Niger

The two existing non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) in Niger continued throughout the review period:

Niger v Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP)
Niger v Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)

Niger is a State Party to Additional Protocol II of 1977.¹ The NIACs to which Niger is a party continue to meet the additional requirements of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II, and this treaty is applicable.

Niger gained its independence from France in 1960. Its first president, Hamani Diori, headed a socialist one-party regime.² President Diori maintained a political, economic and military partnership with France, specifically in uranium mining.³ A French State-owned company Orano (formerly Areva) mined uranium near the city of Arlit from 1971.⁴ By 2020, Niger was the eighth largest uranium producer worldwide. ⁵ For a considerable period, Niger has played a pivotal role in the global supply of this nuclear material, especially for the production of nuclear energy and weapons by France.⁶

An unprecedented drought from 1968 to 1974, which was mismanaged by President Diori, contributed to the coup led by Seyni Kountché in 1974, who later suspended Niger’s constitution and dissolved the National Assembly.⁷ A multi-party democracy was introduced in 1993 following mass protests; however, three coups occurred in the next eighteen years – in 1996, 1999 and 2010.⁸ Following a period of transition in the aftermath of the 2010 coup, Mahamadou Issoufou of the Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS) was elected president in April 2011.⁹ The international community regards the 2021 election of Issoufou’s successor, Mohamed Bazoum, also of the PNDS, as the first democratic and legitimate change of government since Niger’s independence.¹⁰

With the approval of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), a multinational force has been stationed in Niger since 2013.¹¹ Between 2016 and 2024, a German MINUSMA contingent maintained an air transport base at Niamey airport.¹² Various military and security missions were subsequently stationed in Niger, in which the armed forces of several European Union (EU) member States trained Nigerien police officers and soldiers, namely the EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger), the EU Military Partnership Mission in Niger (EUMPM), and the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) Gazelle as part of the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM).¹³

Additionally, in 2014, France initiated Operation ‘Barkhane’, a long-term counterterrorism operation spanning five nations in the Sahel: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.¹⁴ At its peak, this operation involved approximately 5,000 French military personnel.¹⁵ Following the coup in Mali in 2020, France repositioned around 1,500 troops to Niger.¹⁶ The United States had two military bases in Niger, known as Air Base 101 and Air Base 201, and began conducting drone operations there in 2013.¹⁷ For more than a decade, United States (US) military personnel trained Nigerien forces and provided assistance to partner-led counterterrorism operations in the region, targeting both Islamic State and al-Qaeda.¹⁸

For a long time, Niger was regarded by Western nations as a cornerstone of stability in the Sahel.¹⁹ This positive image collapsed when military forces staged a coup in July 2023 and, with significant public support, broke ties to the West, particularly France.²⁰ In view of the coups that had previously occurred in Mali in 2020 and in Burkina Faso in 2022, it was evident a pivotal moment had been reached in the Sahel, albeit with an uncertain trajectory.²¹

Niger is engaged in armed conflict and is experiencing internal disturbances in three different regions. In the Diffa region in the east, the Nigerian group Boko Haram has carried out repeated attacks since 2015.²² In the southern Dosso, Maradi and Tahoua regions, local gangs operate with the support of Islamist terrorist groups from northwest Nigeria, engaging in activities that fall below the armed conflict threshold such as cattle theft, commercial kidnapping and smuggling. ²³ The third conflict zone is in the Tillabéri region in the north-west that borders Burkina Faso and Mali, where the terrorist networks ‘Group in Support of Islam and Muslims’ (JNIM), which is affiliated with al-Qaeda, and ‘Islamic State – Sahel Province’ (ISSP) operate.²⁴ Unlike in the east and south, where State security forces have successfully contained the violence, the situation in Tillabéri has steadily worsened since 2017.²⁵

Conflict in Niger is caused by complex structural factors similar to those affecting other countries in the Sahel.²⁶ These factors include economic weakness, poor infrastructure and living conditions, corruption, inadequate security, radical Islamist preachers, and the climate crisis.²⁷ More than 180,000 cases of conflict-related internal displacement were reported in Niger in 2023 by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the country’s highest figure since records began in 2015.²⁸ At the end 2024, 412,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) were recorded in Niger, most in the regions of Tillabéri and Diffa, in the Lake Chad basin. ²⁹ The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate.³⁰

Creation of the ‘Alliance of Sahel States’ (AES) between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger

Following the ECOWAS threat of military intervention in Niger, the military authorities in Bamako and Ouagadougou jointly stated on 1 August 2023 that any military intervention by ECOWAS in Niger would be considered a declaration of war against Mali and Burkina Faso.⁸³ The next day, a senior junta leader, General Salifou Modi, met the transitional presidents of Mali and Burkina Faso in their respective capitals to discuss the potential for cooperation between the three States.⁸⁴ Following these talks, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso signed a charter on 16 September 2023 to establish the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), in an initiative to create a framework for collective defence and mutual assistance.⁸⁵ from the Permanent Representative of Mali to the United Nations addressed to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc S/2023/695, 3 October 2023.

On 1 December 2023, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger announced their decision to form a three-state confederation, establish a stabilisation fund and an investment bank, and eventually introduce a common currency.⁸⁶ The next day, Burkina Faso and Niger followed Mali’s lead in leaving the G5 Sahel anti-jihadist alliance. Mauritania and Chad, the two remaining members, acknowledged on 6 December 2023 that the three founding members had left the alliance, paving the way for its dissolution.⁸⁷

The foreign ministers of the AES convened in Niamey, the capital of Niger, on 17 May 2024 to finalize the documents establishing the alliance.⁸⁸ On 20 May 2024, AES initiated joint military exercises in conjunction with Chadian and Togolese troops in Niger’s western region.⁸⁹ An AES summit was held on 6 July 2024 in Niamey to deliberate over joint military operations and the decision to exit ECOWAS was reaffirmed.⁹⁰

In early 2025, the governments of the three alliance Member States began issuing common biometric passports.⁹¹ On 21 January 2025, Nigerien Defence Minister Salifou Modi announced the formation of a 5,000-strong military unit, known as the ‘unified force’, to fight terrorism.⁹² Between late February and mid-March 2025, the unified force conducted Operation ‘Yereko 2’ in the tri-border area, which includes Tillabéri, which seemingly targeted IS Sahel, though the number of casualties is unknown.⁹³ In the interim, on 29 March 2025, the Nigerien government declared its withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), originally established in 1994 by Nigeria to combat terrorism in the Lake Chad basin, citing the imperative to fortify security measures at oil facilities.⁹⁴

Rupture with former colonial power France

The July 2023 coup leadership skilfully exploited a prevailing animosity towards former colonial power France.⁹⁵ On 25 August 2023, the junta ordered Sylvain Itte, the French ambassador in Niamey, to depart the country within 48 hours.⁹⁶ Three days later, however, French President Macron announced that Itte would remain in his post, which reportedly prompted the junta to order the police to expel Itte in the following days.⁹⁷ On 1 September 2023, the junta accused French President Emmanuel Macron of using ECOWAS as a ‘neo-colonial project’.⁹⁸ Tens of thousands of people demonstrated in Niamey and the south-western town of Ouallam, demanding the withdrawal of French forces.⁹⁹

Amid these heightened tensions, on 24 September 2023, France announced it was ending its military cooperation with Niger and withdrawing French soldiers by the end of the year.¹⁰⁰ The French ambassador to Niger left for Paris on 27 September 2023, a month after he had been ordered to leave by the junta.¹⁰¹ In early October, the 1,500 French troops began withdrawing from the Tillabéri region.¹⁰² The final French military forces departed from Niger in December 2023, marking the official conclusion of military cooperation between the two nations. ¹⁰³

The permanent closure of the French embassy in Niamey was confirmed on 2 January 2024, on the basis that serious impediments had made the implementation of its mission impossible.¹⁰⁴ Later that year the Nigerien Foreign Minister, Sangaré, accused France of training, financing and arming terrorist groups in the Sahel.¹⁰⁵ On an economic level, on 21 January 2025, French company Orano declared its intention to pursue further arbitration proceedings concerning the revocation in June 2024 of the permit for the uranium mine.¹⁰⁶

Shifting security alliances from Western States to Russia

Niger made an observable shift away from its former Western State allies during the reporting period. After the Nigerien junta requested the departure of the French ambassador and troops from Niger in August 2024¹⁰⁷, it expelled the UN Resident Coordinator in Niger, Louise Aubin, on 10 October 2023, citing ‘underhand manoeuvres’ by the UN, including the non-accreditation of Niger’s representatives at international conferences.¹⁰⁸

Two defence and security partnerships with the EU were terminated on 4 December 2023 by the junta, namely the EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) and the EU Military Partnership Mission in Niger (EUMPM).¹¹² On 26 January 2024, Nigerien authorities expelled fifteen staff members of EUCAP Sahel Niger.¹¹³

In a parallel development, on 4 December 2023, General Tchiani received a Russian delegation and concluded agreements to strengthen bilateral military cooperation.¹¹⁴ After the signing of the military cooperation agreements with Russia in December 2023, Prime Minister Zeine led a delegation to Moscow on 16 January 2024, where both nations declared their intention to further strengthen military cooperation.¹¹⁵

In a battle for military influence in Niger, on 13 December 2023, following a visit to Niamey, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Molly Phee, said that the United States was ready to restart collaboration with Niger after it had suspended cooperation in the aftermath of the coup.¹¹⁶ After a US diplomatic delegation repeatedly travelled to Niamey to meet with Prime Minister Zeine and others on 12 March 2024, the Nigerien authorities renounced their military accords with Washington with immediate effect four days later.¹¹⁷ The junta leaders accused the delegation of disrespecting diplomatic protocol and of intending to restrict Niamey’s ability to choose its international partners.¹¹⁸ On 27 March 2024, the Nigerian government and the US ambassador discussed the withdrawal of US forces ¹¹⁹

Following the break with Washington, protests in support of the government and calling for the immediate withdrawal of US forces took place on 13 and 21 April 2024.¹²⁰ From 15 to 19 May, a US delegation held talks with Nigerien officials in Niamey on an exit of the US military personnel by 15 September 2024.¹²¹ Prime Minister Zeine claimed that a lack of US military support in the fight against jihadists had led to the breakdown of security ties, but he also welcomed US engagement in economic investment.¹²² The withdrawal of US troops formally started on 7 June, officially concluding on 16 September 2024.¹²³

In terms of Niger’s cooperation with the EU, the EU announced that 30 June 2024 would mark the end of the EU’s military mission, EUMPM.¹²⁴ On 29 May 2024, however, Germany announced that its troops would temporarily remain at an air transport base outside Niamey until the final withdrawal of the remaining thirty-eight German soldiers by 31 August 2024.¹²⁵ On 22 November, Nigerien authorities accused the EU ambassador of mishandling food aid, and the EU subsequently declared that it had recalled its envoy from Niger the following day.¹²⁶

Reflecting the shifting nature of military alliances, around 100 Russian military instructors and equipment arrived in Niamey on 10 April 2024, with a mission to train Nigerien forces to use new equipment, including anti-aircraft systems.¹²⁷ The presence of troops potentially linked to the Russian paramilitary group Africa Corps, formerly known as Wagner Group, was declared via social media on 12 April.¹²⁸ On 3 June 2024, the Russian Deputy Defence Minister met with President General Tchiani and Prime Minister Zeine to negotiate defence and energy cooperation.¹²⁹ The Nigerien government later revealed that it was looking for investment from Russia in uranium and other resources.¹³⁰

Creation of the ‘Patriotic Movement for Freedom and Justice’ (MPLJ)

The Patriotic Movement for Freedom and Justice (MPLJ) was created in early August 2024 following division within the ranks of the Patriotic Liberation Front (PLF), a group campaigning for the reinstatement of the ousted Nigerien president, Bazoum.¹³¹ It claimed responsibility for its first attack on 17 September 2024, targeting a military position in the town of Chirfa, Agadez region, near the Libyan border.¹³² The MPLJ reportedly killed fourteen soldiers and two gendarmes, losing two fighters in the attack.¹³³

Restrictions on the media, activists and NGOs

During the reporting period, strict restrictions were placed on both local and international journalists, as well as on activists and NGOs. In early September 2024, Ivorian journalist Mathurin Adou was accused of ‘spying’ and, after being questioned by the authorities in Niamey, went missing.¹³⁴ He was subsequently indicted for threatening State security.¹³⁵ Prosecutors from Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger launched an inquiry into France 24 journalist Wassim Nasr on 25 September 2024 in relation to his analysis of a jihadist attack in Mali.¹³⁶ On 10 December 2024, Nigerien authorities revoked the BBC’s radio licence for three months, following its coverage of the attack in Chatoumane, and instructed local radio not to rebroadcast BBC programmes.¹³⁷

In early 2025, the government announced the suspension of the local Canal 3 TV and detained its journalist, Seyni Amadou, on 18 January 2025 after he hosted a programme discussing the government’s performance.¹³⁸ Amid overwhelming condemnation, however, the authorities reversed the measure on 20 January 2025 and released Amadou.¹³⁹

In respect of NGOs, Interior Minister General Mohamed Toumba signed a decree on 12 November 2024 withdrawing the licence to operate in Niger from French aid group Acted and their local partner.¹⁴⁰ The next day the Nigerien government withdrew the permit of the Dutch International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO).¹⁴¹ In a major reversal, the Nigerien government terminated its agreements with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on 4 February 2025 without explanation, ordering the immediate closure of its offices and the departure of its foreign staff.¹⁴² On 7 February 2025, the Interior Ministry established a technical committee to monitor the activities of NGOs and their adherence to the government’s vision.¹⁴³

On 3 December 2024, the authorities arrested human rights activist Moussa Tchangari and indicted him for advocating and being associated with terrorism.¹⁴⁴ Additional charges of ‘infringing on national defence’ and ‘intelligence with enemy countries’ were added by the Nigerien courts on 3 January 2025.¹⁴⁵ This action prompted an immediate outcry from seventeen NGOs and civil society leaders, who denounced the arbitrary arrest on 13 January 2025 and called for Moussa Tchangari’s release.¹⁴⁶

Revocations of citizenship and arrest of government opponents

On 10 October 2024, President Tchiani stripped nine of Bazoum’s allies of their citizenship, claiming they had colluded with hostile foreign powers.¹⁴⁷ Four ex-ministers who served under Bazoum were held on grounds of breaching national security and treason despite a court ruling in favour of their provisional release in July 2024.¹⁴⁸ The government then provisionally stripped seven individuals closely associated with Bazoum, including former ministers and Mahmoud Sallah, the leader of the pro-Bazoum armed group the Patriotic Liberation Front (PLF), of their nationality.¹⁴⁹ Mr Sallah was later arrested by Libyan security forces in southern Libya.¹⁵⁰ On 13 January 2025, the Nigerien authorities arrested former oil minister Mahaman Barké for reasons that remain opaque.¹⁵¹

A gesture of reconciliation was signalled by the junta on 1 April 2025 with the announcement of the release of almost fifty political and military figures.¹⁵² Among those to be released were members of the government that was ousted in July 2023, as well as military officers detained over coup attempts in 2015 and 2021.¹⁵³ The decision followed recommendations from the National Dialogue held in February 2025. The ousted President Bazoum, however, remains in detention.¹⁵⁴

Creation of Free Armed Forces (FAL) and Coordination of Free Forces of Niger

In late September 2024, former Minister of State, Rhissa Ag Boula, established the Free Armed Forces (FAL), a political and military movement that aims to overthrow the military authorities.¹⁵⁵ This step followed the dissolution of the Council of Resistance for the Republic (CRR), initially formed to work towards the restoration of democracy through peaceful and democratic means, which Rhissa Ag Boula announced on 25 September 2024.¹⁵⁶ The CRR’s interim president, Ousmane Abdoul Moumouni, had excluded Rhissa Ag Boula one day prior due to his insistence on war and his unwillingness to compromise.¹⁵⁷ On 5 October 2024, FAL and three other anti-government armed groups in support of Bazoum formed a coalition called the ‘Coordination of Free Forces of Niger’ to coordinate their actions.¹⁵⁸

Initiation of a national dialogue and the installation of a new government

A national dialogue on the future of the transition was held in Niamey on 15 to 20 February 2025, following the transitional government’s announcement on 14 September 2023 that it would be opening consultations at local level in preparation for dialogue.¹⁵⁹ The Nigerien government followed in the footsteps of Mali and Burkina Faso, where national dialogues held in the aftermath of military coups contributed to legitimizing the rule of the military.¹⁶⁰ On 21 February 2025, the commission announced its key recommendations.¹⁶¹ These included a renewable five-year transition period, the dismantling of all existing political parties, the adoption of a new constitution, and the creation of a “Consultative Council for Refoundation” as a legislative body.¹⁶² The opposition condemned the process for excluding all political parties, and various civil society organizations opted to boycott the conference.¹⁶³

On 26 March 2025, the government formally approved the recommendations from the national dialogue held in February, thereby consolidating military control.¹⁶⁴ At the same ceremony, General Tchiani was inaugurated as president for a five-year renewable term under the ‘Charter of Refoundation’, which replaced the constitution.¹⁶⁵ The following month, a reshuffle of the cabinet was carried out by Tchiani, with key officials such as Prime Minister Ali Lamine Zeine, Defence Minister General Salifou Modi, and Interior Minister General Mohamed Toumba remaining in place.¹⁶⁶ Eight newly appointed ministers were brought in, including pro-government civil society activist Abdoulaye Seydou, who assumed the role of commerce minister, and a prominent Muslim cleric Ali Ben Salah Hamouda, who was appointed culture minister.¹⁶⁷ On 1 May 2025, a decree signed by President Tchiani appointed 189 members to the Consultative Council of the Refoundation, which will function as an advisory legislative body during the five-year transitional period.¹⁶⁸

Mutinies among rank-and-file soldiers

Reports indicate that soldiers stationed at the garrison in Termit, a small desert locale in the Zinder region of southern Niger, have been protesting since 8 May 2025.¹⁶⁹ The soldiers voiced their discontent about poor living conditions, inadequate equipment, and delayed salary payments.¹⁷⁰ The discontent has escalated to the point at which disgruntled soldiers reportedly detained the Commander of the Zinder Military Zone and the Deputy Army Chief and demanded an in-person meeting with the Minister of Defence, General Salifou Modi.¹⁷¹

Between 24 and 25 June 2025, soldiers stationed in the towns of Filingué and Téra (in Tillabéri region) refused orders to deploy to the front to secure the convoys coming from Burkina Faso, claiming a lack of air and other support. ¹⁷² In Filingué, soldiers allegedly assaulted their commanding officer so badly he had to be medically evacuated to Niamey and then to Turkey for treatment.¹⁷³ Following the signing of decrees by President Tchiani on 30 May 2025 promoting seventeen officers, including Defence Minister General Salifou Modi, Interior Minister General Mohamed Toumba, and Chief of Army Staff General Salifou Barmou, an outcry erupted on social media in June 2025 about the rewarding of ‘armchair officers’, while frontline troops suffered casualties and lacked support.¹⁷⁴

Violence involving Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province

Occasional clashes and other activities involving the non-state armed groups Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) occurred on Nigerien territory during the reporting period. This section discusses first Boko Haram and then ISWAP.

Following the rift in 2016 that saw Boko Haram divide into two factions, the faction under the command of Abubakar Shekau reverted to the name Jama’at Ahl al Sunna li Da’wa wal Jihad.¹⁷⁵ Significant territory was lost, and Boko Haram was weakened after Shekau’s death in 2021.¹⁷⁶ After 2022, however, Bakura Doro assumed command of the group and its primary stronghold on the islands of Lake Chad, on the border between Niger and Chad.¹⁷⁷ Boko Haram subsequently strengthened its dominion over the Nigerien and Chadian sections of the lake, as well as Barwa in Niger.¹⁷⁸ As of September 2024, Bakura was actively enlisting fighters in Niger’s Diffa region.¹⁷⁹

On 8 November 2023, Boko Haram fighters accidentally encountered the Niger Armed Forces (FAN) as fighters were walking in the bush south of Toumour, a rural commune located near the Niger-Nigeria border. The resulting clashes saw three Nigerien soldiers killed. ¹⁸⁰ On 23 April 2024, Boko Haram ambushed a convoy of the Nigerien military, injuring at least four soldiers.¹⁸¹ Boko Haram was suspected of having attacked a defence and security forces outpost in the vicinity of N’Guigmi, in Diffa region, on 30 April 2024. Security forces repelled the attack, killing three militants.¹⁸² On 11 June 2024, FAN and Boko Haram clashed in Bargara, in the Diffa region of Niger close to the border of Nigeria. These clashes killed ten Boko Haram fighters.¹⁸³ It was suspected that Boko Haram might have been involved in a clash that occurred in September 2024, in which five soldiers were killed.¹⁸⁴ These attacks could be described as incidental and infrequent, and do not meet the intensity requirements demanded by international humanitarian law (IHL) to constitute a NIAC.

When Boko Haram splintered into two factions in 2016, one rebranded under the name Islamic State West Africa Province.¹⁸⁵ Its operations are primarily concentrated in north-eastern Nigeria, with activities throughout the Lake Chad region and on Nigeria’s borders with Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.¹⁸⁶ Since 2022, ISWAP has increased its operations and extended its area of influence, incorporating other Islamic State affiliates in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso into a new structure in which the ISWAP leader exerts influence over their campaigns.¹⁸⁷

In January 2024, FAN encountered ISWAP fighters in Diffa near the Nigerian border. Fighting only lasted about twenty minutes but saw ten soldiers and several fighters killed. FAN called in air support to target ISWAP fighters rowing towards the shores of Lake Chad.¹⁸⁸ On 19 February 2024, ISWAP militants attacked a national guard position in Assaga Koura, Diffa region, killing two guards and an unspecified number of militants.¹⁸⁹ In March, FAN once again used its air force to execute strikes against ISWAP in Diffa, killing ten fighters.¹⁹⁰ ISWAP may have attacked a military convoy on 14 August 2024, killing at least four civilians.¹⁹¹ ISWAP is also accused of attacking the Nigerien military near the village of Chetimari in Niger‘s Diffa region on 1 October 2024.¹⁹² ISWAP may have been involved in an attack on a military outpost in Diffa region on 16 March 2025, killing at least four soldiers, and, according to the Nigerien government, dozens of ISWAP fighters.¹⁹³ These violent encounters, which could positively be attributed to violence generated between FAN and ISWAP, seem almost accidental (ISWAP being unexpectedly found by FAN on Nigerien territory) and sporadic, and do not equate to protracted armed violence.

Non-international armed conflict between Niger and the Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP)

Background

ISSP, known as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) between 2015 and 2019, started launching offensives in the Sahel in September 2016, primarily targeting Burkinabe and Nigerien military and security force positions.¹ These first attacks comprised an incursion on a tax office in Markoye, an assault on a military base in Intagom, and an unsuccessful prison break attempt in Koutoukale.² On 4 October 2017, a joint US-Nigerien patrol was ambushed by nearly 100 ISIS-Sahel militants in Tongo Tongo, killing four US and six Nigerien personnel.³ Following its integration into ISWAP between 2019 and 2022, ISSP was finally formed as the independently operating ‘Sahel Province’ of the Islamic State in 2022, seeking to consolidate territorial control.⁴

Intensity

By July 2024, it was estimated that ISSP had 2,000 to 3,000 fighters in its ranks.⁵ FAN and ISSP frequently clashed throughout the review period, including in July, ⁶ October,⁷ and November 2023.⁸ Fighting continued throughout 2024 with fighting reported in March, ⁹ April,¹⁰ July,¹¹ September,¹² October,¹³ and December.¹⁴ Clashes reported in the first half of 2025 occurred in January,¹⁵ February,¹⁶ March,¹⁷ May,¹⁸ and June.¹⁹

The frequency and intensity of clashes increased towards the end of the reporting period, likely attributable to a power vacuum left in the Sahel after the withdrawal of the French armed forces.²⁰

Casualty figures are not regularly reported by the media, but both sides suffered significant losses during the reporting period. A military operation conducted on or around 3 October 2023 by FAN in north-west Tabatol against ISSP resulted in an estimated twenty-nine soldiers killed as well as ‘several dozen terrorists’, although an accurate death toll was not reported. In terms of material destruction, fifteen motorcycles were destroyed.²¹An ambush by ISSP against FAN was reported to have occurred on 18 November 2023. The reported casualties were significant with 153 soldiers dead, thirty-four soldiers injured, and seventy-one soldiers missing, with sixteen vehicles destroyed.²² The Nigerien government has not confirmed this event.²³ On 21 March 2024, ISSP executed an ambush against FAN, this time in the region of Tillabéri. This ambush killed twenty-three soldiers and thirty fighters, with seventeen soldiers injured. ²⁴ The high death toll from this attack led to ECOWAS formally offering its condolences to the government of Niger and issuing a statement condemning the ambush tactics employed by ISSP.²⁵ The multiplicity of ISSP’s successful and carefully planned ambushes are attributable to the control the group exercises over key areas in the tri-border state.²⁶

A firefight between FAN and ISSP broke out on 23 July 2024 in the Tillaberi region. Fifteen FAN soldiers and twenty-one ISSP fighters were killed, while sixteen soldiers were hospitalized.²⁷ There is a disputed death toll for clashes at Chatoumane in western Niger at the beginning of December 2025. Some reports suggest that around ninety-one soldiers died. The government denied these figures but said that twenty-six fighters had been killed.²⁸

ISSP produces its own improvised explosive devices (IEDs),²⁹ which include vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs).³⁰ Its arsenal also includes mortars,³¹ small arms, and light weapons such as Kalashnikov rifles.³²

As a consequence of the intensity of violence in fighting between FAN and ISSP, Niger has contracted Russian troops to train FAN how to fight against ISSP. FAN soldiers were also to be trained on the use a new air defence system acquired by Niger to combat ISSP. The Russian personnel arrived during April 2024.³³ FAN has relied on aerial strikes to respond to ISSP.³⁴

The UN Secretary-General has voiced concern about ISSP‘s actions in Niger in his 2024 report to the UN Security Council on the activities of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel.³⁵

Key areas under ISSP control in Niger include certain areas along the border with Mali. These areas include the north of the Dosso region,³⁶ for instance, the border town of Anderamboukane.³⁷ Territories under ISSP control on the Malian side of the border include the villages of Akabar, In-Araban, and Tabankort in Menaka region, and Amalaoulou and In-Delimane in Gao.³⁸

Organization

ISSP is a Salafi-jihadist militant group and the Sahelian affiliate of Islamic State.³⁹ ISSP’s leadership structure integrates foreign and local leadership from diverse ethnic backgrounds, including from the Arab, Dawsahak, Djerma Fulani, Songhai, and Tuareg ethnic groups.⁴⁰ ISSP has a consolidated chain of command and senior leadership roles are held by Western Saharan and Malian Arabs. One such senior official is Abu al-Bara al-Sahrawi, who, in addition to serving as the current governor, is the emir (leader) in one of the core military zones operating out of the In-Araban area of Mali.⁴¹

ISSP’s organizational structure is divided into four regions which are Burkina Faso, Muthalath (the tri-state border region), Anderamboukane, and Azawagh (Mali/Niger borderlands between Menaka, Tillabéri, and Tahoua). Five distinct military zones (at an operational level) are spread across the four regions with each military zone given specific geographical and operational tasks. The military zones all have a similar operational command structure. At the head of each zone is the emir who governs the zone. Other senior leadership mirrored in each zone includes a cadi (judge) and military commanders. Zone 1 covers areas in Burkina Faso and the Gourma; Zone 2 covers the Haoussa area; Zone 3 extends to the area between Amalaoulou, Akabar, and In-Delimane; Zone 4 constitutes the area between Menaka, Anderamboukane, and Abala; and Zone 5 (the Eastern zone) covers Azawagh.⁴² ISSP’s command structure is very sophisticated. The group can discipline fighters through its Law and Sanctions Office, which is composed of judges and Islamic police.⁴³

ISSP‘s logistical support comes from a series of strongholds in the Sahel. The group has support bases in Tillabéri and a control hub in Mali’s Ménaka region, a region that includes the border town adjacent to Niger, Andéramboukane.⁴⁴ The Malian border villages of Akabar, Tabankort and In-Araban in the Menaka region, and Amalaoulou and In-Delimane in the Gao region along the border with Niger constitute key ISSP bases and the group’s traditional stronghold.⁴⁵ ISSP has various supply routes and support zones over a vast area ⁴⁶ to facilitate logistics. For example, the routes are used to ensure supply and resupply of weapons and ammunition, and to allow for the movement of fighters. Such support zones and critical supply corridors cover the area between Tillabéri, Tahoua and Dosso in south-western Niger, and areas in Sokoto and Kebbi states in north-western Nigeria.⁴⁷

ISSP is organized in close geographic proximity to ensure fluidity between military zones as a means of maintaining high levels of interconnectedness. This enables the coordination of major attacks and offensives between military zones. Often, the strategy of force concentration between different zones enables ISSP to deploy large numbers of fighters from different zones into the same general direction if the need arises.⁴⁸ ISSP fighters set up camp in dense forest areas to escape aerial surveillance.⁴⁹ When ISSP mounts large-scale attacks seeking to take control over enemy military bases or territory, VBIEDs are employed to overrun the defences.⁵⁰ ISSP also employs multi-front attacks to put pressure on its enemy. This shows the ability of the group to execute planned military operations.⁵¹

Using motorcycles enables fighters to move around swiftly and gives greater mobility in reaching and retreating from military objectives. ISSP fights an ‘asymmetric’ conflict, largely relying on ambushes using IEDs planted where military patrols are expected to pass and attacking once the IEDs are remotely detonated. ⁵² Other tactics employed by ISSP include mortar attacks, roadside bombs, suicide bombings, and attaching explosive devices to vehicles.⁵³

Operating in marginalized communities with weakened resistance offers ISSP ripe opportunities to recruit. ISSP has been accused of actively recruiting children as fighters, training them, and deploying them on the front line.⁵⁴ There has also been active recruitment in north-western Nigeria.⁵⁵ ISSP unifies communication through its media branch, responsible for its IS weekly Al-Naba news platform where official communiqués are released.⁵⁶

ISSP is primarily driven by an extremist ideological narrative but is also focused on its pursuit of greater territorial control, and in Niger it specifically aims to control more territory than its rival JNIM.⁵⁷

Territorial control is a requirement of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II.⁵⁸ During the period under review, ISSP increased its territorial footprint across the tri-border area, called the Liptako-Gourma tri-border region, which covers parts of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger,⁵⁹ and the Tahoua, Tillabéri,⁶⁰ and Dosso regions in Niger.⁶¹ Control exercised by ISSP is reported as mostly consolidated along the Mali/Niger border in north-eastern Mali and north-western Niger.⁶²

The nature of control exercised by ISSP departs from mere military control as it governs territory under its control according to a self-styled system of jihadist governance. Examples include the regulation of reopened markets.⁶³

A strict interpretation of Sharia law and Islamic courts are used to regulate social life in ISSP-controlled areas.⁶⁴ This control enables ISSP to implement IHL including Additional Protocol II of 1977, as required by Article 1(1) of the Protocol.⁶⁵ Article 1(1) demands the ability to implement Additional Protocol II, not its actual implementation.⁶⁶

Lastly, from the intensity assessment above, clearly the territory controlled by ISSP facilitates the planning of military operations, fulfilling the final requirement in Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II of 1977, which requires ISSP to be sufficiently organized to launch sustained and concerted attacks.⁶⁷

The organizational structure of ISSP is sophisticated and complies with the four organizational requirements under Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. Hence, the NIAC between Niger and ISSP constitutes an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC.

1
‘ISIS-Sahel’, Director of National Intelligence: Counter Terrorism Guide, September 2024; H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024; J. G. Birru, ‘IS Sahel’s tactics cause mass, indiscriminate violence’, ACLED, 13 January 2023.
2
J. G. Birru, ‘IS Sahel’s tactics cause mass, indiscriminate violence’, ACLED, 13 January 2023.
3
‘ISIS-Sahel’, Director of National Intelligence: Counter Terrorism Guide, September 2024; J. Burke, ‘US special forces deaths in Niger lift veil on shadow war against Islamists in Sahel’, The Guardian, 15 October 2017; US Department of Defense, ‘Department of Defense Press Briefing on the results of the Investigation into the October 4, 2017, Ambush in Niger’, 10 May 2018; ‘Strategic Implications of the Ambush in Niger’, Institute for Security Studies, November 2017.
4
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024; ‘Sub-Saharan Africa Remains an Epicenter of Violent Jihadist Terrorism’, The Soufan Center, 1 May 2025; J. G. Birru, ‘IS Sahel’s tactics cause mass, indiscriminate violence’, ACLED, 13 January 2023.
5
‘Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/556, 22 July 2024; A. Shtuni, ‘The Islamic State in 2025: an Evolving Threat Facing a Waning Global Response’, International Center for Counter-Terrorism, 11 July 2025.
6
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group September, ‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group
7
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Attaque terroriste nord-ouest de TABATOL: 29 Morts, plusieurs terroristes neutralisés, 15 motos et des munitions saisies’, Agence Nigérienne de Presse, 3 October 2023; O. Ribouis, ‘Niger : plusieurs soldats tués dans une localité proche du Burkina Faso’, Banouto, 19 October 2023
8
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group.
9
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Au Niger, 23 militaires tués dans une embuscade tendue par des « terroristes »’, Le Monde, 22 March 2024; ‘La Cedeao condamne avec fermeté l’attaque terroriste au Niger’, TRT Global, 25 March 2024
10
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Six Nigerien Soldiers Killed in Landmine Blast’, Voice of America: Africa, 11 April 2024; ‘Niger: 6 soldats victimes d’une mine près de la frontière avec le Mali’, Sahara Media, 12 April 2024; ‘Zone des trois frontières: Des dizaines de terroristes neutralisés, don’t 8 en terriroire malien suite à l’incident de Tin Gara’, Le Sahel, 12 April 2024
11
H. Sourou, ‘Attaque meurtrière contre une patrouille des FDS au Niger: 7 gardes nationaux tués’, Journal du Niger, 11 July 2024; M. D, ‘Niger: Au moins 6 militaires tués dans une attaque armée!’, West Africa Democracy Radio, 15 July 2024; ‘Insécurité: évasion de détenus dont des chefs terroristes de la prison de haute sécurité de Koutoukalé (Région de Tillabéri)’, ActuNiger, 11 July 2024; Wamaps, X, 25 July 2024; Pagoui, X, 24 July 2024; Wamaps, X, 23 July 2024
12
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; Wamaps, X, 2 September 2024; ‘Niger: 14 terroristes « neutralisés » par l’armée dans l’ouest du pays’, Al24News, 12 September 2024; ‘14 terroristes cherchant à semer la désolation ont été envoyés en enfer mardi dernier. Ils ont rejoint leurs congénères au fin fond de la géhenne’, aNiamey, 13 September 2024
13
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; Pagoui, X, 15 October 2023; Hamid Amadou N’gadé, ‘Dépêche sécuritaire – Tahoua: Un véhicule suspect de l’EIGS attaque les FDS à Agarak (Tilia, région de Tahoua)’, Facebook, 15 October 2024
14
Charlie Werb, X, 6 December 2024; Pagoui, X, 6 December 2024; ‘Niger soldiers killed in ‘terrorist attack’ near Burkina Faso’, RFI, 12 December 2024; ‘In Niger, 39 villagers killed in a double attack by suspected jihadists near Burkina Faso’, Le Monde, 15 December 2024; J. Le Bihan and M. Laplace, ‘Au Niger, au moins une centaine de soldats tués dans la région de Tillabéri’, Le Monde, 12 December 2024; ‘At Least 61 Soldiers and 32 Civilians Killed in EIGS Attack in Chatoumane, Niger Republic’, Zagazola, 10 December 2024; ‘10 Niger soldiers killed in ‘terrorist attack’ near Burkina Faso: army’, Africa Daily, 11 December 2024.
15
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Au Niger, un accord avec une société chinoise pour sécuriser des installations pétrolières’,Le Monde, 15 January 2025; CG. N. B, ‘Niger: L’armée va sécuriser le pipeline de la CNPC’, Le Projet Afrique Chine, 21 January 2025
16
‘Au Niger, quinze terroristes et dix militaires tués dans l’ouest du pays (Armée)’, Niger Focus, 6 February 2025; Challenge Nigériens, Facebook, 6 February 2025; ‘Opération Niya: Les vecteurs aériens neutralisent 15 ennemis dans la zone de Takrouzat’, Le Sahel, 7 February 2025
17
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: March 2025’, ACLED, 7 March 2025; ‘Lutte contre le terrorisme: 45 terroristes de l’EIGS tués dans la zone de l’Opération Niya’, Le Sahel, 20 March 2025; N. Fotso, ‘Niger: Frappe Foudroyante Contre le Terrorisme à Diffa et Tillabéri’, Info Cameroun, 21 March 2025
18
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; Y. Barma, ‘Insécurité: une dizaine de soldats tués dans une série d’attaques coordonnées dans le département de Doutchi (Dosso)’, Echos du Niger, 6 May 2025; ‘Niger: Au moins huit soldats tués, seize portés disparus dans des attaques’, Afrika Soir, 6 May 2025; Brant, X, 8 May 2025; ‘Ouest du Niger: au moins une quarantaine de soldats des forces spéciales tués à Eknewane dans une attaque jihadiste, selon des sources non-officielles et sécuritaires’, Press Afrik, 26 May 2025; I. D. Hadiza, ‘Insécurité: l’EIGS revendique l’attaque du camp militaire d’Eknewane, près de la frontière malienne’, Echos du Niger, 27 May 2025; ‘Niger: plusieurs soldats tués dans une attaque revendiquée par l’Etat islamique’, TV5Monde, 27 May 2025
19
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Au Niger, 34 soldats tués dans une attaque contre la ville de Banibangou, près de la frontière malienne’, Le Monde, 20 June 2025; ‘Au Niger, 34 militaires tués dans une attaque à la frontière avec le Mali’, France 24, 20 June 2025; ‘Le Niger visé par une nouvelle attaque attribuée aux djihadistes’, RTS, 23 June 2025; Hamid Amadou N’gadé, X, 27 June 2025.
20
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
21
‘Attaque terroriste nord-ouest de TABATOL: 29 Morts, plusieurs terroristes neutralisés, 15 motos et des munitions saisies’, Agence Nigérienne de Presse, 3 October 2023; W. Muia, ‘Niger attack: Jihadists kill dozen of soldiers in deadliest raid since coup’, BBC, 3 October 2023; A. Bonny, ‘Niger confirms 29 soldiers killed in terrorist attack near border with Mali’, AA, 3 October 2023.
22
Zagazola, X, 18 November 2023.
23
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group.
24
‘Au Niger, 23 militaires tués dans une embuscade tendue par des « terroristes »’, Le Monde, 22 March 2024; ‘At least 23 Niger soldiers killed in ambush, defence ministry says’, Reuters, 22 March 2024; ‘Islamic State Says It Was Behind Attack on Niger Military’, Voice of America: Africa, 23 March 2024.
25
‘La Cedeao condamne avec fermeté l’attaque terroriste au Niger’, TRT Global, 25 March 2024; Ecowas – Cedeao, X, 23 March 2024.
26
‘Au Niger, 23 militaires tués dans une embuscade tendue par des « terroristes »’, Le Monde, 22 March 2024.
27
L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: July 2024’, ACLED, 12 August 2024; ‘Niger Says At Least 15 Soldiers Killed Near Burkina Border’, Barron’s, 23 July 2024.
28
‘Niger soldiers killed in ‘terrorist attack’ near Burkina Faso’, RFI, 12 December 2024; Charlie Werb, X, 6 December 2024; ‘At Least 61 Soldiers and 32 Civilians Killed in EIGS Attack in Chatoumane, Niger Republic’, Zagazola, 10 December 2024.
29
M. Bere, ‘The Islamic State in the Sahel: Understanding its Internal and External Dynamics and Attack Modalities’, Perspectives on Terrorism, June 2024; ‘At least 23 Niger soldiers killed in ambush, defence ministry says’, Reuters, 22 March 2024; ‘Six Nigerien Soldiers Killed in Landmine Blast’, Voice of America: Africa, 11 April 2024
30
‘ISIS-Sahel’, Director of National Intelligence: Counter Terrorism Guide, September 2024; ‘At least 23 Niger soldiers killed in ambush, defence ministry says’, Reuters, 22 March 2024; M. Bere, ‘The Islamic State in the Sahel: Understanding its Internal and External Dynamics and Attack Modalities’, Perspectives on Terrorism, June 2024.
31
‘ISIS-Sahel’, Director of National Intelligence: Counter Terrorism Guide, September 2024
32
M. Bere, ‘The Islamic State in the Sahel: Understanding its Internal and External Dynamics and Attack Modalities’, Perspectives on Terrorism, June 2024.
33
C. Ewokor and K. Armstrong, ‘Russian troops arrive in Niger as military agreement begins’, BBC, 12 April 2024.
34
‘Opération Niya: Les vecteurs aériens neutralisent 15 ennemis dans la zone de Takrouzat’, Le Sahel, 7 February 2025; ‘Au Niger, quinze terroristes et dix militaires tués dans l’ouest du pays (Armée)’, Niger Focus, 6 February 2025.
35
‘Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel’, UN Doc S/2023/1075, 2 January 2024, para 25.
36
H. Nsaibia, ‘Conflict intensifies and instability spreads beyond Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger’, ACLED, 12 December 2024
37
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
38
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
39
J. G. Birru, ‘IS Sahel’s tactics cause mass, indiscriminate violence’, ACLED, 13 January 2023.
40
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
41
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
42
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
43
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
44
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
45
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
46
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024
47
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
48
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
49
M. Bere, ‘The Islamic State in the Sahel: Understanding its Internal and External Dynamics and Attack Modalities’, Perspectives on Terrorism, June 2024.
50
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024; ‘West Africa and the Sahel’, Security Council Report, 30 July 2025; ‘ISIS-Sahel’, Director of National Intelligence: Counter Terrorism Guide, September 2024.
51
L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: July 2025’, ACLED, 4 July 2025.
52
M. Bere, ‘The Islamic State in the Sahel: Understanding its Internal and External Dynamics and Attack Modalities’, Perspectives on Terrorism, June 2024.
53
M. Bere, ‘The Islamic State in the Sahel: Understanding its Internal and External Dynamics and Attack Modalities’, Perspectives on Terrorism, June 2024; ‘ISIS-Sahel’, Director of National Intelligence: Counter Terrorism Guide, September 2024; J. G. Birru, ‘IS Sahel’s tactics cause mass, indiscriminate violence’, ACLED, 13 January 2023.
54
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
55
J. Barnett et al, ‘Northwestern Nigeria: A Jihadization of Banditry, or a “Banditization” of Jihad?’, Online Article, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, January 2022.
56
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
57
M. Bere, ‘The Islamic State in the Sahel: Understanding its Internal and External Dynamics and Attack Modalities’, Perspectives on Terrorism, June 2024.
58
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases.
59
A. Shtuni, ‘The Islamic State in 2025: an Evolving Threat Facing a Waning Global Response’, International Center for Counter-Terrorism, 11 July 2025
60
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024; L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel’, Critical Threats, 20 November 2024
61
‘West Africa and the Sahel’, Security Council Report, 30 July 2025.
62
L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel’, Critical Threats, 20 November 2024.
63
H. Nsaibia, ‘Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion’, ACLED, 30 September 2024.
64
‘Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger)’, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 15 July 2025.
65
‘Article 1 – Material Field of Application’, International Committee for the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases.
66
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.38.
67
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.40; M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021.

Non-International Armed Conflict between Niger and Jama’a Nusra al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM)

Background

JNIM, which was founded in March 2017, is the result of a merger of four established groups: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s Sahara Emirate, Al-Murabitun, Ansar Dine, and Katiba Macina.¹ Between late 2017 and early 2018, JNIM expanded its operational area to include south-western Niger.² Although the group had operated in Tillabéri for a number of years and significantly increased its operations in the border regions between Benin, Niger, and Nigeria in 2023, it was only in the middle of 2024 that Niger was designated as an official operation zone through JNIM’s media channels.³ The first time that responsibility for an attack in northern Niger was officially claimed by JNIM was the Assamakka attack on 19 October 2024.⁴

Intensity

Armed attacks between FAN and JNIM occurred frequently throughout the reporting period. Attacks were specifically reported in July,⁵ August,⁶ and September 2023,⁷ and February,⁸ May,⁹ June,¹⁰ August,¹¹ September,¹² October,¹³ and November 2024,¹⁴ February,¹⁵ March, ¹⁶ April,¹⁷ and May 2025.¹⁸ From August 2024 to the end of the reporting period, the frequency of attacks significantly escalated to almost monthly incidents of combat between FAN and JNIM.¹⁹ It is clear that attacks were sustained throughout the reporting period and their frequency and brutality contributed to internal displacement in the region.²⁰

Weaponry includes those recovered from ambushes against FAN such as Kalashnikov assault rifles,²¹ M80 rifles,²² and 12.7 mm machine guns.²³ Drones,²⁴ IEDs, rockets and mortars are also employed in this NIAC.²⁵

Casualties are not always recorded in publicly available information. Selected attacks where a high death toll was recorded are listed to illustrate the ferocity of fighting between JNIM and FAN. A significant attack resulting in the deaths of some 100 fighters was launched by JNIM against FAN in August 2023 in Koutougou, Niger (bordering Mali and Burkina Faso).²⁶ The Nigerien government acknowledged it had lost twenty soldiers,²⁷ while a further twenty were reported as wounded.²⁸ A clash between JNIM and FAN in Gotheye town, in the Téra area of Tillabéri on or about 25 June 2024 killed sixty soldiers.²⁹ The attack attracted international attention, with the Turkish Foreign Ministry releasing a statement condemning JNIM‘s actions.³⁰

On 26 August 2024, another attack with a high death toll took place in Gotheye, which borders Burkina Faso, when JNIM launched an orchestrated ‘surprise’ attack against a FAN military base.³¹ FAN responded to an attack by JNIM on 18 September 2024 by sending in ground forces and air support to Niaktiré in Tillabery region. At least 100 JNIM fighters were killed while three FAN soldiers died and twenty-seven were injured. FAN also managed to destroy several motorcycles used by JNIM in the attack.³² The nature of attacks initiated by JNIM are clearly planned and executed frequently and are thus sustained and concerted military operations as demanded by Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II of 1977.

The intensity of violence generated by the engagements between JNIM and FAN satisfies the requirements for a NIAC under IHL.

Organization

JNIM is the Sahel branch of al-Qaeda. It is a Salafi-jihadist group that has, as a parent organization, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which originates from the 1990s Algerian civil war.³³

JNIM has an organized command structure which resembles a top-down hierarchy. Essentially, there are three overall hierarchical tiers: central leadership, regional commanders, and local commanders.³⁴ Central leadership includes its emir, Iyad Ag Ghaly(aka Abu al-Fadl), who founded Ansar Dine.³⁵ Deputy leaders include Yahya Abu Hammam (Djamel Okacha), the leader of AQIM Sahara, Amadou Koufa, the leader of the Katibat Macina (Macina Liberation Front or FLM), and Abu Hassan al-Ansari, the deputy leader of al-Mourabitoun.³⁶ Another deputy leader is Abu Abdul Rahman Ali al-Sanhaji (Ali Maychou) who is a representative of AQIM Sahara, as well as being a senior judge in JNIM and its religious advisor, ‘Koufa’.³⁷

Different subgroups are at the disposal of top leadership but are able to operate with some flexibility as subgroups are divided into regionally separate areas.³⁸ These subgroups are organized so as to facilitate coordination and deepen cooperation in the group.

Its organizational structure has been described as ‘strategically coherent’ with senior regional commanders deployed to external JNIM subgroups to ensure cooperation and discipline.³⁹ Some analysts, though, dispute whether this level of coherence exists between subgroups,⁴⁰ instead describing JNIM as essentially an umbrella group.⁴¹

Discipline is enforced at the highest level by a ‘Majlis Shura’ (Consultative Council) which publicly responds to accusations of atrocities. JNIM’s Shura Council ensures Islamic governance and strict adherence to Islamic law in areas under JNIM control.⁴² These bodies, as well as the tiered command structure, enable JNIM to implement IHL. Training is offered to fighters by highly mobile units using motorcycles to facilitate training where and when needed across the Sahel region.⁴³ Training camps create the opportunity to implement IHL and enhance discipline among fighters.

Military tactics employed by JNIM are described as purposeful encircling of isolated strategic zones, weakening state presence and creating power vacuums.⁴⁴ JNIM also relies on motorcycles for manoeuvrability during ambushes.⁴⁵ JNIM prefers remote violence such as using explosives, artillery and mortar fire over swarming tactics and ambushes, which are the modus operandi of ISSP.⁴⁶ Part of its military tactics include using IEDs to destroy military and other infrastructure.⁴⁷ JNIM also maintains a high operational tempo to ensure it outpaces its adversaries as part of its military strategy.⁴⁸

JNIM is able to facilitate logistics through an extended network across central Sahel into the West African littoral states including parts of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin, Ivory Coast and Togo.⁴⁹ Weapons and munitions are replenished through large-scale attacks on garrisons or auxiliary camps belonging to State armed forces in the operational area.⁵⁰ Weapons and other military needs are also met using profits from artisanal mining, livestock theft, fundraising, taxation and looting.⁵¹

JNIM‘s vast territorial reach⁵² gives it a larger recruitment pool.⁵³ It is reported that JNIM has between 5,000 and 6,000 fighters in its ranks.⁵⁴ JNIM uses its media wing, al-Zallaqa,⁵⁵ and propaganda channels⁵⁶ to communicate with the outside world and to control its narrative. JNIM also has an official spokesperson, who, at the time of reporting, was Mahmoud Barry.⁵⁷

Territorial control is a requirement of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. JNIM exercises consolidated control over rural areas in Ouro Gueladjo which is in the south-west of Niger.⁵⁸ JNIM exercises further control over parts of Gotheye department in Niger, between Gotheye city and the Samira mine near the Burkinabe border.⁵⁹ JNIM has a stronghold in the southern parts of Dosso, especially within the W-Arly-Pendjari Complex protected area, including Park W, which borders Benin and Nigeria.⁶⁰

Territorial control, as depicted above, enables ISSP to implement IHL, including Additional Protocol II, as required by Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. Article 1(1) demands the ability to implement Additional Protocol II, not its actual implementation.⁶¹

JNIM is capitalizing on territorial gains in the south-west of Tillabéri and southern parts of Dosso,⁶² as well as Niamey⁶³ and Bamako,⁶⁴ to launch planned attacks against FAN. Indeed, territory under its control is enabling JNIM to plan and mount ambushes against FAN troops.⁶⁵ Territorial control further provides the platform for JNIM to carry out carefully planned attacks against FAN military bases.⁶⁶ Activities in other countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso, and a possible expansion to the northern Gulf of Guinea, is possible due to JNIM’s territorial control in Niger.⁶⁷

Lastly, from the intensity assessment above, clearly the territory controlled by JNIM facilitates the planning of military operations, fulfilling the final requirement in Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II, which requires JNIM to be sufficiently organized to launch sustained and concerted attacks.⁶⁸

The organizational structure of JNIM is sophisticated and complies with the four organizational requirements under Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II of 1977. Hence, the NIAC between Niger and JNIM constitutes an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC.

1
L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel’, Critical Threats, 20 November 2024; ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin’, Australian Government: Australian National Security; H. Nsaibia, ‘New frontlines: Jihadist expansion is reshaping the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands’, ACLED, 27 March 2025.
2
H. Nsaibia, ‘New frontlines: Jihadist expansion is reshaping the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands’, ACLED, 27 March 2025.
3
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025; H. Nsaibia, ‘New frontlines: Jihadist expansion is reshaping the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands’, ACLED, 27 March 2025.
4
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; M. Olivier, ‘Au Niger, entre Rhissa Ag Boula et Abdourahamane Tiani, la guerre est déclarée’, Jeune Afrique, 21 October 2024; ‘Attaque à Assamaka: une offensive des Forces Armées Libres (FAL) fait sept morts et cinq blessés, trente-sept suspects interpellés’, ActuNiger, 19 October 2024.
5
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; Kane Kadaoure Habibou, Facebook, 15 July 2023; ‘Al-Qaeda Affiliate GSIM Claims Suicide Operation Against Russian Wagner Group Site In Mali; Attack Against Niger Gendarmerie Forces In Niger’, Memri: Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor, 26 July 2023
6
‘Niger says 17 soldiers killed in ‘terrorist ambush’ near border’, RFI, 16 August 2023; I. G. Shuaibu, ‘17 Niger soldiers killed, 20 injured in ambush by suspected terrorists’, AA, 16 August 2023; A. D. Francisco, ‘Regional Overview: Africa: August 2023’, ACLED, 8 September 2023
7
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group
8
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group April, ‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Diffa/Attaque du site de Lada: Le Gouverneur au chevet des militaires blessés’, Le Sahel, 24 April 2024; ‘Boko Haram militants attack, injure five soldiers in Niger’, TRT Global, 24 April 2024
9
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Lutte contre le Boko Haram: Les FDS déjouent une attaque au Sud de N’Guigmi’, Le Sahel, 8 May 2024
10
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; J. Tasamba, ‘Terrorist attack kills 20 soldiers in western Niger’, AA, 26 June 2024; ‘At least 20 soldiers, one civilian killed in western Niger’, Al Jazeera, 26 June 2024; Niger Expansion, Facebook, 3 July 2024; Pagoui, X, 26 June 2024
11
Zagazola, X, 26 August 2024
12
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger: plus de 100 terroristes “neutralisés” par l’armée dans l’ouest du pays’, Mali Web, 19 September 2024
13
M. Olivier, ‘Au Niger, entre Rhissa Ag Boula et Abdourahamane Tiani, la guerre est déclarée’, Jeune Afrique, 21 October 2024; M. Laplace, ‘Al‑Qaeda affiliate JNIM claims attack near Niamey’, The Africa Report, 19 October 2024
14
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group and January, ‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group
15
K. Biederman, ‘Niger: Onze soldats tués près de la frontière algérienne’, Sahel Intelligence, 3 March 2025; ‘Niger: 11 soldats tués dans une attaque terroriste à la frontière algérienne’, Le 360 Afrique, 3 February 2025; ‘Niger: 11 militaires tués dans une embuscade près de la frontière algérienne’, TRT Global, 2 March 2025
16
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Opération Damissa: Une attaque terroriste vaillamment repoussé à Falmey’, Le Sahel, 18 March 2025; Hamid Amadou N’gadé, Facebook, 14 March 2025; Pagoui, X, 14 March 2025
17
‘Niger: Makalondi dans la region de Tillabéry, sous la menace persistante des groups armés’, Afrika Soir, 11 April 2025; ‘Niger Army confirms new clashes with Islamist groups’, Press Latina, 17 April 2025
18
‘Le JNIM frappe au Niger: offensive éclair contre la base militaire de Mossipaga, l’AES en difficulté’, Daily Motion, 20 May 2025; Wassim Nasr, X, 18 May 2025.
19
M. Laplace, ‘Al‑Qaeda affiliate JNIM claims attack near Niamey’, The Africa Report, 19 October 2024; H. Nsaibia, ‘Conflict intensifies and instability spreads beyond Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger’, ACLED, 12 December 2024.
20
‘After Tillabéri, Is Niamey the Next Target?’, Zagazola, 9 April 2025; ‘Niger’, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 26 August 2024.
21
M. Laplace, ‘Al‑Qaeda affiliate JNIM claims attack near Niamey’, The Africa Report, 19 October 2024
22
‘Attaque à Assamaka: une offensive des Forces Armées Libres (FAL) fait sept morts et cinq blessés, trente-sept suspects interpellés’, ActuNiger, 19 October 2024
23
‘Opération Damissa: Une attaque terroriste vaillamment repoussé à Falmey’, Le Sahel, 18 March 2025.
24
Hamid Amadou N’gadé, Facebook, 18 May 2025
25
H. Nsaibia, ‘Conflict intensifies and instability spreads beyond Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger’, ACLED, 12 December 2024.
26
A. D. Francisco, ‘Regional Overview: Africa: August 2023’, ACLED, 8 September 2023; I. G. Shuaibu, ‘17 Niger soldiers killed, 20 injured in ambush by suspected terrorists’, AA, 16 August 2023.
27
‘More than a dozen Niger soldiers killed in attack near Mali border’, Al Jazeera, 16 August 2023
28
‘Niger Says 17 Soldiers Killed in Ambush’, Voice of America, 16 August 2023.
29
J. Tasamba, ‘Terrorist attack kills 20 soldiers in western Niger’, AA, 26 June 2024; Pagoui, X, 26 June 2024.
30
‘Türkiye condemns “heinous attack” on Niger’s soldiers’, TRT Global, 27 June 2024.
31
Zagazola, X, 26 August 2024.
32
‘Niger: Plus de 100 terroristes neutralisés lors d’une opération coordonnée à Niaktiré’, Liptako Gourma 24, 20 September 2024; ‘Over 100 terrorists killed, significant enemy equipment destroyed: Niger’s army’, Big News Network, 19 September 2024; ‘Niger: plus de 100 terroristes “neutralisés” par l’armée dans l’ouest du pays’, Mali Web, 19 September 2024.
33
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023; L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel’, Critical Threats, 20 November 2024.
34
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
35
J. Thompson, ‘Examining Extremism: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 July 2021; ‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
36
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
37
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
38
L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel’, Critical Threats, 20 November 2024; H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023; J. Thompson, ‘Examining Extremism: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 July 2021; ‘Mapping armed groups in Mali and the Sahel’, European Council on Foreign Relations; ‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
39
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
40
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025; D. Eizenga and W. Williams, ‘The Puzzle of JNIM and Militant Islamist Groups in the Sahel’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, December 2020
41
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
42
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025; H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
43
‘JNIM Training Camp in Burkina Faso Shows Terror Group’s Deadly Ambition’, Africa Defense Forum, 18 June 2024; C. Weiss, ‘JNIM documents training camp in Burkina Faso’, Online Article, Long War Journal, 25 May 2024.
44
‘After Tillabéri, Is Niamey the Next Target?’, Zagazola, 9 April 2025.
45
‘Le JNIM frappe au Niger: offensive éclair contre la base militaire de Mossipaga, l’AES en difficulté’, Daily Motion, 20 May 2025.
46
J. G. Birru, ‘IS Sahel’s tactics cause mass, indiscriminate violence’, ACLED, 13 January 2023.
47
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
48
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
49
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
50
‘Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/556, 22 July 2024, para 18.
51
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023.
52
H. Nsaibia, ‘Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)’, ACLED, 13 November 2023
53
‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/71/Rev.1, 6 February 2025, para 12.
54
‘Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/556, 22 July 2024, para 10.
55
‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025
56
M. Laplace, ‘Al‑Qaeda affiliate JNIM claims attack near Niamey’, The Africa Report, 19 October 2024; ‘Mapping armed groups in Mali and the Sahel’, European Council on Foreign Relations
57
LSI Africa, X, 26 November 2024; ‘Explainer: Who is JNIM, the Sahel’s deadliest jihadist group?’, BBC Monitoring, 8 April 2025.
58
H. Bori, ‘Africa File, November 7, 2024: Niamey Threatened; Boko Haram Fallout in Chad; M23 Marches on Eastern DRC; Somalia-Jubbaland Tensions’, Critical Threats, 7 November 2024.
59
L. Karr, ‘Africa File, May 31, 2024: Russian Red Sea Logistics Center in Sudan; JNIM Strengthens Along the Burkinabe-Nigerien Border’, Critical Threats, 31 May 2024.
60
H. Nsaibia, ‘Conflict intensifies and instability spreads beyond Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger’, ACLED, 12 December 2024.
61
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.38.
62
H. Nsaibia, ‘Conflict intensifies and instability spreads beyond Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger’, ACLED, 12 December 2024
63
L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: October 2024’, ACLED, 8 November 2024
64
L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel’, Critical Threats, 20 November 2024; H. Nsaibia, ‘Conflict intensifies and instability spreads beyond Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger’, ACLED, 12 December 2024
65
K. Biederman, ‘Niger: Onze soldats tués près de la frontière algérienne’, Sahel Intelligence, 3 March 2025; ‘Niger: 11 soldats tués dans une attaque jihadiste près de l’Algérie’, Le Figaro, 1 March 2025.
66
‘Opération Damissa: Une attaque terroriste vaillamment repoussé à Falmey’, Le Sahel, 18 March 2025; Pagoui, X, 14 March 2025.
67
L. Karr and B. Carter, ‘Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel’, Critical Threats, 20 November 2024.
68
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.40; M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021.

State Parties

Niger
France [until December 2023]

Non-State parties

Jama’at Nasr Al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM)
Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP)

Other Non-State Actors

Boko Haram (JAS)
Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)
Patriotic Liberation Front (PLF)
Lakurawa

Regional Organizations and Alliances

Joint Force of the Group of Five of the Sahel (G5 Sahel: Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania, and Chad) [Niger withdrew in December 2023; G5 was then dissolved]
Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF: Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria; Benin contributes troops in non-combat roles) [Niger withdrew in March 2025]
Alliance of Sahel States (AES: Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso)

Foreign involvement

Africa Corps/Russia
Joint Special Operations Task Force Gazelle as part of the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) [until December 2023
UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) [German contingent at Niamey airbase, until August 2024]
United States of America [until September 2024]

1
‘States Party to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties as of 9 September 2025’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases.
2
‘Niger’, Bundeszentrales für Politische Bildung, 16 June 2025; F. Dreschsel and Y. Böing, ‘Was ist los in Niger?’, Linx, July 2024.
3
‘Niger’, Bundeszentrales für Politische Bildung, 16 June 2025; F. Dreschsel and Y. Böing, ‘Was ist los in Niger?’, Linx, July 2024.
4
F. Dreschsel and Y. Böing, ‘Was ist los in Niger?’, Linx, July 2024; ‘Orano in Niger’, Orano.
5
F. Dreschsel and Y. Böing, ‘Was ist los in Niger?’, Linx, July 2024; ‘World Uranium Mining Production’, World Nuclear Association, 16 May 2025.
6
F. Dreschsel and Y. Böing, ‘Was ist los in Niger?’, Linx, July 2024; A. Maad, ‘How dependent is France on Niger’s uranium?’, Le Monde, 4 August 2023.
7
‘Niger’, Bundeszentrales für Politische Bildung, 16 June 2025; ‘Timeline: A history of coups in Niger’, Al Jazeera, 27 July 2023; ‘In Niger, soldiers out and civilians in’, The New Humanitarian, 11 March 2011.
8
‘Niger’, Bundeszentrales für Politische Bildung, 16 June 2025; ‘Timeline: A history of coups in Niger’, Al Jazeera, 27 July 2023.
9
F. Dreschsel and Y. Böing, ‘Was ist los in Niger?’, Linx, July 2024; F. Fuglestand and D. Laya, ‘Niger: Independence and conflict’, Britannica, 31 August 2025.
10
‘Niger’, Bundeszentrales für Politische Bildung, 16 June 2025; ‘Niger election: Mohamed Bazoum wins landmark vote amid protests’, BBC, 23 February 2021; ‘Niger’s top court confirms Mohamed Bazoum’s election win’, Al Jazeera, 22 March 2021; ‘Ruling party candidate declared winner of Niger’s historic presidential runoff’, France 24, 23 February 2021.
11
‘Die Bundeswehr bei MINUSMA’, Bundeswehr, December 2023.
12
‘Germany and Niger: Bilateral relations’, German Federal Foreign Office, 3 April 2025; ‘Germany to Withdraw Army Personnel, Equipment from Niger Base by August’, Defense Mirror, 9 July 2024.
13
‘Parlament: Bundeswehr verlängert MINUSMA und stellt Ausbildung bei EUTM Mali ein’, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 20 May 2022; ‘EUCAP Sahel Niger: European Union Capacity-Building – Civilian Mission’, European Union External Action, 30 November 2020; ‘EUMPM Niger’, European Union External Action. The German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) played a key role in these training missions. ‘Germany and Niger: Bilateral relations’, German Federal Foreign Office, 3 April 2025; ‘Parlament: Bundeswehr verlängert MINUSMA und stellt Ausbildung bei EUTM Mali ein’, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 20 May 2022.
14
A. Angyal, ‘The presence of the French Military in the Sahel: A lasting commitment or a distant fantasy?’, Universidad de Navarra, 19 May 2025; J. Campbell, ‘French President Macron Expands on Sahel Drawdown Plan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2021.
15
A. Angyal, ‘The presence of the French Military in the Sahel: A lasting commitment or a distant fantasy?’, Universidad de Navarra, 19 May 2025; J. Campbell, ‘French President Macron Expands on Sahel Drawdown Plan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2021.
16
A. Angyal, ‘The presence of the French Military in the Sahel: A lasting commitment or a distant fantasy?’, Universidad de Navarra, 19 May 2025; ‘Last French troops leave Niger, ending decade of Sahel missions’, France 24, 22 December 2023; C. Châtelot, ‘How France was driven out of the Sahel’, Le Monde, 5 September 2023.
17
M. A. Allen, ‘The US is losing access to its bases in Niger − here’s why that’s a big deal’, The Conversation, 16 April 2024; ‘3 American deaths highlight US military role in Niger’, ABC News, 5 October 2017; F. Karimi, ‘US has hundreds of troops in Niger. Here’s why’, CNN, 10 May 2018.
18
‘U.S. Withdrawal from Niger completed’, US Africa Command, 16 September 2024.
19
‘Niger’, Bundeszentrales für Politische Bildung, 16 June 2025; A. Angyal, ‘The presence of the French Military in the Sahel: A lasting commitment or a distant fantasy?’, Universidad de Navarra, 19 May 2025.
20
‘Niger’, Bundeszentrales für Politische Bildung, 16 June 2025; ‘Timeline: A history of coups in Niger’, Al Jazeera, 27 July 2023; A. Angyal, ‘The presence of the French Military in the Sahel: A lasting commitment or a distant fantasy?’, Universidad de Navarra, 19 May 2025; L. Tschörner, ‘From Anchor of Stability to Crisis Hotspot: Background and Consequences of the Military Coup in Niger’, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, December 2023.
21
‘Niger’, Bundeszentrales für Politische Bildung, 16 June 2025; A. Angyal, ‘The presence of the French Military in the Sahel: A lasting commitment or a distant fantasy?’, Universidad de Navarra, 19 May 2025.
22
‘Niger’, Bundeszentrales für Politische Bildung, 16 June 2025; ‘Niger: Scenes from the Conflict in Diffa’, Médecins Sans Frontières, 14 December 2016; A. Sy, ‘Caught Between Conflict and Floods: Displaced Communities in Niger Look Ahead to a Brighter Future’, Storyteller, International Organization for Migration, 20 March 2023.
23
‘Niger’, Bundeszentrales für Politische Bildung, 16 June 2025; ‘Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist in conflict areas’, Famine Early Warning System Network, June 2024; ‘Conflict in Niger Analysis from ACLED Data’, Data Partnership, 7 September 2025.
24
‘Niger’, Bundeszentrales für Politische Bildung, 16 June 2025.
25
‘Niger’, Bundeszentrales für Politische Bildung, 16 June 2025; J. G. Birru, ‘Fact Sheet: Military Coup in Niger’, ACLED, 3 August 2023; L. Tschörner, ‘Jihadism as a Driver of Local Conflicts: Examining Non-State Violent Orders in Tillabéri, Niger’, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July 2023.
26
‘Niger’, Bundeszentrales für Politische Bildung, 16 June 2025; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Violent Extremism in the Sahel’, Council on Foreign Relations, 4 September 2025.
27
‘Niger’, Bundeszentrales für Politische Bildung, 16 June 2025; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Violent Extremism in the Sahel’, Council on Foreign Relations, 4 September 2025.
28
‘Niger’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 26 August 2024.
29
‘Niger’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 26 August 2024.
30
‘UNHCR Niger – Fiche d’information de Tillaberi, janvier à juin 2024’, Reliefweb, 1 August 2024; ‘Niger : Tillabéri – Perceptions des contraintes d’accès humanitaire – Période de Janvier à Septembre 2024’, OCHA, 19 October 2024; ‘Global Humanitarian Overview 2025: Niger’, Humanitarian Action, 4 December 2024.
31
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘The coup in Niger’, Institute for Security Studies, August 2023; ‘The Attempted Coup in Niger: Avoiding Armed Conflict’, International Crisis Group, 7 August 2023.
32
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘The coup in Niger’, Institute for Security Studies, August 2023.
33
M. Demuynck and M. Böhm, ‘Unravelling the Niger coup and its implications for violent extremism in the Sahel’, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 4 August 2023; ‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; L. Peter, ‘Niger soldiers declare coup on national TV’, BBC, 27 July 2023; S. Dean et al, ‘Niger soldiers claim power after president’s own guards reportedly seize him’, CNN, 27 July 2023.
34
‘The coup in Niger’, Institute for Security Studies, August 2023; E. Peltier, et al, ‘Mohamed Bazoum, Niger President Ousted in Coup, Remains Imprisoned at Home’, The New York Times, 18 August 2023.
35
‘The Attempted Coup in Niger: Avoiding Armed Conflict’, International Crisis Group, 7 August 2023; ‘Niger: Presidential guards disperse demonstrators with warning shots’, Africa News, 13 August 2024; ‘Niger’s Bazoum ‘held by guards’ in apparent coup attempt’, Al Jazeera, 26 July 2023.
36
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘The coup in Niger’, Institute for Security Studies, August 2023; ‘The Attempted Coup in Niger: Avoiding Armed Conflict’, International Crisis Group, 7 August 2023; ‘Niger army pledges allegiance to coup makers’, Al Jazeera, 27 July 2023; A. Bonny, ‘Niger Armed Forces chief endorses mutineers’ action, saying he wants to avoid bloodshed’, AA, 27 July 2023.
37
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘The Attempted Coup in Niger: Avoiding Armed Conflict’, International Crisis Group, 7 August 2023; L. Peter, ‘Niger soldiers declare coup on national TV’, BBC, 27 July 2023; E. Brennan, et al, ‘Niger general appears on state TV as new leader following coup’, CNN, 28 July 2023.
38
‘The Attempted Coup in Niger: Avoiding Armed Conflict’, International Crisis Group, 7 August 2023; S. A. Bonny, ‘Niger junta appoints civilians to Cabinet, member of military as vice president’, AA, 3 August 2023; E. Peltier, ‘A Leader of Niger’s Coup Visits Mali, Raising Fears of a Wagner Alliance’, The New York Times, 2 August 2023.
39
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘The Attempted Coup in Niger: Avoiding Armed Conflict’, International Crisis Group, 7 August 2023; ‘Supporters of Niger’s coup storm French embassy’, Le Monde, 30 July 2023; S. Mednick, ‘French embassy in Niger is attacked as protesters waving Russian flags march through capital’, AP News, 30 July 2023.
40
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘The Attempted Coup in Niger: Avoiding Armed Conflict’, International Crisis Group, 7 August 2023; ‘Niger: four ministers, a deputy and the head of deposed President Bazoum’s party arrested’, Nova News, 31 July 2023; B. Balima and AK. Mazou, ‘Niger arrests politicians after coup, other juntas voice support’, Reuters, 1 August 2023.
41
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Junta’s prime minister says Niger is ‘in a process of transition’’, RFI, 16 August 2023; M. Olivier, ‘Niger coup: Meet Ali Lamine Zeine, the junta’s premier’, The Africa Report, 9 August 2023.
42
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger military names 21-person cabinet ahead of key West African summit’, Al Jazeera, 10 August 2023.
43
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; G. Yabi, ‘The Niger Coup’s Outsized Global Impact’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 31 August 2023; ‘Niger coup leader proposes a three-year transition of power’, Al Jazeera, 20 August 2023; T. Obiezu, ‘Regional Bloc Says Niger Junta’s 3-year Transition Plan Unacceptable’, Voice of America, 22 August 2023.
44
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘The Attempted Coup in Niger: Avoiding Armed Conflict’, International Crisis Group, 7 August 2023; S. Dean et al, ‘Niger soldiers claim power after president’s own guards reportedly seize him’, CNN, 27 July 2023; ‘Security Council Press Statement on Situation in Niger’, United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 28 July 2023.
45
‘The Attempted Coup in Niger: Avoiding Armed Conflict’, International Crisis Group, 7 August 2023; G. Yabi, ‘The Niger Coup’s Outsized Global Impact’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 31 August 2023.
46
G. Yabi, ‘The Niger Coup’s Outsized Global Impact’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 31 August 2023; ‘Burkina Faso, Mali say military intervention in Niger would be ‘declaration of war’’, France 24, 1 August 2023; ‘Burkina Faso, Mali warn against military intervention in Niger’, Al Jazeera, 1 August 2023.
47
‘The Attempted Coup in Niger: Avoiding Armed Conflict’, International Crisis Group, 7 August 2023; ‘Germany suspends aid to Niger, cooperation after coup’, Al Jazeera, 31 July 2023; ‘EU, African Union escalate pressure on Niger’s coup leaders’, Al Jazeera, 29 July 2023.
48
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘The Attempted Coup in Niger: Avoiding Armed Conflict’, International Crisis Group, 7 August 2023; ‘Niger coup: USA intends to keep room for maneuver’, Africa News, 13 August 2024; K. De Young, et al, ‘U.S. suspends security cooperation with Niger as Europeans evacuate’, The Washington Post, 1 August 2023.
49
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; I. Allegrozzi, ‘UN Calls on Niger Junta to Free Former President’, Human Rights Watch, 12 February 2025; P. Kaur, ‘UN working group calls for release of former Niger president’, Jurist News, 12 February 2025.
50
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; C. Krippahl, ‘ECOWAS threatens ‘use of force’ against Niger junta’, Deutsche Welle, 31 July 2023; S. Jones, ‘Niger coup: Britain cuts aid and neighbours ‘may use force’ to restore president’, The Guardian, 31 July 2023.
51
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; C. Krippahl, ‘ECOWAS threatens ‘use of force’ against Niger junta’, DW, 31 July 2023; S. Jones, ‘Niger coup: Britain cuts aid and neighbours ‘may use force’ to restore president’, The Guardian, 31 July 2023.
52
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; B. Balima, ‘Niger closes airspace as it refuses to reinstate president’, Reuters, 7 August 2023; J. Pennington, ‘As critical deadline for Niger’s military coup expires, the country’s airspace closes due to ‘threat of intervention’’, CNN, 6 August 2023; ‘Niger’s junta shuts airspace as the deadline passes to restore the ousted president’, NPR, 7 August 2023; K. Willsher, ‘West African leaders to meet after Niger junta defies deadline’, The Guardian, 7 August 2023.
53
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; N. Kennedy, ‘ECOWAS sets ‘D-Day’ for possible military intervention in Niger’, CNN, 18 August 2023; M. A. Adombila, ‘West African bloc says “D-Day” set for possible Niger intervention’, Reuters, 19 August 2023; ‘West African bloc says undisclosed ‘D-Day’ set for possible Niger intervention’, RFI, 19 August 2023.
54
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger coup: ECOWAS delegation meets deposed president, military govt leader’, Al Jazeera, 19 August 2023; F. Onuah and B. Balima, ‘West African bloc meets Niger’s ousted president, junta leader in Niamey’, Reuters, 20 August 2023; ‘West African mission holds talks with Niger’s junta’, TRT Global, 19 August 2023.
55
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; O. Aworinde, ‘‘Completely Unacceptable’: ECOWAS Rejects Niger Junta’s Three-Year Transition Plan’, Channels TV, 21 August 2023; ‘ECOWAS rejects Niger’s three-year transition plan’, TRT Global, 21 August 2023; L. Abaguo, ‘ECOWAS Rejects Niger Junta’s Three-Year Transition Plan’, Nigeria Info FM, 21 August 2023.
56
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; T. Brouck, ‘Central bank in the junta’s sights in Niger’, The Africa Report, 15 November 2023; B. Margulies, ‘Niger junta arrests, then releases, central bank official’, Central Banking, 10 November 2023.
57
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger junta calls on Togo to facilitate talks’, CNBC Africa, 7 November 2023; ‘Niger: military regime asks Togo to mediate’, Africa News, 13 August 2023.
58
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘ECOWAS court rejects Niger’s request to lift coup sanctions’, Africa News, 13 August 2023; C. Eboh, ‘West African court dismisses Niger junta’s sanctions challenge’, Reuters, 7 December 2023; A, Ejekwonyilo, ‘ECOWAS Court rejects Niger junta’s plea to lift regional sanctions’, Premium Times, 8 December 2023.
59
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; M. Chemam, ‘West African leaders set conditions for lifting Niger sanctions’, RFI, 11 December 2023.
60
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; W. Muia, ‘Niger deposed President Mohamed Bazoum’s son freed by coup leaders’, BBC News, 9 January 2024; ‘Niger military tribunal grants son of deposed president provisional release’, Al Jazeera, 9 January 2024; ‘Junta sets conditions for Mohamed Bazoum’s release’, Africa Intelligence, 12 January 2024; ‘Niger tribunal grants ousted president’s son provisional release from house arrest’, Reuters, 8 January 2024.
61
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; V. Wong, ‘Ecowas: Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso quit West African bloc’, BBC, 28 January 2024; I. Allegrozzi, ‘Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger Quit Regional Bloc’, Human Rights Watch, 2 February 2024; ‘Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso announce withdrawal from ECOWAS’, Al Jazeera, 28 January 2024.
62
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso announce withdrawal from ECOWAS’, Al Jazeera, 28 January 2024; O. Opali, ‘Bloc says Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger remain its ‘important members’’, China Daily, 30 January 2024.
63
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘ECOWAS lifts sanctions on Niger amid tensions in West Africa bloc’, Al Jazeera, 24 February 2024; F. Onuah, ‘West African bloc lifts sanctions on junta-led Niger’, Reuters, 26 February 2024; ‘West African bloc ECOWAS says it is lifting sanctions on Niger’, France 24, 24 February 2024.
64
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Tinubu urges Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali to reconsider exit from ECOWAS’, Business 247 News, 24 February 2024.
65
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; H. Ferdjani, ‘Debate on ditching CFA begins as Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger forge new path’, Al Jazeera, 23 February 2024; ‘The military juntas of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso intend to create a common currency’, Nova News, 12 February 2024; ‘Burkina may quit West African currency union, but not Mali’, Reuters, 1 February 2024.
66
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; C. Asadu, ‘West Africa regional bloc approves exit timeline for 3 member nations hit by coups’, PBS, 15 December 2024.
67
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso formally leave ECOWAS’, Le Monde, 29 January 2025; ‘ECOWAS finally approves the withdrawal of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso from the bloc’, University of Leiden, 13 February 2025; F. B. Aboagye, ‘The Withdrawal of AES from ECOWAS: An opportunity for re-evaluating existing instruments for regional integration?’, Amani Africa, 31 January 2025.
68
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Thousands rally in Burkina, Mali and Niger to cheer ECOWAS exit’, RFI, 28 January 2025; ‘Thousands rally in Burkina, Mali and Niger to cheer ECOWAS exit’, France 24, 28 January 2025.
69
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; D. Sow, ‘Can Realpolitik drive renewed regional cooperation in West Africa?’, Institute for Security Studies, 20 May 2025.
70
See above
71
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger denounces military cooperation agreement with Benin’, Africa News, 13 August 2024; ‘Niger junta ends military accord with Benin amid regional standoff’, Reuters, 13 September 2023; ‘Niger Denounces Military Cooperation Agreement With Benin’, Lagos Talks; J. Tasamba, ‘Niger scraps military pact with Benin over aggression claims’, AA, 13 September 2023.
72
See above
73
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; C. Mitchell, ‘Niger on verge of first oil exports with 110,000 b/d Benin pipeline completed: sources’, S&P Global, 7 March 2024.
74
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; B. Rukanga, ‘Benin blocks Niger oil exports in border row’, BBC, 9 May 2024; A. Cascais, ‘Benin gives green light for Niger’s oil exports to China’, Deutsche Welle, 16 May 2024; ‘Benin temporarily lifts ban on crude oil export from Niger’, West Africa Democracy Radio, 16 May 2024; P. Adjoha and B. Balima, ‘Benin-Niger spat deepens with arrests at crude pipeline terminal’, Reuters, 6 June 2024.
75
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger junta agrees to talks to repair ties with Benin’, Reuters, 3 July 2024; ‘Boni Yayi and Soglo head to Niamey for junta talks’, Africa Intelligence, 4 July 2024; ‘Niger Junta Agrees to Talks to Repair Ties With Benin’, US News, 3 July 2024.
76
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Nigerien govt announces formation of tripartite committee to resolve Benin feud’, West Africa Democracy Radio, 3 July 2024.
77
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; L. Fleming and T. I. Issoufou, ‘Niger confirms anti-junta rebels behind oil attack’, BBC, 22 June 2024; J. Tasamba, ‘Niger rebels claim responsibility for attack on China-backed pipeline’, AA, 18 June 2024; ‘Rising Terrorism Takes Toll on Niger’s Oil Sector’, African Defense Forum, 20 August 2024.
78
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group.
79
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger resumes crude oil exports via Benin’, Energy News, 22 August 2024.
80
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; C. Ubani, ‘Niger Appoints New Ambassador to Benin to Restore Diplomatic Ties’, West Africa Weekly, 28 November 2024; O. Owoseni, ‘Niger Appoints New Ambassador to Benin as Tensions Begin to Thaw’, TV360 Nigeria, 27 November 2024.
81
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; Y. Akinpelu, ‘Nigeria denies colluding with France to destabilise Niger’, BBC, 27 December 2024; S. Anyanwu, ‘Nigeria Refutes Allegations of Plotting to Destabilize the Government of the Republic of Niger’, The Federal Ministry of Information and National Orientation: Nigeria, 21 December 2024.
82
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; Y. Akinpelu, ‘Nigeria denies colluding with France to destabilise Niger’, BBC, 27 December 2024; S. Anyanwu, ‘Nigeria Refutes Allegations of Plotting to Destabilize the Government of the Republic of Niger’, The Federal Ministry of Information and National Orientation: Nigeria, 21 December 2024.
83
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Burkina Faso, Mali say military intervention in Niger would be ‘declaration of war’’, France 24, 1 August 2023; ‘Mali, Burkina Faso Warn Niger Intervention Considered ‘Declaration of War’’, Voice of America: Africa, 1 August 2023; A. Wadia, ‘Is Niger the “Ukraine of the Sahel”?’, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 23 August 2023.
84
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; E. Peltier, ‘A Leader of Niger’s Coup Visits Mali, Raising Fears of a Wagner Alliance’, The New York Times, 2 August 2023.
85
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso sign Sahel security pact’, Reuters, 16 September 2023; ‘Liptako-Gourma Charter establishing the Alliance of Sahel States’, in Letter dated 22 September 2023
86
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso to move toward monetary alliance, Niger leader says’, Reuters, 11 December 2023.
87
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Burkina Faso and Niger to quit G5 Sahel anti-jihadist force following Mali move’, France 24, 12 February 2023; ‘Burkina Faso, Niger Withdraw from G5 Anti-Jihadist Alliance’, Voice of America: Africa, 6 December 2023; W. Ross, ‘G5 Sahel: Niger and Burkina Faso leave anti-Islamist force’, BBC, 3 December 2023.
88
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger finalise regional alliance project’, The Hindu, 19 May 2024; ‘Intel Report: Formation of the Confederation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)’, Special Eurasia, 24 May 2024.
89
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger hosts military exercise involving central Sahel states, Chad and Togo’, West Africa Democracy Radio, 27 May 2024; ‘Alliance of Sahel States holds military exercises in Niger’, Voice of America: Africa, 27 May 2024; A. R. Dossavi, ‘Togo Takes Part in Joint Military Exercises with Sahel Alliance and Chad’, Togo First, 28 May 2024.
90
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; D. Sow and H. Koné, ‘As AES and ECOWAS drift apart, dialogue on the fundamentals is vital’, Institute for Security Studies, 23 July 2024; ‘«Nos peuples ont irrévocablement tourné le dos à la Cedeao», affirme le chef du régime nigérien’, Le Figaro, 6 July 2024.
91
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘AES : common biometric passports from 29 January 2025’, Africa News Agency, 26 January 2025; ‘Mali, Burkina and Niger to launch biometric passports under new alliance’, Reuters, 15 September 2024; B. Rukanga, and P. Nije, ‘Junta-led West African states to launch new passport’, BBC, 16 September 2024; N. Mwangi, ‘Sahel states exit ECOWAS, launch regional passport and joint military’, Peoples Dispatch, 29 January 2025.
92
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; D. Wabwireh, ‘Alliance of Sahel States to form 5,000-troop military unit’, Africa News, 22 January 2025; ‘Alliance of Sahel States to form 5,000-troop military unit’, West Africa Democracy Solidarity Network; ‘Junta-led Sahel states ready joint force of 5,000 troops, says minister’, Reuters, 22 January 2025.
93
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Confederation of Sahel States (AES) Deploys Unified Military in Tri-Border Region’, West African Voice Network, 7 March 2025; ‘Opération Conjointe des FDS de l’AES Yéréko 2 : Plusieurs terroristes affiliés à l’EIGS tués dans la zone des trois frontières’, Le Sahel, 5 March 2025; I. K. Djitteye, ‘Opération Yereko 2 : une démonstration de force réussie de l’Alliance des États du Sahel’, Sahel Tribune, 10 March 2025.
94
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘About the Force’, Multinational Joint Task Force; ‘Niger withdraws from Lake Chad military force’, Reuters, 30 March 2025; E. Egbejule, ‘Niger’s junta withdraws from Lake Chad anti-Islamist force’, The Guardian, 1 April 2025; E. Lionel, ‘Niger withdraws from MNJTF counter-terror coalition’, Military Africa, 31 March 2025.
95
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group.
96
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; B. Balima and M. Aksar, ‘Niger junta expels French ambassador’, Reuters, 26 August 2023; ‘Niger junta gives French envoy 48 hours to leave’, BBC News, 25 August 2023.
97
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; W. Chibelushi, ‘Niger coup: France defies ultimatum for ambassador to leave Niamey’, BBC, 28 August 2023; ‘Macron says French ambassador still in Niger despite ultimatum’, Le Monde, 28 August 2023.
98
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger’s military government slams Macron for backing President Bazoum’, Al Jazeera, 1 September 2023; ‘Niger coup leaders accuse France of wanting to ‘intervene militarily’’, France 24, 31 July 2023; ‘Niger junta accuses Macron of forcing ECOWAS invasion’, Al Mayadeen, 2 September 2023.
99
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Photos: Huge protests in Niger demand French forces to leave’, Al Jazeera, 3 September 2023; ‘Niger: Pro-junta protesters demand French troop withdrawal’, Deutsche Welle, 3 September 2023; ‘Thousands rally in Niger to demand the withdrawal of French troops’, France 24, 2 September 2023.
100
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; C. Liakos, ‘France will end its military presence in Niger by the end of 2023, Macron says’, CNN, 25 September 2023; P. Ricard and E. Vincent, ‘Macron ultimately orders military exit from Niger’, Le Monde, 25 September 2023; ‘France to withdraw ambassador and troops from Niger after coup, Macron says’, France 24, 24 September 2023.
101
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; A. K. Mazou and M. Aksar, ‘French ambassador to Niger leaves as relations nosedive after coup’, Reuters, 27 September 2023; ‘French Ambassador to Niger Leaves as Relations Nosedive After Coup’, Voice of America, 27 September 2023; M. Le Cam, ‘Niger: Why the departure of the French ambassador was inevitable’, Le Monde, 28 September 2023.
102
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘French forces depart Niger, US declares military rulers conducted coup’, Al Jazeera, 12 October 2023; ‘French troops begin withdrawal from Niger’, Reuters, 11 October 2023; E. Vincent and M. Le Cam, ‘The French army has begun its withdrawal from Niger’, Le Monde, 6 October 2023; A. Chrisafis, ‘France to begin pulling out troops from Niger this week’, The Guardian, 5 October 2023.
103
‘Last French troops leave Niger as military cooperation officially ends’, Reuters, 22 December 2023; C. Asadu, ‘France completes military withdrawal from Niger, leaving a gap in the terror fight in the Sahel’, AP News, 23 December 2023; ‘Last set of French troops exit Niger as Sahel sheds Parisian influence’, Al Jazeera, 22 December 2023; M. Le Cam and E. Vincent, ‘France completes troop withdrawal from Niger, closes embassy’,Le Monde, 22 December 2023.
104
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘France closes embassy in Niger until further notice’, France 24, 2 January 2024; L. Kayali, ‘France closes embassy in Niger’, Politico, 2 January 2024; ‘French embassy in Niger closed until further notice – foreign ministry’, Reuters, 3 January 2024.
105
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger accuses France of training, funding terrorist groups in Sahel’, TRT Global, 1 October 2024; ‘Niger blasts France for alleged terror support in Sahel’, Africa Briefing, 1 October 2024.
106
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Orano initiates a second arbitration procedure vis à vis the State of Niger following the loss of operational control over SOMAÏR’, Orano, 21 January 2025; D. Dalton, ‘France’s Orano Files Second Arbitration Procedure Over Niger Uranium Crackdown’, Nuclear Net, 21 January 2025.
107
See above
108
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; J. Tasamaba, ‘Niger’s military government orders expulsion of UN official’, AA, 12 October 2023; ‘Niger: Authorities putting rights at risk’, Amnesty International, 26 October 2023; United Nations Secretary-General, ‘Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General – on Niger’, 11 October 2023.
109
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger junta revokes law aimed at curbing migration to Europe’, Info Migrants, 28 November 2023; A. I. Abdoulaye, ‘Niger after the Coup: new migration patterns in the Sahel?’, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 8 May 2024; ‘Niger junta repeals law aimed at slowing migration to Europe’, Reuters, 27 November 2023.
110
F. Dreschsel and Y. Böing, ‘Was ist los in Niger?’, Linx, July 2024; A. Bisong et al, ‘What does the regime change in Niger mean for migration cooperation with the EU?’, ECDPM, 11 September 2023; L. Lambert, ‘Niger’, Migration Control Info, 9 December 2019.
111
F. Dreschsel and Y. Böing, ‘Was ist los in Niger?’, Linx, July 2024; S. Stille, ‘The criminalization of mobility in Niger: The case of Law 2015-36’, ASILE, November 2023; J. Garver-Affeldt, ‘The criminalization of mobility in Niger: the case of Law 2015–36’, Migration Center, 13 December 2023.
112
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger ends EU security and defense partnerships’, Le Monde, 4 December 2023; ‘EUMPM Niger: Council decides not to extend the mandate of the mission’, European Council, 27 May 2024.
113
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Junta expels European EUCAP mission staff’,Africa Intelligence, 1 January 2024; ‘Niger’s military junta expels 15 members of the Eucap mission’, Nova News, 20 January 2024.
114
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘A Russian Delegation arrives in Niger for talks to strengthen military cooperation’, West Africa Democracy Radio, 5 December 2023; ‘Russian officials visit Niger to strengthen military ties’, Africa News, 13 August 2024; ‘Niger’s junta ends security agreements with EU, turns to Russia for defence cooperation’, France 24, 4 December 2023.
115
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger Ruler Discusses ‘Military Cooperation’ with Putin’, Voice of America: Africa, 27 March 2024; ‘Russia and Niger pledge to strengthen military ties’, Africa Daily, 16 January 2024.
116
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘US plans to resume partnership with Niger, diplomat says’, Reuters, 13 December 2023; J. Tasamba, ‘US intends to resume partnership with Niger junta: Diplomat’, AA, 12 December 2023; ‘U.S. says its prepared to resume conditional cooperation with Niger’, CGTN Africa, 14 December 2023.
117
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; D. Vergun, ‘U.S. Working Diplomatically With Niger on New Path of Cooperation’, U.S. Department of War, 18 March 2024; ‘US concern over Niger’s deal with Iran contributed to rupture of ties’, The Arab Weekly, 19 March 2024; ‘Niger Revokes Military Accord With US, Junta Spokesperson Says’, Voice of America, 16 March 2024.
118
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger Revokes Military Accord With US, Junta Spokesperson Says’, Voice of America, 16 March 2024; B. Balima and B. Felix, ‘Niger revokes military accord with US, junta spokesperson says’, Reuters, 17 March 2024; M. McCluskey and H. Chen, ‘Niger ends military agreement with US, calls it ‘profoundly unfair’’, CNN, 16 March 2024.
119
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger suspends military cooperation with US: Spokesman’, Al Jazeera, 17 March 2024 amid growing uncertainty over whether the 1,000 US military personnel stationed at the Agadez military base would stay in the country. ‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group.
120
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Thousands protest in Niger demanding immediate withdrawal of US troops’, France 24, 13 April 2024; ‘Hundreds protest in Niger demanding departure of US troops’, Al Jazeera, 13 April 2025; ‘Hundreds protest in Niger for immediate exit of US troops’, TRT Global, 21 April 2024.
121
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; E. Schmitt, ‘U.S. to Withdraw All Troops From Niger by September’, The New York Times, 19 May 2024; ‘Joint Statement From the U.S. Department of Defense and the Department of National Defense of the Republic of Niger’, US Department of Defense, 19 May 2024.
122
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; R. Chason, ‘U.S. threats led to rupture of vital military ties, Nigerien leader says’, Washington Post, 14 May 2024; E. Helmore, ‘Niger’s prime minister blames US for rupture of military pact’, The Guardian, 14 May 2024.
123
‘U.S. Withdrawal from Niger completed’, United States Africa Command, 16 September 2024; ‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘American troops begin withdrawal from Niger’, Africa News, 13 August 2024; H. Britzky, ‘US military completes withdrawal from Niger’, CNN, 16 September 2024. The possibility of future non-military cooperation was left open by Washington. ‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group.
124
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘EUMPM Niger: Council decides not to extend the mandate of the mission’, European Council, 27 May 2024; ‘EU to end military mission to Niger by June 30’, Reuters, 27 May 2023; L. Dominici, ‘European Union ends EUMPM mission in Niger as ties with Russia strengthen’, Institute for Global Studies, 4 June 2024.
125
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Germany withdraws troops from junta-run Niger’, DW, 30 August 2024; ‘Germany to keep military base in Niger open under temporary deal, Berlin says’, Reuters, 28 May 2024; ‘Lufttransportstützpunkt in Niger wird über den 31. Mai hinaus weiterbetrieben’, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 29 May 2024.
126
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘EU recalls its envoy from Niger over flood fund distribution’, Deutsche Welle, 23 November 2024; G. Sorgi, ‘Brussels recalls envoy to Niger after junta accuses EU of mishandling aid’, Politico, 23 November 2024; ‘Aid or interference? Niger rejects EU diplomat over ‘unauthorised’ activity’, TRT Global, 25 November 2024.
127
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; M. Knight et al, ‘Russian weapons and trainers arrive in Niger weeks after US military agreement ends’, CNN, 12 April 2024; ‘Russian military instructors, air defence system arrive in Niger amid deepening ties’, France 24, 12 April 2024.
128
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Russian military instructors, air defence system arrive in Niger amid deepening ties’, France 24, 12 April 2024.
129
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger hosts Russian Deputy Minister of Defense Iounus-Bek Evkourov’, West Africa Democracy, 3 June 2024.
130
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger Invites Russian Firms to Mine Uranium, Other Resources’, The Moscow Times, 13 November 2024; ‘Niger embraces Russia for uranium production leaving France out in the cold’, RFI, 13 November 2024.
131
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger: Three attacks against the army, among the perpetrators also the pro-Bazoum rebels’, Nova News, 19 September 2023.
132
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger: Three attacks against the army, among the perpetrators also the pro-Bazoum rebels’, Nova News, 19 September 2023; ‘Armed Niger group fights for freedom of ousted president’, CAJ News, 20 September 2024.
133
‘Niger: Three attacks against the army, among the perpetrators also the pro-Bazoum rebels’, Nova News, 19 September 2023; ‘Armed Niger group fights for freedom of ousted president’, CAJ News, 20 September 2024.
134
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; E. B ‘Ivorian journalist arrested in Niger over Burkina Faso coup plot’, West Africa Democracy Radio, 26 September 2024; ‘Disappearance of Ivorian Journalist in Niger Raises Alarm’, News Central, 16 September 2024.
135
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger: Journalist Serge Mathurin Adou charged in attempted coup case’, West Africa Democracy Radio, 15 November 2024; ‘Freedom of Expression Developments in West Africa: A November 2024 Roundup’, Media Foundation for West Africa.
136
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; O. Sankare, ‘Sahel junta alliance opens terror probe into France 24 journalist’, AA, 26 September 2024; ‘France: France 24 journalist under investigation for his “jihadist reporting” in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger’, International Federation of Journalists, 3 October 2024.
137
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger suspends BBC, announces a complaint against RFI’, Committee to Protect Journalists, 13 December 2024; C. Ewokor, ‘Niger’s military rulers suspend BBC broadcasts’, BBC, 13 December 2024.
138
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger journalist held after channel suspended, association says’, Voice of America, 18 January 2025; ‘Niger: RSF condemns the suspension of Canal 3 TV and calls for the immediate release of its editor-in-chief Seyni Amadou’, Ecoi.net, 20 January 2025.
139
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger frees journalist detained over anti-junta broadcast’, Punch, 20 January 2025; ‘Niger Frees News Editor Who Aired Junta-Critical Story’, Channels TV, 20 January 2025.
140
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger military junta bans French humanitarian NGO Acted’, France 24, 13 November 2024; M. Banchereau, ‘Niger junta bans French aid group amid tensions with France’, AP News, November 2023; O. Al Yahyai, ‘Niger expels French aid group as ties with the West deteriorate’, Euro News, 13 November 2024.
141
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘INSO suspends services and closes offices in Niger’, International NGO Safety Organisation, 28 February 2025; A. Salkida, ‘INSO Ordered to Suspend Services in Nigeria’, HumAngle, 3 June 2025.
142
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Niger: ICRC ceases operations’, News release, 7 February 2025; ‘Niger junta expels Red Cross without explanation’, RFI, 6 February 2025; S. Sanderson, ‘Niger Red Cross ban comes amid ‘dire humanitarian’ situation’, Deutsche Welle, 7 February 2025.
143
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; J. Chukwu, ‘Niger Government Establishes Committee To Monitor NGOs Amid Humanitarian Sector Scrutiny’, West Africa Weekly, 8 February 2025; ‘Niger: NGOs must align with the military regime’s vision, according to a decree’, Sene News, 9 February 2025.
144
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger: Prominent Civil Society Activist Arbitrarily Arrested’, Human Rights Watch, 9 December 2024; Amnesty International, ‘Niger: Six month-long arbitrary detention of human rights defender Moussa Tchangari must end’, Press release, 3 June 2025; Amnesty International, ‘Niger: Prominent human rights defender detained: Moussa Tchangari’, Press release, 16 December 2024.
145
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; Amnesty International, ‘Niger: Further information: New charges against human rights defender: Moussa Tchangari’, Press release, 15 January 2025; ‘Niger: “Threatened and brought to heel”: Human rights and civic space under pressure since the 26 July coup’, ReliefWeb, 18 March 2025.
146
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger: Joint call for the immediate release of Moussa Tiangari’, International Federation for Human Rights, 15 January 2025; Amnesty International, ‘New Charges Against Human Rights Defender’, 15 January 2025.
147
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger strips citizenship of exiled allies of deposed president’, Africa Briefing, 11 October 2024; ‘Niger strips deposed leader Bazoum’s associates of nationality’, TRT Global, 11 October 2024.
148
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group.
149
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger rebels fighting for ousted president’s release hand over weapons’, Voice of America, 11 November 2024; ‘Niger’s Transitional Government Strips Nationality from Seven Former Officials of Ousted Civilian Government’, West African Voice Network, 6 November 2024.
150
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Nigerian opposition leader seized by LNA in al-Qatrun’, Libya Security Monitor, 23 February 2025; G. Ikeh, ‘Nigerien opposition leader Mahmoud Sallah arrested in Libya’, APA News, 26 February 2025; ‘Libya: Haftar forces arrest Mahmoud Salah, leader of Niger’s armed opposition’, Nova News, 24 February 2025.
151
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Unexpected Arrest of the Former Minister of Oil in Niger, Mahaman Moustapha Barké’, Energy News, 20 January 2025.
152
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; T. Naadi and C. Macaulay, ‘Niger’s military leaders free ministers, but not ousted president’, BBC, 2 April 2025; ‘Niger junta releases ministers of overthrown government’, France 24, 2 April 2025.
153
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; T. Naadi and C. Macaulay, ‘Niger’s military leaders free ministers, but not ousted president’, BBC, 2 April 2025; ‘Niger junta releases ministers of overthrown government’, France 24, 2 April 2025.
154
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; T. Naadi and C. Macaulay, ‘Niger’s military leaders free ministers, but not ousted president’, BBC, 2 April 2025; ‘Niger junta releases ministers of overthrown government’, France 24, 2 April 2025.
155
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; J. Le Bihan, ‘Face à Abdourahamane Tiani, Rhissa Ag Boula passe à la lutte armée’, Jeune Afrique, 26 September 2024; ‘Niger, du rififi dans le groupe armé créé pour libérer Bazoum’, Mondafrique, 27 September 2024; ‘Niger. Rhissa Ag Boula lance les forces armées libres (FAL) pour renverser la junta’, La Cinquieme, 28 September 2024.
156
‘Niger, du rififi dans le groupe armé créé pour libérer Bazoum’, Mondafrique, 27 September 2024; ‘Niger : Annonce de la dissolution du Conseil de la Résistance pour la République et de la création de la structure des Forces Armées Libres’, Madar, 27 September 2024.
157
‘Niger, du rififi dans le groupe armé créé pour libérer Bazoum’, Mondafrique, 27 September 2024; ‘Niger: Annonce de la dissolution du Conseil de la Résistance pour la République et de la création de la structure des Forces Armées Libres’, Madar, 27 September 2024.
158
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group. The coalition has yet to conduct military operations.
159
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; A. Herrberg, ‘Niger’s National Dialogue: A genuine path to democratic transition or just political theatre?’, Berghof Foundation, 25 February 2025; ‘Niger’s leader opens national dialogue on State reform’, Pravda, 16 February 2025.
160
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Mali national dialogue recommends extending junta rule for several more years’, France 24, 10 May 2025; ‘Burkina Faso military rule extended for five years’, Le Monde, 25 May 2025.
161
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; L. Mudge, ‘A Bleak Future for Democracy in Niger’, Human Rights Watch, 21 February 2025; ‘Niger – February 2025’, Global State of Democracy Initiative.
162
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; L. Mudge, ‘A Bleak Future for Democracy in Niger’, Human Rights Watch, 21 February 2025; ‘Niger – February 2025’, Global State of Democracy Initiative.
163
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; L. Mudge, ‘A Bleak Future for Democracy in Niger’, Human Rights Watch, 21 February 2025.
164
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger’s junta leader Tiani sworn in as president for five-year transition period’, France 24, 26 March 2025; D. Wabwireh, ‘Niger’s junta, Abdourahamane Tchiani sworn in as transitional president for a period of five years’, Africa News, 26 March 2025; A. Olaoluwa and N. Ogbonna, ‘Niger coup leader sworn in as president for five years’, BBC, 26 March 2025.
165
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger’s junta leader Tiani sworn in as president for five-year transition period’, France 24, 26 March 2025; D. Wabwireh, ‘Niger’s junta, Abdourahamane Tchiani sworn in as transitional president for a period of five years’, Africa News, 26 March 2025; A. Olaoluwa and N. Ogbonna, ‘Niger coup leader sworn in as president for five years’, BBC, 26 March 2025.
166
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Les membres du Gouvernement’, Niger: Portail Officiel du Gouvernement.
167
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Les membres du Gouvernement’, Niger: Portail Officiel du Gouvernement.
168
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Breakaway Sahel state launches consultative council to steer post-coup reforms’, Business Insider, 29 June 2025; ‘Niger’s president appoints 189-member council to guide national refoundation efforts’, Niger Issues, 2 May 2025.
169
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger: à Termit, la garnison militaire se soulève contre la junte au pouvoir’, Nasuba, 13 May 2025; ‘Niger: mutinerie au sein d’une garnison basée à Termit dans le Sahara’, RFI, 13 May 2025; ‘General Tchiani walks a tightrope to maintain control of army’, Africa Intelligence, 13 June 2025; ‘Niger: Soldiers Mutiny in Northeastern Termit Camp, US Ambassador Presents Credentials to Junta Leader’, Worldview, 13 May 2025.
170
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger: à Termit, la garnison militaire se soulève contre la junte au pouvoir’, Nasuba, 13 May 2025; ‘Niger: mutinerie au sein d’une garnison basée à Termit dans le Sahara’, RFI, 13 May 2025.
171
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger: à Termit, la garnison militaire se soulève contre la junte au pouvoir’, Nasuba, 13 May 2025.
172
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger: deux mouvements d’humeur de soldats en 72 heures’, RFI, 27 June 2025; E. Ahonon, ‘Niger: Deux mutineries de soldats en 72 heures dans l’ouest du pays’, Afrika Soir, 27 June 2025; ‘Niger: Vague de mécontentement dans l’armée, deux mutineries en 72 heures’, 27 June 2025.
173
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger: deux mouvements d’humeur de soldats en 72 heures’, RFI, 27 June 2025; E. Ahonon, ‘Niger: Deux mutineries de soldats en 72 heures dans l’ouest du pays’, Afrika Soir, 27 June 2025; ‘Niger: Vague de mécontentement dans l’armée, deux mutineries en 72 heures’, 27 June 2025.
174
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Forces Armées Nigériennes : Salifou Mody sacré Général d’Armée, 16 hauts gradés promus’, ActuNiger, 2 June 2025; ‘Le Niger a un nouveau général 5 étoiles’, Afrique Sur 7, 4 June 2025.
175
‘Boko Haram, including JAS and ISIS-WA’, European Union Agency for Asylum, February 2019; V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, September 2024.
176
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, September 2024; ‘Fighting among Boko Haram Splinters Rages On’, International Crisis Group, 30 May 2023.
177
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, September 2024; ‘Fighting among Boko Haram Splinters Rages On’, International Crisis Group, 30 May 2023.
178
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, September 2024.
179
V. Foucher, ‘Boko Haram: Mapping an Evolving Armed Constellation’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, September 2024.
180
‘Niger: 3 soldats tués au Sud de Toumour’, Mardar, 9 November 2023.
181
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Boko Haram militants attack, injure five soldiers in Niger’, TRT Global, 24 April 2024; ‘Cinq soldats nigériens blessés dans une embuscade de Boko Haram’, Voice of America: Africa, 24 April 2024; ‘Diffa/Attique du site de Lada: Le Gouverneur au chevet des militaries blessés’, Le Sahel, 24 April 2024.
182
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Lutte contre le Boko Haram: Les FDS déjouent une attaque au Sud de N’Guigmi’, Le Sahel, 8 May 2024.
183
Fatoumata, ‘Niger: Une dizaine de combattants de Boko Haram éliminés par l’armée dans l’extrême est du pays’, Mali Actu, 13 June 2024; ‘Niger : une dizaine de combattants de Boko Haram éliminés par l’armée’, Le Courrier du Vietnam, 13 June 2024.
184
‘Au Niger, trois attaques séparées causent la mort d’au moins douze militaires’, Le Monde, 19 September 2024; ‘Multiples attaques meurtrières au Niger’, Infos Niger, 19 September 2024; ‘Niger: trois attaques contre l’armée, parmi les auteurs également des rebelles pro-Bazoum’, Nova News, 19 September 2024.
185
M. Samuel, ‘Boko Haram factional violence worries Islamic State’, Institute for Security Studies, 25 April 2024; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Violent Extremism in the Sahel’, Council on Foreign Relations, 4 September 2025.
186
‘Islamic State West Africa Province’, Australian Government: Australian National Security, 22 September 2024; ‘ISIS–West Africa (ISIS-WA)’, Director of National Intelligence: Counter Terrorism Guide, April 2025; M. Samuel, ‘When rebels rule: ISWAP’s formula for winning support in Nigeria’s northeast’, The New Humanitarian, 24 July 2025; ‘The Islamic State West Africa Province’s Tactical Evolution Fuels Worsening Conflict in Nigeria’s Northeast’, The Soufan Center, 21 May 2025.
187
A. Dahiru, ‘ISWAP Rebrands, Expands Scope Of Operations’, HumAngle, 1 October 2022.
188
‘Dix militaires blessés et des “dizaines de terroristes” tués dans le sud-est du Niger’, Voice of America: Africa, 24 January 2024; ‘Diffa, Attaque de l’Aérodrome de N’Guigmi: le Gouverneur Ibrahim Bagadoma aux chevets des blessés’, Agence Nigérienne de Presse, 23 January 2024; ‘Plusieurs dizaines de terroristes neutralisés lors de l’attaque de l’aéroport de N’Guigmi (Diffa) (Communiqué)’, aNiamey, 24 January 2024.
189
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group.
190
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; ‘Niger: une dizaine d’éléments de Boko Haram tués par l’armée dans l’extrême est du pays’, Afrique Diplomatique, 15 March 2024; ‘Niger: une dizaine de combattants de Boko Haram tués par l’armée dans l’extrême est du pays’, Xinhua, 15 March 2024.
191
‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group; Pagoui, X, 15 August 2024.
192
Pagoui, X, 3 October 2024; Wamaps, X, 3 October 2024; ‘Africa: Niger’, International Crisis Group.
193
N. Fotso, ‘Niger: Frappe Foudroyante Contre le Terrorisme à Diffa et Tillabéri’, Info Camroun, 21 March 2025; ‘Lutte contre le terrorism: 45 terroristes de L’EIGS tués dans la zone de l’Opération Niya’, Le Sahel, 20 March 2025; ‘Niger: Une victoire éclatante contre le terrorisme à Diffa et Tillabéri’, Center for Development Studies and the Prevention of Extremism, 21 March 2025.

Niger

Reporting period: July 2024 - June 2025

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (between July 2023 and June 2025)

Coup d’état in July 2023

Strained relations with ECOWAS

Tense relationship with Benin over crude oil exports

Creation of the ‘Alliance of Sahel States’ (AES) between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger

Rupture with former colonial power France

Shifting security alliances from Western States to Russia

Creation of the ‘Patriotic Movement for Freedom and Justice’ (MPLJ)

Restrictions on the media, activists and NGOs

Revocations of citizenship and arrest of government opponents

Creation of Free Armed Forces (FAL) and Coordination of Free Forces of Niger

Initiation of a national dialogue and the installation of a new government

Mutinies among rank-and-file soldiers

Violence involving Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province

Non-International Armed Conflicts

Background

Intensity

Organization

Background

Intensity

Organization

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

Non-State parties

Other Main actors

Other Non-State Actors

Regional Organizations and Alliances

Foreign involvement