Cyprus - Türkiye - WAR WATCH

Türkiye has occupied the northern part of Cyprus since July 1974.

Türkiye is the occupying power in the northern part of Cyprus. Türkiye exercises control through both the presence of its armed forces, and the authority it exerts over the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is the de facto authority in the area.

Türkiye has maintained its military presence in northern Cyprus since the 1974 invasion, establishing the self-declared ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC) in 1983, which is not recognized by the international community.

Notwithstanding the absence of recognition by the international community, in recent years the TRNC became an observer of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). Following the adoption of resolution 1367 by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Turkish Cypriot community has been represented by two elected representatives in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.¹

The law of military occupation is set out in customary international humanitarian law (IHL), Hague Convention IV of 1907 and its Annex, Geneva Convention IV of 1949, and Additional Protocol I of 1977. Both Cyprus and Türkiye are party to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, but only Cyprus is party to Additional Protocol I.

In addition to IHL, international human rights law continues to apply during times of occupation. Both Türkiye and Cyprus are parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights. Türkiye remains bound by its international human rights law obligations in the territory it occupies.

Cyprus gained independence from Britain in 1960. The new republic was governed under a constitution providing for power-sharing between the Greek Cypriot majority and Turkish Cypriot minority, but the arrangement broke down quickly amid intercommunal violence. UN Security Council Resolution 186 of 1964 established the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to maintain order on the island.² On 15 July 1974, a coup backed by the military junta then ruling Greece overthrew the Cypriot government with the aim of uniting the island with Greece. In response, Türkiye launched a military operation on 20 July 1974, landing troops in the north of the island in its capacity as a guarantor power under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. A ceasefire was reached shortly after, but Türkiye launched a second offensive in August 1974, ultimately taking control of approximately 36% of Cypriot territory.³ The conflict resulted in the large-scale displacement of both communities: 160,000 to 200,000 Greek Cypriots fled or were expelled from the north, while around 60,000 Turkish Cypriots moved from the south to the north.⁴ UNFICYP took up positions along the buffer zone also known as the Green Line separating the two sides, where it remains deployed to this day.⁵

Following the 1974 invasion of northern Cyprus, Türkiye has maintained its presence north of the Green Line, establishing the self-declared TRNC in 1983. The TRNC has declared independence, and established diplomatic relations with Türkiye. As noted, despite its claim to secession, the TRNC does not enjoy international recognition.⁶ The United Nations Security Council deemed the TRNC’s declaration of independence to be invalid and called upon all States not to recognize it.⁷

In 2004, an UN-backed reunification plan known as the Annan Plan was put to simultaneous referenda on both sides of the island. Turkish Cypriots approved the plan by approximately 65%, while more than 75% of Greek Cypriots rejected it.⁸ The failure of the Annan Plan marked a turning point in the peace process, deepening mutual distrust and making it significantly harder to identify a common basis for renewed negotiations. It remains a reference point for both sides: Turkish Cypriots and Türkiye have repeatedly cited the outcome to argue that their side has demonstrated greater willingness to compromise, while the Greek Cypriot rejection has drawn persistent criticism from the international community.⁹

Reunification negotiations have been nevertheless ongoing for the last decades. However, a final agreement is not yet in reach. In May 2017, the UN envoy for the situation in Cyprus ended a visit to the Island with frustration after failing to reach an agreement on conditions to resume reunification talks.¹⁰

In February 2019, the UN special envoy Jane Holl Lute visited Cyprus in order to create the necessary atmosphere to resume Reunification negotiations. Cyprus’s President Nicos Anastasiades announced during the visit that his country is ready to enter into negotiations with Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). On 26 February 2019, Turkish Cypriot President Mustafa Akinci and Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades met at the UN Buffer Zone with the participation of the UN Cyprus envoy, Elizabeth Spehar. During the meeting, they agreed on a number of issues: confidence-building measures, including the interoperability of cell phone networks and electrical grids, as well as the clearing of mined areas. The UN is seeking a future peace deal to unite the island under a federal umbrella. However, a final deal is yet to be reached. Given the continued presence of Turkish troops without the consent of the Cypriot government, the classification of the conflict on the island remains a military occupation.¹¹

In October 2020, Ersin Tatar won the presidential elections in northern Cyprus. During his campaign, President Tatar expressed his believe in a two-State solution. Accordingly, in November the UN convened preliminary talks between the respective leaders in an informal ‘five-plus-UN meeting’, whereby the five members were Greece, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and both Cypriot communities. Between 27 and 29 October, ‘five-plus’ informal talks took place in Geneva. At the end of the meetings, UN Secretary-General António Guterres affirmed: ‘we have not yet found enough common grounds to allow for the resumption of formal negotiations’. Nevertheless, all parties expressed their intention to continue the talks in the coming months.¹² On 27 September 2021, Secretary-General Guterres convened talks between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders in order to discuss the possibility to relaunch negotiations. On 4 November, following a month of negotiations, Guterres appointed Colin Stewart as new special representative and head of UNFICYP. Nevertheless, since December 2021, UN-supported attempts to relaunch negotiations have stalled.¹³

Partial reopening of Varosha/Maraş

Varosha, known in Turkish as Maraş, is a suburb of Famagusta that has been sealed off since 1974, when its approximately 17,000 Greek Cypriot residents fled the advance of Turkish troops. UN Security Council Resolution 550 (1984) declared any attempt to resettle any part of Varosha by persons other than its original inhabitants to be inadmissible and called for the transfer of the area to UN administration.¹⁴ On 8 October 2020, Turkish Cypriot authorities partially reopened the beachfront area to the public, in what the UN Security Council reaffirmed was contrary to its resolutions.¹⁵ On 20 July 2021, Tatar announced a further reopening of part of the fenced-off area; the Security Council responded with a presidential statement approved by all 15 members condemning the announcement and calling for the immediate reversal of all steps taken on Varosha since October 2020.¹⁶ Türkiye rejected the statement.¹⁷ The Varosha developments have been cited in subsequent Security Council resolutions on Cyprus as an ongoing concern.¹⁸

US lifts arms embargo; Türkiye announces troop reinforcement

On 16 September 2022, the United States announced the lifting of the arms embargo on Cyprus, which was introduced in 1987, explaining that the Republic of Cyprus ‘has met the necessary conditions under relevant legislation’. Among other conditions to lift the embargo, Cyprus adopted several financial regulatory oversight mechanisms and denied Russian military vessels access to ports. On the same day, the Turkish Foreign Minister criticized the US decision, warning that it could ‘lead to an arms race on the island.’ As a consequence, Turkish President Erdoğan announced that he would send weapons, ammunition, and vehicles to support its 40,000 troops currently deployed on the island.¹⁹ In early March 2026, Türkiye deployed six F-16 fighter jets and air defence systems to northern Cyprus in relation to the regional crisis in Middle East.²⁰

Election of Christodoulides and resumption of informal contacts

Nikos Christodoulides won the Greek Cypriot presidential election on 12 February 2023 and took office on 28 February.²¹ A former foreign minister, Christodoulides had campaigned on a commitment to breaking the deadlock in reunification talks. On 23 February, he met Turkish Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar for the first time in the UN-controlled buffer zone in Nicosia, hosted by UN Special Representative Colin Stewart.²² Tatar described the encounter as an ‘acquaintance meeting’, and no further meetings were scheduled as a direct result.²³ The positions of the two sides remained unchanged: Christodoulides reaffirmed his support for the UN framework for a bizonal, bicommunal federation, while Tatar maintained that negotiations could only resume on the basis of sovereign equality and equal international status for the TRNC.²⁴

Appointment of UN Personal Envoy Holguín

On 5 January 2024, Secretary-General Guterres appointed María Ángela Holguín Cuéllar, the former foreign minister of Colombia, as his Personal Envoy on Cyprus.²⁵ The post had been vacant since 2017, when Norwegian diplomat Espen Barth Eide concluded his term following the collapse of the Crans-Montana talks.²⁶ Holguín was tasked with a good offices role, searching for common ground and advising the Secretary-General on the way forward. She conducted consultations with both Cypriot leaders and the guarantor powers between January and July 2024, at the end of which she submitted her report to him.²⁷ Her open letter of July 2024, published alongside the report, did not address substantive matters but indicated that she had been unable to identify sufficient common ground or political will to recommend the resumption of formal negotiations.²⁸

50^th anniversary of the invasion and hardening of Türkiye’s public stance

On 20 July 2024, President Erdoğan attended celebrations in northern Cyprus marking the 50th anniversary of the 1974 invasion.²⁹ Speaking at the TRNC parliament building, Erdoğan said that ‘a federal solution is not possible in Cyprus’ and that ‘a stable solution to the issue is possible only with the recognition of two States’, adding that Türkiye would ‘continue to fight with determination for the recognition of the TRNC and the implementation of a two-State solution’.³⁰

Two days prior, the Turkish parliament had passed a resolution marking the anniversary and calling for international recognition of the TRNC.³¹ The anniversary events were widely interpreted as a significant public hardening of Türkiye’s position, with Erdoğan explicitly ruling out the UN-endorsed federal framework that has formed the basis of international efforts for decades.³²

Informal talks in New York

On 16 October 2024, Secretary-General Guterres hosted an informal dinner in New York with Christodoulides and Tatar, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly.³³ Both leaders agreed to continue contacts and to explore the opening of additional crossing points along the Green Line as a confidence-building measure, and met again in the buffer zone in January 2025 to discuss this.³⁴ However, Tatar had stated ahead of the dinner that he would not engage in reunification discussions on any terms that did not include recognition of the TRNC, and the fundamental divergence between the two sides’ positions – federation versus two-State solution – remained unresolved.³⁵

Informal five-plus Geneva talks and follow-up meeting in Nicosia

On 17 and 18 March 2025, Secretary-General Guterres hosted an informal meeting in Geneva, bringing together Christodoulides and Tatar alongside the three guarantor powers: Greece, Türkiye, and the United Kingdom.³⁶ Guterres described the outcome as ‘meaningful progress’ and ‘a new atmosphere’, characterizing it as the most significant development since the collapse of the Crans-Montana talks in 2017.³⁷ The parties agreed on six confidence-building measures: the opening of four new crossing points along the Green Line; demining; the creation of a bicommunal Technical Committee on Youth; joint environmental and climate initiatives, including solar energy in the buffer zone; and the restoration of cemeteries.³⁸ They also agreed to a further informal meeting in late July 2025 and accepted Guterres’ appointment of a Personal Envoy to prepare next steps; Holguín was reappointed to this role on 2 May 2025.³⁹

On 2 April 2025, Christodoulides and Tatar held a follow-up meeting in Nicosia, at which they inaugurated the new Youth Technical Committee, the first new bicommunal committee formed in a decade.⁴⁰ Despite the renewed momentum, both leaders continued to affirm positions that remain far apart on the fundamental question of the form of any future settlement.⁴¹

Military occupation of Cyprus by Türkiye

For a territory to be considered occupied, it must be ‘under the authority of the hostile army’.¹ For an occupation to exist, hostile foreign forces must exercise effective control. Three cumulative elements must be fulfilled for effective control to exist.

First, the armed forces of a foreign state are physically present in the territory and the territorial state did not consent to their presence.
Second, the presence of the foreign forces prevent the effective local government in place at the time of invasion from exercising its powers.
Third, the foreign forces establish their own authority.For further information, see ‘military occupation – elements of occupation’ in our classification section.

States may use proxy forces to occupy a territory: if a State exercises overall control over de facto local authorities or other local groups that exert effective control over the territory, the State can be considered an occupying force.For further information on overall control, see ‘contemporary challenges for classification – control over proxy forces’ in our classification section. Two elements must therefore exist in such a situation: the foreign State has overall control over de facto local authorities; and the de facto authorities exercise effective control over a territory.²

In the case of northern Cyprus, all the elements necessary to establish that Türkiye is an occupying power are present.

Turkish military forces maintain a large presence in northern Cyprus. Despite repeated UN Security Council resolutions calling for Turkish military withdrawal,³ reportedly approximately 30,000-40,000 Turkish soldiers remain. They significantly outnumber the 1,000 Greek troops in Cyprus.⁴ The continuing presence of Turkish troops continues to be a major obstacle for finding a solution to the conflict and contributed to the collapse of the peace talks under the auspices of the United Nations in July 2017.⁵

The European Court of Human Rights has recognized that Türkiye is occupying northern Cyprus.⁶ According to the European Court, Türkiye exercises ‘effective overall control’ over the TRNC, in particular due to ‘the large number of [Turkish] troops engaged in active duties’ in northern Cyprus. Moreover, ‘such control, according to the relevant test and in the circumstances of the case, entails [Turkish] responsibility for the policies and actions of the “TRNC”’⁷ because the local administration ‘survives by virtue of Turkish military and other support’.

Taken together, these elements indicate that Türkiye occupies northern Cyprus through the presence of its regular troops as well through the TRNC acting as its proxy.

Views of parties to the conflict and international community

The subjective views of the parties and other actors may be an indicator, but are not determinative for the classification of a situation.

Türkiye recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as ‘an independent State established by the Turkish Cypriot community in the exercise of its right to self-determination and possessing exclusive control and authority over the territory north of the United Nations buffer-zone’.⁸ Cyprus considers that Türkiye unlawfully occupies the part of Cyprus known as the TRNC.⁹ Following the proclamation of the TRNC in 1983, the Security Council held the TRNC’s declaration of independence to be invalid and called upon all States not to recognize it.¹⁰ The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe described the northern part of Cyprus as ‘occupied by Türkiye since 1974’.¹¹

1
Article 42, 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs on Land.
2
For further information, see T. Ferraro, ‘Determining the Beginning and End of an Occupation Under International Humanitarian Law’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 94, No. 885 (2012) 158ff.
3
See for example UN Security Council Resolution 353, 20 July 1974; and Resolution 357 (1974).
4
See eg: H. Smith, ‘Cyprus Reunification Talks Collapse Amid Angry Scenes’, The Guardian, 7 July 2017; ‘Cyprus Talks End Without a Peace and Reunification Deal’, BBC, 7 July 2017; ‘Cyprus Talks Stall Over Fate of Turkish Troops’, Al Jazeera, 13 January 2017.
5
H. Smith, ‘Cyprus Reunification Talks Collapse Amid Angry Scenes’, The Guardian, 7 July 2017; ‘Cyprus Talks End Without a Peace and Reunification Deal’, BBC, 7 July 2017; P. Wintour, ‘Cyprus Talks: Turkish Troops Will Remain on Island, Vows Erdoğan’, The Guardian, 13 January 2017.
6
ECtHR, Loizidou v Türkiye, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 28 November 1996, para. 54.
7
ECtHR, Loizidou v Türkiye, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 28 November 1996, para. 56.
8
ECtHR, Loizidou v Türkiye, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 28 November 1996, paras. 69 and 15.
9
See eg: ECtHR, Cyprus v Türkiye, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 10 May 2001, para. 70.
10
See UN Security Council Resolution 541 (1983), 18 November 1983.
11
Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1628 (2008), 2008.

State Parties

Cyprus
Türkiye, including through its proxy (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC))

1
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1376 (2004), April 2004; see also ‘“Elected Representatives of the Turkish Cypriot Community” will be able to sit in the Chamber’, News, 4 October 2004; and ‘Assembly Participation by Two “Elected Representatives of the Turkish Cypriot Community”’, News, 25 January 2005.
2
UN Security Council Resolution 186, 4 March 1964
3
‘Cyprus marks 51 years since Turkish invasion that led to island nation’s partition’, Euronews, 20 July 2025.
4
‘Cyprus marks 51 years since Turkish invasion that led to island nation’s partition’, Euronews, 20 July 2025
5
UN Security Council Resolution 186, 4 March 1964.
6
For further information on the role of recognition for secessionist entities, see ‘international armed conflict – secessionist entities’ in our classification section.
7
See UN Security Council Resolution 541 (1983), 18 November 1983.
8
‘Erdoğan dismisses UN plan for federated Cyprus, reaffirms commitment to two-state peace deal’, Euronews, 21 July 2024.
9
International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023.
10
M. Kambas, ‘UN Cyprus envoy to end shuttle diplomacy as sides fail to agree conditions’, Reuters, 26 May 2017.
11
‘Ready to resume talks immediately, Anastasiades says’, CyprusMail Online, 4 February 2019; ‘Lute meeting productive says spokesman’, CyprusMail Online, 4 February 2019; ‘UN welcome Turkish, Greek Cypriot leaders’ meeting’, Daily Sabah, 1 March 2019.
12
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch: Cyprus.
13
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch: Cyprus.
14
UN Security Council Resolution 550, 11 May 1984; and Resolution 789, 25 November 1992
15
UN Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2020/9, 9 October 2020.
16
UN News, ‘Security Council calls for “immediate reversal” of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot decision on Varosha’, 23 July 2021
17
‘UNSC condemns plan to reopen Northern Cyprus resort Varosha’, Al Jazeera, 23 July 2021
18
UN Security Council Resolution 2674 (2023), 31 July 2023.
19
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch: Cyprus.
20
N. Potera, ‘Türkiye sends F-16s to Cyprus. New security architecture in the Eastern Mediterranean’, Defence 24, 12 March 2026.
21
Daily Sabah, ‘Turkish, Greek Cypriot leaders meet for informal talks’, 23 February 2023
22
Daily Sabah, ‘Turkish, Greek Cypriot leaders meet for informal talks’, 23 February 2023
23
Famagusta Gazette, ‘Cyprus: Tatar and Christodoulides to discuss earthquake measures’, 23 February 2023
24
‘Turkish, Greek Cypriot leaders meet for informal talks’, Daily Sabah, 23 February 2023.
25
‘Secretary-General Appoints María Angela Holguín Cuéllar of Colombia Personal Envoy on Cyprus’, UN Press Release SGA/2255, 5 January 2024
26
‘Holguin appointed UN chief’s personal envoy to Cyprus’, Cyprus Mail, 3 May 2025.
27
Global Panorama, ‘The 50th Anniversary of Türkiye’s Military Intervention in Cyprus‘, 20 November 2024
28
Global Panorama, ‘The 50th Anniversary of Türkiye’s Military Intervention in Cyprus’, 20 November 2024.
29
Euronews, ‘Erdoğan dismisses UN plan for federated Cyprus, reaffirms commitment to two-state peace deal’, 21 July 2024
30
Turkish Presidency Directorate of Communications, ‘Erdoğan defines recognition of two states as a condition for Cyprus settlement‘, 20 July 2024
31
Global Panorama, ‘The 50th Anniversary of Türkiye’s Military Intervention in Cyprus‘, 20 November 2024
32
Euronews, ‘Erdoğan dismisses UN plan for federated Cyprus, reaffirms commitment to two-state peace deal’, 21 July 2024
33
The Media Line, ‘Cypriot Leaders Agree To Renew Informal Talks on Reunification’, 16 October 2024
34
Reuters/US News, ‘Cyprus Leader Says Any Deal on Island Must Align With UN Resolutions’, 5 March 2025.
35
The National Herald, ‘No Expectations for Cypriot Leaders UN Dinner Session in N.Y.’, 16 October 2024
36
UN News, ‘Cyprus talks show “new atmosphere” between divided island’s leaders: Guterres‘, 18 March 2025
37
UN Geneva Newsroom, ‘Informal Meeting on Cyprus – UN Secretary-General António Guterres Media Stakeout’, 18 March 2025
38
Ibid.; Security Council Report, ‘Cyprus, July 2025 Monthly Forecast‘, 30 June 2025
39
UN Press Release SGA/2351, ‘Secretary-General Appoints María Angela Holguín Cuéllar of Colombia Personal Envoy on Cyprus’, 2 May 2025
40
Daily Sabah, ‘Cypriot leaders meet as they explore cooperation’, 5 May 2025
41
The National Herald, ‘Despite Meeting, Cyprus Reunification Standoff Still Remains‘, 2 April 2025

Cyprus – Türkiye

Reporting period: 2023 - 2026

Partial reopening of Varosha/Maraş

US lifts arms embargo; Türkiye announces troop reinforcement

Election of Christodoulides and resumption of informal contacts

Appointment of UN Personal Envoy Holguín

50^th anniversary of the invasion and hardening of Türkiye’s public stance

Informal talks in New York

Informal five-plus Geneva talks and follow-up meeting in Nicosia

Military occupation of Cyprus by Türkiye

Views of parties to the conflict and international community

State Parties

Cyprus – Türkiye

Reporting period: 2023 - 2026

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (between 2023 and 2026)

Partial reopening of Varosha/Maraş

US lifts arms embargo; Türkiye announces troop reinforcement

Election of Christodoulides and resumption of informal contacts

Appointment of UN Personal Envoy Holguín

50th anniversary of the invasion and hardening of Türkiye’s public stance

Informal talks in New York

Informal five-plus Geneva talks and follow-up meeting in Nicosia

Non-International Armed Conflicts

Views of parties to the conflict and international community

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

50^th anniversary of the invasion and hardening of Türkiye’s public stance