South Sudan

Two non-international armed conflicts (NIAC) were ongoing in Sudan in the reporting period:

South Sudan v the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO)
South Sudan v the National Salvation Front (NAS)

This entry uses the term SPLM/A-IO as an umbrella term for the combination of the political party SPLM-IO and its military wing SPLA-IO.

The Republic of Sudan gained independence from Britain and Egypt in 1956. ¹. Following Sudan’s independence, internal divisions between the economically advantaged northern regions and the less-developed southern regions gave rise to decades of violence, with two civil wars, one from 1955 to 1972, and a second from 1983 to 2005 killing an estimated two million people. ² The south of Sudan, whose inhabitants are predominantly Christian and Animist, forcibly resisted the rule of the north and the attempted imposition of Arabic language and culture. ³ The first Sudanese civil war ended in 1972 with the Addis Ababa Agreement, which granted significant autonomy to the regional government of South Sudan. ⁴

Hostilities in the second Sudanese civil war concluded in 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and John Garang, the head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A). ⁵ During a six-year transitional period, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement granted extensive autonomy to the south, ultimately giving the South Sudanese an opportunity to decide whether to continue as part of Sudan or to secede and form an independent nation. ⁶ In April 2010, Sudan held elections at presidential and parliamentary levels, encompassing Sudan as a whole as well as the semi-autonomous region in the south.⁷Salva Kiir, who since 2005 had functioned as Sudan’s vice president, emerged triumphant as regional president in the south. ⁸

Fears of renewed violence between the north and the south following the separation from Sudan were quashed as a peaceful referendum was held on 9 January 2011, with south Sudanese citizens voting overwhelmingly for independence. ⁹ Consequently, the Republic of South Sudan officially declared its independence from the Republic of Sudan on 9 July 2011, with Salva Kiir becoming the first head of state. ¹⁰ The young nation was, however, plagued by political turmoil due to weak governance and long-standing ethnic tensions, which escalated into violence and a new armed conflict in December 2013. The fighting was sparked by President Salva Kiir’s allegation that Vice President Riek Machar was planning a coup d’état. ¹¹ Riek Machar was subsequently removed from his position as Vice President. ¹²

The armed conflict that ensued was characterized by ethnic animus, with Dinka militias and the supporters of President Kiir clashing with Nuer forces aligned with Machar. ¹³Fighters on both sides targeted civilians on the basis of their ethnic identity, committing murder, rape, torture, and other violent crimes and resulting in an estimated 400,000 fatalities and four million displaced internally or forced to flee the country. ¹⁴ Further, the violence prevented crops from being planted or harvested resulting in food shortages across the nation and leading the United Nations (UN) Security Council to label the food crisis the ‘worst in the world’ in July 2014. ¹⁵There have been critical food shortages and famines ever since. ¹⁶

A power-sharing agreement was brokered in August 2015 by the Regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development, with support from the United States and a number of other nations. ¹⁷ The agreement initially broke down in 2016 following violent clashes between government forces and opposition groups after Machar returned from exile and resumed his position as Vice President. ¹⁸ However, the parties to the conflict reaffirmed their commitment two years later, leading to the signature in 2018 of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The Revitalized Agreement was mediated by Uganda and Sudan, and signed by the government, Mr Machar’s political party, and several rebel movements. ¹⁹Following its signing, Kiir and Machar established a unity government in 2020, having twice missed the agreed deadline. ²⁰.

The years since have seen little progress in the implementation of the 2018 peace agreement, notably in terms of security measures, institutional restructuring, and the establishment of an electoral apparatus. ²¹The transitional period for implementation of the agreement has been repeatedly extended by the government, with the latest extension for a further two years announced in September 2024 and currently set to end in January 2027. ²² In the same vein, long-delayed national elections – originally due to take place in December 2024 – have been postponed until 2026. ²³ The ongoing dispute between President Kiir and Vice President Machar has raised concerns that violence could again escalate in the run-up to the presidential elections, given that both have stated their intention to stand for election. ²⁴

An armed uprising in the south of the country led by former South Sudanese army general Thomas Cirillo and his National Salvation Front, which seeks to oust the incumbent President Salva Kiir from power, poses another grave risk to the civilian population and may jeopardize the ongoing peace process. ²⁵

Since the civil war ended, the peace process has been at risk, and there has been an increase in intercommunal violence and attacks. ²⁶ The situation further deteriorated in April 2023 when hostilities erupted in the neighbouring nation of Sudan, precipitating an influx of refugees, including a considerable number of South Sudanese citizens who had previously fled South Sudan. ²⁷ According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, an estimated 945,000 persons were internally displaced in South Sudan due to violence and armed conflict as of the end of 2024. ²⁸

Additionally, on 9 April 2025, the UN World Food Programme (WFP) warned that hunger in South Sudan’s north-east had escalated to a critical tipping point, with almost 7.7 million people facing severe food insecurity amid ongoing armed conflict in South Sudan’s Greater Upper Nile region. ²⁹ Heavy rains and floods since May 2024 had devastated villages and farmland, worsening the hunger crisis for more than three million people. ³⁰ Currently, more than 18,000 peacekeepers are serving with the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), which initially deployed in 2005. ³¹ They are responsible for protecting civilians and are authorized by the UN Security Council to use force in their capacity to facilitate the safe delivery of humanitarian aid, promote human rights, and build a durable peace in this conflict-affected country. ³²

Extension of the transitional period and the postponement of elections scheduled for December 2024

On 13 September 2024, the government announced that, from 22 February 2025, the transitional period of the 2018 peace agreement (R-ARCSS) would be extended by a further two years – this came on top of an earlier extension in August 2022. ⁸⁰ Unsurprisingly, this transition extension was met with criticism from both domestic and external actors. ⁸¹Thus, for instance, on 23 September 2024, a group of twenty-three lawyers filed a petition with the Supreme Court challenging the decision, and on 21 September 2024, the Troika (comprising the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway) criticized the leaders for their apparent lack of political will. ⁸²

At the same time as its decision to extend the transitional period, the government announced the deferral of South Sudan’s first elections (initially scheduled for December 2024) to December 2026. ⁸³ President Kiir initially expressed a preference for holding elections in December 2024; however, he said, the nation was not adequately prepared for elections that would be considered free and fair. ⁸⁴ At the same time, Vice President Riek Machar was increasing pressure to postpone the process, leading to a consensus between the two parties on an extension that would maintain the status quo for a further two years. ⁸⁵ On the same day, Tut Gatluak, who serves as the Presidential Adviser on National Security, stated that the postponement would allow time to implement the key remaining protocols in the R-ARCSS, including drafting the new constitution and completing a national census.⁸⁶

In the months and years leading up to the decision on election postponement, a broad array of actors had voiced their concerns about South Sudan’s preparedness to hold national elections. For instance, on 6 July 2023, the head of the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) said that the country was ‘not yet ready’ for ‘free, fair and credible elections’. ⁸⁷ On 10 August 2023, Charles Tai Gituai, the interim chairperson of the peace monitoring mechanism, said that the authorities had made no progress in implementing key sections of the 2018 peace agreement. ⁸⁸ In a similar vein, a statement was issued on 1 December 2023 by seventy local civil society organisations warning that the country was not prepared for elections, and on 14 December 2023, UN Special Representative Nicholas Haysom reiterated his concerns in front of the UN Security Council.⁸⁹

On 5 March 2024, the chief of UN peacekeeping operations, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, voiced concerns regarding the potential for violence to occur if the polls were not managed with the utmost care, concluding that the country was not prepared for elections.⁹⁰ Additionally, on 8 April 2024, UN Secretary-General Guterres transmitted a letter to the UN Security Council, outlining more than a dozen preconditions for the facilitation of fair elections, and emphasizing a pressing need for technical, legal and operational support. ⁹¹

Senior security and political leadership reforms

Shortly after the transitional period was extended, President Kiir issued a series of decrees dismissing several senior officials, including two of the country’s five vice presidents. ⁹²Notably, on 2 October 2024, the President dismissed Akol Koor Kuc from his position as Director General of the Internal Security Bureau, the powerful domestic arm of the National Security Service, a position he had occupied ever since South Sudan independence in 2011. ⁹³ Akech Tong Aleu, Kuc’s successor, was replaced just a few months later, in February 2025. ⁹⁴ In the space of just a few days, the President also replaced Lual Wek Guem, the head of the SSPDF Presidential Guard known as the Tiger Division (generally regarded as one of the most powerful fighting forces within the SSPDF) with the former Commander of the 1^st Infantry Division, Abraham Gum Makuac. ⁹⁵

In December 2024, the Inspector General of the South Sudan National Police Service, Atem Marol Biar, was replaced by Abraham Peter Manyuat, and the sanctioned individual Santino Deng Wol was removed as the SSPDF Chief of Defence Forces. ⁹⁶Furthermore, on 10 January 2025, Tut Kew Gatluak Manime, the President’s long-standing national security adviser and chairperson of the National Transitional Committee who had formerly been regarded as one of the most powerful figures in the President’s inner circle and had been vital to overseeing the Government’s connections with Khartoum, was reassigned as presidential envoy to the Middle East and ambassador to Kuwait.⁹⁷ Significant tensions were created within the South Sudan security services due to these dramatic changes at the top of the country’s already volatile security sector. ⁹⁸The abrupt alterations were widely perceived as an attempt by the President to eliminate potential threats to his continued rule, while also tightening his grip on the country’s security forces by limiting the ethnic and tribal ties of their senior leadership. ⁹⁹

On 10 February 2025, these changes in leadership were paralleled by changes in the political sphere. ¹⁰⁰ Through two decrees, the President replaced Vice President Hussein Abdelbagi Akol with Josephine Lago, and Vice President James Wani Igga with Benjamin Bol Mel, a high-profile entrepreneur who had formerly functioned as the Senior Presidential Envoy for Special Programmes. ¹⁰¹Simultaneously, the President dismissed Alfred Futuyo Karaba, who had been installed by the SPLM/A-IO in accordance with the 2018 peace agreement, from his position as Governor of the Western Equatoria state.¹⁰² The SPLM/A-IO later condemned the Governor’s dismissal as a violation of the peace agreement. ¹⁰³ On 20 May 2025, Kiir promoted Vice President Benjamin Bol Mel, who is widely seen as his chosen successor, to the first deputy chairperson of the ruling party; this elevates Bol Mel to the role of acting president should Kiir resign or die in office. ¹⁰⁴ This move saw the long-serving trio of deputies Awet Akot, Kuol Manyang and James Wani all removed from power.¹⁰⁵

In another significant development, President Kiir issued a directive on 26 March 2025 to place Vice President Machar under formal house arrest. ¹⁰⁶This action constitutes a clear violation of the 2018 peace agreement and exacerbated the prevailing tensions in the conflict. ¹⁰⁷This development occurred in the aftermath of Kiir ordering the arrest of several of Machar’s prominent associates, in response to the violence in Nasir since mid-February 2025 (see above). ¹⁰⁸ Following Machar’s arrest, his party, the SPLM-IO, experienced a series of defections, with eight SPLM-IO officials in Western Equatoria defecting to Kiir’s SPLM and over 3,000 opposition forces defecting in Central Equatoria following attacks on SPLM/A-IO bases by the SSPDF and the UPDF.¹⁰⁹

Peace deal with the SPLM/A-IO Kitwang faction under Simon Gatwech Dual

General Gatwech was initially named Chief of Staff of the SPLA-IO in 2014 but he refused to relocate to Juba after the 2018 peace agreement was signed until the security arrangements had been implemented in full. ¹¹⁰ In August 2021, Gatwech and his then-ally, the senior commander Johnson Olony, defected from the SPLM/A-IO to form the SPLM/A-IO Kitgwang faction. This triggered a wave of intense violence in the Upper Nile state. ¹¹¹Following a disagreement between Gatwech and Olony, the Agwelek militia group, also known as the SPLA-IO Kitgwang Agwelek faction, broke away from the wider Kitgwang faction in August 2022.¹¹²

After an initial peace agreement between the South Sudanese government and the SPLM/A-IO Kitwang in January 2022 had failed, President Kiir’s faction of the government made a new agreement with Simon Gatwech Dual’s faction. The agreement was brokered by Sudanese authorities in Port Sudan on 4 February 2025.¹¹³In accordance with the agreement, Mr Dual, who is presently in Sudan, committed to return to Juba within twelve months. ¹¹⁴ Upon his return, he will be made Deputy Chief of Defence Forces in the SSPDF, and he will be allowed to integrate up to 21,900 of his troops into the armed forces and to appoint individuals to various political positions. ¹¹⁵

Renewed efforts to unify security forces

The unification of security forces, as outlined in the 2018 peace agreement, had been mostly halted since 2022, but remained a top concern for many including the SPLM/A-IO, which considers these to be indispensable for the facilitation of free elections. ¹¹⁶ The implementation of the transitional security arrangements was set to resume on 1 March 2025, with the training of a second batch of Necessary Unified Forces (NUF), as announced by Kuol Manyang on 20 February 2025 who replaced Mr Gatluak as Chair of the National Transitional Committee. ¹¹⁷

It has been reported that several deployments to the Sudanese border in the first half of 2025 included ‘unified forces’. ¹¹⁸ However, in the context of the continuous failure to remunerate and provide sustenance to security forces, many of the participants in the initial phase of the unification process have left. ¹¹⁹The arms embargo, renewed by the UN Security Council in Resolution 2731 (2024), has also been cited by government officials as a hindrance to arming and deploying additional unified forces. ¹²⁰The process has been further hampered by the attempts of the SPLM and the SSPDF to negotiate separate agreements with defectors outside the scope of the 2018 agreement, as positions in the government and the integration of forces into the SSPDF have frequently been promised to incentivize such deals. ¹²¹

A growing number of clashes involving the so-called ‘White Army’

By early March 2025, and up until the end of the reporting period, there was an increase in the number of clashes between the SSPDF and self-defence groups identifying as the White Army militia, a mostly Nuer self-defence group with alleged ties to Vice President Machar and his SPLA-IO. ¹²² The White Army is the moniker used by self-defence militias operating in South Sudan who use white ash to cover their bodies. The purpose of the White Army is to defend Nuer communities. ¹²³

Two-day clash between the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the SPLA-IO

On 15 and 16 March 2025, a fierce two-day battle was fought by Sudan’s paramilitary RSF against the SPLA-IO along the border separating the two countries. ¹²⁴ The fighting commenced when RSF fighters launched a surprise attack on an SPLA-IO unit in the vicinity of Dukduk, located approximately fifty kilometres south-west of Renk town, close to the Sudanese border, and approximately twenty kilometres west of Bout, the capital of Blue Nile state’s Tadamon locality. ¹²⁵ The death of three senior SPLA-IO officers has been confirmed. ¹²⁶ The RSF further estimates that around 400 men from the SPLA-IO were either killed or captured. ¹²⁷

The hostilities suggest that the RSF is now operating within the confines of Renk county in South Sudan, a manoeuvre probably condoned by the SSPDF. ¹²⁸ This escalation in violence also serves as an indicator of the strengthening relationship between the RSF and the Government of South Sudan, which mirrors the ongoing deterioration of relations between Juba and Port Sudan. ¹²⁹

UN Security Council renewal of sanctions, embargos and UNMISS

On 30 May 2025, the UNSC voted to extend the sanctions imposed on South Sudan for a period of one year. ¹³⁰ This decision encompasses a range of measures, including an arms embargo, travel restrictions, and the freezing of assets, all with the aim of pressuring the South Sudanese government to engage in constructive negotiations and address the ongoing conflict in the country. ¹³¹ In a similar manner, on 29 April 2024, the UN Security Council renewed UNMISS’s mandate for a year and then again on 8 May 2025, for a further year until 30 April 2026. ¹³²

Non-international armed conflict between South Sudan (SSPDF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO)

Background

Shortly after achieving independence from Sudan in 2011, the country’s independence movement, spearheaded by the ruling party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), underwent a period of fragmentation fuelled by ethnic differences.¹. In 2013, South Sudan descended into a NIAC after President Salva Kiir, an ethnic Dinka, dismissed Riek Machar, who is from the Nuer ethnic group, as Vice President on 23 July 2013 over his ambitions to become SPLM chairperson and run for the presidency in 2015.² As early as 15 December 2013, the friction trickled into the SPLM’s military wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), ³ when fighting erupted in Juba within Dinka and Nuer factions of the SPLA’s Presidential Guard, over the potential disarmament of Nuer members of the SPLA. ⁴ The clashes extended to other security forces, including the military and police, as of 16 December 2013, and violence spread to include the civilian population. ⁵ On 17 December 2013, following Kiir’s dismissal of the entire cabinet, ⁶Machar created the resistance movement SPLM/A-IO, composed of former government soldiers and volunteers, formally declared the formation of the SPLM/A-IO on 15 April 2014. ⁷ While fighting between the SPLM/A-IO and the SPLA, which was officially renamed ‘South Sudan People’s Defence Forces’ (SSPDF) in 2018, ⁸ originated in Juba, it later spread to the Greater Upper Nile region. The conflict intensified throughout 2014 and 2015, ⁹ and continues despite several failed peace agreements. ¹⁰

Intensity

Multiple clashes took place between the SSPDF and the SPLM/A-IO throughout the reporting period. Clashes included armed confrontations in July, ¹¹ November, ¹² and December 2023,¹³ January 2024, ¹⁴and January, ¹⁵ February, ¹⁶ March, ¹⁷ April, ¹⁸May,¹⁹ and June 2025. ²⁰ The frequency and intensity of clashes escalated significantly during the first half of 2025, peaking in March. ²¹The fighting has also caused internal displacement; the clashes which occurred in the Nasir, Ulang and Baliet counties, for example, had, as of end-February 2025, displaced 63,500 civilians. ²²

For the most part, it was the SSPDF who mounted attacks against territorial strongholds under SPLM/A-IO control in efforts to regain control of these territories. ²³ The SSPDF and SPLA-IO also clashed over disputed territories. ²⁴ The SPLA-IO managed to remain in stable control of most of the territory it held throughout the reporting period. ²⁵

On 17 and 18 March 2025 in Nasir in Upper Nile State, the UPDF launched major airstrikes against the SPLA-IO, employing barrel bombs on this group at the request of the SSPDF. ²⁶ Again, around 22 to 25 March 2025, the UPDF and the SSPDF launched joint aerial strikes in Akobo county in Jonglei state. ²⁷ The first series of attacks resulted in at least twenty-one deaths, ²⁸ with the second series of aerial bombardments also killing civilians. ²⁹ These attacks led to at least 50,000 internally displaced persons. ³⁰ In response to the attacks, the embassies of Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the United States, the United Kingdom and a delegation of the European Union expressed concern regarding the high number of civilian casualties.³¹

The SPLA-IO has taken weapons from the SSPDF during past encounters, ³² including Romanian manufactured rifles. ³³The types of weapons deployed by the SSPDF and UPDF against the SPLA-IO often include aerial bombs. ³⁴

Airstrikes often lead to increased internal displacement.³⁵Between January and June 2025, an estimated 300,000 new IDPs were reported in South Sudan. Although it is difficult to attribute internal displacement to a specific NIAC where several are ongoing in any given territory, the SPLA-IO strongholds of Fangak county, Nasir and Jonglei state were highlighted as territories with the greatest displacement. ³⁶

Despite frequent attacks launched by the SSPDF and UPDF, the SPLM-IO managed to hold onto the vast majority of its territory. It is clear that the notion of intensity demanded by international humanitarian law remains satisfied in this fighting relationship.

Organization

The SPLM/A-IO is the umbrella term for the combination of the political party SPLM-IO and its military wing SPLA-IO. ³⁷ The SPLA-IO predominantly draws support from the ethnic Nuer community. ³⁸ The SPLA-IO has a structured leadership with several senior portfolios akin to national armed forces. Senior positions include Commander-in-Chief, who is the overall leader of the SPLA-IO, ³⁹the Chief of Staff, ⁴⁰ the Deputy Chief of Defence Forces, ⁴¹ Inspector General, ⁴² the Assistant Chief of Staff, ⁴³ the Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics, ⁴⁴ the Director General of the National Security Services (Spy Chief), ⁴⁵ and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Moral Orientation,⁴⁶ The SPLA-IO uses the same ranking system (organizational structure) as most professional armies. High-ranking positions include Lieutenant General, Major General, Brigadier General, General, and so forth. ⁴⁷ During March 2025, several high-ranking officers were kidnapped and placed under house arrest by the South Sudanese government. For this reason, the SPLA-IO made temporary appointments to fill senior ranks during April 2025 to ensure that the SPLA-IO could continue to function. The arrest or kidnapping of senior SPLA-IO leaders led to mass defections by fighters. ⁴⁸ The impact of these defections on the organizational structure of this non-state actor should be monitored during the subsequent reporting period as it may impact on the classification of this situation.

The SPLA-IO has structured leadership akin to professional armies; they are therefore considered highly organized. ⁴⁹ It is these leadership structures and portfolios such as ‘Moral Orientation’ that enable this non-state armed group to implement international humanitarian law (IHL) and to enforce discipline among the fighters. The SPLA-IO also has multiple training camps in areas under its military control, ⁵⁰ which can be employed to promote discipline among fighters and explain the consequences of disobedience from recruitment to deployment. The responsible command and territorial control that allows permanent training camps to exist enables the SPLA-IO to implement Additional Protocol II as required by Article 1(1) of this treaty. ⁵¹ Indeed, the article demands the ability to implement Additional Protocol II, not its actual implementation. ⁵²

As most of the members of the SPLA-IO were trained by the national armed forces, fighters are highly skilled at tactical level. ⁵³Fighters are, however, not trained or well adapted to guerrilla warfare which poses limitations in their current setting; their military mindset is akin to that of their enemy because leadership and soldiers/fighters from the SPLA-IO trained together with the SSPDF prior to 2013. The majority of new fighters are recruited from the Nuer population, and reports suggest that the SPLA-IO often recruits children. ⁵⁴ Logistics, which include the collection of weapons, are allegedly provided by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a dissident armed force fighting against the Sudanese Armed Forces in Sudan.⁵⁵

The SPLA-IO’s official spokesperson as of May 2025 until the time of writing was Col. Lam Paul Gabrial. ⁵⁶ This non-state armed group also has an official account on X through which it broadcasts messages for public attention. ⁵⁷

Territorial control is a requirement of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. ⁵⁸ The SPLA-IO continues to control territory in South Sudan. ⁵⁹These territories include the long-time SPLA-IO stronghold Kediba in Western Equatoria State, Kendila, Panyume, Mongoya and Lujulo in Morobo county in Central Equatoria state, Wunliet area in Warrap state, and the recently recaptured New Fangak in Fangak county in Jonglei state. ⁶⁰ Despite the brief capture (by the SSPDF) and recapture (by SPLA-IO) between enemies concerning territory in Morobo county and New Fangak, ⁶¹ the SPLA-IO remains in control over the majority of territory it continued to control during the reporting period. In areas under SPLM/A-IO control, the group operates military checkpoints for security purposes and taxes those who live in the territories. ⁶²Territorial control serves as a confirmation that the SPLA-IO leadership is akin to responsible command. ⁶³

In addition to the SPLA/M-IO’s military control of certain areas, they were also granted a 27 per cent ratio in state and local government positions as part of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement (R-ARCSS). ⁶⁴However, after the removal of the SPLM/A-IO’s Alfred Futiyo Karaba as governor of Western Equatoria state in February 2025, ⁶⁵ and James Odhok Oyai as the governor of Upper Nile state in March 2025, ⁶⁶ the group now governs only one state, namely Western Bahr el-Ghazal.⁶⁷ This constitutes a breach of the ‘27 per cent’ clause set forth in the R-ARCSS. ⁶⁸

Lastly, from the intensity assessment above, clearly the territory controlled by SPLA-IO facilitates the planning of defensive military operations, fulfilling the final requirement in Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II which requires the SPLA-IO to be sufficiently organized to launch sustained and concerted attacks.⁶⁹

The organizational structure of SPLA-IO is sophisticated and complies with the four organizational requirements under Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. Hence, the NIAC between South Sudan and SPLA-IO constitutes an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC.

1
S. Lawal, ‘Fighting flares in South Sudan: Is the 2018 peace deal in danger?’, Al Jazeera, 7 March 2025
2
‘Profile: South Sudan rebel leader Riek Machar’, Al Jazeera, 5 January 2014; S. Lawal, ‘Fighting flares in South Sudan: Is the 2018 peace deal in danger?’, Al Jazeera, 7 March 2025.
3
African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, ‘Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan’, African Union, 15 October 2014, paras 49 – 60, and 433; ‘About’, Sudan People’s Liberation Army,
4
‘Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan’, African Union, 15 October 2014, para 68.
5
‘Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan’, African Union, 15 October 2014, para 67.
6
‘Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan’, African Union, 15 October 2014, paras 62, 63 and 422,
7
‘Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan’, African Union, 15 October 2014, para 435.
8
‘SPLA officially renamed ‘South Sudan People’s Defence Forces’’, Sudan Tribune, 2 September 2018; ‘South Sudan’s army renamed ‘South Sudan People’s Defense Forces’’, Radio Tamazuj, 2 October 2018; M. Berge Jr., ‘South Sudan’s army renamed ‘South Sudan People’s Defense Force’’, Sudan Support, 4 October 2018,
9
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ‘Custom Report Excerpts: South Sudan’, U.S. Department of State,
10
‘South Sudan President Salva Kiir signs peace deal’, BBC News, 26 August 2015; ‘South Sudan’s warring parties agree ceasefire in bid to end four-year war’, The Guardian, 23 December 2017.
11
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘SSPDF, SPLA-IO clash near Upper Nile-Ruweng border’, Sudans Post, 2 July 2023,
12
‘Clashes erupt between rival forces in Leer’, Radio Tamazuj, 28 November 2023; ‘SPLA-IO, pro-government forces trade accusations over Guit fighting’, Radio Tamazuj, 3 December 2023; ‘SSPDF and allies attack SPLA-IO outpost in Leer’, Sudans Post, 27 November 2023,
13
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; C. Stephen, ‘South Sudan army agree with armed opposition forces to restore security in Unity state’, Juba Echo, 6 December 2023,
14
‘Fighting erupts between SSPDF and SPLA-IO in northern Unity State’, Sudans Post, 29 January 2024; ‘SSPDF, SPLA-IO reportedly clash in Unity State’, Eye Radio, 29 January 2024,
15
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; D. G. Deng, ‘South Sudan fighting’, Voice of America, 30 January 2025; ‘SSPDF, SPLA-IO trade accusations after clashes in Western Bahr el Ghazal’, Sudans Post, 23 January 2025; W. Madouk, ‘SPLA-IO, SSPDF clash’, One Citizen Daily, 24 January 2025,
16
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘Fighting erupts in Western Equatoria as SPLA-IO alleges SSPDF pursuit of ex-governor’, Sudans Post, 12 February 2025; ‘SPLA-IO says SSPDF using checkpoint removal to seize land’, Radio Tamazuj, 13 February 2025,
17
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘Nasir rocked by renewed aerial bombardments’, Radio Tamazuj, 19 March 2025; W. Muia, ‘UN fears war as barrel bombs dropped in South Sudan’, BBC, 25 March 2025; ‘Airstrikes kills one, injures 12 in South Sudan’s Upper Nile State’, The Juba Mirror, 22 March 2025, D. G. Deng, ‘UPDF, SSPDF bomb Akobo County’, The Radio Community, 18 March 2025; L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: April 2025’, ACLED, 4 April 2025; K. E. Duku, ‘SPLA-IO claims Attack on base, west of Juba city’, One Citizen Daily, 26 March 2025; ‘SPLA-IO accuses SSPDF of bombing Wunaliet site’, Sudans Post, 26 March 2025; M. James, ‘SSPDF and SPLA-IO trade blames over Wunaliet airstrike, Nyamini withdrawal’, Eye Radio, 25 March 2025; M. Daniel and B. Johnson, ‘Police: Calm restored in Rajaf and Rambur after clashes, no casualties reported’, Eye Radio, 26 March 2025; ‘Fighting near Juba as SPLA-IO alleges SSPDF attack’, Sudans Post, 25 March 2025; ‘S.Sudan opposition army condemns new attacks near capital’, 24 News, 26 March 2025,
18
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘Heavy fighting erupts at SPLA-IO site in Central Equatoria’, Africa Press, 22 April 2025,
19
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; SSBC News, ‘Armed Clashes Reported in Uror County as SPLA-IO Accuses SSPDF-Linked Militias of Attack’, Facebook, 25 May 2025; ‘Relative calm in Uror after Sunday clashes between SSPDF, SPLA-IO’, Radio Tamazuj, 26 May 2025,
20
A. Hawari, ‘Four killed in Piji clashes btw SSPDF and SPLA-IO’, Eye Radio, 3 June 2025; K. Madut, ‘South Sudan: SSPDF Bombs Areas in Panyijiar County’, The Tower Post, 24 June 2025.
21
‘Condemnation of Violence in Nasir County’, U.S. Embassy in South Sudan, 7 March 2025; ‘UNMISS calls for urgent resolution of tensions between armed forces in Western Equatoria’, United Nations Mission in South Sudan, 16 January 2025; ‘Western envoys offer to facilitate direct dialogue between South Sudan peace partners’, Radio Tamazuj, 18 March 2025.
22
UNSC, ‘Situation in South Sudan’, UN Doc S/2025/211, 7 April 2025, para 34.
23
‘Clashes erupt between rival forces in Leer’, Radio Tamazuj, 28 November 2023; ‘SPLA-IO, pro-government forces trade accusations over Guit fighting’, Radio Tamazuj, 3 December 2023; ‘SPLA-IO withdraws forces from Unity State base after clash’, Sudans Post, 29 January 2024; W. Madouk, ‘SPLA-IO, SSPDF clash’, One Citizen Daily, 24 January 2025; ‘SPLA-IO says SSPDF using checkpoint removal to seize land’, Radio Tamazuj, 13 February 2025; ‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; M. P. Atem, ‘SSPDF condemned for Rirangu attack’, The Community Radio, 14 February 2025; SSBC News, ‘Armed Clashes Reported in Uror County as SPLA-IO Accuses SSPDF-Linked Militias of Attack’, Facebook, 25 May 2025.
24
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group.
25
‘SPLA-IO, pro-government forces trade accusations over Guit fighting’, Radio Tamazuj, 3 December 2023; ‘SSPDF blames SPLA-IO for illegal checkpoint chaos’, Radio Tamazuj, 10 February 2025; SSBC News, ‘Armed Clashes Reported in Uror County as SPLA-IO Accuses SSPDF-Linked Militias of Attack’, Facebook, 25 May 2025; ‘Relative calm in Uror after Sunday clashes between SSPDF, SPLA-IO’, Radio Tamazuj, 26 May 2025; L. Memo, ‘Central Equatoria RRC distributes food aid to Morobo IDPs’, Eye Radio, 9 May 2025.
26
‘Nasir rocked by renewed aerial bombardments’, Radio Tamazuj, 19 March 2025; D. G. Deng, ‘UPDF, SSPDF bomb Akobo County’, The Radio Community, 18 March 2025.
27
D. G. Deng, ‘UPDF, SSPDF bomb Akobo County’, The Radio Community, 18 March 2025; W. Muia, ‘UN fears war as barrel bombs dropped in South Sudan’, BBC, 25 March 2025.
28
‘Nasir rocked by renewed aerial bombardments’, Radio Tamazuj, 19 March 2025,
29
D. G. Deng, ‘UPDF, SSPDF bomb Akobo County’, The Radio Community, 18 March 2025.
30
L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: April 2025’, ACLED, 4 April 2025.
31
‘Airstrikes hit Akobo amid rising tensions’, Radio Tamazuj, 18 March 2025; ‘Western envoys offer to facilitate direct dialogue between South Sudan peace partners’, Radio Tamazuj, 18 March 2025.
32
‘SPLA-IO generals killed in clashes with RSF in Renk County village’, Sudans Post, 17 March 2025; J. Young, ‘A Fractious Rebellion: Inside the SPLM-IO’, Small Arms Survey, September 2015,
33
‘South Sudan: Evidence of violations and illicit concealment of arms must spur UN to renew arms embargo’, Amnesty International, 30 April 2020.
34
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; W. Muia, ‘UN fears war as barrel bombs dropped in South Sudan’, BBC, 25 March 2025.
35
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; C. Stephen, ‘South Sudan army agree with armed opposition forces to restore security in Unity state’, Juba Echo, 6 December 2023.
36
M. A. Kuot, ‘‘We are suffering’: Displaced families bear burden of South Sudan conflict’, Al Jazeera, 6 May 2025; ‘South Sudan – Event Tracking Report – Nasir County Crisis #83 (01 – 16 June 2025)’, International Organization for Migration, 19 June 2025; ‘South Sudan – Event Tracking Report – Nasir County Crisis #84 (17 – 30 June 2025)’, International Organization for Migration, 8 July 2025; ‘South Sudan: Humanitarian Snapshot (June 2025)’, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 8 July 2025.
37
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2683 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/343, 29 April 2024.
38
‘SPLM/A and SPLA-IO: Two Sides of the Same Coin in South Sudan’s Political Crisis’, The Juba Mirror, 10 June 2025.
39
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; G. Malak, ‘South Sudan crisis: Splinter group ousts Machar as SPLM-IO leader’, The East African, 9 April 2025,
40
N. Mandil and D. N. Kupemba, ‘General’s arrest violates South Sudan peace deal, opposition says’, BBC, 6 March 2025; ‘Tensions rise in Juba following arrest of top SPLA-IO officers’, Radio Tamazuj, 4 March 2025; ‘SPLA-IO chief of staff Gabriel Duop Lam arrested by security forces in Juba’, Sudans Post, 4 March 2025,
41
‘SPLA-IO confirms arrest of its top general amid rising tensions in Nasir’, Sudans Post, 4 March 2025,
42
‘SPLA-IO confirms arrest of its top general amid rising tensions in Nasir’, Sudans Post, 4 March 2025,
43
‘Mixed reactions as South Sudan factions sign deal’, Monitor, 20 November 2017; ‘Wave Of High Profile Arrests In S.Sudan: SPLM-IO Leaders Detained Amid Rising Tensions’, The Spy Uganda, 7 March 2025,
44
‘Kiir unifies armed forces command’, Radio Tamazuj, 12 April 2022,
45
‘Airstrikes hit Akobo amid rising tensions’, Radio Tamazuj, 18 March 2025; ‘SPLA-IO chief of staff Gabriel Duop Lam arrested by security forces in Juba’, Sudans Post, 4 March 2025,
46
‘SPLA-IO begins peace mission, cautions over ceasefire violations’, Sudans Post, 18 February 2024; ‘SPLA-IO starts peace mission, warns over ceasefire violations’, Sudan Tribune, 18 February 2024; ‘Wave Of High Profile Arrests In S.Sudan: SPLM-IO Leaders Detained Amid Rising Tensions’, The Spy Uganda, 7 March 2025.
47
‘SPLA-IO starts peace mission, warns over ceasefire violations’, Sudan Tribune, 18 February 2024; ‘SPLA-IO generals killed in clashes with RSF in Renk County village’, Sudans Post, 17 March 2025.
48
‘Two SPLA-IO groups join SSPDF in Malakal’, Radio Tamazuj, 12 March 2025; ‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘Over 600 SPLA-IO fighters defect to SSPDF’, Radio Tamazuj, 2 April 2025; ‘South Sudan arrests key Machar allies as army surrounds his house’, Al Jazeera, 5 March 2025; ‘Timeline of Escalating Tensions in South Sudan’, Amani Africa.
49
J. Young, ‘A Fractious Rebellion: Inside the SPLM-IO’, Small Arms Survey, September 2015.
50
‘Two SPLA-IO groups join SSPDF in Malakal’, Radio Tamazuj, 12 March 2025; S. Deng, ‘SPLA-IO organizes forces for phase two training’, The Dawn, 19 February 2024,
51
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases.
52
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.38.
53
J. Young, ‘A Fractious Rebellion: Inside the SPLM-IO’, Small Arms Survey, September 2015.
54
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2683 (2023)’, UN Doc S/2024/343, 29 April 2024.
55
‘SPLA-IO generals killed in clashes with RSF in Renk County village’, Sudans Post, 17 March 2025.
56
W. Madouk, ‘SPLM-IO alleges assassination attempt on Col. Lam’, One Citizen Daily, 24 February 2024; ‘SPLA-IO generals killed in clashes with RSF in Renk County village’, Sudans Post, 17 March 2025; ‘Two SPLA-IO groups join SSPDF in Malakal’, Radio Tamazuj, 12 March 2025.
57
SPLM/A – IO Rep USA, X.
58
‘Article 1 – Material field of application’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases.
59
‘SPLA-IO says SSPDF using checkpoint removal to seize land’, Radio Tamazuj, 13 February 2025.
60
‘Clashes between South Sudanese army, opposition forces intensify on capital outskirts’, Xinhua, 27 March 2025; ‘South Sudan opposition forces claim capture of border areas’, Xinhua, 10 May 2025; ‘SPLA-IO claims recapture of Fangak County headquarters’, Sudans Post, 11 June 2025; ‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; C. Onyango-Obbo, ‘Burning hopes and war drums: South Sudan needs to be saved from itself’, The Pan African Review, 14 July 2025.
61
‘SPLA-IO claims recapture of Fangak County headquarters’, Sudans Post, 11 June 2025; ‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group,
62
‘SPLA-IO says SSPDF using checkpoint removal to seize land’, Radio Tamazuj, 13 February 2025; ‘SSPDF blames SPLA-IO for illegal checkpoint chaos’, Radio Tamazuj, 10 February 2025.
63
M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021.
64
‘Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)’, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 12 September 2018, 22.
65
‘Residents express mixed reactions to Kiir’s sacking of Futuyo’, Sudans Post, 21 February 2025; ‘Western Equatoria communities concerned after 5 months without a substantive governor’, Radio Tamazuj, 16 June 2025,
66
‘Gen. Koang sworn in as Upper Nile governor’, Radio Tamazuj, 20 March 2025; ‘South Sudan president sacks Upper Nile governor after clashes with ethnic militia’, Reuters, 20 March 2025,
67
‘Western Bahr el Ghazal’s new governor arrives in Wau’, Radio Tamazuj, 26 November 2024; ‘Kiir inaugurates new Western Bahr el Ghazal governor amidst opposition’, Sudans Post, 13 November 2024.
68
‘Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)’, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 12 September 2018, 22.
69
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context’, Oxford University Press, 2022, para 1.40; M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 9 December 2021.

Situation between the SSPDF and the White Army

Intensity

The first documented attacks in the reporting period occurred in Ulang around 14 or 15 February 2025 when the White Army opportunistically attacked the SSPDF when soldiers were collecting firewood near their village. ¹³³ In response, the SSPDF deployed airstrikes on and around 25 and 27 February 2025 against the White Army which the government itself labelled as civilians or militias. ¹³⁴ On 4 March 2025, the White Army active in Nasir overwhelmed a South Sudanese army barracks in Nasir, located in the Upper Nile state. This was the only attack in the reporting cycle that seemed planned and not spontaneous. ¹³⁵ In retaliation, the government initiated an aerial bombardment of civilian areas, using barrel bombs that are reported to have contained highly combustible accelerants. ¹³⁶On 19 April 2025, the SSPDF retook Nasir town but there was no resistance as the White Army had already left.¹³⁷

Another spontaneous encounter between the White Army youths based in Malakal town occurred when the Fangak White Army attacked wounded SSPDF soldiers.¹³⁸ This seems like self defence by the White Army opportunistically joining the SPLA-IO in its attack against these wounded soldiers and not a planned military operation. ¹³⁹ However, the Police Commissioner of Malakal claimed that ‘the White Army had obstructed the SSPDF from advancing into Nasir County, leading to sustained clashes’. ¹⁴⁰ It is reported that hundreds were killed in the clashes. ¹⁴¹

Organization

Research suggests that the White Army may have some form of structured leadership akin to chiefdoms, drawn from the purpose of these self-defence groups which is to protect their communities’ homes and cattle. These militias do not function as a single cohesive force but they are nonetheless capable of mobilizing on a large scale. ¹⁴²Therefore, the groups are sufficiently organized to enable them to deploy troops, but the nature of leadership only allows for the defence of different chiefdoms.

As there are multiple White Armies across the Upper Nile Region, each dedicated to the protection of its own community but with the possibility to mobilize for broader self-defence, these groups may be considered ‘decentralized’. Decentralized armed groups are described not as disorganized but as groups which are differently organized. This means that these groups have a command structure with a certain level of authority over sub-units. ¹⁴³ It is suggested that armed groups organized in this way meet some of the organizational criteria needed to be a party to a NIAC, including the ability to define a unified military strategy and tactics, to adopt disciplinary rules, to plan and coordinate military operations, to gain access to weapons, and to recruit and train fighters. ¹⁴⁴ There is, however, little evidence to suggest that any training is taking place for the purposes of launching military operations rather than activating the groups for the purposes of self-defence. There is also a paucity of reporting on evidence of disciplinary systems akin to loosely organized armed groups or the type of command required to implement IHL.

The classification of a decentralized group as a party to a conflict is not merely dependent on organization; the fighting must also generate protracted armed violence. In turn, the level of intensity generated by such a group may also serve as an important element to consider whether organization is met. ¹⁴⁵ As is illustrated below, clashes during 2025, for the most part, seemed unplanned; rather, they were opportunistic or responsive, aligned with the aim to keep the government armed forces away from Nuer communities who view the SSPDF as the enemy. Clashes also seemed to involve different communal factions of the White Army not coordinating but responding to perceived threats to their own communities. Only one attack seemed planned – a 4 March 2025 attack mounted against a military base by the Nasir faction of the White Army.

While it is not entirely clear if the White Army can be categorized as a decentralized armed group, what is clear is that the level of intensity of violence is below the threshold needed for a NIAC.

State Parties

Sudan
Ugandan People’s Defense Force (as of March 2025)

Non-state parties

National Salvation Front (NAS)
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition(SPLA-IO)

Other actors

White Army (a self-defence militia, not party to a NIAC)

Peacekeeping operations

UNMISS

1
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; ‘Wiederholte Rückfälle in die Gewalt’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development; A. A. Sikainga and R. O. Collins, ‘Sudanese independence and civil war’, Britannica, 16 July 2025
2
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; ‘Wiederholte Rückfälle in die Gewalt’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development; A. A. Sikainga and R. O. Collins, ‘Sudanese independence and civil war’, Britannica, 16 July 2025; ‘Timeline: South Sudan’s history at a glance’, Concern Worldwide; T. Glawion, ‘Südsudan’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 25 September 2024.
3
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; A. A. Sikainga and R. O. Collins, ‘Sudanese independence and civil war’, Britannica, 16 July 2025; ‘Timeline: South Sudan’s history at a glance’, Concern Worldwide; ‘South Sudan: Ethnic Conflict and Civil War’, The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2024.
4
‘The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of South Sudan’, United Nations Peacemaker; A. A. Sikainga and R. O. Collins, ‘Sudanese independence and civil war’, Britannica, 16 July 2025; T. Glawion, ‘Südsudan’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 25 September 2024.
5
T. Glawion, ‘Südsudan’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 25 September 2024; ‘South Sudan: Ethnic Conflict and Civil War’, The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2024; J. L. Spaulding and R. O. Collins, ‘Resumption of civil war’, Britannica, 16 July 2025.
6
‘Wiederholte Rückfälle in die Gewalt’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development; ‘Timeline: South Sudan’s history at a glance’, Concern Worldwide; T. Glawion, ‘Südsudan’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 25 September 2024; and ‘South Sudan: Ethnic Conflict and Civil War’, The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2024.
7
‘Wiederholte Rückfälle in die Gewalt’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development; J. L. Spaulding and R. O. Collins, ‘Resumption of civil war’, Britannica, 16 July 2025; ‘President Omar al-Bashir re-elected in Sudan elections’, BBC, 26 April 2010; and D. Smith, ‘Omar Hassan al-Bashir declared winner of Sudan election’, The Guardian, 26 April 2010.
8
‘Wiederholte Rückfälle in die Gewalt’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development; J. L. Spaulding and R. O. Collins, ‘Resumption of civil war’, Britannica, 16 July 2025; D. Smith, ‘Omar Hassan al-Bashir declared winner of Sudan election’, The Guardian, 26 April 2010.
9
D. Smith, ‘Sudan referendum result confirmed’, The Guardian, 7 February 2011; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; ‘Timeline: South Sudan’s history at a glance’, Concern Worldwide; T. Glawion, ‘Südsudan’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 25 September 2024; ‘South Sudan: Ethnic Conflict and Civil War’, The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2024; M. el Din Sabr and A. A. Sikainga, ‘The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement’, Britannica, 16 July 2025.
10
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; ‘Independence of South Sudan’, United States Institute of Peace; ‘Timeline: South Sudan’s history at a glance’, Concern Worldwide; and M. el Din Sabr and A. A. Sikainga, ‘The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement’, Britannica, 16 July 2025.
11
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; ‘Timeline: South Sudan’s history at a glance’, Concern Worldwide; See T. Glawion, ‘Südsudan’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 25 September 2024; M. el Din Sabr and A. A. Sikainga, ‘The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement’, Britannica, 16 July 2025; K. Noel and A. de Waal, ‘Understanding the Roots of Conflict in South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 14 September 2016; ‘South Sudan Peace Process: Key Facts: Conflict in South Sudan’, United States Institute of Peace.
12
‘Timeline: South Sudan’s history at a glance’, Concern Worldwide; M. el Din Sabr and A. A. Sikainga, ‘The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement’, Britannica, 16 July 2025; K. Noel and A. de Waal, ‘Understanding the Roots of Conflict in South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 14 September 2016; ‘South Sudan president fires cabinet’, Al Jazeera, 24 July 2013.
13
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; ‘South Sudan: Ethnic Conflict and Civil War’, The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2024; M. el Din Sabr and A. A. Sikainga, ‘The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement’, Britannica, 16 July 2025; ‘South Sudan Peace Process: Key Facts: Conflict in South Sudan’, United States Institute of Peace; V. Mishra, ‘South Sudan: Conflict and hunger push millions to the brink’, United Nations News, 9 April 2025; ‘Statement to the Security Council by Adama Dieng, United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, on his visit to South Sudan’ United Nations Press Release, 17 November 2016.
14
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; T. Glawion, ‘Südsudan’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 25 September 2024; M. el Din Sabr and A. A. Sikainga, ‘The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement’, Britannica, 16 July 2025; ‘Südsudan 2023’, Amnesty International, 24 April 2024; ‘Brief on Violence Affecting Civilians: January – March 2023’, United Nations Mission in South Sudan, 2023.
15
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; ‘Timeline: South Sudan’s history at a glance’, Concern Worldwide; M. el Din Sabr and A. A. Sikainga, ‘The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement’, Britannica, 16 July 2025; ‘South Sudan’s food crisis ‘worst in the world’ – UN’, BBC News, 26 July 2024.
16
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; ‘Timeline: South Sudan’s history at a glance’, Concern Worldwide; V. Mishra, ‘South Sudan: Conflict and hunger push millions to the brink’, United Nations News, 9 April 2025.
17
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; T. Glawion, ‘Südsudan’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 25 September 2024; ‘South Sudan: Ethnic Conflict and Civil War’, The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2024; ‘South Sudan Peace Process: Key Facts: Conflict in South Sudan’, United States Institute of Peace; J. Lynch, ‘S. Sudan takes tentative step forward as former rebel leader becomes VP’, The Christina Science Monitor, 26 April 2016.
18
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; ‘Timeline: South Sudan’s history at a glance’, Concern Worldwide; T. Glawion, ‘Südsudan’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 25 September 2024; See ‘South Sudan: Ethnic Conflict and Civil War’, The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2024; A. A. Sikainga and M. el Din Sabr, ‘Continued problems with Sudan’, Britannica, 16 July 2025.
19
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; ‘Timeline: South Sudan’s history at a glance’, Concern Worldwide; T. Glawion, ‘Südsudan’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 25 September 2024; ‘South Sudan: Ethnic Conflict and Civil War’, The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2024; V. Mishra, ‘South Sudan: Conflict and hunger push millions to the brink’, United Nations News, 9 April 2025; A. A. Sikainga and M. el Din Sabr, ‘Continued problems with Sudan’, Britannica, 16 July 2025; Intergovernmental Authority on Development, ‘Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)’, 12 September 2018.
20
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; ‘South Sudan’s rival leaders form coalition government’, Al Jazeera, 22 February 2020; ‘South Sudan’s president, opposition leader agree to form unity government’, France24, 20 February 2020; C. H. Vhumbunu, ‘The Formation of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity in South Sudan’, Accord, 20 August 2020
21
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; ‘South Sudan: Ethnic Conflict and Civil War’, The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2024; L. G. Gatluak, ‘South Sudan’s peace implementation is in progress’, Sudan Tribune, Undated; ‘Sudan war affects implementation of 2018 peace deal: official’, Sudan Tribune, 3 July 2024.
22
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; ‘South Sudan: Ethnic Conflict and Civil War’, The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2024; ‘President Cyril Ramaphosa welcomes South Sudan transitional government extension’, South African Government, 18 September 2024; ‘South Sudan: Statement by the Spokesperson on the extension of the transition’, European Union External Action, 23 September 2024; ‘South Sudan: extension of transitional government will compound dire human rights crisis if leaders do not change course – UN experts’, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 25 September 2024; P. G. Geng and J. G. Akech, ‘What Does Extension of the Transition Period Mean for Constitution-Making in South Sudan?’, Constitution Net, 1 November 2024; C. Mawel, ‘South Sudan: Economic Crisis Now to Blame for Stalled ‘Peace Deal’’, The Tower Post, 3 July 2024.
23
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; ‘South Sudan: Ethnic Conflict and Civil War’, The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2024; ‘South Sudan: Postponing long-awaited elections ‘a regrettable development’’, United Nations News, 7 November 2024; L. B. Deng, ‘What Could End the Long Postponement of South Sudan’s First Elections?’, The Global Observatory, 15 October 2024.
24
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; D. Machol, ‘South Sudan president says he will be a candidate in long-delayed elections set for 2024’, AP News, 5 July 2023; ‘Toward a Viable Future for South Sudan’, International Crisis Group, 10 February 2021.
25
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; A. Boswell, ‘Special Report: Conflict and Crisis in South Sudan’s Equatoria’, United States Institute of Peace, April 2021; G. Twesigye, ‘National Salvation Front (NAS) is Responsible for Juba- Nimule Road Attack- S. Sudan Forces Confirm’, Nexus Media, 25 September 2024; ‘Rise in violence against civilians in South Sudan’, United Nations News, 17 April 2025; A.R.A. Shaban, ‘South Sudan: ex-army general forms rebel group aimed at deposing President Kiir’, Africa News, 13 August 2024.
26
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; ‘South Sudan’, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 15 July 2025; ‘Press release: Surge in intercommunal conflict causing immense harm to civilians in South Sudan, according to the latest UNMISS Quarterly Brief’, United Nations Peacekeeping, 18 March 2024; ‘South Sudan: the conflict in focus’, Conciliation Resources.
27
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; ‘South Sudan: Ethnic Conflict and Civil War’, The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2024; V. Mishra, ‘Sudan: Refugee numbers swell as war continues to drive displacement’, United Nations News, 11 October 2024.
28
‘South Sudan’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 24 May 2023.
29
‘Timeline: South Sudan’s history at a glance’, Concern Worldwide; ‘South Sudan: Ethnic Conflict and Civil War’, The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2024; V. Mishra, ‘South Sudan: Conflict and hunger push millions to the brink’, United Nations News, 9 April 2025; ‘Hunger hotspots in South Sudan at tipping point as food insecurity nears record levels’, World Food Programme, 9 April 2025.
30
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; ‘South Sudan: Ethnic Conflict and Civil War’, The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2024; ‘South Sudan: Floods Snapshot’, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 29 November 2024; ‘Nearly 380,000 people displaced by South Sudan floods, UN says’, Al Jazeera, 9 November 2024.
31
T. Glawion, ‘Südsudan’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 25 September 2024; ‘About UNMISS’, United Nations Mission in South Sudan; ‘UNMIS Background’, United Nations Peacekeeping.
32
T. Glawion, ‘Südsudan’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 25 September 2024; ‘About UNMISS’, United Nations Mission in South Sudan.
33
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘Situation Update: January 2024: Sudan: The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Gains Ground in Sudan’, ACLED, 12 January 2024; H. Ali, ‘The War in Sudan: How Weapons and Networks Shattered a Power Struggle’, German Institute for Global and Area Studies, 2024; ‘Sudanese army renews airstrikes on RSF in Khartoum, gains ground in Omdurman’, Sudan Tribune, 10 January 2024.
34
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; See ‘South Sudan army accuses RSF of backing rebels, beefs up northern border security’, Sudans Post, 11 January 2024; ‘South Sudan’s RSF mercenaries, fears of more to come’, Ayin Network, 22 March 2024; ‘Rebel leader Buay Rolnyang dismisses alleged RSF links, declares oilfields as target’, Sudans Post, 30 January 2024.
35
See ‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; See ‘Near Verbatim: Press conference by Mr Nicholas Haysom, Special Representative of The Secretary-General and Head of UNMISS’, United Nations Mission in South Sudan, 13 February 2024.
36
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘Situation Update: July 2024: Sudan: The RSF marches on Sennar and West Kordofan’, ACLED, 12 July 2024.
37
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘SAF launches airstrikes on areas in South Sudan’, Assayha, 2 December 2024; ‘Three injured in aerial attack in Renk County’, Radio Tamazuj, 2 December 2024; Hot in Juba, ‘Sudanese warplane injures three in aerial bombing of Renk’, Facebook, 3 December 2024.
38
See ‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; See ‘Fighting erupts in Sudan’s Blue Nile and White Nile states’, Sudan Tribune, 8 December 2024; See ‘Roundup: Conflict in Sudan escalates amid continued clashes between army, paramilitary forces’, Xinhua, 17 December 2024.
39
See ‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; See ‘South Sudan hits record one million new arrivals from Sudan crisis’, United Nations Refugee Agency, 21 January 2025.
40
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘SPLA-IO generals killed in clashes with RSF in Renk County village’, Sudans Post, 17 March 2025; ‘Sudan/South Sudan: Closed Consultations’, Security Council Report, 18 March 2025.
41
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘SPLA-IO generals killed in clashes with RSF in Renk County village’, Sudans Post, 17 March 2025; ‘Sudan/South Sudan: Closed Consultations’, Security Council Report, 18 March 2025.
42
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘SPLA-IO generals killed in clashes with RSF in Renk County village’, Sudans Post, 17 March 2025; ‘Sudan/South Sudan: Closed Consultations’, Security Council Report, 18 March 2025.
43
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; See ‘Two Years On: Sudan’s Forgotten War Escalates into the World’s Largest Displacement and Humanitarian Crisis’, GOAL, 13 April 2025; ‘Humanitarian Situation Report No. 30: Sudan’, United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), 29 May 2025.
44
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘South Sudan oil production faces challenges due to Sudan conflict’, Sudan Tribune, 20 February 2024; ‘South Sudan warns of economic collapse due to disruptions in oil pipelines’, Sudan Tribune, 28 February 2024; C. Mitchell and M. H. Ng, ‘Force majeure declared on South Sudan’s Dar Blend crude loadings: sources’, S & P Global, 29 February 2024.
45
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘South Sudan oil production faces challenges due to Sudan conflict’, Sudan Tribune, 20 February 2024; C. Mitchell and M. H. Ng, ‘Force majeure declared on South Sudan’s Dar Blend crude loadings: sources’, S & P Global, 29 February 2024.
46
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘Sudan war causes stoppages on South Sudan oil pipeline, officials say’, Reuters, 25 March 2024; E. J. Akile, ‘Sudan conflict still stands in the way despite oil pipeline repaired – official’, Eye Radio, 23 July 2025.
47
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘Pipeline rupture: South Sudan faces major economic crisis’, energynews, 9 July 2024; ‘IMF Staff Completes Mission to South Sudan for the Third Review of a Staff-Monitored Program with Board Involvement’, International Monetary Fund, 2 October 2024.
48
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘South Sudan unveils measures to stabilize exchange market’, Sudan Tribune, 31 March 2024; See F. Soares da Gama, et al, ‘Republic of South Sudan: Interim Country Strategy Paper (I-CSP) 2022-2024’, African Development Bank Group, November 2021.
49
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; J. Anyanzwa, ‘South Sudan forex reserves at ‘historic low’ as inflationary pressures bite’, The East African, 12 May 2024.
50
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘South Sudan unveils measures to stabilize exchange market’, Sudan Tribune, 31 March 2024; K. M, Kuir, ‘No funds without reform: IMF denial highlights South Sudan’s accountability crisis’, One Citizen Daily, 10 May 2025.
51
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘PETRONAS Withdraws from the Republic of South Sudan’, Petronas, 7 August 2024; ‘Petronas withdraws from South Sudan after 14 years of operations’, Business Times, 8 August 2024; ‘Petronas exits South Sudan, Savannah energy deal collapses’, Sudan Tribune, 9 August 2024.
52
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘Sudan lifts force majeure on oil to Port Sudan’, Reuters, 6 January 2025; ‘South Sudan set to restart oil production on Jan. 8’, Sudans Post, 7 January 2025.
53
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘South Sudan set to restart oil production on Jan. 8’, Sudans Post, 7 January 2025.
54
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group.
55
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; M. Nashed, ‘South Sudan on edge as Sudan’s war threatens vital oil industry’, Al Jazeera, 21 May 2025; ‘Revealed: Juba strikes deal with RSF to allow crude oil flow’, Radio Tamazuj, 1 November 2024.
56
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; O. Okuj, ‘South Sudan, Sudan collaborate to prevent oil shutdown, says Petroleum Undersecretary’, Eye Radio, 13 May 2025; ‘South Sudan resumes oil exports via Sudan after pipeline repair’, Sudan Tribune, 30 April 2025.
57
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘Sudan orders halt to South Sudan oil exports citing RSF attacks’, Sudan Tribune, 10 May 2025.
58
‘SSOMA, opposition groups at Tumaini Initiative rebrand to United People’s Alliance’, Radio Tamazuj, 10 January 2025; ‘SSOMA renames group as United Peoples’ Alliance’, Eye Radio, 10 January 2025,
59
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘South Sudan mediation talks launched in Kenya with a hope of ending conflict’, Le Monde, 9 May 2024; ‘Kenya-led talks a foundation for peace in South Sudan: RJMEC’, Sudan Tribune, 11 May 2024; ‘Mediation Key to South Sudan Peace Process, President Ruto’, Republic of Kenya, 9 May 2024.
60
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘Gen. Cirillo’s NAS says it will not join Tumaini Initiative talks’, Radio Tamazuj, 10 December 2024; I. S. Magara and J. Pospisil, ‘Overloaded? Hope and Scepticism around the Tumaini Peace Initiative for South Sudan’, African Arguments, 27 May 2024; ‘Gatwech declines invitation to Nairobi peace talks citing security concerns’, Sudans Post, 22 May 2024.
61
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘Machar writes to Kenya mediation over deviations from 2018 peace agreement’, Sudan Tribune, 20 June 2024; ‘Nairobi peace talk paper ready’, Radio Tamazuj, 7 June 2024.
62
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘Nairobi peace talk paper ready’, Radio Tamazuj, 7 June 2024.
63
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘SPLM-IO pulls out of Kenya-mediated peace initiative’, Sudan Tribune, 17 July 2024; ‘Machar withdraws from Kenya-led initiative citing ‘breach’ to existing peace deal’, Sudans Post, 16 July 2024; ‘Dr. Machar’s SPLM/A-IO withdraws from Nairobi Talks, rebuffs initialled protocols’, Radio Tamazuj, 17 July 2024.
64
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group.
65
‘SSOMA, opposition groups at Tumaini Initiative rebrand to United People’s Alliance’, Radio Tamazuj, 10 January 2025; ‘SSOMA renames group as United Peoples’ Alliance’, Eye Radio, 10 January 2025.
66
‘SSOMA, opposition groups at Tumaini Initiative rebrand to United People’s Alliance’, Radio Tamazuj, 10 January 2025; ‘SSOMA renames group as United Peoples’ Alliance’, Eye Radio, 10 January 2025.
67
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘New rebel faction emerges in South Sudan as NAS splinters’, Sudans Post, 23 June 2024; C. Ninrew, ‘NAS commander dumps Cirillo, forms own group’, Eye Radio, 22 June 2024
68
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘New rebel faction emerges in South Sudan as NAS splinters’, Sudans Post, 23 June 2024; C. Ninrew, ‘NAS commander dumps Cirillo, forms own group’, Eye Radio, 22 June 2024.
69
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; C. Ninrew, ‘NAS commander dumps Cirillo, forms own group’, Eye Radio, 22 June 2024; ‘New rebel faction emerges in South Sudan as NAS splinters’, Sudans Post, 23 June 2024
70
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; C. Ninrew, ‘NAS commander dumps Cirillo, forms own group’, Eye Radio, 22 June 2024; ‘New rebel faction emerges in South Sudan as NAS splinters’, Sudans Post, 23 June 2024.
71
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; D. G. Deng, ‘UPDF INCURSION: Gov’t’s silence indicates internal complexity-Analyst’, One Citizen Daily, 2 September 2024; ‘Concern over Juba’s silence amidst Uganda ‘invasion’’, Radio Tamazuj, 2 September 2024.
72
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘UPDF flogs, briefly detains six S. Sudanese inside Kajo-keji’, Eye Radio, 11 August 2024; K. Livingstone, ‘ENCROACHMENT: UPDF assaults farmers in Kajo-Keji County’, One Citizen Daily, 12 August 2024; ‘MPs upset by continued incursions by Ugandan army into South Sudan’, Radio Tamazuj, 14 August 2024.
73
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘South Sudanese decry ‘invasion’ by Ugandans’, Radio Tamazuj, 28 August 2024; D. Moses, ‘UPDF troop influx in Magwi raises security concerns, MP reports’, Eye Radio, 29 August 2024; P. B. Ladu, ‘ENCROACHMENT: UPDF claims more land in Eastern Equatoria-MP’, One Citizen Daily, 30 August 2024.
74
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; H. Nsaibia, et al, ‘Regional Overview: Africa: September 2024’, ACLED, 4 October 2024.
75
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group.
76
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘South Sudan general among dozens killed in attack on UN helicopter’, The Guardian, 8 March 2025; W. Muia and A. Lime, ‘VP’s arrest ends South Sudan peace deal, his party says’, BBC, 27 March 2025.
77
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; ‘South Sudan general among dozens killed in attack on UN helicopter’, The Guardian, 8 March 2025; ‘Security Council Press Statement on Attack against United Nations Mission in South Sudan’, United Nations Meetings Converge and Press Releases, 21 March 2025; ‘UN crew member killed in attack on helicopter in South Sudan’, Al Jazeera, 7 March 2025.
78
Center for Preventative Action, ‘Instability of South Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 March 2025; ‘South Sudan general among dozens killed in attack on UN helicopter’, The Guardian, 8 March 2025; ‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘Security Council Press Statement on Attack against United Nations Mission in South Sudan’, United Nations Meetings Converge and Press Releases, 21 March 2025; ‘UN crew member killed in attack on helicopter in South Sudan’, Al Jazeera, 7 March 2025.
79
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; K. E. Duku, ‘SPLA-IO claims Attack on base, west of Juba city’, One Citizen Daily, 26 March 2025; ‘SPLA-IO accuses SSPDF of bombing Wunaliet site’, Sudans Post, 26 March 2025; M. James, ‘SSPDF and SPLA-IO trade blames over Wunaliet airstrike, Nyamini withdrawal’, Eye Radio, 25 March 2025.
80
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘Kiir and rival Machar extend transitional period by two years’, Sudans Post, 13 September 2024; ‘South Sudan extends transitional government by two years’, Reuters, 4 August 2022; UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025.
81
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘AUC Chairperson statement regarding the extended political transition in South Sudan’, African Union, 21 September 2024.
82
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘South Sudan lawyers petition court over election postponement’, Sudan Tribune, 23 September 2024; ‘South Sudan lawyers challenge the postponement of elections in court’, Reuters, 23 September 2024; J. Tanza, ‘South Sudan in Focus: Lawyers petition South Sudan government’, Voice of America, 23 September 2024; ‘Lawyers petition court about extension of transitional period’, Radio Tamazuj, 23 September 2024; ‘Troika Statement’, U.S. Embassy in South Sudan, 30 October 2024.
83
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025; ‘South Sudan: Postponing long-awaited elections ‘a regrettable development’’, United Nations News, 7 November 2024; ‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; S. F. W. Dicken, ‘South Sudan Postpones Elections To 2026: A Move Toward Inclusivity and Stability’, Wilson Center, 6 February 2025; ‘South Sudan postpones December election by two years’, Al Jazeera, 14 September 2024.
84
‘South Sudan: Postponing long-awaited elections ‘a regrettable development’’, United Nations News, 7 November 2024; ‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘South Sudan postpones December election by two years’, Al Jazeera, 14 September 2024.
85
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; M. Blanshe, ‘Can South Sudan be ready for elections by December 2024?’, The Africa Report, 17 November 2023.
86
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; C. Ninrew, ‘Presidency extends transitional period until 2026’, Eye Radio, 13 September 2024; ‘Mixed reactions over South Sudan transitional period extension’, Sudan Tribune, 15 September 2024.
87
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘South Sudan “not yet ready” for credible elections, says UN envoy’, Sudan Tribune, 6 July 2023; ‘Statement by Nicholas Haysom, Special Representative of the Secretary-General & Head of UNMISS at the 30th RJMEC Plenary Meeting [As Delivered]’, United Nations Peacekeeping, 6 July 2023; D. Machol, ‘South Sudan “not ready” for “free, fair” presidential election, UN mission head says’, AP News, 6 July 2023.
88
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘Statement by Guang Cong, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Political at the 31st RJMEC Plenary Meeting [As Delivered]’, United Nations Peacekeeping, 10 August 2023; ‘‘Conditions to hold elections not in place’-UNMISS Deputy Chief’, Radio Tamazuj, 10 August 2023; See ‘Statement by H.E. Amb. Maj Gen (rtd) Charles Tai Gituai, CBS Interim Chairperson – RJMEC, to the 31st RJMEC Monthly Meeting Thursday, 10 August 2023 Juba, South Sudan’, Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), 10 August 2023.
89
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; L. Memo, ‘South Sudan not ready for December 2024 elections: civil society’, Eye Radio, 26 March 2024; ‘Civil society worries over election readiness’, Radio Tamazuj, 1 December 2023; ‘Security Council Briefing on UNMISS by Special Representative of Secretary-General Nicholas Haysom’, United Nations Peacekeeping, 14 December 2023; ‘Security Council Meets on Situation in Sudan and South Sudan’, United Nations Media, 14 December 2023.
90
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘If Not Managed Carefully, South Sudan Elections Could Result in ‘Disastrous Consequences,’ Peacekeeping Chief Warns Security Council’, United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Release, 5 March 2024; ‘Elections in South Sudan carry risks of violence: UN peacekeeping chief’, Xinhua, 6 March 2024.
91
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; M. Miller, ‘UN Secretary-General Guterres’ April 8 Negative Assessment of Preconditions for Elections in South Sudan’, U.S. Department of State, 16 April 2024; UNSC, ‘Letter dated 8 April 2024 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc S/2024/297, 8 April 2024; ‘UN chief calls for ‘urgent steps’ towards S. Sudan election’, TRT Global, 17 April 2024.
92
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025.
93
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025; ‘South Sudan’s president sacks his powerful spy chief’, BBC, 3 October 2024; ‘Kiir ousts veteran national security chief Gen. Akol Koor’, Sudans Post, 2 October 2024; G. Malak, ‘South Sudan President Kiir dismisses intelligence chief Akol Koor Kuc’, The East African, 3 October 2024.
94
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025; N. Mandil, ‘South Sudan president sacks top leaders and spy chief’, BBC, 11 February 2025; B. Takpiny, ‘South Sudan’s president dismisses 2 vice presidents, national security chief’, AA, 10 February 2025; ‘South Sudan’s president sacks three ministers in latest reshuffle’, TRT Global, 11 March 2025.
95
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025; ‘Kiir replaces commander of presidential guard’, Sudans Post, 10 October 2024; ‘New commander takes charge of presidential guards’, Radio Tamazuj, 10 October 2024; Sylvester, ‘SSPDF announces changes, deploys two key officers in positions’, The City Review, 11 October 2024.
96
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025; ‘South Sudan President Kiir sacks key officials in sweeping reshuffle’, CGTN Africa, 10 December 2024; ‘South Sudan president fires army and police chiefs, central bank governor’, Reuters, 10 December 2024; ‘South Sudanese Kiir Fires Army Chief, IGP, and BoSS Governor in Major Reshuffle’, Kenyan Foreign Policy, 10 December 2024.
97
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025; ‘Kiir fires powerful security advisor’, Radio Tamazuj, 10 January 2025; D. G. Deng, ‘Kiir fires security advisor Tut Kew’, The Radio Community, 11 January 2025; ‘Kiir dismisses long-time ally Tut Gatluak as security advisor’, Sudans Post, 10 January 2025.
98
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025.
99
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025.
100
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025.
101
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025; N. Mandil, ‘South Sudan president sacks top leaders and spy chief’, BBC, 11 February 2025; ‘Kiir fires vice presidents Wani, Abdelbagi in major shake-up amid succession talk’, Sudans Post, 10 February 2025; ‘South Sudanese president dismisses vice presidents, intelligence chief’, Xinhua, 11 February 2025.
102
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025; O. Okuj, ‘Kirr explains Futuyo’s removal as SPLM-IO pursues dialogue’, Eye Radio, 26 February 2025; ‘Dr. Machar demands immediate reinstatement of Governor Futuyo, Minister Awel’, Radio Tamazuj, 12 February 2025; Y. Joseph, ‘Warrap SPLM-IO caucus demands Futuyo, Yolanda back’, One Citizen Daily, 15 February 2025.
103
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025; ‘Dr. Machar demands immediate reinstatement of Governor Futuyo, Minister Awel’, Radio Tamazuj, 12 February 2025.
104
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘South Sudan’s President Kiir promotes sanctioned ally as ruling party deputy’, Reuters, 21 May 2025; ‘South Sudan’s leader promotes ally, demotes veterans in party reshuffle’, TRT Global, 21 May 2025; ‘Kiir appoints ally Bol Mel as deputy ruling party leader’, Radio Tamazuj, 20 May 2025.
105
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘South Sudan’s leader promotes ally, demotes veterans in party reshuffle’, TRT Global, 21 May 2025; ‘Kiir appoints ally Bol Mel as deputy ruling party leader’, Radio Tamazuj, 20 May 2025.
106
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: April 2025’, ACLED, 4 April 2025; ‘S.Sudan govt says Vice President Machar ‘under house arrest’’, France24, 28 March 2025; A. L. Dahir, ‘South Sudan’s Vice President Machar Arrested, Party Says’, New York Times, 27 March 2025; ‘Detention of South Sudan’s VP Machar cancels peace deal, his party says’, Reuters, 27 March 2025.
107
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; See L. Serwat, et al, ‘Africa Overview: April 2025’, ACLED, 4 April 2025; W. Muia and A. Lime, ‘VP’s arrest ends South Sudan peace deal, his party says’, BBC, 27 March 2025.
108
‘South Sudan on the Precipice of Renewed Full-blown War’, International Crisis Group, 7 March 2025; ‘South Sudan: Opposition Leaders, Others, Detained’, Human Rights Watch, 13 March 2025; ‘South Sudan arrests key Machar allies as army surrounds his house’, Al Jazeera, 5 March 2025.
109
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group.
110
‘Gen. Simon Gatwech ‘approves’ peace deal with government’, Radio Tamazuj, 4 February 2025.
111
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025; ‘South Sudan opposition’s top general returns to Juba’, Radio Tamazuj, 26 April 2016; ‘Gatwech ousts Machar as SPLM/A-IO Commander in Chief’, Radio Tamazuj, 3 August 2021.
112
‘Gen. Simon Gatwech ‘approves’ peace deal with government’, Radio Tamazuj, 4 February 2025; ‘SPLA-IO Kit-Gwang jittery over peace pact neglect’, Radio Tamazuj, 19 November 2024; ‘Context’, Small Arms Survey.
113
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025; ‘Gen. Simon Gatwech ‘approves’ peace deal with government’, Radio Tamazuj, 4 February 2025; ‘South Sudan gov’t, SPLM-IO splinter group sign peace agreement’, Sudan Tribune, 16 January 2021.
114
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025; ‘Gen. Simon Gatwech ‘approves’ peace deal with government’, Radio Tamazuj, 4 February 2025.
115
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025; ‘Gen. Simon Gatwech ‘approves’ peace deal with government’, Radio Tamazuj, 4 February 2025.
116
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025.
117
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025; L. Memo, ‘NTC outlines workplan to complete security arrangement in 9 months’, Eye Radio, 20 February 2025; ‘Gen. Manyang: Second phase of unified forces training set for March’, Radio Tamazuj, 21 February 2025.
118
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025.
119
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025.
120
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025.
121
UNSC, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/442, 2 July 2025.
122
‘Timeline of Escalating Tensions in South Sudan’, Amani Africa; V. Mishra, ‘South Sudan on the brink of civil war, top UN official warns’, United Nations News, 24 March 2025; ‘South Sudan Drawing Closer to the Brink of All-Out War’, Soufan Center, 13 March 2025; L. Serwat, et al, ‘Regional Overview: Africa: April 2025’, 4 April 2025.
123
I. M. Breidlid and M. J. Arensen, ‘The nuer White Armies: comprehending South Sudan’s most infamous community defence group’, Informal Armies: Community defence groups in South Sudan’s Civil War, February 2017, 27.
124
Sudan War Monitor, ‘Sudan’s RSF clashes with South Sudan’s SPLA-IO’, Substack, 18 March 2025.
125
‘SPLA-IO generals killed in clashes with RSF in Renk County village’, Sudans Post, 17 March 2025; ‘South Sudan says verifying presence of Sudanese armed groups’, Sudan Tribune, 18 March 2025.
126
‘SPLA-IO generals killed in clashes with RSF in Renk County village’, Sudans Post, 17 March 2025; Jonglei Times, ‘RSF ambush, kills three senior SPLA-IO officers over alleged links to Al Burhan’, Facebook, 20 March 2025.
127
Jonglei Times, ‘RSF ambush, kills three senior SPLA-IO officers over alleged links to Al Burhan’, Facebook, 20 March 2025.
128
Sudan War Monitor, ‘Sudan’s RSF clashes with South Sudan’s SPLA-IO’, Substack, 18 March 2025.
129
Sudan War Monitor, ‘Sudan’s RSF clashes with South Sudan’s SPLA-IO’, Substack, 18 March 2025.
130
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2781 (2025)’, UN Doc S/Res/2781 (2025), 30 May 2025; ‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; See ‘UN Security Council renews South Sudan arms embargo’, Radio Tamazuj, 30 May 2025; ‘Explanation of Vote on a UN Security Council Resolution on South Sudan’, The United States Mission to the United Nations, 30 May 2025; ‘UN Security Council renews sanctions against South Sudan’, Xinhua, 31 May 2025.
131
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2781 (2025)’, UN Doc S/Res/2781 (2025), 30 May 2025; ‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘UN Security Council renews South Sudan arms embargo’, Radio Tamazuj, 30 May 2025; ‘Explanation of Vote on a UN Security Council Resolution on South Sudan’, The United States Mission to the United Nations, 30 May 2025; ‘UN Security Council renews sanctions against South Sudan’, Xinhua, 31 May 2025.
132
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2778 (2025)’, UN Doc S/Res/2778 (2025), 30 April 2025; ‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘Security Council Extends Mandate of United Nations Mission in South Sudan, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2778 (2025)’, United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 20 April 2025; ‘UN Security Council extends South Sudan mission amid rising instability’, The United Nations Office at Geneva, 8 May 2025.
133
‘Four soldiers killed, civilians injured in Nasir clashes’, Radio Tamazuj, 15 February 2025.
134
‘Airstrikes in Upper Nile as tensions escalate’, Radio Tamazuj, 25 February 2025; ‘SSPDF blames ongoing fighting in Upper Nile State on SPLA-IO, White Army’, Sudans Post, 27 February 2025; O. Okuj, ‘SSPDF calls on armed youth to retreat after Ulang airstrike’, Eye Radio, 25 February 2025; ‘South Sudan on the Precipice of Renewed Full-blown War’, International Crisis Group, 7 March 2025.
135
V. Mishra, ‘South Sudan on the brink of civil war, top UN official warns’, United Nations News, 24 March 2025; ‘South Sudan Drawing Closer to the Brink of All-Out War’, Soufan Center, 13 March 2025; ‘‘White Army’ claims control of Nasir town’, Radio Tamazuj, 4 March 2025; ‘Govt confirms White Army assault in Nasir Garrison, SSPDF withdrawal’, Eye Radio, 5 March 2025; N. Princewill, ‘The world’s youngest country fought for decades to govern itself. Now it’s on the cusp of another civil war’, CNN, 29 March 2025.
136
V. Mishra, ‘South Sudan on the brink of civil war, top UN official warns’, United Nations News, 24 March 2025; ‘South Sudan Drawing Closer to the Brink of All-Out War’, Soufan Center, 13 March 2025; ‘‘White Army’ claims control of Nasir town’, Radio Tamazuj, 4 March 2025; ‘Govt confirms White Army assault in Nasir Garrison, SSPDF withdrawal’, Eye Radio, 5 March 2025; N. Princewill, ‘The world’s youngest country fought for decades to govern itself. Now it’s on the cusp of another civil war’, CNN, 29 March 2025.
137
D. Akech, ‘South Sudan Retakes Opposition Stronghold, but Violence is Set to Worsen’, International Crisis Group, 23 April 2025; ‘South Sudan army recaptures Nasir town from White Army militia’, Xinhua, 22 April 2025; South Sudan 24, ‘SSPDF Recaptures Ulang from White Army Militia’, Facebook, 17 April 2025; ‘SSPDF retakes strategic town of Nasir’, Radio Tamazuj, 20 April 2025.
138
‘Arrival of wounded soldiers heightens tensions in Malakal’, Radio Tamazuj, 13 April 2025.
139
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group; ‘Allegations of targeted attacks in Malakal; police dispute claims’, Radio Tamazuj, 11 April 2025.
140
‘Arrival of wounded soldiers heightens tensions in Malakal’, Radio Tamazuj, 13 April 2025; ‘Chief of Defense Forces visits Malakal’, Radio Tamazuj, 18 April 2025.
141
‘Africa: South Sudan’, International Crisis Group.
142
F. Abebe, ‘South Sudan, The Nuer “White Armies”’, International Committee of the Red Cross: How Does Law Protect in War.
143
S. Vité and I. Gallino, ‘Decentralized armed groups: Can they be classified as parties to non-international armed conflicts?’, International Review of the Red Cross, August 2024.
144
S. Vité and I. Gallino, ‘Decentralized armed groups: Can they be classified as parties to non-international armed conflicts?’, International Review of the Red Cross, August 2024.
145
S. Vité and I. Gallino, ‘Decentralized armed groups: Can they be classified as parties to non-international armed conflicts?’, International Review of the Red Cross, August 2024.

South Sudan

Reporting period: July 2023 - June 2025

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (between July 2023 and June 2025)

Heightened risk of Sudanese civil war spill-over

Economic crisis following oil pipeline damage

Kenyan-mediated ‘Tumaini Initiative’

Splintering of Thomas Cirillo’s National Salvation Front

The Ugandan People’s Defence Force presence in South Sudan

Extension of the transitional period and the postponement of elections scheduled for December 2024

Senior security and political leadership reforms

Peace deal with the SPLM/A-IO Kitwang faction under Simon Gatwech Dual

Renewed efforts to unify security forces

A growing number of clashes involving the so-called ‘White Army’

Two-day clash between the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the SPLA-IO

UN Security Council renewal of sanctions, embargos and UNMISS

Non International Armed Conflict

Background

Intensity

Organization

Under the threshold situations

Situation between the SSPDF and the White Army

Intensity

Organization

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

Non-state parties

Other main actors

Other actors

Peacekeeping operations