Morocco - Western Sahara

An international armed conflict (IAC) was occurring in Western Sahara during the reporting period. The conflict occurs both through alien occupation of the territory of Western Sahara and in the hostilities between Morocco and the Polisario Front. The Polisario Front, which is fighting for the right of Sahrawis to self-determination, is recognized as a national liberation movement by the United Nations (UN).¹ Morocco continues to occupy around eighty per cent of the territory of Western Sahara, including the areas between the Atlantic coast and the system of sand fortifications known as the ‘Berm’ that Morocco built.² A twenty-nine-year ceasefire that had been in place between Morocco and the Polisario Front since 1991 came to an end in November 2020. Since then, the two parties have conducted low-intensity attacks against each other, including during the reporting period.

The law of occupation has applied since Morocco entered Western Sahara in 1975 and progressively placed large swathes of the territory under its authority. This includes the customary law rules on occupation reflected in the Regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV of 1907³ (to which Morocco is not a party).⁴ Moreover, as a result of the unilateral declaration made by the Polisario Front under the terms of Additional Protocol I of 1977 and accepted by the Swiss Federal Council, both Geneva Convention IV of 1949⁵ and the Additional Protocol⁶ applied as of June 2015 to the conflict with Morocco, which became recognized as an IAC.

Western Sahara is a non-self-governing territory in north-western Africa that faces the Atlantic Ocean. It is bordered by Morocco to the north, Algeria to the east, and Mauritania to the east and south, with the Spanish Canary Islands off its western coast.⁷ This 266,000km² remote piece of the Sahara desert, which became a Spanish protectorate in 1884, was named Spanish Sahara in 1934.⁸ In 1963, the UN inscribed the Spanish Sahara on the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories under Chapter XI of the United Nations (UN) Charter,⁹ bringing the area within the purview of the decolonization process enshrined in the UN’s Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.¹⁰ Even though resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly in the following years recognized the inalienable right of the people of Spanish Sahara to self-determination, Spain (as the Administering Power) did not expedite the decolonization process.¹¹ Additionally, Western Sahara’s neighbouring States, Mauritania and Morocco, asserted their sovereign rights over the territory.¹² To counter the presence of foreign forces and win independence for the region, a political-military group formed on 10 May 1973 named Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro(Frente Polisario, or Polisario Front) from the two historic regions making up Western Sahara and largely composed of the indigenous nomadic inhabitants called Sahrawi.¹³

In 1974, the UN General Assembly submitted a request to the International Court of Justice to a deliver an Advisory Opinion answering two questions – first, whether Western Sahara was terra nullius at the time of Spanish colonization (specifically from 1884) and second, should the first question be answered in the negative, what the legal ties were between the territory of Western Sahara and Morocco and Mauritania.¹⁴ In delivering its judgement on 16 October 1975, the Court found that Western Sahara was not uninhabited in 1884 [para 83] and that, while there were legal ties between the people living in Western Sahara and Morocco and Mauritania at the time of Spanish colonization, these States had no ties of territorial sovereignty over Western Sahara.¹⁵ In the same resolution calling on the Court to delivery an Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara, the UN General Assembly requested the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to send a visiting mission to Western Sahara.¹⁶ This mission took place between May and June 1975 and found that the people of the territory, the Sahrawi, supported the Polisario Front and wanted an independent State.¹⁷

On 28 October 1975, as a response to the ICJ’s ruling, King Hassan II of Morocco called on Moroccan volunteers to ‘reclaim’ Western Sahara.¹⁸ On 6 November 1975, between 200,000 and 350,000 volunteers moved towards and into Western Sahara, which was, at the time, still under Spanish colonial control.¹⁹ This march was known as the Green March because of the religious importance of the colour green.²⁰ By 9 November 1975, the volunteers had pushed ten kilometres into Western Sahara but retreated after King Hassan II called on them to do so.²¹ Facing pressure from the United Nations to complete the decolonization process, Spain opted to relinquish territorial control of Western Sahara in November 1975.²² On 14 November 1975, Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania signed the Declaration of Principles on Western Sahara (the Madrid Accords) in which Spain withdrew from Western Sahara and the three States agreed to institute temporary control of the territory between Morocco, Mauritania, and the Yema’a (also spelled Jemaâ) – the representatives of the Western Saharan population.²³

While Spain only fully withdrew in February 1976 almost immediately after the signing the Accords, Morocco and Mauritania occupied Western Sahara,²⁴ with Morocco taking two thirds of the northern part of Western Sahara and Mauritania taking the remaining third in the south.²⁵ The Polisario Front rejected the Madrid Accords on 15 November 1975,²⁶ and in 1976, the group declared the establishment of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR),²⁷ with its government in exile in Algeria.²⁸

In November 1975, Morocco’s military advanced into Western Sahara, having moved 100 kilometres into the latter’s territory by 28 November.²⁹ By 11 December, Morocco had gained more territory while Mauritania also managed to occupy some towns.³⁰ While initially on the backfoot, the Sahrawi people and particularly the Polisario Front retaliated against and violently rejected the Moroccan and Mauritanian occupations.³¹ Mauritania was the weaker of the two occupying States, both militarily and economically and, as such, the Polisario Front concentrated their initial efforts on their forces.³² This paid off when, in 1979, Mauritania signed a secret peace agreement with the Polisario Front, withdrawing its troops from and revoking all territorial claims to Western Sahara.³³

Following Mauritania’s withdrawal, Morocco claimed the territory Mauritania had relinquished thus gaining control of around eighty per cent of the territory,³⁴ entrenching its hold over the coastal areas and building a system of sand barriers – the Berm – to prevent enemy incursions. This left the Polisario Front and Sahrawi communities confined to a strip of land along the eastern border of the territory and to refugee camps in Algeria. Morocco and the Polisario Front continued to fight into the 1980s, engaging in UN-led peace talks in the latter half of the decade which eventually came to fruition in 1991 when the two sides signed a ceasefire.³⁵

In addition to agreeing to stop hostilities, the ceasefire agreement also stated that a ‘fair and impartial referendum, without military or administrative constraints’ was to take place in Western Sahara to allow the Sahrawi people to exercise their right to self-determination.³⁶ The referendum was to be conducted by the United Nations in cooperation with what was then the Organization of African States (OAU).³⁷ The referendum was to determine whether the Sahrawi people wanted independence or to integrate into Morocco.³⁸ In order to carry out this referendum, the UN Security Council established the UN Mission for the Referendum on Western Sahara (MINURSO) in April 1991.³⁹

The referendum was set to take place in January 1992 but was delayed due to fundamental disagreements between Morocco and the Polisario Front on, among other issues, the identification of voters, the appeals process, and the repatriation of refugees.⁴⁰ A 2003 plan for the referendum, proposed by former UN special envoy to the question of Western Sahara ,James Baker, was rejected by both Morocco and the Polisario Front.⁴¹ For Morocco, the issue is the independence of Western Sahara⁴² while for the Polisario Front the finer details of who was eligible to vote and how long the transitional period would be was of concern.⁴³ Faced with a stalemate, the United Nations asked the parties to formulate their own proposals on settling the conflict.⁴⁴

Morocco proposed a plan that would guarantee to the people of Western Sahara autonomy and ‘a privileged position and … a leading role in the bodies and institutions of the region’ but does not recognize the right of the SADR to independence.⁴⁵ The Polisario Front’s vision for the territory was ‘a genuine referendum on self-determination in Western Sahara in strict conformity with the spirit and letter of the UN General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) [with] the choice between independence, integration into the Kingdom of Morocco, and self-governance’.⁴⁶ Several rounds of direct talks between Morocco and the Polisario Front together with Algeria and Mauritania were mediated by the Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Western Sahara between 2007 and 2010, but did not reach an agreement on the substantive issues.⁴⁷ Despite this, the ceasefire held.

On 20 October 2020, pro-Polisario protesters, reportedly helped by armed fighters, blocked access to Guerguerat in the UN-administered buffer zone, severing the main land link between Morocco and the rest of Africa.⁴⁸ On 13 November 2020, Morocco launched a military operation in the area to re-open the border crossing, prompting the Polisario Front to declare the end of the 1991 ceasefire. In contrast, Morocco said it remained committed to the ceasefire.⁴⁹ In the following months, however, hostilities between Morocco and the Polisario Front continued. April 2021 marked the first instance where Morocco reportedly used a drone for combat operations in Western Sahara – a means of warfare that it has used more widely since then.⁵⁰

On the diplomatic front, several States announced support for Morocco’s long-standing Autonomy Plan. In December 2020, United States (US) President Donald Trump recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, calling the autonomy plan ‘serious, credible, and realistic’ and ‘the only basis for a just and lasting solution’ to the issue.⁵¹ The United States did this in exchange for Morocco normalizing diplomatic relations with Israel, which had been cut off since 2000 because of Israel’s occupation of Palestine.⁵² Algeria, a long-time supporter of the Polisario Front and the independence of the SADR in the territory of the Western Sahara, criticised the move, calling it a breach of international law and going on to state that the move could not legitimize the Moroccan claim to Western Sahara.⁵³ Weeks later, US Secretary of State Mark Pompeo said that the United States was starting the process of ‘inaugurating a virtual presence post for Western Sahara… to be followed soon by a fully functioning consulate’.⁵⁴ Despite a call from dozens of US senators to reverse the position of the Trump administration,⁵⁵ in 2021 US President Joe Biden decided not to do so.⁵⁶

The US move prompted several Western, Arab, and African States to provide more vocal support for the Moroccan Autonomy Plan which has continued to grow during the reporting period (see below). In March 2022, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez wrote to King Mohammed VI of Morocco saying that Spain considered the Moroccan autonomy initiative as the most serious, realistic, and credible basis to resolve the dispute over Western Sahara.⁵⁷ This position was shared a few months later by the Netherlands.⁵⁸ Other States and international actors, however, maintained a more tepid (if not altogether critical) stance vis-à-vis the Moroccan position. Germany, for instance, criticized US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, leading Morocco to suspend all contact with the German embassy in Rabat;⁵⁹ efforts between the two States to normalize diplomatic relations led the German Foreign Minister to declare that ‘Germany considers … the autonomy plan presented in 2007 as a serious and credible effort by Morocco and as a good basis for a solution agreed upon between both parties’.⁶⁰ In September 2022, however, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights stated in its judgment in Mornah v. Benin that ‘although Morocco has always laid claim on the territory it occupies, its assertion has never been accepted by the international community’, and that ‘the continued occupation of the SADR by Morocco is incompatible with the right to self-determination of the people of SADR as enshrined in Article 20 of the [African] Charter [on Human and Peoples’ Rights]’.⁶¹

Ongoing Hostilities

Although low in intensity and infrequent, there have been ongoing military operations in the context of the ongoing IAC during the reporting period.

In September 2023, the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) reportedly struck Bir Lahlou, a town within Polisario Front territory⁶², killing four people, including a regional military commander of the Polisario Front.⁶³ On the evening of 29 October 2023, the Polisario Front targeted three different neighbourhoods in Smara, located in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, killing one person and injuring three others.⁶⁴ The group carried out further attacks on Smara on 5 November, but no casualties were reported.⁶⁵ In late December 2023, seven rockets were fired close to the MINURSO team in Aousserd, in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara.⁶⁶ The RMA blamed Polisario Front for the attacks.⁶⁷

In what appear to be a series of attacks in later December 2023 and early January 2024, the Polisario Front reported to MINURSO that the RMA had struck the area of Mijek, killing four, wounding one, and destroying three vehicles.⁶⁸ In a similar incident, on either 1 or 2 January 2024, Morocco struck a car that it alleged was carrying four members of the Polisario Front, killing all four passengers.⁶⁹ Morocco alleged they were attempting to carry out terrorist attacks in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara.⁷⁰ Algerian media contested the identity of those killed, claiming that they were actually Mauritanian gold prospectors.⁷¹

The United Nations reported that another strike on the Polisario Front also took place in Bir Lahlou on 6 January, apparently killing three Polisario fighters and injuring a fourth.⁷² The identity of the victims could, however, not be confirmed because the Polisario Front did not grant MINURSO permission to visit the site.⁷³

Also in January 2024, Morocco moved heavy artillery into an area near Bir Gandouz, which is in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara,⁷⁴ but within the UN buffer zone, therefore constituting a violation of the 1991 ceasefire.⁷⁵ The purpose was apparently to prepare for a limited operation against the Polisario Front within the UN buffer zone.⁷⁶ It does not appear that any operations were carried out in this area. In moves again violating the ceasefire, Morocco had set up two military camps in the UN buffer zone near Aousserd by June 2024, justifying their actions to MINURSO as ‘preventative and provisional’ in light of attacks by the Polisario Front.⁷⁷

The rest of 2024 was also marked by sporadic violence. In February, an airstrike reported to MINURSO by the Polisario Front allegedly killed four miners and injured two others, all of whom were from Mali and Mauritania.⁷⁸ During Ramadan, in March and April, the Polisario Front allegedly engaged in four attacks while the RMA allegedly conducted three airstrikes.⁷⁹ The first strike by the RMA allegedly killed two people and injured one, but the Polisario Front denied MINURSO permission to visit the site.⁸⁰ Of the other two strikes, MINURSO found evidence of only one.⁸¹

In May 2024, the Polisario Front again launched an attack on Smara.⁸² Although no casualties were reported, the Polisario Front said it had hit military targets,⁸³ but Morocco called the target area empty and Moroccan media speculated that the attack may have been connected to the Polisario Front’s upcoming anniversary of their armed struggle.⁸⁴ In May and July, three attacks by the Polisario Front landed near MINURSO’s Mahbas site.⁸⁵ In October, the RMA reportedly carried out strikes in Mijek, allegedly killing three gold miners, two Mauritanians and a Sudanese.⁸⁶ On 9 November 2024, the Polisario Front again carried out strikes in the Mahbas region where civilians were celebrating the anniversary of the Green March.⁸⁷ No casualties were reported.⁸⁸ Morocco did, however, respond with drone strikes, reportedly killing Polisario Front fighters.⁸⁹ The group, however, denied that anyone had been killed.⁹⁰

The final attack of the year took place on 28 December when Morocco claimed that it had struck a vehicle carrying both Polisario Front and Algerian personnel in Mridimate region, killing an Algerian officer and leaving several others injured.⁹¹

These strikes were followed up by two of a similar nature in January 2025 when Morocco struck two Polisario vehicles near Bir Lahlou on 11 January, allegedly killing four,⁹² and on 18 January in the Haouza region, which allegedly killed high-level Polisario Front members, including Salamou Mohammed Fadel El Boubari, El-Wafi Mokhtar Ahmida, and Bibo El-Njam.⁹³

Morocco carried out more drone strikes in May 2025, killing a senior commander of the Polisario Front on 12 May.⁹⁴ A second strike on a vehicle on 16 May 2025 in the Kuerziz area killed two Mauritian gold miners.⁹⁵ Moroccan media reported another strike on 29 May which killed an unknown number of people with this site claiming they were Polisario Front members while the Polisario Front claimed the victims were Mauritanian miners.⁹⁶ Another incident of this nature occurred in late June, with some news outlets reporting that Mauritanian miners were struck,⁹⁷ while others claim it was Polisario Front members.⁹⁸ No casualties were reported but three vehicles were damaged.⁹⁹

Earlier in June, RMA strikes hit Algerian trucks, killing three.¹⁰⁰ June also saw Polisario Front attacks on Smara, although no casualties were reported.¹⁰¹ The attack was framed in Moroccan media as a response to moves in the US to declare the group a terrorist organization.¹⁰² Morocco reportedly retaliated and ‘eliminated’ the unit of the Polisario Front that was responsible for the attack.¹⁰³ Morocco reportedly killed six more Polisario front members in late August/early September who were attempting to attack Moroccan positions in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara.¹⁰⁴

A similar incident occurred in mid-November, with the RMA claiming that they struck two armed Polisario Front vehicles that were attempting to launch rockets at Smara.¹⁰⁵ There were reportedly ten casualties, and on social media pro-Polisario supporters allegedly boasted that they had captured seventy-two Moroccan soldiers.¹⁰⁶ Some days before this, on 4 November, Bloomberg reported that Polisario Front had attacked Moroccan military positions in trenches in Mahbes.¹⁰⁷

The Polisario Front’s media site, Sahara Press Service, reported that the Sahrawi People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), the armed forces of the SADR and what may be considered the armed wing of the Polisario Front,¹⁰⁸ carried out attacks on Moroccan soldiers in various places in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara throughout the reporting period, often claiming to have inflicted heavy losses on the RMA both in terms of casualties and equipment damage. These include attacks in July 2023,¹⁰⁹ October 2023,¹¹⁰ December 2023,¹¹¹ and January,¹¹² February,¹¹³ March,¹¹⁴ April, ¹¹⁵ May,¹¹⁶ June,¹¹⁷ July,¹¹⁸ August,¹¹⁹ September,¹²⁰ October,¹²¹ November,¹²² and December 2024,¹²³ and January, ¹²⁴ February,¹²⁵ March,¹²⁶ April,¹²⁷ May,¹²⁸ June,¹²⁹ July,¹³⁰ August,¹³¹ September,¹³² October,¹³³ November,¹³⁴ and December 2025.¹³⁵ These attacks are not always corroborated in Moroccan media or by conflict-tracking bodies/organizations.

UN’s Attempted Revival of Solving the Western Sahara Question

During the reporting period, the United Nations revived its effort to solve the Western Sahara issue, with its envoy conducting several visits to the territory, as well as to Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania.

On 2 July 2023, Staffan de Mistura, the UN envoy for Western Sahara, visited Algeria to discuss advancing the political process on Western Sahara.¹³⁶ In continuing his mission, Mr de Mistura visited Western Sahara on 4 September 2023 for the first time since his appointment in October 2021.¹³⁷ As part of his tour, between 5 and 8 September, Mr de Mistura visited the Moroccan cities of Laayoune, Dakhla, and Rabat, meeting with various Moroccan officials and members of civil society.¹³⁸ Within Morocco there was both support for the independence of Western Sahara as well for Morocco’s autonomy plan.¹³⁹ However, Moroccan officials, who did support the UN-led process, made it clear that the Moroccan position is that the only viable solution was Morocco’s Autonomy Plan in which Morocco would exercise sovereignty over the entire Western Sahara but the people would have their own local administrative, judicial, and parliamentary authorities.¹⁴⁰ On 11 September 2023, the Secretary-General of Polisario Front, Brahim Ghali, met with UN Secretary-General António Guterres at UN Headquarters in New York where the two discussed the importance of advancing the political process, as led by Mr de Mistura, as well as of the stability of the MINURSO presence in Western Sahara.¹⁴¹ Mr Ghali also met with de Mistura on the same day, reiterating Polisario Front’s position that Morocco had breached the ceasefire and that the only way forward on Western Sahara was a referendum which would allow the Sahrawi people to exercise their right to self-determination and independence.¹⁴²

In April 2024, Mr de Mistura met with officials from Morocco, the Polisario Front, and Algeria, with all parties’ positions on the question remaining unchanged – the latter two supporting SADR independence and the former seeking Moroccan sovereignty over an autonomous Western Sahara.¹⁴³ Despite their differences, all three parties expressed support for the de Mistura’s mission.¹⁴⁴ The meetings were in preparation for closed-door consultation at the Security Council, held on 16 April 2024.¹⁴⁵ In another closed-door meeting in October 2024, de Mistura presented three plans to the Security Council.¹⁴⁶ One plan was the Morocco-proposed autonomy plan (see above), one was the Polisario Front’s independence plan, and the third was a plan to partition Western Sahara between Morocco and Polisario Front.¹⁴⁷ The third plan would see an independent State created in the southern part of Western Sahara with the remainder of the territory officially becoming Moroccan.¹⁴⁸ This proposal was not an official UN proposal and was ultimately rejected by both Morocco and the Polisario Front.¹⁴⁹ Morocco maintained its position that ‘the Sahara is Moroccan and an integral part of Moroccan soil’ while Brahim Ghali said that the group would always reject a proposal that did not ‘guarantee the self-determination of the Sahrawi people’.¹⁵⁰ Mr De Mistura declared that should he not be able to make ‘significant progress’ on Western Sahara by April 2025, the UN Secretary-General should consider whether he and MINURSO are still and can be a meaningful part of the process.¹⁵¹ Whether these statements from de Mistura intended to galvanize support for his mission¹⁵² or not, on 31 October 2024, the Security Council expressed its support for Mr de Mistura and his work and further renewed MINURSO’s mandate until 31 October 2025.¹⁵³

In March 2025, one month shy of his own self-imposed April 2025 deadline for him to make progress or offer the UN Secretary-General his resignation, de Mistura started a new round of consultations on Western Sahara.¹⁵⁴ This was in preparation for another closed-door session on the question in the Security Council to be held in mid-April 2025.¹⁵⁵ In these consultations, neither the Polisario Front nor Morocco moved from their long-held positions on Western Sahara.¹⁵⁶ In the 14 April 2025 briefing by de Mistura, he hinted that the US’s recent reiterating of its support for Morocco’s Autonomy Plan and its promises to be involved in achieving ‘a mutually acceptable solution’ among the relevant parties as well the re-establishment of French and Algerian ties, were a sign the UN would make significant progress on the issue that he could present to the Security Council in October.¹⁵⁷ In Moroccan media, Mr de Mistura’s speech was seen as being ‘favourable’ to the Moroccan Autonomy Plan.¹⁵⁸ This is because he called for Morocco to provide more details on the plan in the coming months.¹⁵⁹ Algeria was apparently not pleased with the meeting¹⁶⁰ while the Polisario Front stated that the issue remained on the UN Agenda, ‘despite Moroccan propaganda’,¹⁶¹ in response to news that Morocco sought to have the issue removed from the agenda of the UN Fourth Committee.¹⁶²

State support for Morocco’s Autonomy Plan grew steadily in 2025 (see below). As a result, at its annual meeting on MINURSO’s mandate on 31 October 2025, the Security Council, in addition to extending MINURSO’s mandate for another year, officially backed Morocco’s Autonomy Plan for Western Sahara.¹⁶³ This plan was to be taken as a ‘basis’ for ‘achieving a final and mutually acceptable political solution’ to the Western Sahara issue.¹⁶⁴ The resolution passed with eleven votes, with Russia, China, and Pakistan abstaining, and Algeria refusing to participate.¹⁶⁵

Though supporting Morocco’s autonomy plan, the resolution also states that the plan should allow for the Sahrawi people to exercise their right to self-determination.¹⁶⁶ This is especially considering Morocco’s Autonomy Plan extends Moroccan sovereignty over the territory.¹⁶⁷ Though some saw the resolution as a UN endorsement of Moroccan sovereignty over the territory¹⁶⁸ – Morocco marked the day as a national holiday¹⁶⁹– some States stressed that voting in favour of the resolution did not constitute a recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, with Pakistan and Guyana vowing that any political solution should take into account the self-determination of the Sahrawi people.¹⁷⁰

The Polisario Front interpreted the resolution in a similar matter. In a letter transmitted to the to the Security Council in November 2025, the group stated that a close reading of the resolution did not amount to a recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the territory, nor did it recognize Morocco’s Autonomy Plan as the only basis for further negotiations on the territory.¹⁷¹ The group went on to state that the Security Council very clearly supported a ‘just, lawful, and realistic political solution’ to the issue in which the Sahrawi people were able to exercise the right to self-determination.¹⁷² Both South Africa¹⁷³ and Algeria¹⁷⁴ were immediately critical of the resolution due to its failure to grant Sahrawi plans the same status as the Moroccan Autonomy Plan. However, in a surprising turnabout, in November 2025 South African President Cyril Ramaphosa welcomed the resolution, calling Morocco’s plan a ‘political solution that brings the file to an end’.¹⁷⁵

In November 2025, Morocco started working on a new version of its Autonomy Plan.¹⁷⁶ And while the Polisario Front indicated that it was interested in returning to talks with Morocco,¹⁷⁷ by 3 December 2025, it confirmed that it had not been invited to participate in such talks.¹⁷⁸ Such talks, however, allegedly began in secret in Madrid in February 2026.¹⁷⁹

Increased International Support for Morocco’s Autonomy Plan

The Moroccan Autonomy Plan, first introduced by Morocco to the Security Council in 2007, while at first supported primarily by the US gained increasing support from other States during the reporting period.¹⁸⁰

After re-establishing diplomatic ties in 2020 following US President Trump’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in Western Sahara, Morocco and Israel further normalized and strengthened diplomatic ties during the reporting period. As early as June 2023, Israel, following in US footsteps, stated that it would support Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara,¹⁸¹ doing so on 17 July 2023.¹⁸² Relations between the two States deepened in September 2023 when Moroccan Councillors visited the Israeli Knesset¹⁸³ and in November 2025 when BlueBird Aero Systems, a subsidiary of Israel Aerospace Industries, started building a new drone plant near Casablanca.¹⁸⁴

France had a more tepid and nuanced response immediately after the US recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.¹⁸⁵ But signs of a shifting position came in April 2024 when France reportedly started preparing to invest in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, a move that drew criticism from the Polisario Front.¹⁸⁶ And, by July 2024, French Prime Minister Emmanuel Macron wrote to King Mohammed VI of Morocco in which he declared that Morocco’s autonomy plan was the ‘only basis’ on which the Western Sahara issue could be resolved, declaring that France would adopt the position that Western Sahara was to fall within Moroccan sovereignty.¹⁸⁷ This move was, according to one Moroccan official, ‘a game-changer’.¹⁸⁸

In response, Algeria withdrew its ambassador to France (although France did not retaliate¹⁸⁹), and, for its part, the Polisario Front accused France of acting in violation of international law.¹⁹⁰ Entrenching its position further, in October 2024 not only did President Macron visit Morocco,¹⁹¹ but he also announced to the French parliament that France would invest in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara.¹⁹² Relations between France and Algeria have been tense but inconsistent since France’s announcement.¹⁹³

The US position during the reporting period has been consistent – it has repeatedly recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over the entire Western Sahara and supported the Moroccan Autonomy Plan.¹⁹⁴ In late August and early September 2023, Joshua Harris, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for North Africa for then US President Joe Biden, visited Morocco, and the Polisario Front and Algerian leadership in Algeria in a show of US support for the UN-led political process on Western Sahara.¹⁹⁵ An additional purpose of the visit was apparently encourage peace between Morocco and Algeria in order to avoid further deterioration of already strained relations between the two States.¹⁹⁶ Mr Harris visited Tindouf in Algeria on 31 August 2023 to speak with Brahim Ghali, the leader of the Polisario Front, as well as UN and other non-governmental agencies operating in the region.¹⁹⁷ He then visited Morocco where he impressed on Moroccan officials that the United States fully supported Morocco’s Autonomy Plan for the territory.¹⁹⁸

Other developments included calls from within the US to declare the Polisario Front a terrorist organization¹⁹⁹ as well as calls to stop funding ‘failed peacekeeping missions’ including MINURSO.²⁰⁰ In terms of the first development, US Congressman Joe Wilson stated in April 2025 that he would introduce legislation to designate the Polisario Front as a terrorist organization²⁰¹ and by June 2025, the text for the Bill had been introduced in the US House of Representatives.²⁰² Morocco was galvanized by this and pushed for the Polisario Front to be internationally recognized as a terrorist organization in August 2025.²⁰³

Also in August 2025, American officials engaged with Alexander Ivanko, the head of MINURSO, reportedly to talk about reducing the number of MINURSO staff.²⁰⁴ MINURSO had already downsized due to US budget cuts in early 2025.²⁰⁵ Also, like France, the United States has pledged to invest in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara.²⁰⁶

Beyond Israel, France, and the United States, several other States have supported either the Moroccan Autonomy Plan or Moroccan sovereignty Western Sahara or both. These include Portugal,²⁰⁷ Ghana,²⁰⁸ the United Kingdom,²⁰⁹ Kenya,²¹⁰ Chad,²¹¹ the Dominican Republic,²¹² North Macedonia,²¹³ Guatemala,²¹⁴ and Panama.²¹⁵ Other States that pledged investments in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara include China, Spain, Saudi Arabia, and Germany.²¹⁶ In addition, the number of States recognizing SADR in Africa and internationally has decreased, with several withdrawing or freezing recognition pending resolution of the dispute.²¹⁷ On 29 November 2024, Panama, the first State to recognize the SADR in 1980, suspended its diplomatic relations with the republic.²¹⁸

The African Union did not make any statements on Moroccan sovereignty or its autonomy plan during the reporting period, despite several of its Members supporting these positions.²¹⁹ The European Union (EU) position was not explicitly announced but certain attitudes were present in the fishing case. Finally, the UN officially positioned itself as supporting the Moroccan Autonomy Plan when it renewed MINURSO’s mandate in October 2025.

Judgments by the Court of Justice of the European Union

In July 2023, a fishing deal between Morocco and the EU expired.²²⁰ At the time, renewal was uncertain, pending a final decision from the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) on the legality of the deal since fishing was taking place off the shore of the Western Sahara and its people had not been consulted in drafting the agreement.²²¹ And, in October 2024, even as the policies of several EU member States towards the question of Western Sahara underwent significant shifts, the judicial organs of the EU re-affirmed their long-standing position on the issue. In two judgments delivered on 4 October 2024, the Grand Chamber of the CJEU held that two agreements concluded with Morocco on agricultural products and fisheries were inapplicable in Western Sahara as the territory is ‘separate and distinct’ from Morocco and as the Sahrawi people could not be presumed to have given their consent.²²²

In July 2025, it was reported that the EU and Morocco were engaging in talks to side-step the CJEU’s ruling.²²³ And in August 2025, the EU Commission sought to re-negotiate the fishing deal with Morocco, hoping to ‘bring the agreement into compliance with the CJEU ruling, EU law, and international law’.²²⁴ The proposal sought to introduce ‘monitoring mechanism[s]’, to ensure that Western Saharan people benefited from the trade.²²⁵ The deal was signed in October 2025²²⁶ and the European Commission approved it in November 2025.²²⁷ In December 2025, the Polisario Front filed a new appeal before the CJEU.²²⁸

Continued Acrimony Between Morocco and Algeria

In 2021, Algeria cut off diplomatic ties with Morocco.²²⁹ Algeria has long been a supporter of the Polisario Front and the SADR both politically and economically,²³⁰ with some also suggesting that support is also military in nature²³¹ – Morocco considers the Polisario Front an Algerian proxy.²³² There are also Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria.²³³ Algeria has an active part in discussions on solving the Western Sahara question.²³⁴ During the reporting period, the relationship between the two States grew more acrimonious.

In September 2023, the two States had a heated exchange about Western Sahara in the UN General Assembly.²³⁵ In October 2023, the two States again criticized each other in the UN’s Fourth Committee with Morocco accusing Algeria of creating, financing, and harbouring the Polisario Front and distorting international law on the issue of Western Sahara.²³⁶ Algeria responded by accusing Morocco of dumping drugs in Algeria and of using Israeli spyware to spy on Algerian officials, journalists, politicians and diplomats.²³⁷ Also in September 2023, Morocco rebuffed an Algerian offer of support following the 6.8 magnitude earthquake in Morocco on 8 September 2023 that killed 2,000 people.²³⁸

In January 2024, Morocco beat South Africa in a bid to lead the UN Human Rights Council.²³⁹ Both South Africa and Algeria opposed the bid due to the Western Sahara issue.²⁴⁰ In May 2024, Algeria and Morocco again exchanged heated remarks on self-determination and independence at a meeting in Caracas, Venezuela.²⁴¹ Tensions again flared but took on a new character in a preparatory meeting of the Tokyo International Summitt on Development in Africa in August 2024.²⁴² A representative from the SADR was present at the summit and a Moroccan delegation attempted to remove his name plate at the meeting.²⁴³ An Algerian delegate rushed to prevent this, which saw the two representatives end up in a ‘brawl’ during which they fell to the floor.²⁴⁴

In July 2025, King Mohammed VI of Morocco extended an olive branch to Algeria, stating that the Moroccan position on Western Sahara should not be understood as ‘enmity toward Algeria’.²⁴⁵ This was regarded as a ‘renewed’ offer since the King had made such an offer in 2021 and 2023.²⁴⁶ This did not prevent another acrimonious exchange between the two States at the UN General Assembly in September 2025.²⁴⁷ However, after this exchange Morocco once again reiterated its King’s desire to make peace with Algeria.²⁴⁸

Tensions within the Polisario Front

There were some apparent tensions within the Polisario Front during the reporting period.

In February 2024, Polisario Front leadership and more radical younger members found themselves at odds.²⁴⁹ In an interview with Spanish news outlet Nueva Revolución, Mansur Omar, the Polisario Front’s representative to the EU, stated that the group was not interested in ratcheting up tensions with Morocco.²⁵⁰ However, this position contradicts the one adopted by the Polisario Front in their January 2023 congress where they called for military action against Morocco.²⁵¹ Omar and other leadership were accused by younger members of betraying the fight for independence.²⁵² Opposing views between members were also visible in May 2025 when the Polisario Front distanced itself from statements made by one of its officials wherein they vaguely threatened foreigners who visit and do business in the Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara.²⁵³

In July 2024, 100 Polisario Front fighters laid down their arms, leaving the group.²⁵⁴ This followed an apparent April mutiny against Brahim Ghali’s leadership, particularly his refusal to engage with fighters.²⁵⁵ This also proceeded a call from Bachir Mustapha Sayed, the brother of the founder of the Polisario Front, for a general conference of the group to save the group from ‘disappearing’.²⁵⁶ Sayed also criticised Brahim Ghali, blaming his poor leadership for the group not making significant progress in their fight against Morocco.²⁵⁷ Sayed was supported by Oubi Bachir, the representative of the group based in Switzerland.²⁵⁸ The two, along with Mohamed Ibrahim Biadillah, the former coordinator of the group’s military activities, had apparently asked Algeria to remove Brahim from his position.²⁵⁹ There was apparently a petition circulating in the Algerian-based refugee camps calling for the group’s leadership to change.²⁶⁰ The main leadership of the group did not respond to this.²⁶¹ According to Moroccan media, Sayed resigned from his position as an advisor to leadership in September 2024 to contest for leadership.²⁶² By September 2025, there appears to have been widespread dislike of Brahim Ghali, with accusations of his being corrupt, incompetent, and erratic, and as a result, weakening the movement.²⁶³

Finally, the response within the group to the UN’s decisions to back Morocco’s Autonomy Plan (see above) was split.²⁶⁴ Specifically, it was divided on whether to engage in peace talks or not, with the latter option being perceived as the group making itself non-compliant with UN and its process.²⁶⁵

Attack against Pro-Polisario Organization in Copenhagen

On 13 January 2025, Molotov cocktails were thrown at Global Aktion, the Copenhagen-based Danish partner to Polisario Front supporter Westen Sahara Resource Watch.²⁶⁶ Anti-Polisario and pro-Morocco slogans were spray-painted on the pavement in front of the building.²⁶⁷ Though there was extensive property damage and equipment and documents were stolen, no injuries or casualties were reported.²⁶⁸ One of the Polisario Front’s media platforms stated that the incident pointed to ‘Moroccan nationalist motives’,²⁶⁹ with the Omar Mansour, the group’s European representative calling is ‘part of a systemic campaign to repress the Saharawis’.²⁷⁰ Within Denmark, some politicians suggested that the attack could be considered an act of terrorism.²⁷¹ Danish police arrested a nineteen-year-old British national (suspected to be part of a gang) for the attack, charging him with ‘serious arson’.²⁷² According to Crisiswatch, a second suspect was also arrested.²⁷³

The ongoing IAC between Morocco and the Polisario Front continued throughout the reporting period. Two categories of IAC continue in Morocco, the first through the occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco – Morocco has been occupying some eighty per cent of Western Sahara since the 1980s – and the second is the hostilities between Morocco and the Polisario Front which qualifies as an Art 1(4) Additional Protocol I-type IAC – this conflict restarted in November 2020 after a twenty-nine-year ceasefire.

Occupation of part of Western Sahara by Morocco

Under international humanitarian law (IHL) a situation of occupation exists if the territory is ‘under the authority of the hostile army’ even in the absence of resistance.²⁷⁴ The hostile foreign forces must exercise effective control over a territory without the consent of the sovereign state.²⁷⁵ The nature of ‘effective control’ in the context of occupation is further elaborated in legal doctrine and interpretations, which establish three cumulative conditions for occupation:²⁷⁶

The foreign state’s armed forces are physically present in the territory or parts of the territory of the territorial state without its consent.
The presence of the foreign forces prevents the effective local government in place at the time of invasion from substantially or completely exercising its powers.
The foreign forces establish their own authority.

Prior to determining if Moroccan soldiers are present in Western Sahara, it is necessary to explore if the fact that the final status of Western Sahara is yet to be settled does not represent an obstacle to it being considered as occupied under IHL. In other words, must the ‘occupied ‘territory’s sovereign status be undisputed. Besides cases of ‘belligerent occupation’ in the traditional sense (where all or part of the territory of one State is occupied by another State), cases of ‘alien occupation’ may also occur, where occupation weighs on territory which has not yet been fully formed as a State.²⁷⁷ Neither the 1907 Hague Regulations nor the 1949 Geneva Conventions ‘suggests that only territory the title to which is clear and uncontested can be occupied territory’.²⁷⁸ On the contrary, occupation is deemed to exist ‘as soon as a territory is under the effective control of a State that is not the recognized sovereign of the territory’.²⁷⁹

As such, although the status of Western Sahara has been unsettled for the past fifty years and although there is a recent trend of States recognising Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, the matter is still not fully settled. The Polisario Front continues to maintain the right of the Sahrawi people to the territory and to independence,²⁸⁰ and some States and institutions do still recognize this.²⁸¹ Against this background, Moroccan forces that are present in the territory of Western Sahara must be understood as being stationed in foreign territory. This conclusion is not affected by the consideration that the people of Western Sahara may, in their exercise of self-determination, eventually attribute sovereignty over their territory to Morocco. Indeed, ‘the existence of an occupation as a type of international armed conflict must be determined solely on the basis of the prevailing facts’.²⁸² Thus, the future status of a territory is not determinative of the present classification of the situation under IHL.

As stated by Marco Sassòli, the existence of an occupation is determined by facts on the ground.²⁸³ What is factual is that Moroccan soldiers are and were physically present in the non-self-governing territory of Western Sahara against the wishes of the Polisario Front during the reporting period. MINURSO has confirmed that Morocco has stationed soldiers or military camps near Bir Gandouz and Aousserd, both of which are in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara.²⁸⁴ The first requirement is thus satisfied.

The second requirement is that ‘the effective local government in place at the time of the invasion has been or can be rendered substantially or completely incapable of exerting its powers by virtue of the foreign forces’ unconsented-to presence’.²⁸⁵ Morocco has come to control around eighty per cent of the territory of Western Sahara, including the whole coastal strip from Morocco to Mauritania as well as its hinterland for hundreds of kilometres.²⁸⁶ It has both an economic and military presence in the parts of Western Sahara that it controls. It has stationed its troops at various places along the Berm in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara,²⁸⁷ and has invested in the territory²⁸⁸ and exploited the resources there for its own benefit.²⁸⁹ Therefore, the capacity of the Polisario Front to substantially exert its powers over Western Sahara is significantly limited to the small percentage of territory not under the control of Morocco, and the second requirement for effective control under IHL is met.

The third requirement entails that ‘the foreign forces are in a position to exercise authority over the territory concerned (or parts thereof) in lieu of the local government’.²⁹⁰ In the territory of Western Sahara under its control, known in Morocco as the Southern Provinces, Morocco administers Moroccan law and regulations through Moroccan institutions.²⁹¹ In 2015, it was estimated that, of the total resident population of Western Sahara, Moroccan immigrants outnumber the indigenous Sahrawi community by at least two to one.²⁹² Morocco, therefore, exercises control over most of Western Sahara, to the exclusion of the Polisario Front as the government of the SADR. The third element for effective control is thus fulfilled.

The occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco meets the requirements of occupation under IHL and an IAC by occupation exists.

International Armed Conflict between Morocco and the Polisario Front

Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I determines that armed conflicts in which a people are fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation, or racist regimes qualify as IACs.¹ Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I thus elevate ‘wars of national liberation’ into the realm as IACs; prior to this treaty, such conflicts were considered as being of a non-international character (NIACs).² Simply put, when a party to the Protocol engages in an armed conflict against a non-State actor which qualifies as a ‘people’ and such people has made an Article 96(3) declaration stating that they are fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation, or racist regimes in order to exercise their right to self-determination, the application of the Protocol to this conflict is triggered.³

Morocco has been a party to Additional Protocol I since 2011.⁴ The Polisario Front had the opportunity under Article 96(3) of Additional Protocol II to bind itself to Additional Protocol I through a unilateral declaration.⁵ On 21 June 2015 the Polisario Front made a unilateral declaration on behalf of the people of Western Sahara under Article 96(3) of the Protocol, undertaking to apply the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocol in its armed conflict against Morocco.⁶ On 26 June 2015, the Swiss Federal Council, in its capacity as depositary of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, accepted the declaration by the Polisario Front and notified this to the other States Parties.⁷ In line with Article 96(3), the unilateral declaration had the effect, as of 23 June 2015 (the date of its receipt), of (i) bringing into force the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I for the Polisario Front in its armed conflict with Morocco; (ii) establishing for the Polisario Front the same rights and obligations as those assumed by Morocco; and (iii) making the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Protocol equally binding for all the parties to the armed conflict in Western Sahara.⁸ This was the first occasion where the Swiss Federal Council accepted such a declaration by a national liberation movement and non-state actor.⁹

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross’ Commentaries to Additional Protocol I, for a conflict to qualify as a war of national liberation and be classified as an IAC, two cumulative conditions must apply: (i) there must be an armed conflict in which a people is struggling against colonial domination, alien occupation or a racist regime, and (iii) the struggle of that people must be in order to exercise its right to self-determination.¹⁰

It will first be determined if the Polisario Front constitutes a ‘people’ and if this ‘people’ fights against Morocco (an alien occupier) and second if the armed conflict is fought for the purpose of exercising the right to self-determination.

Additional Protocol I does not define the term ‘peoples’, however, the 1987 Commentaries to article 1(4) of the Additional Protocols elaborates on this notion in the context of this treaty: ‘The essential factor is a common sentiment of forming a people, and a political will to live together as such. Such a sentiment and will are the result of one or more of the criteria indicated, and are generally highlighted and reinforced by a common history. This means simultaneously that there is a bond between the persons belonging to this people and something that separates them from other peoples: there is a common element and a distinctive element’.¹¹

The Sahrawi are a mostly nomadic people of Abar and Berber descent and heritage.¹² Their identity is closely tied to the desert of Western Sahara.¹³ Some Sahrawi people are from southern Morocco and Algeria, but many are from Western Sahara.¹⁴ The Polisario Front represents the Sahrawi people of Western Sahara and emerged as an opposition to Moroccan and Mauritanian occupation of Western Sahara during the 1970s.¹⁵ A large number of Sahrawi’s fled to Algeria where they have lived in refugee camps ever since.¹⁶ Sahrawis share a language (Hassaniya), common origin, and religion – Islam.¹⁷ The Polisario Front, as the internationally recognized representative of the Sahrawi people,¹⁸ has, since its inception, repeatedly called for the Sahrawi to be able to exercise their right to self-determination and establish the independent SADR in the territory of Western Sahara.¹⁹ It is understood that most Sahrawis still support this.²⁰ Sassòli explains that ‘alien occupation’ could refer to instances such as the Sahrawis where ‘people have never had an opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination’.²¹ Indeed, since the 1991 promise of the referendum that would allow the Sahrawi people to determine their own future, including whether they wish for the SADR to be an independent State, has yet to take place and is unlikely to under Morocco’s Autonomy Plan.²²

The first requirement is thus met, the Polisario Front, representing ‘a people’, is engaged in an armed conflict against Morocco an ‘alien occupier’.

The second requirement under Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I is to determine if the liberation movement is fighting its enemy for the purpose of self-determination. The UN’s Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples recognizes that all peoples have the right to self-determination which allows them to ‘freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’.²³ The Polisario Front is committed to achieving and defending the right of the people Sahrawi people to freedom and independence²⁴ and has consistently framed their actions as those of a colonized people fighting to exercise their right to freely determine their political and economic future,²⁵ as well as repeatedly referring to Western Sahara as ‘the last colony in Africa’, framing its struggle as one of decolonization.²⁶ Additionally, they often justify their military activities against the RMA as a fight against occupation.²⁷

In addition, the UN has re-affirmed on numerous occasions ‘the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence … and the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of that right’.²⁸ Despite indicating Morocco’s Autonomy Proposal as basis for discussions between parties, the latest UN Security Council Resolution 2797 (2025) envisages self-determination of the people of Western Sahara as the ultimate objective that any final and mutually acceptable political solution must aim to achieve.²⁹ A similar approach emerges from the work of the African Union, with both the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and the AU Peace and Security Council requiring that political solutions to the dispute over Western Sahara provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.³⁰

The second requirement is thus met. The Polisario Front are fighting for the right to exercise self-determination.

Finally, the acceptance of the Article 96(3) Additional Protocol I unilateral declaration by the Polisario Front on behalf of its people³¹ may serve as evidence that Swiss Federal Council who serves as a depository of the protocol considers the situation between Morocco and the Polisario Front to meet the requirements for an Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I.

It is concluded that the armed conflict between Morocco and the Polisario Front meets the requirements under Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I of 1977 and constitutes an IAC.

1
‘Article 1 – General principles and scope of application’, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), International Humanitarian Law Databases, International Committee of the Red Cross.
2
‘Article 1 – General principles and scope of application – Commentary of 1987’, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), International Humanitarian Law Databases, International Committee of the Red Cross, para 66.
3
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 10.
4
‘States Party to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties’, International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law Databases, 23 January 2026.
5
‘Article 96 – Treaty relations upon entry into force of this Protocol’, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), International Humanitarian Law Databases, International Committee of the Red Cross.
6
Polisario Front, ‘Unilateral declaration under Article 96(3) AP I’, 21 June 2015, 1.
7
K. Fortin, ‘Unilateral Declaration by Polisario under API accepted by Swiss Federal Council’, Armed Groups and International Law, 2 September 2015.
8
‘Article 96 – Treaty relations upon entry into force of this Protocol’, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), International Humanitarian Law Databases, International Committee of the Red Cross.
9
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.22.
10
‘Article 1 – General principles and scope of application – Commentary of 1987’, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)’, International Humanitarian Law Databases, International Committee of the Red Cross, para 107.
11
‘Article 1 – General principles and scope of application – Commentary of 1987’, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)’, International Humanitarian Law Databases, International Committee of the Red Cross, para 103.
12
‘Backgrounder: Sahrawi Refugees and Western Sahara’, U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 23 April 2025.
13
‘Backgrounder: Sahrawi Refugees and Western Sahara’, U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 23 April 2025.
14
‘Sahrawi People’, Atlas of Humanity.
15
‘Backgrounder: Sahrawi Refugees and Western Sahara’, U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 23 April 2025.
16
‘Backgrounder: Sahrawi Refugees and Western Sahara’, U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 23 April 2025.
17
‘Sahrawi People’, Atlas of Humanity; ‘The Saharawi people and the Western Sahara’, Sahara Marathon.
18
‘Sahrawi People’, Atlas of Humanity
19
‘Letter dated 17 November 2025 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc S/2025/764, 24 November 2025; ‘POLISARIO affirms Sahrawi people’s strong commitment to self-determination and independence, and to defending their rights and sovereignty by all legitimate means’, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic: Embassy to Ethiopia & Permanent Representation to the African Union, 5 November 2025; S. El-Hafed, ‘Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination, independence, and legitimate resistance is inalienable and non-negotiable right’, Sahara Press Service, 14 July 2025.
20
K. Fadel, ‘Self-Determination Is the Only Endgame for Western Sahara’, Modern Diplomacy, 15 May 2025.
21
M. Sassòli ‘International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare (Second Edition)’, Edward Elgar, 2024, para 6.28.
22
K. Fadel, ‘Self-Determination Is the Only Endgame for Western Sahara’, Modern Diplomacy, 15 May 2025.
23
UN General Assembly ‘Resolution 1514 (XV): Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples’, UN Doc A/Res/1514(XV), 14 December 1960, para 2.
24
‘Polisario Front’, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic: Embassy to Ethiopia & Permanent Representation to the African Union
25
‘Letter dated 21 October 2025 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc S/2025/664, 21 October 2025, Annex, para 7
26
‘Situation concerning Western Sahara – Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2022/733, 3 October 2022, para 17; and UN Doc S/2024/707, 1 October 2024, para 4; ‘Letter dated 17 November 2025 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc S/2025/764, 24 November 2025; S. El-Hafed, ‘Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination, independence, and legitimate resistance is inalienable and non-negotiable right’, Sahara Press Service, 14 July 2025.
27
‘SPLA inflicts heavy losses on Moroccan occupation forces in Farsia sector’, Sahara Press Service, 23 December 2025; ‘SPLA carries out attacks against positions of Moroccan occupation soldiers in Houza and Farsia sectors’, Sahara Press Service, 18 January 2025.
28
UN General Assembly ‘Resolution 34/37: Question of Western Sahara’, 21 November 1979, para 1; and ‘Resolution 35/19: Question of Western Sahara’, UN Doc A/Res/35/19, 11 November 1980, para 1.
29
UN Security Council ‘Resolution 2797 (2025)’, 31 October 2025, operative para 3.
30
AU Peace and Security Council, ‘Decision on the Situation in Western Sahara’, AU Doc PSC/PR/COMM.(DLXXXVIII), 6 April 2016, paras 3 and 7; AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, ‘Decision on the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union on the issue of Western Sahara’, AU Doc Assembly/AU/4(XXXI), 2 July 2018, para 4.
31
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.22

Occupation

Morocco
Western Sahara (Non-Self-Governing Territory)

International Armed Conflict

Morocco
Polisario Front (as representative of the people of Western Sahara)

Algeria
UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)

1
UN General Assembly Resolution 34/37: Question of Western Sahara’, 21 November 1979.
2
‘The Moroccan Wall Still Stands’, Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, 23 February 2015; ‘World’s barriers: Western Sahara’, BBC, 5 November 2009; H. McNeish, ‘Western Sahara’s struggle for freedom cut off by a wall’, Al Jazeera, 5 June 2015.
3
‘Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land’, International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law Databases
4
‘States Party to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties’, International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law Databases, 23 January 2026.
5
‘Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War’, International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law Databases
6
‘Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts’, International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law Databases
7
‘Western Sahara’, The United Nations and Decolonization, 9 September 2024.
8
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic’, 24–28 September 2012, para 7; ‘Backgrounder: Sahrawi Refugees and Western Sahara’, US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 23 April 2025; ‘Western Sahara’, The United Nations and Decolonization, 9 September 2024.
9
UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories’, UN Doc A/5514, 1963, Annex III
10
UN General Assembly ‘Resolution 1514 (XV): Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples’, 14 December 1960.
11
UN General Assembly ‘Resolution 2702 (XX): Question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara’, 16 December 1965; ‘Resolution 2229 (XXI): Question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara’, 20 December 1966; ‘Resolution 2354 (XXII): Question of Uni and Spanish Sahara’, 19 December 1967; and ‘Resolution 2711 (XXV): Question of Spanish Sahara’, 14 December 1970.
12
UN General Assembly ‘29^thsession, 4^th Committee, 2117^th meeting’, UN Doc A/C.4/SR.2117, 25 November 1974; and ‘29^th session, 4^th Committee, 2130^th meeting’, UN Doc A/C.4/SR.2130, 10 December 1974.
13
‘Polisario Front’, Britannica, 4 November 2025.
14
ICJ, ‘Western Sahara’, Advisory Opinion, 16 October 1975, para 75.
15
ICJ, ‘Western Sahara’, Advisory Opinion, 16 October 1975, para 162.
16
UN General Assembly ‘Resolution 3292 (XXIX): Question of Spanish Sahara’, UN Doc A/Res/3292, 13 December 1974.
17
J. Besenyő, ‘Guerrilla Operations in Western Sahara: The Polisario versus Morocco and Mauritania’, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 2017; UN Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples ‘Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’, UN Doc A/46/23, 1995, Chapter XII, para 18.
18
‘Moroccans march into Western Sahara in the Green March, 1975’, Global Nonviolent Action Databases.
19
L. El Fehaim, ‘The origins of the conflicts in Western Sahara’, Eismena, 6 January 2026; W. D. Swearingen, ‘Independent Morocco’, Britannica, 10 February 2026; ‘Moroccans march into Western Sahara in the Green March, 1975’, Global Nonviolent Action Databases; T. Lehtinen, ‘The Unfinished Referendum Process in Western Sahara’, Journal of African Elections, May 2001.
20
‘Moroccans march into Western Sahara in the Green March, 1975’, Global Nonviolent Action Databases.
21
‘Moroccans march into Western Sahara in the Green March, 1975’, Global Nonviolent Action Databases.
22
L. El Fehaim, ‘The origins of the conflicts in Western Sahara’, Eismena, 6 January 2026; W. D. Swearingen, ‘Independent Morocco’, Britannica, 10 February 2026; ‘Moroccans march into Western Sahara in the Green March, 1975’, Global Nonviolent Action Databases; J. Besenyő, ‘Guerrilla Operations in Western Sahara: The Polisario versus Morocco and Mauritania’, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 2017.
23
‘Maroc, Mauritanie et Espagne: Déclaration de principes au sujet du Sahara occidental, 14 November 1975’, UN Treaty Series; L. El Fehaim, ‘The origins of the conflicts in Western Sahara’, Eismena, 6 January 2026; I. Molina and P. del Amo, ‘Between principles and national interest: 50 years since the Spanish withdrawal from the Western Sahara’, Real Instituto El Cano, 7 January 2026.
24
I. Molina and P. del Amo, ‘Between principles and national interest: 50 years since the Spanish withdrawal from the Western Sahara’, Real Instituto El Cano, 7 January 2026; J. Besenyő, ‘Guerrilla Operations in Western Sahara: The Polisario versus Morocco and Mauritania’, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 2017
25
T. Lehtinen, ‘The Unfinished Referendum Process in Western Sahara’, Journal of African Elections, May 2001; J. Besenyő, ‘Guerrilla Operations in Western Sahara: The Polisario versus Morocco and Mauritania’, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 2017.
26
J. Besenyő, ‘Guerrilla Operations in Western Sahara: The Polisario versus Morocco and Mauritania’, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 2017
27
‘Western Sahara Conflict (1973 – 1991)’, PA-X Analytics, University of Edinburgh; L. El Fehaim, ‘The origins of the conflicts in Western Sahara’, Eismena, 6 January 2026; T. Lehtinen, ‘The Unfinished Referendum Process in Western Sahara’, Journal of African Elections, May 2001
28
T. Lehtinen, ‘The Unfinished Referendum Process in Western Sahara’, Journal of African Elections, May 2001.
29
J. Besenyő, ‘Guerrilla Operations in Western Sahara: The Polisario versus Morocco and Mauritania’, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 2017.
30
J. Besenyő, ‘Guerrilla Operations in Western Sahara: The Polisario versus Morocco and Mauritania’, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 2017.
31
T. Lehtinen, ‘The Unfinished Referendum Process in Western Sahara’, Journal of African Elections, May 2001; J. Besenyő, ‘Guerrilla Operations in Western Sahara: The Polisario versus Morocco and Mauritania’, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 2017.
32
J. Besenyő, ‘Guerrilla Operations in Western Sahara: The Polisario versus Morocco and Mauritania’, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 2017.
33
J. Besenyő, ‘Guerrilla Operations in Western Sahara: The Polisario versus Morocco and Mauritania’, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 2017; T. Lehtinen, ‘The Unfinished Referendum Process in Western Sahara’, Journal of African Elections, May 2001; ‘Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic’, Britannica, 11 July 2025.
34
J. Besenyő, ‘Guerrilla Operations in Western Sahara: The Polisario versus Morocco and Mauritania’, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 2017; L. El Fehaim, ‘The origins of the conflicts in Western Sahara’, Eismena, 6 January 2026
35
J. Besenyő, ‘Guerrilla Operations in Western Sahara: The Polisario versus Morocco and Mauritania’, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 2017; L. El Fehaim, ‘The origins of the conflicts in Western Sahara’, Eismena, 6 January 2026; T. Lehtinen, ‘The Unfinished Referendum Process in Western Sahara’, Journal of African Elections, May 2001.
36
‘The Situation Concerning Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary General’, UN Doc S/21360, 18 June 1990, Part I, para 4.
37
‘The Situation Concerning Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary General’, UN Doc S/21360, 18 June 1990, Part I, para 23.
38
‘The Situation Concerning Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary General’, UN Doc S/21360, 18 June 1990, Part I, para 31.
39
UN Security Council ‘Resolution 690: The Situation Concerning Western Sahara’, UN Doc S/Res/690(1991), 19 April 1991.
40
‘Chronology: Western Sahara – a 50-year-old dispute’, Reuters, 9 August 2007; T. Lehtinen, ‘The Unfinished Referendum Process in Western Sahara’, Journal of African Elections, May 2001; H. Lulie, ‘The word that reignited the Western Sahara debate’, Institute for Security Studies, 26 April 2016; ‘History’, MINURSO; ‘Background’, MINURSO.
41
H. Lulie, ‘The word that reignited the Western Sahara debate’, Institute for Security Studies, 26 April 2016; T. Shelley, ‘Behind the Baker Plan for Western Sahara’, Middle East Research and Information Project, 1 August 2003.
42
‘Morocco and Western Sahara’, Human Rights Watch; T. Shelley, ‘Behind the Baker Plan for Western Sahara’, Middle East Research and Information Project, 1 August 2003; H. Lulie, ‘The word that reignited the Western Sahara debate’, Institute for Security Studies, 26 April 2016
43
T. Shelley, ‘Behind the Baker Plan for Western Sahara’, Middle East Research and Information Project, 1 August 2003.
44
‘Background’, United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.
45
‘Letter dated 11 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc S/2007/206, 13 April 2007, Annex, paras 4 and 7.
46
‘Letter dated 16 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc S/2007/210, 16 April 2007, Annex, para 7.
47
‘Background’, United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.
48
‘Situation concerning Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2021/843, 1 October 2021, paras 2 – 8; ‘Fears grow of new Western Sahara war between Morocco and Polisario Front’, Reuters, 14 November 2020.
49
‘Fears grow of new Western Sahara war between Morocco and Polisario Front’, Reuters, 14 November 2020; ‘Polisario leader says Western Sahara ceasefire with Morocco is over’, Reuters, 14 November 2020.
50
Oussama-Aamari, ‘Morocco Using Drones to Fend Off Polisario Attacks’, Morocco World News, 6 February 2023
51
‘Proclamation on Recognizing The Sovereignty Of The Kingdom Of Morocco Over The Western Sahara’, Trump White House, 10 December 2020; ‘Relaunching Negotiations over Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, 14 October 2021; O. Rickett and D. Hilton, ‘Israel and Morocco to normalise ties as US recognises Rabat’s claim to Western Sahara’, Middle East Eye, 10 December 2020.
52
‘Time for International Re-engagement in Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, 11 March 2021, footnote 64.
53
‘Algeria criticizes Israel’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara’, Reuters, 20 July 2023; ‘Algeria criticises Israel recognition of Morocco sovereignty over Western Sahara’, Middle East Monitor, 20 July 2023; ‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, July 2023.
54
‘US to open consulate in disputed Western Sahara, Pompeo says’, Middle East Eye, 24 December 2020
55
‘Senators urge Biden to undo US recognition of Morocco’s claim to Western Sahara’, Middle East Eye, 18 February 2021
56
‘Western Sahara: Biden won’t reverse Trump’s recognition of Morocco sovereignty – report’, Middle East Eye, 1 May 2021.
57
I. Cembrero, ‘Sahara occidental. L’Espagne s’aligne sur le Maroc et se fâche avec l’Algérie’, L’Orient XXI, 12 April 2022.
58
‘Netherlands backs Morocco’s Western Sahara autonomy plan – statement’, Reuters, 11 May 2022.
59
‘Morocco cuts contact with German embassy – reports’, Deutsche Welle, 3 February 2021
60
Agence France-Presse, ‘Germany Backs Morocco Proposal for W. Sahara Autonomy’, Voice of America – Africa, 25 August 2022.
61
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘Bernard Anbataayela Mornah v. Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Tanzania, and Tunisia’, Judgment, 22 December 2022, paras 302–03.
62
‘Bir Lahlou’, Oxford Reference 2019
63
‘Situation concerning Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2023/729, 3 October 2023, para 10.
64
‘Four blasts in Western Sahara kill one, injure three, Moroccan authorities say’, Reuters, 29 October 2023; ‘1 dead, 3 hurt as multiple blasts rock Western Sahara’, Deutsche Welle, 29 October 2023; ‘Morocco to Investigate Explosions in Western Sahara’, Voice of America, 29 October 2023; B. El Atti, ‘Polisario claims responsibility over four explosions in Western Sahara, killing one’, The New Arab, 30 October 2023; A. Sharawi and M. El Ahmadi, ‘Polisario Attack on Smara: A Worrying Escalation for Morocco’, Washington Institute, 15 November 2023; ‘Situation Concerning the Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/707, 1 October 2024, para 14.
65
‘Situation Concerning the Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/707, 1 October 2024, para 15; ‘Polisario claims rocket attack near Smara, no casualties reported’, Hespress, 27 June 2025.
66
‘Situation Concerning the Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/707, 1 October 2024, para 18.
67
‘Situation Concerning the Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/707, 1 October 2024, para 18; S. Zoutein, ‘Polisario Launches New Attack on Morocco’s Southern Region of Aousserd’, Morocco World News, 16 December 2023.
68
‘Situation Concerning the Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/707, 1 October 2024, para 23; ‘Moroccan drone targets Polisario militia infiltrating buffer zone for terrorist attacks’, Hespress, 3 January 2024.
69
‘Moroccan drone targets Polisario militia infiltrating buffer zone for terrorist attacks’, Hespress, 3 January 2024.
70
‘Moroccan drone targets Polisario militia infiltrating buffer zone for terrorist attacks’, Hespress, 3 January 2024.
71
‘Moroccan drone targets Polisario militia infiltrating buffer zone for terrorist attacks’, Hespress, 3 January 2024.
72
‘Situation Concerning the Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/707, 1 October 2024, para 23.
73
‘Situation Concerning the Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/707, 1 October 2024, para 23.
74
Sylvanus, ‘Morocco Deploys Heavy Artillery Near Western Sahara Border’, Bladi.net, 19 January 2024; ‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, January 2024
75
‘Military Agreement No 1’, Association de soutien à un référendum libre et régulier au Sahara Occidental.
76
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, January 2024; ‘Military Agreement No 1’, Association de soutien à un référendum libre et régulier au Sahara Occidental.
77
‘Situation Concerning the Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/707, 1 October 2024, para 20.
78
‘Situation Concerning the Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/707, 1 October 2024, para 24.
79
‘Situation Concerning the Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/707, 1 October 2024, para 26.
80
‘Situation Concerning the Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/707, 1 October 2024, para 26.
81
‘Situation Concerning the Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/707, 1 October 2024, para 26.
82
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, May 2024; I. Lechleb, ‘Explosions rock Morocco’s Smara ahead of «African Lion 2024» military exercice’, Hespress, 20 May 2024.
83
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, May 2024; ‘SPLA carries out new attacks targeting soldiers of Moroccan occupier in Smara sector’, Sahara Press Service, 19 May 2024
84
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, May 2024; I. Lechleb, ‘Explosions rock Morocco’s Smara ahead of «African Lion 2024» military exercice’, Hespress, 20 May 2024.
85
‘Situation Concerning the Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/707, 1 October 2024, para 21.
86
‘Situation Concerning Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/612, 30 September 2025, para 20.
87
‘Situation Concerning Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/612, 30 September 2025, para 15; M. Jaabouk, ‘Polisario attacks civilians with projectiles in Al Mahbes’, Yabiladi, 10 November 2024; S. Kasraoui, ‘Polisario Missile Attack Targets Green March Commemoration in Morocco’s Mahbes Region’, Morocco World News, 10 November 2024; ‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, November 2024.
88
‘Situation Concerning Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/612, 30 September 2025, para 15; ‘Polisario attacks civilians with projectiles in Al Mahbes’, Yabiladi, 10 November 2024; S. Kasraoui, ‘Polisario Missile Attack Targets Green March Commemoration in Morocco’s Mahbes Region’, Morocco World News, 10 November 2024; ‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, November 2024.
89
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, November 2024; ‘Casualties reported as Morocco responds to Polisario shells with drone strike’, Middle East Monitor, 12 November 2024.
90
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, November 2024.
91
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, December 2024; L. Babas, ‘FAR drone strikes Polisario vehicles, Algerian officer killed’, Yabiladi, 28 December 2024.
92
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, January 2025; L. Babas, ‘Morocco FAR drone strike kills four Polisario members in Sahara’, Yabiladi, 13 January 2025; Sylvanus, ‘Moroccan Drone Strike Kills Senior Polisario Commander in Buffer Zone’, Bladi.net, 19 January 2025
93
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, January 2025; Sylvanus, ‘Moroccan Drone Strike Kills Senior Polisario Commander in Buffer Zone’, Bladi.net, 19 January 2025.
94
‘Moroccan drone strike kills senior Polisario commander near buffer zone’, Hespress, 15 May 2025; ‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, May 2025.
95
‘Situation Concerning Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2025/612, 30 September 2025, para 20; ‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, May 2025; ‘Moroccan Occupation Forces Continue to Commit War Crimes in Western Sahara’, CODESA, 18 May 2025.
96
M. Jaabouk, ‘Sahara: Moroccan drone strikes Polisario vehicles’, Yabiladi, 30 May 2025.
97
Moroccan World News, Facebook, 21 June 2025
98
M. Jaabouk, ‘FAR drone strikes Polisario vehicle near Sand Wall’, Yabiladi, 20 June 2025.
99
Moroccan World News, Facebook, 21 June 2025.
100
M. Jaabouk, ‘Sahara: Moroccan army drone strikes Algerian truck near Bir Lahlou’, Yabiladi, 5 June 2025; ‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, June 2025.
101
M. Jaabouk, ‘Sahara: Polisario fires five projectiles on Es-Smara’, Yabiladi, 27 June 2025; E. Fernández, ‘The Polisario Front attacks Moroccan positions in Esmara’, Atalayar, 30 June 2025.
102
M. Jaabouk, ‘Sahara: Polisario fires five projectiles on Es-Smara’, Yabiladi, 27 June 2025; ‘Report: Polisario’s Admission of Smara Attack Raises Prospect of Terrorist Designation and Puts Algeria in International Spotlight’, Fes News, 28 June 2025.
103
A. Edmar, ‘Morocco Strikes Back and Neutralizes Polisario Militants by Drone After Terror Attack in Smara’, Le 7 TV, 28 June 2025; ‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, July 2025.
104
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, September 2025.
105
M. Jaabouk, ‘Moroccan Armed Forces drones thwart Polisario attack in Es-Smara’, Yabiladi, 13 November 2025.
106
M. Jaabouk, ‘Moroccan Armed Forces drones thwart Polisario attack in Es-Smara’, Yabiladi, 13 November 2025.
107
S. Karam, ‘Saharan Rebels Claim Attack on Morocco Troops in Rebuff to UN’, Bloomberg, 6 November 2025, Updated 7 November 2025.
108
‘The Constitution of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic’, Policing Law, 2015, Article 22
109
‘Western Sahara: SPLA Carries Out New Attacks Against Entrenchments of Moroccan Occupation Soldiers in Mahbes Sector’, All Africa Report, 10 July 2023
110
‘SPLA carries out new attacks against entrenchments of Moroccan occupation forces in Amgala sector’, Sahara Press Service, 15 October 2023; ‘SPLA carries out new attacks against Moroccan occupation forces’ entrenchments in Mahbes, Smara, and Farsia sectors’, Sahara Press Service, 29 October 2023
111
‘SPLA carries out new attacks on entrenchments of Moroccan occupation soldiers in Akouiret Ould Abalal region’, Sahara Press Service, 8 December 2023
112
‘SPLA carries out new attacks against Moroccan occupation forces entrenchments in Kelta sector’, Sahara Press Service, 13 January 2024; ‘SPLA carries out new attacks Moroccan bases in Mahbes sector’, Sahara Press Service, 8 January 2024
113
‘SPLA carries out new attacks against entrenchments of Moroccan occupation forces in Mahbes sector’, Sahara Press Service, 4 February 2024; ‘SPLA carries out new attacks against positions of Moroccan occupation soldiers in Mahbes sector’,Sahara Press Service, 10 February 2024
114
‘SPLA carries out new attacks against Moroccan occupation soldiers’ entrancement in Mahbes Sector’,Sahara Press Service, 3 March 2024; ‘SPLA targets base of Moroccan occupation forces in Mahbes sector’,Sahara Press Service, 9 March 2024
115
‘SPLA carries out new attacks on positions of Moroccan occupying forces in Mahbes and Farsia sectors’, Sahara Press Service, 28 April 2024; ‘SPLA carries out new attack against military base of Moroccan Royal Army in Mahbes sector’, Sahara Press Service, 14 April 2024
116
‘SPLA carries out new attacks targeting soldiers of Moroccan occupier in Smara sector’,Sahara Press Service, 5 May 2024; ‘SPLA carries out new attacks against Moroccan occupation army in Mahbes sector’, Sahara Press Service, 11 May 2024
117
‘SPLA carries out new attacks against Moroccan occupation bases in Galta sector’, Sahara Press Service, 30 June 2024; ‘SPLA carries out new attacks against Moroccan occupying troops’ bases in Mahbes sector’, Sahara Press Service, 18 June 2024
118
‘SPLA carries out new attacks against Moroccan occupation army in Mahbes sector’, Sahara Press Service, 6 July 2024
119
‘SPLA carries out attacks against Moroccan occupation military bases in Mahbes sector’,Sahara Press Service, 3 August 2024; ‘SPLA carries out attacks against Moroccan occupation forces in Farsia sector’,Sahara Press Service, 4 August 2024
120
‘SPLA targets Moroccan enemy’s entrenchments in Amgala sector’, Sahara Press Service, 24 September 2024; ‘SPLA targets Moroccan occupation forces’ bases in Mahbes sector’, Sahara Press Service, 10 September 2024
121
‘SPLA inflicts heavy human and material losses on Moroccan occupation forces in Mahbes sector’, Sahara Press Service, 22 October 2024; ‘SPLA targets Moroccan occupation forces stationed in Amgala sector’, Sahara Press Service, 9 October 2024
122
‘SPLA units target rear bases of Moroccan occupation forces in Mahbes sector’,Sahara Press Service, 9 November 2024; ‘SPLA targets Moroccan occupation forces in Amgala sector’, Sahara Press Service, 26 November 2024
123
‘SPLA units target Moroccan occupation base in Amgala sector’, Sahara Press Service, 8 December 2024; ‘SPLA units target Moroccan occupation army base in Guelta sector’,Sahara Press Service, 22 December 2024
124
‘SPLA carries out attacks against positions of Moroccan occupation soldiers in Houza and Farsia sectors’,Sahara Press Service, 18 January 2025; ‘SPLA targets Moroccan army bases in Farsiya sector’,Sahara Press Service, 18 January 2025
125
‘SPLA targets Moroccan occupation army positions in Mahbes and Farsia sectors’, Sahara Press Service, 14 February 2025; ‘SPLA targets command post of Moroccan occupation army in Guelta sector’, Sahara Press Service, 23 February 2025
126
‘SPLA units target support and supply positions of Moroccan occupation soldiers in Guelta sector’, Sahara Press Service, 15 March 2025; ‘SPLA targets headquarters of Moroccan occupation army in Mahbes sector’,Sahara Press Service, 5 March 2025
127
‘SPLA carries out new attacks against positions of Moroccan occupation forces in Mahbès sector’,Sahara Press Service, 7 April 2025; ‘SPLA units target positions of Moroccan occupation soldiers in Hawza sector’,Sahara Press Service, 17 April 2025
128
‘SPLA carries out new attacks against Moroccan occupation forces in Smara sector’, Sahara Press Service, 3 May 2025; ‘SPLA targets positions of Moroccan occupation soldiers in Guelta sector’,Sahara Press Service, 28 May 2025
129
‘SPLA units target Moroccan occupation military base in Farsia sector’, Sahara Press Service, 15 June 2025
130
‘SPLA destroys Moroccan occupation forces’ artillery positions in Hawza sector’, Sahara Press Service, 12 July 2025; ‘SPLA targets bases of Moroccan occupation forces in Auserd region’,Sahara Press Service, 2 July 2025
131
‘SPLA targets Moroccan occupation forces’ bases in Amgala and Hawza sectors’, Sahara Press Service, 7 August 2025; ‘SPLA targets two Moroccan occupation military bases in Farsia sector’, Sahara Press Service, 6 August 2025
132
‘SPLA targets Moroccan enemy bases in Farsia sector’, Sahara Press Service, 23 September 2025; ‘SPLA targets Moroccan occupation army base in Mahbas sector’, Sahara Press Service, 5 September 2025
133
‘SPLA targets base of Moroccan occupation forces in Farsiya Sector’, Sahara Press Service, 27 October 2025; ‘SPLA targets positions and headquarters of Moroccan occupation forces in Mahbes and Guelta sectors’,Sahara Press Service, 16 October 2025
134
‘SPLA targets Moroccan occupation forces in Mahbes sector’, Sahara Press Service, 26 November 2025; ‘SPLA targets artillery positions of Moroccan occupation army in Guelta sector’, Sahara Press Service, 6 November 2025
135
‘SPLA targets Moroccan army positions in Farsia and Guelta sectors’,Sahara Press Service, 22 December 2025; ‘SPLA inflicts heavy losses on Moroccan occupation forces in Farsia sector’, Sahara Press Service, 23 December 2025.
136
‘Situation concerning Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2023/729, 3 October 2023, para 33.
137
‘A UN envoy has made his first visit to Western Sahara. He pledged to advance the political process’, Independent, 8 September 2023; B. El Atti, ‘For the first time, United Nations Western Sahara envoy De Mistura visits disputed territory’, The New Arab, 5 September 2023.
138
‘Situation concerning Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2023/729, 3 October 2023, paras 34-37; B. El Atti, ‘For the first time, United Nations Western Sahara envoy De Mistura visits disputed territory’, The New Arab, 5 September 2023; ‘Morocco demands Western Sahara deal ‘based exclusively’ on its plan’, i24 News, 8 September 2023.
139
‘Situation concerning Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2023/729, 3 October 2023, para 35.
140
B. El Atti, ‘For the first time, United Nations Western Sahara envoy De Mistura visits disputed territory’, The New Arab, 5 September 2023; ‘Morocco demands Western Sahara deal ‘based exclusively’ on its plan’, i24 News, 8 September 2023; ‘Letter dated 11 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc S/2007/206, 13 April 2007.
141
‘Situation concerning Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2023/729, 3 October 2023, para 27.
142
‘Situation concerning Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2023/729, 3 October 2023, para 38.
143
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, April 2024; ‘Sahara: Morocco’s FM meets Staffan de Mistura in Rabat ahead of UN consultations’, Yabiladi, 24 March 2025; K. Bensekkaim, ‘Algeria’s Attaf Meets UN Envoy De Mistura On Western Sahara’, Al 24 News, 16 September 2025; ‘Representative of Polisario Front holds talks with Staffan de Mistura’, Sahara Press Service, 15 April 2024; ‘UN envoy meets Polisario Front representatives in Algeria’, Africa News, 4 September 2022, Updated 13 August 2024.
144
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, April 2024; K. Bensekkaim, ‘Algeria’s Attaf Meets UN Envoy De Mistura On Western Sahara’, Al 24 News, 16 September 2025; ‘Representative of Polisario Front holds talks with Staffan de Mistura’, Sahara Press Service, 15 April 2024.
145
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, April 2024; ‘Sahara: Morocco’s FM meets Staffan de Mistura in Rabat ahead of UN consultations’, Yabiladi, 24 March 2025; K. Bensekkaim, ‘Algeria’s Attaf Meets UN Envoy De Mistura On Western Sahara’, Al 24 News, 16 September 2025; ‘Representative of Polisario Front holds talks with Staffan de Mistura’, Sahara Press Service, 15 April 2024.
146
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, October 2024; ‘UN envoy proposes Western Sahara partition plan’, Reuters, 17 October 2024; R. Bousmid, ‘Partition of Western Sahara: UN envoy’s suggestion rejected by all sides’, The Africa Report, 23 October 2024.
147
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, October 2024; ‘UN envoy proposes Western Sahara partition plan’, Reuters, 17 October 2024; R. Bousmid, ‘Partition of Western Sahara: UN envoy’s suggestion rejected by all sides’, The Africa Report, 23 October 2024.
148
R. Bousmid, ‘Partition of Western Sahara: UN envoy’s suggestion rejected by all sides’, The Africa Report, 23 October 2024.
149
‘UN envoy proposes Western Sahara partition plan’, Reuters, 17 October 2024; R. Bousmid, ‘Partition of Western Sahara: UN envoy’s suggestion rejected by all sides’, The Africa Report, 23 October 2024.
150
R. Bousmid, ‘Partition of Western Sahara: UN envoy’s suggestion rejected by all sides’, The Africa Report, 23 October 2024.
151
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, October 2024; ‘UN envoy proposes Western Sahara partition plan’, Reuters, 17 October 2024; R. Bousmid, ‘Partition of Western Sahara: UN envoy’s suggestion rejected by all sides’, The Africa Report, 23 October 2024.
152
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, October 2024
153
‘Resolution 2756 (2024)’, UN Doc S/Res/2756 (2024), 31 October 2024.
154
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, March 2025; ‘De Mistura begins consultations ahead of closed-door session at Security Council’, Sahara Press Service, 11 March 2025; ‘UN Security Council holds closed-door meeting on Western Sahara issue’, Sahara Press Service, 14 April 2025.
155
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, March 2025; ‘De Mistura begins consultations ahead of closed-door session at Security Council’, Sahara Press Service, 11 March 2025.
156
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, March 2025; ‘De Mistura begins consultations ahead of closed-door session at Security Council’, Sahara Press Service, 11 March 2025; F. Naim, ‘Western Sahara: Bourita Meets UN Envoy Ahead of UN Security Council Talks’, Morocco World News, 24 March 2025.
157
S. Bennis, ‘De Mistura’s Shift Puts Final Nail in Coffin of Algeria’s Exposed Western Sahara Agenda’, Morocco World News, 16 April 2025; M. Jaabouk, ‘Sahara: De Mistura aligns with roadmap outlined by the Trump administration’, Yabiladi, 15 April 2025; ‘UN envoy calls for resolution in Western Sahara conflict’, BSS News, 15 April 2025; ‘Security Council : Briefing of UN Personal Envoy for Western Sahara Staffan de Mistura’, Maghreb Online, 16 April 2025.
158
S. Kasraoui, ‘De Mistura’s Favorable Tone on Autonomy Plan Could Strike Nerve Among Pro-Polisario Advocates’, Morocco World News, 15 April 2025.
159
‘Security Council : Briefing of UN Personal Envoy for Western Sahara Staffan de Mistura’, Maghreb Online, 16 April 2025; S. Kasraoui, ‘De Mistura’s Favorable Tone on Autonomy Plan Could Strike Nerve Among Pro-Polisario Advocates’, Morocco World News, 15 April 2025.
160
‘UN envoy calls for resolution in Western Sahara conflict’, BSS News, 15 April 2025
161
M. Jaabouk, ‘Sahara: De Mistura aligns with roadmap outlined by the Trump administration’, Yabiladi, 15 April 2025
162
‘A Window for Diplomacy in Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, 20 October 2025.
163
UN Security Council ‘Resolution 2797 (2025)’, 31 October 2025.
164
UN Security Council ‘Resolution 2797 (2025)’ 31 October 2025.
165
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, October 2025; F. Di Pede, ‘UN Security Council Resolution 2797 (2025): a setback for Western Sahara’s self-determination?’, SIDI Blog, 5 February 2026; ‘UN Security Council supports Morocco’s plan for Western Sahara’, Al Jazeera, 31 October 2025.
166
UN Security Council ‘Resolution 2797 (2025)’, 31 October 2025.
167
F. Di Pede, ‘UN Security Council Resolution 2797 (2025): a setback for Western Sahara’s self-determination?’, SIDI Blog, 5 February 2026.
168
‘UN Security Council supports Morocco’s plan for Western Sahara’, Al Jazeera, 31 October 2025; ‘UN approves resolution supporting Morocco’s claim to Western Sahara’, The Guardian, 31 October 2025; M. El-Houni, ‘New horizons after the UN vote on Morocco’s Sahara’, The Arab Weekly, 1 November 2025; A. Faouzi, ‘EU Adopts Unified Position Supporting Morocco’s Autonomy Plan for Western Sahara’, Morocco World News, 29 January 2026
169
B. Rukanga, ‘Morocco declares public holiday to mark UN approval of its Western Sahara plan’, BBC, 5 November 2025
170
UN, ‘With 11 Members Voting in Favour, 3 Abstaining, Security Council Adopts Resolution 2797 (2025), Renewing Mandate of UN Mission in Western Sahara for One Year’, UN Doc SC/16208, 31 October 2025.
171
‘Letter dated 17 November 2025 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc S/2025/764, 24 November 2025.
172
‘Letter dated 17 November 2025 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc S/2025/764, 24 November 2025.
173
‘South Africa warns against biased UNSC resolution and reaffirms Sahrawi right to Self-Determination’, Sahara Press Service, 31 October 2025
174
‘UN Security Council supports Morocco’s plan for Western Sahara’, Al Jazeera, 31 October 2025; ‘UN approves resolution supporting Morocco’s claim to Western Sahara’, The Guardian, 31 October 2025
175
‘In major shift, South Africa backs UN resolution on Moroccan autonomy plan’, Middle East Online, 12 December 2025.
176
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, November 2025; S. Temsamani, ‘Morocco signals inclusive vision in governance of Sahara autonomy’, The Arab Weekly, 14 November 2025.
177
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, December 2025; ‘Mr. Attaf received his Sahrawi counterpart’, People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
178
‘Polisario Front has not yet received any official invitation to resume negotiations with the occupying state (Polisario Representative to UN)’, Sahara Press Service, 3 December 2025.
179
‘Western Sahara Talks on Moroccan Autonomy Plan Open in Madrid Amid Secrecy Over Outcomes’, Assahifa, 8 February 2026.
180
S. Kasraoui, ‘De Mistura’s Favorable Tone on Autonomy Plan Could Strike Nerve Among Pro-Polisario Advocates’, Morocco World News, 15 April 2025.
181
‘Israel to recognise Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara soon, official says’, Reuters, 8 June 2023; ‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, June 2023
182
‘Israel recognises Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara’, Reuters, 17 July 2023; ‘Israel recognises Western Sahara as part of Morocco’, Al Jazeera, 17 July 2023; ‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, July 2023; ‘Situation concerning Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2023/729, 3 October 2023, para 24; M. Inbar, ‘Morocco’s King announces Israeli recognition of Western Sahara’, i24 News, 17 July 2023.
183
‘History in the Knesset: President of the Moroccan House of Councillors to make first-ever official visit to the Israeli parliament; Knesset Speaker MK Ohana: “A precedent-setting visit that signals a new era in Israel–Morocco relations”’, Knesset News, 4 September 2023
184
R. Manuel, ‘Israeli Company Opens Kamikaze Drone Plant in Morocco’, The Defense Post, 14 November 2025.
185
‘Time for International Re-engagement in Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, 11 March 2021.
186
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, April 2024; ‘France to fund Western Sahara projects in sign of closer ties with Morocco’, The Arab Weekly, 8 April 2024.
187
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, April 2024; ‘France reverses course to back Moroccan autonomy plan for disputed Western Sahara’, France 24, 30 July 2024; A. Eljechtimi and J. Irish, ‘France backs Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara’, Reuters, 30 July 2024.
188
‘France reverses course to back Moroccan autonomy plan for disputed Western Sahara’, France 24, 30 July 2024.
189
A. Eljechtimi and J. Irish, ‘France backs Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara’, Reuters, 30 July 2024
190
‘France reverses course to back Moroccan autonomy plan for disputed Western Sahara’, France 24, 30 July 2024; A. Eljechtimi and J. Irish, ‘France backs Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara’, Reuters, 30 July 2024.
191
F. Bobin, ‘Macron visits Morocco in reunion likely to irritate Algeria’, Le Monde, 27 October 2024, Updated 28 October 2025
192
‘Macron pledges French investment in Western Sahara under ‘Moroccan sovereignty’’, Le Monde, 29 October 2024.
193
S. Kasraoui, ‘De Mistura’s Favorable Tone on Autonomy Plan Could Strike Nerve Among Pro-Polisario Advocates’, Morocco World News, 15 April 2025; ‘Why are relations between Algeria and France so bad?’, Al Jazeera, 1 May 2025.
194
‘Secretary Rubio’s Meeting with Moroccan Foreign Minister Bourita’, U.S. Department of State, 8 April 2025; ‘Trump reaffirms support for Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara’, Reuters, 2 August 2025.
195
‘A UN envoy has made his first visit to Western Sahara. He pledged to advance the political process’, Independent, 8 September 2023; B. El Atti, ‘For the first time, United Nations Western Sahara envoy De Mistura visits disputed territory’, The New Arab, 5 September 2023; R. Redondo, ‘The US Under Secretary of State for North Africa visits Morocco against the backdrop of Western Sahara’, Atalayar, 7 September 2023; ‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, September 2023.
196
B. El Atti, ‘For the first time, United Nations Western Sahara envoy De Mistura visits disputed territory’, The New Arab, 5 September 2023; R. Redondo, ‘The US Under Secretary of State for North Africa visits Morocco against the backdrop of Western Sahara’, Atalayar, 7 September 2023.
197
B. El Atti, ‘For the first time, United Nations Western Sahara envoy De Mistura visits disputed territory’, The New Arab, 5 September 2023; R. Redondo, ‘The US Under Secretary of State for North Africa visits Morocco against the backdrop of Western Sahara’, Atalayar, 7 September 2023.
198
R. Redondo, ‘The US Under Secretary of State for North Africa visits Morocco against the backdrop of Western Sahara’, Atalayar, 7 September 2023; ‘USA reiterates support for Morocco’s ‘serious, credible, realistic’ Autonomy Plan’, Bahrain News Agency, 7 September 2023; ‘US Deputy Under Secretary of State for North Africa, Mr. Joshua Harris, reiterated, on September 07th, 2023, in Rabat, his country’s support for the autonomy plan as a serious, credible and realistic solution to the dispute over the Sahara’, Kingdom of Morocco: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates, 7 September 2023.
199
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, April 2025; S. Kasraoui, ‘US Congressman to Submit Legislation to Designate Polisario As Terrorist Group’, Morocco World News, 11 April 2025
200
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, March 2025; M. Rubin, ‘To Cut Waste, Eliminate Failed UN Peacekeeping Operations’, American Enterprise Institute, 19 March 2025.
201
S. Kasraoui, ‘US Congressman to Submit Legislation to Designate Polisario As Terrorist Group’, Morocco World News, 11 April 2025
202
‘H.R.4119 – Polisario Front Terrorist Designation Act’, Congress.Gov, 24 June 2025.
203
‘Morocco pushes for international designation of Polisario as a terrorist group’, The Arab Weekly, 13 August 2025.
204
M. Jaabouk, ‘US delegation visits Laayoune to discuss MINURSO personnel reduction with UN officials’, Yabiladi, 21 August 2025; ‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, August 2025.
205
M. Jaabouk, ‘Sahara: La MINURSO réduit la voilure, inquiétude au sein du Polisario’, Yabiladi, 2 April 2025.
206
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, March 2025; J. A. Pedraza, ‘Acciona and Cepsa/Moeve, among the companies selected by Morocco to develop green hydrogen projects in the Sahara’, Atalayar, 7 March 2025; ‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, September 2025; ‘US encourages investments in Morocco-ruled Western Sahara’, Reuters, 25 September 2025.
207
S. Goncalves, ‘Portugal signals support for Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara’, Reuters, 22 July 2025
208
A. Eljechtimi, ‘Ghana endorses Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara’, Reuters, 6 June 2025
209
J. Landale, ‘UK backs Morocco’s plan for disputed Western Sahara’, BBC, 2 June 2025
210
S. Kasraoui, ‘Kenyan Parliamentary Delegation Renews Support for Morocco’s Autonomy Plan’, Morocco World News, 1 September 2025
211
‘Chad opens consulate in Western Sahara, supporting Morocco’s sovereignty’, Alarabiya, 15 August 2024
212
‘Dominican Republic supports sovereignty over Sahara’, EU Reporter, 18 August 2024
213
‘The Republic of North Macedonia “considers the Autonomy Plan, put forward by the Kingdom of Morocco in 2007, as the unique basis for the settlement of this dispute.”’, Kingdom of Morocco: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation, and Moroccan Expatriates, 21 July 2025
214
I. Toutate, ‘Guatemala Backs Morocco’s Autonomy Plan for Western Sahara’, Morocco World News, 3 July 2025
215
‘Panama’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Javier Martínez-Acha Vasquez, reaffirmed, on Tuesday in New York, his country’s support for the autonomy initiative presented by Morocco for the definitive resolution of the regional dispute on the Moroccan Sahara’, Kingdom of Morocco: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation, and Moroccan Expatriates, 23 September 2025.
216
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, March 2025; J. A. Pedraza, ‘Acciona and Cepsa/Moeve, among the companies selected by Morocco to develop green hydrogen projects in the Sahara’, Atalayar, 7 March 2025.
217
P. Fabricius, ‘Western Sahara’s quest for independence seems to be flagging’, Institute for Security Studies, 16 August 2024.
218
R. Redondo, ‘Panama suspends relations with the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic’, Atalayar, 29 November 2024.
219
A. Faouzi, ‘Central Africa Leads Way as 40 Countries Back Morocco’s Sahara Sovereignty’, Morocco World News, 9 September 2025.
220
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, July 2023; M. Strauss, ‘Morocco-EU fisheries deal set to expire’, Deutsche Welle, 16 July 2023.
221
M. Strauss, ‘Morocco-EU fisheries deal set to expire’, Deutsche Welle, 16 July 2023; ‘Confirmed: EU fishing in occupied Western Sahara ends in July’, Western Sahara Resource Watch, 8 May 2023; O. McBride, ‘EU-Morocco Fisheries Agreement Expires with Spanish Fishing Fearing Future’, The Fishing Daily, 17 July 2023.
222
CJEU, ‘Joined Cases C-778/21 P and C-798/21 P: Commission and Council v Front Polisario’, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 4 October 2024; and ‘Joined Cases C-779/21 P and C-799/21 P: Commission and Council v Front Polisario’, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 4 October 2024.
223
‘Brussels and Rabat explore loopholes to sidestep Court rulings on Western Sahara’, Western Sahara Resource Watch, 29 July 2025.
224
‘EU seeks new trade talks with Morocco – Western Sahara included’, Western Sahara Resource Watch’, 25 August 2024.
225
‘EU seeks new trade talks with Morocco – Western Sahara included’, Western Sahara Resource Watch’, 25 August 2024.
226
M. Alaoui, ‘EU seeks ‘interim formula’ for Morocco fisheries deal, awaits Rabat’s response’, The Arab Weekly, 1 October 2025; A. Faouzi, ‘Spain Anticipates New Fishing Deal with Morocco Despite Opposition’, Morocco World News, 13 October 2025; ‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, October 2025
227
G. Zine, ‘European Commission approves EU-Morocco fishing agreement negotiations’, Yabiladi, 11 November 2025; S. Kasraoui, ‘EU Commission Approves Proposal for Negotiations on New Fishing Deal with Morocco’, Morocco World News, 11 November 2025.
228
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, December 2025; L. F. Naili, ‘EU-Morocco Agreement: Polisario Front to File New Appeal With ECJ Before Year-End’, Al 24 News, 1 December 2025.
229
‘UN envoy calls for resolution in Western Sahara conflict’, BSS News, 15 April 2025; S. Kasraoui, ‘De Mistura’s Favorable Tone on Autonomy Plan Could Strike Nerve Among Pro-Polisario Advocates’, Morocco World News, 15 April 2025; ‘Managing Tensions between Algeria and Morocco’, International Crisis Group, 29 November 2024.
230
R. Fabiani, ‘Paving the Way to Talks on Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, 20 July 2023
231
A. Lmrabet, ‘Morocco-Algeria Tension: Origins of a Long History of Mistrust and Hatred’, Politics Today, 7 July 2023
232
‘Managing Tensions between Algeria and Morocco’, International Crisis Group, 29 November 2024; R. Fabiani, ‘Paving the Way to Talks on Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, 20 July 2023.
233
R. Fabiani, ‘Paving the Way to Talks on Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, 20 July 2023.
234
‘Morocco backs UN talks on Western Sahara as new envoy visits’, The Arab Weekly, 14 January 2022; R. Fabiani, ‘Paving the Way to Talks on Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, 20 July 2023.
235
N. Kozlowski, ‘Western Sahara at the heart of fierce battle at the United Nations’, The Africa Report, 3 November 2023; ‘Algeria, Morocco spar over Western Sahara at UN’, Africa News, 27 September 2023, Updated 13 August 2024; F. Serrano, ‘Morocco and Algeria’s regional rivalry is about to go into overdrive’, Middle East Institute, 9 November 2023.
236
N. Kozlowski, ‘Western Sahara at the heart of fierce battle at the United Nations’, The Africa Report, 3 November 2023.
237
N. Kozlowski, ‘Western Sahara at the heart of fierce battle at the United Nations’, The Africa Report, 3 November 2023.
238
‘Breakdown in Algeria-Morocco Relations Threatens to Destabilize Maghreb’, Africa Defense Forum, 26 September 2023, Updated 27 September 2023.
239
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, December 2024; ‘Morocco wins ‘historic’ vote to preside over United Nations Human Rights Council’, The Arab Weekly, 10 January 2024; ‘Morocco to lead UN Human Rights Council despite South Africa’s disapproval’, Al Jazeera, 10 January 2024.
240
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, December 2024; ‘Morocco wins ‘historic’ vote to preside over United Nations Human Rights Council’, The Arab Weekly, 10 January 2024; ‘Morocco to lead UN Human Rights Council despite South Africa’s disapproval’, Al Jazeera, 10 January 2024.
241
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, May 2024; Sylvanus, ‘Moroccan UN Envoy Accuses Algeria of ’Diplomatic Terrorism’ in Western Sahara Dispute’, Bladi.net, 19 May 2024; ‘Caracas: Hilale Denounces Pressure Exerted by Algerian Ambassador on Delegations Supporting Sahara’s Moroccanness’, Assahifa, 19 May 2024.
242
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, August 2024; ‘Morocco and Algerian representatives brawl at TICAD meeting in Tokyo’, Arab News Japan, 24 August 2024.
243
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, August 2024; ‘Morocco and Algerian representatives brawl at TICAD meeting in Tokyo’, Arab News Japan, 24 August 2024.
244
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, August 2024; ‘Morocco and Algerian representatives brawl at TICAD meeting in Tokyo’, Arab News Japan, 24 August 2024.
245
S. Kasraoui, ‘King Mohammed VI Recommits to Reconciliation with Algeria, Touts Sahara Momentum’, Morocco World News, 29 July 2025; ‘Moroccan King Calls for Dialogue with Algeria on Throne Day’, APA News, 31 July 2025.
246
S. Kasraoui, ‘King Mohammed VI Recommits to Reconciliation with Algeria, Touts Sahara Momentum’, Morocco World News, 29 July 2025.
247
J. Shangobiyi, ‘Morocco and Algeria in UN spat as Sahara dispute resurfaces’, Maghrebi, 1 October 2025.
248
J. Shangobiyi, ‘Morocco and Algeria in UN spat as Sahara dispute resurfaces’, Maghrebi, 1 October 2025; M. Jaabouk, ‘At UN Assembly, Morocco renews King Mohammed VI’s olive branch to Algeria’, Yabiladi, 30 September 2025.
249
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, February 2024.
250
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, February 2024; H. Santorum, ‘Mansur Omar: “Estamos tratando que el conflicto saharaui quede en una baja intensidad”’, Nueva Revolucion, 10 February 2024.
251
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, February 2024; ‘Polisario 16th Congress, 13-20 January 2023’, Australia Western Sahara Association, 27 February 2023.
252
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, February 2024.
253
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, May 2025.
254
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, July 2024; M. Jaabouk, ‘Over 100 Polisario fighters defect in Tindouf’, Yabiladi, 17 July 2024.
255
M. Jaabouk, ‘Over 100 Polisario fighters defect in Tindouf’, Yabiladi, 17 July 2024.
256
M. Jaabouk, ‘Bachir Sayed s’inquiète du risque de «disparition du Polisario»’, Yabiladi, 8 July 2024; M. Jaabouk, ‘Polisario : Bachir Mustapha Sayed challenges leadership after mass defection’, Yabiladi, 19 July 2024.
257
M. Jaabouk, ‘Bachir Sayed s’inquiète du risque de «disparition du Polisario»’, Yabiladi, 8 July 2024; M. Jaabouk, ‘Polisario : Bachir Mustapha Sayed challenges leadership after mass defection’, Yabiladi, 19 July 2024.
258
M. Jaabouk, ‘Après Bachir Sayed, un autre haut cadre alerte sur un risque de «disparition du Polisario»’, Yabiladi, 9 July 2024.
259
M. Jaabouk, ‘Après Bachir Sayed, un autre haut cadre alerte sur un risque de «disparition du Polisario»’, Yabiladi, 9 July 2024.
260
M. Jaabouk, ‘Polisario leadership rift deepens as Brahim Ghali blocks extraordinary congress’, Yabiladi, 21 July 2025.
261
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, July 2024.
262
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, September 2024; M. Jaabouk, ‘Polisario: Bachir Sayed prepares his candidacy to succeed Brahim Ghali’, Yabiladi, 3 September 2024.
263
A. Faouzi, ‘Polisario Mutiny: Pro-Separatist Sahrawi Media Denounces Brahim Ghali as ‘Failed Tyrant’’, Morocco World News, 2 September 2025.
264
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, November 2025.
265
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, November 2025.
266
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, January 2025; ‘WSRW partner’s office firebombed’, Western Sahara Resource Watch, 13 January 2025; ‘Terrorist attack against Danish NGO Global Aktion in Copenhagen: A Moroccan criminal message in flames’, Sahara Press Service, 14 January 2025.
267
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, January 2025; ‘WSRW partner’s office firebombed’, Western Sahara Resource Watch, 13 January 2025; ‘Terrorist attack against Danish NGO Global Aktion in Copenhagen: A Moroccan criminal message in flames’, Sahara Press Service, 14 January 2025.
268
‘WSRW partner’s office firebombed’, Western Sahara Resource Watch, 13 January 2025; ‘Terrorist attack against Danish NGO Global Aktion in Copenhagen: A Moroccan criminal message in flames’, Sahara Press Service, 14 January 2025.
269
Terrorist attack against Danish NGO Global Aktion in Copenhagen: A Moroccan criminal message in flames’, Sahara Press Service, 14 January 2025
270
‘El Frente POLISARIO condena el ataque terrorista marroquí contra sede de asociación de apoyo al Sáhara Occidental en Copenhague’, Ecsaharaui, 13 December 2025; M. Jaabouk, ‘Denmark : Polisario accuses Morocco of involvement in fire at NGO headquarters’, Yabiladi, 14 January 2025.
271
‘Terrorist attack against Danish NGO Global Aktion in Copenhagen: A Moroccan criminal message in flames’, Sahara Press Service, 14 January 2025.
272
‘British man charged with burning down Danish pro-Polisario NGO headquarters’, Hespress, 18 January 2025; L. Babas, ‘Danish police arrest British suspect in arson of pro-Polisario NGO headquarters’, Yabiladi, 17 January 2025.
273
‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, January 2025.
274
‘Article 42 of Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907’, ICRC International Humanitarian Law Databases.
275
T. Ferraro and L. Cameron, ‘Article 2: Application of the Convention’, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, ICRC, 2016, para 302; and ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict, RULAC, October 2015.
276
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11-12; International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict, RULAC, October 2015, 11; T. Ferraro ‘Determining the Beginning and End of an Occupation Under International Humanitarian Law’, International Review of the Red Cross, 2012
277
‘Article 1 – General principles and scope of application – Commentary of 1987’, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), International Humanitarian Law Databases, International Committee of the Red Cross, para 112.
278
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, ‘Central Front, Ethiopia’s Claim 2’, Partial Award, 28 April 2004, para 29.
279
‘Article 2 – Application of the Convention– Commentary of 2025’, Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, International Humanitarian Law Databases, International Committee of the Red Cross, para 395.
280
S. El Hafed, ‘Sahrawi people will not renounce their right to self-determination and independence, whatever the cost (Minister of Cooperation)’, Sahara Press Service, 29 January 2026; ‘POLISARIO affirms Sahrawi people’s strong commitment to self-determination and independence, and to defending their rights and sovereignty by all legitimate means’, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic: Embassy to Ethiopia & Permanent Representation to the African Union, 5 November 2025; K. Fadel, ‘Self-Determination Is the Only Endgame for Western Sahara’, Modern Diplomacy, 15 May 2025
281
M. Elbaikan, ‘Why the World Must Support the Western Saharan People’s Just and Lawful Struggle for Self-Determination’, Dawn, 5 November 2025; ‘Strong support for Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination at commemoration of Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’, Sahara Press Service, 20 December 2025.
282
‘Article 2 – Application of the Convention– Commentary of 2025’, Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, International Humanitarian Law Databases, International Committee of the Red Cross, para 370.
283
M. Sassòli, ‘International Humanitarian Law’, Edward Elgar, 2019.
284
‘Situation Concerning the Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2024/707, 1 October 2024, para 20; Sylvanus, ‘Morocco Deploys Heavy Artillery Near Western Sahara Border’, Bladi.net, 19 January 2024; ‘Middle East and North Africa: Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, January 2024; ‘Situation Concerning Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2019/282, 1 April 2019, para 34.
285
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11.
286
J. Besenyő, ‘Guerrilla Operations in Western Sahara: The Polisario versus Morocco and Mauritania’, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 2017; L. El Fehaim, ‘The origins of the conflicts in Western Sahara’, Eismena, 6 January 2026.
287
‘The Moroccan Wall Still Stands’, Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, 23 February 2015; ‘World’s barriers: Western Sahara’, BBC News, 5 November 2009; H. McNeish, ‘Western Sahara’s struggle for freedom cut off by a wall’, Al Jazeera, 5 June 2015
288
‘Relaunching Negotiations over Western Sahara’, International Crisis Group, 14 October 2021
289
A. MacDonald, ‘Fifty years of plunder: How Morocco and its allies profit from Western Sahara’, Middle East Eye, 6 November 2025.
290
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11.
291
US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ‘2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices’, 11 March 2010.
292
W. Shefte, ‘Western Sahara’s stranded refugees consider renewal of Morocco conflict’, The Guardian, 6 January 2015.

Morocco – Western Sahara

Reporting period: July 2024 - June 2025

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (between 2023 and 2025)

Ongoing Hostilities

UN’s Attempted Revival of Solving the Western Sahara Question

Increased International Support for Morocco’s Autonomy Plan

Judgments by the Court of Justice of the European Union

Continued Acrimony Between Morocco and Algeria

Tensions within the Polisario Front

Attack against Pro-Polisario Organization in Copenhagen

International Armed Conflict

Occupation of part of Western Sahara by Morocco

Parties to the Conflict

Occupation

International Armed Conflict

Other Main actors