Kenya

A single pre-existing non-international armed conflict (NIAC) is ongoing between Kenya and the armed group Al-Shabaab. Kenya is a State Party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to Additional Protocol II of 1977. However, the current NIAC does not satisfy the particular requirement in Article 1(1) of the Protocol that the group exercise a level of territorial control that would enable it to sustain military operations and thus the Protocol does not apply.

Kenya is an east African country which borders on the Indian Ocean to its east, South Sudan and Ethiopia to the north, Somalia to its north-east, Uganda to the west and Tanzania to the south.¹ The ongoing NIAC between the Somali Armed Forces and Al-Shabaab, which has persisted in Somalia since at least 2006,² has crossed into Kenya. Following an increase in Al-Shabaab activity on Kenyan territory, Kenya closed its border with Somalia in October 2011,³ and, on 14 October deployed the Kenyan Armed Forces,⁴ under Operation Linda Nchi, to the border with southern Somalia.⁵ On 22 February 2012, the Kenyan Armed Forces integrated with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).⁶ Kenya continued to fight Al-Shabaab in Somalia under the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) until it was phased out,⁷ and it currently supports Somalia as part of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).⁸

ACLED reports that the first incident involving Al-Shabaab in Kenya took place in 2008.⁹ As a response to the deployment of the Kenyan Armed Forces in Somalia to combat Al-Shabaab in 2011, Al-Shabaab increased its activities in Kenya’s north-eastern region.¹⁰ Al-Shabaab declared that Kenya’s support of Somalia had provoked its response on Kenyan territory.¹¹ Post-Kenyan deployment in Somalia, significant attacks by Al-Shabaab on Kenyan territory include the Westgate Mall attack on 21 September 2013,¹² when Al-Shabaab fighters stormed a shopping centre in Nairobi killing sixty-seven people,¹³ and the attack on Garissa University where Al-Shabaab fighters shot and killed 148 people.¹⁴ ACLED reports that Al-Shabaab activity in Kenya had escalated significantly by 2024.¹⁵

ATMIS draw down and the possible impact on Kenya

UN Security Council Resolution 3628 (2022) enabled the reconfiguration of AMISOM into ATMIS as had been requested by the African Union Peace and Security Council.⁴³ The purpose behind the reconfiguration was an effort to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab.⁴⁴ On 27 June 2023, the Security Council emphasized the primary responsibility for protecting civilians in Somalia, including against the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, lay with the Somali government.⁴⁵

The process envisioned in the transition has four phases. Phase one is the reconfiguration of the mission. Phase two covers the handing over of a number of forward operating bases to Somali security forces and the commencement of other joint shaping and clearing operations. Phase three is a decisive operation in handing over the remaining forward operating bases while phase four encompasses the withdrawal and liquidation of ATMIS.⁴⁶ The Security Council supported the revised National Security Architecture of Somali to include a detailed generation of forces as ATMIS starts the second phase of its draw down in Somalia.⁴⁷

On 28 June 2024, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2741 (2024) which covers the third phase of the ATMIS draw-down. The intention of the African Union is to replace ATMIS with an African Union-led Peace Support operation.⁴⁸ The third phase in the draw down of ATMIS was completed by mid-November 2024.⁴⁹ The draw-down of ATMIS is expected to create a security vacuum not only in Somalia but in other States in the Horn of Africa, including Kenya.⁵⁰ After June 2023, as a result of the draw-down of ATMIS, reports suggest that fighting along the Kenya-Somalia border has intensified. ⁵¹ Following the implementation of the third phase, the trend continued; the Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies (CRIPS) recorded eighty-five ‘terror related incidents’, an increase on the seventy-two in 2023.⁵² During this period civilians, security officials, and hospitals were the targets.

Deployment to Haiti

On 2 October 2023, in reaction to the high level of gang violence in Haiti, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2699 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, establishing a Multi-National Support Mission for the country.⁵³ Kenya volunteered to head the mission,⁵⁴ and the proposal was approved.⁵⁵ The first contingent of Kenyan police arrived in Haiti during June 2024.⁵⁶

The Impact of USAID Cuts on Kenya

The USAID funding cuts implemented by the Trump administration have had an impact on Kenya.⁵⁷ Kenya hosts refugees from several conflicts including in Somalia, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁵⁸ The cut in funding has led to a drastic reduction in the food supply in Kenyan refugee camps.⁵⁹ The refugees receive only between 30 and 40 per cent of the prescribed rations.⁶⁰ The number of medical staff has also been significantly reduced due funding cuts.⁶¹

Islamic State Somalia Activity

Islamic State Somalia (ISS), a group which broke away from Al-Shabaab, emerged in Somalia in the second half of 2015.⁶² As of late 2018, ISS had occupied the ISS al-Karrar regional offices in Somalia. The purpose of these offices is to coordinate IS regional activities for eastern, central, and southern Africa.⁶³

Some sources indicate a limited presence of ISS in Kenya,⁶⁴ despite the absence of a territorial stronghold. In 2023, ISS-East Africa activity in Kenya seemed to be restricted to failed attacks, recruitment drives, and facilitating travel by IS members.⁶⁵ Between November and December 2024, seventeen people suspected of being ISS members were arrested in Kenya.⁶⁶ During the reporting period there was little evidence of a clash between ISS and its affiliates with Kenyan security forces.

Kenya is a member of the Global Coalition against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL – also known as Daesh/ISIS/ ISL,⁶⁷ which was formed in September 2014.⁶⁸ The coalition focuses on degrading and defeating ISIL and its affiliates.⁶⁹

Non-international armed conflict between Kenya and Al-Shabaab

Background

Kenya is among the areas most affected by Al-Shabaab’s external operations. Since 2011, there has been a dramatic increase in attacks after Al-Shabaab expanded its operations beyond the Somali border.¹ Although it originated and lodges its stronghold in Somalia, Al-Shabaab morphed into a transnational non-state actor operational in East Africa.² The military wing of Al-Shabaab is the most prominent non-State actor in East Africa; it conducts attacks primarily in Somalia but also against neighbouring states such as Kenya. Al-Shabaab concentrates its external operations (beyond Somali borders) in Kenya.³

Intensity

The frequency of attacks remained high throughout the reporting period with multiple clashes between the Kenyan Defence Forces and Al-Shabaab occurring almost every month. Attacks were reported in July 2023,⁴ August,⁵ September,⁶ October,⁷ November,⁸ and December 2023,⁹ and January,¹⁰ February,¹¹ March,¹² April,¹³ May,¹⁴ June,¹⁵ July,¹⁶ August,¹⁷ September,¹⁸ October,¹⁹ November,²⁰ and December 2024,²¹ and February,²² March,²³ April,‘²⁴ May,²⁵

Between July and December of 2023, an estimated fifty-five fatalities were reported in Kenya with a further ninety-five injured.²⁶ This was as a result of thirty-nine Al-Shabaab-linked attacks in the latter half of 2023.²⁷. In 2024, a total of eighty-five incidents involving Al-Shabaab were recorded by the Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies (CHRIPS) observatory, causing 107 fatalities and 124 injured.²⁸ Similar statistics for the 2025 period were not available at the time of reporting.

The first deployment of armed drones by Al-Shabaab against the Kenyan Defence Forces during this period was reported in July 2023.²⁹ The Kenyan Defence Forces recovered evidence that shows Al-Shabaab converts off-the-shelf commercially available drones and equips them with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or other munitions.³⁰ Al-Shabaab has access to military grade weaponry such as rocket propelled grenades³¹ and AK 47 rifles, and the group often plant IEDs,³² including for the purposes of ambushing military vehicles near the Bula Hawa border crossing between Somalia and Kenya on the Kenyan side in Mandera county.³³ The success of Al-Shabaab and the type of weapons it uses forced the Kenyan authorities to begin upgrading the equipment of their own forces as of February 2024.³⁴

Approximately 7,700 people were internally displaced during 2023. The displacement of many of the people included in these figures can be attributed to Al-Shabaab activity in Kenyan counties on the Kenyan-Somalia border. These counties include Lamu, Garissa, Wajir, and Mandara.³⁵ Approximately 38,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) displacements were documented during 2024. It is suggested that, owing to underreporting, this might be a conservative figure.³⁶ The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that between January and June 2025, there were 20,000 IDPs in Kenya, a figure which could be the result of the ongoing conflict.³⁷ It is, of course, impossible to attribute every single IDP to the ongoing conflict, but it assumed that Al-Shabaab’s activities on the border between Somalia and Kenya are a prominent driver of displacement there.

The intensity of fighting in the pre-existing NIAC between Kenya and Al-Shabaab remained at the threshold set by international humanitarian law (IHL) throughout the reporting period.

Organization

A decade after its emergence, according to analyst Matthew Bryden, Al-Shabaab is ‘on the threshold of becoming a genuinely transnational organization’.³⁸ Al-Shabaab, ‘the Youth’, is a formal Al-Qaeda affiliate in East Africa.³⁹ Although the group often acts independently of Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda leadership supports and endorses its activities.⁴⁰ It is reported that foreign Al-Qaeda affiliates comprise more than half of Al-Shabaab’s executive council and, in consequence, Al-Shabaab embraces a globalized rhetoric and promotes Al-Qaeda propaganda.⁴¹

Underpinning the threat Al-Shabaab poses in Kenya is the presence of a long-standing network which facilitates radicalization and recruitment to the group.⁴² Al-Shabaab’s sophisticated command structure is both hierarchical and centralized in nature.⁴³ Al-Shabaab is led by an ‘Emir’, Ahmed Umar Abu Abaidah.⁴⁴ Regional commanders report to the emir and are tasked with managing the group’s regional presence including in southern Somalia and Mogadishu, Bay and Bokool, Puntland and Somaliland, and Juba Valley.

The leader of Al-Shabaab’s military operations is Yassir Jiis (previously known as Abdullahi Haji Da’ud).⁴⁵ The military leader’s portfolio includes oversight over two separate military branches which are led by regional military leaders. The first, Jaysh Al-‘Usr (army of hardship), serves as the major external military apparatus. The second, Jaysh Al-Hisbah (army of morality), functions as the group’s religious police force and enforces Sharia in areas Al-Shabaab controls.

Al-Shabaab’s top leadership structure consists of various ranks.⁴⁶ There are several emirs, an intelligence wing, and other senior officials including financial and military officials. At the time of writing, the emir ranks reportedly were filled as follows: the Emir (Ahmed Umar Abu Ubaidah),⁴⁷ the deputy emir (Abukar Ali Adan),⁴⁸ the deputy emir responsible for Aminyat, Al-Shabaab’s intelligence wing (Mahad Karate),⁴⁹ the military emir (Yassir Jiss),⁵⁰ interior emir (Mohamed Mire)⁵¹ (deceased December 2024),⁵² and the weapons procurement emir (Abdullah Jeeri).⁵³

Senior officials involved in the military and secret services portfolios include the senior official responsible for operational planning (Jehad Serwan Mostafa),⁵⁴ the senior official serving on the main leadership council (Fuad Mohamed Khalaf),⁵⁵ the senior ideologue (Muhammad Bashar Abdulkarim),⁵⁶ the intelligence wing (Yusuf Ahmed Hajji Nurow aka Gees Ade),⁵⁷ and senior Aminyat official responsible for the attack planning portfolio (Mustaf ’Ato).⁵⁸

The leadership concerned with finances is also structured and includes the following senior leaders: Khalif Adele, Hassan Afgooye, Abdikarim Hussein Gagaale. A structured financial leadership enhances the logistical capacity of Al-Shabaab.⁵⁹ Historically, Al-Shabaab is known to have several streams of income.⁶⁰ These are said to include support from locals, sponsors, proselytizing, funding from other terrorist groups, piracy, kidnapping, racketeering, and the extortion of local businesses, farmers, and aid groups.⁶¹ Reports claim that Al-Shabaab has received funding from governments including those of Eritrea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Qatar, and Yemen. These governments deny making financial contributions to the group.⁶² The United States Treasury Department estimates that Al-Shabaab generates approximately US$100 million per annum, of which around one quarter is used to procure weapons and explosives.⁶³

Al-Shabaab is estimated to be the wealthiest and largest Al-Qaeda affiliate,⁶⁴ and, as of January 2024, had a reported 7,000 to 12,000 fighters.⁶⁵ The group controls large parts of Somali territory which, as of February 2025, included parts of southern and central Somalia.⁶⁶

Al-Shabaab’s financial standing and extensive territorial control in Somalia supports and enhances its logistical capacity. Al-Qaeda provides skills transfers to Al-Sha⁶⁷ It includes basic infantry and weapons training,⁶⁸ military tactics development, advanced training in explosives, and training in assassination.

Al-Shabaab remains sufficiently organized under IHL.

The pre-existing NIAC between Kenya and Al-Shabaab continued throughout the reporting period.

1
D. Torbjörnsson, ‘Explaining the differences in al-Shabaab expansion into Ethiopia and Kenya’, Studies in African Security, May 2017, 1.
2
‘What’s next for the fight against al-Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia – August 2024’, ACLED, 4 September 2024.
3
J. N. Maringa et al, ‘Understanding the history and operations of Al Shabaab in Kenya through the lens of Kant’s categorical imperative of moral philosophy’, Social Sciences & Humanities Open, 2025.
4
‘On the radar: Kenya starts major operation against al Shabaab’, The Star, 5 July 2023; ‘Special Report: Kenya-Somalia Border: Rising al-Shabaab Threat in the Wake of ATMIS Drawdown’, ACLED, 1 September 2023; Counter Terrorism Policing KE, X, 5 July 2023; ‘Attack on Kenya Defence Forces Outpost Confirms Al-Shabaab Drone Use’, African Defense Forum, 25 July 2023; ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2023: Kenya’, U.S. Department of State; J. Christine and M. Nyarangi, ‘Trends of Violent Extremist Attacks and Arrests in Kenya, January – December 2023’, Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies, Report No. 7
5
A. Wasike, ‘2 killed, 10 injured as over 60 terrorists attack civilians in Kenya’, AA, 1 August 2023; ‘What’s next for the fight against al-Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia – August 2024’, ACLED, 4 September 2024; K. Kazungu, ‘Two killed, Lamu MCA and 10 others injured in suspected Shabaab attack’, Daily Nation, 1 August 2023; ‘Suspected al-Shabaab militants killed 2 and burned homes in Lamu’, The Somali Digest, 24 August 2023
6
‘Africa: Kenya’, International Crisis Group; J. Christine and M. Nyarangi, ‘Trends of Violent Extremist Attacks and Arrests in Kenya, January – December 2023’, Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies, Report No. 7
7
‘Africa: Kenya’, International Crisis Group; J. Christine and M. Nyarangi, ‘Trends of Violent Extremist Attacks and Arrests in Kenya, January – December 2023’, Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies, Report No. 7
8
‘Africa: Kenya’, International Crisis Group; J. Christine and M. Nyarangi, ‘Trends of Violent Extremist Attacks and Arrests in Kenya, January – December 2023’, Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies, Report No. 7
9
J. Christine and M. Nyarangi, ‘Trends of Violent Extremist Attacks and Arrests in Kenya, January – December 2023’, Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies, Report No. 7; ‘Africa: Kenya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Terror Related Attacks’, Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Research Hub
10
‘Al-Shabaab Claims Responsibility for Attacks on Telecom Infrastructure in Mandera County’, Halqabsi News, 12 January 2024; ‘Africa: Kenya’, International Crisis Group; J. Christine, ‘Trends of Violent Extremist Attacks and Arrests in Kenya, January – December 2024’, Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies; ‘Kenya: Al-Shabaab, Pastoralist Militias, and the M23 – January 2024’, ACLED, 19 January 2024
11
‘Africa: Kenya’, International Crisis Group; J. Christine, ‘Trends of Violent Extremist Attacks and Arrests in Kenya, January – December 2024’, Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies
12
‘An explosion near a police station in northern Kenya has killed 4 people, including 3 officers’, AP News, 25 March 2024; ‘Kenya Blast Blamed on Al-Shabaab Kills Four’, The Defense Post, 27 March 2024; ‘Kenya: Four people killed in blast near police station’, Africa News, 13 August 2024; ‘Africa: Kenya’, International Crisis Group
13
‘Africa: Kenya’, International Crisis Group; E. Musambi, ‘A bomb attack in northern Kenya kills 5 people near the border with Somalia’, AP News, 29 April 2024
14
‘Africa: Kenya’, International Crisis Group
15
‘Africa: Kenya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Kenya: Police avert major IED attack by Al-Shabaab at Mandera border point’, Counter-IED Report, 5 June 2024
16
‘Four elite police officers killed by al Shabaab in Mandera’, The Star, 12 July 2024
17
‘Kenyan police pursue al-Shabab militants after attack in border region’, Xinhua, 11 August 2024; M. Otsialo, ‘Mandera: Five injured in suspected al-Shabaab attack’, Daily Nation, 25 July 2024;
18
M. Otsialo, ‘Mandera: Four injured in suspected al-Shabaab attack’, Daily Nation, 20 September 2024
19
‘Africa: Kenya’, International Crisis Group;
20
‘Africa: Kenya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Kenya says destroy 2 al-Shabab camps in border region’, Xinhua, 6 November 2024; ‘Suspected Al-Shabaab Attack on Military Convoy in Mandera Leaves Three Injured’, Mustaqbal Media, 21 November 2024
21
‘Africa: Kenya’, International Crisis Group; B. Makong, ‘Kenya: Mandera DCI Officer Killed in Suspected Al Shabaab Attack’, All Africa, 9 December 2024
22
A. Wasike, ‘Al-Shabaab gunmen abduct 5 officials in Kenya’s border region’, AA, 3 February 2025; ‘Africa: Kenya’, International Crisis Group
23
A. Wandera, ‘Six Kenyan police personnel killed in ambush near Somalia’, BBC, 23 March 2025; ‘Six personnel killed in attack on Somali border: Kenyan police’, Al Jazeera, 23 March 2025; E. Musambi, ‘Somali militants kill 6 Kenyan police reservists and ransack their border camp’, AP News, 23 March 2025; ‘Africa: Kenya’, International Crisis Group
24
Suspected al Shabaab militants kill five Kenya quarry workers, police report says’, Reuters, 29 April 2025; ‘Africa: Kenya’, International Crisis Group
25
‘Africa: Kenya’, International Crisis Group and June 2025.‘Africa: Kenya’, International Crisis Group.
26
‘CVE Observatory: Terror Related Attacks 2023’, Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Research Hub.
27
J. Christine and M. Nyarangi, ‘Trends of Violent Extremist Attacks and Arrests in Kenya, January – December 2023’, Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies, Report No. 7
28
J. Christine, ‘Trends of Violent Extremist Attacks and Arrests in Kenya, January – December 2024’, Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies.
29
Counter Terrorism Policing KE, X, 5 July 2023.
30
‘Attack on Kenya Defence Forces Outpost Confirms Al-Shabaab Drone Use’, African Defense Forum, 25 July 2023.
31
T. Cerullo, ‘60 Suspected Al Shabaab Militants Raid Village, GSU Camp in Lamu’, Kenyans.co.ke, 26 July 2025
32
‘An explosion near a police station in northern Kenya has killed 4 people, including 3 officers’, AP News, 25 March 2024; E. Musambi, ‘A bomb attack in northern Kenya kills 5 people near the border with Somalia’, AP News, 29 April 2024; ‘Kenya: Police avert major IED attack by Al-Shabaab at Mandera border point’, Counter-IED Report, 5 June 2024
33
‘Africa: Kenya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Suspected Al-Shabaab Attack on Military Convoy in Mandera Leaves Three Injured’, Mustaqbal Media, 21 November 2024.
34
‘Africa: Kenya’, International Crisis Group.
35
‘Kenya’ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 25 August 2025.
36
‘Kenya’ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 25 August 2025; ‘IMDC Data Portal’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.
37
‘Eastern Africa: Humanitarian Snapshot (As of June 2025)’, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 15 July 2025.
38
D. Torbjörnsson and M. Jonsson, ‘Containment or Contagion? Countering al Shabaab Efforts to Sow Discord in Kenya’, Studies in African Security, June 2016.
39
‘Al-Shabaab’, Counter Extremism Project.
40
‘Al-Shabaab’, Australian Government: Australian National Security.
41
‘Al-Shabaab’, Counter Extremism Project.
42
D. Torbjörnsson and M. Jonsson, ‘Containment or Contagion? Countering al Shabaab Efforts to Sow Discord in Kenya’, Studies in African Security, June 2016.
43
‘Al-Shabaab’, Counter Extremism Project; ‘Al-Shabaab’, Australian Government: Australian National Security.
44
‘Al-Shabaab’, Counter Extremism Project.
45
C. Weiss, ‘Detailing Shabaab’s Leadership and Key Personnel’, The Long War Journal.
46
C. Weiss, ‘Detailing Shabaab’s Leadership and Key Personnel’, The Long War Journal.
47
C. Weiss, ‘Detailing Shabaab’s Leadership and Key Personnel’, The Long War Journal
48
‘Abukar Ali Adan’, United Nations Security Council
49
‘Mahad Karate’, United Nations Security Council
50
A. Blinken, ‘Designation of Mohamed Mire, Yasir Jiis, Yusuf Ahmed Hajji Nurow, Mohamoud Abdi Aden, and Mustaf `Ato as Specially Designated Global Terrorists’, Federal Register, 14 October 2022
51
C. Weiss, ‘Detailing Shabaab’s Leadership and Key Personnel’, The Long War Journal
52
M. Dhaysane, ‘Senior al-Shabaab leader, 10 terrorists killed in US airstrikes in Somalia’, AA, 8 January 2025
53
‘Treasury Designates al-Shabaab Financial Facilitators’, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 17 October 2022.
54
C. Weiss, ‘Detailing Shabaab’s Leadership and Key Personnel’, The Long War Journal
55
‘Fuad Mohamed Khalaf’, United Nations Security Council
56
C. Weiss, ‘Detailing Shabaab’s Leadership and Key Personnel’, The Long War Journal Chief of Aminyat,
57
‘Al-Shabaab’, Counter Extremism Project
58
A. Blinken, ‘Designation of Mohamed Mire, Yasir Jiis, Yusuf Ahmed Hajji Nurow, Mohamoud Abdi Aden, and Mustaf `Ato as Specially Designated Global Terrorists’, Federal Register, 14 October 2022.
59
C. Weiss, ‘Detailing Shabaab’s Leadership and Key Personnel’, The Long War Journal.
60
C. Klobucista et al, ‘Al-Shabaab’, Council on Foreign Relations, 6 December 2022.
61
‘Al-Shabaab’, Counter Extremism Project.
62
‘Al-Shabaab’, Counter Extremism Project.
63
P. D. Williams, ‘The Somali National Army Versus al-Shabaab: A Net Assessment’, Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, April 2024; UNSC, ‘Thirty-third report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/92, 29 January 2024; C. Klobucista et al, ‘Al-Shabaab’, Council on Foreign Relations, 6 December 2022.
64
C. Weiss, ‘Detailing Shabaab’s Leadership and Key Personnel’, The Long War Journal
65
P. D. Williams, ‘The Somali National Army Versus al-Shabaab: A Net Assessment’, Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, April 2024; ‘Thirty-third report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/92, 29 January 2024.
66
P. D. Williams, ‘The Somali National Army Versus al-Shabaab: A Net Assessment’, Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, April 2024; M. Yusuf, ‘Report: IS-Somalia becomes financial hub; leader could be top IS chief’, Voice of America, 12 September 2024; M. Harper, ‘Why Trump is on the warpath in Somalia’, BBC, 7 February 2025.
67
baab by affording training for Al-Shabaab members not only in Afghanistan but also in parts of Somalia.‘Al-Shabaab’, Counter Extremism Project.
68
P. D. Williams, ‘The Somali National Army Versus al-Shabaab: A Net Assessment’, Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, April 2024

State

Kenya

Non-state

Al-Shabaab

1
‘Maps of Kenya’, World Atlas; ‘General Overview’, Kenya High Commission in Ontario, Canada.
2
‘IHL in Focus: Annual Report: Assessing Compliance in Contemporary Armed Conflict, July 2023 – June 2024’, Geneva Academy; P. D. Williams, ‘The Somali National Army Versus al-Shabaab: A Net Assessment’, Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, April 2024
3
‘Kenya Says Somalia Border Reopening Delayed After Attacks’, Voice of America, 6 July 2023
4
‘What’s next for the fight against al-Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia – August 2024’, ACLED, 4 September 2024; W. Ross, ‘Kenya’s incursion into Somalia raises the stakes’, BBC News, 17 October 2011
5
D. M. Anderson and J. Knight, ‘Kenya at War: Al-Shabaab and its Enemies in Eastern Africa’, African Affairs, 2014, 3 – 4; ‘Kenya in AMISOM’, Ministry of Defence – Kenya.
6
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2036 (2012)’, 22 February 2012, preamble para 16.
7
‘ATMIS’, Ministry of Defence – Kenya
8
‘Kenyan troops in Somalia welcome new Commander’, African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia, 18 May 2025.
9
‘What’s next for the fight against al-Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia – August 2024’, ACLED, 4 September 2024.
10
‘What’s next for the fight against al-Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia – August 2024’, ACLED, 4 September 2024.
11
‘Why is al-Shabab targeting Kenya?’, BBC News, 3 April 2015.
12
‘Kenya: Westgate Mall attack’, BBC, 24 September 2021
13
‘Al-Shabaab Five Years after Westgate: Still a Menace in East Africa’, International Crisis Group, 21 September 2018
14
A. Pate et al, ‘Al-Shabaab Attack on Garissa University in Kenya’, Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2015; D. Torbjörnsson, ‘Explaining the differences in al-Shabaab expansion into Ethiopia and Kenya’, Studies in African Security, May 2017, 1; ‘Kenya attack: 147 dead in Garissa University assault’, BBC News, 3 April 2015.
15
‘What’s next for the fight against al-Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia – August 2024’, ACLED, 4 September 2024.
16
‘Kenya Situation Update January 2024: Al-Shabaab, Pastoralist Militias, and the M23’, ReliefWeb, 19 January 2024; S. Odidi, ‘The nexus between horizontal inequalities and violent conflicts: A case study of Kenya’, ACCORD, 25 April 2024.
17
T. N. Pinto, ‘Farmer-herder tensions ignite across Africa’, Geopolitical Intelligence Services, 17 February 2025.
18
‘Absorbing Climate Shocks and Easing Conflict in Kenya’s Rift Valley’, International Crisis Group, 20 April 2023.
19
‘Absorbing Climate Shocks and Easing Conflict in Kenya’s Rift Valley’, International Crisis Group, 20 April 2023.
20
‘Africa: Kenya’, International Crisis Group; ‘Kenya battles threats from communal militias and al-Shabaab – November 2024’, ACLED, 25 November 2024.
21
‘Kenyan Security Forces Combating al-Shabaab, Pastoralist Militias, and Mob Violence – April 2024’, ACLED, 19 April 2024.
22
E. Mogale and M. Schmidt, ‘Kenya protests show citizens don’t trust government with their tax money: can Ruto make a meaningful new deal?’, Institute of Development Studies, 19 July 2024.
23
‘Kenya enacts tax changes under Finance Act, 2023’, Ernst & Young, 20 July 2023.
24
‘One man shot dead in Kenya amid protests over tax hikes’, Al Jazeera, 7 July 2023; N. Princewill et al, ‘Anger boils over as Kenya’s cost of living protests shake the nation’, CNN, 20 July 2023.
25
‘Kenyan president vows to restore order after deadly tax hike protests’, BBC, 25 June 2024; C. Mwakideu, ‘Kenya: What’s behind the deadly protests?’, DW, 26 June 2024.
26
E. Mogale and M. Schmidt, ‘Kenya protests show citizens don’t trust government with their tax money: can Ruto make a meaningful new deal?’, Institute of Development Studies, 19 July 2024; ‘Kenya proposes tax changes under the Finance Bill, 2024’, Ernst & Young, 21 May 2024.
27
R. Apollo et al, ‘Youth uprising: How Gen-Z protests could shift Kenya’s power structures’, African Cities, 16 August 2024; W. K. Shilaho and L. Monyae, ‘Kenya’s Historic Gen-Z led Protests: The Issues’, ACCORD, 29 August 2024; J. Mbugua, ‘Why Kenya’s Gen Z Has Taken to the Streets’, Journal of Democracy, July 2025.
28
W. Muia, ‘New faces of protest – Kenya’s Gen Z anti-tax revolutionaries’, BBC, 20 June 2024; ‘The Gen Z Protest in Kenya Article Published on The Contrapuntal’, European Centre for Electoral Support; W. K. Shilaho and L. Monyae, ‘Kenya’s Historic Gen-Z led Protests: The Issues’, ACCORD, 29 August 2024; M. M. Bigg, ‘‘Promises Have Not Been Kept’: What’s Behind Africa’s Youth Protests’, The New York Times, 15 October 2025.
29
A. Wandera, ‘Kenyan authorities paid trolls to threaten Gen Z protesters, Amnesty says’, BBC, 19 November 2025.
30
‘Statement on the Situation in Kenya: Protests and Tax Measures Affecting Vulnerable Citizens’, African Union: African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 19 June 2024.
31
L. Madowo and N. Princewill, ‘16 dead and hundreds injured in Kenya protests, Amnesty International says’, CNN, 26 June 2025; J. Muia, ‘42 people killed, 1,500 arrested during June 25 and Saba Saba protests – Murkomen’, Citizen Digital, 15 July 2025.
32
M. Juma and A. Irungu, ‘Kenya femicide: Hundreds protest at violence against women’, BBC, 27 January 2024; ‘‘Stop killing us!’: Thousands march to protest against femicide in Kenya’, Al Jazeera, 27 January 2024
33
M. Mwangi and A. Ross, ‘Kenyan police fire teargas at protesters marching against femicide’, Reuters, 10 December 2024; A. L. Dahir, ‘Protests in Kenya Demand Action Over a Spate of Brutal Murders of Women’, The New York Times, 10 December 2024
34
‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights urges action against abductions and forced disappearances in Kenya’, African Union: African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 30 December 2024; D. Mule, ‘Statement on the Recent Surge of Abductions/Enforced Disappearances in Kenya’, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, 26 December 2024.
35
M. Tongola, ‘Ruto downplays abduction cases stating some are normal arrests’, Standard Media, 21 November 2024.
36
‘Justice for Ojwang: Kenya Demands Change’, Mimeta, 20 June 2025.
37
W. Muia et al, ‘Why the death of a blogger has put Kenya’s police on trial’, BBC, 18 June 2025; E. Sampson and B. Otieno, ‘Albert Ojwang Was Killed in Police Custody. Kenyans Are Not About to Let It Go’, The New York Times, 6 June 2025; ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights deplores the death in Custody of Mr. Albert Omondi Ojwang in the Republic of Kenya’, African Union: African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 12 June 2025.
38
E. Igunza, ‘Protests erupt in Kenya’s capital over blogger’s death in police custody’, NPR, 12 June 2025.
39
‘Garissa University attack: Tanzanian and Kenyans get long sentences’, BBC, 3 July 2019.
40
M. Caldwell, ‘Nairobi students protest massacre’, DW, 4 July 2015.
41
High Court of Nairobi, ‘Legal Advice Centre ta Kituo Cha Sheria 84 others v Cabinet Secretary Ministry of Education 7 others’, 31 July 2024; B. Mwaniki, ‘Justice for the Fallen in Kenya: Supreme Court Awards Terror-attack Families Compensation’, Democracy in Africa, 12 August 2024; A. Wasike, ‘Kenyan government ordered to pay $3.4M to victims of 2015 university terror attack’, AA, 31 July 2024.
42
A. Wasike, ‘Kenyan government ordered to pay $3.4M to victims of 2015 university terror attack’, AA, 31 July 2024.
43
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2628 (2022)’, 31 March 2022.
44
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2628 (2022)’, 31 March 2022,operative para 22(a).
45
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2687 (2023)’, 27 June 2023, operative paras 1 and 3.
46
‘The Transition Process’, African Union Transition Mission in Somalia.
47
‘Resolution 2687 (2023)’, 27 June 2023, operative para 7.b.
48
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2741 (2024)’, 28 June 2024.
49
‘Burgavo Base handover marks end of ATMIS Phase Three drawdown’, African Union Transition Mission in Somalia, 14 November 2024.
50
M. Bryden, ‘Somalia at Risk of Becoming a Jihadist State’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 17 November 2025; H. Getachew, ‘The Post-African Union Transition Mission in Somalia and its Regional Security Implications’, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 30 July 2024.
51
‘Special Report: Kenya-Somalia Border: Rising al-Shabaab Threat in the Wake of ATMIS Drawdown’, ACLED, 1 September 2023.
52
J. Christine, ‘Trends of Violent Extremist Attacks and Arrests in Kenya, January – December 2024’, Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies.
53
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2699 (2023)’, 2 October 2023, operative para 1.
54
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2699 (2023)’, 2 October 2023; ‘Kenya considers leading a force in Haiti: What you need to know’, Al Jazeera, 1 August 2023
55
‘UN approves international force to aid Haiti amid gang violence’, Al Jazeera, 2 October 2023.
56
H. Isaac, ‘Haiti PM vows to retake country as first Kenyan police arrive’, Al Jazeera, 27 June 2024.
57
R. Eastham and C. Baguma, ‘‘People who spent years saving lives are now struggling to survive’ – how we witnessed Trump’s USAID cuts devastate health programmes in Kenya’, The Conversation, 18 July 2025.
58
S. Marks and J. Hong, ‘Trump’s aid cuts are hitting the world’s largest refugee camps’, Moneyweb, 30 November 2025.
59
D. Wabwireh, ‘The ripple effect of Trump’s budget cuts on refugee camps in Kenya’, Africa News, 18 July 2025; ‘Refugees in Kenya impacted by food aid cuts; WFP rolls out new system’, Al Jazeera, 11 August 2025.
60
A. Soy, ‘Starvation alert as children fill Kenya refugee ward after US aid cuts’, BBC, 12 June 2025.
61
S. Marks and J. Hong, ‘Trump’s aid cuts are hitting the world’s largest refugee camps’, Moneyweb, 30 November 2025.
62
‘The Islamic State in Somalia: Responding to an Evolving Threat’, International Crisis Group, 12 September 2024; C. Weiss and L. Webber, ‘Islamic State-Somalia: A Growing Global Terror Concern’, Online article, Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, September 2024.
63
C. Weiss and L. Webber, ‘Islamic State-Somalia: A Growing Global Terror Concern’, Online article, Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, September 2024. M. Yusuf, ‘Report: IS-Somalia becomes financial hub; leader could be top IS chief’, Voice of America, 12 September 2024.
64
‘Foreign Travel Advice: Kenya’, Gov.UK
65
C. Weiss and L. Webber, ‘Islamic State-Somalia: A Growing Global Terror Concern’, Online article, Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, September 2024; ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2023: Kenya’, U.S. Department of State.
66
Thirty-seven suspected terrorists arrested in East Africa, says Interpol’, Reuters, 27 January 2025; ‘37 terror suspects arrested in East African operation’, Interpol, 27 January 2025.
67
F. Irshaid, ‘Isis, Isil, IS or Daesh? One group, many names’, BBC News, 2 December 2015)
68
P. Loft and L. Brooke-Holland, ‘Countering Islamic State/Daesh in Africa, Syria and Iraq 2025’, UK Parliament: House of Commons, 28 March 2025.
69
‘Our Mission’, The Global Coalition.

Kenya

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (between 2023 and 2025)

Intercommunal Crisis

Political Protests

Kenyan Government to Compensate Garissa Attack Victims