 2024 the exact internal operations and functions of SM were not entirely clear.²⁷ The three former organizational units announced that SM should improve its treatment of civilians in a joint statement.²⁸ Despite the limited information about its command structure, there is a command structure, and fighters are well trained, bearing in mind that SM is composed mostly of former fighters from the pre-2016 FARC-EP guerrillas.²⁹ Additionally, owing to a very experienced leadership, SM can impose discipline and adhere to IHL.

Further, the fact SM has a presence both in Colombia and Venezuela enhances its logistical capacity which enables the group to engage military tactics.³⁰ The group primarily operates in the jungle and mountainous areas along the Venezuelan and Colombian border. Not only does the jungle provide cover, it is also a lucrative region for drug trafficking and illegal mining.³¹

SM employs guerrilla tactics in launching military operations.³² As a transnational criminal enterprise, the tactics of SM’s military wing include armed assaults, assassinations, extortion operations, and hostage-taking.³³ A further part of their military tactics is to form alliances with other groups such as the ELN. The practice is not only military cooperation but is also for the purpose of territorial expansion for the movement of drugs.³⁴

SM has its stronghold in the border state of Apure.³⁵ Since the split in November 2024, SM has maintained its headquarters in Venezuela.³⁶

Until the split in November 2024, Walter Mendoza was the chief negotiator of SM.³⁷ Post-split, it is suggested the overall leader, Iván Márquez, speaks on behalf of SM.

Both non-state actors engaged in this NIAC are sufficiently organized under IHL. For an analysis of the organization of the EMC, see above.

As the intensity of the fighting is protracted in nature, the NIAC between the EMC and SM continued to constitute a NIAC.

1
‘Humanitarian Report 2024: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross; ‘Humanitarian Challenges 2025: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross.
2
Welt im Konflikt, ‘Remains of the FARC Guerilla (2025)’ Substack, 22 January 2025.
3
J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025.
4
O. Griffin and L. J. Acosta, ‘In the jungle with the secretive Colombian guerrillas key to country’s future’, The Independent, 21 August 2024.
5
J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025; A. Suárez and M. Rueda, ‘Explainer: What are Colombia’s ex-FARC splinter groups?’ AP News, 1 December 2021.
6
‘Colombia: combates entre disidentes de FARC dejan 12 muertos’, DW, 2 December 2024; ‘Las 5.000 personas que están sufriendo la guerra de la Segunda Marquetalia y el EMC en Caquetá’, Pares, 23 February 2024; ‘Cinco soldados colombianos resultan heridos en enfrentamientos con disidentes de las FARC’, Swiss Info, 22 July 2024; D. Diaz, ‘El EMC declara “zona de conflicto” a uno de los espacios de reincorporación del Acuerdo de Paz’, El País, 26 June 2024.
7
Welt im Konflikt, ‘Remains of the FARC Guerilla (2025)’ Substack, 22 January 2025.
8
‘Lo que debe saber del grupo armado separado de Iván Márquez que negocia con el Gobierno’, El Espectador, 27 November 2024; S. Garcia, ‘What an Internal Split Means for Colombia’s Second Marquetalia’, InSight Crime, 27 November 2024.
9
J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025.
10
L. Williams, ‘Advanced Drone Warfare Emerges in Colombia’, The Rio Times, 16 April 2024; J. Freixes, ‘Armed Drones Used by Illegal Groups in Colombia’, Colombia One, 18 June 2024; D. García, ‘Estado Central Mayor de las FARC amenaza a Colombia con drones con explosivos’, 360 Radio, 10 June 2025.
11
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; ‘Central General Staff – Ex-FARC Mafia’, InSight Crime, 14 June 2024.
12
‘Some 5,000 people affected by fighting in Colombia’s southwest, government says’, Reuters, 28 June 2023.
13
‘Thirty-Sixth Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Organization of American States Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS)’, Organization of American States, 2024, 6; ‘Thirty-Seventh Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission of the Organization of American States to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS)’, Organization of American States, 2025, 8.
14
J. Freixes, ‘Colombia’s Largest Ex-FARC Dissident Group Splits in Two’, Colombia One, 18 November 2024; S. Garcia, ‘What an Internal Split Means for Colombia’s Second Marquetalia’, InSight Crime, 27 November 2024.
15
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” is Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 18–19.
16
‘Second Marquetalia’, InSight Crime, 5 July 2022; H. Schmutz, ‘Kolumbien: Regierung und Farc-EP Segunda Marquetalia beginnen Friedensdialog’, Amerika21, 19 June 2024.
17
J. A. Blanquicet, ‘‘Iván Márquez’ y la última información que se tiene del paradero del jefe de la ‘Segunda Marquetalia’’, El Tiempo, 23 April 2025.
18
‘Disidencias de las FARC-EP: dos caminos de una guerra en construcción – Partes 1 y 2’, Fundación conflict responses, 1 March 2024; J. C. Garzón et al, ‘Segunda Marquetalia: Disidencias, rearmados y un futuro incierto’, Ideas paz, 7 July 2021.
19
‘Disidencias de las FARC-EP: dos caminos de una guerra en construcción – Partes 1 y 2’, Fundación conflict responses, 1 March 2024.
20
‘Disidencias de las FARC-EP: dos caminos de una guerra en construcción – Partes 1 y 2’, Fundación conflict responses, 1 March 2024.
21
L. J. Acosta, ‘Colombia rebel group Segunda Marquetalia splits, but peace talks go on’, Reuters, 20 November 2024; S. Garcia, ‘What an Internal Split Means for Colombia’s Second Marquetalia’, InSight Crime, 27 November 2024; UNSC, ‘United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia’, UN Doc S/2024/968, 26 December 2024.
22
‘Lo que debe saber del grupo armado separado de Iván Márquez que negocia con el Gobierno’, El Espectador, 27 November 2024; S. Garcia, ‘What an Internal Split Means for Colombia’s Second Marquetalia’, InSight Crime, 27 November 2024.
23
‘Disidencias de las FARC-EP: dos caminos de una guerra en construcción – Partes 1 y 2’, Fundación conflict responses, 1 March 2024.
24
J. C. Garzón et al, ‘Segunda Marquetalia: Disidencias, rearmados y un futuro incierto’, Ideas paz, 7 July 2021.
25
J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025.
26
‘Disidencias de las FARC-EP: dos caminos de una guerra en construcción – Partes 1 y 2’, Fundación conflict responses, 1 March 2024.
27
‘Disidencias de las FARC-EP: dos caminos de una guerra en construcción – Partes 1 y 2’, Fundación conflict responses, 1 March 2024; ‘Second Marquetalia’, InSight Crime, 5 July 2022.
28
‘Disidencias de las FARC-EP: dos caminos de una guerra en construcción – Partes 1 y 2’, Fundación conflict responses, 1 March 2024.
29
L. Ortiz, ‘Desmantelaron otra caleta con explosivos de la Segunda Marquetalia en Putumayo: encontraron casi 400 artefactos bélicos’, Infobae, 30 April 2024.
30
J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025; ‘¿Plomo Es Lo Que Viene? dos años de balance y retos de la Paz Total’, Pares, 16 July 2024.
31
‘Second Marquetalia’, InSight Crime, 5 July 2022; L. J. Acosta, ‘Colombia rebel group Segunda Marquetalia splits, but peace talks go on’, Reuters, 20 November 2024.
32
O. Griffin and L. J. Acosta, ‘In the jungle with the secretive Colombian guerrillas key to country’s future’, The Independent, 21 August 2024.
33
US Department of State, ‘Country Report on Terrorism 2022 – Chapter 5 – Segunda Marquetalia (SM)’, Ecoi.net, 30 November 2023.
34
J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025; ‘Disidencias de las FARC-EP: dos caminos de una guerra en construcción – Partes 1 y 2’, Fundación conflict responses, 1 March 2024; ‘Second Marquetalia’, InSight Crime, 5 July 2022.
35
J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025.
36
J. A. Blanquicet, ‘‘Iván Márquez’ y la última información que se tiene del paradero del jefe de la ‘Segunda Marquetalia’’, El Tiempo, 23 April 2025.
37
‘La disidencia de Segunda Marquetalia confirma que ‘Iván Márquez’ está vivo: “Se comunica con nosotros”’, Europa Press, 4 November 2024.

State Parties

Colombia

Non-state parties

Comuneros del Sur
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)
Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC) (formerly Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC))
Estado Mayor de los Bloques y el Frente (EMBF)
Comandos de la Frontera (CDF) of Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB)
Estado Mayor Central (EMC)
Segunda Marquetalia (SM)
Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez (Frente 57)

1
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.44.
2
M. L. Perez, ‘Kolumbien’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 31 March 2025.
3
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, US Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017.
4
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017.
5
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017.
6
‘United States Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 1: Drug and Chemical Control’, United States Department of State, March 2025, 168; ‘Colombia: Events of 2024’, Human Rights Watch.
7
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017.
8
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017.
9
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017.
10
M. L. Perez, ‘Kolumbien’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 31 March 2025.
11
‘Colombia’, Servicestelle Friedensbildung Baden-Württenberg.
12
M. L. Perez, ‘Kolumbien’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 31 March 2025.
13
‘Colombia’, Servicestelle Friedensbildung Baden-Württenberg.
14
M. L. Perez, ‘Kolumbien’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 31 March 2025.
15
M. L. Perez, ‘Kolumbien’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 31 March 2025.
16
‘Colombia y Venezuela lanzan una operación militar conjunta en la convulsa región de Catatumbo’, Europa Press, 31 January 2025.
17
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group.
18
‘Colombia y Venezuela lanzan una operación militar conjunta en la convulsa región de Catatumbo’, Europa Press, 31 January 2025; ‘Venezuela y Colombia inician operación militar conjunta en la frontera’, Voice of America, 31 January 2025; J. Frexies, ‘Colombia and Venezuela Launch Joint Military Operation in Catatumbo’, Colombia One, 31 January 2025.
19
S. Rivas, ‘Las Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia lanzan la Operación Perseo contra la guerrilla’, Pucará defensa, 12 October 2024; J. P. C. ‘¿En qué va la operación Perseo en contra de las disidencias de las Farc en el Cañón del Micay?’, Cambio, 1 January 2025.
20
J. P. Contreras Ríos, ‘El Plateado: así se vive tras 100 días de la operación para retomar fortín del EMC’, El Espectador, 25 January 2025.
21
J. P. Contreras Ríos, ‘El Plateado: así se vive tras 100 días de la operación para retomar fortín del EMC’, El Espectador, 25 January 2025.
22
‘Conquering Self Defense Forces of the Sierra Nevada (ACSN)’, InSight Crime, 11 October 2024; ‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; ‘Decreto 2659 de 2022’, Función pública, 31 December 2022; ‘Decreto 2660 de 2022’, Función pública, 31 December 2022.
23
O. Fajardo, ‘Comienza en Caracas la mesa de diálogo entre el Gobierno de Colombia y Segunda Marquetalia’, CNN Colombia, 24 June 2024; V. Amaya, ‘Comenzó la mesa de diálogo entre Gobierno colombiano y Segunda Marquetalia en busca de la paz’, RFI, 25 June 2024; V. Peñaloza and L. Pérez, ‘Gobierno nacional y Autodefensas Conquistadoras anuncian primeros compromisos de los diálogos de paz’, Radio Nacional de Colombia, 13 March 2025; J. Bernal, ‘Gobierno Petro comenzará diálogos de paz con las Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada’, Infobae, 23 February 2025.
24
‘ACSN Peace Talks Timeline’, ABColombia; ‘Segunda Marquetalia: Peace Talks with Colombian Government’, ABColombia.
25
M. Pérez Gallardo, ‘Colombia: entra en vigor el cese al fuego de 180 días entre el Gobierno y la guerrilla del ELN’, France 24, 4 August 2023; D. Díaz, ‘El cese al fuego más esperado de la Paz Total entra en vigor’, El Pais, 3 August 2023.
26
M. A. Rodríguez, ‘Gobierno y ELN: cese al fuego bilateral será sometido a evaluación para definir nueva prórroga’, Infobae, 29 January 2024; ‘El Gobierno de Colombia y el ELN acuerdan extender el cese del fuego hasta el 5 de febrero’, CNN Español, 29 January 2024.
27
‘Colombia y ELN anuncian una ampliación del cese al fuego’, Deutsche Welle, 6 February 2024; ‘Colombia agrees with ELN rebel group to extend truce’, Al Jazeera, 6 February 2024.
28
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; B. F. Valencia Ríos, ‘Finalizó el cese al fuego con el ELN y no hubo prórroga, ¿diálogos de paz en veremos? ’, El Colombiano, 4 August 2024.
29
‘ELN Peace Talks Timeline’, ABColombia; W. Gazeau, ‘El Gobierno colombiano y el ELN anuncian que reactivarán las negociaciones de paz’, France24, 7 November 2024; ‘Presidente Petro suspende diálogos con el Eln tras “crímenes de guerra” en el Catatumbo’, Presidencia, 17 January 2025.
30
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; ‘Decreto 1684 de 2023: Nivel Nacional’, Régimen legal de Bogotá D.C., 16 October 2023.
31
‘Decreto de cese al fuego bilateral y temporal de carácter nacional entre el gobierno nacional y el autodenominado EMCFARC’, Indepaz, 16 October 2023; C. A. Morales Castillo and G. Castrillón Pulido, ‘Con decreto de cese al fuego, se instala mesa de diálogo con disidencia de Mordisco’, El Espectador,17 October 2023.
32
P. A. Marín Molano, ‘2024 año crucial en la Mesa de Diálogos entre el EMC y el Gobierno Nacional’, Pares, 18 January 2024; ‘Gobierno extiende hasta julio el cese al fuego con el Estado Mayor Central tregua de las Farc’, Radio Nacional de Colombia, 14 January 2024.
33
R. Cué Barberena, ‘El Gobierno colombiano finaliza tregua con el EMC, aunque la mantiene con algunas facciones’, France 24, 17 July 2024; ‘Gobierno de Colombia suspende cese al fuego con una parte del EMC’, Voice of America, 16 July 2024.
34
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; ‘Gobierno de Colombia suspende cese al fuego con una parte del EMC’, Voice of America, 16 July 2024.
35
‘General Staff of Blocks and Front (EMBF)’, InSight Crime, 31 July 2025.
36
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; R. Cué Barberena, ‘El Gobierno colombiano finaliza tregua con el EMC, aunque la mantiene con algunas facciones’, France 24, 17 July 2024; ‘Gobierno de Colombia suspende cese al fuego con una parte del EMC’, Voice of America, 16 July 2024.
37
‘Es oficial: Gobierno no autorizó ampliación del cese el fuego con disidencia de Calarcá’, El Espectador, 17 April 2025; J. Márquez, ‘Alerta máxima en el Catatumbo tras fin del cese al fuego bilateral con el EMBF de las FARC’, Caracol Radio, 17 April 2025; Observatorio de Derechos Humanos y Conflictividades de Indepaz, ‘Prórroga de un mes del cese al fuego con el EMBF: Impactos y Perspectivas’, Indepaz, 18 April 2025.
38
‘Gobierno prorroga cese al fuego bilateral, únicamente con cuatro grupos del denominado Estado Mayor al mando de alias ‘Calarcá’: Mindefensa’, Presidencia, 19 April 2025; ‘Gobierno prorroga por un mes cese al fuego con disidencias de las Farc’, Legis ámbito jurídico, 21 April 2025.
39
J. Camilo Colorado, ‘Gobierno y disidencias de las Farc acuerdan zona de paz en la región de Catatumbo’, La Republica, 4 May 2025; ‘Presidente destaca acuerdo con el Frente 33 para la creación de zona de paz en el Catatumbo’, Presidencia, 3 May 2025.
40
‘Gobierno y Frente 33 de disidencia Calarcá acuerdan zona de preagrupamiento en Catatumbo’, El Espectador, 4 May 2025.
41
J. Pablo Patiño, ‘Gobierno y Comuneros del Sur acordaron cese al fuego y destrucción de armas, ¿cómo será?’, eColombiano, 20 December 2024; C. Burgos, ‘Gobierno nacional y Comuneros del Sur acordaron cese al fuego bilateral de seis meses’, Radio Nacional de Colombia, 22 December 2024.
42
‘Gobierno nacional y Comuneros del Sur firmaron este sábado dos acuerdos históricos como parte del proceso paz territorial en Nariño’, Presidencia, 5 April 2025; ‘La guerrilla disidente colombiana del ELN acuerda desarmarse, aunque la ‘paz total’ sigue siendo difícil de alcanzar’, WOLA, 6 May 2025; ‘La negociación con el frente Comuneros Sur: primera victora de la paz total de Petro’, Pares, 8 April 2025.
43
‘Las claves de la entrega de armas de Comuneros del Sur, la primera en Gobierno Petro’, El Espectador, 7 April 2025; S. Rodriguez Álverez, ‘Comuneros del Sur: Petro se anota un triunfo y avanza en nuevo modelo de paz’, La Silla Vacía, 7 April 2025.
44
M. Saiz, ‘Comuneros del Sur Disarming Marks Small Win for Colombia’s Total Peace’, InSight Crime, 9 April 2025; ‘La guerrilla disidente colombiana del ELN acuerda desarmarse, aunque la ‘paz total’ sigue siendo difícil de alcanzar’, WOLA, 6 May 2025.
45
‘Gobierno Petro anuncia otra Zona de Ubicación: será con Comuneros del Sur’, El Espectador, 10 June 2025; P. T. C. and P. G. T., ‘Las dudas de la mesa con Comuneros del Sur, la disidencia del ELN en Nariño’, Fundación ideas para la paz, 7 July 2025.
46
S. Torrado, ‘Claves de los diálogos de paz con la Segunda Marquetalia y la Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano’, El Pais, 13 February 2025; N. R. Matta Colorado, ‘Alias Araña cayó por traficar mientras negociaba la paz’, eColombiano, 14 February 2025; L. Martínez, ‘Gobierno y Coordinadora Nacional del Ejército Bolivariano, continuarán con diálogos’, Asuntos Legales, 16 March 2025.
47
F. Saavedra, ‘Así quedó el acuerdo entre el Gobierno y la Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano para erradicar 30.000 hectáreas de coca en Putumayo y Nariño’, Infobae, 2 April 2025; ‘Gobierno y Coordinadora Bolivariana firman tres acuerdos preliminares’, Agencia Prensa Rural, 11 April 2025.
48
A. Alsema, ‘Colombia to create three guerrilla demobilization zones’, Colombia Reports, 26 May 2025; ‘Colombia to Create Three Guerrilla Demobilization Zones’, International Center for Transitional Justice, 26 May 2025.
49
E. J. Alonso Dorado, ‘Gobierno y CNEB firman acuerdo para la entrega y destrucción de más de 13 toneladas de material de guerra’, El Tiempo, 20 July 2025.
50
L. Caicedo, ‘Comuneros del Sur: ¿cómo es el frente ‘rebelde’ que se separó del ELN?’, Caracol Radio, 8 May 2024.
51
‘El Frente Comuneros del Sur, la primera disidencia del ELN’, Cambio, 9 May 2024.
52
L. Caicedo, ‘Comuneros del Sur: ¿cómo es el frente ‘rebelde’ que se separó del ELN?’, Caracol Radio, 8 May 2024.
53
‘National Liberation Army (Colombia)’, Mapping Militants Project, 3 December 2024; ‘Colombia recognizes dissident ELN faction as independent organization’, Reuters, 8 May 2024.
54
M. Benavides Cadena, ‘Nueva disidencia en el Valle, ‘Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez’. ¿Quién la lidera?’, Caracol Radio, 2 April 2024.
55
L. S. Cardona Ruiz, ‘Análisis: Así opera el Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez que genera zozobra en el Valle’, El Pais, 30 March 2025; ‘Este es el nuevo frente de las disidencias de las Farc que llegó al norte del Cauca; es comandando por un sanguinario que asesinó a varios cabecillas para llegar al poder’, Semana, 10 August 2024.
56
M. Benavides Cadena, ‘Nueva disidencia en el Valle, ‘Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez’. ¿Quién la lidera?’, Caracol Radio, 2 April 2024.
57
J. P. Contreras Ríos, ‘Así nació el grupo que se separó de Mordisco y que ahora negocia la paz con Petro’, El Espectador, 4 December 2024.
58
‘Lo que debe saber del grupo armado separado de Iván Márquez que negocia con el Gobierno’, El Espectador, 27 November 2024.
59
UNSC, ‘United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia: Report of the Secretary General’, UN Doc S/2024/986, 26 December 2024; L. J. Acosta, ‘Colombia rebel group Segunda Marquetalia splits, but peace talks go on’, Reuters, 20 November 2024; S. Garcia, ‘What an Internal Split Means for Colombia’s Second Marquetalia’, InSight Crime, 27 November 2024.
60
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; ‘At least seven dead and 50 wounded as Colombia hit with bombings and gun attacks’, The Guardian, 10 June 2025; A. Alsema, ‘At least three killed in wave of bomb attacks in southwest Colombia’, Colombia Reports, 10 June 2025; K. Johnson, ‘Ataques en Cauca y Valle: ¿otra ronda de lo mismo’, Razon Publica, 15 June 2025.
61
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; ‘At least seven dead and 50 wounded as Colombia hit with bombings and gun attacks’, The Guardian, 10 June 2025; A. Alsema, ‘At least three killed in wave of bomb attacks in southwest Colombia’, Colombia Reports, 10 June 2025; ‘Siete muertos en múltiples ataques con disparos y explosivos de guerrilleros en Colombia’, RFI, 10 June 2025 (Updated 11 June 2025).
62
A. Alsema, ‘At least three killed in wave of bomb attacks in southwest Colombia’, Colombia Reports, 10 June 2025.
63
‘At least seven dead and 50 wounded as Colombia hit with bombings and gun attacks’, The Guardian, 10 June 2025.
64
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; ‘At least seven dead and 50 wounded as Colombia hit with bombings and gun attacks’, The Guardian, 10 June 2025.
65
‘At least seven dead and 50 wounded as Colombia hit with bombings and gun attacks’, The Guardian, 10 June 2025; S. Jones, ‘Shot Colombian presidential candidate survives emergency surgery’, The Guardian, 8 June 2025; ‘At least 7 killed in explosions and attacks outside police stations in southwest Colombia’, AP News, 11 June 2025; K. Johnson, ‘Ataques en Cauca y Valle: ¿otra ronda de lo mismo’, Razon Publica, 15 June 2025.
66
‘Colombia’, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 14 May 2025.
67
‘Colombia’, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 14 May 2025.
68
‘Colombia’, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 14 May 2025.
69
‘Colombia’, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 14 May 2025.
70
S. Rodriguez and Georgetown University Latin America & Caribbean Policy Association, ‘Internal Displacement in Colombia: Characterization and Relevant Research Findings’, Georgetown Public Policy Review, 25 January 2024; V. Sainz, ‘Forced to Flee: The Global Impact of Conflict-Driven Internal Displacement’, Atlas Institute for International Affairs, 14 April 2025.

Colombia

Reporting period: July 2023 - June 2025

why a disclaimer ?

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (between July 2023 and May 2025)

Escalating tension between armed groups in Catatumbo

Operación Perseo (Operation Perseus)

Ceasefires and the ‘total peace’ process

The splintering of several armed groups on Colombian territory

Unprecedented series of bombings by EMC in June 2025 following the attempted assassination of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe in Bogotá

Increasing numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs)

Non International Armed Conflict

Background

Intensity

Organization

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Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

Non-state parties