Moldova - Russian Federation

Transdniestria claimed by Moldova, remained occupied by Russia.

The law of occupation applies to the belligerent occupation of Moldovan territory by Russia. The law of military occupation is set out in Hague Convention IV of 1907 and the annexed Regulations; Geneva Convention IV of 1949; and Additional Protocol I of 1977. Moldova and Russia are parties to the Geneva Conventions, but only Moldova is party to the Additional Protocol I. Customary international humanitarian law (IHL) also applies to an occupation complementing treaty law and binding all the parties.

Transdniestria (also called Transnistria) is a narrow strip of land within the internationally recognized borders of Moldova in Eastern Europe. This narrow strip of land is nestled between the Dniester river and Ukraine and is part of sovereign Moldovan territory. Moldova is made up of two regions. The eastern part of the State, Bessarabia, mainly comprises ethnic Romanians, while in Transdniestria in the west most of the population is Slavic.¹ In 1989, during the lead-up to the fall of the Soviet Union, tensions ran high in Transdniestria when Moldova adopted a controversial language law making Moldovan its official language instead of Russian.² Transdniestria broke away from Moldova on 2 September 1990,³ but does not enjoy recognition by the international community.⁴ Before announcing its independence, fighting broke out in November 1990 between the Moldovan Armed Forces and Transdniestrian separatists.⁵ Fighting escalated when Transdniestria’s paramilitary forces seized Moldovan public institutions in 1991.⁶ During this period the Russian Armed Forces became involved in the conflict.

Following Moldova’s declaration of independence on 27 August 1991,⁷ the Soviet Union’s Fourteenth Army remained in the Transdniestrian part of Moldovan territory,⁸ joining the separatists in their conflict against the Moldovan Armed Forces.⁹ The conflict peaked in June 1992 with the battle of Dniester in which between 700 and 1,000 people were killed,¹⁰ and 3,500 were wounded.¹¹ The Yeltsin-Snegur ceasefire agreement¹² was signed in July 1992 after the battle of Dniester to officially end the conflict.¹³ This agreement created the Joint Control Commission and a Russian-led peacekeeping mission.¹⁴

On several occasions, Russia committed, at international level, to withdraw its forces from Transdniestria. The 1994 bilateral agreement¹⁵ was reaffirmed at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit;¹⁶ in 2003, the Russian Draft Memorandum on the Basic Principles of the State Structure of a United State in Moldova (also referred to as the Kozak Memorandum) was issued;¹⁷ while 2005 saw the 5+2 diplomatic negotiation platform.¹⁸ Russia is yet to honor any of these commitments.¹⁹ In 2020, President Vladimir Putin expressly rejected the Kozak Memorandum, blaming Western intervention for the situation.²⁰ The 5+2 format negotiations became defunct in 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine, as both Russia and Ukraine were participants in the process.²¹

Russian soldiers remained on this strip of Moldovan territory throughout the reporting period.²²

Parliamentary elections

In September 2025, Moldova held their parliamentary elections. These elections were described as potentially determining the fate of Moldova’s accession bid into the EU.⁴⁶ Leading up to the elections there were allegations of electoral fraud, with police discovering 200 ballots already stamped in a printing house in the capital. All had the stamp ‘voted’ on the ‘Alternativa’ block.⁴⁷ Alternativa in this instance refers to Blocul Politic Alternativa, a political alliance which describes itself as having been formed by forces united in their belief that Moldova needs a new direction.⁴⁸ According to Ion Ceban, the leader of the political party, the ballots were just models for the electoral campaign.⁴⁹ In another incident, Prime Minister Dorin Recean reported that a massive cyberattack had targeted the structure related to Moldova’s electoral process with around 4,000 websites being brought down. However, the attacks were detected and neutralized before they could affect the electoral process.⁵⁰ Bomb alerts were reported at several polling stations in the diaspora, which the Moldovan authorities denounced as part of Russia’s assault on the electoral process in Moldova.⁵¹

Russian-controlled outlets have been accused of being the foundation of a global media and proxy propaganda infrastructure intended to disrupt the electoral process.⁵² The United Kingdom announced that it would sanction the Evrazia organization for Russian interference in Moldovan elections.⁵³

The pro-European party, Action and Solidarity, won the elections, capturing 50.2 per cent of the vote, winning 55 out of 101 seats, and securing a single party majority aligned with the Moldovan President and Prime Minister.⁵⁴ The victory has been described as a litmus test in Moldova where Russian interference and disinformation campaigns had sought to prevent the country from joining the European mainstream.⁵⁵

Transdniestria elections

Transdniestria held its parliamentary elections on 30 November 2025. These elections served to fill all thirty-three seats in the Supreme Council.⁵⁶ These elections identify potential presidential candidates in Transdniestria.⁵⁷ Voter turnout was disappointing as only 26 per cent of voters – 102,600 of 394,000 – participated. A preliminary list of the thirty-three elected deputies was published; all elected officials belong to the ‘Renewal’ party. Detailed voting results by district were not made available.⁵⁸

International armed conflict between Moldova and Russia – War WATCH

Approximately 1,500 Russian soldiers remain in the Transdniestria region of Moldova.¹ This is despite Moldova not consenting to this and the State’s repeated requests for Russia to withdraw its soldiers from Moldova’s sovereign territory.² In October 2022, Moldova was once again asked Russia to withdraw its soldiers from Transdniestria.³

In January 2025, Moldova’s prime minister said that a lasting solution to the energy crisis in Transdniestria hinged on Russia withdrawing its troops from Transdniestria.⁴ In July 2025, European leaders called for the ‘full’ and ‘immediate’ withdrawal of all Russian military personnel and ammunition from the Transdniestrian region of Moldova, reaffirming their commitment to supporting Moldova’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and its continued path towards EU membership.⁵ In December 2025, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europea (OSCE) Chairperson in Office, Finland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Elina Valtonene, urged Russia to immediately and unconditionally withdraw its troops and weapons from Transdniestria.⁶

Under IHL, a situation of occupation exists if the territory is ‘under the authority of the hostile army’, even in the absence of resistance.⁷ The hostile foreign forces must exercise effective control over a territory without the consent of the sovereign State.⁸ The nature of ‘effective control’ in the context of occupation is further elaborated in legal doctrine and interpretations, which establish three cumulative conditions for occupation:⁹

The foreign state’s armed forces are physically present in the territory or parts of the territory of the territorial state without its consent.
The presence of the foreign forces prevents the effective local government in place at the time of invasion from substantially or completely exercising its powers.
The foreign forces are able to establish their own authority.

In Moldova, Russian Armed Forces, without Moldovan consent, remain present on sovereign Moldovan territory.¹⁰ Russia’s Fourteenth Army never withdrew from Transdniestria,¹¹ although Moldova has repeatedly called on Russia to withdraw its armed forces and weaponry from Moldovan territory.¹² In sum, Russia’s continued military presence in Transdniestria without Moldova’s consent fulfils the first requirement of occupation as demanded by IHL.

There have been reports of Russia attempting to consolidate their military presence in the region with The Moscow Times reporting in June 2025 that Russia was planning to deploy 10,000 more troops to the Moldovan breakaway region.¹³ This was in reference to statements by Moldova’s Prime Minister to the Financial Times, citing intelligence assessments.¹⁴

The second requirement for effective control necessitates that ‘the effective local government in place at the time of the invasion has been or can be rendered substantially or completely incapable of exerting its powers by virtue of the foreign forces’ unconsented-to presence’.¹⁵ Moldova is incapable of exercising control over Transdniestria. The self-proclaimed ‘Moldovan Republic of Transnistria’ administers and acts as the de facto authority of Transdniestria. Indeed, the Moldovan Republic of Transnistria has its own de facto constitutional regime, de facto courts, and de facto authorities akin to police and armed forces.¹⁶ Transdniestria has its own government, parliament, constitution, flag, and national anthem.¹⁷ Moldova has not been able to exercise any authority over Transdniestria.¹⁸ Hence the second condition for occupation under IHL is fulfilled.

The third requirement to qualify a situation as an occupation under IHL entails that ‘the foreign forces are in a position to exercise authority over the territory concerned (or parts thereof) in lieu of the local government.¹⁹ It is required that the foreign forces are in a position to exercise authority but it is not demanded that the foreign forces do exercise such authority. Russia has the ability to exercise authority in Transdniestria owing to its continued military presence. The European Court of Human Rights has recognized that the Russian Federation exercises de facto jurisdiction over Transdniestria as its regime would not be able to survive without the continued military, economic and political support of Russia.²⁰

The Council of Europe has qualified the Transdniestrian situation as a Russian occupation of Moldova.²¹ The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova drew a similar conclusion.²²

1
ECtHR, ‘Case of Lypovchenko and Halabudenco v the Republic of Moldova And Russia’, Judgment, 20 February 2024, para 57; ‘European Parliament resolution of 5 May 2022 on the state of play of EU-Moldova cooperation (2022/2651(RSP))’, European Union, 2022, para F; ‘From Warnings to Warfare: Russia’s Hybrid Offensive Against Moldova’s Westward Turn”’, Robert Lansing Institute, 13 October 2025.
2
UNGA, ‘Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 22 June 2019’, UN Doc A/RES/72/282, 26 June 2018, preambular paras 1 and 7; ‘Russia Seeks to Deploy 10K More Troops to Moldovan Breakaway Region, PM Says’, The Moscow Times, 4 June 2025.
3
J. Pleschberger, ‘Moldova urges Russia to withdraw troops from Transnistria’, CTGN, 28 October 2022.
4
‘Moldova PM Says Russia Troops Must Leave Transnistria to Solve Crisis’, Kyiv Post, 22 January 2025.
5
‘EU Calls for withdrawal of Russian forces from Transnistria’, Kuwait News Agency, 4 July 2025.
6
‘OSCE Chair Calls on Russia to Withdraw Troops from Transnistria’, Mezha, 4 December 2025.
7
‘Article 42 of Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases.
8
T. Ferraro and L. Cameron, ‘Article 2: Application of the Convention’, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2016, para 302.
9
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11-12; T. Ferraro ‘Determining the Beginning and End of an Occupation Under International Humanitarian Law’, International Review of the Red Cross, 2012
10
UNGA, ‘Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 22 June 2019’, UN Doc A/RES/72/282, 26 June 2018, preambular para 6 and operative para 1; A. Ali, ‘Transnistria: Russia’s Sleeper Front’, European Relations, 6 August 2025.
11
‘Transnistria profile’, BBC News, 25 October 2024
12
UNGA, ‘Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 22 June 2019’, UN Doc A/RES/72/282, 26 June 2018, preambular para 7; ‘Russia Seeks to Deploy 10K More Troops to Moldovan Breakaway Region, PM Says’, The Moscow Times, 4 June 2025.
13
‘Russia Seeks to Deploy 10K More Troops to Moldovan Breakaway Region, PM Says’, The Moscow Times, 4 June 2025.
14
H. Foy and P. Ivanova, ‘Russia wants to deploy 10,000 troops in Moldovan breakaway regio, PM warns’, Financial Times, 4 June 2025; ‘Lecartev: Russia plans for major troop buildup in Transnistria’, Ukrainian World Congress, 6 June 2025.
15
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11.
16
ECtHR, ‘Case of Lypovchenko and Halabudenco v the Republic of Moldova And Russia’, Judgment, 20 February 2024, paras 2, 12, 14, and 57.
17
‘Transnistria profile’, BBC News, 25 October 2024.
18
ECtHR, ‘Case of Lypovchenko and Halabudenco v the Republic of Moldova And Russia’, Judgment, 20 February 2024, para 55.
19
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee for the Red Cross, 2024, 11.
20
Republic of Moldova Constitutional Court, ‘Judgment on the Interpretation of Article 11 of the Constitution (Permanent Neutrality)’, 2 May 2017, para 132; ECtHR, ‘Case of Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia’, Judgment, 8 July 2004, paras 222 and 392; ECtHR, ‘Case of Ivanţoc and Others v Moldova and Russia’, Judgment, 15 November 2011, para 101; ECtHR, ‘Case of Catan and Others v Moldova and Russia’, Judgment, Grand Chamber, 19 October 2012, paras 122 – 123.
21
‘Consequences of the Russian Federations Aggression against Ukraine, Opinion 300 (2022)’, Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 15 March 2022, para 5.
22
Republic of Moldova Constitutional Court, ‘Judgment on the Interpretation of Article 11 of the Constitution (Permanent Neutrality)’, 2 May 2017, para 134.

State

Moldova
Russia

1
‘Constitutional History of Moldova’, Constitution.Net.
2
‘Transnistria profile’, BBC News, 25 October 2024; A. Ali, ‘Transnistria: Russia’s Sleeper Front’, European Relations, 6 August 2025.
3
A. Ali, ‘Transnistria: Russia’s Sleeper Front’, European Relations, 6 August 2025
4
‘Transnistria profile’, BBC News, 25 October 2024; ‘Transnistria’, DW.
5
‘The war in Transnistria’, BBC.
6
‘Transnistria profile’, BBC News, 25 October 2024; ‘Moldova Marks 30 Years Since War with Russia-Backed Transnistria Rebels’, Balkan Insight, 2 March 2022.
7
‘Transnistria – Life in a Russian Bear Hug’, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
8
ECtHR, ‘Case of Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia’, Judgment, 8 July 2004, paras 32 – 35
9
K. Verseck, ‘Breakaway Transnistria is Russia’s stronghold in Moldova’, DW, 28 September 2025; ‘Breakaway Moldovan Region Of Transdniester Celebrates 30 Years Of ‘Independence’’, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 2 September 2020.
10
A. Felcher, ‘The 1990–92 Armed Conflict at the Dniester River: Continuous Memory Confrontation’, Cultures of History Forums, 19 September 2022; ‘Transnistria profile’, BBC News, 25 October 2024; ‘Moldova Marks 30 Years Since War with Russia-Backed Transnistria Rebels’, Balkan Insight, 2 March 2022
11
V. Roşa, ‘The Transnistrian Conflict: 30 Years Searching for a Settlement’, Utrikespolitiska Institutet, October 2021.
12
K. Harrington, ‘Moldova Marks 30 Years Since Ceasefire Ended War on Costly Terms’, Balkan Insight, 21 July 2022
13
‘Moldova and Transnistria: Thawing the Frozen Conflict?’, Spheres of Influence, 21 November 2023.
14
K. Harrington, ‘Moldova Marks 30 Years Since Ceasefire Ended War on Costly Terms’, Balkan Insight, 21 July 2022.
15
‘Written Declaration No. 243 on the 14th Russian Army’s withdrawal from Transnistria’, Council of Europe, 12 July 1995
16
‘Lisbon Document 1996’, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1996
17
‘Russian Draft Memorandum on the basic principles of the state structure of a united state in Moldova, 17 November 2003’, Eurac Research
18
‘Annex 3 to the Commission Implementing Decision on the ENI East Regional Action Programme for 2019, Part 2, including some actions to be carried out in 2020, to be financed from the general budget of the European Union’, European Union; ‘Memorandum: Meeting of Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Dmitri Medvedev on 4 – 5 June 2010 in Meseberg’, Die Bundesregierung; L. S. Râncioagă, ‘Recent Evolutions in the Political Environment in Transnistria’, Revista de Ştiinţe Politice, 2012.
19
S. Korshak, ‘Explained: Russian Troops, Pro-Russian Forces in Moldovan ‘Separatist’ Transnistria Region’, Kyiv Post, 25 September 2025.
20
W. H. Hill, ‘Putin on Moldova: What Can We Still Learn from a 2003 Failure?’, Wilson Center, 15 January 2021.
21
‘Krasnoselski se plânge iarăși pe Moldova: Criza energetică a răcit relațiile’, Timpul, 18 November 2022.
22
A. Ali, ‘Transnistria: Russia’s Sleeper Front’, European Relations, 6 August 2025; M. Lelich and L. Oleniak, ‘Ukraine’s Ambassador to Moldova reveals number of Russian soldiers in Transnistria’, RBC-Ukraine, 28 October 2025; K. Verseck, ‘Breakaway Transnistria is Russia’s stronghold in Moldova’, DW, 28 September 2025.
23
C. Belton, ‘Russia’s security service works to subvert Moldova’s pro-Western government’, The Washington Post, 28 October 2022; K. Zakharchenko, ‘Russia Could Invade Moldova in Days If Ukraine Weakens – Ex-Moldovan Spy Chief’, Kyiv Post, 22 April 2025; ‘Russia Seeks to Deploy 10K More Troops to Moldovan Breakaway Region, PM Says’, The Moscow Times, 4 June 2025.
24
‘Russia ramping up operations in Moldova’s breakaway Transnistria region’, The New Voice of Ukraine, 10 December 2025; K. Zakharchenko, ‘Russia Could Invade Moldova in Days If Ukraine Weakens – Ex-Moldovan Spy Chief’, Kyiv Post, 22 April 2025.
25
M. Sharipzhan, et al, ‘EU Monitoring Threats To Moldova’s Elections Amid Alleged Russian Plot To Train Provocateurs In Serbia’, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 25 September 2025; ‘Moldova detains 74 people over alleged Russia-backed plot before elections’, Al Jazeera, 22 September 2025.
26
‘Military Strategy 2025–2035 approved by Government’, Government of the Republic of Moldova, 8 October 2025
27
‘Russia named top security threat in Moldova’s military strategy’, Russian News Agency, 8 October 2025.
28
M. Gridina, ‘Kremlin Warns Moldova Could “Share Ukraine’s Fate” After New Military Strategy Designates Russia as Main Threat’, Moldova Live, 13 October 2025.
29
‘Russia boosts activity in Transnistria to divert Ukraine’s resources and strengthen military presence’, The Odessa Journal, 10 December 2025; ‘Russia ramping up operations in Moldova’s breakaway Transnistria region’, The New Voice of Ukraine, 10 December 2025.
30
‘No Russian buildup seen in Transnistria, border agency says’, The New Voice of Ukraine, 14 December 2025.
31
S. Ciochina, ‘Moldovans in Transnistria adjust to life without Russian gas’, DW, 1 October 2025; T. Zadorozhnyy, ‘Transnistria again declares economic emergency over Russian gas cut’, The Kyiv Independent, 11 June 2025; ‘Russian gas shutdown forces closure of almost all industry in Transnistria’, The Guardian, 2 January 2025.
32
V. Solovyov, ‘The Gas Man Cometh: Moscow risks losing Transnistria by creating energy problems for Moldova’, The Insider, 27 January 2025.
33
E. Grynszpan, ‘Russia cuts Transnistria’s gas supply to destabilize Moldova’, Le Monde, 12 January 2025; T. Zadorozhnyy, ‘Transnistria again declares economic emergency over Russian gas cut’, The Kyiv Independent, 11 June 2025; ‘Russian gas flow to Europe via Ukraine stopped: Who does it hurt?’, Al Jazeera, 1 January 2025; M. Ohanjanyan, ‘Unfreezing Transnistria?’, Clingendael, 12 March 2025.
34
‘Statement: “If Russia halts gas deliveries to the Transnistrian region, we can discuss reintegrating the area into the country”’, Moldova 1, 16 December 2025.
35
‘Statement: “If Russia halts gas deliveries to the Transnistrian region, we can discuss reintegrating the area into the country”’, Moldova 1, 16 December 2025.
36
‘Moldova expels three Russian diplomats, Moscow promises to retaliate’, Al Jazeera, 31 March 2025; ‘Moldova says Russia helped pro-Moscow MP flee long jail sentence’,CNN, 31 March 2025.
37
‘Moldova’, European Commission. In June 2022, it was granted EU candidate country status.‘European Council conclusions on Ukraine, the membership applications of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, Western Balkans and external relations, 23 June 2022’, European Council, 23 June 2022.
38
‘Moldova’, European Commission.
39
Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, ‘EU opens accession negotiations with Moldova’, European Commission, 25 June 2024.
40
‘The European Parliament adopted the resolution supporting Moldova’s accession to the EU’, Government of the Republic of Moldova, 10 September 2025
41
Directorate-General for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood, ‘Moldova successfully completes its screening process’, European Commission, 22 September 2025.
42
P. Kirby, ‘Pro-EU leader wins Moldova election despite alleged Russian meddling’, BBC, 4 November 2024.
43
‘Moldova formally protests alleged Russian election meddling’, Al Jazeera, 12 November 2024; T. Lister and K. Gak, ‘Moldova’s election delivers lessons to Europe on countering Russian interference’, CNN, 30 September 2025.
44
P. Kirby, ‘Pro-EU leader wins Moldova election despite alleged Russian meddling’, BBC, 4 November 2024.
45
‘Moldova formally protests alleged Russian election meddling’, Al Jazeera, 12 November 2024.
46
D. Peleschuk, ‘Moldova faces key parliamentary election, with EU bid at stake’, Reuters, 25 September 2025.
47
C. Donțu and R. Hoară, ‘Poliția din Chișinău a descoperit 200 de buletine de vot care erau deja ștampilate în favoarea blocului Alternativa’, Știrile Pro TV, 24 September 2025.
48
‘About Us’, Blocul Politic Alternativa.
49
C. Donțu and R. Hoară, ‘Poliția din Chișinău a descoperit 200 de buletine de vot care erau deja ștampilate în favoarea blocului Alternativa’, Știrile Pro TV, 24 September 2025.
50
M. Conovali, ‘Promo-LEX: Alegători transportați în coloană cu mașini transnistrene: în unele telefoane „instrucțiuni” de vot’, News Maker, 28 September 2025.
51
I. Soltan, ‘Alertă cu bombă la mai multe secții de votare din străinătate. MAE: Avem scenariul sub control’, Agora, 28 September 2025.
52
A. Hansen, ‘How Russia tried to manipulate Moldova’s election – and what it reveals’, The Interpreter, 27 November 2025.
53
‘UK sanctions pro-Russian group over alleged Moldova vote interference’, Al Jazeera, 2 April 2025; T. Lister and K. Gak, ‘Moldova’s election delivers lessons to Europe on countering Russian interference’, CNN, 30 September 2025.
54
T. Akhvlediani, ‘In Moldova’s election, the line held and a mandate was won – but the hard work is only just beginning’, Center for European Policy Studies, 1 October 2025.
55
T. Lister and K. Gak, ‘Moldova’s election delivers lessons to Europe on countering Russian interference’, CNN, 30 September 2025.
56
A. Выприцких, ‘В Приднестровье началось досрочное голосование на выборах в местный парламент’, News Maker, 24 November 2024.
57
A. Dirun, ‘Parliamentary Elections in Transnistria: Internal and External Dynamics, Including Rising Tensions with Moldova and the Influence of Russia’, Tartu Ülikool, 27 November 2025.
58
‘Foreign Intelligence Service: Transnistria “elections” mark record low turnout, complete control by Sheriff-linked party’, The Odessa Journal, 2 December 2025.

Moldova – Russian Federation

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (between 2023 and 2025)

Heightened security tension between Moldova and Russia

Russia cut off all gas exports to Moldova

Moldova expels Russian diplomats

Moldova’s road to European Union Membership

Moldova’s elections

Transdniestria elections

International Armed Conflict

Parties to the Conflict

State