Mexico

Two non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) are ongoiOver the past decades, the Government of Mexico has been engaged in drug-related violence with several cartels, including as a party to non-international armed conflicts (NIAC) with the Sinaloa Cartel and Los Zetas since early 2010s,¹ as well as the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG, Jalisco Cartel New Generation) since the late 2010s.² In parallel, the CJNG was also involved in a NIAC against the Sinaloa Cartel.³ In 2022, however, although the violence remained sufficiently intense, the increasing difficulty of attributing incidents of violence to specific armed actors due to their fragmentation resulted in the declassification of the armed conflicts.⁴ In fact, available evidence now indicates that the NIAC between Mexico and the CJNG has remained ongoing.

During the reporting period, two NIACs have been ongoing, one pitting Mexico against the CJNG, and the other between the CJNG and the Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL).

Mexico is a State Party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, and the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. It ratified the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty in September 2013.

Mexico’s criminal landscape was traditionally dominated by few major criminal organizations that operated in separate regions of the country and worked in relative cooperation under the leadership of Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, the head of Guadalajara organization.⁵ Since the arrest of Félix Gallardo, the cartels have endeavoured successive waves of splintering,⁶ with major cartels fragmentating into smaller and more volatile groups that have been diversifying their activities and using extreme violence in attempts to control parts of Mexican territory.⁷

Kingpin Strategy and Resulting Fragmentation and Spike in Violence

Increased competition, fragmentation, and violence among Mexican cartels have often been described as the result of the so-called ‘kingpin’ strategy. Initially developed by the United States (US) Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in 1990s, the kingpin strategy was later adopted by Mexican authorities and has remained central to the ‘War on Drugs’ over the following decades.⁸ By targeting leadership responsible for the production, distribution, and financial management of the drug trafficking organizations in order to ‘weaken, dismantle and destroy’ them,⁹ the kingpin strategy led to the neutralization or prosecution of leaders of drug trafficking organizations but also to organizational decentralization and splintering, and the emergence of rival factions.¹⁰ In the vast majority of cases, the result was a short-term rise in murder rates.¹¹

Militarization of Mexican Criminal Landscape

The introduction of paramilitary tactics into Mexican criminal landscape, initiated by the Gulf Cartel in the late 1990s through the recruitment of deserters from Mexican special forces, since then known as Los Zetas, resulted in a further escalation of violence.¹² Los Zetas then splintered from the Gulf Cartel following the arrest and extradition of Gulf Cartel leader – Osiel Cardenas Guillen – in 2007 and became one of Mexico’s most powerful and feared cartels, before declining by 2012 due to infighting, fragmentation and the loss of key leaders.¹³

Moreover, Mexican cartels’ substantial annual income has usually been reinvested in weapons procurement and recruitment, as illustrated by a recent international operation involving Moroccan authorities that led to the arrest and the extradition of the suspects accused of supplying military-grade weapons to the CJNG.¹⁴ This has fuelled cartels’ strike capability, including in their confrontation with the Mexican government, and, in turn, the cycle of violence.¹⁵

Sinaloa Cartel

The Sinaloa Cartel, based in the city of Culiacán (Sinaloa state), and operating in several other Mexican states, including Baja California, Chihuahua, Durango, Guadalajara, Mexico City, Sonora, Tepic, Toluca, and Zacatecas,¹⁶ is considered by the DEA as ‘one of the world’s oldest and most powerful drug cartel […] [and] one of the largest producers and traffickers of fentanyl and other illicit drugs’.¹⁷ Operating as decentralized networks under the broader Sinaloa umbrella, the Sinaloa Cartel is reported to comprise tens of thousands of members across more than forty countries worldwide. Beyond drug production and trafficking, it has engaged in a wide range of other violent illicit activities, including money laundering, weapons smuggling, human trafficking, prostitution, and extortion. The Sinaloa Cartel also possesses military-grade weapons, using extreme violence to instil terror and achieve its objectives. Notably, in October 2019 and January 2023, the cartel launched extremely violent operations across Culiacán and Sinaloa state, blocking highways, setting ablaze vehicles, attacking Mexican security forces and firing at a passenger plane at the city’s International Airport.¹⁸ Relying on corrupt Mexican officials, including within Mexican federal police and military, the Sinaloa Cartel has maintained substantial advantage over its rivals.¹⁹

The Sinaloa Cartel originated from families involved in drug trade in Sinaloa state, historically notorious for the cultivation of cannabis and poppy as well as marijuana and heroin smuggling, that became involved in transporting cocaine for Colombian and Central American traffickers in the late 1970s. At that time, they redirected their activities to Guadalajara, in the state of Jalisco, and formed what became known as the Guadalajara organization.²⁰

Following the killing of an undercover DEA agent in 1985, these families were forced to dissolve the Guadalajara organization and disperse across Mexico. Joaquín Guzmán Loera, alias ‘El Chapo’, and his associate Héctor Luis Palma Salazar remained in the Sinaloa area, established the Sinaloa Cartel, and formed alliances, including with the Milenio Cartel, led by the Valencia family in Michoacán, and the Beltrán Leyva brothers (BLO).²¹ Soon after, former founders of Guadalajara organization started fighting each other in a decades-long bloody war. In particular, in 1989, the Sinaloa Cartel entered into a violent conflict with the Tijuana Cartel, also known as the Arellano Felix Organization, after the latter killed one of El Chapo’s close friends and declared the state of Baja California to be its exclusive territory.²² In 1993, El Chapo fled to Guatemala after escaping an attempt on his life where he was arrested and extradited to Mexico. With the help of his brother, Arturo Guzmán Loera, alias ‘El Pollo’, as well as Hector Beltran Leyva and of Juan José Esparragoza Moreno, alias ‘El Azul’, El Chapo continued to run the business from prison, where he lived an opulent lifestyle enabled by the corruption of prison authorities.²³ A senior official in Mexico’s maximum-security prison system, Dámaso López Núñez, alias ‘El Licenciado’, was in charge of the Puente Grande penitentiary (Jalisco), where El Chapo was detained. He is alleged to have run a network of corrupt prison guards and personally organized El Chapo’s escape on 19 January 2001. After El Chapo’s escape, El Licenciado resigned from his official position and joined the Sinaloa Cartel, becoming one of El Chapo’s closest allies.²⁴

In the 2000s, the Sinaloa cartel was led by “El Chapo”, alongside Ismael Zambada García, alias ‘El Mayo’, and El Azul.²⁵ During his 15 years in El Chapo’s service, El Licenciado also built his own drug-trafficking structure, operating in Mexico, the United States, and Central and South America.²⁶

In the aftermath of the arrest of Gulf Cartel’s leader Osiel Cárdenas in 2003, the Sinaloa Cartel started contesting the Gulf Cartel’s hegemony over trafficking routes through Ciudad Juarez.²⁷ After two-year fighting that had killed more than 5,000 people and prompted the Mexican President Felipe Calderon to send thousands of troops to the area, in 2010, the Sinaloa Cartel eventually defeated the Gulf Cartel and took control over the coveted trafficking routes through Ciudad Juarez. The Sinaloa was then considered as the most powerful Mexican and world’s largest criminal organization, with its leader, El Chapo, making Forbes’ list of the world’s top billionaires.²⁸

In parallel, in 2008, the alliance between Guzmán and the BLO collapsed amid suspicion that El Chapo had turned Alfredo Beltran Leyva in to the authorities. This triggered waves of violence across Sinaloa, Chihuahua and Durango states, forcing hundreds of people to flee. ²⁹ In addition, the killing of Ignácio ‘Nacho’ Coronel by Mexican authorities in early 2010 severed links between the Sinaloa Cartel and Milenio Cartel and resulted in the splitting of Milenio Cartel (see below). During the 2010s, the Sinaloa Cartel stayed in the hands of El Chapo, El Mayo, and El Azul, until El Azul reportedly died of a heart attack in June 2014 and El Chapo was extradited to the United States following his third capture in 2017.³⁰

Before that, in February 2014, El Chapo was re-arrested and delegated his leadership duties to El Licenciado. After escaping again in July 2015, El Chapo was recaptured in January 2016 and extradited to the United States in early 2017.³¹ Seeking to fill the power vacuum resulting from the diminishing importance of El Chapo’s within the Sinaloa Cartel, El Licenciado allegedly attempted to kill the leader of another Sinaloa Cartel faction, El Mayo, as well as two of El Chapo’s sons in February 2017. Shortly after his attempts reportedly failed, he was arrested by Mexican authorities in May 2017 and extradited to the United States on 6 July 2018.³²

The latest arrest and subsequent extradition to the United States in 2017 of its most notorious leader, El Chapo, resulted in the fracturing of Sinaloa Cartel and in a spike in violence.³³ Between 2017 and 2021, the faction led by El Mayo (‘Mayiza’) and the one led by El Chapo’s sons (Chapitos’) repeatedly clashed.³⁴ Despite these repeated incidents of violence, the Chapitos, the Mayiza, and other Sinaloan factions continued to form an alliance to regulate some criminal activities in Sinaloa,³⁵ until the Chapitos’ alleged betrayal of El Mayo in July 2024 (see below).

Jalisco Cartel New Generation (CJNG)

In 2010, the killing of the Milenio Cartel leader, Ignacio ‘Nacho’ Coronel, by Mexican security forces resulted in the splitting of the Milenio Cartel, which acted as a member of the Sinaloa Cartel’s criminal federation³⁶ and had previously moved drug shipments and manage finances for the Sinaloa Cartel in several Mexican states. The Milenio Cartel then divided into two factions, the ‘Resistencia’ and the ‘Torcidos’, which fought each other for control of drug trafficking in Jalisco. The Torcidos subsequently emerged as the successor of Sinaloan capo’s network in the region and later became the Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación – CJNG).³⁷ The CJNG was founded by a former police officer – Nemesio Rubén Oseguera Cervantes, alias ‘El Mencho’ – and based in the state of Jalisco.³⁸ From then on, El Mencho acted as CJNG’s leader until he was killed on 22 February 2026 (see below).³⁹

The cartel has been notorious for its extreme and very public use of violence, military firepower and organization, conducting forced disappearances and forced recruitment, engaging in extortion, and with the demonstrated capacity to infiltrate state authorities. Following its emergence, homicides and enforced disappearance rates, as well as the discovery of clandestine mass graves containing dismembered bodies and ‘extermination sites’ increased drastically in Jalisco.⁴⁰ Initially known as the ‘Matazetas’ (Zetas killers) following the killing and mutilation of several Los Zetas members, ⁴¹ the CJNG has also been described as ‘one of the most aggressive in its attacks on the military – including on helicopters – and … a pioneer in launching explosives from drones and installing mines.’⁴²

As detailed below, the CJNG has also used extreme violence against its rivals, public officials and the civilian population as a strategy to gain and secure territorial control, in retaliation for past operations or on allegations of collaboration with rivals.⁴³ Considered by the DEA to be as powerful as the Sinaloa Cartel, the CJNG has established a presence in more than forty nations, notably across almost all fifty US states, and has positioned itself as a major supplier of cocaine, while generating also billions from the production and trafficking of fentanyl and methamphetamine.⁴⁴ Since its formation, the CJNG has expanded beyond drug-related activities and is now involved in fuel theft, extortion, human trafficking, illegal mining, timeshare, real estate and tourism fraud, and money laundering.⁴⁵ Although the CJNG is today considered as the main rival to the Sinaloa Cartel, both groups also work together at times within certain drug supply chains, notably by sharing some suppliers of precursor chemicals for the production of methamphetamine and fentanyl.⁴⁶

Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)

The Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL) was established in the state of Guanajuato in 2014 when local criminal actors united to resist increasing incursions by the CJNG and Los Zetas in the region. Initially involved in fuel theft, the group later expanded into extortion and methamphetamine trafficking.⁴⁷ Founded by David Rogel Figuerora, a one-time Los Zetas operative, José Antonio Yépez Ortiz, alias ‘El Marro’, quickly became the CSRL’s leader following Figueroa’s mysterious disappearance.⁴⁸ As noted below, after El Marro’s capture in 2020, the CSRL is said by one authority to have become unstable, losing its vertical hierarchical structure and evolving into a horizontal network of cells led by regional leaders coordinating criminal activities across the state of Guanajuato.⁴⁹ Named after Santa Rosa de Lima, the town that served as a base for the CSRL, the CSRL developed strongholds in towns across Guanajuato, including the small town of Juventino Rosas in which El Marro was captured in August 2020.⁵⁰

Rising Tensions between the CJNG and the CSRL

After tensions escalated between the CJNG and the CSRL following failed negotiations and the CSRL’s murder of the nephew of El Mencho, the CJNG’s leader, in 2017, the CSRL released a video showing its leader, El Marro, surrounded by heavily armed men and declaring war on the CJNG.⁵¹ Since then, violence has drastically increased in Guanajuato, which has become one of Mexico’s most violent states, with the CJNG and the CSRL carrying out violent acts against each other and other rival groups, along with attacks on civilians, political leaders, and security forces, resulting in rising death tolls.⁵² As a result, Mexican government, under the then President Andrés Manuel Lõpez Obrado (AMLO), treated the neutralization of the CSRL as a top security priority. This led to mass arrests of CSRL operatives and members of El Marro’s family in 2019, and to El Marro’s capture in August 2020.⁵³

Continued fighting between the CJNG and the CSRL

Despite the government’s crackdown, the resulting decentralization of the group, and the CJNG’s growing influence and presence, the CSRL has remained active in Guanajuato during the reporting period. It has continued to commit murders, maintaining control over at least ten major municipalities, and to fight the CJNG across the state.⁵⁴ Guanajuato registered the highest number of murders across Mexico in 2025 and the ongoing fighting between the CJNG and the CSRL is said to be behind most of acts of violence in the region.⁵⁵ The CSRL has received support, including weapons and fighters, from other criminal groups, notably factions of the Sinaloa Cartel and the Gulf Cartel, in its fight against the CJNG. This support has enabled it to maintain substantial territorial control in Guanajuato.⁵⁶ The CJNG’s designation by the United States as both a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity and a Foreign Terrorist Organization, alongside other Latin American cartels and gangs, in early 2025⁵⁷ has been described by certain analysts as an action that could strengthen the CSRL’s position.⁵⁸ That said, the CSRL was recently sanctioned by the Trump administration.⁵⁹ Moreover, in 2025, the CJNG reportedly formed an unexpected alliance with the Chapitos, one of the two rival factions within the Sinaloa Cartel (see below), against the latter’s Sinaloan rival, the Mayiza.⁶⁰

Escalating violence within Sinaloa Cartel

Following the arrest by US authorities of El Mayo and one of El Chapo’s sons, Joaquín Guzmán López, in July 2024, violence between the two rival factions has escalated into a bloody internal war in September 2024, amid accusations that younger Guzmán betrayed El Mayo by allegedly luring him to a meeting where he was captured by the United States.⁶¹ As a result, homicides and disappearance rates as well as armed confrontations in Sinaloa state, primarily in Culiacán, have drastically increased, with thousands of people murdered and thousands more having disappeared.⁶² By contrast with earlier internal divisions that occurred within the Sinaloa Cartel (see above), the current level of violence has been described as unprecedented, with fighting no longer confined to rural areas and also affecting urban centres.⁶³

Intensification of security operations against cartels

Since Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum took office in October 2024, security operations targeting criminal organizations, and associated armed clashes between Mexican security forces and criminal groups, including through military deployments⁶⁴ have significantly increased amid pressure from the Trump administration to intensify efforts against drug trafficking.⁶⁵ US President Donald Trump has made the fight against criminal organization involved in drug trafficking into the United States a key priority. In addition to related sanctions and Foreign Terrorist Organization designations against several Cartels, he has alleged that ‘cartels are running Mexico’, threatening to strike ‘narco-terrorists’ positions. After El Mencho’s death, he reiterated his stance, stating that ‘Mexico must step up their effort on Cartels and Drugs!’ ⁶⁶ In a move described as ‘an attempt by her government to co-operate with US counternarcotic efforts and thereby ward off the possibility of Trump ordering unilateral strikes against the cartels in Mexican territory’, the Mexican President transferred 37 high-profile suspected drug traffickers to the United States in mid-February 2026.⁶⁷ These efforts also led to international operations, such as one involving Moroccan authorities in late March 2026 that resulted in the arrest and extradition to the United States of individuals accused of supplying the CJNG with military-grade weapons, including machine guns, rocket launchers, and sniper rifles.⁶⁸

Neutralization of the CJNG’s leader

Within the context of the current revival of the kingpin strategy, Mexican authorities attempted to capture El Mencho, the leader of the CJNG, on 22 February 2026 while he was hiding out in Tapalpa, a small town in the state of Jalisco. Cartel members opened fire when Mexican Special Forces and National Guard, with the Air Force providing air cover, encircled the area and opened fire with heavy weapons, ⁶⁹ leaving several cartel members dead while El Mencho and his closed guard fled to a cabin complex in a wooden area. Pursued by Mexican special forces, a second exchange of fire took place during which Oseguera and some of his bodyguards were injured. Dispatched to a nearby medical facility by helicopter, El Mencho died during the flight. The operation triggered widespread retaliatory attacks (see below), forcing the helicopter dispatching El Mencho to divert in nearby Michoacan state.⁷⁰ Another Mexican Army helicopter was shot down by the CJNG, without any of its occupants being killed.⁷¹

Two criteria need to be assessed in order to determine whether a situation of armed violence amounts to a NIAC:

First, the level of armed violence must reach a certain degree of intensity that goes beyond internal disturbances and tensions.
Second, in every NIAC, at least one side in the conflict must be a non-State armed group that exhibits a certain level of organization in order to qualify as a party to the NIAC. Government forces are presumed to satisfy the criteria of organization. ⁷²

Various indicative factors are used to assess whether a given situation has met the required intensity threshold, such as the number, duration, and intensity of individual confrontations; the types of weapons and military equipment used; the number of persons and types of forces participating in the fighting; the number of casualties; the extent of material destruction; the number of civilians fleeing; and the involvement of the UN Security Council.⁷³

A series of indicative factors are used to assess whether armed groups exhibit the required degree of organization, such as the existence of a command structure and disciplinary rules and mechanisms; the ability to procure, transport, and distribute arms; the ability to plan, coordinate, and carry out military operations; and the ability to negotiate and conclude agreements, e.g. ceasefire or peace agreements. If the minimum criterion for organization of the armed groups is not fulfilled, there is no armed conflict.⁷⁴

As regards the motives of the organized armed group, ‘[t]he determination of the existence of an armed conflict is based solely on two criteria: the intensity of the conflict and organization of the parties, the purpose of the armed forces to engage in acts of violence or also achieve some further objective is, therefore, irrelevant.’⁷⁵ In other words, the motives – political or economic– of the armed actors have no bearing on whether the situation is classified as a NIAC.⁷⁶

The intensity of the conflict and organization of the parties are the only two criteria to determine whether a NIAC exists. The purpose of the armed forces to engage in acts of violence or the fact that they seek to achieve some further objective is irrelevant. Although respective cartels operate through fluid, decentralized and sometimes fragmented arrangements, such structures can still meet the organization threshold where leadership can coordinate operations across semi-autonomous subunits, assign tasks, redeploy units, and retain or delegate operational control.

Non-international armed conflict between Mexico and Jalisco Cartel New Generation (CJNG)

Organization

Before his killing, the CJNG was run by El Mencho under a highly hierarchical and centralized command structure,¹ with high-ranking CJNG members who reported directly to him and were, for instance, involved in brokering the alliance allegedly formed with Chapitos (see above).² The CJNG comprised an armed wing composed of specialized units carrying out distinct military functions: territorial conquest (Grupo Élite), personal protection (Fuerzas Especiales Mencho) and a drone unit conducting intelligence and targeted killings (Operadores Droneros).³ It has also been described by the US government as functioning ‘as quasi-governmental entit[y], controlling nearly all aspects of society’.⁴

Beyond its core membership, the CJNG has maintained a unique franchise-based structure, with relatively autonomous regional factions or cells operating under the cartel’s label and financial network and aligning with dozens of other local criminal actors to manage illicit activities and to expand its territorial control outside its strongholds.⁵ The CJNG has an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 members.⁶

Active in several illicit economies – including drug production and trafficking as its main activities, but also extortion, fuel theft, illegal mining, migrant smuggling and money laundering (see above) – the CJNG has been described as deploying substantial financial resources and exploiting corrupt officials. Its financial branch, the so-called ‘Los Cuinis’, maintains an extensive network for laundering illicit proceeds, including through Chinese money laundering networks, cryptocurrencies, bulk cash smuggling, and trade-based money laundering.⁷ As a result, the CJNG has controlled increasing swaths of Mexico’s economy,⁸ as well as of regional and global illicit markets.⁹

According to analysts, the combination of highly vertically integrated command structure and franchise-based model has enabled the CJNG to expand into nearly all Mexican states, establishing territorial and social control that has facilitated its infiltration of political and judicial institutions, as well as the State security and economic sectors.¹⁰ Several powerful commanders have exerted considerable influence in key Mexican states, where the CJNG’s territorial footprint in Mexico is currently described as follows: hegemony in Aguascalientes, Colima, Jalisco and Nayarit states, control over roughly half of the country, notably western Mexico and Pacific Coast region, and influence across most of the remaining territory.¹¹

**Mexican States Where the CJNG Controls – and Contests – Territory, February 2026.** ©InSight Crimes

The CJNG has, however, faced contestation and, at the time of writing, has notably failed to overpower the CSRL in Guanajuato. It also continues to fight security forces and local rivals in Baja California and Michoacán.¹² The alliance reportedly formed with the Chapitos has presumably reinforced the CJNG’s influence in Sinaloa and Baja California states. El Mencho’s death, however, could end up favouring the Mayiza in their fight against the Chapitos and, in turn, threatening CJNG’s presence in the area.¹³

Regarding military recruiting and training, the CJNG has run dozens of paramilitary-style training camps, notably in the Sierra de Ahuisculco, a mountain range in Jalisco, where people are lured with promises of legitimate jobs or kidnapped, and then forced, under threats and ill-treatment, to train with firearms, join the cartel, and kill and cremate fellow recruits (particularly those who resist or are deemed to be of no use).¹⁴ Additionally, it has previously conducted aerial propaganda drops, ¹⁵ and has been described as engaging in ‘spectacular displays of narco-messaging (propaganda, notices, and threats)’ and as being ‘social media savvy’,¹⁶ Taken together, these practices evidence its ability to speak with one voice.

Its capacity to conduct coordinated and sustained military-type attacks has been observed since at least 2015 and was again in evidence during retaliatory attacks following El Mencho’s death in late February 2026 (see below). The CJNG’s power has been described as rooted in its paramilitary force, relying on extortion, brutal violence and enforced disappearances to seize territory, strengthen its control and facilitate forced recruitment.¹⁷ Such capacity has persisted after the death of El Mencho: according to the Mexican Ministry of Defence, attacks in Jalisco were coordinated by El Mencho’s right-hand and financial head of the CJNG, known as ‘El Tuli’, who was then killed when Mexican security forces attempted to arrest him.¹⁸ However, as observed by some analysts, since there is no direct heir nor official successor to El Mencho and given the size and territorial reach of the CJNG, risks of fragmentation, with the possible involvement of other armed actors, are considered very high.¹⁹ Nonetheless, as things stand at time of writing, the CJNG has displayed a sufficient level of organization and, compared with other cartels, a more integrated structure.

Intensity

The CJNG distinguishes itself through its military-type training and deployment tactics.²⁰ The CJNG has also displayed an arsenal of military-grade weaponry, including drones carrying explosive devices, landmines, assault rifles, grenade and rocket launchers, armoured vehicles (some with mounted machine guns). This was illustrated by material recovered at the site of the raid that led to El Mencho’s death, which included armoured vehicles and rocket launchers, as well as by a recent international operation against individuals charged with conspiracy to provide military-grade weapons to the CJNG, such as machine guns, rocket launchers, sniper rifles, and AK-47 rifles, and potentially surface-to-air missiles and advanced anti-aircraft systems, with a total value of around US$58 million.²¹ The CJNG is also notorious for aggressively engaging Mexican military forces and conducting coordinated attacks, including downing a helicopter and killing six soldiers in 2015 with rocket-propelled grenades, and attempting to assassinate the head of Mexico City’s police force with grenades and high-powered rifles in 2020.²² In reaction, the Mexican government deployed the newly established National Guard in 2019 and a massive contingent of soldiers in February 2026, rather than relying solely on ordinary police operations.²³

More broadly, the CJNG is specifically known for its level of brutality that has been described as comparable to that of Los Zetas (see above).²⁴ From January 2024 to 16 February 2026, thousands of violent incidents across Mexico, largely concentrated in Jalisco, were attributed to the CJNG and affiliated groups.²⁵

**Violent CJNG activity in Mexico, 1 January to 16 February 2026**. ©The Guardian, 2026

Initially, this violence predominantly targeted civilians, accounting for over forty per cent of their violent activity, but has since increasingly included clashes with armed groups and/or security forces.²⁶

In February 2025, US president Donald Trump designated the CJNG as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, emphasizing ‘its intimidating acts of violence, including attacks on Mexican military and police with military grade weaponry, the use of drones to drop explosives on Mexican law enforcement, and assassinations or attempted assassinations of Mexican officials’.²⁷ In July of the same year, an indictment in the state of Virginia against a Bulgarian arms smuggler revealed that the cartel was attempting to purchase approximately US$58 million worth of weapons, including surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft systems (ZU-23).²⁸

On 22 February 2026, in the course of the operation leading to the killing of El Mencho and several of his accomplices, a Mexican Army helicopter was hit by the CJNG and forced to make an emergency landing, without any of the soldiers on board being killed.²⁹ Following the operation, the CJNG launched coordinated retaliatory attacks, including through the reported use of explosive-laden drones,³⁰ that killed twenty-five Mexican soldiers. Around thirty cartel operatives and one bystander were also reported killed in the ensuing clashes. In total, more than 70 attacks were recorded in Guanajuato alone.³¹ The cartel also erected hundreds of roadblocks across Jalisco and, to a lesser extent, in dozens of other Mexican states, and set vehicles, stalls, and businesses ablaze, including gas stations, and, reportedly, people as well. Armed assaults were also carried out against banks, shops, and government infrastructure. ³² Although Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum stated on 23 February 2026 that the situation was normalizing and roadblocks were under control, around 2,500 additional Mexican troops were deployed to Jalisco at the same time, as locals and tourists were urged to remain confined or fled the surge in violence in the area. Across Jalisco and several other states, airlines cancelled flights, public transport was interrupted, banks were closed and shuttered, and schools and universities suspended classes.³³ The CJNG also reportedly offered a roughly $1,100 reward for every Mexican soldier killed.³⁴ Moreover, according to analysts, since there is no clear direct heir or successor to El Mencho, the risk of cartel power struggle that would result in a sharp escalation in violence and could draw other cartels into the fighting is very high.³⁵ Even though no further hostilities have been reported at the time of writing,³⁶ the intensity of the recent violence, coupled with escalation risks related to possible CJNG’s fragmentation and the Mexican authorities’ renewed reliance on the kingpin strategy, indicate that the NIAC between Mexican authorities and the CJNG remains, for the time being, ongoing.Redaelli and Arévalo arrived at a similar conclusion, at least for specific regions and during specific periods.³⁷

1
S. Pellegrini and M. F. Arocha, ‘Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)’, ACLED, 14 April 2023; O. Holmes et al., ‘Violence in Mexico after military kills notorious drug cartel boss – a visual guide’, The Guardian, 23 February 2026.
2
P. Asmann, ‘What’s Next for Mexico’s CJNG After the Killing of ‘El Mencho’? ‘, InSight Crime, 23 February 2026; ‘5 CJNG Hotspots to Watch After El Mencho’s Killing in Mexico’, InSight Crime, 24 February 2026.
3
C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026.
4
US Presidential Document, Executive Order 14157, Federal Register: The Daily Journal of the United States Government, 20 January 2025.
5
DEA, ‘The Jalisco New Generation Cartel’, Command & Control: Cartels; S. Pellegrini and M. F. Arocha, ‘Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)’, ACLED, 14 April 2023; P. Asmann, ‘What’s Next for Mexico’s CJNG After the Killing of ‘El Mencho’?’, InSight Crime, 23 February 2026; C. Flores, ‘Will Mexico’s Jalisco cartel’s violent biz model survive El Mencho’s death?’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2026; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026.
6
C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026
7
DEA, ‘The Jalisco New Generation Cartel’, Command & Control: Cartels; P. Asmann, ‘What’s Next for Mexico’s CJNG After the Killing of ‘El Mencho’? ‘, InSight Crime, 23 February 2026.
8
‘‘An atmosphere of terror’: the bloody rise of Mexico’s top cartel’, The Guardian, 2 April 2021.
9
S. Henkin, ‘Tracking Cartels Infographic Series: The Violent Rise of Cártel de Jalisco Nuevo Generación (CJNG)’, START, June 2020.
10
S. Henkin, ‘Tracking Cartels Infographic Series: The Violent Rise of Cártel de Jalisco Nuevo Generación (CJNG)’, START, June 2020; ‘What’s Next for Mexico’s CJNG After the Killing of ‘El Mencho’? ‘, InSight Crime, 23 February 2026; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026.
11
S. Henkin, ‘Tracking Cartels Infographic Series: The Violent Rise of Cártel de Jalisco Nuevo Generación (CJNG)’, START, June 2020; S. Pellegrini and M. F. Arocha, ‘Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)’, ACLED, 14 April 2023; P. Asmann, ‘What’s Next for Mexico’s CJNG After the Killing of ‘El Mencho’? ‘, InSight Crime, 23 February 2026; L. Schmidt, V. Dittmar and P. Asmann, ‘5 CJNG Hotspots to Watch After El Mencho’s Killing in Mexico’, InSight Crime, 24 February 2026; C. Flores, ‘Will Mexico’s Jalisco cartel’s violent biz model survive El Mencho’s death?’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2026; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026. It has largely defeated the Los Zetas and Gulf Cartel factions in central Mexico.S. Henkin, ‘Tracking Cartels Infographic Series: The Violent Rise of Cártel de Jalisco Nuevo Generación (CJNG)’, START, June 2020.
12
S. Henkin, ‘Tracking Cartels Infographic Series: The Violent Rise of Cártel de Jalisco Nuevo Generación (CJNG)’, START, June 2020; S. Pellegrini and M. F. Arocha, ‘Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)’, ACLED, 14 April 2023; ‘5 CJNG Hotspots to Watch After El Mencho’s Killing in Mexico’, InSight Crime, 24 February 2026.
13
‘5 CJNG Hotspots to Watch After El Mencho’s Killing in Mexico’, InSight Crime, 24 February 2026.
14
A. Guillén and D. Petersen, ‘El regreso del infierno; los desaparecidos que están vivos’,Quinto Elemento Lab, 4 February 2019; ‘‘An atmosphere of terror’: the bloody rise of Mexico’s top cartel’, The Guardian, 2 April 2021; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026.
15
J. P. Sullivan, ‘Crime wars: Operational perspectives on criminal armed groups in Mexico and Brazil’, International review of the Red Cross, No. 923, June 2023, p 857.
16
S. Henkin, ‘Tracking Cartels Infographic Series: The Violent Rise of Cártel de Jalisco Nuevo Generación (CJNG)’, START, June 2020. See also: .‘Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)’, InSight Crime, 19 September 2025
17
C. Flores, ‘Will Mexico’s Jalisco cartel’s violent biz model survive El Mencho’s death?’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2026.
18
R. Cortes, A. Pelaez-Fernandez and S. Morland, ‘Romantic tryst led to Mexican cartel leader’s capture, death’, Reuters, 23 February 2026; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026.
19
O. Holmes et al., ‘Violence in Mexico after military kills notorious drug cartel boss – a visual guide’, The Guardian, 23 February 2026; P. Asmann, ‘What’s Next for Mexico’s CJNG After the Killing of ‘El Mencho’? ‘, InSight Crime, 23 February 2026; L. Callaghan, ‘A cartel boss is dead, but normal Mexicans always pay the price’, The Times, 28 February 2026; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026.
20
S. Henkin, ‘Tracking Cartels Infographic Series: The Violent Rise of Cártel de Jalisco Nuevo Generación (CJNG)’, START, June 2020; C. Flores, ‘Will Mexico’s Jalisco cartel’s violent biz model survive El Mencho’s death?’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2026.
21
F. Naim, ‘Morocco Helps US Target Global Arms Network Linked to Mexican CJNG Cartel’, Morocco World News, 27 March 2026
22
‘Mexico declares all-out war after rising drug cartel downs military helicopter’, The Guardian, 5 May 2015; ‘México: Cártel de Jalisco exhibe su arsenal’, Teletrece on Youtube, 20 July 2020; ‘‘An atmosphere of terror’: the bloody rise of Mexico’s top cartel’, The Guardian, 2 April 2021; S. Pellegrini and M. F. Arocha, ‘Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)’, ACLED, 14 April 2023; J. P. Sullivan, ‘Crime wars: Operational perspectives on criminal armed groups in Mexico and Brazil’, International review of the Red Cross, No. 923 (June 2023), pp 857 and 866–68; ‘Who was El Mencho, the former police officer who co-founded an ultraviolent cartel in Mexico?’, The Guardian, 23 February 2026; R. Cortes, A. Pelaez-Fernandez and S. Morland, ‘Romantic tryst led to Mexican cartel leader’s capture, death’, Reuters, 23 February 2026; C. Flores, ‘Will Mexico’s Jalisco cartel’s violent biz model survive El Mencho’s death?’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2026.C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026.
23
C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026
24
C. Flores, ‘Will Mexico’s Jalisco cartel’s violent biz model survive El Mencho’s death?’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2026.
25
O. Holmes et al., ‘Violence in Mexico after military kills notorious drug cartel boss – a visual guide’, The Guardian, 23 February 2026.
26
S. Pellegrini and M. F. Arocha, ‘Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)’, ACLED, 14 April 2023.
27
US Department of State, ‘Designation of International Cartels’, Fact sheet, 20 Feburary 2025; US Department of State, Executive Order 13224, 20 February 2025; C. Flores, ‘Will Mexico’s Jalisco cartel’s violent biz model survive El Mencho’s death?’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2026.
28
US Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Virginia, ‘Bulgarian arms trafficker and three others indicted for conspiring to supply military-grade weaponry to Mexican drug cartels’, Press Release, 20 July 2025; C. Flores, ‘Will Mexico’s Jalisco cartel’s violent biz model survive El Mencho’s death?’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2026.
29
C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026.
30
S. Pellegrini, ‘Mexico: El Mencho’s killing triggers nationwide escalation — Expert comment’, ACLED, 23 February 2026; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026.
31
O. Holmes et al., ‘Violence in Mexico after military kills notorious drug cartel boss – a visual guide’, The Guardian, 23 February 2026; R. Cortes, A. Pelaez-Fernandez and S. Morland, ‘Romantic tryst led to Mexican cartel leader’s capture, death’, Reuters, 23 February 2026; ‘El Mencho: Mexico officials say 25 soldiers killed after cartel raid’, Al Jazeera, 23 February 2026; ‘Key events in Mexican operation to capture cartel leader ‘El Mencho’’, Reuters, 23 February 2026; C. Flores, ‘Will Mexico’s Jalisco cartel’s violent biz model survive El Mencho’s death?’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2026; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026.
32
Cortes, A. Pelaez-Fernandez and S. Morland, ‘Romantic tryst led to Mexican cartel leader’s capture, death’, Reuters, 23 February 2026; ‘El Mencho: Mexico officials say 25 soldiers killed after cartel raid’, Al Jazeera, 23 February 2026; O. Holmes et al., ‘Violence in Mexico after military kills notorious drug cartel boss – a visual guide’, The Guardian, 23 February 2026; L. Callaghan, ‘A cartel boss is dead, but normal Mexicans always pay the price’, The Times, 28 February 2026; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026.
33
O. Holmes et al., ‘Violence in Mexico after military kills notorious drug cartel boss – a visual guide’, The Guardian, 23 February 2026; R. Cortes, A. Pelaez-Fernandez and S. Morland, ‘Romantic tryst led to Mexican cartel leader’s capture, death’, Reuters, 23 February 2026; ‘Key events in Mexican operation to capture cartel leader “El Mencho”’, Reuters, 23 February 2026; ‘El Mencho: Mexico officials say 25 soldiers killed after cartel raid’, Al Jazeera, 23 February 2026; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026.
34
R. Cortes, A. Pelaez-Fernandez and S. Morland, ‘Romantic tryst led to Mexican cartel leader’s capture, death’, Reuters, 23 February 2026; ‘Key events in Mexican operation to capture cartel leader ‘El Mencho’’, Reuters, 23 February 2026; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026.
35
O. Holmes et al., ‘Violence in Mexico after military kills notorious drug cartel boss – a visual guide’, The Guardian, 23 February 2026; P. Asmann, ‘What’s Next for Mexico’s CJNG After the Killing of ‘El Mencho’? ‘, InSight Crime, 23 February 2026; S. Collinson, ‘A cartel crackdown carries political risks for Trump’, CNN Politics, 24 February 2026.
36
D. Wood, ‘The Killing of “El Mencho”: Implications for the Cartels and Mexico’s Security’, Wilson Center, 24 February 2026.
37
C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026.

Non-international armed conflict between Jalisco Cartel New Generation (CJNG) and Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)

Organization

The formation of the CSRL (see above) forms part of a broader phenomenon of self-defence groups and/or local criminal actors coalescing to counter the increasing expansion of the CJNG, as also seen with the formation of Cárteles Unidos in 2019 in Michoacán, and which has resulted in an escalation of armed clashes between these entities and the CJNG.¹

As detailed above, the CJNG displays a sufficient degree of organization, and the CSRL was led by El Marro under a hierarchical structure until his arrest in 2020.² Since then, the CSRL has been composed of several relatively autonomous cells following a more horizontal structure. Nevertheless, a certain degree of coordination exists among regional leaders, enabling them to coordinate the CSRL’s activities across the state of Guanajuato.³ Moreover, El Marro has reportedly continued to send instructions to CSRL’s members from jail though is family and lawyers, notably helping to form an alliance with the Gulf Cartel (see above).⁴ In the past, the CRSL conducted underground operations through tunnels, but also recorded videos for propaganda and held tactical debriefings. bombs J. P. Sullivan, ‘Crime wars: Operational perspectives on criminal armed groups in Mexico and Brazil’, International review of the Red Cross, No. 923, June 2023, pp 857-858 Similarly, both cartels have displayed messages across the cities in Guanajuato, accusing each other for the spike in violence.⁵ It has recruited ex-Colombian military and paramilitary personnel to increase its manpower in its fight against the CJNG.⁶ These elements tend to indicate that the CSRL has remained sufficiently organized during the reporting period.

Intensity

Before the reporting period, the conflict between the CSRL and the CJNG resulted in the highest level of violence recorded in Mexico.⁷ Although directly linked to the CJNG’s attempts to gain territorial control and dominate local drug and smuggling markets to the detriment of the CSRL, the violence has predominantly targeted civilians and their assets, and, compared to other states, has less often taken the form of direct clashes between these groups.⁸ The CJNG also accused the CSRL of attacking bars and other public spaces to prompt security forces to intervene and thereby slow the CJNG’s expansion.⁹ Nonetheless, members of respective cartels were also targeted. In particular, in order to identify and kill their adversaries, the CSRL dyed their methamphetamine blue to distinguish it from the white product sold by the CJNG. According to reports, several street dealers on both sides ended up dead for selling the wrong product in the ‘wrong place’.¹⁰

As detailed above, the recorded violence between the CJNG and CSRL during the reporting period comparatively lower, but violence continues and remains high in comparison with other Mexican states.¹¹ Most incidents of violence in the region are reportedly related to the ongoing fighting between the CJNG and the CSRL, and Guanajuato was the deadliest state in Mexico in 2025.¹² Such incidents include gunmen shooting at people gathered at a football pitch in the city of Salamanca (Guanajuato) in late January 2026, killing eleven and injuring dozens more. One day earlier, several violent incidents in the same city resulted in five killings and one abduction.¹³ In addition, incidents of violence, especially those targeting private individuals, are likely underreported due to high impunity rate, distrust in authorities and lack of resources to conduct investigations.¹⁴

Since targeting inhabitants and their property, rather than clashing directly with the opponent, has been a deliberate strategy in the fighting between the CJNG and the CSRL, the remaining incidents of violence perpetrated by both actors, including against civilians in the area, must be taken into account. Taken together, they indicate that, for the time being, hostilities have not ceased and the NIAC remains ongoing.

1
S. Pellegrini and M. F. Arocha, ‘Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)’, ACLED, 14 April 2023.
2
‘Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)’, InSight Crime, 19 September 2025; US Department of the Treasury, ‘Secretary Bessent Orders Sanctions Against Violent Mexican Cartel’, Press release, 17 December 2025.
3
‘Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)’, InSight Crime, 19 September 2025.
4
US Department of the Treasury, ‘Secretary Bessent Orders Sanctions Against Violent Mexican Cartel’, Press release, 17 December 2025.
5
‘Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)’, InSight Crime, 19 September 2025.
6
US Department of the Treasury, ‘Secretary Bessent Orders Sanctions Against Violent Mexican Cartel’, Press release, 17 December 2025.
7
S. Pellegrini and M. F. Arocha, ‘Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)’, ACLED, 14 April 2023.
8
S. Pellegrini and M. F. Arocha, ‘Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)’, ACLED, 14 April 2023.
9
‘Cinco miembros de Pájaros Sierra fueron abatidos por el Ejército en Michoacán’, infobae, 16 November 2022; S. Pellegrini and M. F. Arocha, ‘Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)’, ACLED, 14 April 2023.
10
‘Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)’, InSight Crime, 19 September 2025.
11
See also: S. Pellegrini and M. F. Arocha, ‘Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)’, ACLED, 14 April 2023; US Department of the Treasury, ‘Secretary Bessent Orders Sanctions Against Violent Mexican Cartel’, Press release, 17 December 2025.
12
V. Buschschlüter, ‘Gunmen storm Mexico football pitch and kill at least 11 people’, BBC, 26 January 2026.
13
V. Buschschlüter, ‘Gunmen storm Mexico football pitch and kill at least 11 people’, BBC, 26 January 2026; D. Bonello and D. Reyes, ‘On the Radar: Violence from Gangs and Governments Rules the Region’, InSight Crime, 30 January 2026.
14
S. Pellegrini and M. F. Arocha, ‘Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)’, ACLED, 14 April 2023.

Below threshold situation: internal division within Sinaloa Cartel

Organization

The Sinaloa Cartel is described as not following a hierarchical structure under a single leadership, but being composed of various cells that cooperate with one another and outsource operations abroad, or even within Mexico, to local criminal organizations.⁷⁷ The Sinaloa Cartel’s network structure has reportedly enabled it to consolidate presence in several Mexican states, resist to change within drug landscape and effectively replace its lost leaders and members.⁷⁸ Described as the most powerful criminal organization (see above), the Sinaloa Cartel has transitioned in the late 2010s towards a paramilitary structure able to surrounding government forces, establishing blockades and attacking civilians as well as military targets including in urban settings. It has also coordinated activities through radios for command and control and video monitors.⁷⁹

Since 2017 and the fall of El Chapo, the Sinaloa Cartel has operated through main two leadership structures: the Mayiza, also known as the Mayos, comprising loyalists of El Mayo, and the Chapitos, composed of El Chapo’s sons (Joaquín Guzmán López, Ovidio Guzmán López who was arrested and extradited to the United States in 2023, Iván Archivaldo, and Jesús Alfredo). Both factions reportedly command local armed branches that enable them to control territory.⁸⁰ Since the arrest of ‘El Mayo’ in July 2024 (see above), the Mayiza is currently led by Ismael Zambada Sicairos, alias ‘Mayito Flaco’, one of El Mayo’s sons.⁸¹ According to reports, the Chapitos operate mainly in urban areas and on the Pacific coast of the Sinaloa sate, as well as in Sonora and Baja California states where the compete with rival groups. On the other hand, the Mayiza maintain strongholds in rural areas and also operates in Durango state while maintaining a strong presence in Baja California, Sonora, and Zacatecas states.⁸²

**Violent events involving the Sinaloa Cartel and affiliates**. ©ACLED, May 2025.

Although the Sinaloa Cartel could previously be apprehended as a whole under the concept of a decentralized organized armed group, since the rupture between the Mayiza and the Chapitos, the organization threshold must be assessed individually for both factions. Indeed, while until El Mayo’s arrest in July 2024, the Sinaloa Cartel succeeded in maintaining a relative unity, this cohesion then collapsed, giving rise to unprecedentedly intense fighting between the Mayiza and the Chapitos (see above and below). Other residual factions from Sinaloa cartel have also reportedly competed against these both main and now rival factions.⁸³ Given the lack of available information on the organization of respective factions, for the time being, assessing whether they are sufficiently organized under IHL remains uncertain.

Intensity

The clashes that broke out between the Chapitos and the Mayiza in September 2024 following El Mayo’s arrest have reached unprecedented level of violence in Mexico over the past six years.⁸⁴ Initially concentrated in Sinaloa state (see above), the ongoing violence has also spread to other territories controlled and disputed by the Sinaloa Cartel, as other criminal groups have sought to exploit the cartel’s internal division to advance their own expansion, compounded by the current Mexican government’s renewed reliance on the ‘kingpin’ strategy (see above) amid renewed pressure from the Trump administration.⁸⁵ Initially concentrated in Sinaloa state’s capital city, Culiacán, the fighting has since expanded into rural areas and also affected Sonora and Baja California amid increased disputes between respective allies.⁸⁶ Between July 2024 and March 2025, both factions’ targeting of civilians and of rival members nearly quadrupled compared to the previous year, with a peak recorded between October and November 2024,⁸⁷ and resulted in more than 2,800 deaths and 3,300 disappearances as of late February 2026.⁸⁸ Notably, civilians have been targeted in retaliatory attacks on allegations of links to rival factions, and have also been kidnapped and forcibly disappeared to instil fear and extort ransoms. Local authorities have been further targeted to establish control over localities and reduce rivals’ influence.⁸⁹ When designating the Sinaloa Cartel as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in February 2025, Trump administration emphasized its use of violence to ‘murder, kidnap, and intimidate civilians, government officials, and journalists’.⁹⁰

**Gang-related violence in Sinaloa state**. ©ACLED, May 2025.

In the past, among other cartels, the Sinaloa Cartel was reported to possess improvised armoured vehicles, .50 calibre anti-materiel and sniper rifles, grenades, small-calibre mortars, rocket launchers including with anti-armour munitions, man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS), and machine guns. It was also known for its use of improvised explosive devices, ambushes against Mexican security and military forces, use of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, and trenches and other obstacles in the battlespace.⁹¹ Presumably, the Chapitos and the Mayiza, as the two main Sinaloa factions, have retained substantial parts of this arsenal, even though information remains limited in this respect.

In sum, although the intensity threshold has been reached in relation to the spike in violence between the Chapitos and the Mayiza since 2024, persisting uncertainty as to whether the organization criterion is fulfilled individually by both factions does not allow us to conclude that a NIAC between the two main rival Sinaloa factions is ongoing.

State Parties

Mexico

Non-State parties

Jalisco Cartel New Generation (CJNG)
Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)

Other Non-State Actors

Chapitos
Mayiza

1
S. Casey-Maslen, ‘Armed conflicts in Mexico’, The War Report: Armed Conflict in 2013, S. Casey-Maslen (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2014, pp 156–62.
2
‘Mexico’s most powerful cartel has also been safest from prosecution’, Mexico News Daily, 17 September 2018; International Crisi Group, Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Mexico, (January 2018-December 2021).
3
C. Woody, ‘Mexico’s biggest cartel is leaderless, and drug violence may be about to intensify’, Business Insider, 29 October 2016; P. Asmann, ‘Is the Jalisco Cartel Winning the Battle for Mexico’s Caribbean?’, InSight Crime, 11 July 2019.
4
RULAC, ‘Mexico: Declassification of the Three Armed Conflicts Involving Drug Cartels on RULAC’, 12 December 2022.
5
‘The Felix Gallardo organization (Guadalajara OCG)’, Wilson Center; C. Redaelli, ‘Engaging with drug lords: protecting civilians in Colombia, Mexico, and Honduras’, The War Report: Armed Conflict in 2014, A. Bellal (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2015, pp 521–22.
6
E. G. Brun and G. Kotarska, ‘The Kingpin Strategy: More Violence, No Peace’, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 17 November 2022; .‘The Felix Gallardo organization (Guadalajara OCG)’, Wilson Center.
7
P Asmann, ‘Mexico’s Zetas: From Criminal Powerhouse to Fragmented Remnants’, InSight Crime, 6 April 2018 ; P. Asmann, ‘Fragmentation: The Violent Tailspin of Mexico’s Dominant Cartels’, InSight Crime, 16 January 2019; E. G. Brun and G. Kotarska, ‘The Kingpin Strategy: More Violence, No Peace’, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 17 November 2022.
8
P. Crocoran, ‘Mexico President Reprises Controversial Kingpin Strategy’, InSight Crime, 6 June 2017; P. Asmann, ‘Fragmentation: The Violent Tailspin of Mexico’s Dominant Cartels’, InSight Crime, 16 January 2019; E. G. Brun and G. Kotarska, ‘The Kingpin Strategy: More Violence, No Peace’, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 17 November 2022; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026.
9
DEA Museum, ‘Disrupt, Dismantle, And Destroy: The Kingpin Strategy’, 10 December 2020.
10
C. Redaelli, ‘Engaging with drug lords: protecting civilians in Colombia, Mexico, and Honduras’, The War Report: Armed Conflict in 2014, A. Bellal (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2015, pp 522–23; P. Crocoran, ‘Mexico President Reprises Controversial Kingpin Strategy’, InSight Crime, 6 June 2017; P. Asmann, ‘Fragmentation: The Violent Tailspin of Mexico’s Dominant Cartels’, InSight Crime, 16 January 2019; E. G. Brun and G. Kotarska, ‘The Kingpin Strategy: More Violence, No Peace’, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 17 November 2022.
11
P. Crocoran, ‘Mexico President Reprises Controversial Kingpin Strategy’, InSight Crime, 6 June 2017.
12
E. G. Brun and G. Kotarska, ‘The Kingpin Strategy: More Violence, No Peace’, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 17 November 2022; ‘Zetas’, InSight Crime, 30 August 2024 (updated 17 February 2026).
13
‘Dos carteles dominan la guerra de las drogas en México’, Informador, 7 October 2011; S. Casey-Maslen, ‘Armed conflicts in Mexico’, The War Report: Armed Conflict in 2013, S. Casey-Maslen (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2014, pp 160-161; C. Redaelli, ‘Engaging with drug lords: protecting civilians in Colombia, Mexico, and Honduras’, The War Report: Armed Conflict in 2014, A. Bellal (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2015, pp 521–22; P. Asmann, ‘Fragmentation: The Violent Tailspin of Mexico’s Dominant Cartels’, InSight Crime, 16 January 2019; E. G. Brun and G. Kotarska, ‘The Kingpin Strategy: More Violence, No Peace’, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 17 November 2022; ‘Zetas’, InSight Crime, 30 August 2024 (updated 17 February 2026).
14
F. Naim, ‘Morocco Helps US Target Global Arms Network Linked to Mexican CJNG Cartel’, Morocco World News, 27 March 2026.
15
C. Redaelli, ‘Engaging with drug lords: protecting civilians in Colombia, Mexico, and Honduras’, The War Report: Armed Conflict in 2014, A. Bellal (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2015, pp 523–24; D. Ore, ‘A Reuters special report: How Mexican narcos use remittances to wire U.S. drug profits home’, Reuters, 18 August 2023.
16
S. Casey-Maslen, ‘Armed conflicts in Mexico’, The War Report: Armed Conflict in 2013, S. Casey-Maslen (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2014, pp 161–62; ‘Sinaloa Cartel’, InSight Crime, 19 May 2025 (updated 19 February 2026).
17
DEA, ‘The Sinaloa Cartel’, Command & Control: Cartels.
18
DEA, ‘The Sinaloa Cartel’, Command & Control: Cartels.
19
‘Sinaloa Cartel’, InSight Crime, 19 May 2025 (updated 19 February 2026).
20
‘Sinaloa Cartel’, InSight Crime, 19 May 2025 (updated 19 February 2026).
21
Beltrán Leyva Organization’, InSight Crime, 6 October 2021; ‘Mayiza’, InSight Crime, 27 May 2025; ‘Sinaloa Cartel’, InSight Crime, 19 May 2025 (updated 19 February 2026).
22
C. Woody, ‘ONE YEAR LATER: The rise and fall of ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán, the world’s most ambitious drug lord’, Business Insider, 11 July 2016.
23
‘Joaquín Guzmán Loera, alias ‘El Chapo’’, InSight Crime, 20 March 2019.
24
‘Dámaso López Núñez, alias ‘Licenciado’’, InSight Crime, 9 July 2018.
25
‘Sinaloa Cartel’, InSight Crime, 19 May 2025 (updated 19 February 2026).
26
‘Dámaso López Núñez, alias ‘Licenciado’’, InSight Crime, 9 July 2018.
27
S. Casey-Maslen, ‘Armed conflicts in Mexico’, The War Report: Armed Conflict in 2013, S. Casey-Maslen (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2014, pp 161–62.
28
A. A. Caldwell and M. Stevenson, ‘AP Exclusive: Sinaloa cartel wins Juarez turf war’, The Seattle Times, 9 April 2010.
29
‘Beltrán Leyva Organization’, InSight Crime, 6 October 2021; ‘Sinaloa Cartel’, InSight Crime, 19 May 2025 (updated 19 February 2026).
30
‘Sinaloa Cartel’, InSight Crime, 19 May 2025 (updated 19 February 2026).
31
‘Dámaso López Núñez, alias ‘Licenciado’’, InSight Crime, 9 July 2018.
32
‘Dámaso López Núñez, alias ‘Licenciado’’, InSight Crime, 9 July 2018.
33
L. Goi, ‘Internal Cartel Conflict Could Be Behind Spike in Western Mexico Violence’, InSight Crime, 9 February 2017; P. Asmann, ‘Fragmentation: The Violent Tailspin of Mexico’s Dominant Cartels’, InSight Crime, 16 January 2019.
34
‘Sinaloa Cartel’, InSight Crime, 19 May 2025 (updated 19 February 2026).
35
M. F. Arocha and S. Pellegrini, ‘How the Sinaloa Cartel rift is redrawing Mexico’s criminal map’, ACLED, 7 May 2025; ‘Sinaloa Cartel’, InSight Crime, 19 May 2025 (updated 19 February 2026).
36
‘The New Criminal Group Hitting Mexico’s CJNG Where It Hurts’, InSight Crime, 24 July 2018.
37
DEA, ‘The Jalisco New Generation Cartel’, Command & Control: Cartels; ‘Cártel de Jalisco, herencia de Ignacio ‘“Nacho’” Coronel’, El Informador, 8 October 2011; ‘Jalisco Cartel New Generation (CJNG)’, InSight Crime, 23 February 2026; C. Flores, ‘Will Mexico’s Jalisco cartel’s violent biz model survive El Mencho’s death?’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2026.
38
DEA, ‘The Jalisco New Generation Cartel’, Command & Control: Cartels; ‘Jalisco Cartel New Generation (CJNG)’, InSight Crime, 23 February 2026.
39
‘Jalisco Cartel New Generation (CJNG)’, InSight Crime, 23 February 2026; ‘Who was El Mencho, the former police officer who co-founded an ultraviolent cartel in Mexico?’, The Guardian, 23 February 2026.
40
‘Mexico declares all-out war after rising drug cartel downs military helicopter’, The Guardian, 5 May 2015; ‘‘An atmosphere of terror’: the bloody rise of Mexico’s top cartel’, The Guardian, 2 April 2021; S. Pellegrini and M. F. Arocha, ‘Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)’, ACLED, 14 April 2023; ‘Jalisco Cartel New Generation (CJNG)’, InSight Crime, 23 February 2026; C. Flores, ‘Will Mexico’s Jalisco cartel’s violent biz model survive El Mencho’s death?’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2026; F. Naim, ‘Morocco Helps US Target Global Arms Network Linked to Mexican CJNG Cartel’, Morocco World News, 27 March 2026.
41
P. Asmann, ‘Masacre en Veracruz remata sangriento inicio de 2019 en México’, InSight Crime, 24 April 2019; S. Henkin, ‘Tracking Cartels Infographic Series: The Violent Rise of Cártel de Jalisco Nuevo Generación (CJNG)’, START, June 2020.
42
‘Mexico declares all-out war after rising drug cartel downs military helicopter’, The Guardian, 5 May 2015; ‘Who was El Mencho, the former police officer who co-founded an ultraviolent cartel in Mexico?’, The Guardian, 23 February 2026. See also: C. Flores, ‘Will Mexico’s Jalisco cartel’s violent biz model survive El Mencho’s death?’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2026.
43
See also: S. Pellegrini and M. F. Arocha, ‘Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)’, ACLED, 14 April 2023.
44
DEA, ‘The Jalisco New Generation Cartel’, Command & Control: Cartels; ‘Who was El Mencho, the former police officer who co-founded an ultraviolent cartel in Mexico?’, The Guardian, 23 February 2026.
45
DEA, ‘The Jalisco New Generation Cartel’, Command & Control: Cartels; S. Henkin, ‘Tracking Cartels Infographic Series: The Violent Rise of Cártel de Jalisco Nuevo Generación (CJNG)’, START, June 2020; S. Pellegrini and M. F. Arocha, ‘Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)’, ACLED, 14 April 2023; P. Asmann, ‘What’s Next for Mexico’s CJNG After the Killing of ‘El Mencho’? ‘, InSight Crime, 23 February 2026; C. Flores, ‘Will Mexico’s Jalisco cartel’s violent biz model survive El Mencho’s death?’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2026; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026.
46
‘Sinaloa Cartel’, InSight Crime, 19 May 2025 (updated 19 February 2026).
47
‘Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)’, InSight Crime, 19 September 2025; US Department of the Treasury, ‘Secretary Bessent Orders Sanctions Against Violent Mexican Cartel’, Press release, 17 December 2025.
48
‘Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)’, InSight Crime, 19 September 2025.
49
‘Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)’, InSight Crime, 19 September 2025.
50
C. Dalby, ‘Three Takeaways from the Capture of ‘El Marro’ in Mexico’, InSight Crime, 5 August 2020; ‘Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)’, InSight Crime, 19 September 2025.
51
‘Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)’, InSight Crime, 19 September 2025.
52
‘Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)’, InSight Crime, 19 September 2025.
53
‘Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)’, InSight Crime, 19 September 2025.
54
‘Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)’, InSight Crime, 19 September 2025; US Department of the Treasury, ‘Secretary Bessent Orders Sanctions Against Violent Mexican Cartel’, Press release, 17 December 2025.
55
V. Buschschlüter, ‘Gunmen storm Mexico football pitch and kill at least 11 people’, BBC, 26 January 2026.
56
‘El Cártel de Sinaloa apoyaría con armamento al Santa Rosa de Lima en Guanajuato, revelaron las autoridades’, infobae, 22 September 2020; ‘Detienen en México a persona ligada a masacre en un bar en el centro del país en 2024’, SwissInfo, 22 August 2025; ‘Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)’, InSight Crime, 19 September 2025; US Department of the Treasury, ‘Secretary Bessent Orders Sanctions Against Violent Mexican Cartel’, Press release, 17 December 2025.
57
US Presidential Document, Executive Order 14157, Federal Register: The Daily Journal of the United States Government, 20 January 2025; US State Department, ‘Foreign Terrorist Organization Designations of Tren de Aragua, Mara Salvatrucha, Cartel de Sinaloa, Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion, Carteles Unidos, Cartel del Noreste, Cartel del Golfo, and La Nueva Familia Michoacana’, Federal Register: The Daily Journal of the United States Government, 2 February 2025.
58
‘Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)’, InSight Crime, 19 September 2025.
59
US Department of the Treasury, ‘Secretary Bessent Orders Sanctions Against Violent Mexican Cartel’, Press release, 17 December 2025.
60
‘5 CJNG Hotspots to Watch After El Mencho’s Killing in Mexico’, InSight Crime, 24 February 2026.
61
P. Asmann and V. Dittmar, ‘The New Rules of Engagement in Sinaloa’s Latest Crime Wars’, InSight Crime, 21 April 2025; ‘Sinaloa Cartel’, InSight Crime, 19 May 2025 (updated 19 February 2026); C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026.
62
Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Peace Index 2025, p. 20; ‘Mayiza’, InSight Crime, 27 May 2025; P. Asmann and V. Dittmar, ‘The New Rules of Engagement in Sinaloa’s Latest Crime Wars’, InSight Crime, 21 April 2025; International Crisi Group, Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Mexico, February 2026; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026.
63
P. Asmann and V. Dittmar, ‘The New Rules of Engagement in Sinaloa’s Latest Crime Wars’, InSight Crime, 21 April 2025.
64
. C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026. As observed by the authors, Mexico has been criticized in the past by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) for over-relying on military deployments instead of civilian police operations for public security. See: IACHR, Case of Alvarado Espinoza et al. v. Mexico, Judgment, 28 November 2018.
65
S. Pellegrini, ‘Mexico: El Mencho’s killing triggers nationwide escalation — Expert comment’, ACLED, 23 February 2026.
66
S. Collinson, ‘A cartel crackdown carries political risks for Trump’, CNN Politics, 24 February 2026; V. Buschschlüter, ‘Gunmen storm Mexico football pitch and kill at least 11 people’, BBC, 26 January 2026.
67
V. Buschschlüter, ‘Gunmen storm Mexico football pitch and kill at least 11 people’, BBC, 26 January 2026.
68
F. Naim, ‘Morocco Helps US Target Global Arms Network Linked to Mexican CJNG Cartel’, Morocco World News, 27 March 2026.
69
C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026.
70
‘Key events in Mexican operation to capture cartel leader ‘El Mencho’’, Reuters, 23 February 2026; ‘El Mencho: Mexico officials say 25 soldiers killed after cartel raid’, Al Jazeera, 23 February 2026.
71
C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026.
72
ICTY, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995, para 70; ICTY, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, Trial Chamber, Judgment, Case No IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997, para 562.
73
For a summary, see ICTY, Prosecutor v Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski, Trial Chamber, Judgment, Case No IT-04-82-T, 10 July 2008, para 177.
74
For a summary, see ICTY, Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj and others, Trial Chamber, Judgment, Case No IT-04-84-T, 3 April 2008, para 60.
75
ICTY, Prosecutor v Fatmir Limaj et al., Judgment (Trial Chamber) (Case No. IT-03-66-T), 30 November 2005, para 170.]
76
C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026.
77
M. F. Arocha and S. Pellegrini, ‘How the Sinaloa Cartel rift is redrawing Mexico’s criminal map’, ACLED, 7 May 2025; ‘Sinaloa Cartel’, InSight Crime, 19 May 2025 (updated 19 February 2026).
78
M. F. Arocha and S. Pellegrini, ‘How the Sinaloa Cartel rift is redrawing Mexico’s criminal map’, ACLED, 7 May 2025; ‘Sinaloa Cartel’, InSight Crime, 19 May 2025 (updated 19 February 2026).
79
J. P. Sullivan, ‘Crime wars: Operational perspectives on criminal armed groups in Mexico and Brazil’, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 923 (June 2023), p 856.
80
‘Sinaloa Cartel’, InSight Crime, 19 May 2025 (updated 19 February 2026); ‘Chapitos’, InSight Crime, 19 May 2025; ‘Mayiza’, InSight Crime, 27 May 2025.
81
‘Mayiza’, InSight Crime, 27 May 2025.
82
M. F. Arocha and S. Pellegrini, ‘How the Sinaloa Cartel rift is redrawing Mexico’s criminal map’, ACLED, 7 May 2025; ‘Chapitos’, InSight Crime, 19 May 2025.
83
M. F. Arocha and S. Pellegrini, ‘How the Sinaloa Cartel rift is redrawing Mexico’s criminal map’, ACLED, 7 May 2025.
84
M. F. Arocha and S. Pellegrini, ‘How the Sinaloa Cartel rift is redrawing Mexico’s criminal map’, ACLED, 7 May 2025.
85
M. F. Arocha and S. Pellegrini, ‘How the Sinaloa Cartel rift is redrawing Mexico’s criminal map’, ACLED, 7 May 2025.
86
M. F. Arocha and S. Pellegrini, ‘How the Sinaloa Cartel rift is redrawing Mexico’s criminal map’, ACLED, 7 May 2025.
87
M. F. Arocha and S. Pellegrini, ‘How the Sinaloa Cartel rift is redrawing Mexico’s criminal map’, ACLED, 7 May 2025.
88
P. Asmann and V. Dittmar, ‘The New Rules of Engagement in Sinaloa’s Latest Crime Wars’, InSight Crime, 21 April 2025; ‘Special Series: The Sinaloa Cartel’s Internal War’, InSight Crime; International Crisi Group, Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Mexico, February 2026.
89
M. F. Arocha and S. Pellegrini, ‘How the Sinaloa Cartel rift is redrawing Mexico’s criminal map’, ACLED, 7 May 2025.
90
US Department of State, ‘Designation of International Cartels’, Fact sheet, 20 February 2025; US Department of State, Executive Order 13224, 20 February 2025.
91
J. P. Sullivan, ‘Crime wars: Operational perspectives on criminal armed groups in Mexico and Brazil’, International review of the Red Cross, No. 923, June 2023, pp 856 and 866.

Mexico

Reporting period: 2023 - 2026

Overview

Historical background

Kingpin Strategy and Resulting Fragmentation and Spike in Violence

Militarization of Mexican Criminal Landscape

Sinaloa Cartel

Jalisco Cartel New Generation (CJNG)

Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)

Rising Tensions between the CJNG and the CSRL

Key developments (between 2023 and 2026)

Continued fighting between the CJNG and the CSRL

Escalating violence within Sinaloa Cartel

Intensification of security operations against cartels

Neutralization of the CJNG’s leader

Legal Classification

Non-International Armed Conflicts

Organization

Intensity

Organization

Intensity

Below threshold situation: internal division within Sinaloa Cartel

Organization

Intensity

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

Non-State parties

Other Main actors

Other Non-State Actors