Cyprus – Türkiye

Türkiye has occupied the northern part of Cyprus since July 1974 through both the presence of its armed forces and the control it exerts over the self-declared ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC), which acts as the de facto authority in the area.

The law of military occupation is set out in customary international humanitarian law (IHL), Hague Convention IV of 1907 and its annexed Regulation, Geneva Convention IV of 1949, and Additional Protocol I of 1977. Both Cyprus and Türkiye are parties to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, but only Cyprus is a party to Additional Protocol I, meaning that that the Protocol is not formally applicable. Türkiye also remains bound by its international human rights law obligations in the territory it occupies.

Cyprus was part of the Ottoman Empire for three centuries and then fell under British rule for eight decades. In the 1950s, Greek Cypriots established paramilitary groups to push the British out. Some Turkish Cypriots joined the British forces as auxiliary security units to oppose the Greek Cypriot militants. Following Greek Cypriot retaliations, Turkish Cypriots created their own paramilitary groups, sparking clashes as both communities fought over the island’s future. Greek Cypriots aimed to unite with Greece, while Turkish Cypriots favoured partition and sought Turkey’s protection. Cyprus gained independence from Britain in 1960 after Greek Cypriots expelled British authorities.¹International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023. The newly established Republic of Cyprus was governed by a constitution that provided for power-sharing between the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority. However, this compromise quickly fell apart as intercommunal violence intensified.²International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023. United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 186 established the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964 to maintain order on the island.³UN Security Council Resolution 186, 4 March 1964. However, intercommunal violence continued until the end of 1967, involving murders, abductions, and sexual violence against Turkish Cypriots, compelling them to seek refuge in enclaves, which covered only three per cent of the island.⁴ International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023.

The situation worsened when a coup backed by the military junta then ruling Greece overthrew the Cypriot government on 15 July 1974 with the aim of uniting the island with Greece. Several hundred people were killed in the resultant violence.⁵International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023; ‘Cyprus marks 51 years since Turkish invasion that led to island nation’s partition’, Euronews, 20 July 2025. In response, Türkiye launched a military operation on 20 July 1974, landing troops in the north of the island to protect Turkish Cypriots.⁶International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023; ‘Cyprus marks 51 years since Turkish invasion that led to island nation’s partition’, Euronews, 20 July 2025. A ceasefire was reached shortly after, but Türkiye launched a second offensive in August 1974, ultimately taking control of approximately thirty-six per cent of Cypriot territory,⁷‘Cyprus marks 51 years since Turkish invasion that led to island nation’s partition’, Euronews, 20 July 2025. and expelling Greek Cypriots from the northern part of the island in a campaign of murders, evictions, looting, detention, and sexual violence.⁸International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023. Turkish forces also seized control of the Varosha/Maraş beach resort on the Famagusta/Gazimağusa coast, a former economic hub.⁹International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023.

Between 1963 and 1974, the conflict led to the deaths of over 3,000 people. A total of 400 Turkish Cypriots and 3,400 Greek Cypriots were killed or disappeared, and there was large-scale displacement of both communities: 160,000 to 200,000 Greek Cypriots fled or were expelled from the north, while between 45,000 and 60,000 Turkish Cypriots moved from the south to the north.¹⁰International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023; ‘Cyprus marks 51 years since Turkish invasion that led to island nation’s partition’, Euronews, 20 July 2025.

Since the 1974 invasion, Türkiye has maintained its military presence north of the Green Line,¹¹United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), ‘About the buffer zone’, 22 November 2025. and the island and its capital, Nicosia, have been effectively divided, with two separate administrations.¹²International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023. UNFICYP took up positions along the buffer zone, also known as the Green Line, separating the two sides, and remains deployed there to this day.¹³UN Security Council Resolution 186, 4 March 1964; United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), ‘About the buffer zone’, 22 November 2025. In the following decade, Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders began negotiations supported by the UN, with the goal of creating a bizonal, bicommunal federation.

However, the chances of reunification were significantly diminished when, in 1983, Türkiye established the self-proclaimed ‘TRNC’.¹⁴International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023. The TRNC has declared independence and established diplomatic relations with Turkey. Despite its claim to secession, the TRNC is not a State.¹⁵International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023. See also: M. H. Goldmann, ‘Turkey, Cyprus, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, Research Paper No. 15-8, M. G. Robertson Global Centre for Law & Public Policy, 2015. Also in 1983, the UN Security Council declared the TRNC’s declaration of independence invalid and called upon all States not to recognize it.¹⁶UN Security Council, Resolution 541 (1983), 18 November 1983, para 2.

Despite many Turkish and Turkish Cypriots still supporting partition, and Turkish forces remaining stationed in northern Cyprus, both sides officially called for continuing efforts to reunify the island.¹⁷International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023. When Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected as the Turkish Prime Minister in 2002, he actively supported the reunification of the island and endorsed the proposal developed under the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.¹⁸International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023. This proposal, known as the Annan Plan, ¹⁹The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, 31 March 2004. anticipated Cyprus’ European Union (EU) accession and sought to establish a federal entity with two constituent states.²⁰International Crisis Group, ‘The Cyprus Stalemate: What Next?’, Europe Report No. 171, 8 March 2006, p 3.

In 2004, the Annan reunification plan was put to simultaneous referenda on both sides of the island on 24 April 2004. Turkish Cypriots approved the plan by approximately sixty-five per cent, while seventy-six per cent of Greek Cypriots rejected it.²¹International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023; ‘Erdoğan dismisses UN plan for federated Cyprus, reaffirms commitment to two-state peace deal’, Euronews, 21 July 2024.

On 29 April 2004, following the adoption of resolution 1367 by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Turkish Cypriot community has been represented by two elected representatives in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.²²Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1376 (2004), April 2004; ‘Council of Europe invites Turkish Cypriots’, Cyprus Mail, Archives, 5 October 2004. In May 2004, the Republic of Cyprus acceded to the EU as a divided island: the northern part was deemed an area over which the government has jurisdiction but cannot exercise control, and in which EU law was suspended.²³‘Protocol No. 10 on Cyprus’, European Union Official Journal, 12003T/PRO/10, 16 April 2003; International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023. In parallel, notwithstanding the absence of recognition by the international community, the TRNC became an observer of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (in 2004) and of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (in 2012).²⁴Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Relations with The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)’, 2026; Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Relations with the Organisation of Economic Cooperation (ECO)’, 2026.

Yet, since 1974, the TRNC has remained isolated, heavily dependent on Türkiye for direct assistance and trade. Türkiye heavily supports Turkish Cypriot institutions and infrastructure. Ankara is also the sole provider of flights connecting the island, and communication services including post and phone lines are managed by Türkiye. Few foreign officials meet with Turkish Cypriot authorities, and the TRNC has no formal relations with international organizations. Banking services are limited to Turkish banks, the northern part of the island is largely controlled by Turkish companies and investors, and most international brands are unavailable due to pressure from the Republic of Cyprus. The TRNC cannot participate in international sports competitions.²⁵International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023. Around 40,000 Turkish troops have been deployed on the island since the Turkish invasion.²⁶H. Smith and P. Wintour, ‘UK, Greece and Turkey join Cyprus peace talks in Geneva’, The Guardian, 12 January 2017.

Although distrust persists in both communities, reunification talks have continued over the past decades albeit without resolution.²⁷International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023. In 2015, after the elections in northern Cyprus, both sides of the island were led by prominent supporters of reunification: Mustafa Akıncı for the Turkish Cypriots and Nicos Anastasiades for the Greek Cypriots. This led to the start of promising negotiations, including weekly meetings between the two leaders, during which citizenship, voting issues and post-unification governance frameworks were discussed.²⁸International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023. In November 2016, a first round of talks outside the island took place in Mont Pèlerin, Switzerland, on the territory to be covered by the future Turkish Cypriot constituent state.²⁹International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023. In early January 2017, a second round of talks was held in Geneva and covered sensitive issues such as governance, property, EU matters, the economy, and the allocation of territory (including land swaps). Negotiators were then joined by guarantor powers from the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee (United Kingdom, Greece, and Türkiye)³⁰Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, Art. II. and convened the ‘Conference on Cyprus’ under the UN Secretary-General’s auspices, in which security guarantees were notably discussed.³¹H. Smith and P. Wintour, ‘UK, Greece and Turkey join Cyprus peace talks in Geneva’, The Guardian, 12 January 2017; International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023. Opposing views on security concerns – the Turkish Cypriots and Türkiye wanted to maintain the system of guarantors, while Greece and the Greek Cypriots sought to end it – led to a six-month stalemate, which was further exacerbated by local dissension.³²International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023.

In May 2017, the UN Special Adviser for Cyprus, Espen Barth Eide, ended a visit to the Island with frustration after failing to reach an agreement on conditions to resume reunification talks.³³M. Kambas, ‘UN Cyprus envoy to end shuttle diplomacy as sides fail to agree conditions’, Reuters, 26 May 2017. Nevertheless, the two Cypriot leaders met in New York in early June 2017 at the UN Secretary-General’s invitation and agreed to resume talks in Crans-Montana later that same month.³⁴‘UN chief Guterres meets with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders’, UN News, 5 June 2017. Described by the United Nations as ‘the best chance’ at reunification, the 2017 Crans-Montana summit brought together the two community leaders, representatives of the UN, the EU, and the United Kingdom, as well as the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers.³⁵Mission of the Secretary-General’s Good Offices in Cyprus, ‘Conference on Cyprus reconvenes in Crans-Montana’, 28 June 2017. However, the summit failed to reach a deal, with negotiators unable to agree on key issues, including the power-sharing arrangement and the timeframe for the departure of Turkish troops.³⁶ M. Kambas, ‘Cypriot president says wants zero forces, guarantees from Turkey’, Reuters, 10 July 2017; International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023. As a result, Türkiye withdrew its fifteen-year support for the creation of a federation in Cyprus,³⁷M. I. Arslan, ‘Federation no longer on table for Cyprus: Turkish envoy’, Anadolu Ajansi, 25 November 2021; International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023. and although Anastasiades was re-elected in February 2018, he lost a northern counterpart capable of reaching a deal, as Akıncı was seriously weakened.³⁸‘Chypre : le président conservateur Nicos Anastasiades réélu’, France 24, 04 February 2018; International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023.

The inability to reach an agreement at Crans-Montana has intensified tensions on both sides of the island, making compromise less likely and weakening areas of cooperation. Competition for maritime hydrocarbons, disputes over maritime jurisdiction, shifting alliances and the increased militarization of both sides, as well as of historical allies and regional powers, have further exacerbated tensions.³⁹International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023. In particular, Western nations have tightened their military support for Greek Cypriots and increased their military cooperation with Greece, while Türkiye has reinforced its military presence in northern Cyprus.⁴⁰International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023. Additionally, Türkiye’s refusal to demarcate exclusive economic zones with the Republic, which it does not recognize, together with exploration and drilling by Türkiye and Greek Cypriot private partners in contested waters around Cyprus, as well as Turkish Cypriots’ demands for equal rights to the island’s resources, have led to increasing tensions between Greece and Türkiye.⁴¹International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023; International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, February 2019-December 2022’.

Nevertheless, in February 2019, the UN Special Envoy, Jane Holl Lute, visited Cyprus to seek to create the conditions for a resumption of reunification negotiations that had ended in July 2017. President Anastasiades announced during the visit that he was ready to resume negotiations with the TRNC.⁴²‘Ready to resume talks immediately, Anastasiades says’, Cyprus Mail, 4 February 2019; ‘Lute meeting productive says spokesman’, Cyprus Mail, 4 February 2019. On 26 February 2019, Akinci and Anastasiades met at the UN Buffer Zone. They agreed on a number of issues: confidence-building measures, including the interoperability of mobile phone networks and electrical grids, as well as the clearing of minefields.⁴³‘UN welcome Turkish, Greek Cypriot leaders’ meeting’, Daily Sabah, 1 March 2019.

Throughout 2019 and the first half of 2020, UN-led negotiations continued without any significant progress. In parallel, tensions between the Republic of Cyprus and the European Union, on one side, and Türkiye and the TRNC, on the other, over the exploitation of hydrocarbons in contested waters escalated. Türkiye sent drilling vessels while Greek Cypriot companies continued to explore and discover significant gas reserves. These tensions were further exacerbated when Türkiye and Libya concluded a maritime border deal in November 2019 – an agreement heavily criticized by Cyprus, Greece, and Egypt. In turn, in January 2021, Cyprus concluded a deal with Greece and Israel to build a natural gas pipeline in the eastern Mediterranean that would bypass Türkiye, a move strongly criticised by Turkish authorities.⁴⁴International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, February 2019-June 2020’.

In early October 2020, the TRNC, supported by Türkiye, announced it would reopen part of the Maraş/Varosha beachfront strip. This area had been sealed off and under Turkish military control since the 1974 Turkish invasion, during which around 17,000 Greek Cypriot residents fled the advance of Turkish troops. At that time, the UN Security Council declared any attempt to resettle any part of Varosha by persons other than its original inhabitants inadmissible and called for the transfer of the area to UN administration.⁴⁵UN Security Council, Resolution 550 (1984), 11 May 1984; UN Security Council, Resolution 789 (1992), 25 November 1992. The partial reopening of Maraş/Varosha prompted international criticism and the collapse of the TRNC government after the coalition partner, the People’s Party, withdrew in protest.⁴⁶A. Woodyatt, L. Doherty and C. Liakos, ‘North Cyprus reopens ‘ghost town’ beach resort for first time since 1970s’, CNN Travel, 10 October 2020; International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, October 2020’. The UN Security Council reaffirmed that the move breached its resolutions.⁴⁷UN Security Council, Presidential Statement S/PRST/2020/9, 9 October 2020.

On 19 October 2020, nationalist candidate, Ersin Tatar, won the TRNC ‘presidential’ election in northern Cyprus.⁴⁸ ‘Northern Cyprus: Right-wing nationalist Ersin Tatar elected president’, BBC, 19 October 2020; International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, October 2020’. During his campaign, President Tatar expressed his support for a two-State solution, a position he has maintained since.⁴⁹International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, September 2020’; International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, October 2020’; ‘KKTC Cumhurbaşkanı Tatar: Artık biz Kıbrıs’ta yeni siyaseti (iki devletli çözüm) savunuyoruz’, Anadolu Ajansı, 19 June 2021; International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023.

On 3 November 2020, the UN organised preliminary talks between the respective leaders in the buffer zone to explore the possibility of convening an informal ‘five-plus-UN meeting’ that would include Greece, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and both Cypriot communities.⁵⁰International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, September 2020’; International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, October 2020’; International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, November 2020’. Discussions with stakeholders continued in late 2020 and into early 2021. On 24 February 2021, the UN announced five-plus-UN talks scheduled for 27–29 April 2021.⁵¹International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, December 2020-February 2021’. However, the gap between the desired outcomes of Türkiye and Turkish Cypriots, who favour a two-state solution, and Greece and Greek Cypriots, who prefer a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, remained unbridgeable. As a result, the informal talks ended without any significant progress. At the end of the meetings, UN Secretary-General António Guterres affirmed: ‘We have not yet found enough common grounds to allow for the resumption of formal negotiations’.⁵²International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, March 2021-April 2021’; ‘Secretary-General’s Press Conference following the informal 5+1 meeting on Cyprus’, UN Secretary-General Statements, 29 April 2021. Nevertheless, the UN Special Envoy for Cyprus, Jane Hall Lute, continued to pursue common ground for a new round of talks.⁵³International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, May 2021’.

On 20 July 2021, Tatar announced that Turkish forces would hand over 3.5 square kilometres of Varosha/Maraş to TRNC control and that Greek Cypriot property owners could apply to the TRNC for reparations. This sparked strong condemnation from Cypriot government, Greece, and other States.⁵⁴International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, July 2021’. The UN Security Council responded with a presidential statement approved by all 15 members condemning the announcement and calling for the immediate reversal of all steps taken since October 2020.⁵⁵‘Security Council calls for “immediate reversal” of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot decision on Varosha’, UN News, 23 July 2021. Türkiye ignored the statement.⁵⁶ ‘UNSC condemns plan to reopen Northern Cyprus resort Varosha’, Al Jazeera, 23 July 2021. The Varosha/Maraş developments have been cited in subsequent Security Council resolutions on Cyprus as an ongoing concern.⁵⁷UN Security Council, Resolution 2674 (2023), 31 July 2023.

On 27 September 2021, Secretary-General Guterres convened talks between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders to discuss the possibility of relaunching negotiations. On 4 November, following a month of negotiations, Guterres appointed Colin Stewart as his new Special Representative and Head of UNFICYP. Nevertheless, since December 2021, UN-supported attempts to relaunch negotiations have stalled, and tensions have crystallized around drilling activities in contested waters around Cyprus.⁵⁸International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, September 2021-February 2022’.

In late February 2022, Cyprus’ Foreign Minister, Ioannis Kasoulides, expressed the Republic’s intention to actively pursue confidence-building measures with Turkish Cypriots, such as opening Ercan airport to international flights and transferring the Varosha/Maraş area to UN administration. Turkish Cypriot counterparts criticized this move, calling it a disguised attempt to maintain the status quo and bolster Greek Cypriot claims of sovereignty over the island.⁵⁹International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, March 2022’. Following the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent closure of airspace and ports to Russia by EU members, including by the Republic of Cyprus, the TRNC affirmed that its airspace was open to Russia and that it would welcome Russian tourists. In response, Russia indicated that it might consider direct flights to northern Cyprus and would begin offering consular services to Russian nationals. These apparent tightening of ties between Russia and northern Cyprus were perceived as a possible step towards Russia’s recognition of a Turkish Cypriot State.⁶⁰International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, March 2022’; International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023; A. I. Kirenci, ‘Russian Embassy will provide consular services in Northern Cyprus – TASS’, TRT World, 09 August 2023.

In early April 2022, Israel, Greece, and the Greek Cypriot-led Republic held talks in Athens to advance energy collaboration. This includes the Euro-Asia interconnector, the world’s longest and deepest underwater power cable through the Mediterranean, intended to reduce European emergency dependency on Russian gas and expected to be completed in 2024, as well as the development of a liquefied natural gas terminal in the Republic of Cyprus.⁶¹‘Greece, Cyprus and Israel to expand energy cooperation amid Ukraine war’, Reuters, 5 April 2022; International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, April 2022’.

In May 2022, Cyprus’s government offered several confidence-building measures, including the establishment of Turkish Cypriots’ connections to other countries, which were perceived as a disguised move to extend Greek Cypriot influence across the island and were rejected by the Turkish Cypriot counterparts.⁶²International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023. Two months later, Turkish Cypriots proposed collaborating with Greek Cypriots on hydrocarbons, electricity, renewable energy, water, demining, and irregular migration.⁶³‘Northern Cyprus proposes cooperation with Greek Cypriots on hydrocarbon, renewables’, Anadolu Agency, 02 July 2022; International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, July 2022’. The Greek Cypriot president rejected the offer but said his administration remains open to discussions if the talks are based on UN Security Council resolutions concerning the Cyprus issue.⁶⁴International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, July 2022’.

On 16 September 2022, the United States announced the lifting of the arms embargo on Cyprus, which was introduced in 1987 and already partially lifted for non-lethal weapons in December 2019,⁶⁵‘Turkey condemns US decision to lift Cyprus arms embargo’, Al Jazeera, 17 September 2022. explaining that the Republic of Cyprus ‘has met the necessary conditions under relevant legislation’. Among other conditions to lift the embargo, Cyprus adopted several financial regulatory oversight mechanisms and denied Russian military vessels access to ports.⁶⁶US Department of State, ‘Lifting of Defense Trade Restrictions on the Republic of Cyprus for Fiscal Year 2023’, Press Statement, 16 December 2022. The same day, the Turkish Foreign Minister criticised the US decision, warning that it could ‘lead to an arms race on the island’.⁶⁷‘Turkey condemns US decision to lift Cyprus arms embargo’, Al Jazeera, 17 September 2022. In response, Turkish President Erdoğan announced that he would send weapons, ammunition, and vehicles to support its 40,000 troops deployed on the island.⁶⁸‘Turkey to re-inforce military presence in northern Cyprus -Erdogan’, Reuters, 28 September 2022; International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, September 2022’; International Crisis Group, ‘An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus’, Report No. 268, 17 April 2023. In early October 2022, Turkish President Erdoğan further announced plans to send drones to northern Cyprus.⁶⁹International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, October 2022’.

The TRNC demanded that the UNFICYP’s deployment in northern Cyprus end unless the UN signs an agreement with the TRNC, not only with the Greek Cypriot government.⁷⁰International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, October 2022’. Nevertheless, on 30 January 2023, the UN Security Council renewed UNFICYP’s mandate for one year.⁷¹UN Security Council, Resolution 2674 (2023), UN Doc. S/RES/2674, 30 January 2023.

In the first half of 2023, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaderships continued to oppose their respective visions for the island’s future, namely a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation against a two-State solution, while continuing UN-facilitated dialogue efforts. New tensions about hydrocarbon drilling and the ghost resort Varosha/Maraş also surfaced.⁷²International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, January 2023 – July 2023’. In particular, following his election on 12 February 2023, the new president and former foreign minister of the Greek Cypriot-led Republic,⁷³ Nikos Christodoulides,‘Cyprus ex-foreign minister Christodoulides elected president’, Le Monde, 12 February 2023. reiterated his engagement towards ‘the end of the Turkish occupation and the reunification of our homeland’ as well as his commitment ‘to restart the dialogue, to create the conditions for solving the Cyprus problem’.⁷⁴T. Bolton, ‘Nikos Christodoulides elected president of Cyprus, vows to revive peace talks with Turkey’, euronews, 13 February 2023.

On 23 February, he met Turkish Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar for the first time in the UN-controlled buffer zone in Nicosia, hosted by UN Special Representative Colin Stewart.⁷⁵‘Turkish, Greek Cypriot leaders meet for informal talks‘, Daily Sabah, 23 February 2023. The positions of the two sides remained unchanged: Christodoulides reaffirmed his support for the UN framework for a bizonal, bicommunal federation, while Tatar maintained that negotiations could only resume on the basis of sovereign equality and equal international status for the TRNC.⁷⁶ ‘Turkish, Greek Cypriot leaders meet for informal talks’, Daily Sabah, 23 February 2023.

Following the lifting of the US arms embargo, the Republic of Cyprus pledged on 10 March 2023 to increase military spending to up to two per cent of gross domestic product (GDP).⁷⁷P. Iddon, ‘Cyprus Is Planning A New Military Buildup’, Forbes, 19 March 2023; International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, March 2023’. It also expressed concerns about Turkish activities in Varosha/Maraş, emphasising that ‘any development other than the transfer of Varosha under UN administration’ would be illegal.⁷⁸International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, March 2023’. President Christodoulides travelled to Brussels, where he presented a proposal seeking more active EU involvement in the Cyprus issue; the initiative faced strong opposition from the Turkish Cypriot leadership.⁷⁹International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, March 2023’.

The Republic of Cyprus signed a partnership agreement with the United States to cooperate on maritime security and other issues, prompting strong criticism from the TRNC and Türkiye in early April 2023.⁸⁰American Hellenic Institute, ‘The United States & the Republic of Cyprus Strategic Partnership Overview’, May 2025; International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, April 2023’. In May 2023, Cyprus strengthened its ties with France and Israel and conducted military exercises with partner nations, including Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, the United States, and the United Kingdom.⁸¹Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Defence, ‘Announcement of the Ministry of Defence on the completion of the Multinational CIMIC Exercise “ARGONAUT 2023”’, Press release, 19 May 2023; International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, May 2023’. After his re-election, Erdoğan met Tatar in the TRNC on 12 June 2023 during his first foreign trip. Erdoğan voiced his support for the two-State solution again and urged the international community to recognize the TRNC.⁸²International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, June 2023’.

Already dim, the prospects for resuming formal talks diminished further when, on 17 August 2023, the TRNC announced the construction of a road connecting the mixed village of Pile in the buffer zone to Yiğitler, within the TRNC, citing humanitarian reasons.⁸³‘Turkish Cypriots’ road expansion in buffer zone irks United Nations’, Daily Sabah, 18 August 2023; International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, August 2023’. The UNFICYP attempted to block the Turkish Cypriot construction workers and police upon their arrival close to the Green Line, leading to clashes between the UN peacekeepers and Turkish Cypriot police, in which at least three peacekeepers, two private landowners and eight Turkish Cypriot police officers were injured.⁸⁴‘Turkish Cypriots press on road project amid UN objections’, Daily Sabah, 20 August 2023; International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, August 2023’. The skirmishes drew harsh condemnation from the international community and widened dissension between the two parties.⁸⁵Republic of Türkiye, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘No: 201, 19 August 2023, Press Release Regarding the Intervention of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus in the Construction of the Pile-Yiğitler Road in the Territory of the TRNC’, 19 August 2023; ‘Turkish Cypriots press on road project amid UN objections’, Daily Sabah, 20 August 2023; International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, August 2023 – September 2023’. Nevertheless, road construction continued, and by October 2023 the parties reached an agreement on the road, which was brokered by the UN.⁸⁶‘Turkish Cypriots press on road project amid UN objections’, Daily Sabah, 20 August 2023; M. M. Firik, ‘Northern Cyprus continues construction of Pile-Yigitler Road despite objection’, Anadolu Ajansi, 20 August 2023; A. I. Kirenci, ‘Pile-Yigitler road back on track in Cyprus, after obstruction by UN’, TRT World, 25 August 2023; ‘UN mission announces deal on Turkish Cypriot road construction’, Daily Sabah, 09 October 2023; International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, September 2023 – October 2023’.

On 5 January 2024, the UN Secretary-General Guterres appointed María Ángela Holguín Cuéllar, the former foreign minister of Colombia, as his Personal Envoy on Cyprus.⁸⁷‘Secretary-General Appoints María Angela Holguín Cuéllar of Colombia Personal Envoy on Cyprus’, UN Press Release SGA/2255, 5 January 2024 The post had been vacant since 2017, when Norwegian diplomat Espen Barth Eide concluded his term following the collapse of the Crans-Montana summit.⁸⁸‘Holguin appointed UN chief’s personal envoy to Cyprus’, Cyprus Mail, 3 May 2025. Holguín was tasked with a good-offices role, seeking common ground and advising the UN Secretary-General on the way forward. She conducted consultations with both Cypriot leaders and the guarantor powers between January and July 2024, and at the end of those consultations submitted her report to him.⁸⁹ ‘Holguin gives Guterres her report on Cyprus problem and prospects to start talks’, Cyprus Mail, 10 July 2024; ‘The 50th Anniversary of Türkiye’s Military Intervention in Cyprus‘, Global Panorama, 20 November 2024. Her open letter of July 2024, published alongside the report, did not address substantive matters but indicated that she had been unable to identify sufficient common ground or political will to recommend the resumption of formal negotiations.⁹⁰‘Holguin says ‘we must think differently’ in parting letter’, Cyprus Mail, 07 July 2024; ‘The 50th Anniversary of Türkiye’s Military Intervention in Cyprus‘, Global Panorama, 20 November 2024.

On 20 July 2024, President Erdoğan attended celebrations in northern Cyprus marking the 50th anniversary of the 1974 invasion.⁹¹‘Erdoğan dismisses UN plan for federated Cyprus, reaffirms commitment to two-state peace deal’, Euronews, 21 July 2024. Speaking at the TRNC parliament building, Erdoğan said that ‘a federal solution is not possible in Cyprus’ and that ‘a stable solution to the issue is possible only with the recognition of two States’, adding that Türkiye would ‘continue to fight with determination for the recognition of the TRNC and the implementation of a two-State solution’.⁹²Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, Directorate of Communications, ‘Erdoğan defines recognition of two states as a condition for Cyprus settlement‘, 20 July 2024 The anniversary events were widely interpreted as a significant public hardening of Türkiye’s position, with Erdoğan explicitly ruling out the UN-endorsed federal framework that has formed the basis of international efforts for decades.⁹³‘Erdoğan dismisses UN plan for federated Cyprus, reaffirms commitment to two-state peace deal’, Euronews, 21 July 2024.

On 16 October 2024, the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, hosted an informal dinner in New York with Christodoulides and Tatar on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly.⁹⁴‘Cypriot Leaders Agree To Renew Informal Talks on Reunification’, The Media Line, 16 October 2024. Both leaders agreed to continue contacts and to explore the opening of additional crossing points along the Green Line as a confidence-building measure and meet again in the buffer zone in January 2025 to discuss it.⁹⁵‘Cyprus Leader Says Any Deal on Island Must Align With UN Resolutions’, Reuters, 5 March 2025. However, Tatar had stated ahead of the dinner that he would not engage in reunification discussions on any terms that did not include recognition of the TRNC, and the fundamental divergence between the two sides’ positions – a federation versus a two-State solution – remained unresolved.⁹⁶‘No Expectations for Cypriot Leaders UN Dinner Session in N.Y.’, The National Herald, 16 October 2024.

On 23 October 2024, Cyprus and the United States launched a ‘Strategic Dialogue’ in Nicosia, with the aims of promoting stability and peace in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and Europe, enhancing bilateral and regional security, and fostering economic innovation and prosperity, among other objectives. The dialogue was also meant to act as a ‘platform to advance practical cooperation in areas including crisis management and law enforcement, energy security, culture, education, innovation and technology, trade and investment, and people-to people ties.’⁹⁷US Embassy Nicosia, ‘Joint Statement of the First Strategic Dialogue between the Republic of Cyprus & the United States of America’, 23 October 2024. Security ties between Cyprus and the United States were further strengthened in January 2025, when US President Biden issued a presidential memorandum enabling the Republic of Cyprus to receive US defence articles and to engage in military sales.⁹⁸K. Singh, ‘Biden boosts security ties with Cyprus through security memorandum’, Reuters, 16 January 2025.

On 17 and 18 March 2025, the UN Secretary-General Guterres hosted another informal meeting in Geneva, bringing together Christodoulides and Tatar alongside the three guarantor powers: Greece, Türkiye, and the United Kingdom.⁹⁹‘Cyprus talks show “new atmosphere” between divided island’s leaders: Guterres‘, UN News, 18 March 2025. Guterres described the outcome as ‘meaningful progress’ and ‘a new atmosphere’, characterizing it as the most significant development since the collapse of the Crans-Montana summit in 2017.¹⁰⁰ ‘Informal Meeting on Cyprus – UN Secretary-General António Guterres Media Stakeout’, UN Geneva Newsroom, 18 March 2025. The parties agreed on six confidence-building measures: the opening of four new crossing points along the Green Line; demining; the creation of a bicommunal Technical Committee on Youth; joint environmental and climate initiatives, including the impacts on mining areas; solar energy in the buffer zone; and the restoration of cemeteries.¹⁰¹‘Informal Meeting on Cyprus – UN Secretary-General António Guterres Media Stakeout’, UN Geneva Newsroom, 18 March 2025; ‘Cyprus, July 2025 Monthly Forecast‘, Security Council Report, 30 June 2025. They also agreed to a further informal meeting in late July 2025 and accepted Guterres’ appointment of a Personal Envoy to prepare next steps; Holguín was reappointed to this role on 2 May 2025.¹⁰²‘Secretary-General Appoints María Angela Holguín Cuéllar of Colombia Personal Envoy on Cyprus’, UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, SGA/2351, 02 May 2025.

On 2 April 2025, Christodoulides and Tatar held a follow-up meeting in Nicosia, at which they inaugurated the new Youth Technical Committee, the first new bicommunal committee formed in a decade.¹⁰³‘Cypriot leaders meet as they explore cooperation‘, Daily Sabah, 5 May 2025. Despite the renewed meeting, both leaders continued to reaffirm their positions, which remain far apart.¹⁰⁴‘Despite Meeting, Cyprus Reunification Standoff Still Remains‘, The National Herald, 2 April 2025

On 4 April 2025, the first European Union-Central Asia summit was held in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.¹⁰⁵European Council/Council of the European Union, ‘First EU-Central Asia summit, 4 April 2025: Main results’, 23 April 2025. The leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the EU adopted a joint declaration in which they notably reaffirmed their commitment to UN Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) regarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus.¹⁰⁶Joint Declaration following the first European Union-Central Asia summit, 04 April 2025, para. 4.

Over the following months, both leaders continued direct talks on confidence-building measures, mediated by the UN Special Representative. However, tensions erupted over the TRNC’s sale of Greek Cypriot property to foreigners and related prosecutions carried out by the Greek Cypriot authorities, stalling bilateral meetings.¹⁰⁷International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, May 2025 – August 2025’. In parallel, the UN Secretary-General reappointed María Ángela Holguín Cuéllar as personal envoy, who visited Cyprus to prepare a high-level informal meeting expected to take place in New York towards the end of July.¹⁰⁸International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, May 2025 – June 2025’. The EU Commission appointed a Special Envoy for Cyprus, prompting criticism from Türkiye, which asserted that ‘EU lost its impartiality on the Cyprus issue by admitting the Greek Cypriot side to EU membership in 2004’.¹⁰⁹Republic of Türkiye, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘QA-8, 14 May 2025, Statement of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Öncü Keçeli, in Response to a Question Regarding the Appointment of a “Special Envoy for Cyprus” by the European Commission’, Press & Information, 14 May 2025; International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, May 2025 – June 2025’.

Following the election of the new leader of the TRNC, Tufan Erhurman, in October 2025, who favoured reunification talks, hope for the resumption of talks between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot leaders surfaced.¹¹⁰‘Turkish Cypriots elect Tufan Erhurman in northern Cyprus polls’, Al Jazeera, 19 October 2025; International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, October 2025’. Yet tensions persisted over Cyprus’s efforts to strengthen regional alignments, notably through reinforced security, defence, and military cooperation with Greece and Israel.¹¹¹International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, October 2025 – December 2025’. See also: Y. Chaliotis, ‘Christodoulides may be becoming one of the most effective presidents of Cyprus’, The Times of Israel/The Blogs, 5 June 2026. Cyprus also signed a strategic partnership with France in December 2025.¹¹²‘Cyprus and France sign strategic partnership agreement in Paris’, Policy Press, 17 December 2025. In early 2026, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders met under UN auspices and bilaterally, with the aim of reaching agreements on remaining confidence-building measures to be implemented and resuming substantive talks. These successive meetings were met with optimism, even though no immediate breakthrough was achieved.¹¹³ International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, January 2026 – April 2026’.

In response to the regional crisis in the Middle East, in early March 2026, Türkiye deployed six F-16 fighter jets and air defence systems to northern Cyprus.¹¹⁴N. Potera, ‘Türkiye sends F-16s to Cyprus. New security architecture in the Eastern Mediterranean’, Defence 24, 12 March 2026; International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, March 2026 – April 2026’. France, Greece, and the United Kingdom deployed maritime destroyers, warships, anti-drone defences, and fighter jets to bolster the Republic’s defence after an Iranian-made drone struck a United Kingdom (UK) military base in southern Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus also announced that it was in discussions with France about the deployment of French troops in southern Cyprus for humanitarian purposes.¹¹⁵J. Parker, ‘European allies rush to bolster Cyprus defences after drones target British base’, BBC, 03 March 2026; International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, March 2026 – April 2026’. Both sides criticised their counterparts’ moves.¹¹⁶International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis Watch: Cyprus, March 2026 – April 2026’

In June 2026, Christodoulides made his first official visit to Kazakhstan and inaugurated the Republic’s first embassy in Central Asia. Several agreements and memoranda were signed on issues such as digitization, e-government, cybersecurity, and space, culture, education and science, sport, and cooperation on investment.¹¹⁷Y. Chaliotis, ‘Christodoulides may be becoming one of the most effective presidents of Cyprus’, The Times of Israel/The Blogs, 05 June 2026. In parallel, Cyprus has deepened its military cooperation with France through the signing of a defence agreement that allows for Cypriot and French armed forces to operate together and for French troops to be deployed on Cyprus territory.¹¹⁸E. Panayiotou, ‘Cyprus, France sign defence agreement to deepen military cooperation’, Cyprus Mail, 08 June 2026. In response, Türkiye warned that ‘if the rights and laws of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots are threatened in the eastern Mediterranean, our response will be very clear and very harsh’.¹¹⁹‘Turkey issues warning over France-Cyprus troops deal’, Le Monde, 10 June 2026.

State Parties

• Cyprus
• Türkiye, including through its proxy (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC))