Lebanon (2026-10-08)

Multiple armed conflicts were occurring on the territory of Lebanon as of May 2026:

Shebaa Farms claimed by Lebanon, and other Lebanese territories remain under occupation by Israel.
An international armed conflict (IAC) exists between Lebanon and Israel as of 8 October 2023, due to Israel’s use of force against non-State armed groups on Lebanese territory without Lebanon’s consent.
A non-international armed conflict (NIAC) between Israel and the non-State armed group Hezbollah has been ongoing since the end of November 2023, primarily in the south of Lebanon.

The law of occupation applies to the belligerent occupation of Lebanese territory by Israel. The law of military occupation is set out in Hague Convention IV of 1907 and the annexed Regulations, Geneva Convention IV and Additional Protocol I of 1977. Israel and Lebanon are parties to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, but only Lebanon is party to the Additional Protocol I of 1977.

Customary international humanitarian law (IHL) is also applicable during an occupation; it complements applicable treaty law and binds all parties to the conflict.

In addition to the law of occupation, the existence of an IAC between Israel and Lebanon, triggered by Israel’s use of force against a non-State actor on Lebanese territory without Lebanon’s consent, triggers the application of a broader body of treaty and customary IHL.

The NIAC between Israel and Hezbollah is regulated by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, ¹ and customary IHL.

Since gaining independence in 1943 from a two-decades-long French mandate, Lebanon has been plagued by recurring armed conflicts and chronic instability. Although Lebanon played a minimal role in the 1967 Six-Day War by Arab states against Israel, ² the war had lasting repercussions for Lebanon. During the conflict, Israel captured the Shebaa Farms, a narrow strip of land it considers part of the Golan Heights, but which Lebanon claims as its own territory. Israel purported to annex the Golan Heights, including Shebaa Farms, in 1981, but this claim is invalid as accretion of territory by force is not lawful. ³ In 1974, the United Nations declared Shebaa Farms a part of Israeli-occupied Syrian territory. ⁴ However, following Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000, after an 18-year-long occupation, Hezbollah asserted that the withdrawal had been incomplete and claimed the Shebaa Farms as Lebanese, not Syrian, territory. ⁵

The Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990), a devastating internal conflict, began as an armed confrontation between Christian militias and a coalition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Druze, and Muslim militias. ⁶ The war drew in regional and international actors, notably Syria and Israel. Syrian forces entered Lebanon in 1976 and remained until their withdrawal in 2005. Israel intervened militarily on two occasions: first, in 1978 (briefly), and then in a full-scale invasion in 1982 which led to the occupation of a security zone in southern Lebanon that lasted until 2000. During this period, in response to the deteriorating security situation, the United Nations (UN) established the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978 to monitor the cessation of hostilities and support the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty in the south. UNIFIL’s mandate has since evolved to adapt to the shifting reality on the ground. ⁷

Hezbollah emerged during the 15-year-long Lebanese Civil War. A Shiite Muslim political party and militant organization based in Lebanon, Hezbollah is often described as operating as ‘a State within a State’ due to its military, political, and social influence. Hezbollah has been backed by Iran and is ideologically influenced by the ideas of Ayatollah Khomeini and the programme of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. It also maintains close ties to a broader network of Iran-aligned non-State armed groups. It is politically motivated by violent opposition to Israel and resistance to Western influence in the Middle East. ⁸

During the first two decades of its existence, Hezbollah prioritized driving the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) out of southern Lebanon. ⁹ In 2006, Israel again invaded southern Lebanon, ¹⁰ which involved both an international armed conflict against Lebanon and a NIAC against Hezbollah. Despite the conflict lasting only thirty-four days, Hezbollah continued to attack Israel, justifying its actions by reference to Israel’s continued military presence on the Lebanon-Israel-Syria border. ¹¹ Hezbollah launched isolated missile attacks against the Israeli presence in the Shebaa Farms in 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024. ¹²

Hezbollah’s attack on Israel on 12 July 2006 and the subsequential conflict triggered the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 on 11 August 2006 which specifically called for the cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. This resolution further signifies that Hezbollah had the capacity to achieve its objectives by conducting military operations in an organized manner and that the group has been successful in engaging in military tactics. ¹³

Beyond Lebanon, Hezbollah has played a substantial role in regional conflicts, particularly, the Syrian armed conflict in which it provided crucial support to the Assad regime. ¹⁴ Hezbollah was militarily active there from 2013 onwards. ¹⁵ At that time and place, it was sufficiently organized to be considered a non-State party to the Syrian conflict. ¹⁶

The group is also implicated in attacks against United States (US) personnel and interests in the Middle East. ¹⁷

Since 7 October 2023, Israel has conducted a series of strikes against Hezbollah leadership¹⁸. Similarly, on 17 and 18 September 2024, an IDF action exploded multiple pagers used by Hezbollah operatives but also by civilians¹⁹. A ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon was reached on 26 November 2024 and became operational on 27 November 2024.

Targeted Assassinations on High Value Targets

In the renewed hostilities in 2026 (see below), Israel killed Ahmed Ali Balout, a commander of Hezbollah’s Radwan Force.²⁰ They also claimed to have killed 250 Hezbollah members in a single day – ‘within minutes’ – including the Deputy Commander of the Missile Unit, Abu Mahummad Habib, the Commander of the Logistics Support Headquarters, Hassan Mustafa Nasser, senior Commanders in the intelligence unit, namely Ali Hijazi, Abu Ali Abbas, and Ali Qassem, the Head of Artillery in the Iqlim region, Ali Mohammad Sbeiti, and the Head of Artillery in the Badr unit, Ali Jamil Musa.²¹ Hezbollah’s head of intelligence, Hussein Makled, was reportedly also killed in the 2 March attacks.²²

Implementation of 26 November 2024 ceasefire agreement

A ceasefire agreement was reached on 26 November 2024 and became operational on 27 November 2024. The agreement entailed, inter alia, a halt to hostilities starting 27 November, with Israel ceasing offensive operations, Lebanon preventing Hezbollah attacks, both sides committing to UNSC Resolution 1701, coordinated troop deployment and arms control, international monitoring, and indirect US- and UN-facilitated talks to resolve border disputes. ²³

The ceasefire agreement facilitated a sixty-day transition period, which included the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon. The IDF withdrew from most positions in southern Lebanon on 18 February 2025, retaining control of five strategic sites in addition to the disputed Shebaa Farms area. ²⁴ Despite ongoing border negotiations, Israeli officials, including Foreign Minister Israel Katz, confirmed that regardless of the outcome of talks, the IDF would maintain its presence at these five positions. ²⁵ The IDF has communicated that it will complete the withdrawal only once the LAF takes full control over southern Lebanon and replaces Hezbollah. ²⁶ As of mid-2026, the IDF had not withdrawn from southern Lebanon. ²⁷

Military operations in 2025 and 2026 despite 26 November 2024 ceasefire

Tensions reignited on 22 March 2025 when at least five rockets were fired from Lebanon toward the Israeli town of Metula, causing no casualties. ²⁸ In retaliation, the IDF launched artillery and airstrikes on southern Lebanon, resulting in at least one fatality. ²⁹ On 28 March, the situation escalated further when the IDF conducted airstrikes on Beirut, the first strikes on the capital since the ceasefire took effect, after additional rocket fire from Lebanon. ³⁰ Rockets have been fired from Lebanon on at least two occasions since the ceasefire, although Hezbollah has denied involvement. ³¹ Hamas later claimed responsibility, stating that individuals unaffiliated with its leadership had fired the rockets and handing over three suspects to the Lebanese security forces. ³²

Israeli airstrikes have continued across Lebanon, targeting sites in the Bekaa Valley, ³³ southern Lebanon, ³⁴ and on 5 June 2025, Israel launched airstrikes on suspected Hezbollah drone production factories in southern Beirut. ³⁵

On 30 June 2025, an Israeli official stated that peace negotiations with Lebanon cannot move forward until Hezbollah is disarmed. While Israel recognizes Lebanon’s attempts to dismantle Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, it believes this task is extremely challenging. Israeli strikes on Hezbollah targets have continued despite the ceasefire agreement in place. ³⁶

On 8 January 2026, the Lebanese army announced that it had finished phase one of its plan to bring all weaponry belonging to non-State actors in southern Lebanon under its control.³⁷ By this date, the Lebanese army was in control of all of Lebanon that was south of the Litani River (besides those areas that were still under Israeli control).³⁸ Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said that this meant that ‘decisions of war and peace’ now belonged to Lebanon alone(see below).³⁹ Benjamin Netanyahu called this ‘encouraging’ but ‘far from sufficient’.⁴⁰ Despite progress by Lebanon in sticking to the November 2024 ceasefire, Israel continued to launch ‘frequent’ attacks in Lebanon.⁴¹ On 21 January 2026, Israel launched a wave of attacks throughout southern Lebanon, killing two people and injuring nineteen others.⁴² Israel said it was targeting Hezbollah operatives and ‘weapons manufacturing sites’.⁴³

Despite Hezbollah’s vow to not give up its weapons north of the Litani, the Lebanese government promised to push forward with the next phase of the plan – seeking to disarm the group between the Litani and Awali rivers.⁴⁴ Following the renewed outbreak of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel on 2 March (see below), the Lebanese government banned Hezbollah from carrying out military activities.⁴⁵ Hezbollah rejected the government’s stance, stating its ‘bold and confrontational measures’ were ‘unjustified’.⁴⁶ Hezbollah’s ‘role in the political sphere’ was also banned.⁴⁷

Election of a new Lebanese president on 9 January 2025

On 9 January 2025, the Lebanese Parliament elected army commander Joseph Aoun as President, ending a prolonged presidential vacuum that had persisted since October 2022 when Michel Aoun left office and lawmakers failed to agree on a successor. ⁴⁸ The decision to convene a new parliamentary session for the purposes of voting for a new president was announced one day after the November 2024 ceasefire approved by Israel and the Lebanese government came into effect. ⁴⁹

In the first round of voting, lawmakers from the pro-Hezbollah bloc submitted blank ballots; describing it as a deliberate tactic to delay the process, and acting as ‘protectors of national understanding’ and opposing all forms of foreign interference, having ‘shed blood for this country’. ⁵⁰ Winning the second round of voting, Joseph Aoun assumed office while retaining his role as commander of the LAF, becoming the country’s 14^th President and the fifth military commander to hold the position. ⁵¹

On 13 January 2025, President Aoun nominated Nawaf Salam, then serving as a judge at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), as prime minister. Parliament confirmed the nomination later that same day. ⁵² Judge Nawaf Salam resigned as member of the ICJ the following day. ⁵³

Municipal elections in May 2025

In May 2025, Lebanon held municipal elections that were widely seen as a litmus test for Hezbollah’s popular support, particularly in the south. ⁵⁴ Voting occurred over the course of four weeks, starting in Mount Lebanon, then moving through the northern districts, Beirut, and the Bekaa Valley, and concluding in southern Lebanon. Despite suffering political and military setbacks during fourteen months of conflict with Israel, Hezbollah retained its core voter base. Along with its political ally, the Amal Movement, Hezbollah secured victories in dozens of municipalities. Although establishment parties won the majority of seats nationwide, reformist and anti-establishment candidates also made gains, including in areas historically dominated by Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. ⁵⁵

Lebanon requests renewal of UN peacekeeping mandate

In June 2025, the Lebanese government formally requested the extension of the mandate of UNIFIL for an additional year to 31 August 2026. ⁵⁶ The existing mandate was due to expire on 31 August 2025, unless renewed by the UN Security Council. Lebanon reaffirmed its commitment to UNIFIL’s presence and ongoing cooperation under UNSC Resolution 1701. ⁵⁷ In August 2025, the Security Council extended UNIFIL’s mandate for a final time until 31 December 2026 and called for all peacekeepers to be fully withdrawn by the end of 2027.⁵⁸

Renewed hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel in March 2026

In response to US President Donald Trump’s threats on Iran in January 2026 and his announcement of an ‘armada’ in the region, Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem, on 26 January, stated that Hezbollah was ‘not neutral’ and that they would get involved in any conflict that targeted Iran.⁵⁹ Making good on its threat, on 2 March 2026 Hezbollah launched six rockets and drones at Haifa in northern Israel as revenge for the US/Israeli assassination of Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.⁶⁰ No deaths were reported in Israel.⁶¹ Israel responded by launching a barrage of strikes on southern Lebanon, including the southern suburbs of Beirut, on what it called Hezbollah operatives and military sites, killing at least fifty-two people and wounding several others.⁶² Hezbollah’s head of intelligence, Hussein Makled, was reportedly killed in the attacks.⁶³ Israel also issued evacuation orders for more than fifty villages in southern and eastern Lebanon.⁶⁴

The two sides continued to exchange fire in March 2026. On 9 March, Israel struck Al-Qard al-Hasan, a financial institution in Beirut sanctioned by the United States, as well as other parts of Beirut’s southern suburbs.⁶⁵ Between 11 and 12 March, Hezbollah, in coordination with Iran, launched 200 rockets and twenty drones at northern Israel.⁶⁶ No Israelis were killed but two people were injured.⁶⁷ Some of the Hezbollah rockets reached Tel Aviv while ballistic missiles launched from Iran reportedly reached central Israel.⁶⁸ Most missiles were intercepted, causing debris. Those that did land caused fires.⁶⁹ Israel responded with its own strikes across southern Lebanon.⁷⁰ One strike in Corniche in Beirut reportedly killed twelve people and injured twenty-eight others.⁷¹ On 13 March, Israel struck Burj Qalaouiyah, reportedly targeting a center run by the Hezbollah-affiliated Islamic Health Association (IHA).⁷² Twelve medical workers were killed. ⁷³ Overall, Israeli strikes reportedly hit about 100 sites in Beirut in March.⁷⁴ By 2 April, the IDF claimed that it had killed more than 1000 Hezbollah fighters,⁷⁵ and around the same time, Lebanon reported that more than 1,300 people had been killed in Israeli strikes.⁷⁶

As early as 3 March, Israel embarked on a ground invasion in southern Lebanon, seizing hilltops and villages.⁷⁷ The invasion has seen fighting between Hezbollah and the IDF in southern Lebanon, with the two reportedly engaging in at least forty-five armed clashes in March.⁷⁸ On 29 March, The Times of Israel reported that the IDF was advancing further into southern Lebanon, taking over control of positions previously used by Hezbollah to launch attacks on Israel and the IDF⁷⁹ Israel has gone deep into Lebanon despite the ceasefire, occupying territory for an indefinite period of time (see below). The Israeli attacks on and invasion into southern Lebanon triggered mass displacement, with over one million people registered as displaced with the Lebanese government at the time of reporting.⁸⁰

The deadliest Israeli strikes came after the United States, Israel, and Iran announced a ceasefire on 8 April. Not long after the announcement, the IDF carried out the ‘largest wave of strikes on Hezbollah’ since the beginning of renewed hostilities.⁸¹ Israel targeted 100 sites within ten minutes, stating that they included Hezbollah command centers, intelligence headquarters, and other military sites.⁸² The IDF acknowledged that most of the sites were ‘within the heart of the civilian population’ but called this a strategic decision on Hezbollah’s – ‘a cynical exploitation of Lebanese citizens as human shields in order to safeguard its operations’.⁸³ The IDF did issue evacuation orders before carrying out the strikes.⁸⁴ But at least 182 people were killed in the strikes, the highest death toll in a single day since 2 March,⁸⁵ while at least 837 people were injured.⁸⁶ According to the IDF, it killed 250 Hezbollah operatives ‘within minutes’ in these attacks.⁸⁷

A ten-day ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel, brokered by the United States, was esigned on 16 April 2026 (see below).⁸⁸ It was extended for a further three weeks on 23 April 2026 ⁸⁹ and for forty-five more days on 15 May 2026.⁹⁰ Despite this, both sides continue to trade blows but with Israel’s being significantly more deadly (see below).

Israeli invasion and seizure of parts of Southern Lebanon

As part of its renewed hostilities with Hezbollah (see above), Israel advanced into southern Lebanon in early March 2026.⁹¹ Since then, Israel has severed northern Lebanon from southern Lebanon by destroying all bridges that traverse the Litani River and has, despite the ceasefire (see below), maintained a presence in a ten kilometre stretch of southern Lebanon.⁹² In early March 2026, Israel ordered all residents living south of the Litani River to evacuate to the north – telling them to ‘leave “immediately” for their “safety”’.⁹³ It also called on people in Beirut’s southern suburbs and those in the Bekaa Valley region to evacuate.⁹⁴ In total, Israel called for evacuations in areas covering approximately a tenth of Lebanon’s sovereign territory.⁹⁵ By 6 March, it was estimated that at least 300 000 people had been displaced due to these orders and the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah.⁹⁶ As of end May 2026, more than one million people self-registered as displaced.⁹⁷

In late March 2026, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz stated that Israel would remain in and be in control of southern Lebanese territory that extended to the Litani.⁹⁸ In addition, Katz announced that homes in Lebanese villages near the Israeli border would be demolished,⁹⁹ which subsequently occured.¹⁰⁰ Israel further prohibited residents from returning and classified the zone as an active combat area that was not subject to the ceasefire.¹⁰¹ The seizure of territory has been condemned by Hezbollah officials and drew ‘concern’ from the United Nations.¹⁰²

Israeli attacks on journalists

Israel repeatedly targeted and killed Lebanese journalists during its latest round of hostilities with Hezbollah (see above).

On 12 March 2026, an Israeli strike killed Mohamad Shehab, a freelance camera and drone operator in a targeted strike on his apartment complex.¹⁰³ His young daughter was also killed and his wife was severely injured.¹⁰⁴ Israel justified its action on the basis that it was targeting a Hezbollah commander in the complex.¹⁰⁵ On the morning of 18 March 2026 in an Israeli strike on a residential building in Beirut, Mohamed Sherri, a journalist who worked for the Hezbollah-affiliated Al Manar TV, and his wife were killed while they were sleeping.¹⁰⁶ On 25 March 2026, a photojournalist with Al Manar TV, Hussain Hamood, was killed in an Israeli strike on southern Lebanon while he was filming.¹⁰⁷

On 28 March 2026, three Lebanese journalists – Ali Shoeib (Al Manar TV), Fatima Ftouni, and Mohamed Ftouni (both with Al Mayadeen) – were killed by an Israeli strike on their car.¹⁰⁸ In confirming that they had killed Shoeib and Mohamed Ftouni, Israel justified the action by calling the two Hezbollah ‘terrorists’ that were operating ‘under the guise’ of being journalists.¹⁰⁹ The IDF went on to accuse Shoeib of being part of Hezbollah’s Radwan Force and stated that he exposed the locations of IDF soldiers along the border and shared ‘Hezbollah propaganda materials’.¹¹⁰ The IDF stated that it was aware that a female journalist had been killed.¹¹¹ Hezbollah rejected the IDF’s justifications, calling them ‘false claims’ that were intended to absolve Israel of ‘responsibility for this crime’.¹¹² Lebanon’s President, Jospeh Aoun, also called the attack a crime, calling it a violation of international law, a sentiment repeated by Nawaf Salam, the Lebanese Prime Minister.¹¹³

On 8 April 2026, Ghada Dayekh was killed in an Israeli strike on her home.¹¹⁴ Dayekh was a presenter with Saw al-Farah, a privately owned broadcaster that she had helped launch in the 1980s.¹¹⁵ On the same day, in a separate Israeli strike, Suzan Khalil (Al Manar TV) was killed.¹¹⁶ Khalil’s death came just hours after the ceasefire between the United States, Israel, and Iran was announced.¹¹⁷

Finally, on 22 April 2026, an Israeli double-tap strike killed a prominent Lebanese journalist, Amal Khalil, and injured a photographer, Zeinab Faraj.¹¹⁸ Khalil, who was based in and reported on events in southern Lebanon, had reportedly been surveilled and had received direct threats from Israel in the two years leading up to her death.¹¹⁹ Israel stated that they did not deliberately target Khalil, but Lebanon believes she was deliberately targeted.¹²⁰ According to Al Akhbar, Al Jazeera, and the BBC, Khalil and Faraj were travelling in a car when the car in front of them was struck by an Israeli drone, killing two men.T¹²¹ Khalil and Faraj sought cover in a building which was struck by Israeli warplanes.¹²² The ambulance that arrived on the scene was subsequently targeted.¹²³ The ambulance was able to rescue Faraj but could not recover Khalil’s body (it was later recovered).¹²⁴ While Israel acknowledged that two journalists had been injured, it did not acknowledge Khalil’s death and further denied that it prevented rescue teams from reaching Khalil and Faraj.¹²⁵ It said that the two cars it had targeted (one which had included Khalil and Faraj as passangers) were targeted because they had left a ‘military structure used by Hezbollah’ and that they were approaching Israeli troops in a way that made them an ‘immediate threat’.¹²⁶

Israeli attacks on healthcare workers

Israel killed 226 Lebanese healthcare workers in their 2024 conflict with Hezbollah¹²⁷ and targeted workers during the latest round of hostilities (see above).¹²⁸ Between 2 March and 21 March 2026, Israeli attacks struck 128 medical facilities. Forty healthcare workers were killed and 107 were injured.¹²⁹ By 15 May 2026, the totals stood at 110 dead and 252 injured.¹³⁰ Israel has justified these attacks on facilities and healthcare workers by accusing Hezbollah of using medical facilities and ambulances for military purposes.¹³¹

Many of the strikes were double-taps,¹³² but in April 2026 a quadruple-tap was reported.¹³³

The IDF told the media that certain attacks were ‘under review’.¹³⁴

Israeli strikes on bridges in Southern Lebanon

As part of its advance into the current occupation of southern Lebanon, Israel destroyed several bridges linking southern Lebanon to the rest of the country in early 2026.¹³⁵ Israeli Minister of Defense, Israel Katz, ordered the IDF to destroy all bridges that cross the Litani River.¹³⁶ Israel claims that the bridges were being used to move Hezbollah fighters from southern to northern Lebanon.¹³⁷

Killing of UNIFIL peacekeepers

UNIFIL peacekeepers have been targeted and killed since the renewed outbreak of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. On 6 March 2026, three peacekeepers were injured in an attack on their base in Al Qawzah in southern Lebanon.¹³⁸ On 15 March 2026, unidentified non-State actors fired upon peacekeepers patrolling Yatar, Dayr Kifa, and Qallawiyah.¹³⁹ On 18 April 2026, another peacekeeper was killed and three others injured after coming under fire from non-State actors (allegedly Hezbollah).‘UNIFIL statement (18 April 2026)’, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 18 April 2026. One of the injured peacekeepers succumbed to his injuries on 22 April 2026.¹⁴⁰ Both victims were French.¹⁴¹

The 2026 ceasefire(s) between Lebanon and Israel

On 16 April 2026, the United States announced that it had brokered a ten-day ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon.¹⁴² The ceasefire, however, still gave Israel the ‘right to take all necessary measures in self-defense, at any time, against any planned, imminent, or ongoing attacks’.¹⁴³ The ceasefire further required Lebanon to ‘take meaningful steps to prevent Hezbollah’ and other non-State armed groups in Lebanon from attacking Israel.¹⁴⁴ President Trump urged Hezbollah to abide by the ceasefire,¹⁴⁵ and according to the BBC, Hezbollah signalled a willingness to do so as long as Israel agreed to ‘a comprehensive halt to attacks’ and to not have freedom of movement within Lebanon limited.¹⁴⁶

On 14 April 2026, the first direct talks between Israel and Lebanon since 1983 took place in Washington, DC in the United States,¹⁴⁷, President Trump announced that the ceasefire would be extended by a further three weeks.¹⁴⁸ After more rounds of talks between Israel and Lebanon in the United States, it was announced on 15 May 2026 that the ceasefire was again extended, this time for a period of forty-five days.¹⁴⁹

Post-ceasefire hostilities

Despite the ceasefire and its renewal, Israel has frequently conducted attacks on Lebanese territory, while Hezbollah has attacked Israeli troops and Israel.¹⁵⁰

On 25 May 2026, Itamar Ben-Gvir, Israel’s National Security Minister, and Bezalel Smotrich, the Finance Minister, called for the return to a full-scale war in Lebanon.¹⁵¹ Ben-Gvir called for electricity to Lebanon to be ‘cut off’ and for the Zahrani to be ‘seized’.¹⁵² Smotrich called for strikes in Beirut, stating that ‘for every one explosive drone [from Hezbollah], ten buildings must fall in Beirut’.¹⁵³ Later the same day, Benjamin Netanyahu released a video on telegram calling for strikes on Hezbollah with whom Israel is, according to Netanyahu, ‘at war’ to be intensified.¹⁵⁴ The IDF abided by the order, striking multiple sites in southern Lebanon and causing a mass exodus of people from the southern suburbs of Beirut.¹⁵⁵

As of late May 2026, twenty-four Israelis had reportedly been killed since 2 March 2026 – twenty-three soldiers and one civilian.¹⁵⁶ Over 3,000 people have been killed in Lebanon with more than 9000 people also injured.¹⁵⁷ It is unclear if the number includes Hezbollah fighters, but Reuters reported in late March that more than 400 Hezbollah fighters had been killed.¹⁵⁸ This would be in addition to the 250 fighters Israel claimed to have killed on 8 April 2026.¹⁵⁹ More than one million people have been registered as displaced with the Lebanese government.¹⁶⁰

Lebanon and Israel were engaged in two different legal types of IACs as of May 2026.

The first type of IAC concerns the Israeli military occupation of Lebanese territory, particularly the Shebaa Farms. ¹⁶¹

The second type is an active IAC beginning on 8 October 2023, when Israel launched military operations against non-State armed groups operating in Lebanese territory without the consent of the Lebanese government, thereby meeting the legal threshold for an IAC under IHL. ¹⁶²

International Armed Conflict between Israel and Lebanon

International armed conflict between Israel and Lebanon

Following Hamas’ action in Israel on 7 October 2023, in a show of solidarity with the Palestinian people, L. Bassam, et al, ‘Israel, Hezbollah Exchange Artillery, Rocket Fire’ Reuters, 8 October 2023, Hezbollah attacked the Shebaa Farms, controlled by Israel as the occupying power, on 8 October 2023. ¹ In response, the IDF launched multiple air strikes on Lebanese territory, starting on 8 October 2023. ² Military operations continued during 2024 (see 2023 version), 2025 and 2026.³ This recent escalation of hostilities is in addition to the ongoing Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory in the Shebaa Farms.

An IAC occurs when one or more states resort to armed force against another State, regardless of the motives for or the intensity of the violence. ⁴ An IAC can be triggered by attacks that are directed towards the territory of another state. It is not necessary that attacks are directed against the armed forces of that state.

On 1 October 2024, Israel launched a ground offensive against Hezbollah crossing into Lebanese territory along the southern border with the stated purpose of conducting ‘limited, localised, and targeted raids’ against strategically significant Hezbollah targets. ⁵ The IDF’s ground offensive into southern Lebanon and an intensified frequency of airstrikes in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley and Beirut in October 2024, indicated a significant month-on-month increase in attacks launched by Israel on Lebanese territory. ⁶ The IDF further expanded its ground operation in Lebanon during November 2024. ⁷

On 27 November 2024, a ceasefire agreement was signed by Israel, Lebanon, and five mediating nations, including the United States. ⁸ The agreement mandated a sixty-day halt to hostilities, during which Israel was to withdraw its forces from southern Lebanon. ⁹ Despite the formal ceasefire, hostilities have continued across multiple regions of Lebanon, reaffirming the ongoing IAC between Israel and Lebanon. Shortly after the ceasefire, France reported 52 Israeli violations of the agreement. ¹⁰ Israel accused Hezbollah of breaching the agreement and declared its forces would remain in southern Lebanon beyond the agreed sixty-day withdrawal deadline, citing Hezbollah’s continuing threat and the Lebanese army’s alleged complicity. ¹¹ On 1 December 2024, the IDF claimed it had identified and killed Hezbollah operatives firing from a church in southern Lebanon. ¹² A few days earlier, on 28 November, Lebanon had accused Israel of conducting airstrikes and tank shelling several villages, injuring two civilians. ¹³ Tensions escalated in March 2025 when at least five rockets were launched from Lebanon toward the Israeli town of Metula, ¹⁴ followed by an IDF artillery and airstrike response which killed at least one person in southern Lebanon. ¹⁵

The situation deteriorated further with Israeli airstrikes on Beirut. ¹⁶ Since then, Israeli airstrikes have continued across Lebanese territory, including the Bekaa Valley, ¹⁷ southern Lebanon, ¹⁸ and southern Beirut. ¹⁹Israel has effectively cut off northern Lebanon from southern Lebanon by destroying all bridges across the Litani River that connected the two parts of the country in early 2026 (see above).²⁰ Lebanon has condemned the invasion into and the seizure of villages in southern Lebanon as well as the destruction of the Litani River bridges, categorising these acts as an Israeli attempt to occupy more of southern Lebanon.²¹

IHL applies to the IAC between Israel and Lebanon, despite the ceasefire agreement as the declassification of an IAC is dependent on an objective judgement of a general end to military operations with a degree of stability and permanence. ²² The March 2026 hostilities between Israel and Lebanon, as well as Israel’s refusal to leave the parts of southern Lebanon it seized during the hostilities,²³ reinforces the situation of an ongoing IAC between the two States,²⁴ in addition to the ongoing belligerent occupation by Israel of a part of Lebanese territory.

Israel’s military occupation of Lebanon

Israel seized control of the Shebaa Farms during the 1967 Six-Day War and has retained control over the area ever since. The Shebaa Farms are currently administered by Israel as part of the Golan Heights. Israel maintains that the territory was Syrian at the time of capture and therefore forms part of its broader occupation of the Golan Heights. ²⁵

However, Lebanon claims the Shebaa Farms as part of its own territory, and Syria has supported this position, although neither nation has concluded a binding treaty to formalise their border or resolve the issue. During the 1950s, Syria had exploited this border ambiguity by establishing military posts in the Shebaa Farms and registering residents as Syrian nationals in a 1960 census. ²⁶

In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon in response to cross-border attacks by Palestinian militants. Israeli forces, alongside allied Maronite Christian militias, advanced as far as Beirut during the early stages of the intervention. While Israel withdrew from the capital by late September 1982, it continued to occupy southern Lebanon until May 2000. ²⁷ Following this withdrawal, Lebanon began asserting a formal claim over the Shebaa Farms, an area relatively unknown to many Lebanese citizens prior to that time. ²⁸ Lacking a definitive border treaty, the UN relied on existing maps to determine the line of withdrawal. These maps placed the Shebaa Farms within the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, leading the UN to certify in 2000, ²⁹ that Israel had fully withdrawn from Lebanese territory in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 425. ³⁰

In addition to Shebaa Farms, Israel reportedly continues to control at least five other positions along the Lebanese border, including areas in the Tyre, Bint Jbeil, and Marjayoun districts. ³¹ These positions have drawn criticism, particularly as they are accompanied by frequent ceasefire violations since the agreement of 27 November 2023. ³²

Under IHL, a situation of occupation exists if the territory is ‘under the authority of the hostile army’, even in the absence of resistance. ³³ The hostile foreign forces must exercise effective control over a territory without the consent of the sovereign state. ³⁴ The nature of ‘effective control’ in the context of occupation is further elaborated in legal doctrine and interpretations, which establish three cumulative conditions for occupation: ³⁵

The foreign state’s armed forces are physically present in the territory or parts of the territory of the territorial state without its consent.
The presence of the foreign forces prevents the effective local government in place at the time of invasion from substantially or completely exercising its powers.
The foreign forces are able to establish their own authority.

The three requirements are unpacked below, with the conclusion that these conditions are met in the case of Israel’s continued presence in the Shebaa Farms and the adjacent areas in southern Lebanon.

With respect to the first requirement, Israel seized control of the Shebaa Farms during the 1967 Six-Day War and has retained control since. ³⁶ Maps used by the UN in demarcating the Blue Line (the line of withdrawal) ³⁷, United Nations Peacekeeping, 5 March 2021 do not conclusively show the border between Lebanon and Syria in the area, although they consider at least a part of the Shebaa Farms is in southern Lebanon and, therefore, occupied by Israel. ³⁸Syria itself agrees that the Shebaa Farms are within Lebanese territory, ³⁹ although Israel considers the area to be inside Syria’s border and continues to occupy the territory.

Nevertheless, disputed territorial title does not preclude a classification as an occupation. As clarified by Sassòli, occupation is determined by facts on the ground, not by legal title or by recognition ⁴⁰ of the situation as a belligerent occupation. Further, Article 47 of Geneva Convention IV explicitly stipulates that annexation of an occupied territory does not deprive its population of the Convention’s protections,⁴¹ and annexation does not preclude the application of the Convention.

In sum, Israel’s continued military presence and administration of parts of southern Lebanon and the Shebaa Farms, without Lebanon’s consent, and the reality that this impedes the exercise of Lebanese sovereignty fulfils this first requirement.

The second requirement for effective control necessitates that ‘the effective local government in place at the time of the invasion has been or can be rendered substantially or completely incapable of exerting its powers by virtue of the foreign forces’ unconsented-to presence’. ⁴²

The third requirement entails that ‘the foreign forces are in a position to exercise authority over the territory concerned (or parts thereof) in lieu of the local government. ⁴³ Although the farms are uninhabited, Israel hosts several outposts, ⁴⁴ in this 28 square kilometre strip of land. ⁴⁵ Due to the presence of such military postings and the use of force by Israel, Lebanon is prevented from exerting its authority over the territory, ⁴⁶ and therefore this requirement is fulfilled.

Another territory that remains occupied by Israel includes Ghajar town. Ghajar is a village west of the Shebaa Farms where residents have dual Israeli-Lebanese citizenship. The village was divided by the Blue Line with the northern half located on the Lebanese side and the southern portion in the Golan Heights. A fence divided these two parts until 2006 when conflict was triggered between Israel and Hezbollah, and Israel reoccupied the northern parts of Ghajar. ⁴⁷ As Israel re-occupied the northern part of Ghajar without the permission of Lebanon, the first requirement for effective control ⁴⁸ was met as of 2006. Israel consolidated control over the entire village. During 2022, Ghajar’s local council erected a fence on the northern border of this village to close it off from its Lebanese surroundings. ⁴⁹ The Israeli army completed construction of this fence in July 2023. ⁵⁰. Ghajar town was now completely cut off from Lebanese control and the local government in the north remained paralysed, therefore the second requirement for effective control was cemented. ⁵¹ Israel and the local government under its control allows visitors to enter but only with permission of the IDF and the local government. ⁵² Lebanon does not exert any control over this town. All three requirements are thus satisfied, and Israel continues to occupy Ghajar town.

Further, as mentioned above, in addition to the Shebaa Farms, it has been suggested that Israel continues to occupy five positions along the Lebanese border. These include Laboune Hill in the Tyre district, Jabal Balat and Jal al-Deir in the Bint Jbeil district, and a position along the Markaba-Houla road and Hamames Hill, both located in the Marjayoun district. ⁵³ Reportedly, these outposts are manned by full Israeli army companies and were selected for their strategic elevation and proximity to northern Israeli towns. ⁵⁴ Israel has not indicated a timeline for withdrawal; instead, it ties its continued occupation to the Lebanese army’s ability to neutralize Hezbollah. ⁵⁵ In March 2025, it was reported that Israel plans to continue occupying the five positions until the ‘Lebanese army stabilizes the situation in southern Lebanon and ensures Hezbollah no longer is a threat’. ⁵⁶ Lebanon has condemned the occupation of these positions as a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. ⁵⁷ In June 2025, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz confirmed the indefinite nature of Israel’s military presence in these positions. ⁵⁸

In sum, Israel’s continuing administration of the Shebaa Farms, which were not under its control prior to 1967, constitutes a belligerent occupation. Thus, Israel is the occupying power.

A ceasefire agreement was reached on 26 November 2024 and became operational on 27 November 2024. ⁵⁹ The termination of an IAC does not necessarily coincide with peace treaties or ceasefires, which may be unstable or incomplete. Instead, the end of an IAC must be assessed based on the facts on the ground, with reference to the applicable legal criteria under IHL. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), this occurs at the general close of military operations meaning the cessation of all active hostilities and military movements of a belligerent nature, such that the likelihood of renewed conflict can reasonably be ruled out. ⁶⁰An occupation, specifically, ends when any of the three cumulative conditions for the occupation ceases to be met. ⁶¹ As the ceasefire agreement did not impact any of the three factors, it does not end the IAC between Israel and Lebanon because Israel continues to occupy parts of Lebanese territory, ⁶² even if ground forces withdrew from the rest of Lebanese territory. ⁶³

1
‘Israel, Hezbollah Exchange Fire, Raising Regional Tensions’, Al Jazeera, 8 October 2023. ↩︎
2
D. Gritten, ‘What to Know about the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict’, BBC News, 1 October 2024 ↩︎
3
L. Stephan, ‘Lebanon: Six months after a ceasefire with Israel, a low-intensity war is ongoing’, Le Monde, 23 May 2025. ↩︎
4
ICTY, ‘Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić a/k/a “Dule”’, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, para 70 ; ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, 2024, pp. 9–10. ↩︎
5
D. Estrin, ‘Israel Begins Ground Offensive in Lebanon’ NPR, 1 October 2024; D. Lieber, et al, ‘Israeli Special Forces Launch Raids Into Lebanon Ahead of Expected Ground Incursion’ The Wall Street Journal, 30 September 2024; and D. Byman, ‘Lessons from Israel’s Last War in Lebanon’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 October 2024. ↩︎
6
A. Mehvar, et al, ‘Middle East Overview: October 2024’, ACLED, 7 November 2024. ↩︎
7
A. Mehvar, et al, ‘Middle East Overview: November 2024’, ACLED, 6 December 2024. ↩︎
8
D. Coote and P. Godfrey, ‘Israel-Hezbollah cease-fire: Displaced Lebanese begin to head home as guns, bombs fall silent’, UPI, 27 November 2024. ↩︎
9
A. Geller, ‘What to know about the ceasefire deal between Israel and Lebanon’s Hezbollah’, AP News, 27 November 2024. ↩︎
10
‘France Warns Israel of Ceasefire Collapse after Recording 52 Violations’, MTV Lebanon, 1 December 2024. ↩︎
11
‘IDF warns Lebanese against return to border villages as it prepares to extend stay’, The Times of Israel, 25 January 2025. ↩︎
12
‘IDF kills terrorists in southern Lebanon located near church who ‘violated ceasefire agreement’’, The Jerusalem Post, 1 December 2024. ↩︎
13
B. McKernan, ‘Hezbollah keeping ‘hands on trigger’ amid fragile ceasefire with Israel’, The Guardian, 28 November 2024. ↩︎
14
E. Fabian, ‘Katz: IDF will stay at 5 points in southern Lebanon regardless of border dispute talks’, Times of Israel, 14 March 2025, ↩︎
15
‘One dead as Israel strikes Lebanon after cross-border rocket fire’, France 24, 22 March 2025. ↩︎
16
‘Israel warns of attacks ‘everywhere’ in Lebanon after rocket fire’, France 24, 28 March 2025. ↩︎
17
E. Fabian, ‘IDF targets Hezbollah weapons manufacturing, storage site in Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley’, The Times of Israel, 6 May 2025, ↩︎
18
‘Israel launches wave of strikes across south Lebanon’, Al Jazeera, 29 May 2025; D. Daoud, ‘Israeli operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah: May 12 – May 18, 2025’, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 23 May 2025, and on 5 June 2025, ↩︎
19
‘Israel says hits Beirut, targeting Hezbollah drone factories’, France 24, 5 June 2025. ↩︎
20
‘Lebanon: Israeli Bridge Attack a Potential War Crime’, Human Rights Watch, 16 April 2026; ‘Israeli strike destroys last bridge over Litani River as intense fighting continues in south Lebanon’,CBC, 16 August 2026. ↩︎
21
‘Israel says four soldiers killed as army pushes deeper into south Lebanon’, Al Jazeera, 31 March 2026; Y. Knell and A. Davies, ‘Israel says it will keep control over part of southern Lebanon after war with Hezbollah ends’, BBC, 31 March 2026; ‘Lebanon’s Aoun warns Israeli attack on bridge ‘prelude to ground invasion’’, Al Jazeera, 22 March 2026. ↩︎
22
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11. ↩︎
23
Y. Knell and A. Davies, ‘Israel says it will keep control over part of southern Lebanon after war with Hezbollah ends’, BBC, 31 March 2026; A. Cornwell and N. Osseiran, ‘Israel’s military to occupy swathe of southern Lebanon, defence minister says’, Reuters, 24 March 2026 ↩︎
24
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11; also ICTY, ‘Prosecutor v Delalić et al’, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 16 November 1998, para 184; ICTR, ‘The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007, para 207; SCSL, ‘Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor’, Trail Chamber II,Judgment, 18 May 2012, paras 563–66) ↩︎
25
‘Six-Day War’, Britannica, 28 July 2025; and A. Zeidan, ‘Shebaa Farms’, Britannica. ↩︎
26
A. Kaufmann, ‘The Israel-Hezbollah Conflict and the Shebaa Farms’, The Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, 13 November 2006; and ‘Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon (2000)’, Economic Cooperation Foundation, 24 to 25 May 2000. ↩︎
27
E. Pace, ‘Israel Units Start the Withdrawal from Beirut Area’, New York Times, 4 September 1983. ↩︎
28
S. Hijazi and Z. Antonios, ‘To whom do Shebaa Farms belong?’, L’Orient Today, 24 January 2024; J. A. Gross, ‘IDF to recognize 18-year occupation of south Lebanon as official campaign’, The Times of Israel, 4 November 2020; and L. Berman, ‘Two decades on, Israel confronts legacy of ‘forgotten’ south Lebanon occupation’, The Times of Israel, 18 June 2021. ↩︎
29
‘Security Council Endorses Secretary-General’s Conclusion on Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon as of 16 June’, United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 18 June 2000 ↩︎
30
UNSC, ‘Resolution 425 (1978)’, UN Doc S/Res/425(1978), 19 March 1978. ↩︎
31
‘Lebanese army deploys to south as Israel maintains five military positions’, The New Arab, 11 March 2025. ↩︎
32
‘Shebaa Farms: Joumblatt faces backlash over territory’s disputed identity’, L’Orient Today, 3 July 2025. ↩︎
33
‘Article 42 of Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907’, ICRC International Humanitarian Law Databases. ↩︎
34
T. Ferraro and L. Cameron, ‘Article 2: Application of the Convention’, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, ICRC, 2016, para 302; and ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict, RULAC, October 2015. ↩︎
35
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11-12; International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict, RULAC, October 2015, 11; T. Ferraro ‘Determining the Beginning and End of an Occupation Under International Humanitarian Law’, International Review of the Red Cross, 2012: ↩︎
36
‘Six-Day War’, Britannica, 28 July 2025. ↩︎
37
‘It’s time to talk about the Blue Line: Constructive re-engagement is key to stability’ ↩︎
38
F. C. Hof. ‘A Practical Line: The Line of Withdrawal from Lebanon and Its Potential Applicability to the Golan Heights’, Middle East Journal, 2001. ↩︎
39
‘The Syrian Golan’, Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations, ↩︎
40
M. Sassòli, ‘International Humanitarian Law’, Edward Elgar, 2019 ↩︎
41
‘Article 47 – Inviolability of rights’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases, ↩︎
42
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11. The Shebaa Farms are administered by Israel as part of the Golan Heights. A. Zeidan, ‘Shebaa Farms’, Britannica. ↩︎
43
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, 2024, 11. ↩︎
44
UNSC, ‘Identical letters dated 19 June 2023 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council’, UNSC Doc S/2023/459, 13 July 2023, ↩︎
45
‘Briefing Notes: Gruppe 62 – Informationszentrum Asyl und Migration’, Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 25 September 2023. ↩︎
46
UNSC, ‘Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2025’, UNSC S/2025/460, 11 July 2025, ↩︎
47
A. Zeidan, ‘Shebaa Farms’, Britannica. ↩︎
48
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11, ↩︎
49
A. Zeidan, ‘Shebaa Farms’, Britannica. ↩︎
50
W. Taleb, ‘About Ghajar, the disputed village occupied by Israel’, L’Orient Today, 7 July 2023 ↩︎
51
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, 2024, 11. ↩︎
52
‘August 2025 Monthly Forecast: Lebanon’, Security Council Report, 30 July 2025. ↩︎
53
‘Lebanese army deploys to south as Israel maintains five military positions’, The New Arab, 11 March 2025. ↩︎
54
‘‘A dead zone’: Why is Israel still occupying these five positions in Lebanon?’, The New Arab, 18 February 2025. ↩︎
55
‘‘A dead zone’: Why is Israel still occupying these five positions in Lebanon?’, The New Arab, 18 February 2025. ↩︎
56
‘Israeli occupation of south Lebanon to last ‘weeks, months’ in ‘quiet understanding’ with US: Report’, The Cradle, 4 March 2025. ↩︎
57
‘Lebanon files UN complaint against Israeli violations of Resolution 1701, ceasefire agreement’, LBC International, 4 February 2025. ↩︎
58
N. Homsi, ‘Lebanon warns of danger as Israeli occupation and attacks continue’, The National News, 1 June 2025. ↩︎
59
J. Deeb, ‘Full text of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon’, Middle East Eye, 27 November 2024. ↩︎
60
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 9 and 10. ↩︎
61
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11. ↩︎
62
K. Johnson, ‘The U.N. Resolution at the Heart of the Israel-Lebanon Conflict’, Foreign Policy, 14 May 2025, ↩︎
63
‘Israel says troops will stay in five locations across southern Lebanon’, Al Jazeera, 17 February 2025. ↩︎

Non-International Armed Conflict between Israel and Hezbollah

Background

Israel is engaged in an extraterritorial NIAC, ¹ whereunder Israel, through the IDF, is fighting a non-state armed group, Hezbollah, on the territory of another state, Lebanon. The fighting began on 8 October 2023, when Hezbollah launched missiles into Israel in support of the attacks of 7 October 2023. ². In response, Israel launched rockets into Lebanon against Hezbollah. ³

Intensity

Since 8 October 2023, there have been a great many strikes between Israel and Hezbollah, including rocket launches, missile strikes and drone attacks targeting various locations across northern Israel and southern Lebanon. ⁴ Hezbollah has actively employed rockets and sophisticated weaponry, such as anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and drones, which reportedly have resulted in casualties among IDF troops. ⁵

In retaliation, Israel has conducted extensive airstrikes, ⁶ aimed at dismantling Hezbollah’s military infrastructure with the primary focus on Hezbollah strongholds ⁷ in the south of Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley in the east, and the suburbs of Beirut. Reports indicate that Israel targeted high-ranking Hezbollah officials and destroyed significant stockpiles of munitions. ⁸ Despite this, Hezbollah retains a substantial arsenal and operational capacity. ⁹

Israel continued to attack Hezbollah January 2026,¹⁰ with hostilities between the two parties flairing again on 2 March 2026 when Hezbollah launched a six rockets into northern Israel as retaliation for the US/Israeli assassination of Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (see above).¹¹ No deaths were reported in Israel.¹² Israel responded by launching a barrage of attacks into southern Lebanon, killing at least fifty-two people and wounding several others.¹³ Israel initated a ground invasion in southern Lebanon on 3 March.¹⁴ In a coordinated attack with Iran on 11 and 12 March, Hezbollah launched twenty drones and 200 rockets into northern Israel, with some rockets managing to reach Tel Aviv.¹⁵ No Israelis were killed but two people were injured.¹⁶

Recent analyses underscores Hezbollah’s evolving military capabilities. In 2024, the Armed Conflict Survey noted the group’s use of advanced weaponry, including Russian-made anti-tank guided missiles and Iranian-supplied unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), in attacks against IDF positions in northern Israel. These actions are seen as a part of a broader trend of mutual learning and operational enhancement within the network of Iranian-aligned militias, including the Houthis. ¹⁷

The fighting between the IDF and Hezbollah equates to protracted armed violence.

Organization

Hezbollah functions as a Shiite Muslim political party and an armed militant group. ¹⁸ It has developed a comprehensive infrastructure comprising a robust security apparatus, political institutions, and an extensive social services network, leading many observers to describe it as a ‘state within a state’.¹⁹ Hezbollah’s military wing has been active from as early as 1982. ²⁰

As of 2024, the Congressional Research Service estimated Hezbollah’s military strength at approximately 40,000 fighters. ²¹ The group is widely regarded as the most powerful armed non-state actor in Lebanon, with a vast political apparatus and tens of thousands of supporters globally. ²² Its armed wing is considered the most dominant and sophisticated militia operating in the country. ²³

Hezbollah has a sophisticated vertical command structure. ²⁴ The Shura Council is the central decision-making body of Hezbollah, and the secretary general is the head of the Shura Council. ²⁵ The former secretary general of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, was killed on 27 September 2024 and since 29 October 2024, Naeem Qasim has served as the secretary general. ²⁶ The Jihad Council is one of five councils subordinate to the Shura Council and is responsible for coordinating military strategy and tactics. At least seven key positions are held at the Jihad Council, including the head of the council, the head of military operations, the head military commander, the commanders for specific regions, heads of specific military units, the head of security, and military liaisons. Several senior leaders on the Jihad Council have been killed by the IDF. ²⁷

Hezbollah has a dedicated media liaison, ²⁸ a position embedded in the Jihad Council, which enables Hezbollah to speak with one voice.²⁹ The former Hezbollah media liaison, Mohamed Afif, ³⁰ was killed in November 2024. Hezbollah named Youssef al-Zein as his successor. ³¹

Hezbollah’s logistical capacity is a critical component of its operational strength and organizational sophistication. ³² This capacity is underpinned by a well-designed force structure, geographically dispersed and fortified defensive positions and a substantial arsenal of heavy weaponry, including rockets, missiles and unmanned aerial systems. Hezbollah was, at the time hostilities began, regarded as one of the most heavily armed non-state actors in the world, possessing a large and sophisticated military arsenal. Its stockpile is estimated to include up to 130,000 rockets and missiles, including precision-guided munitions, drones and anti-tank weaponry, capable of striking targets deep within Israeli territory. The group benefits from substantial financial and military backing from Iran, which reportedly provides hundreds of millions of dollars annually. ³³ After Hezbollah suffered heavy losses in their 2024 hostilities with Israel, Iran reportedly sent 1,000 Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) advisors to Lebanon to reorganize Hezbollah into smaller units in order to prevent infiltration from Israeli spies. The IRGC also reportedly retrained Hezbollah fighters.³⁴

Hezbollah’s military personnel are estimated to range between 20,000 and 50,000 fighters, many of whom are combat-hardened from years of engagement in Syria in support of President Bashar al-Assad. Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, once claimed 100,000 fighters, but this figure is widely viewed as an exaggeration. The group’s military operations are directed by its Jihad Council, under a highly centralized and hierarchical command structure headed by the Shura Council, with the secretary-general at its apex. ³⁵ These features clearly demonstrate that Hezbollah meets the logistical capacity criterion for the purposes of assessing its level of organization under IHL. ³⁶

It is clear that Hezbollah is sufficiently organized as demanded by IHL for an armed group to be a party to an armed conflict.

A ceasefire agreement ³⁷ between Israel and Lebanon, representing Hezbollah, was concluded and approved by Israel’s Cabinet on 26 November 2024, taking effect the following day. This agreement was brokered with the assistance of the United States and France. The agreement includes a phased withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon over a period of sixty days, ³⁸ concurrent with the deployment of Lebanese army personnel to the south and requires Hezbollah forces to withdraw north of the Litani River.

This ceasefire agreement does not entail the end of the NIAC between Israel and Hezbollah. A NIAC only ends when there is a lasting cessation of armed confrontation without a real risk of its resumption. ³⁹ These conditions are not satisfied in the present context. Since the ceasefire, recurrent clashes continue between Israel and Hezbollah and include the exchange of fire, Israeli airstrike Hezbollah targets, and Hezbollah launches rocket and engages in cross-border operations, demonstrating ongoing violence rather than isolated ceasefire violations. ⁴⁰ The underlying drivers of the conflict remain unresolved, and both parties engage in mutual threats. Moreover, Israeli officials express an intention to maintain their military positions indefinitely, ⁴¹ and Hezbollah publicly reaffirms its readiness to act militarily. This situation reflects a real risk of resumption, if not a de facto continuation of hostilities. ⁴²

Indeed, the renewed hostilities that broke out between Hezbollah and Israel on 2 March indicate not that a new NIAC started but that the one which started in October 2023 remained ongoing. In addition, despite the April 2026 ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon (and its extensions), Israel has continued to launch attacks on Hezbollah in southern Lebanon (see above).⁴³

In summary, Israel and Hezbollah remain engaged in a NIAC.

1
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, ↩︎
2
International Affairs And Defence Section, ‘Israel-Hezbollah Conflict 2023/24: UK and International Response’, House of Commons Library, 12 December 2024 ↩︎
3
L. Bassam and others, ‘Israel, Hezbollah Exchange Artillery, Rocket Fire’, Reuters, 8 October 2023. ↩︎
4
A. Mehvar, et al, ‘Middle East Overview – September 2024: Expanding Israeli Operations in Lebanon and the Escalation of the Middle East Crisis’, ACLED, 4 October 2024. ↩︎
5
M. ELDoh, ‘Hezbollah’s Military Tactics in the Post-Nasrallah Era’, Geopolitical Monitor, 29 October 2024. ↩︎
6
M. Jadah et al, ‘Israel Claims 4,500 Strikes on Lebanon since Fighting Began: Day 158 of the Gaza War’ L’Orient Today, 12 March 2024, ↩︎
7
A. Mehvar, ‘Q&A: Behind the Data on the Israel-Hezbollah War’, ACLED, 1 November 2024, ↩︎
8
‘Middle East & North Africa: Lebanon’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
9
E. Banco, ‘Exclusive: Lebanon’s Hezbollah Aims to Rebuild Longer Term despiteIsraeli Blows, US Intel Says’, Reuters, 4 December 2024. ↩︎
10
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11
A. Cuddy et al, ‘Israel strikes Lebanon after Hezbollah rocket fire as Iran conflict widens’, BBC, 2 March 2026; ‘Lebanon: Israeli military’s overly broad mass evacuation orders sowing panic and fuelling humanitarian suffering’, Amnesty International, 6 March 2026; A. Shalev, ‘The war that never ended: Israel seizes moment to finish fight against Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy in Lebanon’, CNN, 13 March 2026; W. Christou, ‘Israel strikes Lebanon after Iran ally Hezbollah fires missiles over border’, The Guardian, 2 March 2026. ↩︎
12
A. Cuddy et al, ‘Israel strikes Lebanon after Hezbollah rocket fire as Iran conflict widens’, BBC, 2 March 2026; ‘Hezbollah strikes Israel as American and Israeli planes pound Iran’, NPR, 2 March 2026. ↩︎
13
A. Cuddy et al, ‘Israel strikes Lebanon after Hezbollah rocket fire as Iran conflict widens’, BBC, 2 March 2026; W. Christou, ‘Israel strikes Lebanon after Iran ally Hezbollah fires missiles over border’, The Guardian, 2 March 2026; ‘Hezbollah strikes Israel as American and Israeli planes pound Iran’, NPR, 2 March 2026. ↩︎
14
A. Boxerman and C. Goldbaum, ‘Israel Advances in Lebanon and Seizes More Land, as Hezbollah Fight Escalates’, The New York Times, 3 March 2026; L. Williamson, ‘Israeli troops push into Lebanon for yet another war with Iran’s proxy Hezbollah’, BBC, 6 March 2026. ↩︎
15
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16
‘Hezbollah launched 200 rockets at Israel overnight’, i24 News, 12 March 2026; E. Fabian and L. Berman, ‘Hezbollah fires 200 rockets at north, Iran launches missiles in ‘integrated operation’’, The Times of Israel, 12 March 2026. ↩︎
17
‘The Armed Conflict Survey 2024’, International Institute for Security Studies, 12 December 2024. ↩︎
18
‘What is Hezbollah’, Council on Foreign Relations, 29 October 2024. ↩︎
19
K. Robinson, ‘What is Hezbollah? What to know about its origins, structure and history’, PBS, 16 October 2023. ↩︎
20
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21
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22
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23
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24
‘What is Hezbollah’, Council on Foreign Relations, 29 October 2024. ↩︎
25
‘What is Hezbollah’, Council on Foreign Relations, 29 October 2024. ↩︎
26
‘Who is Hezbollah’s new leader Sheikh Naim Qassem?, France 24, 29 October 2024. ↩︎
27
J. Choukeir, ‘Which Hezbollah and Hamas leaders have been assassinated?’, Reuters, 17 October 2024. ↩︎
28
‘What is Hezbollah’, Council on Foreign Relations, 29 October 2024, ↩︎
29
ICTY, ‘Prosecutor v. Boškoski and Tarculovski,’ Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 10 July 2008. ↩︎
30
M. Moench, ‘Hezbollah media chief killed in Israeli strike in Beirut’, BBC, 17 November 2024, ↩︎
31
‘Hezbollah announces successor to media head Mohammad Afif Naboulsi’, L’Orient Today, 23 December 2024. ↩︎
32
S. G. Jones, et al, ‘The Coming Conflict with Hezbollah’, Center for Strategic and International Studies Briefs, March 2024. ↩︎
33
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34
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35
S. S. Cordell and AJLabs, ‘How does Hezbollah function – and what arsenal does it have?’, Al Jazeera, 1 October 2024; M. Drummond, ‘What is Hezbollah and how powerful is its military?’, Sky News, 28 September 2024. ↩︎
36
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37
M. Nashed, ‘Ceasefire between Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Israel: What to know’, Al Jazeera, 26 November 2024 ↩︎
38
‘Middle East & North Africa: Lebanon’, International Crisis Group; J. Deeb, ‘Full Text of the Ceasefire Agreement between Israel and Lebanon’, Middle East Eye, 27 November 2024 ↩︎
39
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40
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41
E. Fabian, ‘Katz: IDF will stay at 5 points in southern Lebanon regardless of border dispute talks’, The Times of Israel, 14 March 2025, ↩︎
42
‘Hezbollah warns it could retaliate if Israeli strikes on Lebanon continue’, CBS News, 29 March 2025. ↩︎
43
‘PM Netanyahu announces ‘deepening’ of Israeli military operation in Lebanon’, Associated Press News, 27 May 2026. ↩︎

State Parties

Israel
Lebanon

Non-State Parties

Hezbollah

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

1
‘Article 3 – Conflicts not of an international character’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases, ↩︎
2
‘Six-Day War’, Britannica, 28 July 2025, ↩︎
3
R. Berg, ‘Israeli views on Shebaa Farms harden’, BBC News, 25 August 2006. ↩︎
4
R. Berg, ‘Israeli views on Shebaa Farms harden’, BBC News, 25 August 2006. ↩︎
5
Y. Berman, ‘Shebaa Farms – nub of conflict’, Ynet News, 8 October 2006. ↩︎
6
W. L. Ochsenwald and P. Kingston, ‘Lebanese Civil War’, Britannica, 19 July 2025. ↩︎
7
‘UNFIL Mandate’, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 4 November 2024. ↩︎
8
‘What is Hezbollah’, Council on Foreign Relations, 29 October 2024. ↩︎
9
C. Thomas and J. Zanotti, ‘Lebanese Hezbollah’, United States Library of Congress, 12 April 2024 ↩︎
10
M. Mazzetti, et al, ‘Behind the Dismantling of Hezbollah: Decades of Israeli Intelligence’ The New York Times, 29 December 2024, ↩︎
11
C. Thomas and J. Zanotti, ‘Lebanese Hezbollah’, US Library of Congress, 12 April 2024. ↩︎
12
L. Bassam and H. Lawson, ‘Lebanon’s Hezbollah Fired Missile at Israeli Vehicle in Shebaa Farms Attack, Says Lebanese Source’ Reuters, 27 July 2020; ‘Israel: Hezbollah’s Use of Inherently Inaccurate Weapons to Launch Unlawful Attacks Violates International Law’, Amnesty International, 20 December 2024; and ‘Military occupation of Lebanon by Israel’, RULAC, 17 August 2022. ↩︎
13
UNSC, ‘Resolution 1701 (2006)’, UN Doc S/Res/1701 (2006), 11 August 2006. ↩︎
14
‘What is Hezbollah’, Council on Foreign Relations, 29 October 2024. ↩︎
15
See M. Sullivan, ‘Hezbollah in Syria: Middle East Security Report 19’, Institute for the Study of War, April 2014. ↩︎
16
J. Daher, ‘The Consequences of Hezbollah’s military intervention in Syria on the Lebanese Shia population and Relations with Israel’, Online article, Foundation pour le recherche stratégique, 26 September 2017; ‘Non-international armed conflicts in Syria’, RULAC, 10 August 2023. ↩︎
17
C. Thomas and J. Zanotti, ‘Lebanese Hezbollah’, United States Library of Congress, 12 April 2024. ↩︎
18
(see 2023 version) ↩︎
19
(see 2023 version) ↩︎
20
‘Israel strikes Beirut for the first time since the ceasefire’, Reuters, 6 May 2025; L. Bassam, ‘Israeli strikes kill 12 in Lebanon ahead of US-mediated talks’, Reuters, 13 May 2026. ↩︎
21
Y. J. Bob, ‘Senior IDF intel. officer: In minutes, we devastated Hezbollah, killing hundreds of terrorists’, The Jerusalem Post, 13 April 2026. ↩︎
22
A. Cuddy et al, ‘Israel strikes Lebanon after Hezbollah rocket fire as Iran conflict widens’, BBC, 2 March 2026; E. Fabian, ‘IDF says it killed Hezbollah intelligence chief in overnight strike’, The Times of Israel, 2 March 2026. ↩︎
23
J. Deeb, ‘Full text of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon’, Middle East Eye, 27 November 2024. ↩︎
24
K. Kila, ‘Lebanon presses for full Israeli withdrawal as troops remain in 5 places’, France 24, 18 February 2025. ↩︎
25
E. Fabian, ‘Katz: IDF will stay at 5 points in southern Lebanon regardless of border dispute talks’, Times of Israel, 14 March 2025. ↩︎
26
A. Mehvar, et al, ‘Middle East Overview: November 2024’, ACLED, 6 December 2024. ↩︎
27
E. Fabian, ‘IDF Strikes Hezbollah Rocket Depot, Launch Sites after Identifying Truce Violations’, The Times of Israel, 28 November 2024; and E. Fabian, ‘Katz: IDF will stay at 5 points in southern Lebanon regardless of border dispute talks’, Times of Israel, 14 March 2025. ↩︎
28
H. Bachega and J. Lukiv, ‘Israel strikes Lebanon after first rocket attack since ceasefire’, BBC, 22 March 2025. ↩︎
29
‘One dead as Israel strikes Lebanon after cross-border rocket fire’, France 24, 22 March 2025. ↩︎
30
‘Israel warns of attacks ‘everywhere’ in Lebanon after rocket fire’, France 24, 28 March 2025. ↩︎
31
H. Bachega and J. Lukiv, ‘Israel strikes Lebanon after first rocket attack since ceasefire’, BBC, 22 March 2025. ↩︎
32
‘Hamas says ‘individuals’ behind rocket fire at Israel from Lebanon’, Macau Business.com, 9 May 2025. ↩︎
33
E. Fabian, ‘IDF targets Hezbollah weapons manufacturing, storage site in Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley’, The Times of Israel, 6 May 2025, ↩︎
34
‘Israel launches wave of strikes across south Lebanon’, Al Jazeera, 29 May 2025; D. Daoud, ‘Israeli operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah: May 12–18, 2025’, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 23 May 2025, ↩︎
35
‘Israel says hits Beirut, targeting Hezbollah drone factories’, France 24, 5 June 2025. ↩︎
36
L. Berman, ‘Israel says Hezbollah must disarm before any Lebanon peace talks can advance’, the Times of Israel, 30 June 2025. ↩︎
37
‘Lebanon army says phase one of disarming non-state groups in south complete’, Al Jazeera, 8 January 2026; T. Uriel-Berri and M. Gebeily, ‘Lebanon army says it takes control of south; Israel says Hezbollah still must disarm’, Reuters, 8 January 2026. ↩︎
38
‘Lebanon army says phase one of disarming non-state groups in south complete’, Al Jazeera, 8 January 2026; T. Uriel-Berri and M. Gebeily, ‘Lebanon army says it takes control of south; Israel says Hezbollah still must disarm’, Reuters, 8 January 2026. ↩︎
39
T. Uriel-Berri and M. Gebeily, ‘Lebanon army says it takes control of south; Israel says Hezbollah still must disarm’, Reuters, 8 January 2026. ↩︎
40
T. Uriel-Berri and M. Gebeily, ‘Lebanon army says it takes control of south; Israel says Hezbollah still must disarm’, Reuters, 8 January 2026. ↩︎
41
‘Middle East & North Africa: Lebanon’, International Crisis Group, January 2026; J. Salhani, ‘Israel’s continued attacks on Lebanon could derail Hezbollah disarmament’, Al Jazeera, 7 January 2026. ↩︎
42
‘Wave of Israeli attacks kills two in Lebanon in latest ceasefire violation’, Al Jazeera, 25 January 2026; W. S. Seifeddine and L. Altawell, ‘Israeli strikes kill 2, wound 19 in southern Lebanon despite ceasefire’, AA, 21 January 2026. ↩︎
43
‘Wave of Israeli attacks kills two in Lebanon in latest ceasefire violation’, Al Jazeera, 25 January 2026; W. S. Seifeddine and L. Altawell, ‘Israeli strikes kill 2, wound 19 in southern Lebanon despite ceasefire’, AA, 21 January 2026. ↩︎
44
‘Wave of Israeli attacks kills two in Lebanon in latest ceasefire violation’, Al Jazeera, 25 January 2026; L. Bassam and T. Ramadan, ‘Hezbollah rejects disarmament plan and government’s four-month timeline’, Reuters, 17 February 2026; ‘Lebanon sets four months for second phase of Hezbollah disarmament’, Al Jazeera, 17 February 2026. ↩︎
45
‘Lebanese PM bans Hezbollah’s military activities after attack on Israel’, Al Jazeera, 2 March 2026; L. Bassam et al, ‘Lebanon bans Hezbollah military actions after attack on Israel’, Reuters, 2 March 2026. ↩︎
46
‘Lebanese PM bans Hezbollah’s military activities after attack on Israel’, Al Jazeera, 2 March 2026; L. Bassam et al, ‘Lebanon bans Hezbollah military actions after attack on Israel’, Reuters, 2 March 2026. ↩︎
47
‘Lebanese PM bans Hezbollah’s military activities after attack on Israel’, Al Jazeera, 2 March 2026. ↩︎
48
P. Loft, ‘A new President for Lebanon: What next in 2025?’, House of Commons Library, 13 January 2025. ↩︎
49
B. Farhat, ‘Lebanon to hold January presidential elections amid fragile ceasefire’, Al-Monitor, 28 November 2024. ↩︎
50
Y. Malka, ‘Joseph Aoun has left Baabda Palace and will begin his duties as president tomorrow | Live’, L’Orient Today, 9 January 2025. ↩︎
51
‘Who is Joseph Aoun, the Lebanese army commander elected president?’, Reuters, 9 January 2025. ↩︎
52
‘Lebanon’s Salam wins backing of enough MPs to be named PM, political sources say’, Reuters, 13 January 2025. ↩︎
53
‘Judge Nawaf Salam, President of the Court, resigns as Member of the Court’, International Court of Justice, 14 January 2025. ↩︎
54
A. Sharafeddine and K. Chehayeb, ‘Battered by war and economic crisis, Lebanon holds first local elections in almost 10 years’, AP News, 4 May 2025; ‘South Lebanon votes in municipal election seen as test of Hezbollah support’, Al Jazeera, 24 May 2025; E. Ziadé, ‘Municipal Elections 2025: Mount Lebanon Kicks Off the Race‘ This is Beirut, 3 May 2025. ↩︎
55
J. Salhani, ‘Hezbollah holds firm in Lebanon’s municipal elections’, Al Jazeera, 26 May 2025. ↩︎
56
‘July 2025 Monthly Forecast: Lebanon’, Security Council Report, 30 June 2025. ↩︎
57
I. Kouachi, ‘Lebanon asks UN to renew peacekeepers’ mandate for another year’, AA, 27 June 2025. ↩︎
58
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2790 (2025)’, 28 August 2025. ↩︎
59
‘Hezbollah chief says any attack on Iran also targets his group, ‘we are not neutral’’, Al Arabiya English, 26 January 2026. ↩︎
60
A. Cuddy et al, ‘Israel strikes Lebanon after Hezbollah rocket fire as Iran conflict widens’, BBC, 2 March 2026; ‘Lebanon: Israeli military’s overly broad mass evacuation orders sowing panic and fuelling humanitarian suffering’, Amnesty International, 6 March 2026; A. Shalev, ‘The war that never ended: Israel seizes moment to finish fight against Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy in Lebanon’, CNN, 13 March 2026; W. Christou, ‘Israel strikes Lebanon after Iran ally Hezbollah fires missiles over border’, The Guardian, 2 March 2026. ↩︎
61
A. Cuddy et al, ‘Israel strikes Lebanon after Hezbollah rocket fire as Iran conflict widens’, BBC, 2 March 2026; ‘Hezbollah strikes Israel as American and Israeli planes pound Iran’, NPR, 2 March 2026. ↩︎
62
A. Cuddy et al, ‘Israel strikes Lebanon after Hezbollah rocket fire as Iran conflict widens’, BBC, 2 March 2026; W. Christou, ‘Israel strikes Lebanon after Iran ally Hezbollah fires missiles over border’, The Guardian, 2 March 2026; ‘Hezbollah strikes Israel as American and Israeli planes pound Iran’, NPR, 2 March 2026. ↩︎
63
A. Cuddy et al, ‘Israel strikes Lebanon after Hezbollah rocket fire as Iran conflict widens’, BBC, 2 March 2026; E. Fabian, ‘IDF says it killed Hezbollah intelligence chief in overnight strike’, The Times of Israel, 2 March 2026. ↩︎
64
A. Cuddy et al, ‘Israel strikes Lebanon after Hezbollah rocket fire as Iran conflict widens’, BBC, 2 March 2026; W. Christou, ‘Israel strikes Lebanon after Iran ally Hezbollah fires missiles over border’, The Guardian, 2 March 2026. ↩︎
65
‘Israel strikes Hezbollah financial institutions as Lebanon calls for talks’, Al Jazeera, 9 March 2026. ↩︎
66
‘Hezbollah launched 200 rockets at Israel overnight’, i24 News, 12 March 2026; E. Fabian and L. Berman, ‘Hezbollah fires 200 rockets at north, Iran launches missiles in ‘integrated operation’’, The Times of Israel, 12 March 2026; A. Cuddy and D. Gritten, ‘Israel pounds Beirut suburbs and south Lebanon after Hezbollah rocket barrage’, BBC, 12 March 2026; L. Nevola et al, ‘Middle East Overview: April 2026’, ACLED, 8 April 2026; ‘How Iran rebuilt Hezbollah and planned coordinated missile attacks years in advance’, i24 News, 21 March 2026. ↩︎
67
‘Hezbollah launched 200 rockets at Israel overnight’, i24 News, 12 March 2026; E. Fabian and L. Berman, ‘Hezbollah fires 200 rockets at north, Iran launches missiles in ‘integrated operation’’, The Times of Israel, 12 March 2026. ↩︎
68
E. Fabian and L. Berman, ‘Hezbollah fires 200 rockets at north, Iran launches missiles in ‘integrated operation’’, The Times of Israel, 12 March 2026. ↩︎
69
E. Fabian and L. Berman, ‘Hezbollah fires 200 rockets at north, Iran launches missiles in ‘integrated operation’’, The Times of Israel, 12 March 2026. ↩︎
70
A. Cuddy and D. Gritten, ‘Israel pounds Beirut suburbs and south Lebanon after Hezbollah rocket barrage’, BBC, 12 March 2026. ↩︎
71
A. Cuddy and D. Gritten, ‘Israel pounds Beirut suburbs and south Lebanon after Hezbollah rocket barrage’, BBC, 12 March 2026. ↩︎
72
B. Mroue, ‘Israel strikes Hezbollah’s civilian as well as military wings in an attempt to crush the group’, Associated Press News, 21 March 2026. ↩︎
73
B. Mroue, ‘Israel strikes Hezbollah’s civilian as well as military wings in an attempt to crush the group’, Associated Press News, 21 March 2026. ↩︎
74
L. Nevola et al, ‘Middle East Overview: April 2026’, ACLED, 8 April 2026. ↩︎
75
E. Fabian, ‘IDF says it has killed over 1,000 Hezbollah operatives during current hostilities’, The Times of Israel, 2 April 2026 ↩︎
76
‘Lebanon says death toll from Israel-Hezbollah war rises to over 1,300’, Le Orient Journal, 1 April 2026. ↩︎
77
A. Boxerman and C. Goldbaum, ‘Israel Advances in Lebanon and Seizes More Land, as Hezbollah Fight Escalates’, The New York Times, 3 March 2026; L. Williamson, ‘Israeli troops push into Lebanon for yet another war with Iran’s proxy Hezbollah’, BBC, 6 March 2026. ↩︎
78
L. Nevola et al, ‘Middle East Overview: April 2026’, ACLED, 8 April 2026. ↩︎
79
.E. Fabian, ‘IDF advances deeper into south Lebanon, takes control of strategic positions’, The Times of Israel, 29 March 2026. ↩︎
80
‘Middle East Situation Lebanon – Flash Update #11’, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Operational Data Portal, 26 May 2026. ↩︎
81
L. Nevola et al, ‘Middle East Overview: April 2026’, ACLED, 8 April 2026; E. Fabian, ‘IAF says it carried out largest wave of strikes on Hezbollah since fighting started’, The Times of Israel, 8 April 2026. ↩︎
82
E. Fabian, ‘IAF says it carried out largest wave of strikes on Hezbollah since fighting started’, The Times of Israel, 8 April 2026. ↩︎
83
E. Fabian, ‘IAF says it carried out largest wave of strikes on Hezbollah since fighting started’, The Times of Israel, 8 April 2026. ↩︎
84
E. Fabian, ‘IAF says it carried out largest wave of strikes on Hezbollah since fighting started’, The Times of Israel, 8 April 2026. ↩︎
85
B. Mroue et al, ‘Ceasefire is threatened as Israel expands Lebanon strikes and Iran closes strait again’, Associated Press News, 9 April 2026 ↩︎
86
‘Israel pounds Lebanon with heaviest airstrikes of war as Hezbollah pauses attacks’, Daily Maverick, 8 April 2026. ↩︎
87
Y. J. Bob, ‘Senior IDF intel. officer: In minutes, we devastated Hezbollah, killing hundreds of terrorists’, The Jerusalem Post, 13 April 2026. ↩︎
88
‘Ten Day Cessation of Hostilities to Enable Peace Negotiations Between Israel and Lebanon’, U.S. Department of State, 16 April 2026; E. Shirbon et al, ‘Israel-Lebanon ceasefire goes into effect after US brokers pause – as it happened’, Reuters, 17 April 2026. ↩︎
89
‘Trump says Israel-Lebanon ceasefire extended by three weeks’, BBC, 23 April 2026; Y. Tian and H. Sullivan, ‘What we know about the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire’, BBC, 24 April 2026 ↩︎
90
‘Shaky truce between Israel and Lebanon extended for 45 days, US says’, The Guardian, 15 May 2026; S. Lewis, ‘Israel, Lebanon extend ceasefire by 45 days as Washington talks conclude’, Reuters, 15 May 2026. ↩︎
91
L. Williamson, ‘Israeli troops push into Lebanon for yet another war with Iran’s proxy Hezbollah’, BBC, 6 March 2026. ↩︎
92
C. Magee, ‘Does Israel’s ‘Yellow Line’ violate the Lebanon ceasefire?’, Al Jazeera, 19 April 2026. ↩︎
93
‘Lebanon: Israeli military’s overly broad mass evacuation orders sowing panic and fuelling humanitarian suffering’, Amnesty International, 6 March 2026; M. Gilad, ‘Israel’s obsession with Lebanon’s Litani river: another Nakba in the making?’, Britain Palestine Project, 9 April 2026; ‘Israeli Military Calls for Evacuating Southern Lebanon’, Human Rights Watch, 5 March 2026. ↩︎
94
‘Lebanon: Israeli military’s overly broad mass evacuation orders sowing panic and fuelling humanitarian suffering’, Amnesty International, 6 March 2026; ‘Israeli Military Calls for Evacuating Southern Lebanon’, Human Rights Watch, 5 March 2026; ‘Lebanon: Israeli blanket displacement orders bring more misery to civilians’, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 6 March 2026. ↩︎
95
M. Gilad, ‘Israel’s obsession with Lebanon’s Litani river: another Nakba in the making?’, Britain Palestine Project, 9 April 2026. ↩︎
96
‘Lebanon: 300,000 already displaced as Israel issues mass evacuation orders’, Norwegian Refugee Council, 6 March 2026. ↩︎
97
‘Middle East Situation Lebanon – Flash Update #11’, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Operational Data Portal, 26 May 2026. ↩︎
98
M. Gilad, ‘Israel’s obsession with Lebanon’s Litani river: another Nakba in the making?’, Britain Palestine Project, 9 April 2026; Y. Knell and A. Davies, ‘Israel says it will keep control over part of southern Lebanon after war with Hezbollah ends’, BBC, 31 March 2026; A. Cornwell and N. Osseiran, ‘Israel’s military to occupy swathe of southern Lebanon, defence minister says’, Reuters, 24 March 2026. ↩︎
99
Y. Knell and A. Davies, ‘Israel says it will keep control over part of southern Lebanon after war with Hezbollah ends’, BBC, 31 March 2026 ↩︎
100
C. Magee, ‘Does Israel’s ‘Yellow Line’ violate the Lebanon ceasefire?’, Al Jazeera, 19 April 2026; M. Sıo, ‘Disguised occupation’ in Lebanon: Israel strips life along ‘Yellow Line’ in south’, AA, 28 April 2026. ↩︎
101
C. Magee, ‘Does Israel’s ‘Yellow Line’ violate the Lebanon ceasefire?’, Al Jazeera, 19 April 2026; M. Gilad, ‘Israel’s obsession with Lebanon’s Litani river: another Nakba in the making?’, Britain Palestine Project, 9 April 2026; M. Sıo, ‘Disguised occupation’ in Lebanon: Israel strips life along ‘Yellow Line’ in south’, AA, 28 April 2026. ↩︎
102
A. Cornwell and N. Osseiran, ‘Israel’s military to occupy swathe of southern Lebanon, defence minister says’, Reuters, 24 March 2026. ↩︎
103
‘Mohamad Shehab’, Committee to Protect Journalists, 12 March 2026; E. Ward, ‘Three of the Lives Lost in One Day of Israeli Strikes in Lebanon’, The New York Times, 24 March 2026. ↩︎
104
E. Ward, ‘Three of the Lives Lost in One Day of Israeli Strikes in Lebanon’, The New York Times, 24 March 2026. ↩︎
105
‘Mohamad Shehab’, Committee to Protect Journalists, 12 March 2026; E. Ward, ‘Three of the Lives Lost in One Day of Israeli Strikes in Lebanon’, The New York Times, 24 March 2026. ↩︎
106
‘Mohamed Sherri’, Committee to Protect Journalists, 18 March 2026; L. Sinjab and M. Davies, ‘Three Lebanese journalists killed in Israeli strike, say broadcasters’, BBC, 30 March 2026. ↩︎
107
‘Hussain Hamood’, Committee to Protect Journalists, 25 March 2026. ↩︎
108
M. Davies, ‘Three Lebanese journalists killed in Israeli strike, say broadcasters’, BBC, 30 March 2026; ‘Israeli strike on media car targets, kills 3 journalists in south Lebanon’, Committee to Protect Journalists, 28 March 2026; ‘Lebanon: UN experts call for international independent investigation into Israel’s killing of journalists’, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2 April 2026. ↩︎
109
M. Davies, ‘Three Lebanese journalists killed in Israeli strike, say broadcasters’, BBC, 30 March 2026. ↩︎
110
M. Davies, ‘Three Lebanese journalists killed in Israeli strike, say broadcasters’, BBC, 30 March 2026; ‘Israeli strike on media car targets, kills 3 journalists in south Lebanon’, Committee to Protect Journalists, 28 March 2026. ↩︎
111
M. Davies, ‘Three Lebanese journalists killed in Israeli strike, say broadcasters’, BBC, 30 March 2026. ↩︎
112
M. Davies, ‘Three Lebanese journalists killed in Israeli strike, say broadcasters’, BBC, 30 March 2026. ↩︎
113
M. Davies, ‘Three Lebanese journalists killed in Israeli strike, say broadcasters’, BBC, 30 March 2026. ↩︎
114
‘Ghada Dayekh’, Committee to Protect Journalists, 8 April 2026. ↩︎
115
S. Baaklini, ‘Ghada Dayekh, the ‘soul’ of Sawt al-Farah in Sour, killed in the collapse of her building’, L’Orient Today, 11 April 2026; T. McArthur and H. Sullivan, ‘Lebanon accuses Israel of targeting journalist killed in air strike’, BBC, 23 April 2026. ↩︎
116
T. McArthur and H. Sullivan, ‘Lebanon accuses Israel of targeting journalist killed in air strike’, BBC, 23 April 2026; ‘Suzan Khalil’, Committee to Protect Journalists, 8 April 2026. ↩︎
117
‘Suzan Khalil’, Committee to Protect Journalists, 8 April 2026. ↩︎
118
T. McArthur and H. Sullivan, ‘Lebanon accuses Israel of targeting journalist killed in air strike’, BBC, 23 April 2026; P. Beaumont, ‘Israeli killing of Lebanese journalist draws international condemnation’, The Guardian, 23 April 2026; Y. Hawari, ‘Israel feared Amal Khalil, just as it did Shireen Abu Akleh’, Al Jazeera, 26 April 2026. ↩︎
119
Y. Hawari, ‘Israel feared Amal Khalil, just as it did Shireen Abu Akleh’, Al Jazeera, 26 April 2026. ↩︎
120
T. McArthur and H. Sullivan, ‘Lebanon accuses Israel of targeting journalist killed in air strike’, BBC, 23 April 2026. ↩︎
121
. McArthur and H. Sullivan, ‘Lebanon accuses Israel of targeting journalist killed in air strike’, BBC, 23 April 2026; Y. Hawari, ‘Israel feared Amal Khalil, just as it did Shireen Abu Akleh’, Al Jazeera, 26 April 2026; ‘Enemy planes pursue Khalil’s hopes in the south’, Al Akhbar, 22 April 2026. ↩︎
122
T. McArthur and H. Sullivan, ‘Lebanon accuses Israel of targeting journalist killed in air strike’, BBC, 23 April 2026; Y. Hawari, ‘Israel feared Amal Khalil, just as it did Shireen Abu Akleh’, Al Jazeera, 26 April 2026; ‘Enemy planes pursue Khalil’s hopes in the south’, Al Akhbar, 22 April 2026. ↩︎
123
T. McArthur and H. Sullivan, ‘Lebanon accuses Israel of targeting journalist killed in air strike’, BBC, 23 April 2026; Y. Hawari, ‘Israel feared Amal Khalil, just as it did Shireen Abu Akleh’, Al Jazeera, 26 April 2026; ‘Enemy planes pursue Khalil’s hopes in the south’, Al Akhbar, 22 April 2026. ↩︎
124
T. McArthur and H. Sullivan, ‘Lebanon accuses Israel of targeting journalist killed in air strike’, BBC, 23 April 2026; Y. Hawari, ‘Israel feared Amal Khalil, just as it did Shireen Abu Akleh’, Al Jazeera, 26 April 2026. ↩︎
125
T. McArthur and H. Sullivan, ‘Lebanon accuses Israel of targeting journalist killed in air strike’, BBC, 23 April 2026. ↩︎
126
T. McArthur and H. Sullivan, ‘Lebanon accuses Israel of targeting journalist killed in air strike’, BBC, 23 April 2026. ↩︎
127
‘226 health workers killed in Lebanon since Oct. 7, says WHO’, L’Orient Today, 22 November 2024 ↩︎
128
W. Christou and A. Abdelkarim, ‘Israel deliberately targeting medical facilities in south Lebanon, say health workers’, The Guardian, 21 March 2026; B. Doueik, ‘Why are health workers being targeted in southern Lebanon?’, ACLED, 19 May 2026. ↩︎
129
W. Christou and A. Abdelkarim, ‘Israel deliberately targeting medical facilities in south Lebanon, say health workers’, The Guardian, 21 March 2026. ↩︎
130
S. Jabakhanji, ‘Israeli attacks on medics in southern Lebanon part of ‘alarming pattern,’ says MSF’, CBC, 14 May 2026. ↩︎
131
W. Christou and A. Abdelkarim, ‘Israel deliberately targeting medical facilities in south Lebanon, say health workers’, The Guardian, 21 March 2026; H. Bachega, ‘Israeli triple-tap strike kills three paramedics in Lebanon, officials say’, BBC, 15 April 2026. ↩︎
132
W. Christou and A. Abdelkarim, ‘Israel deliberately targeting medical facilities in south Lebanon, say health workers’, The Guardian, 21 March 2026; B. Doueik, ‘Why are health workers being targeted in southern Lebanon?’, ACLED, 19 May 2026 ↩︎
133
H. Bachega, ‘Israeli triple-tap strike kills three paramedics in Lebanon, officials say’, BBC, 15 April 2026; W. Christou, ‘Israel escalates attacks on medics in Lebanon with deadly ‘quadruple tap’’, The Guardian, 16 April 2026; I. DeBre, ‘Witnesses detail deadly Israeli strikes on medics in Lebanon’, PBS, 18 April 2026. ↩︎
134
I. DeBre, ‘Witnesses detail deadly Israeli strikes on medics in Lebanon’, PBS, 18 April 2026. ↩︎
135
W. Davies et al, ‘Israel destroys river bridges in southern Lebanon’, BBC, 18 March 2026; ‘Lebanon: Israeli Bridge Attack a Potential War Crime’, Human Rights Watch, 16 April 2026; ‘Israel threatens to destroy more Lebanon bridges as crisis mounts’, Al Jazeera, 3 April 2026; ‘Israeli strike destroys last bridge over Litani River as intense fighting continues in south Lebanon’,CBC, 16 August 2026. ↩︎
136
‘Lebanon’s Aoun warns Israeli attack on bridge ‘prelude to ground invasion’’, Al Jazeera, 22 March 2026. ↩︎
137
W. Davies et al, ‘Israel destroys river bridges in southern Lebanon’, BBC, 18 March 2026; ‘Israel destroys bridge in Lebanon and threatens Gaza-scale devastation’, Al Jazeera, 13 March 2026. ↩︎
138
‘UNIFIL Statement (6 March 2026)’, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 6 March 2026. ↩︎
139
‘UNIFIL statement (15 March 2026)’, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 15 March 2026. ↩︎
140
‘UNIFIL statement on the death of 2nd peacekeeper from Ghanduriyah incident’, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 22 April 2026. ↩︎
141
‘UNIFIL statement on the death of 2nd peacekeeper from Ghanduriyah incident’, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 22 April 2026; ‘UNIFIL head leads tribute to peacekeeper fallen in the service of peace’, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 19 April 2026. ↩︎
142
‘Ten Day Cessation of Hostilities to Enable Peace Negotiations Between Israel and Lebanon’, U.S. Department of State, 16 April 2026; E. Shirbon et al, ‘Israel-Lebanon ceasefire goes into effect after US brokers pause – as it happened’, Reuters, 17 April 2026. ↩︎
143
‘Ten Day Cessation of Hostilities to Enable Peace Negotiations Between Israel and Lebanon’, U.S. Department of State, 16 April 2026. ↩︎
144
‘Ten Day Cessation of Hostilities to Enable Peace Negotiations Between Israel and Lebanon’, U.S. Department of State, 16 April 2026. ↩︎
145
Y. Tian and H. Sullivan, ‘What we know about the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire’, BBC, 24 April 2026 ↩︎
146
Y. Tian and H. Sullivan, ‘What we know about the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire’, BBC, 24 April 2026. ↩︎
147
T.Pigott, ‘Meeting Between the Governments of the United States, Lebanon, and Israel’, U.S. Department of State, 14 April 2026; ‘Israel and Lebanon hold rare talks in Washington, DC, amid Iran war’, Al Jazeera, 14 April 2026 and on 23 April 2026 ↩︎
148
‘Trump says Israel-Lebanon ceasefire extended by three weeks’, BBC, 23 April 2026; Y. Tian and H. Sullivan, ‘What we know about the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire’, BBC, 24 April 2026. ↩︎
149
‘Shaky truce between Israel and Lebanon extended for 45 days, US says’, The Guardian, 15 May 2026; S. Lewis, ‘Israel, Lebanon extend ceasefire by 45 days as Washington talks conclude’, Reuters, 15 May 2026. ↩︎
150
‘Israeli far-right ministers want ‘return to war in Lebanon’ despite peace talks’, South China Morning Post, 25 May 2026; ‘Israel to intensify Lebanon offensive to ‘crush’ Hezbollah’, Al Jazeera, 25 May 2026; P. Rao, ‘Israel approves further plans in Lebanon offensive, despite ceasefire’, Yahoo! News, 25 May 2026. ↩︎
151
‘Israeli far-right ministers want ‘return to war in Lebanon’ despite peace talks’, South China Morning Post, 25 May 2026; ‘Israel to intensify Lebanon offensive to ‘crush’ Hezbollah’, Al Jazeera, 25 May 2026. ↩︎
152
‘Israeli far-right ministers want ‘return to war in Lebanon’ despite peace talks’, South China Morning Post, 25 May 2026; ‘Israel to intensify Lebanon offensive to ‘crush’ Hezbollah’, Al Jazeera, 25 May 2026. ↩︎
153
‘Israeli far-right ministers want ‘return to war in Lebanon’ despite peace talks’, South China Morning Post, 25 May 2026; ‘Israel to intensify Lebanon offensive to ‘crush’ Hezbollah’, Al Jazeera, 25 May 2026. ↩︎
154
‘Israel to intensify Lebanon offensive to ‘crush’ Hezbollah’, Al Jazeera, 25 May 2026. ↩︎
155
‘Israel to intensify Lebanon offensive to ‘crush’ Hezbollah’, Al Jazeera, 25 May 2026; E. Nader and T. Mann, ‘Netanyahu says Israel will intensify strikes against Hezbollah’, BBC, 26 May 2026. ↩︎
156
‘Israeli far-right ministers want ‘return to war in Lebanon’ despite peace talks’, South China Morning Post, 25 May 2026. ↩︎
157
‘Lebanon Crisis Situation Analysis (Period: 11/05/26 – 17/05/26)’, Reliefweb, 26 May 2026. ↩︎
158
‘More than 400 Hezbollah fighters killed in new war with Israel so far, sources say’, Reuters, 27 March 2026. ↩︎
159
Y. J. Bob, ‘Senior IDF intel. officer: In minutes, we devastated Hezbollah, killing hundreds of terrorists’, The Jerusalem Post, 13 April 2026. ↩︎
160
‘Middle East Situation Lebanon – Flash Update #11’, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Operational Data Portal, 26 May 2026. ↩︎
161
S. Hijazi and Z. Antonios, ‘To whom do Shebaa Farms belong?’, L’Orient Today, 24 January 2024; ‘Military occupation of Lebanon by Israel’, RULAC, 17 August 2022. ↩︎
162
‘Israel, Hezbollah exchange fire, raising regional tensions’, Al Jazeera, 8 October 2023; E. Fabian, ‘IDF artillery strikes targets in Lebanon as mortar shells fired toward Israel’, The Times of Israel, 8 October 2023; ‘Israel Army Fires Artillery at Lebanon as Hezbollah Claims Attack’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 8 October 2023. ↩︎

Lebanon

Overview

Historical background

Major Events and Key developments (between January 2025 and May 2026)