Colombia (2026-07-23)

As oy May 2026, multiple non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) were ongoing in Colombia. At least four NIACs took place to which Colombia was a party:

Colombia v. Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)
Colombia v. Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC) (formerly Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC))
Colombia v. Estado Mayor Central (EMC)
Colombia v. Comandos de la Frontera (CDF)

Additionally, at least six other NIACs between armed groups were ongoing:

ELN v. the EGC
ELN v. Frente 33 of the Estado Mayor de los Bloques y el Frente (EMBF)
EMC v. Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez
EMC v. the EGC
EMC v. the ELN
EMC v. Segunda Marquetalia (SM)
EMC v. the EMBF

Colombia is a State Party to Additional Protocol II of 1977. All four of the NIACs to which Colombia is a party continue to meet the additional requirements of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II, meaning that this treaty is applicable in addition to the rules of customary international humanitarian law (IHL).

Additional Protocol II does not apply to the NIACs between organized armed groups who are not fighting the territorial State (Colombia in this case) as Article 1(1) of the Protocol is limited to situations where the territorial State is confronting a non-State armed group.¹ The law of NIAC, in particular Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other rules of customary IHL, applies to these situations.

During the 1960s, Marxist campesino and student guerrilla groups emerged in Colombia in response to conditions of an unequal land distribution and land ownership policy that benefitted large landowning interests, multinational agribusiness, and mining companies.² Between 1948 and 1958, Colombia experienced a decade of political violence known as La Violencia. It is in this period that the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo(FARC-EP) and the ELN were established.³ Subsequently, landowners organized to protect themselves against guerrilla groups and, in turn, spurred the emergence of right-wing paramilitary groups in the 1980s. The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) was the largest of these paramilitary groups.⁴

The FARC-EP and the ELN have a history of relying on violence, abduction and extortion to raise revenue and gain leverage over their adversaries. Allegedly, Colombian guerrilla groups kidnapped more than 25,000 people between 1970 and 2010.⁵

Historically, the illicit trade in drugs has been a driver of the conflict in Colombia.⁶ At the start of the twenty-first century, Colombia was responsible for up to ninety per cent of global cocaine production. Simultaneously, multiple non-State armed groups profited from the cocaine trade and competition over territory among these groups provoked further armed violence.⁷

In 2002, Álvaro Uribe won the presidential elections and took a strong stance against the guerrilla groups. Uribe managed to reduce significantly the number of murders and kidnappings, although human rights groups accused the government of human rights abuses. In 2004, the AUC disarmed during the Uribe presidency. However, red flags were raised concerning possible ties between Uribe and the paramilitary groups.⁸

In 2010, Juan Manuel Santos, the Minister of Defence under President Uribe, was himself elected president of Colombia. In 2012, formal peace talks with the FARC-EP were initiated by his government. By the middle of 2016, the Colombian government under Santos and the FARC-EP led by Rodrigo Londoño had agreed to a ceasefire, which the leadership signed in Cartagena in September 2016.⁹

As a result of the peace agreement, more than 13,000 FARC-EP members have laid down their weapons. The FARC-EP formed a political party under the name ‘Comunes’ and was awarded five guaranteed seats in the Senate and the House of Representatives for the period of two subsequent legislative sessions.¹⁰

Post-peace agreement arrangements include the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, which is tasked with supporting the peace agreement.¹¹ The agreement included the creation of a transitional justice system called the Comprehensive System for Peace, which is comprised of the Truth Commission, the Unit for the Search of Missing Persons (UBPD), and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP).¹²

However, some members of the former FARC-EP did not participate in the peace agreement and set up dissident groups. In 2021, these groups engaged in violent attacks in different parts of Colombia despite the initial reduction in conflict-related violence resulting from the 2016 peace agreement.¹³ Further, 2021 marked the rise of historically large nationwide protests as a consequence of the stalled implementation of the peace agreement and tax reforms.

In August 2022, Gustavo Petro was elected Colombia’s first left-wing president. His election revived efforts to restart the peace process that had stalled.¹⁴ President Petro’s government announced a ‘Paz Total’ (‘Total Peace’) policy, which aims to achieve a full implementation of the 2016 peace agreement and ensure structural and social reform. The government is negotiating with ten armed groups as part of this strategy. Despite reaching temporary bilateral ceasefires with certain groups, no substantive peace agreements had been formalized as of end May 2026.¹⁵Indeed, since the middle of 2024, the level of violence has escalated significantly. Additionally, a surge in splintering processes within numerous armed groups was observable during 2023 and 2024 due to a divide between members who were in support of or opposed to entering peace talks with the Colombian government (see previous version).

Escalating tension between armed groups in Catatumbo

The Catatumbo region, which is rich in mineral resources and provides ideal climatic conditions for coca cultivation, has been a traditional stronghold of the ELN, whose control was recently threatened by the growing presence of the Frente 33 of the EMBF, leading to an increase in armed clashes.¹⁶ On 16 January 2025, the ELN initiated a coordinated offensive in Catatumbo during which the group undertook house-to-house searches for former FARC fighters and conducted attacks on Catatumbo-based encampments of the EMBF’s Frente 33. The offensive continued until the end of the month, and resulted in the killing of more than 80 people, the forcible confinement of 24,000, and the displacement of a further 48,000.¹⁷ In response to this heightened armed group activity, on 31 January 2025, the Colombian and Venezuelan governments announced a joint “anti-narcotics military operation” in Catatumbo.¹⁸

Ceasefires and the ‘total peace’ process

During 2025 and 2026, several ceasefire agreements were reached and hostilities suspended as a part of President Petro’s ‘total peace’ policy. The Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada (ACSN) initiated peace talks with the government in February 2025.

The talks with the ACSN are ongoing as of May 2026.¹⁹ Following Segunda Marquetalia’s (SM) disengagement from the total peace process in late 2024, ²⁰ Colombia’s Attorney General reactivated arrest warrants against six former members of SM’s delegation to the peace talks in July 2025.²¹ In October 2025, the Colombian government also revoked SM leader Iván Márquez’s status as a peace negotiator due to inactivity.²²

After peace talks with the ELN had resumed in November 2024, they were again suspended in January 2025 following attacks carried out by the ELN in the Catatumbo region.²³ On 13 October 2025, Petro signalled his interest in reopening talks with the ELN.²⁴ Two months later, in December 2025, one of the ELN’s leading figures, Antonio García, indicated the group’s willingness to return to the negotiating table.²⁵ In February 2026, the ELN met with government representatives and members of the ‘International Community and the Colombian Episcopal Conference’ to discuss the possibility of resuming negotiations. They further declared a unilateral ceasefire on 23 February 2026 to ensure stability leading up to the 8 March 2026 congressional elections and one on 20 May 2026 ahead of the presidential elections.²⁶ As of end May 2026, peace talks between both parties have not formally resumed.

A bilateral ceasefire with the EMBF, which remained at the negotiating table after the split from EMC, was extended until 15 April 2025.²⁷ On 17 April 2025, President Petro’s government formally declared that the ceasefire with the EMBF would not be renewed, while emphasizing that the decision not to extend the truce under its original terms did not imply the suspension of or end to the peace talks.²⁸ However, only a few hours after the announcement of the end of the ceasefire, the Colombian president ordered a suspension of the offensive and of the special military operations by the police against members of the EMBF until 18 May 2025 and conditionally extended the previous ceasefire de facto.²⁹ The president concluded the ‘Catatumbo’ agreement with the EMBF’s Frente 33 in May 2025 to create a ‘Temporary Location Zone’ in a rural area of Tibú.³⁰ This zone could operate in a manner analogous to the areas established for the surrender of weapons and a return to civilian life for former guerrillas of the FARC-EP.³¹ In the aftermath of the failed renewal of the bilateral ceasefire between the Colombian government and the EMBF, the group requested to hold renewed talks on 16 June 2025.³² Both parties returned to the negotiating table on 23 July 2025 and talks the months.³³ An agreement was reached during the seventh round of negotiations in November 2025, and involved pledges to de-escalate the conflict.³⁴

On 19 December 2024, at the government’s dialogue table with Comuneros del Sur there was an agreement to introduce a 180-day ceasefire from January 2025 and for a process to be initiated to destroy the group’s weapons.³⁵ At the end of a meeting with the Comuneros del Sur on 6 April 2025, during which the armed group agreed to progressively disarm, the President ordered the destruction of more than 500 explosive devices that were handed over as a part of the peace agreement. This is widely recognized as the first significant achievement of Gustavo Petro’s ‘total peace’ process.³⁶ The remainder of the weapons were expected to be handed over and destroyed before the end of July 2025 and the process is subject to international verification.³⁷ The Comuneros del Sur further consented to replacing 5,000 hectares under coca cultivation (for cocaine) with an alternative crop.³⁸ The seventh round of talks between Gustavo Petro’s government and the Comuneros del Surwas held in Nariño on 10 June 2025. During the talks, the group reached four agreements, one of which was the creation of a Temporary Location Zone in the municipality of Mallama, Nariño.³⁹ The eighth round of talks concluded in February 2026 with the group pledging neutrality in the March 2026 congressional elections and approving the protocols for the operation of and movement to the Temporary Location Zone in Mallama.⁴⁰

A peace process is underway between the Colombian government and a splinter group of SM, Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB). At the close of a third round of talks in Bogotá on 12 February 2025, Geovany Andrés Rojas, alias Araña, was arrested by agents of the Attorney General’s Office, acting on an Interpol Red Notice of Extradition. The arrest temporarily suspended negotiations, the CNEB agreed to renew talks in April.⁴¹ The preliminary agreements, reached at the fourth round of talks on 10 April 2025, include support for the voluntary substitution of illicit crops, the CNEB respecting IHL, and the definition of a ‘roadmap’ towards a definitive peace agreement.⁴² The government also formally acknowledged the formation of so-called Temporary Location Zones on 25 May 2025 for demobilization, disarmament and reintegration programmes for dissident fighters and further aspects of the peace talks.⁴³ In July 2025, Agreement No 12 was ratified, establishing the ‘Delivery, Verification and Progressive Destruction of War Material’ and approving the ‘Protocol on the Process of Destruction of War Material’.⁴⁴ The dialogue suffered a setback on 12 September 2025, when negotiations were suspended in the aftermath of an attack that killed two soldiers in Putumayo. Talks resumed on 8 October 2025 and led to the handing over of the first batch of the group’s armaments in mid-October.⁴⁵ The sixth round of talks was held in early December 2025, leading to the agreement on the implementation of two Temporary Location Zones.⁴⁶ Although peace talks were suspended multiple times during early 2026, parties formally declared the resumption of negotiations on 26 April 2026.⁴⁷

After months of rapprochement efforts, the Colombian government announced in August 2025 that it would formally hold peace talks with the EGC in Doha mediated by Qatar.⁴⁸ The first round of talks was held between 14 and 18 September 2025.⁴⁹ On 13 October 2025, EGC pledged neutrality in the May 2026 presidential elections.⁵⁰ During the second round of talks in early December 2025, the parties agreed to launch more pilot projects to reduce violence and promote rural development, as well as the establishment of three Temporary Location Zones where EGC fighters are expected to gather from 1 March 2026 as part of a phased disarmament process.⁵¹ Although the US authorities designated the EGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on 16 December 2025, they later provided cautious encouragement for Qatar’s mediation initiative.⁵² In February 2026, the negotiations suffered a setback when EGC temporarily halted its participation in the talks after its leader was placed on the government’s capture list, but the talks later resumed.⁵³ The Colombian government issued arrest warrants for EGC leaders on 9 March 2026, claiming that the group had failed to fulfil its commitments under the Doha talks.⁵⁴However, to revive the ongoing peace process with the group, President Petro formally requested Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office to suspend arrest warrants and extradition requests for the EGC leaders on 8 May 2026.⁵⁵ This move was, however opposed by Colombia’s judiciary.⁵⁶

Unprecedented series of bombings by EMC in June 2025 following the attempted assassination of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe in Bogotá

On 10 June 2025, the FARC-EP dissident group EMC, led by a commander known as ‘Iván Mordisco’, launched an unparalleled series of synchronised bombings across the departments of Cauca and Valle de Cauca along the Pacific coast.⁵⁷ About twenty-six attacks, which included car bombs and drones, were directed at police stations and patrols, some of which took place in Colombia’s third-largest city, Cali.⁵⁸

The towns of Buenos Aires, Caloto, Corinto, Jamundí, and Morales have been hit by further attacks, according to the Ministry of Defence.⁵⁹ Carlos Fernando Triana, the national police chief, stated that the attackers had used a variety of weapons in their attack, including car bombs, motorcycle bombs, rifle fire, and a suspected drone.⁶⁰ At least two police officers and five civilians were killed in the attacks, and at least fifty people were wounded.⁶¹ In response, operations were immediately launched by security forces against the EMC in the region.⁶² The assaults occurred just days after an attempted assassination of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe on 7 June 2025 in Bogotá (see below), which put the country on heightened alert and signalled an escalation in Colombia’s security crisis.⁶³

Death of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe

Miguel Uribe, Colombian senator and May 2026 presidential candidate for the right-wing opposition party Democratic Centre (Centro Democrático), was attacked at a campaign event in Colombia’s capital Bogotá on 7 June 2025.⁶⁴ The assailant shot him once in the leg and twice in the head with a 9mm Glock at close range, firing a dozen times in total. Uribe survived emergency surgery,⁶⁵ but remained in intensive care for nine weeks and underwent numerous additional surgeries.⁶⁶ In response to this uptick in political violence, a wave of protests dubbed ‘March of Silence’ broke out in major Colombian cities on 15 June 2025.⁶⁷

On 5 July 2025, an arrest was made in connection to the 7 June shooting – José Arteaga Hernández, alias ‘El Costanzo’, was accused of organizing the logistics for the attack.⁶⁸ Reports later emerged that the Attorney General’s office suspected a senior member of SM, known as ‘Zarco Aldinever’, of involvement in the shooting.⁶⁹ As of end May 2026, a total of six people have been arrested in connection with the incident, including a teenage boy who is the alleged shooter. He was reportedly hired by a local drug lord.⁷⁰ On 11 August 2025, two months after the assassination attempt, Uribe succumbed to his injuries. He was thirty-nine years old.⁷¹

Following another incident on 13 August 2025, in which congressman Julio César Triana’s vehicle came under attack,⁷² Defence Minister Pedro Sánchez presented plans for large-scale security deployments ahead of the 2026 election.⁷³

Former President Álvaro Uribe found guilty of witness tampering

On 28 July 2025, a Colombian district court found Álvaro Uribe, the former President of the country between 2002 and 2010, guilty of witness tampering and bribery.⁷⁴ The underlying case, which served as the basis for this conviction, saw Uribe accuse left-wing senator Iván Cepeda of plotting to link him to right-wing paramilitaries in Colombia in 2012. In 2018, the Supreme Court dismissed the case against Cepeda and launched an inquiry into whether Uribe had bribed and coerced imprisoned former paramilitaries who had revealed his connections with the United Self Defence Forces of Colombia into altering their testimony.⁷⁵ The July 2025 case constituted the first-ever criminal conviction of a former Colombian head of State.⁷⁶ Uribe was given a twelve-year prison sentence.⁷⁷ The sentence was, however, overturned by the Appeals Court on 21 October 2025, which order twelve years’ house arrest instead.⁷⁸

Heightened tensions between Colombia and United States

The feud between President Trump and President Petro began shortly after Trump’s re-election when both leaders exchanged threats on social media regarding the fate of two United States (US) deportation flights on 26 January 2025.⁷⁹ During 2025 and 2026, the relations between Colombia and the US sharply deteriorated. In late June 2025, President Petro claimed that there was a planned coup d’état against him involving Colombian and American politicians, after El País published recordings suggesting that former Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva was involved. Following these allegations, the US government recalled its chargé d’affaires to Colombia, John McNamara. In response, the Colombian government recalled its ambassador to Washington for ‘consultation’.⁸⁰ In a further sign of escalation, on 30 July 2025, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio accused Colombia’s judicial authorities of engaging in a political smear campaign, following the conviction of Álvaro Uribe (see above).⁸¹

Against the backdrop of disagreements over drug policy and armed group negotiations as well as the record-high levels of coca crop cultivation and cocaine production during Petro’s presidency, the United States decertified Colombia for failing to cooperate in the ‘war on drugs’ on 15 September 2025. This was the first time this had happened since 1996. The US decision, however, came with a full National Interest Waiver, which permits the continuation of financial support and cooperation.⁸² Despite this political ‘warning shot’, the fact that Colombia was not materially cut off speaks to the closeness of the cooperation between the two States and their interdependence, which is rooted in their joint fight against organized crime.⁸³ Petro denounced the move as political, publicly declared that Colombia would no longer purchase weapons from the United States, and critiqued US drug policy at the United Nations General Assembly on 23 September 2025.⁸⁴ Tensions mounted further after Petro attended a pro-Palestine march in New York on 26 September 2025, on the sidelines of the General Assembly, and called on US troops to ‘not point their rifles at humanity’ and to defy Trump’s orders. This move caused the US government to annul his visa.⁸⁵

The relationship remained strained over the following months. On 8 October 2025, Petro publicly denounced the US military operations in the southern Caribbean and Venezuela.⁸⁶ US President Trump, in turn, made accusations of drug trafficking against Petro and threatened to withdraw all remaining aid to the country on 19 October 2025. The Colombian government swiftly denied these allegations.⁸⁷ In an unprecedented move, Petro and his family, as well as Colombia’s Interior Minister, Armando Benedetti, were sanctioned by the US Treasury on 24 October 2025 for supposedly permitting drug cartels to ‘flourish’.⁸⁸

On 10 December 2025, Trump threatened to take military action against Colombia, stating that Petro ‘will be next’ after Venezuela.⁸⁹ He reiterated this threat after Petro publicly denounced the US ‘Operation Absolute Resolve’ in Venezuela on 3 January 2026, which led to the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.⁹⁰ In response, Petro called for mass protests to defend Colombian sovereignty, adding that he would consider taking up arms if necessary.⁹¹

In a sign of de-escalation, Trump and Petro held their first direct phone call on 7 January 2026, during which Petro labelled the disagreement as a misunderstanding and expressed a readiness to take stricter action against the ELN. Both leaders agreed to meet at the White House ‘in the near future’.⁹² Shortly afterward, on 13 January 2026, Colombia’s Defence Minister Pedro Sánchez visited Washington DC and called for greater US military support in the fight against drug trafficking.⁹³ Following an eight-month freeze, the Colombian government declared its intention to reinstate deportation flights from the United States in January 2026 after Trump had threatened the imposition of tariffs.⁹⁴ Meanwhile, several Colombian guerrilla groups, including the EMC and the ELN, formed plans to join forces against US ‘imperialism’.⁹⁵

On 3 February 2026, Petro and Trump held their first face-to-face meeting at the White House in Washington. Both Presidents described the meeting as productive and positive. Petro reiterated his commitment to counter-narcotics cooperation, vowing to ramp up efforts to apprehend high-value targets such as ‘Chiquito Malo’ of the EGC, ‘Pablito’ of the ELN, and ‘Iván Mordisco’ of the EMC. Petro also sought Trump’s assistance in mediating the escalating trade dispute with Ecuador (see below).⁹⁶ Since the talks, tensions between the two governments have eased significantly. On 20 March 2026, however, reports emerged that the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) had labelled Petro a ‘priority target’ amid an investigation by US federal prosecutors into his alleged involvement in drug trafficking. Petro repeatedly denied these allegations. As a consequence, on 31 March US officials decided not to bring criminal charges against him for the time being.⁹⁷

Petro hardens his stance towards armed groups

During a speech in Valledupar on 21 August 2025, Colombian President Petro declared that his government would designate the EGC, EMC and SM as ‘terrorist organizations’ and called on the international community to do the same. This statement was made in the context of attacks that had occurred the day prior in Amalfi and Cali, which resulted in the death of eight National Police officers and two civilians. He further announced that the Colombian government will initiate legal actions so that the leaders of these armed groups are prosecuted for crimes against humanity and that it will request the International Criminal Court (ICC) to advance investigations in this regard.⁹⁸

First Special Jurisdiction for Peace sentences issued

Colombia’s Special Jurisdiction for Peace (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, JEP) is a tribunal forming part of the transitional justice framework called Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition (Sistema Integral de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y No Repetición, SIVJRNR) established by the 2016 peace agreement (see above).⁹⁹ The JEP handed down its first convictions on 16 and 18 September 2025. On 16 September 2025, seven ex-FARC secretariat officials were convicted of orchestrating the kidnapping more than 21,000 people. They were sentenced to eight years of community service, which includes assisting in the search for the missing, demining, and working in environmental conservation and historical preservation. On 18 September 2025, the court sentenced twelve former soldiers for their involvement in 135 extrajudicial executions in Cesar department.¹⁰⁰ The rulings sparked controversy,, however, with several actors criticizing the sentences for being too lenient.¹⁰¹

Developments and security concerns in the run-up to March 2026 congressional and May 2026 presidential elections

On 26 October 2025, Petro’s governing leftist Historical Pact (Pacto Histórico) coalition nominated senator Iván Cepeda Castro as its presidential candidate for the May 2026 election.¹⁰² A few weeks later, on 17 November 2025, Cepeda announced through a statement on social media that his campaign was supported by other liberal factions, and a ‘Broad Front’ uniting left-wing, centrist, and democratic liberalism forces had been formed.¹⁰³ He emerged victorious in a poll conducted by Centro Nacional de Consultoria on 18 November 2025, with far-right candidate Abelardo de la Espriella coming in second.¹⁰⁴

At the same time, political violence and security threats continued to rise ahead of the elections in March and May 2026. In February 2026 alone, several high-profile political figures such as Senator Jairo Castellanos, Senator Aída Quilcué Vivas, Mayor of Morales Óscar Guachetá Arrubla, congressional candidate Lucy Amparo Guzmán González, as well as parliamentary candidates Ana Libia Guetio and Andrés Vásquez Mejía were attacked by the ELN and other armed assailants. Some of them were kidnapped and later freed by security forces.¹⁰⁵ Additionally, armed groups damaged infrastructure, including by burning numerous billboards in Norte de Santander department.¹⁰⁶ The Electoral Observation Mission expressed concern that electoral violence could affect 339 municipalities nationwide.¹⁰⁷

On 8 March 2026, legislative elections and numerous presidential primaries were held. The results produced a fragmented Congress. Five candidates advanced to the first round of presidential elections on 31 May 2026.¹⁰⁸ The security situation remained tense, with three soldiers reportedly killed while on duty guarding polling stations in Caquetá department.¹⁰⁹ Similarly, campaign offices of right-wing candidate Paloma Valencia were attacked. Several presidential candidates received death threats, including Valencia and Abelardo de la Espriella.¹¹⁰ Reports emerged on 17 April 2026 of US intelligence information regarding a potential assassination plot against Cepeda.¹¹¹ On 16 May 2026, Rogers Mauricio Devia, a former mayor affiliated with Abelardo de la Espriella, and his campaign assistant Eder Fabián Cardona were assassinated after a campaign event in Meta department. The same day, an attempt was made to assassinate Julián Cardona, a former mayoral candidate associated with the Democratic Centre.¹¹²

Intelligence–military scandal involving Colombian government

Reports emerged on 23 November 2025 of alleged links between senior State officials, namely an army general and a senior National Intelligence Directorate (DNI) figure, and the EMBF. Radio Caracol reported about alleged meetings in Bogotá, attended by army officers in civilian clothes, during which a ‘non-aggression pact’ was supposedly coordinated between the public force and the dissidents in Catatumbo, Antioquia and southern Bolívar departments. Army officers allegedly provided the dissidents with classified information, including about military operations against the group, and apparently offered protection for the dissidents’ movements in certain conflict areas by establishing a legitimate security company as a front.¹¹³ Accusations also emerged that the Attorney General’s Office had held relevant evidence for an extended period before acting. In reaction to these allegations, the Inspector General temporarily suspended both officials involved in the scandal from their positions. Petro’s government questioned the credibility of the evidence and denied the allegations.¹¹⁴ As of May 2026, no criminal convictions in connection with this scandal have been issued.

Tensions between Colombia and Ecuador

In January 2026, Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa imposed a thirty per cent ‘security tariff’ on Colombian imports due to an alleged lack of measures taken by Colombia to combat drug trafficking along both countries’ shared border. In response, Petro not only reciprocated the measure imposed by Ecuador, but also indefinitely suspended electricity exports to it.¹¹⁵ Over the ensuing weeks, the trade spat escalated as both countries expanded the tariffs to hundreds of products with a percentage of up to 100 per cent imposed on certain goods.¹¹⁶ As a consequence, bilateral trade between the States fell sharply.¹¹⁷ In addition to the ongoing trade issues, Colombian authorities found an unexploded aerial explosive device on Colombian soil in Ipiales, which is in close proximity to the Ecuadorian border. The device was attributed to the Ecuadorian military, which raised suspicions of Ecuador having conducted an airstrike in Colombian territory. However, on 25 March 2026, both governments clarified publicly that the device had landed on Colombian soil by accident and declared their intention to hold further talks on border security.¹¹⁸ On 8 May 2026, the Andean Community (CAN) trade bloc intervened in the ongoing trade spat and ordered both countries to lift trade restrictions.¹¹⁹ In a sign of de-escalation, the following day, Ecuador began reducing tariffs.¹²⁰

Increasing reliance on drone warfare by armed groups

One of the most evident tactical shifts in the context of the ongoing conflicts in Colombia during 2025 and 2026 has been the rapidly increasing use of drones by armed groups. The first operational drone attack in Colombia occurred in 2023. According to ACLED, a rapid escalation in the number of drone attacks was observable in the ensuing years, from just one operational attack in 2023 to thirty-eight in 2024 and 149 in 2025.¹²¹ The first months of 2026 have also seen numerous drone attacks, with seven happening in January alone. It is estimated that nearly all key armed groups employed militarized drones by 2025, often targeting police, army patrols, and other armed groups. Some armed groups have even formed specialized drone units (‘droneros’) within their ranks. In a worrying development, the number of civilians caught in the crossfire or deliberately targeted by drones has also sharply risen between 2024 and 2025.¹²² Many of the drones are purchased commercially and then modified with improvised explosive devices.¹²³

Increasing numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the worsening humantiarian situation

It is reported that around 7.2 million people were internally displaced at the end of 2025 due to ongoing conflict and drug-related violence.¹²⁴ While the number of IDPs has stayed relatively stable comparedhis figure represents a very large increase on the 5.1 million recorded in 2023.¹²⁵ However, some of the increase is attributable to the government’s adjustment of the number of individuals who continue to encounter vulnerabilities associated with their displacement.¹²⁶ Norte de Santander, the Catatumbo region that borders Venezuela, witnessed a substantial surge in violence and displacement, particularly towards the end of 2024, resulting in a significant influx of individuals into urban areas.¹²⁷ In Colombia, however, it is difficult to attribute IDPs exclusively to NIAC-related fighting or to the omnipresent gang violence associated with the drug trade.¹²⁸

Non-international armed conflict between Colombia and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)

Background

The ELN is an armed group founded in 1963 whose ideology is predicated on revolutionary terrorism, drawing inspiration from the ideas of Cuban leader Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, as well as the liberation theology of a Peruvian Catholic priest.¹ Although the Colombian military wiped out most of the ELN in 1973, the group was able to recover and rebuild itself from just sixty-five members.²

The first peace talks with the Colombian government were held in 1975.³ Further talks took place in 1994, 1998, 2005–08, and 2014, but were unsuccessful.⁴ In 2022, the ELN recommenced peace negotiations with the newly elected Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, under the auspices of his ‘total peace’ policy. The peace dialogues have experienced considerable turbulence but in May 2024, the parties reached agreement on a one-year ceasefire, representing the most substantial advancement in the history of the peace dialogues involving the ELN. The resurgence of violence in January 2025, however, prompted Colombian President Petro to suspend peace negotiations with the group.⁵

Intensity

As of May 2026, the pre-existing⁶ Additional Protocol II-type NIAC between the parties to the conflict is ongoing.⁷

In July 2025, the ELN’s membership was estimated at 6,450.⁸ The group is said to have recruited children.⁹ Its organizational structure and substantial membership allow the ELN to continue to exercise military control over substantial parts of the territory of Colombia.¹⁰ This also confirms that the ELN can execute sustained and concerted military operations to ensure that such territory escapes governmental control.¹¹ These territories include parts of the Catatumbo region in Norte de Santander department,¹² specifically Ocaña and Sardinata,¹³ as well as San José del Palmar in the Chocó department.

During March 2025, this NIAC intensified with at least twenty clashes recorded, the highest frequency since January 2018.¹⁴On 20 July 2025, the ELN employed a modified commercial drone to target a military patrol conducted by the Colombian National Army in El Carmen, in the Catatumbo region in Norte de Santander department. This drone strike killed three soldiers.¹⁵ Similarly, the ELN launched several attacks against government targets throughout the first two weeks of August 2025.¹⁶ These August attacks included the group’s targeting of police stations in Cauca department (resulting in the death of two police officers),¹⁷ and police stations in the Arauca and Norte de Santander departments (along the border with Venezuela) which resulted in the death of eleven police officers.¹⁸ One ELN fighter was killed by the Colombian Armed Forces on 2 August 2025.¹⁹ The deadliest attack in August 2025 took place when the ELN employed a drone to strike a police Black Hawk UH-60 helicopter. At least thirteen police officers were killed.²⁰ On 5 October 2025, the ELN attacked a Colombian military base in Puerto Jordán in Arauca department. The attack killed one soldier.²¹ Between 15 and 17 December 2025, the ELN launched multiple coordinated attacks against the Colombian Armed Forces and police forces in various departments as part of a pressure campaign against the Colombian government. The group aligned itself with the Venezuelan government, which was increasingly targeted by the United States, and signalled opposition against possible US interference in Colombia. Attacks were launched simultaneously against government forces and assets in multiple departments including Norte de Santander, Cesar, La Guajira, and Santander near the Venezuelan border. In reaction to these specific attacks, President Petro ordered the Colombian Armed Forces to launch an offensive against the ELN.²² On 18 December 2025, the ELN launched a successful drone attack against the Capitán Antonio Ricaurte military base in Aguachica (Cesar department), which killed seven soldiers.²³

Clashes between the Colombian Armed Forces and the ELN also occurred in early 2026. The first reported clash was on 4 January, when the Colombian Armed Forces attacked ELN positions in San José del Palmar (Chocó department). At least one senior ELN commander was killed in these attacks.²⁴ On 4 February 2026, the Colombian Armed Forces again attacked ELN positions using airstrikes, this time in the Catatumbo region (Norte de Santander department), killing at least ten fighters.²⁵ On 5 February, the ELN ambushed the security convoy of Senator Jairo Castellanos in Arauca department, killing two bodyguards.²⁶ On 16 March, the ELN launched six drones into a police station in Santa Rita de Iró, in the municipality of Río Iró (Chocó department). The attacks killed two police officers and caused structural damage to the offices.²⁷ On 19 April 2026, the Colombian Armed Forces conducted airstrikes on ELN positions in San Martín (Norte de Santander department) killing two fighters.²⁸ On 24 May 2026, troops from the 10^th Ground Operations Battalion of the Colombian Army came under attack by drones loaded with explosive devices launched by the ELN in Tibú (Norte de Santander department). The attack killed one soldier and injured seven others.A. Vicaíno Villa, ²⁹ On 27 May 2026, the ELN carried out two further attacks against State forces. The first occurred along the Cúcuta-Pamplona highway in Norte de Santander department, where the ELN ambushed a police patrol by firing long-range firearms and detonating improvised explosive devices, injuring three police officers.³⁰ The second incident took place in Riohacha (Guajira department), where ELN fighters attacked Colombian soldiers by launching twenle cylinder bombs against them, injuring twelve soldiers.³¹ Both the frequency and severity of attacks between the Colombian Armed Forces and the ELN have escalated since the middle of 2025.

The ELN is equipped with AK-47 assault rifles,³² other small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, landmines, explosives and mortars.³³ The ELN has used drones, both for surveillance but also to bomb the Colombian National Army.³⁴ The ELN mostly modify commercial photography drones by attaching explosives to them and crashing the drones kamikaze-style into their target.³⁵ The most significant drone strike executed by the ELN during the period was the downing of a police Black Hawk UH-60 helicopter in the Antioquia department between Amalfi and Anorí (see above) by flying a modified drone loaded with explosives into the rudders of the helicopter.³⁶ The means and methods of warfare employed by the ELN have escalated from mid-2025 onwards, as this organized armed group which traditionally used small arms, grenades and improvised explosive devices³⁷ increasingly relied on drones and self-made mortars.³⁸ The ELN also adopted a new military tactic dubbed ‘confinement’ to ensure its territorial dominance. For example, during a seven-day confinement in Chocó department, the ELN carried out multiple strikes, enforced a civilian curfew, and spread propaganda to prevent civilian movement. Six thousand civilians were confined.³⁹

More than seven million IDPs were reported as of the middle of 2024 in Colombia.⁴⁰ Part of the displacement is caused by conflict and the drug trade – two situations to which the ELN contributes. However, it is not possible to determine the exact number of IDPs whose displacement can be attributed directly to the activities of the ELN.

Organization

The ELN has a decentralized,⁴¹ but complex command structure.⁴² The highest hierarchical structure of the ELN armed wing is the so-called Comando Central (COCE), which oversees all ELN operations, including military operations. The Dirección Nacional (National Directorate) is tasked by the COCE with coordinating ‘war fronts’, which are regional combat units that operate in parallel and are led by a commander, a political leader and a military leader.⁴³ The Dirección Nacional is made up of 23 members elected by the eight war fronts.⁴⁴ Because the ELN follows a confederate structure, the war fronts remain financially and operationally independent.⁴⁵ The fact that the ELN is a decentralized guerrilla group with several power groups that have not always been in agreement with COCE has been cited as one of the reasons for the difficulties to make progress in peace talks.⁴⁶ The war front leadership-structures allow fighters to be disciplined and constitute evidence of the ELN’s ability to implement IHL. In the Akayesu case, a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) considered the notion of ‘responsible command’ and concluded that structured leadership is indicative of the fact that the organization of a group has reached a sophisticated level. The Trial Chamber found that the fact that the leadership was answerable to authority showed that leadership was sufficiently structured.⁴⁷ Responsible command is one of the requirements to trigger the application of Additional Protocol II.⁴⁸

The majority of the ELN leadership operate from Venezuela,⁴⁹ with other leaders operating from Cuba.⁵⁰ The ELN established its current headquarters in Havana.⁵¹ At the time of reporting, the commander-in-chief of the ELN’s military wing and the overall leader of the group was Eliécer Erlinto Chamorro (or Eliecer Herlinto Chamorro Acosta), alias “Antonio García”.⁵² The second-in-command of the military wing was Israel Ramírez Pineda, alias ‘Pablo Beltrán’, who fulfils various political roles in the organization, including being responsible for recruiting new fighters.⁵³ Gustavo Aníbal Giraldo Quinchía, alias ‘Pablito’ or ‘Carlos Marín Guarín’, is third-in-command and oversees relations between the COCE and the war fronts.⁵⁴

The armed wing is funded through the ELN’s cross-border drug trade operations to Ecuador and Venezuela. The ELN grows coca and produces cocaine. Well-established drug routes and networks enhance the logistical capability of this group.⁵⁵

An example of a military tactic employed by the ELN is to use as escape routes the border routes between Colombia and Venezuela that typically are used by the drug trade when the Colombian National Army is in the area.⁵⁶ The group patrols in small groups of no more than thirty fighters. This practice, coupled with a growing membership, makes it a challenge for Colombia and Venezuela to address.⁵⁷ As of May 2026, the group was operational in 219 municipalities.⁵⁸ The ELN’s presence in Colombia and Venezuela makes the classification of the group complex but it is clearly adaptable. In Venezuela, the group is a paramilitary force that supports the Venezuelan government, whereas in Colombia, it is a guerrilla force fighting the Colombian government.⁵⁹ The ELN has installed anti-personnel mines around its camps as protection and a means of limiting access by law enforcement.⁶⁰ According to the CIA, the ELN’s typical military tactics include mortaring police stations and military bases; planting explosive devices on hard targets such as pipelines and electric pylons; and conducting ambushes, roadblocks and sniper attacks.⁶¹ Attacks in August 2025 (see above) reflected these tactics.⁶²

Pablo Beltrán is its chief negotiator, often representing the ELN in public and to the media.⁶³ The ELN has an official website which it uses to communicate with one voice.⁶⁴

Territorial control is a requirement of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. The ELN exercises control over parts of the territory of Casigua El Cubo, specifically south of Lake Maracaibo, which borders on Venezuela’s Zulia state.⁶⁵ The ELN has managed to consolidate territory under its control over parts of the Catatumbo region in the Norte de Santander department,⁶⁶ including Convención, Ocaña and Sardinata. The nature of control exercised by the ELN in this region is more sophisticated than just military control, as it includes social control over the civilian population.⁶⁷ The ELN also exercises consolidated control over parts of the Chocó department, including the urban centre of San José del Palmar, parts of San Juan subregion, seventeen villages in the La Italia district, thirteen villages in the San Pedro de Ingará district, as well as the Embera Chamí Copé del Río Ingará, the Sabaletera San Onofre y El Tigre, and the Alto Bonito Vira Vira reservations.⁶⁸ Such consolidated control enables the ELN to launch sufficiently sustained and concerted operations,⁶⁹ and sufficiently dominate territory under its control so as to escape the control of the armed forces.⁷⁰ Control over territory confirms the sophisticated degree of organization of the ELN, which is confirmation that the status accorded to the leadership of the ELN is akin to responsible command.⁷¹ The combination of responsible command and control over territory enables the ELN to implement Additional Protocol II. It must be stressed that Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II does not necessitate actual implementation but only the capability to do so.⁷²

The organizational structure of the ELN is sophisticated and complies with the four organizational requirements under Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. Hence, the NIAC between Colombia and the ELN constitutes an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC.

1
‘Ejército de Liberacion Nacional (ELN)’, Kennisbank Terrorisrische Organisaties, 20 January 2025; ‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, Colombia Reports, 14 May 2022; ‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024. ↩︎
2
‘National Liberation Army (Colombia)’, Mapping Militants Project, 3 December 2024. ↩︎
3
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024; S. Castillo, ‘Proceso de Paz con el ELN: diálogos regionales como alternativa histórica’, Indepaz, 30 April 2024. ↩︎
4
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024; S. Castillo, ‘Proceso de Paz con el ELN: diálogos regionales como alternativa histórica’, Indepaz, 30 April 2024. ↩︎
5
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024; S. Castillo, ‘Proceso de Paz con el ELN: diálogos regionales como alternativa histórica’, Indepaz, 30 April 2024; ‘Colombia halts peace talks with ELN rebels and accuses them of war crimes in northeastern region’, AP News, 18 January 2025; J. Freixes, ‘Colombia and ELN Guerrilla to Meet in Venezuela to ‘Unfreeze’ Peace Talks’, Colombia One, 1 November 2024; ‘¿En qué van los diálogos de paz con ELN? La línea de tiempo con los momentos clave’, El Espectador, 15 April 2024; S. Torrado, ‘Proceso de paz con el ELN: fin del cese al fuego, secuestro y suspensión de los diálogos con el Gobierno Petro’, El Pais, 6 June 2025. ↩︎
6
‘Humanitarian Report 2024: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross; ‘Humanitarian Challenges 2025: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross. ↩︎
7
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” is Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 19. ↩︎
8
‘Lo que dicen las nuevas cifras sobre el aumento de integrantes de grupos armados en Colombia’, Ideas Paz, 9 November 2025. ↩︎
9
‘Kids on the Front Lines: Stopping Child Recruitment in Colombia’, International Crisis Group, 12 February 2026. ↩︎
10
A. Diaz Castro, ‘The ELN – Colombia’s last guerrilla’, London politica. ↩︎
11
M. M. Bradley, ‘Additional Protocol II: Elevating the minimum threshold of intensity?’, International Review of the Red Cross, 2020. ↩︎
12
R. Emblin, ‘ELN commanders claim Petro’s Total Peace is becoming “Total War”’, The City Paper, 10 March 2025. ↩︎
13
‘El Catatumbo padece la emergencia humanitaria más grande desde que hay registro en Colombia, a causa del conflicto armado’, Defensoría del pueblo, 6 May 2025; ‘Consolidación territorial del ELN en San José del Palmar (Chocó) e interés del Ejército Gaitanista por la zona tienen en riesgo a su población’, Defensoría del pueblo, 6 June 2025. ↩︎
14
L. Calderón et al, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean, April 2025’, ACLED, 3 April 2025. ↩︎
15
R. Emblin, ‘ELN Modifies Drones To Target Colombia’s Security Forces’, The City Paper, 22 July 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, July 2025. ↩︎
16
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, August 2025. ↩︎
17
‘Dos policías asesinados en ataque contra una estación policial en el suroeste de Colombia’, La Vanguardia, 15 August 2026 ↩︎
18
‘Colombia: Terrorism and Insurgency Assessment – August 2025’, Horizon Intelligence, 27 August 2025; P. Naranjo, ‘Ministro de Defensa confirmó que uniformados secuestrados por el ELN estarían en Venezuela’, Infobae, 6 August 2025. ↩︎
19
S. V. Quevedo Delgado, ‘Un presunto ‘eleno’ abatido e incautación de material de guerra: los resultados de las operaciones militares en Arauca’, El Tiempo, 2 August 2025; ‘Un integrante del ELN fue abatido en combates contra el Ejército en Arauca’, Caracol Radio, 3 August 2025; L. Palomino, ‘Ejército dio golpe al ELN en Arauca: un integrante del grupo ilegal murió en un enfrentamiento’, W Radio, 2 August 2025. ↩︎
20
J. Forero, ‘Police Helicopter Downed by Drone in Colombia, Killing 12’, Wall Street Journal, 21 August 2025; ‘Terror Attacks Across Colombia Kill 19, Injure 70 in Cali and Antioquia’, The City Paper, 21 August 2025. ↩︎
21
J. C. Rodríguez Parrado, ‘Siete militares heridos y uno fallecido dejó ataque con explosivos contra base militar en Puerto Jordán, Arauca’, Infobae, 5 October 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, October 2025. ↩︎
22
A. Pannell, ‘ELN armed strike in Colombia ends with at least 3 dead, 13 departments affected’, Latin America Reports, 18 December 2025; ‘Tras ola de atentados, terroristas del ELN anunciaron cese del paro armado en Navidad y Año Nuevo’, El Colombiano, 21 December 2025; Y. Aure, ‘ELN realizará un paro armado entre el 14 y 17 de diciembre en Colombia’, Al Diario, 13 December 2025. ↩︎
23
‘Siete soldados muertos por un ataque con drones de la guerrilla del ELN en Colombia’, France 24, 19 December 2025; E. Jaramillo Bernat, ‘El ELN asesina al menos a siete soldados en un ataque al batallón de Aguachica’, El País, 19 December 2025; ‘Al menos siete soldados mueren en un atentado del ELN contra una base militar en el noreste de Colombia’, RTVE, 19 December 2025; J. Camilo Suárez, ‘Ataque del ELN a base militar en Aguachica deja siete soldados muertos y 30 heridos’, Diario del Norte, 19 December 2025. ↩︎
24
‘Golpe estratégico: abatido en combate alias ‘Santiago’, principal cabecilla del Eln en Antioquia, Chocó, Valle y Risaralda’, Presidencia, 10 January 2026; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, January 2026. ↩︎
25
‘Fuerzas Militares bombardean al Eln en Catatumbo: el tercer operativo del año’, El Espectador, 11 May 2026; L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Bombardeo contra el ELN en Catatumbo habría dejado varios guerrilleros muertos’, Infobae, 11 May 2026. ↩︎
26
O. Medina, ‘Ambush in Colombian Rebel Fiefdom Kills Senator’s Bodyguards’, Bloomberg, 5 February 2026; L. Reynoso, ‘Un atentado contra la caravana de seguridad del senador Jairo Castellanos en Arauca deja dos muertos’, El País, 5 February 2026. ↩︎
27
N. Valle David, ‘Chocó: Paro armado del ELN tiene confinadas a más de 6 mil personas de 26 comunidades de Bajo Baudó’, Caracol Radio, 17 March 2026. ↩︎
28
L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Bombardeo contra el ELN en Catatumbo habría dejado varios guerrilleros muertos’, Infobae, 11 May 2026; ‘Abatidos dos miembros del ELN durante combates en Catatumbo, Colombia’, Prensa Latina, 19 April 2026; ‘Fuerzas Militares bombardean al Eln en Catatumbo: el tercer operativo del año’, El Espectador, 11 May 2026. ↩︎
29
‘Emboscada con drones explosivos en el Catatumbo dejó soldado bolivarense muerto’, Caracol Radio, 24 May 2026; J. J. Camargo Botello, ‘Un soldado muerto y siete heridos dejó ataque con explosivos del ELN’, El Frente, 25 May 2026. ↩︎
30
K. Lancheros, ‘Armando Benedetti rechazó el ataque del ELN contra una patrulla de la Policía en Norte de Santander: “Eso crea inseguridad, crea miedo”’, Infobae, 26 May 2026; Octavio Cardona, X, 27 May 2026; E. Jaramillo Bernat, ‘Las autoridades colombianas señalan al ELN de lanzar una arremetida violenta en época electoral’, El País, 27 May 2026. ↩︎
31
P. A. Sanchez Martinez and D. Gutiérrezz Munar, ‘Atentado contra batallón del Ejército en Riohacha, Guajira; General Gómez, comandante: ‘No vamos a permitir que grupos criminales amedrenten’’, El Tiempo, 27 May 2026; ‘Comandante del Ejército entregó detalles del atentado contra un batallón en La Guajira: el ELN usó 12 cilindros bomba’, Semana, 27 May 2026; E. Jaramillo Bernat, ‘Las autoridades colombianas señalan al ELN de lanzar una arremetida violenta en época electoral’, El País, 27 May 2026. ↩︎
32
‘Ejército de Liberacion Nacional (ELN)’, Nationaal coördinator terrorismebestrijding en veiligheid, 20 January 2025. ↩︎
33
‘Terrorist Organizations’, Central Intelligence Agency. ↩︎
34
L. Bonilla, ‘Drones de guerra: así operan los grupos colombianos la nueva arma que siembra terror’, El Espectador, 24 April 2025. ↩︎
35
R. Emblin, ‘ELN Modifies Drones To Target Colombia’s Security Forces’, The City Paper, 22 July 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, July 2025. ↩︎
36
J. Forero, ‘Police Helicopter Downed by Drone in Colombia, Killing 12’, Wall Street Journal, 21 August 2025; ‘ELN se atribuyó ataque a helicóptero en Amalfi que dejó 13 policías muertos’, El Espectador, 4 September 2025. ↩︎
37
‘Un integrante del ELN fue abatido en combates contra el Ejército en Arauca’, Caracol Radio, 3 August 2025 ↩︎
38
J. Forero, ‘Police Helicopter Downed by Drone in Colombia, Killing 12’, Wall Street Journal, 21 August 2025; ‘Terror Attacks Across Colombia Kill 19, Injure 70 in Cali and Antioquia’, The City Paper, 21 August 2025; J. Freixes, ‘The ELN’s 72-hour ‘Armed Strike’ in Colombia Ended with Over 50 Attacks’, Colombia One, 17 December 2025. ↩︎
39
J. Freixes, ‘Colombia’s Defense Minister Vows to Confront the ELN’s New Armed Strike in Choco’, Colombia One, 23 March 2026; N. Valle David, ‘Chocó: Paro armado del ELN tiene confinadas a más de 6 mil personas de 26 comunidades de Bajo Baudó’, Caracol Radio, 17 March 2026; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, March 2026. ↩︎
40
‘Colombia situation’, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2025. ↩︎
41
‘National Liberation Army (Colombia)’, Mapping Militants Project, 3 December 2024. ↩︎
42
A. Diaz Castro, ‘The ELN – Colombia’s last guerrilla’, London politica; J. Jules, ‘Así está distribuido el ELN en Colombia, según informes de inteligencia’, RCN Radio, 30 January 2019. ↩︎
43
‘Ejército de Liberacion Nacional (ELN)’, Nationaal coördinator terrorismebestrijding en veiligheid, 20 January 2025; ‘National Liberation Army (Colombia)’, Mapping Militants Project, 3 December 2024; ‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024. ↩︎
44
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024. ↩︎
45
J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025; A. Diaz Castro, ‘The ELN – Colombia’s last guerrilla’, London politica; J. Jules, ‘Así está distribuido el ELN en Colombia, según informes de inteligencia’, RCN Radio, 30 January 2019. ↩︎
46
S. Guerra, ‘¿Por qué ningún gobierno ha logrado un acuerdo paz con el ELN?’, Kienyke, 5 May 2026. ↩︎
47
ICTR, ‘The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu’, Chamber I,Judgment, 2 September 1998, para 623. ↩︎
48
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases. ↩︎
49
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024. ↩︎
50
L. Loaiza, ‘US Pressure on Cuba to Extradite ELN Leaders Unlikely to Succeed’, InSight Crime, 18 May 2020. ↩︎
51
M. Romero, ‘Colombia exige a Cuba que entregue a los jefes guerrilleros del ELN’, France 24, 11 September 2019. ↩︎
52
‘Eliecer Erlinto Chamorro, alias ‘Antonio Garcia’’, InSight Crime, 24 June 2021. ↩︎
53
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, Counter terrorism guide, October 2022; ‘National Liberation Army (Colombia)’, Mapping Militants Project, 3 December 2024. ↩︎
54
‘Gustavo Aníbal Giraldo, alias ‘Pablito’’, InSight Crime, 3 October 2022; ‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, October 2022; ‘National Liberation Army (Colombia)’, Mapping Militants Project, 3 December 2024. ↩︎
55
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024; Unidad Investigative de Venezuela, ‘Rebels and Paramilitaries: Colombia’s Guerrillas in Venezuela’, InSight Crime, 3 October 2022; ‘Ejército de Liberacion Nacional (ELN)’, Nationaal coördinator terrorismebestrijding en veiligheid, 20 January 2025. ↩︎
56
A. Diaz Castro, ‘The ELN – Colombia’s last guerrilla’, London politica. ↩︎
57
L. J. Acosta and H. Murphy, ‘Violentos grupos rivales llenan vacío de las FARC en Colombia: Una paz quebrantada’, Reuters, 26 April 2018. ↩︎
58
S. Vargas Rueda, ‘Estos fueron los grupos armados que más han crecido en Colombia: pasaron de 13.000 miembros en el 2018 a más de a 27.000 en 2025’, Infobae, 14 May 2026. ↩︎
59
A. Diaz Castro, ‘The ELN – Colombia’s last guerrilla’, London politica. ↩︎
60
M. V. Llorente and J. C. Garzón V., ‘¿Qué hacer con el ELN? Opciones para no cerrar la puerta a una salida negociada’, Fundación ideas para la paz, 28 January 2020. ↩︎
61
‘Terrorist Organizations’, Central Intelligence Agency. ↩︎
62
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, August 2025; ‘Colombia: Terrorism and Insurgency Assessment – August 2025’, Horizon Intelligence, 27 August 2025; ‘Dos policías asesinados en ataque contra una estación policial en el suroeste de Colombia’, La Vanguardia, 15 August 2026. ↩︎
63
W. Grant and D. Pardo, ‘”El ELN y Maduro combaten un enemigo común”: entrevista con Pablo Beltrán, negociador de la guerrilla’, BBC, 20 August 2020. ↩︎
64
See, ‘ELN Voces’, ELN Voces. ↩︎
65
‘Colombia Defense Minister Vows ‘Full Force’ Against Guerrillas’, The defense post, 17 March 2025; ‘In Casigua El Cubo, No One Dares Speak of Those Who Rule: The ELN’, Connectas. ↩︎
66
R. Emblin, ‘ELN commanders claim Petro’s Total Peace is becoming “Total War”’, The City Paper, 10 March 2025. ↩︎
67
‘El Catatumbo padece la emergencia humanitaria más grande desde que hay registro en Colombia, a causa del conflicto armado’, Defensoría del pueblo, 6 May 2025. ↩︎
68
‘Consolidación territorial del ELN en San José del Palmar (Chocó) e interés del Ejército Gaitanista por la zona tienen en riesgo a su población’, Defensoría del pueblo, 6 June 2025. ↩︎
69
SCSL, ‘Prosecutor v Moimina Fofana and Allieu Kandewa’, Trial Chamber I, Judgement, 2 August 2007, para 126. ↩︎
70
ICTR, ‘Prosecutor v Alfred Musema’, Trial Chamber I, Judgment and Sentence, 27 January 2000, para 258. ↩︎
71
M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol ii in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021. ↩︎
72
ICTR, ‘The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu’, Chamber I,Judgment, 2 September 1998, para 623; ICTR, ‘Prosecutor v Alfred Musema’, Trial Chamber I, Judgment and Sentence, 27 January 2000, para 258; A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.38. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between Colombia and the Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC) (formerly Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC))

Background

The Colombian National Army and the Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC) have fought each other for almost two decades.¹ This pre-existing Additional Protocol II-type NIAC in Colombia continued throughout 2025 and 2026.²

The EGC (also known as the Gulf Clan or Clan del Golfo),³ is active in both criminal activities and politics, and undertakes military-style operations.⁴ The EGC was established by dissidents from the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)),⁵ who opposed the 2006 demobilization process. The EGC has since become a powerful transnational drug-trafficking operation, supported by its armed wing.⁶ The EGC is considered one of the largest international cocaine distributors.⁷ The EGC itself has no clear ideological origin story and its political ideals are said by commentators to be curated to fit its interests at any given time.⁸

Intensity

Several attacks occurred between the Colombian National Army and the EGC throughout 2025 and 2026. On 15 March 2025, the Colombian National Army and the EGC fought again in Mutatá (Antioquia department). Three EGC fighters were killed, and five fighters were arrested.⁹ Fighting intensified just ten days later on 25 March 2025 when the Colombian National Army used drones to target the EGC in Segovia (Antioquia department). At least nine EGC fighters were killed.¹⁰ Military operations supported by police throughout April 2025 led to the arrest of more than 120 EGC fighters.¹¹ Several airstrikes were launched by the Colombian National Army against the EGC on 8 April 2025. These strikes resulted in at least eight EGC casualties.¹² The Colombian National Army launched another high-intensity military operation against the EGC in Risaralda department on 3 May 2025, triggering several explosions.¹³

Very few specific clashes between the EGC and Colombian Armed Forces were reported between June 2025 and May 2026. However, in November 2025 an intelligence report was leaked which confirmed that the Colombian Air Force had carried out airstrikes against EGC positions in Antioquia on 26 March 2025, 8 April 2025, 3 June 2025, 18 July 2025, and 26 August 2025.¹⁴ Additionally, the Colombian Air Force, troops of the National Army, and units of the National Police carried out a joint operation against the EGC’s Edwin José Sierra Regino substructure on 11 August 2025.¹⁵ According to a February 2026 report by Indepaz, the EGC remained the most targeted group by authorities, with one in four clashes involving the EGC.¹⁶ On 20 March 2026, heavy fighting broke out between the Colombian Army and EGC’s Édgar Madrid Benjumea substructure when the Army was carrying out an operation aimed at dismantling an EGC explosives and drone training centre. Three EGC members were killed during the fighting.¹⁷ Similarly, on 17 May 2026, two soldiers were killed during an armed confrontation between the Colombian Armed Forces and the EGC in Acandí municipality (Chocó department).¹⁸ A few days later, on 23 May 2026, heavy fighting broke out during a military operation against EGC positions in Sipí municipality (Chocó department). The fighting lasted for several hours and reportedly killed five EGC fighters.¹⁹

The EGC has retained control over territory key to its illegal activities despite the best efforts of the Colombian National Army.²⁰ This is in despite of a presidential decree called the ‘Misión Cauca’ strategy,²¹ launched in May 2024 to combat armed groups and, specifically, EGC strongholds in Antioquia, Chocó and Córdoba.²² Territory under the EGC’s command enables it to launch planned and prolonged military operations. Such military operations, in turn, ensure that the EGC retains territorial control over key territories.²³ As of February 2026, the EGC was reported to have about 10,000 members of whom about 3,300 are armed and the rest are part of logistical, financial, urban, and communications support networks that sustain the group’s operations in rural areas and urban centres. The EGC is the largest non-State armed group in Colombia, with varying degrees of influence in at least 296 municipalities.²⁴

Internal displacement remained at high levels throughout 2025.²⁵. However, it is difficult to attribute figures to the EGC specifically since multiple armed groups operate in several districts, all of which potentially contribute to the problem.

Organization

The EGC is divided into three overall branches: the political branch, the military branch and the economic branch.²⁶ The armed wing of the EGC consists of decentralized cells.²⁷. Essentially, local cells are directly commanded by its leadership in Urabá while other cells (mostly local criminal organizations using the EGC moniker) are expected to be activated when they receive instructions.²⁸ The overall leader of the EGC is Jobanis de Jesús Ávila Villadiego, alias ‘Chiquito Malo’.²⁹ His long-time second-in-command José Gonzalo Sánchez, alias ‘Gonzalito’,‘Gaitanistas – Gulf Clan’, ³⁰ was killed in early February 2026.³¹ Gonzalito was reportedly replaced by Wilmar Mejía Úsuga, also known as ‘Richard’, ‘Deivy’ or ‘58’, and José Alberto Vega Albarán, alias ‘Flaco Monseñor’.³² The EGC operates through regional leaders and coordinators specializing in drug trafficking, extortion, illegal mining, and targeted killings. It has at least thirty main leaders and dozens of subordinates distributed across specific geographic areas, each of which responds to clearly defined hierarchical levels.³³ It has recently become more decentralized and resilient because it relies less on any one individual and more on a network of alliances, financial operators, brokers, and international partners.³⁴

The structure of the military wing of the EGC is akin to that of a conventional armed force. The military commander of each cell is responsible for military operations executed by the squadrons, fronts and blocs under their direct command.³⁵ The smallest units are squadrons which consist of ten fighters, a commander, and a deputy commander. The size of these smaller groups facilitates its formation of linkages and fostering of relations with local communities. Sections consist of twenty fighters; a group comprises four squadrons; and companies consist of two groups. Fronts, at a minimum, are made up of two groups; blocs consist of at least two fronts.³⁶

Its armed wing is structured around a Joint General Staff, six regional blocs, and thirty-nine substructures or fronts.³⁷ The ‘Juan de Dios Úsuga’ Central Bloc of Urabá is the main bloc located in the Gulf of Urabá. Older blocs include the Jairo de Jesús Durango Bloc (in Chocó and south-western Antioquia) and the Roberto Vargas Bloc (in Córdoba, north-east Antioquia, and Bajo Cauca). Three newer blocs were established recently; one is called Arístides Meza Bloc (operating in large areas of Caribbean, including Atlantico, Magdalena, Cesar and La Guajira), previously known under the name Erlin Pino; the second is the Nelson Darío Hurtado Simanca (operating in Cundinamarca, Meta, Casanare, and Guaviare); and the third is the Oliverio Isaza Gómez or Magdalena Medio bloc (operating in territories of Santander, Boyacá and southern Bolívar).³⁸ This indicates a more formalized and scalable structure than earlier years.³⁹

The EGC achieves discipline not only owing to its organizational structure but also through social norms and rules of conduct imposed in regions it controls.⁴⁰ The EGC’s approach to discipline is described as ‘carrot and stick’.⁴¹ The EGC has managed to maintain internal cohesion and organizational flexibility, adapting its control methods and avoiding ruptures.⁴² On the official website, the EGC publishes its disciplinary code and pledges its commitment to IHL.⁴³ The EGC boasts a sophisticated command structure which enables it to implement IHL. The combination of such sophisticated command structure and territorial control functionally enables the ELN to have the capacity to implement Additional Protocol II as demanded by Article 1(1) of this instrument.⁴⁴

The EGC has forged stable alliances with foreign criminal organizations, for example in Mexico, Italy, and Albania.⁴⁵ Local cells are financially self-sufficient, a situation which enhances the EGCs logistical capacity.⁴⁶ It is reported that the EGC pays salaries to those in charge of armed and logistical operations through a sophisticated payroll system.⁴⁷ The EGC is known to follow a ‘franchise model’ in that they outsource services, including logistics.⁴⁸

The training of EGC fighters is made possible by dedicated teams of former guerillas.⁴⁹ Recruitment is boosted by paying salaries to new members and providing financial support to their families. Monthly payments range from 1.5 million pesos (for lookouts or informants) to seventeen million pesos for front commanders.⁵⁰ While initially not involved in child recruitment, recent reports indicate that minors are increasingly joining the EGC’s ranks too. Some of them are charged with running errands, spying, and informing EGC fighters on police and military movements in their areas.⁵¹ The military tactics employed by the EGC correspond to those of guerilla or paramilitary groups with a minor difference in that they do not set up large military camps. Territorial control is supported through a network of unpaid informers. Fighters are reported as being highly mobile – the EGC forces advance, engage the enemy, and leave. They employ checkpoints to secure territory under their control.⁵² Another tactic employed by the EGC that evolved during the reporting period is the use of homes and schools in rural areas to avoid confrontations with other armed groups, and to use the civilian population as shields against bombardments by the Colombian Air Force. Additionally, the EGC’s strategy includes having several of its members dress in civilian clothes to deceive the authorities.⁵³ The EGC’s current capabilities are the result of a combination of territorial control, illegal economies, strategic corridors, and alliances with criminal and financial networks in other countries.⁵⁴

The EGC speaks with one voice through its website launched in 2024, ‘El Gaitanista’.⁵⁵ The editorial team publishes frequent communiqués.⁵⁶

The EGC is sufficiently organized to exercise control over territory.⁵⁷ Territory under the control of the EGC includes its headquarters and territorial stronghold around the Gulf of Urabá in the Antioquia and Chocó departments, and stretching into Córdoba. The EGC also exercises control over parts of the Caribbean coast, in the city of Medellín, and in departments such as La Guajira, Santander, Valle del Cauca, and Norte de Santander,⁵⁸ as well as territory in the Upper, Middle and Lower Atrato regions.⁵⁹ The EGC’s military campaigns have been so successful that it expanded its territorial control throughout 2025.⁶⁰ This includes into territory in the Chocó region.⁶¹Wherever the EGC manages to establish itself, it builds forms of illegal armed governance regulating movement, imposing rules of conduct, collecting protection money, intervening in local conflicts, and, in some cases, taking over State functions. Its power does not depend solely on armed force, but on the interplay between territorial control, illicit economies, and control over the daily lives of communities.⁶² In the Akayesu case, an ICTR Trial Chamber considered the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)’s ability to not only exercise control over Rwandan territory but to increase the size of the territory over which it exercised control to confirm the RPF had structured leadership akin to responsible command.⁶³ Similarly, the EGC has managed to obtain more territory. The sophisticated nature of the EGCs command structure and its ability to not only retain control over territory but to expand its territorial control confirms that the EGC has responsible command. This also enables the EGC to launch sustained and concerted military operations, to retain control over existing territory, and to gain control over more territory.⁶⁴ Territorial control is functional in nature; the REAS under the control of the EGC allow it to execute planned military operations on a frequent basis,⁶⁵ and the combination of territorial control and responsible command enables this group to implement Additional Protocol II.

The organizational structure of the EGC is sophisticated and complies with the four organizational requirements under Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. Hence, the NIAC between the EGC and Colombia constitutes an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC.

1
‘¿Qué es el Clan del Golfo? Historia y líderes de la nueva generación de narcos de Colombia’, CCN Español, 10 May 2022. ↩︎
2
‘Humanitarian Report 2024: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross. ↩︎
3
J. Freixes, ‘Gulf Clan, a History of Death and Crime in Colombia’, Colombia One, 16 February 2025. ↩︎
4
‘The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas’, International Crisis Group, 19 March 2024; E. Dickinson, ‘Las Autodefensas Gaitanistas (AGC): ¿epílogo de la Paz Total?’, Razon Publica, 11 August 2024. ↩︎
5
‘United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)’, InSight Crime, 11 June 2024. ↩︎
6
L. Schmidt, ‘Power Play or Peace? AGC’s Role in Colombia’s Fragile Negotiations’, InSight Crime, 16 October 2024; ‘Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC) / Gulf Clan’, Colombia Reports, 21 October 2025. ↩︎
7
J. Freixes, ‘Gulf Clan, a History of Death and Crime in Colombia’, Colombia One, 16 February 2025. ↩︎
8
R. Badillo-Sarmiento and L. F. Trejos-Rosero, ‘Las Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia como grupo armado politizado’, Revista Científica, 1 April 2023. ↩︎
9
P. Naranjo, ‘Tres miembros del Clan del Golfo fueron abatidos tras intensos combates con el Ejército en Antioquia’, Infobae, 15 March 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
10
D. Alejandro Buitrago, ‘Fuerza pública intensifica operativos contra el Clan del Golfo en Segovia, Antioquía, tras el asesinato de Jaime Gallego, líder minero de la zona’, Infobae, 24 March 2025; M. Zapata Correa, ‘Ejército enfrenta al Clan del Golfo en Segovia, Antioquia’, La FM, 24 March 2025. ↩︎
11
‘Plan pistola: van más de 120 integrantes del Clan del Golfo capturados’, El Espectador, 5 May 2025; J. D. Torres Lasso, ‘Autoridades, en alerta máxima por ‘plan pistola’ de grupos ilegales contra la Fuerza Pública: van 17 asesinados’, El Tiempo, 26 April 2025. ↩︎
12
‘Mindefensa confirma 8 muertos y 2 capturados del Clan del Golfo en Antioquia’, País El Heraldo, 9 April 2025; Y. Gualdrón, ‘Revelan videos de bombardeos en el Bajo Cauca que dejaron 8 miembros del Clan del Golfo muertos’, Teleantioquia, 9 April 2025. ↩︎
13
L. Usma, ‘Violentos enfrentamientos del Ejército y el Clan del Golfo en Risaralda: serían seis las bajas de los delincuentes’, El Tiempo, 4 May 2025. ↩︎
14
J. Nomesqui Rivera, ‘Los secretos de cinco bombardeos contra el Clan del Golfo: cuatro bajas de alto valor y más de 15.000 incautaciones’, Infobae, 6 November 2025. ↩︎
15
‘Operación conjunta en contra del Clan del Golfo en Bolívar’, Fuerza Aeroespacial Colombiana, 11 August 2025. ↩︎
16
G. Arias, et al, ‘La anatomía del Clan del Golfo: entre el fortalecimiento y la negociación de paz en Catar’, Ideas Paz, 23 February 2026. ↩︎
17
‘Ejército desmanteló centro de adiestramiento de explosivos y drones del Clan del Golfo, en el sur de Bolívar’, El Heraldo, 20 March 2026. ↩︎
18
‘Un sargento y un soldado caen asesinados en combates con el Clan del Golfo’, El País, 18 May 2026; Séptima División del Ejército Nacional, X, 17 May 2026. ↩︎
19
G. España Giraldo, ‘Golpe al Clan del Golfo: Ejército reporta cinco neutralizados y captura de presuntos cabecillas en Meta’, El País, 24 May 2026; Séptima División del Ejército Nacional, X, 24 May 2026; J. Nomesqui Rivera, ‘Ofensiva de las Fuerzas Militares contra el Clan del Golfo: cinco cabecillas neutralizados e incautados drones para atentados’, Infobae, 23 May 2026. ↩︎
20
‘Thirty-Seventh Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission of the Organization of American States to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS)’, Organisation of America States, 2025, 6. ↩︎
21
A. Rodriguez, ‘Colombia Launches ‘Mission Cauca’ to Safeguard Communities’, Colombia One, 22 June 2024. ↩︎
22
‘Thirty-Seventh Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission of the Organization of American States to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS)’, Organisation of America States, 2025, 9. ↩︎
23
M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol ii in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021; A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.40. ↩︎
24
G. Arias, et al, ‘La anatomía del Clan del Golfo: entre el fortalecimiento y la negociación de paz en Catar’, Ideas Paz, 23 February 2026; ‘En tres años, Clan del Golfo duplicó número de integrantes y amplió su presencia a casi 300 municipios’, Agencia Periodismo Investigativo, 23 February 2026; L. González Perafán, ‘El Clan del Golfo / EGC: expansión territorial y redes con la mafia internacional’, Indepaz, 20 April 2026. ↩︎
25
Colombia situation’, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2026 ↩︎
26
E. Dickinson, ‘Las Autodefensas Gaitanistas (AGC): ¿epílogo de la Paz Total?’, Razon Publica, 11 August 2024. ↩︎
27
‘Gaitanistas – Gulf Clan’, InSight Crime, 18 March 2025; ‘Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC) o Clan del Golfo’, Indepaz, July 2017 ↩︎
28
‘Gaitanistas – Gulf Clan’, InSight Crime, 18 March 2025; ‘Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC) o Clan del Golfo’, Fundación ideas para la paz, July 2017. ↩︎
29
J. M. Arias Montenegro, ‘Así es la sofisticada y compleja estructura del Clan del Golfo, la organización criminal más poderosa de Colombia’, Infobae, 1 June 2025. ↩︎
30
InSight Crime, 13 May 2026; J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025 ↩︎
31
J. A. Blanquicet and C. López, ‘Atención: ‘clan del Golfo’ confirma la muerte de alias Gonzalito segundo cabecilla del grupo armado’, El Tiempo, 1 February 2026; ‘Colombia: segundo cabecilla del Clan del Golfo muere ahogado’, Deutsche Welle, 1 February 2026. ↩︎
32
L. Niño, ‘Clan del Golfo incluyó a dos peligrosos cabecillas en su cúpula tras la muerte de alias Gonzalito: este es su prontuario’, Infobae, 13 February 2026. ↩︎
33
J. M. Arias Montenegro, ‘Así es la sofisticada y compleja estructura del Clan del Golfo, la organización criminal más poderosa de Colombia’, Infobae, 1 June 2025. ↩︎
34
L. González Perafán, ‘El Clan del Golfo / EGC: expansión territorial y redes con la mafia internacional’, Indepaz, 20 April 2026. ↩︎
35
E. Dickinson, ‘Las Autodefensas Gaitanistas (AGC): ¿epílogo de la Paz Total?’, Razon Publica, 11 August 2024. ↩︎
36
‘The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas’, International Crisis Group, 19 March 2024. ↩︎
37
G. Arias, et al, ‘La anatomía del Clan del Golfo: entre el fortalecimiento y la negociación de paz en Catar’, Ideas Paz, 23 February 2026; K. Johnson, et al, ‘El poder armado en expansión Entre el fortalecimiento y la fragmentación de los grupos armados en Colombia’, Fundación Conflict Responses. ↩︎
38
S. Rodriguez Álvarez, ‘“La empresa” del Clan: así creció la mayor amenaza armada de Colombia’, La Silla Vacía, 2 February 2024: K. Johnson, et al, ‘El poder armado en expansión Entre el fortalecimiento y la fragmentación de los grupos armados en Colombia’, Fundación Conflict Responses. ↩︎
39
S. Rodriguez Álvarez, ‘“La empresa” del Clan: así creció la mayor amenaza armada de Colombia’, La Silla Vacía, 2 February 2024. ↩︎
40
J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025. ↩︎
41
S. Rodriguez Álvarez, ‘“La empresa” del Clan: así creció la mayor amenaza armada de Colombia’, La Silla Vacía, 2 February 2024. ↩︎
42
S. Vargas Rueda, ‘Estos fueron los grupos armados que más han crecido en Colombia: pasaron de 13.000 miembros en el 2018 a más de a 27.000 en 2025’, Infobae, 14 May 2026. ↩︎
43
‘Estatutos de Constitución y Régimen Disciplinario’, El Gaitanista. ↩︎
44
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases. ↩︎
45
L. González Perafán, ‘El Clan del Golfo / EGC: expansión territorial y redes con la mafia internacional’, Indepaz, 20 April 2026. ↩︎
46
‘Gaitanistas – Gulf Clan’, InSight Crime, 18 March 2025. ↩︎
47
S. Rodriguez Álvarez, ‘“La empresa” del Clan: así creció la mayor amenaza armada de Colombia’, La Silla Vacía, 2 February 2024. ↩︎
48
S. Rodriguez Álvarez, ‘“La empresa” del Clan: así creció la mayor amenaza armada de Colombia’, La Silla Vacía, 2 February 2024. ↩︎
49
S. Rodriguez Álvarez, ‘“La empresa” del Clan: así creció la mayor amenaza armada de Colombia’, La Silla Vacía, 2 February 2024. ↩︎
50
G. Arias, et al, ‘La anatomía del Clan del Golfo: entre el fortalecimiento y la negociación de paz en Catar’, Ideas Paz, 23 February 2026; ‘Lo que dicen las nuevas cifras sobre el aumento de integrantes de grupos armados en Colombia’, Ideas Paz, 9 November 2025. ↩︎
51
‘Kids on the Front Lines: Stopping Child Recruitment in Colombia’, International Crisis Group, 12 February 2026. ↩︎
52
S. Rodriguez Álvarez, ‘“La empresa” del Clan: así creció la mayor amenaza armada de Colombia’, La Silla Vacía, 2 February 2024. ↩︎
53
J. Nomesqui Rivera, ‘Los secretos de cinco bombardeos contra el Clan del Golfo: cuatro bajas de alto valor y más de 15.000 incautaciones’, Infobae, 6 November 2025. ↩︎
54
L. González Perafán, ‘El Clan del Golfo / EGC: expansión territorial y redes con la mafia internacional’, Indepaz, 20 April 2026. ↩︎
55
El Gaitanista; S. Rodriguez Álvarez, ‘“La empresa” del Clan: así creció la mayor amenaza armada de Colombia’, La Silla Vacía, 2 February 2024. ↩︎
56
‘Comunicados’, El Gaitanista. ↩︎
57
‘Thirty-Seventh Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission of the Organization of American States to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS)’, Organization of America States, 2025, 8. ↩︎
58
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; ‘Gaitanistas – Gulf Clan’, InSight Crime, 18 March 2025. ↩︎
59
‘EGC en el Chocó: violencia, poder y miedo’, Cinep, June 2025. ↩︎
60
‘Gaitanistas – Gulf Clan’, InSight Crime, 18 March 2025; J. Scotland, ‘Gold Rush: Organised Crime in Transition Mineral Supply Chains’, Rusi, 12 May 2025. ↩︎
61
‘EGC en el Chocó: violencia, poder y miedo’, Cinep, June 2025; ‘Petro to announce security measures as Gulf Clan escalates violence across Colombia’, The City Paper, 5 May 2025. ↩︎
62
L. González Perafán, ‘El Clan del Golfo / EGC: expansión territorial y redes con la mafia internacional’, Indepaz, 20 April 2026. ↩︎
63
ICTR, ‘The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu’, Chamber I,Judgment, 2 September 1998, para 623. ↩︎
64
M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol ii in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021. ↩︎
65
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.40. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between Colombia and the Comandos de la Frontera (CDF)

Background

The NIAC between the Colombian National Army and the CDF continued into 2026 despite ongoing peace talks between the parties. Although military operations are infrequent, a peace agreement has not yet been agreed. The group emerged in 2017 shortly after the 2016 peace agreement between the government and the now defunct FARC-EP.¹ The CDF formed out of dissidents from the 32^nd and 48^th fronts of the former FARC-EP.²

Initially, the group went by the name ‘La Mafia’ and sought to reactivate drug-trafficking activity in Putumayo.³ In 2020, however, the group rebranded itself as the CDF.⁴ Its main purpose remains drug trafficking, specifically in seeking to take over all drug trafficking at the Colombia-Ecuador border.⁵

The group operates mainly in the lower Putumayo department in Orito, San Miguel, Valle del Guamuéz, and Puerto Guzmán, which is on the border with Ecuador. In addition to Putumayo, CDF operates in the municipalities of Cartagena del Chairá, La Montañita and Solano, as well as in other municipalities in Cauca, Nariño and Amazonas.⁶ The group also operates out of Ecuador – Ecuadorian authorities have uncovered camps and propaganda which allude to the presence of the group in Sucumbíos.⁷ The group has also infiltrated Peru.⁸

Intensity

According to data released by the Attorney General’s Office in March 2023, the CDF, at that time, had approximately 1,000 fighters spread across territories under its control.⁹ The CDF is well equipped with military-grade arms and weaponry.¹⁰ Equipment includes 5.56mm calibre rifles, grenade launchers, explosives, drones, and tactical communication systems.¹¹ As of April 2026, Colombia continues to employ its armed forces to fight the CDF.‘Tres soldados colombianos mueren en ataque con drones en una zona fronteriza con Ecuador’, Swiss Info, 20 April 2026. During a military operation, the Colombian National Army seized a significant weapons arsenal, including firearms and various types of ammunition, indicating that the arsenal of the CDF extends beyond its rifle of choice, the 5.56mm calibre rifle.¹² Colombia continues to employ its armed forces to fight the CDF.

It is reported that around 7.2 million people were internally displaced at the end of 2025 due to ongoing conflict and drug-related violence.¹³ In Colombia, it is difficult to attribute internally displaced persons exclusively to hostilities in this NIAC or to the omnipresent gang violence associated with the drug trade.¹⁴ Military operations by the Colombian National Army against the CDF were infrequent during 2025 and 2026, which may be attributed to the ongoing peace talks. However, on 16 October 2024, at least one soldier died during combat between the two parties. Although the exact number of casualties on the CDF side is not reported, several clashes occurred as part of the operation.¹⁵ On 3 June 2025, the Colombian National Army and the CDF clashed in the village of Los Ángeles, in the Puerto Guzmán municipality, which forms part of the Putumayo department. Several fighters were injured.¹⁶ On 19 June 2025, the Colombian National Army arrested four CDF fighters at the La Pasera Intelligence checkpoint in the municipality of Mocoa, Putumayo.¹⁷ On 3 September 2025, the CDF tried to burn alive two soldiers who were part of an anti-drug operation, seriously injuring both of them.¹⁸ An aerial attack by the CDF against the Colombian National Army occurred on 20 April 2026, killing three soldiers and injuring two. The CDF used drones fitted with improvised explosive devices to target a military stronghold in Ipiales.¹⁹

The infrequency of military operations during 2025 and 2026 still meets the requirement of ‘sustained and concerted’ military operations as this criterion refers to the group being capable of mounting operations of such nature owing to the fact that it controls territory.²⁰ In addition, lulls in fighting do not necessarily lead to the end of a NIAC; a NIAC ends when a ‘lasting cessation of armed confrontations’ is reached which was not the case here.²¹

Organization

Currently, the CDF is commanded by Giovanny Andres Rojas, alias ‘Araña’. Araña is not only in charge of criminal activity but also of the armed wing of his organization.²² On 12 February 2025, he was arrested on an Interpol Red Notice for Extradition Purposes on drug trafficking-related charges filed in a US court.²³ As of May 2026, he was being held in La Picota prison in Bogotá.²⁴ A May 2026 intelligence report revealed that Araña remains the main leader of the Border Commandos despite his arrest and at least eight senior commanders are operating alongside him, including ‘Bonito’, ‘El Indio’, and ‘Manicure’, signalling a transition from a personality-centred hierarchy toward a command network.²⁵ ‘Compadre’, one of the CDF’s senior leaders who was responsible for coordinating the group’s operations in Ecuadorian territory, was killed during a military operation in the Ecuadorian Amazon region in May 2025.²⁶ The group’s financial chief, Roberto Carlos Álvarez Guerra (‘El Gerente’), was arrested in the United Arab Emirates and extradited to Ecuador in December 2025 following an Interpol Red Notice requested by Ecuador. He is awaiting trial while being held in La Cárcel del Encuentro, a high-security prison in Ecuador.²⁷

The organizational structure of the armed wing of the CDF is sophisticated. There are special combat commands, squads, platoons, companies and columns, and the group has a general directorate with a superior commander who oversees personnel in Caquetá, Putumayo, Amazonas, Nariño and Cauca.²⁸ The hierarchical structure and activities of the CDF reflect their capacity to operate on multiple illegal fronts, consolidating their influence in border areas.²⁹ The most recent reports estimate that the number of CDF fighters ranges between 2,000³⁰ and 3,000.³¹.CDF members live under a military regime and receive military training.³² The CDF is able to discipline fighters and is able to implement IHL. As the CDF controls territory and possesses a sophisticated command structure, it is able to implement Additional Protocol II.

On occasion, however, its military tactics constitute serious violations of IHL. For example, its modus operandi, according to military intelligence and local news reports, is based on a tactic of so-called fire, fear, and bloodshed. Captured enemies are tortured and killed and the bodies are then left in a horrendous state in order to send a message to potential hostile groups.³³ It is, however, only the ability to implement Additional Protocol II that is demanded under Article 1(1) of this instrument and not actual implementation and compliance. ³⁴

As a part of its military tactics, the CDF forms a military alliance with other groups. As of May 2026, the CDF together with the Pacific Guerrillas (Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacífico, CPG) is part of a group called Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB), a splinter group of Segunda Marquetalia (SM).³⁵ Furthermore, reports indicate that the CDF maintaining a close alliance with the Ecuadorian criminal group Los Lobos.³⁶ As of May 2026, the CDF has evolved its military tactics to embrace technology and now employs commercial drones fitted with improvised explosive devices to drop explosives on its government targets.³⁷.

The CDF is sufficiently organized to exercise control over rural areas.³⁸ Areas under its control include territory in the Putumayo department, where the group controls the San Miguel and Putumayo rivers and most of the border with Ecuador including the municipalities of Puerto Asís, Orito, Valle del Guamuez, San Miguel, Puerto Leguízamo, and Puerto Caicedo.³⁹ In these areas residents say the organization imposes rules on commerce and daily life, using fear and coercion to maintain control.⁴⁰ The CDF locates its military bases in the jungle in these territories.⁴¹ As of May 2026, the CDF had a confirmed presence in the Colombian departments of Putumayo, Caquetá, Amazonas, and Nariño, while expanding into Ecuador’s provinces of Sucumbíos, Orellana, and Napo, as well as into Peru.⁴²

For the purpose of identification and as a beneficial military tactic, the CDF wears military-green camouflage and a distinguishing black scarf embroidered with the word ‘Comandos’ in yellow. Two white skulls and a snake are embroidered on the lower part.⁴³ Funding for military activities is raised through drug trade, specifically cocaine production and trafficking routes toward Central America and Mexico, illegal mining and extortion of local communities, merchants, and workers in the informal sector.⁴⁴

The overall CDF commander, Araña, acts as a spokesperson.⁴⁵ He continues to give interviews from prison on behalf of the CDF, although the group has a delegation tasked with negotiating peace on its behalf.⁴⁶ The CDF effectively speaks with one voice.

The organizational structure of the CDF is sophisticated and complies with the four organizational requirements under Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. Hence, the NIAC between Colombian National Army and the CDF constitutes an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC.

1
‘Border Command’, InSight Crime, 30 January 2025; ‘Comandos de Frontera: ¿dónde están ubicados y quiénes son?’, El Espectador, 14 March 2023. ↩︎
2
A. Diaz Castro, ‘Who are the Comandos de Frontera (Border Command)?’, London Politica; ‘Border Command’, InSight Crime, 30 January 2025. ↩︎
3
‘Border Command’, InSight Crime, 30 January 2025. ↩︎
4
‘Border Command’, InSight Crime, 30 January 2025. ↩︎
5
V. Parada Lugo, ‘Entrevista con los Comandos de la Frontera: “Pedimos amnistía, perdón y olvido”’, El Espectador, 12 March 2023. ↩︎
6
‘Border Command’, InSight Crime, 30 January 2025. ↩︎
7
‘Alerta en Sucumbíos por el grupo Comandos De Frontera, una mafia de Colombia’, El Comercio, 21 January 2021. ↩︎
8
‘Border Command’, InSight Crime, 30 January 2025. ↩︎
9
‘Comandos de Frontera: ¿dónde están ubicados y quiénes son?’, El Espectador, 14 March 2023. ↩︎
10
J. Pappier and K. Johnson, ‘Challenges in Assessing Colombia’s ‘Post Conflict’: A follow-up’, Fundación conflict response, 27 June 2022. ↩︎
11
L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Intelligence report revealed key roles in the structure of Border Commandos: alias Compadre was killed after ambush in Ecuador’, Infobae, 12 May 2025. ↩︎
12
L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Capturaron a siete integrantes de los Comandos de Frontera: pretendían atentar contra indígenas en Putumayo’, Infobae, 11 April 2024. ↩︎
13
‘Colombia’, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 14 May 2025. ↩︎
14
S. Rodriguez and Georgetown University Latin America & Caribbean Policy Association, ‘Internal Displacement in Colombia: Characterization and Relevant Research Findings’, Georgetown Public Policy Review, 25 January 2024; V. Sainz, ‘Forced to Flee: The Global Impact of Conflict-Driven Internal Displacement’, Atlas Institute for International Affairs, 14 April 2025. ↩︎
15
P. Naranjo, ‘Enfrentamientos entre Comandos de Frontera y en Ejército en Puerto Leguízamo, Putumayo, dejan un muerto’, Infobae, 16 October 2024. ↩︎
16
L. Palomino, ‘’, W Radio, 3 June 2025. ↩︎
17
P. Naranjo, ‘’, Infobae, 19 June 2025; ‘Ejército capturó a presuntos integrantes de Comandos de la Frontera, en Putumayo’, Caracol Radio, 19 June 2025. ↩︎
18
‘Soldiers doused with gasoline, set on fire during mission to destroy cocaine lab, Colombia army says’, CBS News, 4 September 2025; ‘Two soldiers injured after being burned with gasoline in an uprising in southern Colombia’, De Último Minuto, 3 September 2025; V. Parada Lugo and C. Mella, ‘Los Comandos de la Frontera expanden su poder de Colombia a Ecuador’, El País, 14 September 2025. ↩︎
19
‘Drone attack kills 3 Colombian soldiers as rebel groups develop new lethal capabilities’, Associated Press, 20 April 2026; J. Martinez, ‘Uniformed Dead: The Scale of Colombia’s Drone Threat’, The Rio Times, 21 April 2026. ↩︎
20
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, paras 1.38 and 1.39. ↩︎
21
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” is Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 19. ↩︎
22
‘Border Command’, InSight Crime, 30 January 2025. ↩︎
23
S. Torrado, ‘Claves de los diálogos de paz con la Segunda Marquetalia y la Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano’, El Pais, 13 February 2025; N. R. Matta Colorado, ‘Alias Araña cayó por traficar mientras negociaba la paz’, El Colombiano, 14 February 2025. ↩︎
24
L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Informe de inteligencia reveló los roles clave en la estructura de Comandos de Frontera: alias Compadre fue abatido tras emboscada en Ecuador’, Infobae, 12 May 2025. ↩︎
25
L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Informe de inteligencia reveló los roles clave en la estructura de Comandos de Frontera: alias Compadre fue abatido tras emboscada en Ecuador’, Infobae, 12 May 2025. ↩︎
26
L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Informe de inteligencia reveló los roles clave en la estructura de Comandos de Frontera: alias Compadre fue abatido tras emboscada en Ecuador’, Infobae, 12 May 2025; ‘Noboa incorporó a tres grupos disidentes de las FARC como enemigos en el conflicto armado interno en Ecuador’, Infobae, 16 May 2025; Z. Tatiana, ‘¿Quién es el cabecilla de “Comandos de la Frontera” que murió en Ecuador?’, Caracol Radio, 12 May 2025. ↩︎
27
V. Parada Lugo and C. Mella, ‘Los Comandos de la Frontera expanden su poder de Colombia a Ecuador’, El País, 14 September 2025; ‘Caso Comandos de la Frontera: alias Gerente y 18 personas más van a juicio por lavado de activos’, Ecuavisa, 30 April 2026; ‘Alias ‘Gerente’, líder de Comandos de la Frontera, permanece libre bajo fianza en Emiratos Árabes’, Vistazo, 7 December 2025; ‘Alias Gerente, cabecilla de los Comandos de la Frontera, fue detenido nuevamente en Emiratos Árabes’, Ecuavisa, 29 December 2025; ‘Noboa anuncia la extradición a Ecuador desde EAU del líder de Comandos de la Frontera, escisión de las FARC’, Infobae, 30 December 2025. ↩︎
28
V. Parada Lugo, ‘Entrevista con los Comandos de la Frontera: “Pedimos amnistía, perdón y olvido”’, El Espectador, 12 March 2023. ↩︎
29
L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Informe de inteligencia reveló los roles clave en la estructura de Comandos de Frontera: alias Compadre fue abatido tras emboscada en Ecuador’, Infobae, 12 May 2025. ↩︎
30
K. Johnson, et al, ‘El poder armado en expansión Entre el fortalecimiento y la fragmentación de los grupos armados en Colombia’, Fundación Conflict Responses ↩︎
31
V. Parada Lugo and C. Mella, ‘Los Comandos de la Frontera expanden su poder de Colombia a Ecuador’, El País, 14 September 2025 ↩︎
32
‘Los Comandos de la Frontera ‘imponen su ley’ a punta de sangre y fuego en Sucumbíos’, Primicias, 7 November 2024. ↩︎
33
‘Los Comandos de la Frontera “imponen su ley” a punta de sangre y fuego en Sucumbíos’, Primicias, 7 November 2024. ↩︎
34
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, paras 1.38 and 1.39; Y. Dinstein, ‘Non-International Armed Conflicts in International Law, 2^nd Edition’, Cambridge University Press, 2021, para 177. ↩︎
35
‘Lo que debe saber del grupo armado separado de Iván Márquez que negocia con el Gobierno’, El Espectador, 27 November 2024; S. Torrado, ‘Claves de los diálogos de paz con la Segunda Marquetalia y la Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano’, El Pais, 13 February 2025. ↩︎
36
L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Informe de inteligencia reveló los roles clave en la estructura de Comandos de Frontera: alias Compadre fue abatido tras emboscada en Ecuador’, Infobae, 12 May 2025; ‘Noboa incorporó a tres grupos disidentes de las FARC como enemigos en el conflicto armado interno en Ecuador’, Infobae, 16 May 2025; Z. Tatiana, ‘¿Quién es el cabecilla de “Comandos de la Frontera” que murió en Ecuador?’, Caracol Radio, 12 May 2025. ↩︎
37
‘Drone attack kills 3 Colombian soldiers as rebel groups develop new lethal capabilities’, Associated Press, 20 April 2026 ↩︎
38
‘Border Command’, InSight Crime, 30 January 2025. ↩︎
39
V. P. Lugo, ‘Los Comandos de la Frontera imponen nuevos controles en el Putumayo mientras negocian con el Gobierno’, El Pais, 10 April 2025; ‘La violenta sombra de los Comandos de la Frontera de Colombia se expande en Ecuador y Perú’, Ojo Publico, 27 April 2025; S. M. Ramos, ‘Comandos de Frontera y su presencia en el norte de Ecuador’, Pares, 16 May 2025; ‘Crimen organizado transnacional y deforestación en la Amazonía: una crisis socioambiental que trasciende fronteras’, Mi Putumayo, 19 May 2026. ↩︎
40
V. Parada Lugo and C. Mella, ‘Los Comandos de la Frontera expanden su poder de Colombia a Ecuador’, El País, 14 September 2025. ↩︎
41
V. Parada Lugo, ‘Entrevista con los Comandos de la Frontera: “Pedimos amnistía, perdón y olvido”’, El Espectador, 12 March 2023. ↩︎
42
L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Informe de inteligencia reveló los roles clave en la estructura de Comandos de Frontera: alias Compadre fue abatido tras emboscada en Ecuador’, Infobae, 12 May 2025; V. Parada Lugo and C. Mella, ‘Los Comandos de la Frontera expanden su poder de Colombia a Ecuador’, El País, 14 September 2025; ‘A Jungle Heist: Shielding the Amazon from Organised Crime’, International Crisis Group, 13 May 2026. ↩︎
43
V. Parada Lugo, ‘Entrevista con los Comandos de la Frontera: “Pedimos amnistía, perdón y olvido”’, El Espectador, 12 March 2023. ↩︎
44
V. Parada Lugo, ‘Entrevista con los Comandos de la Frontera: “Pedimos amnistía, perdón y olvido”’, El Espectador, 12 March 2023; L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Informe de inteligencia reveló los roles clave en la estructura de Comandos de Frontera: alias Compadre fue abatido tras emboscada en Ecuador’, Infobae, 12 May 2025; V. Parada Lugo and C. Mella, ‘Los Comandos de la Frontera expanden su poder de Colombia a Ecuador’, El País, 14 September 2025. ↩︎
45
V. Parada Lugo, M. Alvarado Lozada, and A. Ortiz, ‘Video: Esto piden los Comandos de Frontera para entrar a la Paz Total de Petro’, El Espectador, 12 March 2023; V. Parada Lugo, ‘Entrevista con los Comandos de la Frontera: “Pedimos amnistía, perdón y olvido”’, El Espectador, 12 March 2023; ‘Lo que debe saber del grupo armado separado de Iván Márquez que negocia con el Gobierno’, El Espectador, 27 November 2024. ↩︎
46
V. Parada Lugo, ‘Entrevista con los Comandos de la Frontera: “Pedimos amnistía, perdón y olvido”’, El Espectador, 12 March 2023. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) and the Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC) (formerly Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC))

Background

The pre-existing NIAC between the EGC (also known as the Gulf Clan) and the ELN continued throughout 2025 and 2026.¹ Fighting between the EGC and ELN started in 2016 over a disputed territory in Bolívar, following the demobilization of the now defunct FARC-EP. The EGC wants to expand into the north-east of Colombia where the ELN has maintained a monopoly presence for decades. The area is rich in gold reserves, and both sides are fighting for dominance over a trafficking corridor between Antioquia and Southern Bolívar.² Despite agreeing to a ‘non-aggression’ pact in 2019, fighting extended to other departments including Chocó, Norte de Santander and Antioquia.³

The ELN has existed since 1964 and operates as a criminal organization,⁴ a political organization, and an armed group. It is considered transnational as it also operates in Venezuela.⁵ For an in-depth overview of the ELN see above. The EGC, too, is active in criminal activities, politics and military operations.⁶ The EGC was established by dissidents from the AUC,⁷ who opposed the 2006 demobilization process. The EGC has since become a powerful transnational drug-trafficking operation supported by an armed wing.⁸ The EGC is considered one of the world’s largest international cocaine distributors.⁹ The EGC does not have a clear ideological origin story and its political ideals are curated to fit its current interests.¹⁰

Intensity

More than thirty-seven clashes occurred between the ELN and the EGC (at times fighting alongside the EMC) in February 2025.¹¹ Fighting intensified between 4 and 21 February 2025.¹² Several families were displaced as a result of these clashes.¹³

Several clashes also occurred during March 2025. The first, in Llanogrande (Antioquia department) on 2 March 2025, resulted in three casualties.¹⁴ The EGC and ELN clashed again in the Antioquia department (this time in Yondó) on 25 March, killing one ELN fighter.¹⁵

As of February 2025, the ELN acquired drones as part of its arsenal of small arms and light weapons and engaged in aerial bombardment.¹⁶ The frequency of attacks peaked in March.¹⁷ The intensity of the attacks has assisted the ELN to retain territorial control in the Catatumbo region on the border between Colombia and Venezuela.¹⁸ During the remainder of 2025 and the first half of 2026, less specific clashes between ELN and EGC were reported. However, more generalized reports confirmed that fighting and tensions between both groups remained ongoing.¹⁹ Additionally, the Colombian Ombudsman’s Office repeatedly issued warnings to the civilian population due to hostilities reported between ELN and EGC.²⁰

The types of weapons now used by the EGC include drones, explosive devices and sniper rifles (see above).²¹ By February 2026, the EGC was reported to be composed of about 10,000 members. As of May 2026, it exerted influence in at least 296 municipalities.²²

Mass displacement and internal displacement figures in Colombia were particularly high throughout 2024 and 2025.²³ However, as armed groups often operate in multiple districts it is difficult to attribute displacement to a specific group. It is possible that the ELN contributed to the displacement of approximately 20,000²⁴ to 56,000 people in the north-east of Colombia along the border with Venezuela.²⁵

The fighting between the ELN and the EGC continues to equate to protracted armed violence, satisfying the notion of intensity as demanded under IHL.

Organization

Both State actors engaged in this NIAC are sufficiently organized under IHL. For analysis of the organization of the ELN, and for the EGC, see above.

As the intensity of the fighting is protracted in nature, the ELN and EGC have been engaged in an ongoing NIAC throughout 20205 and 2026.

1
‘Humanitarian Report 2024: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross; ‘Humanitarian Challenges 2025: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross. ↩︎
2
‘Por lo menos 10 muertos por combates del Clan del Golfo, Eln y disidencias en el nordeste antioqueño’, El Colombiano, 23 May 2024. ↩︎
3
J. Manjarrés, ‘ELN and Gaitanistas War Again in Northern Colombia’, InSight Crime, 16 August 2022. ↩︎
4
‘Country policy and information note: armed groups and criminal gangs, Colombia, November 2024 (accessible)’, Gov.UK, November 2024. ↩︎
5
‘A History of the Armed Struggle of the ELN in Colombia’, Abolition media, 25 September 2022. ↩︎
6
‘The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas’, International Crisis Group, 19 March 2024; E. Dickinson, ‘Las Autodefensas Gaitanistas (AGC): ¿epílogo de la Paz Total?’, Razon Publica, 11 August 2024. ↩︎
7
‘United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)’, InSight Crime, 11 June 2024. ↩︎
8
L. Schmidt, ‘Power Play or Peace? AGC’s Role in Colombia’s Fragile Negotiations’, InSight Crime, 16 October 2024; ‘Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC) / Gulf Clan’, Colombia Reports, 21 October 2025. ↩︎
9
J. Freixes, ‘Gulf Clan, a History of Death and Crime in Colombia’, Colombia One, 16 February 2025. ↩︎
10
R. Badillo-Sarmiento and L. F. Trejos-Rosero, ‘Las Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia como grupo armado politizado’, Revista Científica, 1 April 2023. ↩︎
11
J. Franciotti and M. Fernanda Arocha, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean, March 2025’, ACLED, 7 March 2025; ‘Guerra en límites entre Antioquia y Bolívar tiene en riesgo a 150.000 personas: alerta Fundación Sumapaz’, El Colombiano, 25 February 2025. ↩︎
12
L. R. Jiménez Valencia, ‘La cruda guerra entre el Eln y el ‘clan del Golfo’ que se ha apoderado de los ríos de Chocó’, El Tiempo, 18 February 2025; C. Mayorga Alejo, ‘La guerra entre Agc y Eln al sur de Chocó mancha el proceso de paz’, Verdad Abierta, 17 February 2024; ‘Emergencias humanitarias en Colombia hoy’, Defensoría del pueblo, 16 February 2025. ↩︎
13
C. Mayorga Alejo, ‘La guerra entre Agc y Eln al sur de Chocó mancha el proceso de paz’, Verdad Abierta, 17 February 2024. ↩︎
14
D. A. Escobar Calle, ‘Tres personas muertas en Urrao, Antioquia, por enfrentamientos Clan del Golfo y el ELN’, Alerta Paisa, 2 March 2025; ‘Tres muertos hallaron tras enfrentamientos entre ELN y Clan del Golfo, en Urrao’, El Espectador, 2 March 2025. ↩︎
15
J. Rodríguez, ‘Combates del ELN y Clan del Golfo dejan un muerto y un herido entre Santander y Antioquia’, BluRadio, 25 March 2025; ‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
16
J. Patino C, ‘Nueva modalidad: ELN usa drones de la disidencias en el Catatumbo’, Cambio, 4 March 2025. ↩︎
17
L. Calderón et al, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean, April 2025’, ACLED, 3 April 2025. ↩︎
18
‘National Liberation Army (ELN)’, InSight Crime, 18 June 2024; ‘Colombia: Armed Groups Batter Border Region’, Human Rights Watch, 26 March 2025. ↩︎
19
J. Patiño C, ‘Una guerra a muerte: así se disputan los grupos ilegales el territorio’, Cambio, 28 September 2025; L. González Perafán, ‘Los Corredores De La Muerte’, Indepaz, 21 September 2025; J. M. Correa, ‘Clan del Golfo niega alianza con disidencias de las Farc en el San Juan y cuestiona alertas de la Defensoría’, Infobae, 3 April 2026. ↩︎
20
‘Grave situación de violencia en Chiriguaná lleva a la Defensoría del Pueblo a emitir Alerta Temprana’, Defensoría del Pueblo Colombia, 31 July 2025; ‘Defensoría del Pueblo emite Alerta Temprana sobre grave escenario de riesgo en Santiago de Cali’, Defensoría del Pueblo Colombia, 26 September 2025; ‘Habitantes del municipio de Atrato, Chocó, están en riesgo a causa de posible confrontación entre grupos armados no estatales’, Defensoría del Pueblo Colombia, 11 May 2026. ↩︎
21
S. Olivares Tobón, ‘Confrontaciones dentro de las minas de Buriticá dejaron dos personas lesionadas’, El Colombiano, 2 October 2023; J. Patino C, ‘Nueva modalidad: ELN usa drones de la disidencias en el Catatumbo’, Cambio, 4 March 2025. ↩︎
22
G. Arias, et al, ‘La anatomía del Clan del Golfo: entre el fortalecimiento y la negociación de paz en Catar’, Ideas Paz, 23 February 2026; ‘En tres años, Clan del Golfo duplicó número de integrantes y amplió su presencia a casi 300 municipios’, Agencia Periodismo Investigativo, 23 February 2026;L. González Perafán, ‘El Clan del Golfo / EGC: expansión territorial y redes con la mafia internacional’, Indepaz, 20 April 2026. ↩︎
23
‘Humanitarian Challenges 2025: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Colombia’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 12 May 2026. ↩︎
24
‘Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)’, Global Security.org. ↩︎
25
‘Colombia: Armed Groups Batter Border Region’, Human Rights Watch, 26 March 2025. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) and the Frente 33 of the Estado Mayor de los Bloques y el Frente (EMBF)

Background

The ELN is a hybrid criminal, political and military organization that formed in 1964.¹ The Estado Mayor de Bloques y Frentes (EMBF) is a splinter group which separated from the general staff of the dissident organization of the former FARC-EP, now the EMC, in April 2024.²

The ELN and EMBF are competing for control over illicit trade, including but not only drugs.³ Catatumbo has a high concentration of mineral resources as well as being a centre for coca cultivation.⁴ As a consequence of the violence in January 2025 (see below under ‘intensity’), the Colombian government paused the bilateral ceasefire with the EMBF on 17 April 2025.⁵ The 33^rd Front of the EMBF and the government concluded the Catatumbo Agreement, which foresees the disarming of the 33^rd Front.⁶

Intensity

On 15 January 2025, the ELN launched a military operation against the EMBF in the Catatumbo region in north-eastern Colombia close to the border with Venezuela.⁷ The fighting lasted for approximately a week and resulted in sixty casualties and the forcible displacement of more than 50,000 people.⁸ The UNHCR reported that by 5 March 2025, more than 91,400 people were affected by the ongoing clash between the ELN and EMBF, including more than 57,000 displaced persons, almost 18,000 persons facing ‘confinement’ (understood as ‘a situation of human rights violation where a community loses mobility, as a result of the actions of illegal armed groups, thus preventing access to essential goods for survival’)⁹ and a further 10,000 facing severe restrictions on their movement.¹⁰

The 33^rd Front of the EMBF launched a counter offensive against the ELN in Catatumbo on 9 March 2025 with the aim of regaining control over territory it had lost in the January attacks.¹¹ The territory they are fighting over is a critical corridor for the drug trade between Colombia and Venezuela. In response to the latest attacks, the Colombian government deployed 10,000 members of its security forces to protect civilians in the area.¹² On 3 May 2025, the government and the 33^rd Front of the EMBF agreed on a ‘peace zone’ in the Catatumbo region.¹³ The UN Security Council and UNHCR have expressed their concern over the humanitarian and security situation in Catatumbo.¹⁴

Intense fighting broke out between the ELN and the 33^rd Front of the EMBF between 16 and 29 December 2025 in Catatumbo in Norte de Santander department. The severity of fighting resulted in at least 250 civilians being internally displaced.¹⁵ The fighting also threatened further harm to more than 6,000 civilians, risking the confinement of multiple communities.¹⁶Public officials plead for de-escalation, including the OmbudsmanIris Marín Ortiz, X, 26 December 2025 and the Vice-President of Colombia Francia Marquez.¹⁷

Fighting between the ELN and EMBF further escalated as these two organized armed groups clashed throughout January 2026 over the control of coca-rich territories, key smuggle and trade routes, and territorial dominance in Tibú, El Tarra, Teorama, and Convención municipalities in Catatumbo region (Norte de Santander department) bordering Venezuela. More than 90,000 civilians were displaced as a result of the clashes between these groups in the Catatumbo region.¹⁸

The fighting between the ELN and the EMBF equates to protracted armed violence, satisfying the notion of intensity as demanded under IHL.

Organization

The overall leader of the EMBF is Alexander Díaz, alias Calarcá Córdoba.¹⁹ The armed wing of the EMBF is led by the commanders of the three regional blocs, namely Commander Jorge Suárez Briceño, Commander Gentil Duarte Magdalena Medio, and Commander Raúl Reyes.²⁰ Although there is limited information about the internal structure of the EMBF, it is known that decisions are made by majority vote. Its command structure and the fact that fighters are former EMC fighters who are well trained, should enable it to impose discipline and implement IHL.²¹ The EMBF’s 33^rd Front operates ‘re-socialisation camps’ in Catatumbo, where it imposes forced labour on individuals deemed to have violated the group’s rules, such as using drugs or supporting State forces.²² In early 2026, reports emerged that the EMBF’s 18^th Front of the Magdalena Medio Bloc had separated from the group and is now incorporated into the EMC.²³ As of July 2025, membership within the EMBF was reportedly at about 2,800.²⁴ In November 2025, as part of several agreements signed with the Colombian government in the context of the Total Peace process, the EMBF pledged not to recruit minors going forward.²⁵ Recent reports indicate, however, that the group continues to recruit children into its ranks.²⁶

The EMBF continues to exercise territorial control primarily over the Catatumbo region, but also areas in Antioquia and southern Bolívar.²⁷ As of August 2025, the municipalities of San Vicente del Caguán and Cartagena del Chairá in Caquetá department have been reported as one of the EMBF’s operational strongholds. The group has also established a presence in Huila, Guaviare, Amazonas, Tolima, and Valle del Cauca departments.²⁸ A May 2026 report confirms that the EMBF operates in 113 municipalities.²⁹ The control of territory is a confirmation of its organizational capacity. The group funds itself through its criminal enterprises which include the coca business.³⁰ Additionally, deforestation and control over environmental activities have allowed the EMBF to monetize land use, collect fines for logging, and regulate extensive cattle ranching, especially in the Amazon and the south of the Colombia.³¹

The EMBF speaks with one voice through its chief negotiator who represents the group in peace negotiations,³² and in media interviews.³³

Both non-State armed groups engaged in this NIAC are sufficiently organized under IHL. For an analysis of the organization of the ELN, see above. The situation constituted a NIAC between the EMBF and ELN from the middle of January 2025.

1
‘A History of the Armed Struggle of the ELN in Colombia’, Abolition media, 25 September 2022. ↩︎
2
UNSC, ‘United Nations Verifications Mission in Colombia’, UN Doc S/2025/188, 27 March 2025, para 4; ‘COI Focus: Colombia: Veiligheidssituatie’, CGRS, 10 April 2025, 2. ↩︎
3
‘Remarks of Carlos Ruiz Massieu, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia Security Council’, UN Verification Mission in Colombia, 22 January 2025. ↩︎
4
‘Major violence impacts Catatumbo region with former FARC members killed’, Justice for Colombia, 24 January 2025. ↩︎
5
‘Gobierno Petro no renovará cese al fuego con disidencias de alias Calarcá, pero mantiene abierto el diálogo’, El Colombiano, 17 April 2025; V. Mishra, ‘Colombia: Catatumbo killings highlight fragility of peace process’, UN News, 22 January 2025. ↩︎
6
A. Alsema, ‘Dissident FARC faction agrees to concentrate members in northeast Colombia’, Colombia Reports, 4 May 2025. ↩︎
7
‘Major violence impacts Catatumbo region with former FARC members killed’, Justice for Colombia, 24 January 2025; ‘COI Focus: Colombia: Veiligheidssituatie’, CGRS, 10 April 2025, 16. ↩︎
8
‘United Nations Verifications Mission in Colombia’, UN Doc S/2025/188, 27 March 2025, para 4. ↩︎
9
‘Colombia: Confinements’, UNHCR Operational Data Portal, January 2022. ↩︎
10
‘Colombia: Humanitarian emergency – The crisis continues in Catatumbo’, UNHCR Operational Data Portal, 2 April 2025. ↩︎
11
L. Calderón Fuentes et al, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean, April 2025’, ACLED, 3 April 2025. ↩︎
12
L. Reynoso, ‘La contraofensiva de las disidencias de las FARC reaviva la crisis en el Catatumbo’, El País, 26 March 2025; J. D. Rodríguez, ‘5 personas asesinadas en nueva masacre en El Catatumbo, esta vez en Ocaña’, Infobae, 5 March 2025. ↩︎
13
‘Gobierno colombiano y Frente 33 de disidencias acuerdan una «zona de paz» en el Catatumbo’, Swiss Info, 4 May 2025; ‘Gobierno y Frente 33 de disidencia Calarcá acuerdan zona de preagrupamiento en Catatumbo’, El Espectador, 4 May 2025. ↩︎
14
UNSC, ‘United Nations Verifications Mission in Colombia’, UN Doc S/2025/188, 27 March 2025, para 4; ‘Colombia: Humanitarian emergency – The crisis continues in Catatumbo’, UNHCR Operational Data Portal, 2 April 2025. ↩︎
15
‘Defensora del Pueblo pide al ELN y al Frente 33 de las disidencias de las Farc cesar los combates en Catatumbo’, El Heraldo, 26 December 2025; D. Ospina, ‘Defensora del Pueblo pide al ELN y al Frente 33 cesar combates en el Catatumbo y permitir atención humanitaria’, Infobae, 26 December 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, December 2025. ↩︎
16
D. Ospina, ‘Defensora del Pueblo pide al ELN y al Frente 33 cesar combates en el Catatumbo y permitir atención humanitaria’, Infobae, 26 December 2025. ↩︎
17
Francia Márquez Mina, X, 26 December 2025. ↩︎
18
S. Brodzinsky, ‘‘We can’t take it any more’: thousands flee guerrilla clashes on Colombia-Venezuela border’, The Guardian, 9 January 2026; V. Parada Lugo, ‘El Catatumbo entra a su segundo año de crisis humanitaria sin señales de alivio’, El País, 18 January 2026; J. Freixes, ‘Violence Flares in Colombia’s Catatumbo Region Amid Armed Group Clashes’, Colombia One, 6 January 2026; ‘Resurgence of armed conflict, arrests and state failures in response to the humanitarian crisis in Catatumbo’, EU SEE, 28 January 2026. ↩︎
19
J. P. Contreras Ríos, ‘Así nació el grupo que se separó de Mordisco y que ahora negocia la paz con Petro’, El Espectador, 4 December 2024. ↩︎
20
‘¿En que está el “EMC” actualmente?’, Fundación conflict responses, 25 April 2024; ‘Gobierno prorroga cese al fuego bilateral, únicamente con cuatro grupos del denominado Estado Mayor al mando de alias ‘Calarcá’: Mindefensa’, Presidencia, 19 April 2025; K. Johnson, et al, ‘El poder armado en expansión Entre el fortalecimiento y la fragmentación de los grupos armados en Colombia’, Fundación Conflict Responses. ↩︎
21
J. C. Villaquirán Úsuga, ‘Así funcionan los campos de entrenamiento de las disidencias de ‘Iván Mordisco’’, El País, 26 November 2024; ‘Exclusivo: así son las ‘escuelas’ de enfermería y entrenamiento de las disidencias de Iván Mordisco’, Semana, 25 November 2024. ↩︎
22
‘DFAT Country Information Report Colombia’, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Australian Government, 28 January 2026. ↩︎
23
‘Reconfiguración del Frente 18 de las disidencias de las FARC en Antioquia: ruptura con Calarcá y alineación con Iván Mordisco’, Pares, 13 March 2026. ↩︎
24
‘Lo que dicen las nuevas cifras sobre el aumento de integrantes de grupos armados en Colombia’, Ideas Paz, 9 November 2025. ↩︎
25
‘Colombia: disidencia FARC se compromete no reclutar menores’, Deutsche Welle, 21 November 2025. ↩︎
26
J. Patiño C, ‘Los incumplimientos de las disidencias de alias Calarcá frente a la paz total’, Cambio, 11 April 2026. ↩︎
27
J. P. Contreras Ríos, ‘Así nació el grupo que se separó de Mordisco y que ahora negocia la paz con Petro’, El Espectador, 4 December 2024. ‘Cuáles son y cuánto poder tienen los dos grupos disidentes de las FARC señalados por los ataques recientes’, La Nacion, 24 August 2025. ↩︎
28
L. González Perafán, ‘Los Corredores De La Muerte’, Indepaz, 21 September 2025; S. Vargas Rueda, ‘Estos fueron los grupos armados que más han crecido en Colombia: pasaron de 13.000 miembros en el 2018 a más de a 27.000 en 2025’, Infobae, 14 May 2026; K. Johnson, et al, ‘El poder armado en expansión Entre el fortalecimiento y la fragmentación de los grupos armados en Colombia’, Fundación Conflict Responses; S. Gómez Zúñiga, ‘Gobernanza e injerencia ambiental del EMBF en Caquetá’, Fundación Conflict Responses, September 2025. ↩︎
29
S. Vargas Rueda, ‘Estos fueron los grupos armados que más han crecido en Colombia: pasaron de 13.000 miembros en el 2018 a más de a 27.000 en 2025’, Infobae, 14 May 2026; K. Johnson, et al, ‘El poder armado en expansión Entre el fortalecimiento y la fragmentación de los grupos armados en Colombia’, Fundación Conflict Responses. ↩︎
30
J. P. Contreras Ríos, ‘Así nació el grupo que se separó de Mordisco y que ahora negocia la paz con Petro’, El Espectador, 4 December 2024; ‘Central General Staff – Ex-FARC Mafia’, InSight Crime, 14 June 2024; El Espectador, ‘Entrevista a Calarcá: jefe disidente de FARC revela que no firmará la paz con Petro’, YouTube, 9 December 2024. ↩︎
31
S. Vargas Rueda, ‘Estos fueron los grupos armados que más han crecido en Colombia: pasaron de 13.000 miembros en el 2018 a más de a 27.000 en 2025’, Infobae, 14 May 2026; K. Johnson, et al, ‘El poder armado en expansión Entre el fortalecimiento y la fragmentación de los grupos armados en Colombia’, Fundación Conflict Responses; S. Gómez Zúñiga, ‘Gobernanza e injerencia ambiental del EMBF en Caquetá’, Fundación Conflict Responses, September 2025. ↩︎
32
J. P. Contreras Ríos, ‘Así nació el grupo que se separó de Mordisco y que ahora negocia la paz con Petro’, El Espectador, 4 December 2024. ↩︎
33
El Espectador, ‘Entrevista a Calarcá: jefe disidente de FARC revela que no firmará la paz con Petro’, YouTube, 9 December 2024; Revista Semana, ‘Alias Calarcá responde por los militares muertos en Guaviare, habla de Petro, Santos y el 2026’, YouTube, 3 May 2025. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) and the Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez

Background

The FARC-EP militant group demobilised in 2016, leading to a proliferation of ex-FARC-EP dissident groups consisting of former FARC-EP members who rejected the peace deal. Two major groups claiming to be the successors of the former FARC-EP rearmed themselves after the demobilisation of the FARC-EP: the Segunda Marquetalia (SM), and the EMC.¹ The EMC is an ‘umbrella organization’ comprised of former FARC-EP fighters.² The EMC was formed in mid-2017 after the demobilization of the FARC-EP, and the second major former FARC-EP splinter group, the SM, was created in 2019.³ The faction under Iván Mordisco still calls itself the EMC. In July 2024, Mordisco announced the creation of a new and restructured EMC.⁴ Unlike the former FARC-EP, the EMC seeks to co-opt local authorities and economies rather than seizing control through armed conflict.⁵

As part of President Gustavo Petro’s ‘Total Peace’ policy, the EMC renewed peace negotiations in 2022, but these were unsuccessful and resulted in a further disintegration of the group.⁶ This led to a group called Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez splintering from EMC in November 2023.⁷ The Frente 57 has repeatedly declared its independence from other EMC factions.⁸ The EMC is not exclusively a military organization; it is a criminal organization with a military wing that assures dominance of key coca-rich territory.⁹

The pre-existing NIAC between the EMC, before its April 2024 split from the EMBF, and the Frente 57 continued throughout 2025 and 2026, with frequent clashes reported.

Intensity

Several armed confrontations occurred between the EMC and Frente 57 during 2025 and 2026. In terms of assessing intensity, the EMC fragmented again in April 2024, 60 per cent of the fighters remained in the original group under the command of Iván Mordisco and a faction, comprising 40 per cent, now form part of the EMBF.¹⁰

This assessment focuses specifically on intensity after the fracture of EMC to determine if the fighting between the EMC faction under Mordisco and Frente 57 continues to equate to protracted armed violence. For a pre-existing conflict between parties to end post-fracturing requires that one of the parties ceases to exist or that a lasting peace follows the conclusion of a peace agreement. Even if the EMC fractured, the original group still exists and continues fighting.¹¹ The EMC still controls territory in Colombia and in Venezuela as direct results of the intensity of the violence generated by its armed wing.¹² Both sides have access to heavy military weaponry which includes drones armed with bombs.¹³

A prolonged military engagement between these armed groups occurred between 1 and 18 February 2025. The conflict was about control of key drug- trafficking corridors.¹⁴ Fighting between the EMC and Frente 57 on 18 March 2025 resulted in a power outage in the region of Toribío (Cauca department).¹⁵ Reports emerged in September 2025 about constant armed confrontations and territorial conflict between the EMC’s Adán Izquierdo and Dagoberto Ramos front and Frente 57 in Pradera municipality in Valle del Cauca department.¹⁶ Although no further specific armed clashes between both parties have been reported after September 2025, the NIAC did not end due to a prevailing risk of resumption (see above). This is confirmed by an April 2026 report, which confirms the continued presence of EMC-aligned groups and Frente 57 in the disputed areas in Cauca and Valle del Cauca departments.¹⁷

The fighting between the EMC and the Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez continues to equate to protracted armed violence, satisfying the notion of intensity as demanded under IHL.

Organization

As of May 2026, the Frente 57 was led by Luis Carlos Pinilla, alias ‘Óscar Barreto’.¹⁸ At least two senior figures lost their lives in combat between November 2024,¹⁹ and March 2025.²⁰ The senior leadership is experienced in guerrilla activity; Óscar Barreto specifically has over 15 years of fighting experience.²¹Between mid-2025 and May 2026, the group suffered repeated blows to its command and logistics networks. In July 2025, the Frente 57’s second-in-command ‘David Metra’, who trained new members in using weapons, grenades, and explosives, was captured alongside ‘Franciny’, also known as ‘El Italiano’, who was a zone commander responsible for leading the fight against the EMC’s Adán Izquierdo Front.²² David Metra was replaced by ‘Gersain’ also known as ‘Mira Poquito’.²³ In September 2025, the group’s logistical leader ‘Tito’ was arrested together with three other members identified as ‘Virgelio’, ‘Rodolfo’, and ‘Orlando’.²⁴ The capture of Frente 57’s financial head, known as ‘Northon’, and a senior figure known as ‘Jhon’ in October 2025 constituted another significant setback for the group.²⁵ January 2026 saw the arrest of ‘Peña’, also known as ‘Chanclas’, who managed the group’s criminal proceeds and recruited new members.²⁶ In February 2026, a woman responsible for leading the group’s support networks known as ‘La Gorda’ was captured in in Tuluá.²⁷ An alleged leader of Frente 57 support networks known as ‘Gonzalo’ and one of the group’s financial chiefs known as ‘El Negro Isaías’ were arrested in March 2026.²⁸ Another senior financial commander known as ‘Patascuy’ or ‘Santiago’ was captured in April 2026.²⁹ Two senior figures, one responsible for carrying out kidnappings, known as ‘Niche’ or ‘Deibis’, and one involved in managing the group’s finances, known as ‘Meraldo’, were arrested in May 2026.³⁰ Additionally, national security forces destroyed one of Frente 57’s weapons caches in October 2025.³¹. As of March 2026, the group’s second-in-command is reportedly a commander known as ‘Hersain’.³²

Although limited information is publicly available concerning the internal structure of the Frente 57, it is evidenced by the above-mentioned arrests that the group has a leadership structure. This, in turn, means it is able to enforce IHL and discipline its fighters. It is additionally reported that Frente 57 trains its fighters in combat techniques and the handling of explosives.³³ In March 2025, the group’s fighters were reported to number between fifty and eighty, but its influence exceeds this number due to its ability to intimidate and control territory.³⁴ The group exercises control over key territories, such as strategic corridors to the Pacific (via the Naya River), rural zones in central and eastern Valle del Cauca including Tuluá, Sevilla and Bugalagrande, as well as municipalities in northern Cauca including Miranda and Corinto, which is evidence that it meets the requirement of a minimum level of organization.³⁵

The Frente 57 speaks with one voice through its website and an X account on which the group publishes statements, denies government-sourced information and issues ‘recommendations’ to the civilian population, such as prohibiting travel at certain times or using military vehicles.³⁶ The group, as of late 2024, has expanded its means of communication, releasing video and other visual content.³⁷ Additionally, the group operates its own website.³⁸

Clearly, Frente 57 is sufficiently organized as required under IHL.

Both non-state actors engaged in this NIAC are sufficiently organized under IHL. For an analysis of the organization of the EMC, see above.

The pre-existing NIAC between the EMC and the Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez was ongoing during 2025 and 2026.

1
‘National Liberation Army (Colombia)’, Mapping Militants Projects, 3 December 2024. ↩︎
2
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; ‘Central General Staff – Ex-FARC Mafia’, InSight Crime, 14 June 2024. ↩︎
3
‘Central General Staff – Ex-FARC Mafia’, InSight Crime, 14 June 2024. ↩︎
4
‘Iván Mordisco anuncia creación de nuevo Estado Mayor Central en Colombia’, La Opinión, 31 July 2024. ↩︎
5
L. Benito, ‘La estructura del Estado Mayor Central representaría un problema para las negociaciones del Gobierno de Gustavo Petro, advierte informe’, Infobae, 16 October 2023. ↩︎
6
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; H. Shuldiner and S. Saffon, ‘From Total to Partial Peace: Colombia’s Talks With Crime Groups Fragment’, InSight Crime, 3 May 2024. ↩︎
7
M. Benavides Cadena, ‘Nueva disidencia en el Valle, ‘Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez’. ¿Quién la lidera?’, Caracol Radio, 2 April 2024. ↩︎
8
‘Claridades Necesarias’, Frente 57 Yair Bermudez, 10 June 2025. ↩︎
9
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; ‘Disidencias de las FARC-EP: dos caminos de una guerra en construcción – Partes 1 y 2’, Fundación conflict responses, 1 March 2024. ↩︎
10
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025. ↩︎
11
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” is Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 19. ↩︎
12
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; ‘Central General Staff – Ex-FARC Mafia’, InSight Crime, 14 June 2024. ↩︎
13
‘Este es el nuevo frente de las disidencias de las Farc que llegó al norte del Cauca; es comandando por un sanguinario que asesinó a varios cabecillas para llegar al poder’, Semana, 10 August 2024; ‘Colombia’ International Crisis Group. ↩︎
14
‘Colombia’ International Crisis Group; ‘Emergencias humanitarias en Colombia hoy’, Defensoría del pueblo: Colombia, 16 February 2025; F. Calderón, ‘Escamoso y Viejo Comando, las nuevas víctimas de la cruenta guerra entre el frente 57 y las disidencias de las Farc en Corinto’, El País, 19 February 2025; ‘Dos militares heridos enfrentamientos entre el Ejército y el frente 57 Yair Bermúdez’, Informativo del Sur, 18 February 2025. ↩︎
15
‘Una persona murió tras enfrentamientos entre el Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez y disidencias en Toribío’, W Radio, 18 March 2025; P. Naranjo, ‘En medio de combates, motobombas y sin energía eléctrica, indígenas expulsaron a tres disidentes del Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez’, Infobae, 19 March 2025. ↩︎
16
D. Stacey, ‘El asesinato a tiros de un funcionario local profundiza la crisis de violencia en el sur del Valle del Cauca’, El País, 10 September 2025; ‘Anuncian recompensa millonaria por alias “Barreto”, cabecilla del Frente 57 en el Valle’, CW+, 2 March 2026. ↩︎
17
V. Parada Lugo, ‘El terror y la angustia se imponen en el Valle y el Cauca tras la última ola de ataques terroristas’, El País, 29 April 2026. ↩︎
18
A. L. Méndez, ‘Exclusivo: este es el dossier contra ‘Barreto’, el hombre al frente del grupo que se apartó de las disidencias y que retó a ‘Iván Mordisco’ y a ‘Calarcá’’, El Tiempo, 18 July 2024. ↩︎
19
‘Eliminan a cabecilla del frente Yair Bermúdez de disidencia Farc en Tuluá’, El Nuevo Siglo, 1 December 2024. ↩︎
20
A. Mesa, ‘Combates en Sevilla – Valle dejan dos bajas en la estructura Yair Bermúdez del Frente 57 de las FARC’, Caracol Radio, 23 March 2025. ↩︎
21
M. Benavides Cadena, ‘Nueva disidencia en el Valle, ‘Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez’ ¿Quién la lidera?’, Caracol Radio, 2 April 2024. ↩︎
22
‘Strategic Blow to the 57th Front “Yair Bermúdez”’, National Police of Colombia, 4 July 2025. ↩︎
23
‘Leader of the GAOR 57th Front “Yair Bermúdez” captured in Sevilla, Valle del Cauca’, National Police of Colombia, 26 January 2026. ↩︎
24
L. Palomino, ‘Capturado cabecilla del Frente 57 Yaír Bermúdez’, W Radio, 18 September 2025. ↩︎
25
‘Impact on the GAO´R front 57 “Yair Bermúdez”’, National Police of Colombia, 6 October 2025; J. Sánchez Romero, ‘Capturan en Tuluá a cabecilla del Frente 57, señalado de liderar secuestros y ataques contra la fuerza pública y campesinos’, Infobae, 5 October 2025. ↩︎
26
‘Leader of the GAOR 57th Front “Yair Bermúdez” captured in Sevilla, Valle del Cauca’, National Police of Colombia, 26 January 2026; ‘Capturan a alias “Peña” o “Chanclas”, presunto jefe criminal del Frente 57 “Yair Bermúdez” en Sevilla’, Super Noticias Del Valle, 23 January 2026. ↩︎
27
‘Cayó alias La Gorda, presunta cabecilla de la red extorsiva de las disidencias de las Farc’, Noticias RCN, 12 February 2026; ‘Capturada alias ‘La Gorda’ en Tuluá: cae presunta cabecilla del Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez’, Extra, 12 February 2026. ↩︎
28
‘Capturan a alias Gonzalo, presunto cabecilla de redes de apoyo del Frente 57 en Valle del Cauca’, Análisis Urbano, 1 April 2026; ‘A decisive blow to the finances of the 57th Front’, National Police of Colombia, 17 March 2026. ↩︎
29
‘We delivered for Colombia: financial leader of the 57th Front falls, total crackdown on crime in the southwest of the country’, National Police of Colombia, 30 April 2026. ↩︎
30
‘En Cali cayó Niche, cabecilla del GAO-r ‘Yair Bermúdez’’, CW+, 12 May 2026; J. Minota Hurtado, ‘Entre extorsiones y reclutamiento: así operaba alias Meraldo, presunto operador logístico y financiero del Frente 57 ‘Yair Bermúdez’ en Valle’, El Tiempo, 14 May 2026. ↩︎
31
L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Golpe al Frente 57 Yaír Bermúdez: desmantelaron una caleta con poderoso arsenal e intendencia militar en Valle del Cauca’, Infobae, 23 October 2025 ↩︎
32
‘Anuncian recompensa millonaria por alias “Barreto”, cabecilla del Frente 57 en el Valle’, CW+, 2 March 2026. ↩︎
33
‘Strategic Blow to the 57th Front “Yair Bermúdez”’, National Police of Colombia, 4 July 2025. ↩︎
34
‘Así opera el Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez, el grupo armado que genera terror en el Valle’, Extra, 30 March 2025; L. S. Cardona Ruiz, ‘Análisis: Así opera el Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez que genera zozobra en el Valle’, El Pais, 30 March 2025. ↩︎
35
‘Así opera el Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez, el grupo armado que genera terror en el Valle’, Extra, 30 March 2025; L. S. Cardona Ruiz, ‘Análisis: Así opera el Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez que genera zozobra en el Valle’, El Pais, 30 March 2025; J. Pardo, ‘El Ejército y la Policía despliegan operativo masivo contra el Frente 57 de las Farc en Tuluá, Valle’, Infobae, 1 March 2026; J. Gamboa, ‘Autoridades capturan a alias Pirri, presunto cabecilla de las disidencias Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez’, El País, 27 March 2025; L. S. Cardona Ruiz, ‘Análisis: Así opera el Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez que genera zozobra en el Valle’, El País, 30 March 2025. ↩︎
36
‘Así opera el Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez, el grupo armado que genera terror en el Valle’, Extra, 30 March 2025; L. S. Cardona Ruiz, ‘Análisis: Así opera el Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez que genera zozobra en el Valle’, El País, 30 March 2025. ↩︎
37
L. S. Cardona Ruiz, ‘Análisis: Así opera el Frente 57 Yaír Bermúdez que genera zozobra en el Valle’, El País, 30 March 2025; J. V. Cabezas Palacios, ‘Las dinámicas del conflicto en zonas con y sin cese al fuego: studio comparativo de Arauca, Cauca, Caquetá y Meta’, Indepaz, 2025. ↩︎
38
‘Comunicados F57’, Frente 57 Yair Bermudez. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) and the Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC) (formerly Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC))

Background

The pre-existing NIAC between the EMC and the EGC continued throughout 2025 and 2026.¹ The EMC is one of two major ex-FARC-EP dissident groups who have been fighting after refusing to demobilize and accept the 2016 peace deal.² The EMC is the largest of the ex-FARC dissident groups.³ The EMC does not seek to seize power through armed conflict, as the former FARC-EP once did, but rather co-opts local authorities and takes control of the economy.⁴

The EGC was established by dissidents from the AUC who opposed the 2006 demobilization process.⁵ The EGC is considered one of the world’s largest international cocaine distributors.⁶ Similarly, the EMC uses its military wing to dominate key coca-rich territory.⁷ Competition is rife among the EMC, the ELN, and the EGC over illicit commercial enterprise such as the cocaine trade.⁸ The root cause of the NIAC between EMC and the EGC is control of territory that is suitable for cocaine production or permits the easy import and export of cocaine between Venezuela and Colombia.⁹

This factor does not change the classification of the ongoing NIAC between the EMC and EGC.

Intensity

A September 2025 report confirmed that the EMC continued to fight against other armed and criminal groups seeking to gain territorial control in Cauca, Nariño, Putumayo, Caquetá, and Arauca departments, among other regions.¹⁰ Between 28 and 29 November 2025, an intense confrontation including the launching of drones loaded with explosives took place in Remedios municipality in Antioquia department. Local news sources reported that the clash involved the EGC and ‘FARC-dissidents’, but that the ELN was also active in the area. While unconfirmed, it is probable that these FARC-dissidents were EMC-aligned forces due to an ongoing territorial dispute between EGC and EMC in the area. The clash lasted for over twenty-four hours.¹¹

The EMC and the EGC occasionally fight alongside each other against the ELN when it serves their interests to do so.¹² But alliances are fluid in the region and on occasion the ELN and the EMC have combined against the EGC.¹³ Fighting between the three groups heightens the incidence of civilian displacement.¹⁴

The types of weapons used by the EGC include explosive devices and long-range firearms.¹⁵ The EMC not only deploys machine guns, hand grenades, and mines but also drones for airstrikes and aerial bombardment.¹⁶

The EGC has been sufficiently successful in its military operations against the EMC (and the ELN) to gain some of their territory.¹⁷ The territorial stronghold of the EGC is in the Gulf of Arabā, in the departments of Antioquia and Chocó and Córdoba. Displacement figures in these areas, a direct result of the ongoing conflict, are high as of end 2025.¹⁸

The fighting between the EMC and the EGC continues to equate to protracted armed violence, satisfying the notion of intensity as demanded under IHL.

Organization

Both non-State actors engaged in this NIAC are sufficiently organized under IHL. For an analysis of the organization of the EMC and the EGC, see above.

The pre-existing NIAC between the EMC and the EGC was ongoing during 2025 and 2026.

1
Humanitarian Report 2024: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross;‘Humanitarian Challenges 2025: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross. ↩︎
2
J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025. ↩︎
3
‘Country Policy and Information Note: Colombia: Armed Groups and Criminal Gangs’, Gov.UK, November 2024, 39. ↩︎
4
L. Benito, ‘La estructura del Estado Mayor Central representaría un problema para las negociaciones del Gobierno de Gustavo Petro, advierte informe’, Infobae, 16 October 2023. ↩︎
5
L. Schmidt, ‘Power Play or Peace? AGC’s Role in Colombia’s Fragile Negotiations’, InSight Crime, 16 October 2024; ‘Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC) / Gulf Clan’, Colombia Reports, 25 October 2021. ↩︎
6
J. Freixes, ‘Gulf Clan, a History of Death and Crime in Colombia’, Colombia One, 16 February 2025. ↩︎
7
J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025. ↩︎
8
T. Breda, ‘Peace talks in Nariño may be a litmus test for Petro’s bid to end Colombia’s conflict’, ACLED, 12 December 2024. ↩︎
9
‘Gaitanistas – Gulf Clan’, InSight Crime, 18 March 2025. ↩︎
10
E. Dickinson, ‘Los cuatro frentes de batalla del Estado Mayor Central’, La Silla Vacía, 4 September 2025. ↩︎
11
N. Valle David, ‘Habitantes de la casa destruida por un dron con explosivo se salvaron porque no estaban en el lugar’, Caracol Radio, 30 November 2025; N. Valle David, ‘Grupos de guerrilla y EGC se están enfrentando con drones cargados de explosivos en Remedios’, Caracol Radio, 29 November 2025; L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Violencia entre grupos armados y drones explosivos agravan la crisis en el nordeste antioqueño: hay confinamiento y éxodo en Remedios’, Infobae, 30 November 2025. ↩︎
12
N. V. David, ‘Combates entre EGC y disidencias ocasionaron desplazamientos internos en Briceño’, Caracol Radio, 9 November 2024; ‘“Vemos gente saliendo con los corotos”: en 4 municipios de Antioquia viven en zozobra por disputa de grupos armados’, El Colombiano, 16 September 2024. ↩︎
13
‘Guerra en límites entre Antioquia y Bolívar tiene en riesgo a 150.000 personas: alerta Fundación Sumapaz’, El Colombiano, 25 February 2025; J. Franciotti and M. F. Arocha, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean: March 2025’, ACLED, 7 March 2025. ↩︎
14
N. V. David, ‘Combates entre EGC y disidencias ocasionaron desplazamientos internos en Briceño’, Caracol Radio, 9 November 2024. ↩︎
15
S. Olivares Tobón, ‘Confrontaciones dentro de las minas de Buriticá dejaron dos personas lesionadas’, El Colombiano, 2 October 2023. ↩︎
16
‘Drones: new terror tool for Colombian guerrillas’, RFI, 21 June 2024; S. Hide, ‘Drone attacks increasingly affect civilians in Colombia’s conflict’, Latin America reports, 5 March 2025; F. Ramos, ‘[ATTACK] FARC Dissidents Escalate Drone Attacks in Colombia’, Modern insurgent, 20 April 2025. ↩︎
17
‘Country Policy and Information Note: Colombia: Armed Groups and Criminal Gangs’, Gov.UK, November 2024, 30-31. ↩︎
18
‘Humanitarian Challenges 2025: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)

Background

The existing NIAC between the EMC and the ELN continued throughout 2025 and 2026.¹ Initially, the EMC and the ELN fought over coca-rich territory in the northeastern Catatumbo region in Colombia which borders on Venezuela.² The conflict arose due to a power vacuum created when the now defunct FARC-EP signed a peace agreement in 2016.³ The fighting continues with the EMC and the ELN fighting for territorial dominance in coca-rich territory and key trafficking routes, predominantly in Arauca, Antioquia, Catatumbo and Chocó departments.⁴ In other departments, such as Bolívar, the ELN and the EMC have been fighting alongside each other against the EGC.⁵

The classification of the fighting relationship is complicated by the reality that both opposing armed groups, the EMC and the ELN, splintered, but for each, a faction has continued to fight (see version: 27 November 2025).⁶ The EMC, a splinter of the former FARC-EP, further split into two factions during April 2024; one faction retains the moniker EMC (under ‘Iván Mordisco) and is engaging the ELN, while the other faction, the EMBF (under ‘Calarcá), is engaged in peace talks with the government.⁷ In turn, the ELN fragmented on 7 May 2024 into the ELN Central Command (retaining the moniker ELN) and the Comuneros del Sur.⁸ The Colombian government is in peace talks with the Comuneros del Sur, which handed over a share of their arms in April 2025.⁹ ¹⁰

Intensity

Fighting continues between the parties to this ongoing NIAC.¹¹ A selection of clashes which transpired during 2025 and 2026 are highlighted below to illustrate that intensity remains at a level of protracted armed violence.

The January 2025 clashes in the Catatumbo and Norte de Santander regions resulted in considerable internal displacement and at least 100 casualties.¹² The Colombian government declared a state of emergency and stationed 5,000 special forces members in the town of Tibu as a direct result of the January 2025 clash between the EMC and the ELN.¹³ The UN Secretary– General called on the parties to cease attacking civilians.¹⁴

In a surprise move, the ELN and the EMC combined against a common enemy, the EGC, in Antioquia and Bolívar departments in February 2025.¹⁵ However, the ELN and the EMC continued to fight each other in Arauca during the month.¹⁶ This example illustrates the volatility of alliances between these groups.¹⁷

The conflict intensified as the EMC and the ELN continued to fight for territorial dominance throughout March 2025 in the Catatumbo region of Norte de Santander department. According to ACLED, confrontations peaked in March 2025 and were at the highest level since March 2022.¹⁸ Reports of specific clashes during the second half of 2025 and the first half of 2026 were scarce. A September 2025 report indicated that the ELN was fighting the EMC (and the EGC) in departments such as Chocó, Arauca, Cauca, Nariño, Antioquia, and Valle del Cauca.¹⁹ On 20 October 2025, the Colombian Ombudsman’s Office issued a warning to the civilian population in Arauca department due to ongoing fighting between the ELN’s Domingo Laín Sáenz Front and the EMC’s 10^th, 28^th and 45^th fronts.²⁰ In February 2026, InSight Crime reported that the ELN was continuously fighting the EMC in southern and northern Cauca department for control of drug trafficking, illegal mining, and dominance over strategic corridors.²¹ The Ombudsman issued a further warning in March 2026 due to a high probability of fighting between the Che Guevara Western War Front of the ELN and the Jaime Martínez Front of the EMC in El Litoral del San Juan in Chocó department over territorial domination.²² These warnings indicate a high risk of resumption of armed confrontations.

The fighting between the EMC and the ELN continues to equate to protracted armed violence, satisfying the notion of intensity as demanded under IHL.

Organization

Both non-State actors engaged in this NIAC are sufficiently organized under IHL. For an analysis of the organization of the EMC and the ELN, see above.

The pre-existing NIAC between the EMC and the ELN was ongoing during 2025 and 2026.

1
‘Humanitarian Report 2024: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross;‘Humanitarian Challenges 2025: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross. ↩︎
2
‘Colombia seeks to reassert control as rebel fighting kills over 100’, Al Jazeera, 22 January 2025. ↩︎
3
‘Central General Staff – Ex-FARC Mafia’, InSight Crime, 14 June 2024. ↩︎
4
‘Nine Killed as Colombia Guerrillas Clash Despite Peace Talks’, The Defense Post, 5 September 2023; J. Franciotti et al, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean, August 2024’, ACLED, 6 September 2024; ‘14 guerrilleros habrían muerto en combate entre ELN y FARC En zona rural del municipio de Arauquita’, News Radio, 13 August 2024; J. D. Rordríguez, ‘Alerta por desplazamientos en Antioquia por guerra entre el ELN, Clan del Golfo y disidencias de las Farc’, Infobae, 22 September 2024; L. R. Jiménez Valencia, ‘La cruda guerra entre el Eln y el ‘clan del Golfo’ que se ha apoderado de los ríos de Chocó’, El Tiempo, 18 February 2025; J. A. Blanquicet, ‘Atención: nuevas confrontaciones entre el Eln y disidencias en Catatumbo dejan dos heridos’, El Tiempo, 14 February 2025. ↩︎
5
‘Enfrentamientos entre grupos armados ilegales generaron el desplazamiento de 1400 personas en el sur de Bolívar’, Defensoría del pueblo: Colombia, 25 November 2023; ‘Cientos de personas huyen de sus casas en medio de combates de grupos armados en Colombia’, Prensa Mercosur, 27 November 2023; I. Gómez Ramiírez, ‘Álvaro Uribe Vélez: Comunidades reportan combates de grupos armados al sur de Bolívar’, Diario Los Américas, 22 November 2023; J. Franciotti and M. Fernanda Arocha, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean, March 2025’, ACLED, 7 March 2025; ‘Guerra en límites entre Antioquia y Bolívar tiene en riesgo a 150.000 personas: alerta Fundación Sumapaz’, El Colombiano, 25 February 2025. ↩︎
6
See above, under key developments. ↩︎
7
‘Lo que debe saber del grupo armado separado de Iván Márquez que negocia con el Gobierno’, El Espectador, 27 November 2024; UNSC, ‘United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia: Report of the Secretary General’, UN Doc S/2024/986, 26 December 2024. ↩︎
8
‘El Frente Comuneros del Sur, la primera disidencia del ELN’, Cambio, 9 May 2024. ↩︎
9
See above, under key developments. ↩︎
10
‘National Liberation Army (Colombia)’, Mapping Militants Project, 3 December 2024; ‘Colombia recognizes dissident ELN faction as independent organization’, Reuters, 8 May 2024. ↩︎
11
‘Humanitarian Report 2024: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross;‘Humanitarian Challenges 2025: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross. ↩︎
12
‘New bloody guerrilla clashes in Colombia: FARC and ELN fight fierce battles in the north-east’, Defense Magazine, 31 January 2025. ↩︎
13
‘Colombia seeks to reassert control as rebel fighting kills over 100’, Al Jazeera, 22 January 2025. ↩︎
14
‘ELN and FARC dissidents fight for control of Colombia’s Catatumbo’, The City Paper, 18 January 2025. ↩︎
15
‘Guerra en límites entre Antioquia y Bolívar tiene en riesgo a 150.000 personas: alerta Fundación Sumapaz’, El Colombiano, 25 February 2025; J. Franciotti and M. Fernanda Arocha, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean, March 2025’, ACLED, 7 March 2025. ↩︎
16
J. A. Blanquicet, ‘Atención: nuevas confrontaciones entre el Eln y disidencias en Catatumbo dejan dos heridos’, El Tiempo, 14 February 2025; ‘Emergencias humanitarias en Colombia hoy’, Defensoría del pueblo: Colombia, 16 February 2025; C. Mayorga Alejo, ‘La guerra entre Agc y Eln al sur de Chocó mancha el proceso de paz’, Verdad Abierta, 17 February 2024; J. D. Rodríguez, ‘Defensoría del Pueblo alerta por combates del ELN y disidencia de ‘Iván Mordisco’ en Arauca’, Infobae, 23 February 2025. ↩︎
17
J. Franciotti and M. Fernanda Arocha, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean, March 2025’, ACLED, 7 March 2025. ↩︎
18
J. Franciotti and M. Fernanda Arocha, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean, March 2025’, ACLED, 7 March 2025. ↩︎
19
J. Patiño C, ‘Una guerra a muerte: así se disputan los grupos ilegales el territorio’, Cambio, 28 September 2025. ↩︎
20
‘Defensoría del Pueblo emite Alerta Temprana para el departamento de Arauca’, Defensoría del Pueblo Colombia, 20 October 2025. ↩︎
21
M. Fernanda Ramírez and J. Manjarrés, ‘Colombia’s EMC Holds ‘Total Peace’ Hostage in Cauca’, InSight Crime, 11 February 2026. ↩︎
22
‘Defensoría emite Alerta Temprana por riesgo de confrontación armada y confinamiento en El Litoral del San Juan, Chocó’, Defensoría del Pueblo Colombia, 30 March 2026. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) and the Segunda Marquetalia (SM)

Background

The existing NIAC between the EMC and the Segunda Marquetalia(SM),¹ continued during 2025 and 2026. The EMC was founded by dissident fronts of the former FARC-EP unwilling to join the 2016 Colombian Peace Accords.² The EMC established itself as the primary successor to the now demobilized FARC-EP.³ SM, similarly, was formed by dissident members of the former FARC-EP in 2019,⁴ and voiced displeasure with the Government of Colombia for not fulfilling its obligations under the peace accords.⁵

Initially, the EMC and SM maintained a neutral relationship, but they came into conflict in several regions over control of territory for cocaine production and drug-trafficking routes.⁶ The fighting relationship between the EMC and SM is complex, as in certain regions they cooperate whereas in others they are in conflict.⁷

SM split in November 2024, and only 20 per cent of the original membership of the group remained. The new splintered-off group operates under the name Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB) and consists of the Pacific Guerrilleros and the Comandos de la Frontera (Border Commands).⁸

Intensity

SM is equipped with small arms, machine guns, improvised explosive devices, and anti-personnel mines.⁹ The EMC has access to drones, enabling it to use aerial bombardment as a means of warfare.¹⁰ The EMC controls several territories in Colombia and Venezuela as a direct result of the intensity of violence its armed wing generates.¹¹

Little information as to the extent and the nature of each individual clash between the EMC and SM was recorded during 2025 and 2026. The EMC and SM continued to clash over disputed territory in the Caquetá Mountain range, along the Caquetá-Putumayo border, and on the Pacific coast of Nariño.¹² In March 2026, the Colombian Ombudsman’s Office issued a warning about potential armed confrontation between the SM, the EMC, and the EMBF in Huila department.¹³

It is not yet clear what the impact of the November 2024 disintegration of SM has had on the intensity of violence.¹⁴ This situation will be monitored, specifically, attention will be given to whether the factions engage in peace talks or engage in fighting and whether fighting meets the intensity requirement needed to trigger an additional NIAC. The pre-existing NIAC between SM and the EMC has not come to an end, as the SM’s parent group continues to exist and there has not yet been a ‘lasting cessation of armed confrontations without real risk of resumption’.¹⁵

Organization

Luciano Marín, alias Iván Márquez, is the overall leader of SM.¹⁶ Despite several reports of his death, recent intelligence suggests he is operating out of Venezuela.¹⁷ In August 2025, SM’s second-in-command, José Manuel Sierra Sabogal, also known as ‘Zarco Aldinever’ was ambushed and assassinated by the ELN in the border region between Colombia and Venezuela.¹⁸ The group is described as an organization of old guerillas who returned to arms. Several members of the now defunct FARC-EP’s original leadership and fighters joined SM when it was established in 2019.¹⁹

SM has a stable and experienced leadership structure. The overall regional factions originally set up to form SM were the Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacifico (Pacific Guerrilleros), and Comandos de la Frontera (Border Commands).²⁰ Each unit had a defined geographic area of operations.²¹ In November 2024, however, SM experienced an internal disagreement between its overall leader, Iván Márquez, and SM chief negotiator, Walter Mendoza, which led to a split.²² The original SM remains under the control of Iván Márquez, whereas the regional factions Pacific Guerrilleros and Border Commands are now under the leadership of Walter Mendoza in the newly formed CNEB. ²³

Before the November 2024 split, regional factions operated in a decentralised manner but qualified as one party to the conflict due to two directorates that overarched both groups. The first, the National Directorate, serves as SM’s secretariat and is composed of high-ranking leaders and the second is the Intermediate Directorate which serves as the Central General Staff. The National Directorate receives instructions from the SM’s leadership which is based in Venezuela.²⁴ The Intermediate Directorate is in charge of relationships between regional structures and the National Directorate. Also, it exercises authority over urban cells.²⁵

As of December 2024, the military wing of SM was composed of eight guerrilla structures which in turn were composed of subgroups called fronts, companies, columns, commissions, and commandos.²⁶ Other reports suggest that up to fifteen SM units were operational. Each SM unit belonging to a regional faction was responsible for its own funding, logistics and military operations.²⁷ The impact of the November 2024 split on SM’s internal organizational structure remains uncertain.

Further, even before the split in November 2024 the exact internal operations and functions of SM were not entirely clear.²⁸ The three former organizational units announced that SM should improve its treatment of civilians in a joint statement.²⁹ Despite the limited information about its command structure, there is a command structure, and fighters are well trained, bearing in mind that SM is composed mostly of former fighters from the pre-2016 FARC-EP guerrillas.³⁰ Additionally, owing to a very experienced leadership, SM can impose discipline and adhere to IHL.

Further, the fact SM has a presence both in Colombia and Venezuela enhances its logistical capacity which enables the group to engage military tactics.³¹ The group primarily operates in the jungle and mountainous areas along the Venezuelan and Colombian border. Not only does the jungle provide cover, it is also a lucrative region for drug trafficking and illegal mining.³²

SM employs guerrilla tactics in launching military operations.³³ As a transnational criminal enterprise, the tactics of SM’s military wing include armed assaults, assassinations, extortion operations, and hostage-taking.³⁴ A further part of their military tactics is to form alliances with other groups such as the ELN. The practice is not only military cooperation but is also for the purpose of territorial expansion for the movement of drugs.³⁵ After the ELN reportedly assassinated ‘Zarco Aldinever’ in August 2025 (see above), the alliance between SM and ELN is assumed to have ceased. This led SM to regroup in remote areas of the Venezuelan Amazonas state.³⁶

SM has its armed stronghold in the Colombian Vichada and Guainía departments as well as the Venezuelan Amazonas, Bolívar, and Apure states.³⁷ Since the split in November 2024, SM has maintained its headquarters in Venezuela.³⁸

Until the split in November 2024, Walter Mendoza was the chief negotiator of SM.³⁹ Post-split, it is suggested the overall leader, Iván Márquez, speaks on behalf of SM.

Both non-State actors engaged in this NIAC are sufficiently organized under IHL. For an analysis of the organization of the EMC, see above.

As the intensity of the fighting is protracted in nature, the NIAC between the EMC and SM continued to constitute a NIAC as of May 2026-

1
‘Humanitarian Report 2024: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross; ‘Humanitarian Challenges 2025: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross. ↩︎
2
Welt im Konflikt, ‘Remains of the FARC Guerilla (2025)’ Substack, 22 January 2025. ↩︎
3
J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025. ↩︎
4
O. Griffin and L. J. Acosta, ‘In the jungle with the secretive Colombian guerrillas key to country’s future’, The Independent, 21 August 2024. ↩︎
5
J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025; A. Suárez and M. Rueda, ‘Explainer: What are Colombia’s ex-FARC splinter groups?’ AP News, 1 December 2021. ↩︎
6
‘Colombia: combates entre disidentes de FARC dejan 12 muertos’, DW, 2 December 2024; ‘Las 5.000 personas que están sufriendo la guerra de la Segunda Marquetalia y el EMC en Caquetá’, Pares, 23 February 2024; ‘Cinco soldados colombianos resultan heridos en enfrentamientos con disidentes de las FARC’, Swiss Info, 22 July 2024; D. Diaz, ‘El EMC declara “zona de conflicto” a uno de los espacios de reincorporación del Acuerdo de Paz’, El País, 26 June 2024. ↩︎
7
Welt im Konflikt, ‘Remains of the FARC Guerilla (2025)’ Substack, 22 January 2025. ↩︎
8
‘Lo que debe saber del grupo armado separado de Iván Márquez que negocia con el Gobierno’, El Espectador, 27 November 2024; S. Garcia, ‘What an Internal Split Means for Colombia’s Second Marquetalia’, InSight Crime, 27 November 2024. ↩︎
9
J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025. ↩︎
10
L. Williams, ‘Advanced Drone Warfare Emerges in Colombia’, The Rio Times, 16 April 2024; J. Freixes, ‘Armed Drones Used by Illegal Groups in Colombia’, Colombia One, 18 June 2024; D. García, ‘Estado Central Mayor de las FARC amenaza a Colombia con drones con explosivos’, 360 Radio, 10 June 2025. ↩︎
11
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; ‘Central General Staff – Ex-FARC Mafia’, InSight Crime, 14 June 2024. ↩︎
12
‘Thirty-Sixth Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Organization of American States Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS)’, Organization of American States, 2024, 6; ‘Thirty-Seventh Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission of the Organization of American States to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS)’, Organization of American States, 2025, 8. ↩︎
13
C. Bohórquez Ramírez, ‘Supuesta amenaza de la ‘Segunda Marquetalia’ de entrar a 11 municipios del Valle puso en alerta a la región: ¿cuáles son esas poblaciones?’, El Tiempo, 26 March 2026; ‘Por riesgo de disputa armada y violencia selectiva, Defensoría emite Alerta Temprana para Algeciras y Campoalegre, Huila’, Defensoría del Pueblo Colombia, 17 March 2026. ↩︎
14
J. Freixes, ‘Colombia’s Largest Ex-FARC Dissident Group Splits in Two’, Colombia One, 18 November 2024; S. Garcia, ‘What an Internal Split Means for Colombia’s Second Marquetalia’, InSight Crime, 27 November 2024. ↩︎
15
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” is Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 18–19. ↩︎
16
‘Second Marquetalia’, InSight Crime, 5 July 2022; H. Schmutz, ‘Kolumbien: Regierung und Farc-EP Segunda Marquetalia beginnen Friedensdialog’, Amerika21, 19 June 2024. ↩︎
17
J. A. Blanquicet, ‘‘Iván Márquez’ y la última información que se tiene del paradero del jefe de la ‘Segunda Marquetalia’’, El Tiempo, 23 April 2025. ↩︎
18
‘Second Marquetalia’, InSight Crime, 19 August 2025. ↩︎
19
‘Disidencias de las FARC-EP: dos caminos de una guerra en construcción – Partes 1 y 2’, Fundación conflict responses, 1 March 2024; J. C. Garzón et al, ‘Segunda Marquetalia: Disidencias, rearmados y un futuro incierto’, Ideas paz, 7 July 2021. ↩︎
20
‘Disidencias de las FARC-EP: dos caminos de una guerra en construcción – Partes 1 y 2’, Fundación conflict responses, 1 March 2024. ↩︎
21
‘Disidencias de las FARC-EP: dos caminos de una guerra en construcción – Partes 1 y 2’, Fundación conflict responses, 1 March 2024. ↩︎
22
L. J. Acosta, ‘Colombia rebel group Segunda Marquetalia splits, but peace talks go on’, Reuters, 20 November 2024; S. Garcia, ‘What an Internal Split Means for Colombia’s Second Marquetalia’, InSight Crime, 27 November 2024; UNSC, ‘United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia’, UN Doc S/2024/968, 26 December 2024. ↩︎
23
‘Lo que debe saber del grupo armado separado de Iván Márquez que negocia con el Gobierno’, El Espectador, 27 November 2024; S. Garcia, ‘What an Internal Split Means for Colombia’s Second Marquetalia’, InSight Crime, 27 November 2024. ↩︎
24
‘Disidencias de las FARC-EP: dos caminos de una guerra en construcción – Partes 1 y 2’, Fundación conflict responses, 1 March 2024. ↩︎
25
J. C. Garzón et al, ‘Segunda Marquetalia: Disidencias, rearmados y un futuro incierto’, Ideas paz, 7 July 2021. ↩︎
26
J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025. ↩︎
27
‘Disidencias de las FARC-EP: dos caminos de una guerra en construcción – Partes 1 y 2’, Fundación conflict responses, 1 March 2024. ↩︎
28
‘Disidencias de las FARC-EP: dos caminos de una guerra en construcción – Partes 1 y 2’, Fundación conflict responses, 1 March 2024; ‘Second Marquetalia’, InSight Crime, 5 July 2022. ↩︎
29
‘Disidencias de las FARC-EP: dos caminos de una guerra en construcción – Partes 1 y 2’, Fundación conflict responses, 1 March 2024. ↩︎
30
L. Ortiz, ‘Desmantelaron otra caleta con explosivos de la Segunda Marquetalia en Putumayo: encontraron casi 400 artefactos bélicos’, Infobae, 30 April 2024. ↩︎
31
J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025; ‘¿Plomo Es Lo Que Viene? dos años de balance y retos de la Paz Total’, Pares, 16 July 2024. ↩︎
32
‘Second Marquetalia’, InSight Crime, 5 July 2022; L. J. Acosta, ‘Colombia rebel group Segunda Marquetalia splits, but peace talks go on’, Reuters, 20 November 2024. ↩︎
33
O. Griffin and L. J. Acosta, ‘In the jungle with the secretive Colombian guerrillas key to country’s future’, The Independent, 21 August 2024. ↩︎
34
US Department of State, ‘Country Report on Terrorism 2022 – Chapter 5 – Segunda Marquetalia (SM)’, Ecoi.net, 30 November 2023. ↩︎
35
J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025; ‘Disidencias de las FARC-EP: dos caminos de una guerra en construcción – Partes 1 y 2’, Fundación conflict responses, 1 March 2024; ‘Second Marquetalia’, InSight Crime, 5 July 2022. ↩︎
36
‘Second Marquetalia’, InSight Crime, 19 August 2025; ‘A Jungle Heist: Shielding the Amazon from Organised Crime’, International Crisis Group, 13 May 2026; S. Alvarado, ‘Everything for Gold: migration and violence on the Río Negro’, Amazon Underworld, 6 August 2025. ↩︎
37
‘Second Marquetalia’, InSight Crime, 19 August 2025; J. McDermott and S. Dudley, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, February 2025. ↩︎
38
J. A. Blanquicet, ‘‘Iván Márquez’ y la última información que se tiene del paradero del jefe de la ‘Segunda Marquetalia’’, El Tiempo, 23 April 2025. ↩︎
39
‘La disidencia de Segunda Marquetalia confirma que ‘Iván Márquez’ está vivo: “Se comunica con nosotros”’, Europa Press, 4 November 2024. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between Colombia and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC)

Background

The pre-existing¹ NIAC between Colombia and the EMC continued into 2026.² The EMC is the largest dissident group of the former FARC-EP and self-identifies as its successor.³ It was founded in mid-2017 after the group rejected the peace negotiations accepted by the parent (and now defunct) FARC-EP group in 2016.⁴ At that time, Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández, also known as ‘Iván Mordisco’, opted not to take part in the negotiations, instead holding on to his command of around 400 members of the former FARC-EP and maintaining control of drug trafficking routes in several south-eastern Colombian regions.⁵

In 2022, the EMC entered into peace negotiations with the government following Gustavo Petro’s inauguration as president, but the negotiation process was marked by significant challenges.⁶ In late 2023, the Colombian National Army advanced in the Cauca region, a stronghold of the EMC, which caused rifts within the criminal group.⁷ The group then broke up. The faction under Ivan Mordisco after the split then disengaged from peace talks with the government while the other faction of the EMC (the EMBF) continued negotiations with the government.⁸ Repeated efforts by the Colombian Government to achieve a peace deal with the EMC have not been successful.⁹ Clashes between the two parties were particularly frequent in the departments of Cauca and Valle del Cauca.¹⁰

Intensity

The Colombian National Army and EMC continued to clash frequently throughout 2025 and 2026.¹¹ Multiple clashes were reported during March,¹² April,¹³ May,¹⁴ June,¹⁵ July,¹⁶ August,¹⁷ September,¹⁸ October,¹⁹ November,²⁰ and December 2025.²¹ Clashes continued in 2026, including in March,²² April,²³ and May.²⁴

In late 2024, President Petro ordered an aerial campaign,²⁵ as part of ‘Operation Perseus’ in an attempt to regain control over El Plateado, an EMC stronghold in the municipality of Argelia.²⁶ Several Colombian National Army divisions were also involved, along with the National Police and special forces units.²⁷ The biggest air operation of Petro’s Presidency was conducted on 11 November 2025 by the Colombian Air Force against EMC camps in Calamar municipality (Guaviare department) where high level leadership was suspected to be operating. These airstrikes caused twenty casualties.²⁸ The Colombian Air Force continued air strikes on 13 November 2025, this time against EMC strongholds in Puerto Rondón (Arauca department) resulting in at least eight casualties.²⁹ More government air strikes were launched on 10 March 2026; this time, coordinated aerial operations were executed in six different departments including the Ituango area (Antioquia department).³⁰ The Colombian government’s increasing reliance on aerial bombardment continued to escalate in the latter half of 2025 until the end of reporting in May 2026. This choice of means and methods reflects the fact that the EMC holds stable control over territory which government ground forces have failed to successfully combat, leading to a change in the Colombian National Army’s tactics.³¹ The frequency and nature of military operations launched by the EMC clearly show that this group plans its military operations. Such planned attacks meet the requirement under Article (1)1 of Additional Protocol II that attacks are to be concerted in nature.³²

It is difficult to determine the death toll as neither the EMC nor the media reported the losses incurred by the EMC in the majority of the clashes that took place. The media did, however, frequently report on the death of soldiers involved in these clashes. On 11 March 2025, the EMC used a remotely detonated bomb against a vehicle transporting soldiers in Balboa municipality, killing five soldiers and leaving another sixteen wounded.³³ During April 2025, six soldiers were killed.³⁴ On 12 August 2025, drone strikes by the EMC against infantry Battalion N.56 and personnel of Marine Battalion N.24 located in Buenaventura killed three soldiers and left four soldiers seriously injured. Commercial drones were weaponized by attaching improvised explosive devices that were akin to mortar type grenades to the drones.³⁵ Another drone attack launched during April 2026 employed a swarming technique and injured two Colombian soldiers.³⁶ On 7 May 2026, five Colombian soldiers were injured during an EMC drone attack in Morales municipality (Cauca department).³⁷ Further, an armed confrontation between the EMC and the Colombian military on 14 May 2026 in Belalcázar (Cauca department) killed least six EMC fighters.³⁸

Internal displacement figures from territories where the EMC fought the Colombian National Army remain high.³⁹ The EMC, however, does not fight only against the Colombian National Army, and other organized armed groups also engage in combat in some of these territories. As such, it is impossible to attribute a percentage of internally displaced persons directly to the fighting between the EMC and the Colombian National Army. Reports do, however, suggest that clashes between the EMC and the Colombian National Army which occurred in Valle del Cauca on 22 July 2025 led directly to the displacement of 320 people.⁴⁰

The Colombian Air Force increasingly employed aerial strikes against the EMC during 2025 and 2026.⁴¹ In response, the EMC has acquired drone technology, using remotely piloted aircraft in several attacks, dropping explosive devices, including grenades, on its military targets.⁴² On 25 August 2025, the EMC employed drone attacks against a military vessel patrolling Naya river in Buenaventura (Valle del Cauca department) killing three soldiers.⁴³ The EMC has also used explosives called ‘tatucos’ against the Colombian National Army.⁴⁴ Tatucos are improvised explosives that need to be activated from a ramp and are often cylinder or car bombs that require remote or timed ignition.⁴⁵

The nature of the military opposition posed by the EMC enabled by territory under its control has led the Colombian National Army to increasingly deploy soldiers in areas controlled by the EMC. For example, the deployment of 400 soldiers in March 2025 in the districts of Huisitó, Playa Rica, Juntas, Fondas, and Pandiguando, in the municipality of El Tambo, Cauca.⁴⁶

It is clear that the notion of intensity demanded under IHL is met in the armed violence between Colombian National Army and the EMC. The frequency, high intensity, and planned nature of the attacks initiated by the EMC illustrates the ability of the EMC to launch sustained and concerted military operations from territory under its control as required by Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II to trigger its application.⁴⁷

Organization

The EMC has a decentralized structure to its leadership with commanders in charge of different factions that fight in certain geographic areas. Individual commanders exercise control over the Jorge Suárez Briceño Bloc, Commander Gentil Duarte bloc, the Magdalena Medio Bloc, and the Carolina Ramírez Front.⁴⁸ In April 2024, the EMC fractured, with sixty per cent of the fighters remaining with the original group under the command of Iván Mordisco. The remaining forty per cent are now led by Alexander Díaz Mendoza, alias ‘Calarcá’, and carry out activities under the name of EMBF.⁴⁹ After the EMC disengaged from peace talks with the government in April 2024 following their split from EMBF, it internally restructured, and several of its blocs – the Western Bloc, the Amazonas Bloc, the Isais Pardo Bloc and the Eastern Joint Command – were brought under the command of different leaders.⁵⁰

As well as a decentralized command structure for various geographically dispersed battalions, the EMC has a secretariat and a central command which oversees the battalions.⁵¹ Other reports, however, suggest that Iván Mordisco has absolute control over the EMC and that the command is not effectively decentralized.⁵² In the second half of 2025, reports emerged of growing in-fighting within the EMC.⁵³

The group has rules that inform its disciplinary system. The EMC imposes a strict code of conduct and exercises social control in the communities under its influence and prohibits crimes such as rape and robbery. Its command structure permits the existence of internal disciplinary systems in each of the decentralised regional command units and this practice further facilitates a capacity to implement IHL.⁵⁴ EMC fighters receive intensive military training,⁵⁵ which facilitates their training in IHL. EMC recruits learn, among other skills, how to handle explosive-laden drones.⁵⁶ The EMC’s sophisticated leadership structure is akin to responsible command which in turn enables the EMC to have the ability to implement Additional Protocol II.

It is a part of the military tactics of the EMC to form alliances to execute military operations. The practice is not without a challenge in that the EMC battalions in various regions may be fighting an armed group which is part of an alliance elsewhere.⁵⁷ Under mounting pressure by government military operations and air strikes since mid-2025 (see above), the EMC has, in recent months, increasingly relied on a strategy of generating fear through terrorist attacks, asymmetric attacks, and by using weaponry that lacks the capacity to carry out precise strikes against specific targets.⁵⁸ Additionally, the EMC is among a growing number of groups that use the civilian population in their struggle for territorial control, for example, by forcing the civilian population into detaining soldiers thereby exploiting civilians as ‘human shields’.⁵⁹ Military tactics employed by the EMC reached a new level of technological sophistication during April 2026 when the EMC started deploying at least fifteen DJI Mavic 4 Pro Model drones in a swarm formation against the Colombian Defence Forces. The swarm formation made it challenging for the Colombian army to respond. It is reported that ‘the saturation of low-cost and high-manoeuvrability air threats made it difficult to neutralize the devices, increasing the risk for the military deployed in open areas’.⁶⁰ The EMC is thus embracing low-cost technology to adjust their military tactics against the Colombian Armed Forces. The EMC controls several militarily important corridors as well as territory in several municipalities and along the Venezuelan border, all of which enhances its logistical capacity.⁶¹ It funds its military activities using some of the profits from its criminal activities which include drug trafficking, illegal gold mining, extortion, kidnappings, contraband and money laundering.⁶² The EMC experienced a general decrease in drug trafficking revenues in late 2025 and early 2026 primarily due to increased seizures by the Colombian authorities.⁶³

Often, forced recruitment is employed to ensure full strength in the ranks of the military wing. The EMC also heavily relies on the recruitment of children, with minors making up thirty-seven per cent of the group’s fighters, according to Colombia’s Minister of Defence.⁶⁴ Without pay, and in many cases without any training or equipment, these children are often used to serve as ‘human shields’ to protect the group’s most important commanders from attacks⁶⁵ or as ‘cannon fodder’.⁶⁶Figures provided by the Colombian Ministry of Defence suggest that EMC membership is growing, its ranks growing from 3,545 in 2022 to 3,860 in the first half of 2023.⁶⁷ Reports suggest that as of December 2024, the group had 6,000 fighters in its military wing.⁶⁸ But according to a recent Critical Threat Capabilities Assessment carried out by the Public Force in Colombia, as of July 2025 the EMC had 3,919 members.⁶⁹

The EMC speaks with one voice through Andrey Avendaño (an alias) who, at the time of reporting, was the group’s spokesperson and chief negotiator.⁷⁰ The EMC’s Secretariat also publishes communications. On 18 February 2026, it issued a letter notifying the UN verification mission, the Mission to Support the Peace Process of the Organization of American States (MAPP-OAS), and the Colombian Ombudsman’s Office that their access would be restricted in territories where the EMC operates, due to an alleged breakdown of trust and ‘serious violations of neutrality’ by these organizations.⁷¹

Territorial control is an organizational criterion under Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II.⁷² The EMC has its stronghold in the Amazon region, including in the departments of Guaviare, Meta, Caquetá, Vaupés and Guainía.⁷³ As of early 2026, the EMC expanded its influence into Cauca department.⁷⁴ The EMC controls areas which are key access points to the Colombian Massif such as the areas of El Boquerón, Mata de Puro, Lerma and La Parada.⁷⁵ The EMC’s territorial control between July in certain territories extends to traditional governmental functions such as the building and maintenance of clinics, roads and bridges.⁷⁶ The EMC expanded its territorial control between July 2023 and June 2025 to include eight new municipalities in the Colombian Massif which includes parts of Bolívar, Sucre, Almaguer, La Vega, Rosas, La Sierra, San Sebastián and Santa Rosa, all in the department of Cauca.⁷⁷ As of end 2025, the EMC operated in 133 municipalities and had consolidated its presence in Amazonas, Huila, Tolima, Valle del Cauca, Antioquia, and Southern Bolívar departments.⁷⁸

The organizational structure of the EMC is sophisticated and complies with the four organizational requirements under Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. Hence, the NIAC between Colombian National Army and the EMC constitutes an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC.

1
‘Humanitarian Report 2024: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross; ‘Humanitarian Challenges 2025: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross. ↩︎
2
‘Iván Mordisco, el líder de las disidencias de las FARC que vuelve al ruedo en Colombia’, Sputnik: Mundo, 23 May 2023. ↩︎
3
M. Pérez Gallardo, ‘El Gobierno colombiano lanza la ‘Operación Perseo’ contra disidentes de las FARC’, France 24, 13 October 2024. ↩︎
4
K. Johnson, ‘¿Cómo funciona internamente la disidencia del Estado Mayor Central de las FARC?’, Fundación conflict responses, 5 June 2023; C. Cohecha, ‘Colombia, EMC armed group begin peace process, suspend offensive actions’, Reuters, 9 October 2023. ↩︎
5
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; ‘Central General Staff – Ex-FARC Mafia’, InSight Crime, 14 June 2024. ↩︎
6
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; H. Shuldiner and S. Saffon, ‘From Total to Partial Peace: Colombia’s Talks With Crime Groups Fragment’, InSight Crime, 3 May 2024. ↩︎
7
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; H. Shuldiner and S. Saffon, ‘From Total to Partial Peace: Colombia’s Talks With Crime Groups Fragment’, InSight Crime, 3 May 2024; O. M. López, ‘Comandante del Ejército ratificó operaciones contra disidencias hasta llegar a El Plateado en Argelia, Cauca’, Infobae, 29 August 2023. ↩︎
8
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; H. Shuldiner and S. Saffon, ‘From Total to Partial Peace: Colombia’s Talks With Crime Groups Fragment’, InSight Crime, 3 May 2024. ↩︎
9
C. Cohecha, ‘Colombia, EMC armed group begin peace process, suspend offensive actions’, Reuters, 9 October 2023; M. Pérez Gallardo, ‘El Gobierno colombiano lanza la ‘Operación Perseo’ contra disidentes de las FARC’, France 24, 13 October 2024; ‘Gobierno de Colombia suspende cese al fuego con una parte del EMC’, Voice of America, 16 July 2024; R. Cué Barberena, ‘El Gobierno colombiano finaliza tregua con el EMC, aunque la mantiene con algunas facciones’, France 24, 17 July 2024. ↩︎
10
‘Un disidente de las FARC muere en un enfrentamiento con el Ejército en Colombia’, Swiss Info, 24 June 2024; F. Agudelo, ‘Así fue como el frente Carlos Patiño de las disidencias de las Farc ejecutó el ataque en contra de tropas del Ejército en Balboa, Cauca’, Infobae, 15 March 2025; ‘Diez disidentes de las Farc murieron en el Cauca: cuidaban la “retaguardia” de la estructura Carlos Patiño’, Semana, 5 March 2025; V. Parada Lugo, ‘La Defensoría del Pueblo confirma la liberación de los 29 integrantes de la Fuerza Pública retenidos en El Plateado’, El Pais, 9 March 2025; J. Ríos Monroy, ‘El Plateado: así opera por dentro la disidencia de FARC que Petro ordenó destruir’, El Espectador, 13 March 2025; ‘Siete muertos en múltiples ataques con disparos y explosivos de guerrilleros en Colombia’, RFI, 10 June 2025 (Updated 11 June 2025). ↩︎
11
‘Colombia anuncia inicio de negociaciones de paz con disidentes de FARC’, Swiss info, 13 March 2023. ↩︎
12
‘Diez disidentes de las Farc murieron en el Cauca: cuidaban la “retaguardia” de la estructura Carlos Patiño’, Semana, 5 March 2025; J. Ríos Monroy, ‘El Plateado: así opera por dentro la disidencia de FARC que Petro ordenó destruir’, El Espectador, 13 March 2025; F. Agudelo, ‘Así fue como el frente Carlos Patiño de las disidencias de las Farc ejecutó el ataque en contra de tropas del Ejército en Balboa, Cauca’, Infobae, 15 March 2025. ↩︎
13
‘Latin America & Caribbean’, International Crisis Group; L. C. Fuentes, ‘Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean: April 2025’, ACLED, 3 April 2025; ‘Muere el jefe de una disidencia de las FARC en enfrentamientos con el Ejército en Colombia’, Swiss info, 9 April 2025; ‘Mueren seis militares colombianos en un ataque de la facción del EMC de las FARC en el sudeste de Colombia’, Infobae, 27 April 2025. ↩︎
14
‘«Triste muerte para un colombiano»: Petro lamentó baja de guerrillero en combates en el Meta’, Vive el Meta, 17 May 2025; N. R. Matta Colorado, ‘Murió “Gato Feo”, el azote de bases militares en Meta’, El Colombiano, 15 May 2025; M. F. Tarazona Martínez, ‘Petro afirma que “Iván Mordisco cayó herido en combate y por días estuvo herido en la selva”’, La FM, 31 May 2025; ‘Cuatro militares colombianos resultan heridos por ataque con drones de disidentes de FARC’, Swiss Info, 24 May 2025. ↩︎
15
A. Alsema, ‘At least three killed in wave of bomb attacks in southwest Colombia’, Colombia Reports, 10 June 2025; ‘At least 7 killed in explosions and attacks outside police stations in southwest Colombia’, AP News, 11 June 2025; ‘At least seven dead and 50 wounded as Colombia hit with bombings and gun attacks’, The Guardian, 10 June 2025; K. Johnson, ‘Ataques en Cauca y Valle: ¿otra ronda de lo mismo’, Razon Publica, 15 June 2025;‘Siete muertos en múltiples ataques con disparos y explosivos de guerrilleros en Colombia’, RFI, 10 June 2025 (Updated 11 June 2025); ‘Latin America & Caribbean’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
16
‘Colombia: Combates soldados y ex FARC dejan 320 desplazados’, Al Momento, 26 July 2025 ↩︎
17
‘Terror Attacks Across Colombia Kill 19, Injure 70 in Cali and Antioquia’, The City Paper, 21 August 2025; E. Jaramillo Bernat, ‘At least six dead and more than 60 injured in attack on military base in Cali’, El País, 22 August 2025; ‘Ataque con drones deja tres militares muertos y cuatro heridos en Buenaventura’, El Espectador, 13 August 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, August 2025; S. T. Sánchez, ‘Liberados los 34 soldados que permanecían retenidos en Guaviare’, El País, 29 August 2025 ↩︎
18
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, September 2025 ↩︎
19
F. Calderón, ‘Nuevos ataques a la Fuerza Pública en el Cauca dejan un policía y un militar heridos’, El País, 19 October 2025; ‘Dos policías resultaron heridos tras atentado con carro-bomba contra estación de Policía de El Estrecho, Cauca’, El Heraldo, 20 October 2025; ‘Atentado con carro bomba en El Patía, Cauca, dejó tres policías heridos’, El Espectador, 20 October 2025 ↩︎
20
M. Delcas, ‘Colombia faces controversy after an airstrike on an armed group with minors’, Le Monde, 21 November 2025; ‘Colombian bombing raid shows why dialogue is only path to peace’, Justice for Colombia, 21 November 2025; M. Fernanda Ramírez and J. Manjarrés, ‘Colombia’s EMC Holds ‘Total Peace’ Hostage in Cauca’, InSight Crime, 11 February 2026; M. Rueda, ‘Human rights office calls on Colombia to suspend airstrikes after confirming 5 deaths of children’, Associated Press, 18 November 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, November 2025 ↩︎
21
‘Menores víctimas de reclutamiento habrían participado en ataque de disidencias en Buenos Aires, Cauca: mindefensa’, El Heraldo, 17 December 2025; S. Vargas, ‘Ataque en Buenos Aires, Cauca: la cronología de un día de terror’, Kienyke, 17 December 2025. ↩︎
22
El Tiempo, ‘Petro’s government orders bombing against dissidents of the 18th front in rural area of Ituango’, YouTube, 10 March 2026; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, March 2026; ‘Colombia: seis disidentes de las FARC mueren en combates’, Deutsche Welle, 27 March 2026 ↩︎
23
L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Colombia registró el primer ataque con enjambre de drones contra el Ejército en Valle del Cauca’, Infobae, 12 April 2026; E. Saumeth, ‘Colombia registra el primer ataque con enjambre de drones contra el Ejército’, Info Defensa, 11 April 2026; ‘Explota carro bomba cerca de base militar en Cali, Colombia’, Quadratin Michoacán, 24 April 2026; ‘At least 20 killed in Colombia highway blast’, Al Jazeera, 28 April 2026; ‘Bomb blast on Colombia highway leaves 21 dead amid pre-election violence’, The Guardian, 27 April 2026 ↩︎
24
‘Heridos cinco militares en un ataque achacado a las disidencias de las FARC en el departamento de Cauca’, Infobae, 7 May 2026; ‘Al menos seis disidentes de las FARC mueren en un combate con el Ejército colombiano’, Swiss Info, 15 May 2026. ↩︎
25
Gustavo Petro, X, 12 October 2024. ↩︎
26
‘Petro ordenó bombardear a disidentes de las FARC tras ataque con drones’, Cooperativa, 12 October 2024. ↩︎
27
‘Fuerzas Militares lanzan Operación Perseo para recuperar El Plateado – Cauca’, Comando general: Fuerza militares de Colombia, 12 October 2024. ↩︎
28
M. Delcas, ‘Colombia faces controversy after an airstrike on an armed group with minors’, Le Monde, 21 November 2025; ‘Colombian bombing raid shows why dialogue is only path to peace’, Justice for Colombia, 21 November 2025. ↩︎
29
R. Muñoz-Ledo, ‘Petro ordena bombardeo contra un jefe de las disidencias de las FARC en la frontera con Venezuela’, CNN, 13 November 2025; M. Rueda, ‘Human rights office calls on Colombia to suspend airstrikes after confirming 5 deaths of children’, Associated Press, 18 November 2025; K. Carrero, et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: December 2025’, ACLED, 8 December 2025. ↩︎
30
El Tiempo, ‘Petro’s government orders bombing against dissidents of the 18th front in rural area of Ituango’, YouTube, 10 March 2026; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, March 2026. ↩︎
31
K. Johnson, et al, ‘El poder armado en expansión Entre el fortalecimiento y la fragmentación de los grupos armados en Colombia’, Fundación Conflict Responses. ↩︎
32
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para1.40. ↩︎
33
J. D. Rodríguez, ‘5 militares muertos y 16 más heridos, 3 de gravedad, deja atentado en Balboa (Cauca)’, Infobae, 12 March 2025; F. Agudelo, ‘Así fue como el frente Carlos Patiño de las disidencias de las Farc ejecutó el ataque en contra de tropas del Ejército en Balboa, Cauca’, Infobae, 15 March 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
34
‘Mueren seis militares colombianos en un ataque de la facción del EMC de las FARC en el sudeste de Colombia’, Infobae, 27 April 2025; ‘Seis militares mueren en una emboscada en Colombia’, DW, 28 April 2025. ↩︎
35
‘Ataque con drones deja tres militares muertos y cuatro heridos en Buenaventura’, El Espectador, 13 August 2025; C. Bohórquez Ramírez, ‘Identifican a los 3 militares asesinados y 4 heridos, tras ataque con drones en el Naya: Ejército atribuyó el hecho al frente ‘Jaime Martínez’’, El Tiempo, 12 August 2025. ↩︎
36
W. Pitre Ariza, ‘Registran primer ataque con enjambre de 15 drones contra el Ejército en Jamundí: dos militares heridos’, El Tiempo, 12 April 2026; E. Saumeth, ‘Colombia registra el primer ataque con enjambre de drones contra el Ejército’, Info Defensa, 11 April 2026. ↩︎
37
‘Heridos cinco militares en un ataque achacado a las disidencias de las FARC en el departamento de Cauca’, Infobae, 7 May 2026. ↩︎
38
‘Al menos seis disidentes de las FARC mueren en un combate con el Ejército colombiano’, Swiss Info, 15 May 2026. ↩︎
39
‘Colombia: Population Movement (internal displacement) – DREF Operation update (MDRCO029)’, Reliefweb, 21 July 2025; ‘Humanitarian Challenges 2025: Colombia’, International Committee of the Red Cross; ‘ACAPS Thematic Report: Colombia – Anticipated implications of US stop-work orders and subsequent cuts (16 April 2025)’, Reliefweb, 16 April 2025. ↩︎
40
‘Colombia: Combates soldados y ex FARC dejan 320 desplazados’, Al Momento, 26 July 2025. ↩︎
41
‘Ejército Nacional refuerza operaciones en Huisitó, Cauca, con más de 400 soldados’, Defensa, 25 March 2025; L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Golpe contundente contra disidencias de las Farc en Argelia, Cauca: 15 subversivos fueron neutralizados’, Infobae, 25 April 2024; J. Ownby, ‘Drones que lanzan bombas: la nueva etapa del conflicto colombiano’, El Pais, 19 June 2024. ↩︎
42
H. Shuldiner and S. Garcia, ‘High-Level Attack Punctuates Security Crisis in Southwestern Colombia’, InSight Crime, 16 June 2024; L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Atacan con drones a militares en Argelia, Cauca: hay varios heridos’, Infobae, 12 June 2024; J. Ownby, ‘Drones que lanzan bombas: la nueva etapa del conflicto colombiano’, El Pais, 19 June 2024; J. Bernal, ‘Sigue la violencia en el Cauca: este lunes se reportan fuertes combates entre Ejército y Disidencias en Argelia’, Infobae, 17 June 2024. ↩︎
43
C. Bohórquez Ramírez, ‘Identifican a los 3 militares asesinados y 4 heridos, tras ataque con drones en el Naya: Ejército atribuyó el hecho al frente ‘Jaime Martínez’’, El Tiempo, 12 August 2025; ‘Ataque con drones deja tres militares muertos y cuatro heridos en Buenaventura’, El Espectador, 13 August 2025. ↩︎
44
J. C. Rodríguez Parrado, ‘Dos soldados fueron asesinados por las disidencias de las Farc en zona rural de Silvia, Cauca’, Infobae, 6 May 2024. ↩︎
45
‘The constant danger of explosive hazards’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 27 March 2025. ↩︎
46
‘Ejército Nacional refuerza operaciones en Huisitó, Cauca, con más de 400 soldados’, Defensa, 25 March 2025. ↩︎
47
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases; M. M. Bradley, ‘Additional Protocol II: Elevating the minimum threshold of intensity?’, International Review of the Red Cross, 2020; A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para1.40. ↩︎
48
‘¿En que está el “EMC” actualmente?’, Fundación conflict responses, 25 April 2024; H. Shuldiner and S. Saffon, ‘From Total to Partial Peace: Colombia’s Talks With Crime Groups Fragment’, InSight Crime, 3 May 2024; J. P. Contreras Ríos, ‘Así nació el grupo que se separó de Mordisco y que ahora negocia la paz con’, El Espectador, 4 December 2024. ↩︎
49
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025. ↩︎
50
‘¿En que está el “EMC” actualmente?’, Fundación conflict responses, 25 April 2024; ‘Mordisco está fuera de la mesa de diálogos, confirma jefe negociador del Gobierno’, El Espectador, 16 April 2024; S. Vanegas, ‘Cuánto poder tiene en Colombia el Estado Mayor Central, la disidencia de las FARC contra la que Petro declaró una “ofensiva total”’, BBC News Mundo, 23 May 2024. ↩︎
51
K. Johnson, ‘¿Cómo funciona internamente la disidencia del Estado Mayor Central de las FARC?’, El Espectador, 5 June 2023; ‘Disidencias de las FARC-EP: dos caminos de una guerra en construcción – Partes 1 y 2’, Fundación Conflict Responses, 1 March 2024. ↩︎
52
H. Shuldiner and S. Saffon, ‘From Total to Partial Peace: Colombia’s Talks With Crime Groups Fragment’, InSight Crime, 3 May 2024. ↩︎
53
E. Dickinson, ‘Los cuatro frentes de batalla del Estado Mayor Central’, La Silla Vacía, 4 September 2025; K. Johnson, et al, ‘El poder armado en expansión Entre el fortalecimiento y la fragmentación de los grupos armados en Colombia’, Fundación Conflict Responses; S. Vargas Rueda, ‘Estos fueron los grupos armados que más han crecido en Colombia: pasaron de 13.000 miembros en el 2018 a más de a 27.000 en 2025’, Infobae, 14 May 2026. ↩︎
54
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; A. P. R, et al, ‘El Proyecto “Estado Mayor Central”: Un intento de unificación disidente’, Ideaspaz, October 2023. ↩︎
55
J. C. Villaquirán Úsuga, ‘Así funcionan los campos de entrenamiento de las disidencias de ‘Iván Mordisco’’, El Pais, 26 November 2024; ‘Exclusivo: así son las ‘escuelas’ de enfermería y entrenamiento de las disidencias de Iván Mordisco’, Semana, 25 November 2024; ‘Las ‘escuelas’ de la muerte del temido Iván Mordisco: SEMANA revela imágenes secretas de los campos de entrenamiento para los menores de edad’, Semana, 23 November 2024. ↩︎
56
J. C. Villaquirán Úsuga, ‘Así funcionan los campos de entrenamiento de las disidencias de ‘Iván Mordisco’’, El Pais, 26 November 2024; ‘Exclusivo: así son las ‘escuelas’ de enfermería y entrenamiento de las disidencias de Iván Mordisco’, Semana, 25 November 2024. ↩︎
57
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025. ↩︎
58
E. Dickinson, ‘Los cuatro frentes de batalla del Estado Mayor Central’, La Silla Vacía, 4 September 2025. ↩︎
59
E. Dickinson, ‘Los cuatro frentes de batalla del Estado Mayor Central’, La Silla Vacía, 4 September 2025; J. A. Blanquicet, ‘Liberan a los 33 soldados que estuvieron más de 70 horas secuestrados en Guaviare’, El Tiempo, 28 August 2025. ↩︎
60
L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Colombia registró el primer ataque con enjambre de drones contra el Ejército en Valle del Cauca’, Infobae, 12 April 2026. ↩︎
61
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025. ↩︎
62
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; ‘Disidencias de las FARC-EP: dos caminos de una guerra en construcción – Partes 1 y 2’, Fundación conflict responses, 1 March 2024. ↩︎
63
E. Dickinson, ‘Los cuatro frentes de batalla del Estado Mayor Central’, La Silla Vacía, 4 September 2025. ↩︎
64
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025; UNSC, ‘United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia’, UN Doc S/2025/188, 27 March 2025: ‘Kids on the Front Lines: Stopping Child Recruitment in Colombia’, International Crisis Group, 12 February 2026; J. A. Blanquicet, ‘Mindefensa revela que el 37 % de las disidencias de ‘Iván Mordisco’ estarían integradas por menores combatientes’, El Tiempo, 10 December 2025. ↩︎
65
‘November Trends and December Alerts: Latin America and Caribbean’, International Crisis Group, November 2025 ↩︎
66
E. Dickinson, ‘Los cuatro frentes de batalla del Estado Mayor Central’, La Silla Vacía, 4 September 2025; E. Dickinson, ‘Colombia’s Stolen Children: Bogotá Must Do More to Stop Armed Groups From Recruiting Minors’, Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2025. ↩︎
67
S. Rodríguez Álvarez, ‘Cifras secretas del gobierno confirman que todos los grupos armados crecieron’, La Silla Vacía, 13 March 2024. ↩︎
68
J. P. Contreras Ríos, ‘Así nació el grupo que se separó de Mordisco y que ahora negocia la paz con’, El Espectador, 4 December 2024. ↩︎
69
‘Lo que dicen las nuevas cifras sobre el aumento de integrantes de grupos armados en Colombia’, Ideas Paz, 9 November 2025. ↩︎
70
P. Carrillo, ‘Inicia en Colombia un nuevo intento de paz con la disidencia de las FARC’, RFI, 17 October 2023; D. M. Rodríguez Sevilla, ‘Excomandantes de las Farc encabezados por ‘Timochenko’, hoy líder de Comunes, no entregaron todos los bienes que recibieron ilegalmente en la guerrilla, dijo cabecilla de las disidencias’, Infobae, 30 December 2024. ↩︎
71
J. Sánchez Romero, ‘Estas son las implicaciones de las restricciones territoriales impuestas por ‘Mordisco’ a la misiones humanitarias, según analista’, Infobae, 18 March 2026. ↩︎
72
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases. ↩︎
73
J. Sampier, M. R. Tortosa and E. Breyne, ‘Mapping and Profiling the Most Threatening Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean’, El Paccto, 2025. ↩︎
74
M. Fernanda Ramírez and J. Manjarrés, ‘Colombia’s EMC Holds ‘Total Peace’ Hostage in Cauca’, InSight Crime, 11 February 2026. ↩︎
75
J. P. C., ‘El conflicto en el Macizo Colombiano: ¿un nuevo frente de guerra en el país?’, Cambio, 3 July 2025. ↩︎
76
‘Colombia calls off ceasefire with some units of EMC armed group’, Reuters, 16 July 2024. ↩︎
77
J. P. C., ‘El conflicto en el Macizo Colombiano: ¿un nuevo frente de guerra en el país?’, Cambio, 3 July 2025. ↩︎
78
K. Johnson, et al, ‘El poder armado en expansión Entre el fortalecimiento y la fragmentación de los grupos armados en Colombia’, Fundación Conflict Responses; S. Vargas Rueda, ‘Estos fueron los grupos armados que más han crecido en Colombia: pasaron de 13.000 miembros en el 2018 a más de a 27.000 en 2025’, Infobae, 14 May 2026. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) and the Frente 33 of the Estado Mayor de los Bloques y el Frente (EMBF) New

Background

The EMBF is a group that, in April 2024, splintered from, and is now fighting, the EMC, a group comprised of the general staff of the dissident faction of the former FARC-EP.¹ One reason for the EMBF separating from the EMC was a wish to continue peace talks with the Colombian government,² In these peace talks, the EMBF and the government have discussed an action plan for reducing the violence generated by the EMBF. ³

Intensity

The EMC and EMBF clashed twice during January 2025 in Calamar (Guaviare department).⁴ The first series of clashes occurred from 18 to 19 January. Twenty-four fighters were killed and an unknown number of civilians were displaced.⁵ The second clash, which occurred on 21 January 2025, resulted in twenty-seven casualties and the recruitment of six children by the armed groups.⁶

Clashes between the EMC and EMBF lasted a total of three days (the first perhaps forty-eight hours and the second which resumed briefly on the 18^th of January 2025). The fighting resulted in approximately fifty-one recorded casualties, the recruitment of six children, and internal displacement. President Petro determined the fighting sufficient to declare a state of emergency in northeastern Catatumbo.⁷ At this stage the threshold of intensity for a NIAC, though, was not yet satisfied.

However, on 26 May 2025, the EMC’s 44^th Front (Amazonas Bloc) imposed an armed blockade in Guaviare department which triggered fighting between the EMC and the EMBF on 3 June 2025. The fighting was one part of a continuous battle between the two organized armed groups for territory in Caquetá, Meta, and Guaviare departments. The fighting between EMC and EMBF in May 2025 caused the confinement of approximately 10,000 civilians.⁸ Crisis Watch described hostilities which continued throughout June 2025 between the EMC and EMBF as ‘fierce’.⁹ Colombia’s Office of the Ombudsperson expressed concern over this situation, stating that 65,000 people were displaced between January and April 2025 due to the ongoing violence in Catatumbo.¹⁰

Although not all clashes are recorded, reports suggest an escalation of fighting between the EMC and the EMBF from mid-2025 through to mid-2026.¹¹ The drivers of these clashes seem to be vested in the illicit drug trade, including control over coca-plantations and key drug trafficking routes.¹² Between 16 and 19 January 2026, armed confrontations between EMC and EMBF were reported in El Retorno (Guaviare department). Authorities later discovered twenty-six bodies. Initial reports described the deaths as combat casualties from the clashes, but by 22 January 2026, Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office said forensic evidence suggested many of the twenty-six dead EMC members may actually have been executed rather than killed in open combat.¹³ Another major armed clash between EMC and EMBF occurred on 27 May 2026 in Guaviare department. Initial reports of militant fatalities ranged between twenty and fifty.¹⁴ Defence Minister Pedro Sánchez Suárez said that the dissident groups in Mordisco and Calarcá clashed due to disputes over drug trafficking, extortion and other illicit economies.¹⁵

The fighting between the EMBF and the EMC equates to protracted armed violence, satisfying the notion of intensity as demanded under IHL.

Organization

Both non-State actors engaged in this NIAC are sufficiently organized under IHL. For an analysis of the organisation of the EMBF and EMC, see above.

As the notion of intensity is met, these FARC dissident groups are engaged in a NIAC.

1
‘United Nations Verifications Mission in Colombia’, UN Doc S/2025/188, 27 March 2025, para 4; ‘COI Focus: Colombia: Veiligheidssituatie’, CGRS, 10 April 2025, 2. ↩︎
2
L. C. Barrios Sabogal and J. Wolff, ‘Escalation of Violence amidst Colombia’s Struggle for Peace: Causes and Implications of Catatumbo’s Humanitarian Crisis’, Research center: Transformations of political violence, Policy Brief No 8, 2025, 4 which are ongoing. ↩︎
3
‘United Nations Verifications Mission in Colombia’, UN Doc S/2025/188, 27 March 2025, paras 33 and 41. ↩︎
4
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; T. Breda, ‘Expert Comment: January 2025 was Colombia’s deadliest month since President Gustavo Petro took office’, ACLED, 29 January 2025. ↩︎
5
J. Pardo, ‘La guerra entre Iván Mordisco y las disidencias de alias Calarcá en Guaviare ya tiene colapsada la morgue: los cuerpos llegan en volquetas’, Infobae, 20 January 2025; ‘Emergencias humanitarias en Colombia hoy’, Defensoría del pueblo, 16 February 2025. ↩︎
6
‘United Nations Verifications Mission in Colombia’, UN Doc S/2025/188, 27 March 2025, para 36. ↩︎
7
A. Pannell, ‘Colombia’s President Petro declares state of emergency in northeastern Catatumbo region’, The Bogotá Post, 22 January 2025. ↩︎
8
‘Guerra entre Mordisco y Calarcá en Guaviare provoca el confinamiento de 10.000 personas’, El Espectador, 4 June 2025. ↩︎
9
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, July 2025. ↩︎
10
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, June 2025; ‘July 2025 Monthly Forecast: Colombia’, Security Council Report, 30 June 2025; ‘El Catatumbo padece la emergencia humanitaria más grande desde que hay registro en Colombia, a causa del conflicto armado’, Defensoría del Pueblo Colombia, 6 May 2025. ↩︎
11
E. Dickinson, ‘Los cuatro frentes de batalla del Estado Mayor Central’, La Silla Vacía, 4 September 2025; ‘DFAT Country Information Report Colombia’, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Australian Government, 28 January 2026. ↩︎
12
V. Parada Lugo, ‘La Fiscalía halla indicios de asesinato en la muerte de 26 disidentes en Guaviare’, El País, 22 January 2026. ↩︎
13
‘Unos 30 muertos habría dejado enfrentamiento entre las disidencias de ‘Mordisco’ y ‘Calarcá’ en el Guaviare’, El Heraldo, 17 January 2026; V. Parada Lugo, ‘La Fiscalía halla indicios de asesinato en la muerte de 26 disidentes en Guaviare’, El País, 22 January 2026; ‘Guerra de disidencias por la coca en Guaviare deja 27 muertos y agrava crisis de mesa de paz’, El Espectador, 20 January 2026; S. Boni, et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: February 2026’, ACLED, 9 February 2026; A. Cabrera, ‘Medicina Legal identifica 4 menores de edad entre los 26 cuerpos rescatados en Guaviare tras los combates entre disidencias de Mordisco y Calarcá’, Radio Santa Fe, 21 January 2026. ↩︎
14
‘Colombia investiga combate entre disidencias de las FARC que habría dejado “múltiples víctimas” de esos grupos’, France 24, 28 May 2026; ‘Investigan combate entre disidencias de las FARC con decenas de muertos en Colombia’, Swiss Info, 28 May 2026; N. R. Matta Colorado, ‘Enfrentamiento entre disidentes de Farc habría dejado decenas de muertos en Guaviare; autoridades tratan de confirmar’, El Colombiano, 27 May 2026. ↩︎
15
Pedro Arnulfo Sanchez S. Orgullosamente Colombiano, X, 28 May 2026. ↩︎

State Parties

Colombia

Non-State parties

Comuneros del Sur
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)
Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC) (formerly Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC))
Estado Mayor de los Bloques y el Frente (EMBF)
Comandos de la Frontera (CDF) of Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB)
Estado Mayor Central (EMC)
Segunda Marquetalia (SM)
Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez (Frente 57)

Non-State Actors

Comuneros del Sur
Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB)

1
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.44. ↩︎
2
M. L. Perez, ‘Kolumbien’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 31 March 2025. ↩︎
3
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, US Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017. ↩︎
4
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017. ↩︎
5
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017. ↩︎
6
‘United States Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 1: Drug and Chemical Control’, United States Department of State, March 2025, 168; ‘Colombia: Events of 2024’, Human Rights Watch. ↩︎
7
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017. ↩︎
8
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017. ↩︎
9
C. Klobucista and D. Renwick, ‘Colombia’s Civil Conflict’, Council of Foreign Relations, 11 January 2017. ↩︎
10
M. L. Perez, ‘Kolumbien’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 31 March 2025. ↩︎
11
‘Colombia’, Servicestelle Friedensbildung Baden-Württenberg. ↩︎
12
M. L. Perez, ‘Kolumbien’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 31 March 2025. ↩︎
13
‘Colombia’, Servicestelle Friedensbildung Baden-Württenberg. ↩︎
14
M. L. Perez, ‘Kolumbien’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 31 March 2025. ↩︎
15
M. L. Perez, ‘Kolumbien’, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 31 March 2025. ↩︎
16
‘Colombia y Venezuela lanzan una operación militar conjunta en la convulsa región de Catatumbo’, Europa Press, 31 January 2025. ↩︎
17
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
18
‘Colombia y Venezuela lanzan una operación militar conjunta en la convulsa región de Catatumbo’, Europa Press, 31 January 2025; ‘Venezuela y Colombia inician operación militar conjunta en la frontera’, Voice of America, 31 January 2025; J. Frexies, ‘Colombia and Venezuela Launch Joint Military Operation in Catatumbo’, Colombia One, 31 January 2025. ↩︎
19
‘ACSN Peace Talks Timeline’, ABColombia ↩︎
20
‘Segunda Marquetalia: Peace Talks with Colombian Government’, ABColombia ↩︎
21
‘Fiscalía reactiva órdenes de captura contra seis miembros de la Segunda Marquetalia’, Agencia Periodismo Investigativo, 18 July 2025. ↩︎
22
S. Ibañez Pita, ‘Gobierno Nacional revocó la designación de Iván Márquez como negociador de paz’, Asuntos Legales, 9 October 2025; ‘Gobierno retira a alias ‘Iván Márquez’ como representante de ‘Segunda Marquetalia’ en diálogos de paz’, Presidencia, 9 October 2025. ↩︎
23
‘ELN Peace Talks Timeline’, ABColombia; W. Gazeau, ‘El Gobierno colombiano y el ELN anuncian que reactivarán las negociaciones de paz’, France24, 7 November 2024; ‘Presidente Petro suspende diálogos con el Eln tras “crímenes de guerra” en el Catatumbo’, Presidencia, 17 January 2025. ↩︎
24
A. Pannell, ‘Colombia’s Petro welcomes peace talks with ELN rebels’, Latin America Reports, 14 October 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, October 2025; B. Turan, ‘Petro calls for resumption of talks with Colombia’s ELN guerrillas’, Colombia Reports, 14 October 2025. ↩︎
25
M. Fernanda Arocha, et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: January 2026’, ACLED, 13 January 2024; ‘En medio de paro armado, el ELN dice a Gobierno que quiere “dar continuidad” a lo pactado en mesa de paz’, El Espectador, 15 December 2025; ‘Colombia halts peace talks with ELN rebels and accuses them of war crimes in northeastern region’, Associated Press, 18 January 2025. ↩︎
26
‘Latin America & Caribbean : Colombia’, February 2026; ‘Colombia’s ELN rebels, FARC dissidents announce ceasefire for presidential election’, Reuters, 20 May 2026; M. Rueda, ‘Colombia’s ELN rebels declare a unilateral ceasefire ahead of key congressional elections’, LMT Online, 23 February 2026. ↩︎
27
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; R. Cué Barberena, ‘El Gobierno colombiano finaliza tregua con el EMC, aunque la mantiene con algunas facciones’, France 24, 17 July 2024; ‘Gobierno de Colombia suspende cese al fuego con una parte del EMC’, Voice of America, 16 July 2024. ↩︎
28
‘Es oficial: Gobierno no autorizó ampliación del cese el fuego con disidencia de Calarcá’, El Espectador, 17 April 2025; J. Márquez, ‘Alerta máxima en el Catatumbo tras fin del cese al fuego bilateral con el EMBF de las FARC’, Caracol Radio, 17 April 2025; Observatorio de Derechos Humanos y Conflictividades de Indepaz, ‘Prórroga de un mes del cese al fuego con el EMBF: Impactos y Perspectivas’, Indepaz, 18 April 2025. ↩︎
29
‘Gobierno prorroga cese al fuego bilateral, únicamente con cuatro grupos del denominado Estado Mayor al mando de alias ‘Calarcá’: Mindefensa’, Presidencia, 19 April 2025; ‘Gobierno prorroga por un mes cese al fuego con disidencias de las Farc’, Legis ámbito jurídico, 21 April 2025. ↩︎
30
J. Camilo Colorado, ‘Gobierno y disidencias de las Farc acuerdan zona de paz en la región de Catatumbo’, La Republica, 4 May 2025; ‘Presidente destaca acuerdo con el Frente 33 para la creación de zona de paz en el Catatumbo’, Presidencia, 3 May 2025. ↩︎
31
‘Gobierno y Frente 33 de disidencia Calarcá acuerdan zona de preagrupamiento en Catatumbo’, El Espectador, 4 May 2025. ↩︎
32
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, June 2025. ↩︎
33
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, July 2025; M. Fernanda Arocha, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: September 2025’, ACLED, 5 September 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, November 2025. ↩︎
34
S. Boni, et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: February 2026’, ACLED, 9 February 2026; ‘Total Peace talks reach new agreements between government and EMBF armed group’, Justice for Colombia, 21 November 2025; ‘Gobierno y disidencia de Calarcá cierran seis acuerdos en el séptimo ciclo’, La Silla Vacía, 21 November 2025. ↩︎
35
J. Pablo Patiño, ‘Gobierno y Comuneros del Sur acordaron cese al fuego y destrucción de armas, ¿cómo será?’, eColombiano, 20 December 2024; C. Burgos, ‘Gobierno nacional y Comuneros del Sur acordaron cese al fuego bilateral de seis meses’, Radio Nacional de Colombia, 22 December 2024. ↩︎
36
‘Gobierno nacional y Comuneros del Sur firmaron este sábado dos acuerdos históricos como parte del proceso paz territorial en Nariño’, Presidencia, 5 April 2025; ‘La guerrilla disidente colombiana del ELN acuerda desarmarse, aunque la ‘paz total’ sigue siendo difícil de alcanzar’, WOLA, 6 May 2025; ‘La negociación con el frente Comuneros Sur: primera victora de la paz total de Petro’, Pares, 8 April 2025. ↩︎
37
‘Las claves de la entrega de armas de Comuneros del Sur, la primera en Gobierno Petro’, El Espectador, 7 April 2025; S. Rodriguez Álverez, ‘Comuneros del Sur: Petro se anota un triunfo y avanza en nuevo modelo de paz’, La Silla Vacía, 7 April 2025. ↩︎
38
M. Saiz, ‘Comuneros del Sur Disarming Marks Small Win for Colombia’s Total Peace’, InSight Crime, 9 April 2025; ‘La guerrilla disidente colombiana del ELN acuerda desarmarse, aunque la ‘paz total’ sigue siendo difícil de alcanzar’, WOLA, 6 May 2025. ↩︎
39
‘Gobierno Petro anuncia otra Zona de Ubicación: será con Comuneros del Sur’, El Espectador, 10 June 2025; P. T. C. and P. G. T., ‘Las dudas de la mesa con Comuneros del Sur, la disidencia del ELN en Nariño’, Fundación ideas para la paz, 7 July 2025. ↩︎
40
J. Bernal, ‘Nuevo acuerdo entre el Gobierno Petro y los Comuneros del Sur: el grupo criminal se comprometió a no interferir en las elecciones del 2026’, Infobae, 3 February 2026; C. Ortega Sarria, ‘Comuneros del Sur pacta en mesa de diálogo acuerdo para garantizar el proceso electoral’, Caracol Radio, 2 February 2026. ↩︎
41
S. Torrado, ‘Claves de los diálogos de paz con la Segunda Marquetalia y la Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano’, El Pais, 13 February 2025; N. R. Matta Colorado, ‘Alias Araña cayó por traficar mientras negociaba la paz’, eColombiano, 14 February 2025; L. Martínez, ‘Gobierno y Coordinadora Nacional del Ejército Bolivariano, continuarán con diálogos’, Asuntos Legales, 16 March 2025. ↩︎
42
F. Saavedra, ‘Así quedó el acuerdo entre el Gobierno y la Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano para erradicar 30.000 hectáreas de coca en Putumayo y Nariño’, Infobae, 2 April 2025; ‘Gobierno y Coordinadora Bolivariana firman tres acuerdos preliminares’, Agencia Prensa Rural, 11 April 2025. ↩︎
43
A. Alsema, ‘Colombia to create three guerrilla demobilization zones’, Colombia Reports, 26 May 2025; ‘Colombia to Create Three Guerrilla Demobilization Zones’, International Center for Transitional Justice, 26 May 2025. ↩︎
44
E. J. Alonso Dorado, ‘Gobierno y CNEB firman acuerdo para la entrega y destrucción de más de 13 toneladas de material de guerra’, El Tiempo, 20 July 2025. ↩︎
45
W. Cortés Cañón, ‘Se reactivan diálogos con la disidencia de ‘Walter Mendoza’, que se separó de la Segunda Marquetalia: Gobierno destruirá 14 toneladas de armamento’, Infobae, 7 October 2025; C. A. Morales Castillo, ‘Así se alista el Gobierno para destruir 14 toneladas de armamento de disidencia de Walter Mendoza’, El Espectador, 7 October 2025; L. J. Acosta, ‘FARC dissidents hand over munitions to Colombia in peace gesture’, Reuters, 16 October 2025; S. Torrado, ‘Claves de los diálogos de paz con la Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano, desprendida de la Segunda Marquetalia’, El País, 16 October 2025. ↩︎
46
J. Penagos Ramírez, ‘Gobierno y disidencia de ‘Walter Mendoza’ cerraron sexto ciclo de diálogos con acuerdos para puesta en marcha de dos zonas de ubicación de temporal’, 7 December 2025; M. Alejandro Rodríguez, ‘Proceso de paz entre Gobierno Petro y disidencias de Wálter Mendoza tiene un nuevo país garante: esto es lo que se sabe’, Infobae, 4 December 2025. ↩︎
47
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, April 2026; J. Bernal, ‘Gobierno Petro retomará diálogos con disidencias de ‘Walter Mendoza’ en medio de la polémica por los atentados de ‘Iván Mordisco’’, Infobae, 27 April 2026; M. Alejandro Rodríguez, ‘Proceso de paz entre Gobierno Petro y disidencias de Wálter Mendoza tiene un nuevo país garante: esto es lo que se sabe’, Infobae, 4 December 2025. ↩︎
48
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, August 2025; J. Freixes, ‘Colombia and Gulf Clan Cartel Hold Peace Talks in Qatar’, Colombia One, 20 August 2025. ↩︎
49
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, September 2025; ‘Qatar Announces Conclusion of First Round of Mediation Between the Government of Colombia and the Self- Proclaimed Gaitanista Army of Colombia’, Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 September 2025; A. Alsema, ‘Colombia’s government and EGC paramilitaries initiate formal talks in Qatar’, Colombia Reports, 19 September 2025. ↩︎
50
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, October 2025. ↩︎
51
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, December 2025; ‘Qatar Announces Signing of “Commitment to Peace” by Colombian Government, Self-Designated EGC Following Two Rounds of Mediation in Doha’, Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 December 2025; ‘State Minister at Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Qatar has Cemented its Position as a Key Diplomatic Power in Global Mediation’, Qatar News Agency, 6 December 2025. ↩︎
52
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, December 2025; M. Rubio, ‘Terrorist Designations of Clan del Golfo’, U.S. Department of State, 16 December 2025. ↩︎
53
‘Latin America & Caribbean : Colombia’, February 2026; A. Pannell, ‘Colombia’s EGC suspends Doha peace talks over Petro-Trump meeting’, Al Jazeera, 4 February 2026; A. Pannell, ‘EGC suspends talks with Colombian government after Petro-Trump meeting’, Latin America Reports, 4 February 2026; A. Alsema, ‘Colombia’s paramilitary successors suspend peace talks’, Colombia Reports, 4 February 2026. ↩︎
54
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, March 2026; ‘Gobierno revocó la resolución que suspendía órdenes de captura contra alias Chiquito Malo y otros jefes del Clan del Golfo’, El Heraldo, 13 March 2026; M. Fernanda Latorre, ‘Gobierno confirma que ‘Chiquito Malo’ y ‘Rodrigo Flechas’, tienen suspensión de orden de captura’, Caracol Radio, 5 February 2026. ↩︎
55
L. J. Acosta, ‘Colombia suspends arrest and extradition warrants for 29 Clan del Golfo leaders’, Reuters, 8 May 2026; S. Cifuentes Quintero, ‘Fiscalía le dijo no a Gustavo Petro: mantendrá las órdenes de captura contra 29 miembros del Clan del Golfo, incluido ‘Chiquito Malo’’, Infobae, 12 May 2026; L. J. Acosta, ‘Colombia suspends arrest and extradition warrants for 29 Clan del Golfo leaders’, Internazionale, 8 May 2026. ↩︎
56
A. Alsema, ‘Petro administration clashes with judicial branch over EGC demobilization plans’, Colombia Reports, 19 May 2026. ↩︎
57
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; ‘At least seven dead and 50 wounded as Colombia hit with bombings and gun attacks’, The Guardian, 10 June 2025; A. Alsema, ‘At least three killed in wave of bomb attacks in southwest Colombia’, Colombia Reports, 10 June 2025; K. Johnson, ‘Ataques en Cauca y Valle: ¿otra ronda de lo mismo’, Razon Publica, 15 June 2025. ↩︎
58
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; ‘At least seven dead and 50 wounded as Colombia hit with bombings and gun attacks’, The Guardian, 10 June 2025; A. Alsema, ‘At least three killed in wave of bomb attacks in southwest Colombia’, Colombia Reports, 10 June 2025; ‘Siete muertos en múltiples ataques con disparos y explosivos de guerrilleros en Colombia’, RFI, 10 June 2025 (Updated 11 June 2025). ↩︎
59
A. Alsema, ‘At least three killed in wave of bomb attacks in southwest Colombia’, Colombia Reports, 10 June 2025. ↩︎
60
‘At least seven dead and 50 wounded as Colombia hit with bombings and gun attacks’, The Guardian, 10 June 2025. ↩︎
61
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group; ‘At least seven dead and 50 wounded as Colombia hit with bombings and gun attacks’, The Guardian, 10 June 2025. ↩︎
62
‘Colombia’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
63
‘At least seven dead and 50 wounded as Colombia hit with bombings and gun attacks’, The Guardian, 10 June 2025; S. Jones, ‘Shot Colombian presidential candidate survives emergency surgery’, The Guardian, 8 June 2025; ‘At least 7 killed in explosions and attacks outside police stations in southwest Colombia’, AP News, 11 June 2025; K. Johnson, ‘Ataques en Cauca y Valle: ¿otra ronda de lo mismo’, Razon Publica, 15 June 2025. ↩︎
64
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, June 2025; H. Barber, ‘Colombian senator Miguel Uribe dies after June campaign shooting’, The Guardian, 11 August 2025; E. Dickinson, ‘Assassination Attempt on Top Politician Stirs Colombian Anxieties’, International Crisis Group, 9 June 2025. ↩︎
65
S. Jones, ‘Shot Colombian presidential candidate survives emergency surgery’, The Guardian, 8 June 2025; E. Dickinson, ‘Assassination Attempt on Top Politician Stirs Colombian Anxieties’, International Crisis Group, 9 June 2025; J. S. Cobb and L. Elliott, ‘Surgery on Colombian senator Uribe went well after shooting, wife says’, Reuters, 9 June 2025 ↩︎
66
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, June 2025; H. Barber, ‘Colombian senator Miguel Uribe dies after June campaign shooting’, The Guardian, 11 August 2025. ↩︎
67
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, June 2025; ‘Massive turnout for ‘March of Silence’ following attack on Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay’, EFE, 15 June 2025; ‘Operan de urgencia a senador colombiano Miguel Uribe por hemorragia cerebral: clínica’, Reuters, 17 June 2025. ↩︎
68
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, July 2025; ‘Capturan a quinta persona acusada de participar en atentado contra senador colombiano Miguel Uribe: fuentes’, Reuters, 5 July 2025; ‘Alleged mastermind behind shooting of Colombian senator and presidential candidate arrested’, Associated Press, 5 July 2025. ↩︎
69
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, July 2025; E. Jaramillo Bernat, ‘La Justicia ordena la captura contra siete mandos de la Segunda Marquetalia por el asesinato de Miguel Uribe’, El País, 24 March 2026; L. Muñoz Medina, ‘Gobierno revocó la designación de alias Zarco Aldinever como negociador de paz tras señalamientos por atentado contra Miguel Uribe’, Infobae, 14 July 2025. ↩︎
70
H. Barber, ‘Colombian senator Miguel Uribe dies after June campaign shooting’, The Guardian, 11 August 2025; L. J. Acosta, ‘Colombian police capture suspected leader in senator’s shooting’, Reuters, 5 July 2025; E. Dickinson, ‘Assassination Attempt on Top Politician Stirs Colombian Anxieties’, International Crisis Group, 9 June 2025. ↩︎
71
H. Barber, ‘Colombian senator Miguel Uribe dies after June campaign shooting’, The Guardian, 11 August 2025; V. Buschschlüter and J. Carlos Cueto, ‘Colombian Senator Miguel Uribe dies two months after being shot’, BBC, 11 August 2025; R. Emblin, ‘Miguel Uribe Turbay Dies at 39 After Assassination Attempt’, The City Paper, 11 August 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, July 2025. ↩︎
72
S. Martin, ‘Another attack in Colombia against an opponent: A congressman’s vehicle is attacked’, Voz, 14 August 2025 ↩︎
73
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, August 2025; ‘“Capacidad de protección pasó de 229 a 520 policías y miembros de la UNP”: mindefensa sobre seguridad de los precandidatos presidenciales’, El Heraldo, 26 August 2025; ‘Colombia announces security reinforcement for candidates in the 2026 electoral elections’, Con El Mazo Dando, 26 August 2025. ↩︎
74
‘Colombia’s former president Álvaro Uribe found guilty of witness tampering’, The Guardian, 28 July 2025; E. Dickinson, ‘Verdict in Landmark Case Finds Colombian Ex-President Guilty of Bribery’, International Crisis Group, 29 July 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, July 2025. ↩︎
75
E. Dickinson, ‘Verdict in Landmark Case Finds Colombian Ex-President Guilty of Bribery’, International Crisis Group, 29 July 2025; ‘Colombia’s former president Álvaro Uribe found guilty of witness tampering’, The Guardian, 28 July 2025. ↩︎
76
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, July 2025; E. Dickinson, ‘Verdict in Landmark Case Finds Colombian Ex-President Guilty of Bribery’, International Crisis Group, 29 July 2025. ↩︎
77
‘Colombia’s former president Álvaro Uribe found guilty of witness tampering’, The Guardian, 28 July 2025; L. Niño, ‘Juicio Álvaro Uribe: esto es lo que pasaría con la pensión vitalicia del expresidente si es hallado culpable’, Infobae, 28 July 2025; E. Dickinson, ‘Verdict in Landmark Case Finds Colombian Ex-President Guilty of Bribery’, International Crisis Group, 29 July 2025. ↩︎
78
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, October 2025; ‘Court overturns conviction of Colombian ex-president Álvaro Uribe’, The Guardian, 21 October 2025; A. Rogers, et al, ‘Colombian appeals court strikes down ex-President Uribe’s conviction’, Al Jazeera, 21 October 2025; D. Jordan, ‘Colombian court overturns former president’s conviction’, BBC, 21 October 2025. ↩︎
79
‘‘A great honor’: Key takeaways from Trump’s meeting with Colombia’s Petro’, Al Jazeera, 4 February 2026; I. Alexander, ‘Petro versus Trump’, Al Jazeera, 4 February 2025. ↩︎
80
‘US and Colombia recall envoys as diplomatic rift deepens’, Al Jazeera, 4 July 2025; A. Suárez, ‘US recalls top diplomat in Colombia as tensions with President Petro escalate’, Associated Press, 4 July 2025; D. Psaledakis, ‘US, Colombia recall their ambassadors in diplomatic tussle’, Reuters, 3 July 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, July 2025. ↩︎
81
‘Colombian politicians criticise US Secretary of State Rubio’s interference in Uribe guilty verdict’, Justice for Colombia, 30 July 2025; P. Laya, ‘Petro Rebukes US Over Rubio’s Criticism of Colombia Judiciary’, Bloomberg, 29 July 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, July 2025. ↩︎
82
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, September 2025; E. Dickinson, ‘Booming Coca and Bilateral Chill Drive U.S. Move to Decertify Colombia’, International Crisis Group, 16 September 2025; ‘Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2026’, U.S. Department of State, 15 September 2025; M. Fernanda Arocha, et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: October 2025’, ACLED, 3 October 2025. ↩︎
83
E. Dickinson, ‘Booming Coca and Bilateral Chill Drive U.S. Move to Decertify Colombia’, International Crisis Group, 16 September 2025. ↩︎
84
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, September 2025; M. Fernanda Arocha, et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: October 2025’, ACLED, 3 October 2025; G. Zegarra, ‘Petro criticó la descertificación de EE.UU.: “Nosotros no vamos a estar bajo chantaje”’, CNN Colombia, 16 September 2025; ‘At UN, Colombian President Petro slams global inaction, calls for urgent reform’, United Nations News, 23 September 2025; L. G. Fadul, ‘Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro slams US policies on drugs, migration’, AA, 24 September 2025. ↩︎
85
‘US revokes visa for Colombian president Gustavo Petro after ‘reckless’ actions in New York’, The Guardian, 27 September 2025; S. Lau and I. Aikman, ‘US revokes Colombian president’s visa over ‘reckless and incendiary’ remarks’, BBC, 27 September 2025; D. Mendoza and T. Symons, ‘US revokes visa of Colombia’s Petro after he called on soldiers to disobey Trump’, CNN, 27 September 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, September 2025; M. Fernanda Arocha, et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: October 2025’, ACLED, 3 October 2025. ↩︎
86
J. Turkewitz and R. Jimison, ‘Colombia’s President Says Boat Bombed by U.S. Was Carrying Colombians’, The New York Times, 8 October 2025; N. Bocanegra and A. Villegas, ‘Colombia’s Petro suggests last vessel bombed by US was Colombian’, Reuters, 9 October 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, October 2025. ↩︎
87
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, October 2025; O. Empson, ‘Trump calls Colombia president ‘illegal drug dealer’ as US says it hit another ship’, The Guardian, 19 October 2025; ‘Trump calls Colombia’s Petro ‘a drug leader’, says US to cut aid to country’, Al Jazeera, 19 October 2025; B. Kleln, ‘Trump escalates back-and-forth with Colombia’s president, announcing end of US payments to country’, CNN, 19 October 2025. ↩︎
88
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, October 2025; ‘Treasury Sanctions Colombian President Gustavo Petro and His Support Network’, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 24 October 2025; C. Neff, ‘US places sanctions on Colombian president over alleged failure to stop cartels’, The Guardian, 25 October 2025; D. Psaledakis, et al, ‘US sanctions Colombia’s president, accuses him of allowing expansion of drug trade’, Reuters, 25 October 2025; R. Comerford, ‘US imposes sanctions on left-wing Colombian President Petro’, BBC, 25 October 2025. ↩︎
89
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, December 2025; ‘US military aggression towards Venezuela presents threat to Colombia’, Justice for Colombia, 16 December 2025; H. Fuller, ‘Trump Warns Colombia Its President Could Be “Next” in U.S. “Anti-drug” Campaign’, Military.com 14 December 2025; B. Canakci, ‘Colombia’s Petro pushes back after Trump warns he ‘will be next’’, AA, 11 December 2025. ↩︎
90
‘U.S. strikes in Venezuela trigger regional and global alarm’, NPR, 4 January 2026; M. Villamil, ‘Petro fija postura de Colombia tras ataque aéreo a Caracas y llama a desescalada y respeto al derecho internacional’, Infobae, 3 January 2026; S. Torrado, ‘Gustavo Petro rechaza la “agresión a la soberanía de Venezuela” y ordena desplegar a los militares en la frontera’, El País, 3 January 2026; M. Fernanda Arocha, et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: January 2026’, ACLED, 13 January 2024. ↩︎
91
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, January 2026; B. Osgood, ‘Colombia’s Petro promises to defend homeland amid Trump threats’, Al Jazeera, 5 January 2026; ‘Petro Calls Colombians to the Streets After Trump Raises Military Option’, The City Paper, 7 January 2026. ↩︎
92
M. Fernanda Arocha, et al, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: January 2026’, ACLED, 13 January 2024; ‘Petro y Trump dialogan tras las amenazas de EEUU a Colombia y se reunirán “en un futuro cercano” en la Casa Blanca’, Cadena SER, 8 January 2026; A. Correal and M. Bearak, ‘How an Abrupt Call Between Trump and Colombia’s President Averted a Crisis’, The New York Times, 9 January 2026; ‘Trump invites Colombia’s Petro to White House after earlier threat of military action’, Reuters, 8 January 2026. ↩︎
93
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, January 2026; J. Freixes, ‘Colombian Defense Minister Visits US to Boost Anti-Drug Cooperation Ahead of Petro’s Trip’, Colombia One, 13 January 2026. ↩︎
94
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, January 2026; V. Buschschlüter and I. Aikman, ‘Colombia yields on US deportation flights to avert trade war’, BBC, 27 January 2025; T. Rogero and E. Helmore, ‘Colombia lifts ban on deportation flights after Trump tariff threat’, The Guardian, 27 January 2025; C. Dorado Suaza, ‘Colombia resumes U.S. deportation flights ahead of Petro’s meeting with Trump’, Latin America Reports, 2 February 2026. ↩︎
95
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, January 2026; ‘Colombian guerrilla group ELN backs pact to fight US ‘to defend the homeland’’, Le Monde, 16 January 2026; ‘Colombian guerrillas vow to confront US ‘imperialism’’, France 24, 4 January 2026. ↩︎
96
C. Vasquez and B. Debusmann Jr, ‘After months of acrimony, Colombia’s Petro is about to meet Trump’, BBC, 3 February 2026; ‘‘A great honor’: Key takeaways from Trump’s meeting with Colombia’s Petro’, Al Jazeera, 4 February 2026; ‘Latin America & Caribbean : Colombia’, February 2026; J. Otis, ‘An uneasy détente: Trump and Colombia’s Petro meet at White House’, NPR, 3 February 2026. ↩︎
97
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, March 2026; J. Mustian, et al, ‘DEA names Colombian President Petro ‘priority target’ amid U.S. probe of drug trafficker ties’, PBS, 20 March 2026; J. Mustian, et al, ‘DEA names Colombian president ‘priority target’ as US prosecutors probe ties to drug traffickers’, Associated Press, 21 March 2026. ↩︎
98
M. Fernanda Arocha, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: September 2025’, ACLED, 5 September 2025; ‘Presidente Petro le pide al mundo declarar organizaciones terroristas a Junta del Narcotráfico y a grupos de ‘Iván Mordisco’, Segunda Marquetalia y Clan del Golfo’, Presidencia, 21 August 2025; ‘Petro declarará como organizaciones terroristas a las disidencias de las FARC y Clan del Golfo’, EFE, 22 August 2025; A. Cabrera, ‘Petro pide al mundo declarar organizaciones terroristas a junta del narcotráfico y a los grupos de Iván Mordisco, segunda Marquetalia y clan del golfo’, Radio Sante Fe, 21 August 2025. ↩︎
99
‘JEP peace court issues first sentences over human rights violations during armed conflict’, Justice for Colombia, 25 September 2025; E. Tassel-Maurizi and M. Merchán Duque, ‘Colombia’s Peace Process: an unprecedented tribunal hands down its first convictions’, EJIL: Talk!, 9 October 2025. ↩︎
100
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, September 2025; ‘A Milestone for Transitional Justice in Colombia: ICTJ Welcomes the First Sentences of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace’, International Center for Transitional Justice, 19 September 2025; ‘JEP peace court issues first sentences over human rights violations during armed conflict’, Justice for Colombia, 25 September 2025; A. Pannell, ‘Landmark ruling convicts seven FARC ex-leaders of wartime crimes’, Al Jazeera, 16 September 2025. ↩︎
101
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, September 2025; J. C. Echeverry, ‘Mala justicia’, El País, 21 September 2025. ↩︎
102
‘Colombia’s left picks Ivan Cepeda as 2026 presidential candidate’, Reuters, 27 October 2025; ‘Progressive senator Iván Cepeda nominated as Historic Pact presidential candidate’, Justice for Colombia, 29 October 2025; ‘Ivan Cepeda’, Colombia Reports, 20 August 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, October 2025. ↩︎
103
‘Candidato Iván Cepeda recibe apoyo de un sector liberal a su campaña presidencial’, Caracol Radio, 17 November 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, November 2025; ‘Pacto Histórico anuncia respaldo de “sector representativo del liberalismo” en frente amplio’, El Espectador, 18 November 2025. ↩︎
104
S. Torrado, ‘Iván Cepeda se dispara en la encuesta presidencial del Centro Nacional de Consultoría en Colombia’, El País, 18 November 2025; ‘Cepeda lidera actualmente intención de voto en Colombia, según sondeo’, Prensa Latina, 18 November 2025. ↩︎
105
‘Latin America & Caribbean : Colombia’, February 2026; L. Calderón Fuentes, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: March 2026’, ACLED, 9 March 2026; S. Torrado, ‘Dos candidatos al Congreso desaparecen en distintas regiones de Colombia’, El País, 26 February 2026; L. Reynoso, ‘Un atentado contra la caravana de seguridad del senador Jairo Castellanos en Arauca deja dos muertos’, El País, 5 February 2026; D. Díaz, ‘La senadora indígena Aida Quilcué es liberada tras varias horas de secuestro’, El País, 10 February 2026; D. Ospina, ‘Alcalde de Morales, Óscar Guachetá, sufrió ataque y breve secuestro en la vía Panamericana: ya está a salvo’, Infobae, 11 February 2026; D. Ospina, ‘Candidata a la Cámara Lucy Amparo Guzmán fue retenida en Cauca: le robaron camioneta y armas de su esquema’, Infobae, 15 February 2026. ↩︎
106
‘Latin America & Caribbean : Colombia’, February 2026; ‘Queman vallas del precandidato presidencial Juan Carlos Pinzón en el Catatumbo’, Semana, 8 February 2026. ↩︎
107
L. Calderón Fuentes, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: March 2026’, ACLED, 9 March 2026; D. Jerez, ‘Elecciones 2026: MOE alerta riesgo de violencia en 339 municipios del país’, LA FM, 4 February 2026. ↩︎
108
L. J. Acosta, ‘Colombians elect fragmented Congress in low-turnout election’, Reuters, 8 March 2026; A. Suárez, ‘Colombians are electing a new Congress and choosing presidential candidates’, Associated Press, 9 March 2026; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, March 2026. ↩︎
109
‘Tres soldados murieron en combates durante instalación de puestos de votación en Caquetá’, El Espectador, 4 March 2026; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, March 2026. ↩︎
110
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, April 2026; ‘Gobierno reforzará seguridad de Paloma Valencia tras denuncias de amenazas y vandalismo’, Noticias RCN, 12 April 2026; C. Osorio, ‘Las amenazas contra Paloma Valencia y Abelardo de la Espriella reviven el temor a un magnicidio’, El País, 15 April 2026. ↩︎
111
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, April 2026; ‘Petro dice que la CIA tiene «datos reales» sobre un posible atentado contra el candidato Cepeda en Colombia’, EFE, 17 April 2026; ‘Petro dice que la CIA tiene “datos reales” sobre posible atentado contra candidato Cepeda’, Infobae, 17 April 2026. ↩︎
112
‘Former mayor shot dead in central Colombia during election campaign’, Associated Press, 16 May 2026; L. Reynoso, ‘La violencia electoral se recrudece con dos atentados en el Meta a dos semanas de las presidenciales’, El País, 17 May 2026. ↩︎
113
‘¿Cómo fue la supuesta infiltración de disidentes con general de Ejército y alto funcionario de DNI?’, Noticias Caracol, 24 November 2025; A. Alsema, ‘FARC dissidents infiltrated Colombia’s military, intelligence agency: report’, Colombia Reports, 24 November 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, November 2025. ↩︎
114
‘¿Cómo fue la supuesta infiltración de disidentes con general de Ejército y alto funcionario de DNI?’, Noticias Caracol, 24 November 2025; ‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, November 2025; L. Reynoso, ‘La Procuraduría suspende al general y al directivo de inteligencia señalados de tener vínculos con las disidencias de Calarcá’, El País, 27 November 2025. ↩︎
115
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, January 2026; S. Hurtado, ‘The Ecuador-Colombia Trade Spat Is a Zero-Sum Game’, America Quarterly, 29 January 2026; J. S. Cobb and A. Valencia, ‘Colombia halts electricity sales to Ecuador and imposes tariffs in trade, drug trafficking spat’, Reuters, 23 January 2026; G. González Calanche, ‘Ecuador Ignites Trade Spat with Colombia over Border Crime’, International Crisis Group, 23 January 2026. ↩︎
116
L. O’Sullivan, ‘Ecuador raises tariffs on Colombia to 50% as trade dispute intensifies’, Latin America Reports, 27 February 2026; A. Valencia and N. Bocanegra, ‘Andean trade bloc orders Colombia, Ecuador to lift trade curbs’, Reuters, 8 May 2026. ↩︎
117
‘Ecuador-Colombia Tariff War: Bilateral Trade Down 44% as Ecuador Prepares 100% Duties in May’, Ecuador Brief 29 April 2026. ↩︎
118
‘Latin America & Caribbean: Colombia’, International Crisis Group, March 2026; L. Gamba, ‘Colombian President Petro claims 27 killed in alleged cross-border bombing by Ecuador’, AA, 18 March 2026; A. Pannell, ‘Colombia’s Petro accuses Ecuador of bombing near border’, Al Jazeera, 17 March 2026; ‘Colombia – Ecuador rift widens over cross-border bombings’, The City Paper, 17 March 2026; M. Martín, ‘Colombia muestra cómo la bomba lanzada por Ecuador cayó en su territorio de forma accidental’, El País, 23 March 2026. ↩︎
119
A. Valencia and N. Bocanegra, ‘Andean trade bloc orders Colombia, Ecuador to lift trade curbs’, Reuters, 8 May 2026. ↩︎
120
J. S. Vergara, ‘Ecuador Reduces Tariffs on Colombian Products as Trade Tensions Begin to Ease’, Finance Colombia, 9 May 2026. ↩︎
121
H. Barber, ‘Drones reshape war in Colombia as deaths and injuries mount’, The Guardian, 18 May 2026; R. Emblin, ‘ELN Modifies Drones To Target Colombia’s Security Forces’, The City Paper, 22 July 2025; V. P. Lugo, ‘El aumento del uso de drones con explosivos cambia la dinámica del conflicto en Colombia’, El País, 22 May 2026; ‘Drones con explosivos, nueva arma de las disidencias de las Farc’, Cambio Colombia, 15 May 2023. ↩︎
122
H. Barber, ‘Drones reshape war in Colombia as deaths and injuries mount’, The Guardian, 18 May 2026; S. Rodriguez Álvarez, ‘Drones en conflicto colombiano: militares se preparan para nueva amenaza’, La Silla Vacía, 21 May 2024; R. Emblin, ‘ELN Modifies Drones To Target Colombia’s Security Forces’, The City Paper, 22 July 2025. ↩︎
123
E. Dickinson, ‘Los cuatro frentes de batalla del Estado Mayor Central’, La Silla Vacía, 4 September 2025. ↩︎
124
‘Colombia’, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 14 May 2025. ↩︎
125
‘Colombia’, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 14 May 2025. ↩︎
126
‘Colombia’, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 14 May 2025. ↩︎
127
‘Colombia’, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 14 May 2025. ↩︎
128
S. Rodriguez and Georgetown University Latin America & Caribbean Policy Association, ‘Internal Displacement in Colombia: Characterization and Relevant Research Findings’, Georgetown Public Policy Review, 25 January 2024; V. Sainz, ‘Forced to Flee: The Global Impact of Conflict-Driven Internal Displacement’, Atlas Institute for International Affairs, 14 April 2025. ↩︎

Colombia

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (between January 2025 and May 2026)

Escalating tension between armed groups in Catatumbo

Ceasefires and the ‘total peace’ process

Unprecedented series of bombings by EMC in June 2025 following the attempted assassination of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe in Bogotá

Increasing numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the worsening humantiarian situation

Non International Armed Conflict

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

Non-State parties

Other main actors

Non-State Actors