Ethiopia

There are two ongoing non-international conflicts in Ethiopia, namely:

A non-international armed conflict between the ENDF and Fano Amhara militias.
A non-international armed conflict between the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) – i.e., the government armed forces – and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA).

In Ethiopia, long-standing internal tensions among regional/ethnically based groups, as well as intersecting disputes with neighbouring countries, have periodically flared up into armed conflict over the last decades.¹ In addition to the non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) classified in this entry, Ethiopia is party to an international armed conflict against Sudan.²

Eritrea-Ethiopia

After three decades of war against Ethiopia, Eritrea became independent on 27 April 1993, following the Conference on Peace and Democracy held in Addis Ababa in 1991. Initially, Eritrea enjoyed the support of the new Ethiopian government. By May 1998, however, relations between the two nations deteriorated due to tensions over trade, access to the Red Sea, and a border dispute. These issues led to a major two-year international armed conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia.³ The conflict formally ended with the conclusion of the Algiers Agreement on 12 December 2000, which also provided for the establishment of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission.⁴

Amhara region

Tensions had escalated between the ENDF and Fano Amhara as of April 2023³², with intensity significantly increasing during August of that year.³³ Initially concentrated in North Wello and North Shewa zones, by August, Fano Amhara fighters had begun to fan out across Amhara, including in the regional capital of Bahir Dar.³⁴ According to ACLED, there were 74 clashes between the ENDF and Fano Amhara between April and July 2023, with the number rising to 90 in the month of August alone.³⁵ On 3 August 2023, the situation intensified to the point where regional security forces could no longer control the Fano Amhara fighters, prompting the Amhara regional authorities to request assistance from the federal government. On 4 August, the Ethiopian government declared a state of emergency in response to the escalating violence.³⁶

Fighting has since further intensified. After Fano militants took control of several towns (later recaptured by the ENDF), clashes shifted to rural areas, including through drone strikes and shelling, in which many civilians were killed along with Fano militants.³⁷

Fighting continued throughout the second half of 2023, inflicting a heavy toll on civilians, but also on Fano members (including senior leaders), as well as the ENDF and Kebele militias.³⁸Numerous members of the ENDF and Fano militants (perceived or actual) were also captured.³⁹ In November 2023, the town of Lalibela changed hands during fighting between the opposing forces.⁴⁰

Despite peace efforts, fighting between the ENDF and Fano Amhara continued in July and August 2024,⁴¹ and grew in intensity in September. Notably, in the middle of the month, significant clashes between Fano Amhara and the ENDF occurred in Gondar and surroundings areas, where Fano pushed the ENDF to withdraw from at least five districts and forced local officials to relocate to the zonal capital, Debre Tabor.⁴² Weapons used in the fighting included heavy artillery and rockets.⁴³ Intense clashes also occurred between the ENDF and Fano Amhara in October.⁴⁴

Fighting continued to be reported between November 2024 and January 2025, with several civilians killed and damage inflicted on homes and agriculture. While exercising control over Feres Bet town (Dega Damot woreda, in West Gojjam Zone), Fano Amhara is said to have held hostage approximately 30 government officials and 70 civilians for two months seeking a ransom for their safe release. On 5 December, Fano fighters executed the hostages as they withdrew from their positions after clashing with the ENDF. During these clashes, the ENDF responded with drone strikes, killing at least five Fano fighters.⁴⁵ Fano Amhara and the ENDF clashed throughout January 2025, notably during a military operation in which Fano claimed to have killed around 200 ENDF soldiers.⁴⁶

Fano Amhara also fought against other militias in Amhara. For instance, in early July 2024, Fano Amhara confronted ethnic Agaw militias, forcing them to surrender weapons and cease all support for the Ethiopian government. Clashes lasted several days, leaving a reported 80 people dead and causing the internal displacement of 10,000 civilians. As a result of the military action, Fano Amhara were able to seize control of Quara woreda in western Gondar.⁴⁷

Oromia region

Combat between the ENDF and the OLA was reported in both 2023 and 2024.⁴⁸ The OLA are said to have also attacked civilians.⁴⁹ Specifically, on 30 October 2024, due to suspicions about local people supporting the government, the OLA killed 38 civilians and burnt down homes in an operation described as the deadliest in the Oromia region since November 2022. The ENDF were subsequently deployed to the region.⁵⁰

Since this deployment, the ENDF have launched several strikes against the OLA. The ENDF and the OLA clashed in November and December 2024 in several zones.⁵¹ On 1 December 2024, the Ethiopian government signed a peace agreement with a splinter group of the OLA.⁵² This splinter group, which was led by former central zone commander, Jaal Sagni Negasa, broke away from the main faction in late September 2024. It comprised several hundred fighters.⁵³ Mr Negasa started sending his fighters to rehabilitation camps in January 2025,⁵⁴ a move that forms part of the agreed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme.⁵⁵ However, the founding OLA faction continued to clash with the ENDF throughout January 2025.⁵⁶

Fighting between Fano Amhara militants and the OLA was first reported in Darra district on 15 June 2024. The fighting resulted in the deaths of at least four civilians and allowed the OLA to gain control over Cheka town, which had previously been controlled by Fano Amhara militias.⁵⁷ The ENDF is fighting the Fano Amhara militias and the OLA in the area.⁵⁸ Clashes between the OLA, Fano and ENDF continued during July and August 2024, leaving nine civilians dead and a number of others wounded. As a result, families were displaced, hundreds of students were prevented from returning home after sitting their exams at Salale University; more than 50 homes were destroyed; and essential infrastructure was severely damaged.⁵⁹

In order to determine if the continued presence of the EDF in Ethiopia amounts to an IAC between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and possibly a situation of belligerent occupation, it is essential to assess whether Ethiopia has consented to this presence and to what extent.

As stated by the ICRC in its commentaries, “[a]ny unconsented-to military operations by one State in the territory of another State should be interpreted as an armed interference in the latter’s sphere of sovereignty and thus may be an international armed conflict under Article 2(1)”.⁶⁰ Such consent “must have been previously expressed or established (explicitly or tacitly). It must be valid, i.e. given by an authority authorized to do so on behalf of the State, and given without any coercion from the intervening State. […] [h]owever, the existence of such consent might be very difficult to establish for a number of reasons. States often do not publicize their consensual agreements. Moreover, the intervention of a third State might not give rise to any protest from the territorial State […] the absence of protest is a strong indicator of the existence of – at least – tacit consent […].”⁶¹ Moreover, any prior consent could be withdrawn at any time, without further formality, including by protesting against the presence of foreign troops initially authorized.⁶²

Although Ethiopia has never publicly requested or authorized Eritrean military involvement in the Tigray conflict or the continued presence of EDF,⁶³ the intervention of the EDF is generally described as having been accepted, or even requested, by Ethiopia.⁶⁴ Following reports of serious abuses and multiple statements calling for EDF withdrawal, Ethiopia announced in early April 2021 that the EDF would leave Tigray.⁶⁵ Moreover, the Pretoria Agreement requires Ethiopia to safeguard its territory against foreign incursion.⁶⁶ That said, the federal government of Ethiopia has never protested against the EDF presence on its territory. On the contrary, only the Tigray Interim Administration denounced the presence of the EDF and requested their withdrawal.⁶⁷ The absence of an official statement or agreement concerning the EDF’s presence, especially in light of Eritrea’s previous support during the Tigray conflict, therefore appears to be the result of a deliberate political decision, implying consent. This is evidenced by Ethiopia’s lack of objection to Eritrea’s military involvement, even after the end of Tigray conflict. Consequently, based on circumstantial evidence, even though tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea have been recently reported, as long as there is no use of armed force between the two nations and no protest by Ethiopia against Eritrea’s presence, there is no IAC between the two States.

Two criteria need to be assessed in order to determine whether a situation of armed violence amounts to a non-international armed conflict:

First, the level of armed violence must reach a certain degree of intensity that goes beyond internal disturbances and tensions.
Second, in every NIAC, at least one side in the conflict must be a non-state armed group that exhibits a certain level of organization in order to qualify as a party to the NIAC. Government forces are presumed to satisfy the criteria of organization.⁶⁸

Various indicative factors are used to assess whether a given situation has met the required intensity threshold, such as the number, duration and intensity of individual confrontations; the types of weapons and military equipment used; the number of persons and types of forces participating in the fighting; the number of casualties; the extent of material destruction; the number of civilians fleeing and the involvement of the United Nations Security Council.⁶⁹

A series of indicative factors are used to assess whether armed groups exhibit the required degree of organization, such as the existence of a command structure and disciplinary rules and mechanisms; the ability to procure, transport and distribute arms; the ability to plan, coordinate and carry out military operations; the ability to negotiate and conclude agreements, e.g. ceasefire or peace agreements. If the minimum criterion for organization of the armed groups is not fulfilled, there is no armed conflict.⁷⁰

Non-International Armed Conflict between the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) and Fano Amhara militias

The intensity criterion has been fulfilled since at least April 2023, with fighting that intensified and spread across the whole Amhara region, including the regional capital Bahir Dar, by August 2023. As noted above, See ‘Major events and developments – Amhara region’. between April and July 2023, 74 clashes were reported between the ENDF and Fano militias. Armed confrontations between the ENDF and Fano militias took place throughout the reporting period and involved repeated use of drone strikes, airstrikes, heavy artillery, rockets and intensive shelling. These clashes have resulted in hundreds or even thousands of deaths and many more injured. Critical infrastructure, agricultural fields and houses have also suffered extensive damage.

The Fano insurgency is characterized by a decentralized and fragmented structure, with a wide range of loosely aligned groups,¹ most of which are small and operate autonomously. At first glance, this decentralized nature may be seen as failing to meet the organizational requirement. According to the ICRC, however, such decentralized armed groups, which consist of fluid alliances of small armed groups led by individual commanders who retain considerable decision-making power and responsibility over group members, and where there is loose internal coordination, including for planning and conduct of military operations, can be considered as a party to a NIAC.²

Notably, Fano groups have executed successful military operations by joining forces and effectively mobilizing their fighters.³ This has enabled the Fano militias to exercise control over several key roadways as of July 2024 and to encircle Woldia city in early September 2024.⁴ In November 2024, Fano claimed to control more than 80 per cent of the Amhara region.⁵ However, Fano militias have only briefly controlled urban centres⁶ and, more generally, only temporary control was reported in most cases.⁷ But their capacity to do so confirms the ability to plan consolidated attacks. Recorded patterns of violence EPO,⁸ indicate that the Fano militias have become more organized, with reports of Fano attacks on ENDF forces tripling compared to the previous year for the period between July and September 2024. Additionally, the Fano militias are able to communicate, but not necessarily with only one voice EPO,⁹Given that both intensity and organization criteria are fulfilled, a NIAC between the ENDF and Fano Amhara is ongoing. However, as long as there is no strong evidence of sufficiently stable territorial control as to enable Fano militias to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and effectively apply Additional Protocol II (AP II), this NIAC does not meet the AP II threshold,¹⁰although customary law still applies.

1
L. Karr, ‘Africa File, September 26, 2024: Fano Offensive in Ethiopia’s Amhara; Egypt Arms Somalia; Rebel Drones in Mali; Burkina Thwarts Another Coup’, Institute for the Study of War, 26 September 2024.
2
ICRC, The Roots of Restraint in War, 2018, pp 45-47.
3
B. Bitew, ‘A conflict between the Amhara Fano and the government is the latest challenge to Ethiopia’, LSE blog, 23 November 2023; ‘Fano force reportedly besieging Woldia City in North Wollo’, borkena, 7 September 2024.
4
‘Fano force reportedly besieging Woldia City in North Wollo’, borkena, 7 September 2024.; L. Karr, ‘Africa File, September 26, 2024: Fano Offensive in Ethiopia’s Amhara; Egypt Arms Somalia; Rebel Drones in Mali; Burkina Thwarts Another Coup’, Institute for the Study of War, 26 September 2024.
5
S. Vera, ‘Who is Fano? Inside Ethiopia’s Amhara rebellion’, The New Humanitarian, 12 November 2024.
6
L. Karr, ‘Africa File, September 26, 2024: Fano Offensive in Ethiopia’s Amhara; Egypt Arms Somalia; Rebel Drones in Mali; Burkina Thwarts Another Coup’, Institute for the Study of War, 26 September 2024.
7
A. Necho and Y. Debebe, ‘Briefing Paper: Understanding the Fano Insurgency in Ethiopia’s Amhara Region’, Rift Valley Institute/Peace Research Facility, February 2024; ‘Fano forces withdraw from Gondar City after two days of fighting’, borkena, 19 September 2024; L. Karr, ‘Africa File, September 26, 2024: Fano Offensive in Ethiopia’s Amhara; Egypt Arms Somalia; Rebel Drones in Mali; Burkina Thwarts Another Coup’, Institute for the Study of War, 26 September 2024.
8
‘EPO December 2023 Monthly | The Fano Insurgency: Main Hurdles to Unifying Fano’, ACLED 19 January 2024; International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, Ethiopia, July–September 2024.
9
‘Ethiopia Weekly Update (17 December 2024)’, ACLED, 18 December 2024.
10
ICRC, Commentary of 1987, paras 4464 and 4467; M. M. Bradley, ‘Additional Protocol II: Elevating the minimum threshold of intensity?’, IRRC, No. 915, January 2022.

Non-international armed conflict between the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)

As outlined above,¹ military operations between the ENDF and the OLA as well as attacks on civilians by the OLA were reported throughout 2023 and 2024. The attacks in October 2024 were the deadliest on record over the two years, with the ENDF launching air and drone strikes against OLA positions. The signature of a peace agreement between the Ethiopian government and a splinter group of the OLA in early December 2024 did not end the fighting between the founding OLA faction and the ENDF, which continued into 2025.

The OLA, also referred to as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)-Shane by the Ethiopian government,² possesses a command structure in the form of a politico-military body labelled the OLF-OLA High Command.³ The OLF-OLA High Command was established in 2021 by its General Assembly (Kora Sabaa) to direct the OLA’s military, political and diplomatic ambitions. The internal disciplinary system of the OLA is believed to be incorporated in the general assembly of the OLA.⁴

In addition to conducting regular attacks against the ENDF and communal militias, which are also frequently used as a tactic to seize weapons from the military,⁵ part of the OLA’s military strategy is to launch targeted attacks against government officials, police officers and commanders in small town and villages in order to disrupt the local administration.⁶ The OLA often employs hit-and-run tactics⁷ and even has its own so-called hit squad, called Abbaa Torbee,⁸ tasked with violent operations in urban areas and assassinations of government officials.

The OLA’s stronghold is in the west of Oromia.⁹ The OLA has close ties with, and relies on, local communities,¹⁰ who may offer some logistical support. The OLA exercised military control over large areas of Ethiopian territory, mostly rural and semi-rural locations in Oromia throughout 2020, 2021 and 2022.¹¹ Reports in 2024 suggested that the OLA may still exert some control over certain rural territories in Oromia.¹² But information regarding the exact areas under OLA control, and the nature of the control, remains scarce and these areas are mostly referred to as ‘hideouts’.¹³

According to the ICRC, a NIAC ends when a ‘peaceful settlement is reached’, namely when ‘one of the parties ceases to exist’ or ‘there is a lasting cessation of armed confrontations without real risk of resumption’.¹⁴ Given that hostilities between the ENDF and the OLA have not ceased and that the OLA continues to exist as an organized armed group, the NIAC between the ENDF and the OLA was ongoing during the reporting period. Since it is uncertain whether the OLA exercises territorial control within the meaning of AP II, the Protocol was not applicable to this conflict although customary law still applies.

1
See ‘Major events and developments – Oromia region’.
2
EPO, ‘Western Oromia Conflict’, ACLED, 20 August 2024.
3
EPO, ‘Ethiopia situation update (5 February 2025)’, ACLED, 5 February 2025.
4
‘Ethiopia: Oromo Liberation Army Denies Reports of Splits Within Group’ Agenzia Nova, 2 October 2024.
5
Oromo Liberation Army OLF-OLA, Post, X, 3 November 2024.
6
UK Government, ‘Guidance: Country policy and information note: Oromos, the Oromo Liberation Front and the Oromo Liberation Army, Ethiopia, March 2022 (accessible)’, 27 December 2024.
7
EPO,‘Western Oromia Conflict’, ACLED, 20 August 2024.
8
EPO, ‘Actor Profiles’, ACLED.
9
G. Tunbridge, ‘Ethiopia signs peace deal with Oromo Liberation Army splinter group’, The Africa Report, 3 December 2024.
10
EPO, ‘Western Oromia Conflict’, ACLED, 20 August 2024.
11
EPO, ‘Western Oromia Conflict’, ACLED, 20 August 2024.
12
German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, Country report 69: Ethiopia: Domestic political situation, April 2024.
13
A. Tekle, ‘Ethiopia, Kenya launch coordinated military offensive against alleged OLA hideouts’, The Reporter (Ethiopia), 8 February 2025. M. M. Bradley, ‘Additional Protocol II: Elevating the minimum threshold of intensity?’, IRRC, No. 915, January 2022.
14
ICRC, How is the term “armed conflict” defined in international humanitarian law?, Opinion Paper, 2024, pp 18–19.

Internal clashes between TPLF factions

Although at least some TPLF factions could be presumed to meet the organization criterion, publicly available information is currently insufficient to determine whether the clashes described above,⁷¹have escalated into regular and intense armed violence. In the absence of factors indicating that the situation has reached the required intensity threshold, there is no basis for classifying the incidents as a NIAC between TPLF factions.

Clashes between Fano Amhara and the OLA

Although reports show that the Fano Amhara and the OLA engage each other in combat from time to time, resulting in civilian deaths and damage to civilian infrastructure, the ENDF is also actively engaging the Fano Amhara militias and the OLA.⁷² It is therefore difficult to attribute casualties, injuries, and property damage to fighting between OLA and Fano Amhara, or, respectively, to the separate clashes between these groups and the ENDF. As a result, the fighting between the Fano Amhara and the OLA cannot be clearly considered to reach the intensity threshold and, thus, to constitute a NIAC.

Clashes between the Fano Amhara and the Ethnic Agaw militias

Although casualties and displacement resulting from clashes between Fanon Amhara and Ethnic Agaw militias⁷³ seem to indicate a certain intensity of violence,⁷⁴ too little is known about the organizational structures of this militia to classify the situation as a NIAC.

State Parties

Ethiopia

Non-state parties

Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)
Fano Amhara Militias

Other States Involved

Eritrea

Other Non-State Actors Involved

Ethnic Agaw militias
Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)

1
BBC, ‘Ethiopia country profile’, 2 January 2024.
2
See ‘International Armed Conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan’.
3
Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Case No 2001-01, 13 April 2002, paras 2.11–2.12; J. Markakis and G. C. Last, ‘Eritrea: Federation with Ethiopia’, Britannica, 21 April 2025.
4
Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, para 2.13.
5
T. M. Kebebew and J. J. Niyo, ‘Instant Non-international Armed Conflict? Classifying the situation in Northern Ethiopia under IHL’, Armed Groups and International Law, 9 December 2020; A. Soliman and A. A. Demissie, ‘The ‘conflict economy’ of sesame in Ethiopia and Sudan’, Chatham House, 4 April 2024; ‘The Enemy of my Enemy is my Friend: Ethiopia – Eritrea Relations and the 2020 Conflict in the Tigray Region in Ethiopia’, ACCORD, 4 March 2025; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Conflict in Ethiopia’, Council of Foreign Relations, 20 March 2025.
6
Amhara and other regional forces are paramilitary groups linked to regional governments in Ethiopia who fought alongside the federal army, notably to counter insurgencies by armed groups.D. Endeshaw, ‘Ethiopia to dismantle regional special forces in favour of ‘centralized army‘, Reuters, 6 April 2023; ‘Why Ethiopia’s Amhara militiamen are battling the army’, BBC, 16 August 2023.
7
‘Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict escalates as leader claims Eritrea is participating in a ‘full-scale war’, ABC, 15 November 2020; E. Bekel and U. Steinwehr, ‘Are other nations involved in the war in Tigray?’, Deutsche Welle, 19 March 2021; ‘V. Čáslavová, ‘The Tigray Conflict and the Role of Eritrea’, HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies, 31 October 2022; T. Bekit and F. Chothia, ‘Eritreans hunted down as military call-up intensifies over Ethiopia’s Tigray war’, BBC, 12 October 2022; J. Clifford, ‘Turn the R2P Around: Eritrea’s Intervention in Ethiopia’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 1 November 2022; D. Endeshaw, ‘Ethiopia to dismantle regional special forces in favour of ‘centralized army‘, Reuters, 6 April 2023; D. Endeshaw, ‘Gunfire, protests in Ethiopia’s Amhara over plan to disband regional force’, Reuters, 9 April 2023; Why Ethiopia’s Amhara militiamen are battling the army’, BBC, 16 August 2023; ‘The Enemy of my Enemy is my Friend: Ethiopia – Eritrea Relations and the 2020 Conflict in the Tigray Region in Ethiopia’, ACCORD, 4 March 2025.
8
Agreement for lasting peace through a permanent cessation of hostilities between the government of the Federal democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Pretoria, 2 November 2022.
9
K. Tyson and L. Karr, ‘Africa File, October 17, 2024: Egypt-Eritrea-Somalia Summit; Challenges with the Tigray Peace process’ Institute for the Study of War, 17 October 2024.
10
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, May and October 2021.
11
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, November–December 2021, and January, February, and May 2022.
12
G. Paravicini, ‘First round of peace talks between Ethiopia and Oromo rebels ends without deal’, Reuters, 3 May 2023; ‘Ethiopia’s Oromo rebels in Tanzania for peace talks’, Reuters, 13 November 2023.
13
EPO, ‘EPO Weekly: 7–13 October 2023’, ACLED, 18 October 2023; EPO, ‘EPO Weekly Update (23 January 2024)’, ACLED, 24 January 2024; EPO, ‘EPO Weekly Update (30 January 2024)’, ACLED, 31 January 2024; EPO, ‘Ethiopia weekly update (2 July 2024)’, ACLED, 4 July 2024; International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, Ethiopia, July 2024.
14
D. Endeshaw, ‘Ethiopia to dismantle regional special forces in favour of ‘centralized army‘, Reuters, 6 April 2023; D. Endeshaw, ‘Gunfire, protests in Ethiopia’s Amhara over plan to disband regional force’, Reuters, 9 April 2023; ‘Why Ethiopia’s Amhara militiamen are battling the army’, BBC, 16 August 2023; Ethiopian Human Rights Commission/Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on the Findings of Community Consultations on Transitional Justice (TJ) with Victims and Affected Populations in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 28 December 2023;EPO, ‘EPO December 2023 Monthly I The Fano Insurgency: Main Hurdles to Unifying Fano’, ACLED, 19 January 2024; A. Soliman and A. A. Demissie, ‘The ‘conflict economy’ of sesame in Ethiopia and Sudan’, Chatham House, 4 April 2024; G. Kamal, ‘Government Failure and Civil War: Conflict in Ethiopia’s Amhara Region’, African Narratives, 22 February 2025;T. Sakr, ‘Ethiopia’s Silent Spiral: The Amhara Conflict and the Fragile Illusion of Peace’, Daily News Egypt, 13 April 2025.
15
ACLED, ‘Amhara Ɩ Regional Profile’, 8 August 2024.
16
Art 8, Agreement for lasting peace through a permanent cessation of hostilities between the government of the Federal democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).
17
‘“People are under siege”: why Ethiopia’s war in Tigray isn’t over’, The Guardian, 7 August 2023; International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia, Comprehensive investigative findings and legal determinations, UN Doc A/HRC/54/CRP.3, 13 October 2023, para 77; ‘Eritrean Troops Accused of Abducting Farmers, Stealing Livestock in Ethiopia’s Tigray’, Associated Press, 2 February 2024; ‘Two years after Ethiopia’s Tigray war Eritrean forces still occupy border regions’, France24, 14 November 2024.
18
M. Haileselassie and M. Schwikowski, ‘Ethiopia’s Tigray region stumbles towards peace’, DW, 11 January 2023.
19
‘News: Eritrea frees 46 Tigrayan detainees, some held for over a year’, Addis Standard, 13 April 2024; A. Tekle, ‘UNHRC renews call for end to human rights violations in Eritrea, demands withdrawal from Tigray’ The Reporter (Ethiopia), 1 March 2025.
20
W. Solomon, ‘Eritrea expands hold on Irob, Gulomahda amid Tigray political feud, federal inaction’, The Reporter (Ethiopia), 21 September 2024.
21
Ilze Brands-Kehris, Assistant Secretary General, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Enhanced Interactive Dialogue on Human Rights in Eritrea’, OHCHR, 27 February 2025; EU Statement, ‘Enhanced Interactive Dialogue on Eritrea’, UN Human Rights Council, 58^th session, 27 February 2025.
22
‘Ethiopia fighting threatens return to civil and regional war’, Financial Times, 16 March 2025. claiming to have withdrawn to what it terms ‘internationally recognized sovereign borders’. G. Tunbridge, ‘Ex‑Ethiopian president Mulatu Teshome accuses Eritrea of plotting war as tensions flare’,The Africa Report, 21 February 2025.
23
K. Yibeltal, ‘“No-one can handle another war” – Tigrayans fear fresh Ethiopian conflict’, BBC, 17 March 2025
24
A. Ross, ‘Explainer: Why are Ethiopia and Eritrea on the brink of a possible war?’, Reuters, 14 March 2025.
25
‘Ethiopia fighting threatens return to civil and regional war’, Financial Times, 16 March 2025.
26
G. Kurtz, S. Roll and T. von Lossow, ‘Escalations Risks in the Horn of Africa’, SWP Comment No 50, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, October 2024, p. 5; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Conflict in Ethiopia’, Council of Foreign Relations, 20 March 2025.
27
A. Ross and G. Paravicini, ‘Ethiopia and Eritrea on path to war, Tigray officials warn’, Reuters, 13 March 2025.
28
D. Berhane, ‘How to resolve Tigray’s dangerous demobilisation deadlock’, The New Humanitarian, 7 May 2025.
29
L. Ataklti, ‘Tigray power feud escalates as regional military disowns interim admin’, The Reporter (Ethiopia), 25 January 2025; F. Harter, ‘A power struggle in Tigray risks Ethiopia’s peace deal’, The New Humanitarian, 4 March 2025; K. Biedermann, ‘Ethiopia: Government closely monitoring growing tensions in Tigray after internal clashes’, Sahel Intelligence, 17 March 2025.
30
L. Ataklti, ‘Tigray power feud escalates as regional military disowns interim admin’, The Reporter (Ethiopia), 25 January 2025; F. Harter, ‘A power struggle in Tigray risks Ethiopia’s peace deal’, The New Humanitarian, 4 March 2025; A. L. Gebru, ‘Ethiopia’s war may have ended, but the Tigray crisis hasn’t’, The Conversation, 18 March 2025; G. Tunbridge, ‘Tigray power struggle tests Abiy Ahmed’s fragile peace in Ethiopia’, The Africa Report, 18 March 2025.
31
N. Gbadamosi, ‘Tigray Power Struggle Risks Ethiopia-Eritrea War’, Foreign Policy, 19 March 2025.
32
EPO, ‘EPO April 2023 Monthly: Volatility in Amhara Region While the Rest of the Country Stabilizes’, ACLED, 6 May 2023.
33
EPO, ‘Amhara I Regional Profile’, ACLED, 8 August 2024.
34
EPO, ‘Amhara I Regional Profile’, ACLED, 8 August 2024.
35
EPO, ‘EPO August 2023 Monthly: Conflict in Amhara Region’, ACLED, 8 September 2023.
36
EPO, ‘Amhara I Regional Profile’, ACLED, 8 August 2024.
37
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, Ethiopia, August and September 2023; I. Molyneaux, ‘Suspected drone attack kills 26 civilians in Ethiopia’s Amhara region’, AeroTime, 15 August 2023.
38
‘እሁድ ዕለት በጎንደር ከተማ የተከሰተው ምንድን ነው?’, BBC Amharic, 25 September 2023;EPO, ‘EPO Weekly: 23–29 September 2023’, ACLED, 4 October 2023; EPO, ‘EPO Weekly: 18-24 November 2023’, 29 November 2023; F. Harter, ‘‘Horrific’ civilian toll as Ethiopia turns to combat drones to quell local insurgencies’, The New Humanitarian, 5 March 2024.
39
‘What happened in Lalibela during November?’, Ethiopia Observer, 30 December 2023; ACLED, Data: Ethiopia, 2 May 2025.
40
‘What happened in Lalibela during November?’, Ethiopia Observer, 30 December 2023.
41
EPO, ‘Ethiopia Weekly Update (16 July 2024)’, ACLED 17 July 2024; EPO, ‘Ethiopia Weekly Update (27 August 2024)’, ACLED, 28 August 2024.
42
‘Intense fighting erupts in Gondar and surrounding areas’, Ethiopia Observer, 17 September 2024; ‘Ethiopia: Fighting in Amhara kills at least nine’, The Africa Report, 19 September 2024; International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, Ethiopia, September 2024.
43
‘News: Heavy fighting in Gondar and surrounding areas results in fatalities, civilian casualties’, Addis Standard, 18 September 2024.
44
‘What transpired in Woldia city yesterday on Sunday night?’, BBC Amharic, 14 October 2024; ‘News: Deadly clashes between gov’t forces, Fano fighters leave civilian casualties across three zones in Amhara region’, Addis Standard, 29 October 2024.
45
EPO, ‘Ethiopia Weekly Update (10 December 2024)’, ACLED, 12 December 2024.
46
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, Ethiopia, January 2025.
47
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, Ethiopia, July 2024.
48
EPO, ‘EPO Weekly: 7–13 October 2023’, ACLED, 18 October 2023; EPO, ‘EPO Weekly Update (23 January 2024)’, ACLED, 24 January 2024; EPO, ‘EPO Weekly Update (30 January 2024)’, ACLED, 31 January 2024; EPO, ‘Ethiopia weekly update (2 July 2024)’, ACLED, 4 July 2024; International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, Ethiopia, July 2024.
49
EPO, ‘Ethiopia weekly update (9 July 2024)’, ACLED, 10 July 2024; EPO, ‘In Amhara, over 7 million people are exposed to political violence: August 2024’, ACLED, 13 September 2024; EPO, ‘EPO Monthly Update | October 2024: Two years after the Pretoria agreement, unrest still looms in Tigray’, ACLED, 8 November 2024.
50
EPO, ‘Ethiopia Weekly Update (5 November 2024)’, ACLED, 6 November 2024.
51
EPO; ‘Ethiopia Weekly Update (26 November 2024)’, ACLED, 27 November 2024; EPO, ‘Ethiopia Weekly Update (3 December 2024)’, ACLED, 4 December 2024; EPO, ‘Ethiopia Weekly Update (17 December 2024)’, ACLED, 18 December 2024.
52
G. Tunbridge, ‘Ethiopia signs peace deal with Oromo Liberation Army splinter group’, The Africa Report, 3 December 2024.
53
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, Ethiopia, December 2024.
54
EPO, ‘Ethiopia situation update (5 February 2025)’, ACLED, 5 February 2025.
55
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, Ethiopia, January 2025.
56
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, Ethiopia, January 2025.
57
‘News: Four civilians killed in deadly attack in Darra district of North Shawa Zone; residents and officials blame ‘Fano militants’’, Addis Standard, 18 June 2024.
58
‘News: Ongoing attacks by armed groups in Derra district of Oromia region claim six more lives in latest violence’, Addis Standard, 31 August 2024.
59
‘News: Three killed following new attack in North Shoa, Oromia region, 400 students stranded at Salale University amid escalating insecurity’, Addis Standard, 26 July 2024; ‘News: Ongoing attacks by armed groups in Derra district of Oromia region claim six more lives in latest violence’, Addis Standard, 31 August 2024.
60
ICRC, 2016 Commentary, para 237.
61
ICRC, 2016 Commentary, para 263. See also: ILC, Draft articles on Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, p 73, paras 3 and 8.
62
ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005, p 168, paras 47 and 53.
63
E. Bekel and U. Steinwehr, ‘Are other nations involved in the war in Tigray?’, Deutsche Welle, 19 March 2021.
64
‘Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict escalates as leader claims Eritrea is participating in a ‘full-scale war’, ABC, 15 November 2020; V. Čáslavová, ‘The Tigray Conflict and the Role of Eritrea’, HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies, 31 October 2022; T. Bekit and F. Chothia, ‘Eritreans hunted down as military call-up intensifies over Ethiopia’s Tigray war’, BBC, 12 October 2022; J. Clifford, ‘Turn the R2P Around: Eritrea’s Intervention in Ethiopia’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 1 November 2022; G. Kurtz, S. Roll and T. von Lossow, ‘Escalations Risks in the Horn of Africa’, SWP Comment No 50, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, October 2024, p 5; ‘The Enemy of my Enemy is my Friend: Ethiopia – Eritrea Relations and the 2020 Conflict in the Tigray Region in Ethiopia’, ACCORD, 4 March 2025.
65
‘Eritrean forces should leave Ethiopia’s Tigray immediately: US’, Al Jazeera, 27 January 2021; ‘Ethiopia says Eritrean soldiers have begun withdrawal from Tigray’, France24, 4 April 2021. See also above ‘Major events and developments’.
66
Art 8, Agreement for lasting peace through a permanent cessation of hostilities between the government of the Federal democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).
67
K. Abate, ‘At AU summit, Tigray demands full implementation of peace deal’, VOA, 17 February 2025; N. Yoseph, ‘Calls for restraint sound out as tensions threaten to erupt in Tigray’, The Reporter (Ethiopia), 15 March 2025.
68
ICTY, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995, para 70; ICTY, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, Trial Chamber, Judgment, Case No IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997, para 562.
69
For a summary, see ICTY, Prosecutor v Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski, Trial Chamber, Judgment, IT-04-82-T, 10 July 2008, para 177.
70
For a summary, see ICTY, Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj and others, Trial Chamber, Judgment, Case No IT-04-84-T, 3 April 2008, para 60.
71
See ‘Major events and developments – Tigray region’.
72
See above ‘Major events and developments – Oromia region’.
73
See above ‘Major events and developments – Amhara region’.
74
G. Ferede, ‘Conflict trends analysis / January 2025: Political uncertainty and continuing conflict in Benishangul–Gumuz’, Rift Valley Institute/Peace Research Facility, 2025.

Ethiopia

Reporting period: July 2023 - June 2025

Overview

Historical background

Eritrea-Ethiopia

Tigray

Oromia

Amhara

Key developments (2023-2025)

Tigray region

Amhara region

Oromia region

Military presence of Eritrea in Tigray region

Non International Armed Conflicts

Other Clashes