Armed conflicts in Syria

There are several ongoing or recently ended international armed conflicts (IAC):

Syria (supported by Russia until December 2024) v the Combined Joint Task Force of Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR).
Israel v Iran (conflict ended in January 2025).
Syria v Israel.
Syria v Türkiye.

Other forms of IAC persist as parts of Syrian territory remain under occupation:

The Golan Heights are under military occupation by Israel.
Parts of northern Syria are under military occupation by Türkiye.

Additionally, there are five ongoing non-international armed conflicts (NIACs):

Syria (new government) v Pro-former government forces (PFGF).
CJTF-OIR (operating alongside the Syrian Democratic Forces, SDF) v Islamic State.
Syria (supported by Shia militias, Hezbollah, Russia, and the Wagner Group, until December 2024) v Islamic State.
United States v Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) (until February 2024).
Türkiye and the Syrian National Army (SNA) v the SDF.
Israel v Hezbollah.

Many armed conflicts in Syria are rooted in the broader context of the Arab Spring, a series of pro-democracy uprisings that began in December 2010 and quickly spread throughout North Africa and the Middle East. In Syria, peaceful protests calling for political reform and greater civil liberties emerged in March 2011, directly challenging the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. The government’s violent suppression of these demonstrations marked a critical turning point, triggering a spiral of violence. By at least February 2012, the situation had evolved into armed conflict, and over the following months, a complex set of NIACs emerged across the territory, opposing the Syrian government, led by Bashar Al-Assad and supported by Russian armed forces and Iranian-backed militias, to multiple non-State armed groups, such as Islamic State, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).¹

The rise of Islamic State in Syria

In parallel with NIACs, a number of IACs emerged in the Syrian context due to the presence of multiple States on Syrian territory without the government’s consent. Key to this development was the rise of Islamic State in 2013, which rapidly seized swathes of territory across both Iraq and Syria. In response, the United States (US)-led international coalition (the Global Coalition against Islamic State) was established in 2015 under the banner of ‘Operation Inherent Resolve’, initially comprising more than seventy states.² The Combined Joint Task Force of the Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR),³ is a multinational military formation established by the Global Coalition against Islamic State that intervened with the declared objective of containing and ultimately defeating the group’s influence in the region, including in Syria. It operated on Syrian territory without the consent of the Syrian government.⁴ Between 2013 and 2019, a significant portion of the territory formerly occupied by Islamic State was reclaimed, predominantly through military operations undertaken by the CJTF-OIR but also with significant support from the SDF⁵ Türkiye, and Iranian-backed militias. Despite Islamic State’s significant territorial defeat, sporadic attacks have continued to occur.

US operations against Shia militias

The United States has also carried out sporadic strikes on Syrian territory since 2019, reportedly in response to attacks on its forces by Shia militias.⁶ These US operations on Syrian territory were carried out without the consent of the Syrian government and are thus also classified as an IAC between the United States and Syria alongside the NIAC with the militias.

Türkiye’s military presence in Northern Syria

Since 2016, Türkiye has undertaken a series of unilateral military operations with both air and ground forces targeting the SDF along the Syria-Türkiye border. The Turkish government perceives the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which it designates as a terrorist organisation.⁷ These military operations were conducted in coordination with Syrian opposition forces, initially involving the Free Syrian Army and, subsequently, its successor, the Syrian National Army (SNA). Over several years, Türkiye has conducted three significant cross-border military campaigns: Operation Euphrates Shield (2016–17), Operation Olive Branch (2018), and Operation Peace Spring (2019).⁸ These military interventions have facilitated Türkiye’s establishment of de facto control over certain regions in northern Syria, including the deployment of Turkish officials to administer these occupied areas.⁹

Alongside these interventions, Türkiye progressively expanded its presence in northern Syria, consolidating control over border towns and strategically securing its de facto authority over the region. Since 2018, Türkiye has implemented measures such as the establishment of a health centre in Afrin, the creation of a local police force to maintain security, and support for local militias to rebuild infrastructure, including schools and hospitals.¹⁰

The launch of Operation Peace Spring in October 2019, which followed the US withdrawal from the region, further solidified Türkiye’s territorial hold, with the operation aimed at removing SDF forces from the vicinity of its border with Syria. The operation resulted in seizure of a significant portion of the territory in the central area of Syria’s border and the creation of a 32km ‘safe zone’.¹¹

The situation amounted to two parallel situations of armed conflict that persist up to the present day:¹² the confrontations between Türkiye and the SDF were classified as an NIAC; while Türkiye’s presence on Syrian territory constitutes a military occupation of parts of Northern Syria by Türkiye, as the Syrian government did not consent to it.

Israel’s military presence in the Golan Heights

Since 1967, a further part of Syrian territory, the Golan Heights, has been occupied by Israel.¹³ Israel seized control over the Golan Heights from Syria on 10 June 1967, during the final day of the Six-Day War, leading to the displacement of most of the Syrian population on the territory. Following Israel’s seizure of the Golan Heights, Israel established settlements in the area and Jewish populations moved onto the territory. In December 1981, the Israeli Parliament passed legislation, known as the Golan Heights Law, which allows the imposition of Israeli laws, jurisdiction, and administration on the territory it has seized.¹⁴

Syria has continuously contested Israeli presence in the Golan Heights. In 1973, the Yom Kippur War broke out and Syria attempted to regain control of the Golan Heights, but failed to do so and Israel captured the city of Quneitra. The following year, the two nations signed the ‘Agreement on Disengagement’. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 350 (1974) and created a buffer zone with the permanent presence of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) peacekeeping mission. The UNDOF mission is still present, making it one of the longest peacekeeping operations in the UN’s history.¹⁵

Between 1987 and 2008, negotiations took place between Syria and Israel, in which Syria consistently demanded a full Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 borders, including the return of the Golan Heights as part of any peace deal. Those negotiations failed to yield agreement between the parties.¹⁶

Internationally, no State has formally recognized Israel’s annexation of the region except for the United States (in March 2019).¹⁷ In its Resolution 497 (1981), the UN Security Council decided that ‘the Israeli decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights is null and void, and without international legal effect’. The UN General Assembly has repeatedly reaffirmed that ‘all legislative and administrative measures taken or to be taken by Israel, the occupying Power, that purport to alter the character and legal status of the occupied Syrian Golan are null and void’. ¹⁸

Additionally, since 2017, Israel has regularly carried out airstrikes on Syrian territory without the consent of the Syrian government, targeting Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah military assets.¹⁹ These incidents have resulted in the classification of two IACs: one between Israel and Iran, and another between Israel and Syria, as well as a spillover of the NIAC between Hezbollah and Israel in Lebanon into Syria.²⁰

The Syrian government’s efforts in Syria

Beginning in 2020, the overall intensity of hostilities in Syria began to decline, marking a notable shift in the dynamics of the multiple parallel armed conflicts in Syria. A key development contributing to this shift was the bilateral agreement reached in March 2020 between Türkiye and the Russian Federation, aimed at de-escalating the violence in the north-western province of Idlib ²¹ The agreement followed a sharp escalation in military confrontations between Turkish forces and Syrian government troops (the latter supported by Russia), which had caused significant military and civilian casualties.²² The ceasefire agreement remained in force despite breaches of the agreement by both sides.

Between March 2020 and mid-2023, the Syrian government, with support from Russian, Iranian, and Hezbollah forces, gradually reasserted control over approximately seventy per cent of its territory.²³ Meanwhile, control over the remaining areas was divided among various actors: Turkish forces and affiliated Syrian opposition groups held significant parts of northern Syria; HTS (which subsequently became the government of Syria) maintained influence in parts of Idlib province; and the SDF retained control over substantial territories in the north-east.²⁴

Although the situation in Syria had attained a relative stalemate in 2022, the situation remained volatile with a high level of violence persisting between the various actors involved in the parallel armed conflicts in Syria.

The end of the Assad regime

One of the most significant changes occurred in December 2024, when President Bashar al-Assad’s government collapsed following a large-scale offensive led by HTS, one of Syria’s most powerful armed opposition groups. On 27 November 2024, a coalition of armed groups led by HTS launched the ‘Repelling the Aggression’ campaign against government forces in Aleppo. Simultaneously, Turkish-backed factions of the SNA initiated separate offensives targeting SDF-controlled areas in northern Aleppo. By 8 December, opposition forces had captured Damascus, effectively ending the Assad regime’s decades-long rule and establishing a transitional government under HTS leadership.²⁵

This event transformed the internal dynamics of armed groups operating in Syria. The operational capacity of Iranian-backed militias has been significantly degraded, suffering from both persistent Israeli attacks and the loss of their strategic alliance with the Syrian government.²⁶ In addition, the interim government under HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa has initiated efforts to unify the fragmented armed opposition across the country. In March 2025, an agreement was signed between HTS and the SDF, enacting a nationwide ceasefire and outlining a political merger that formally recognized Kurdish representation as a foundational element of the Syrian State.²⁷

Despite these developments, the effort to dissolve and unify various armed opposition factions under a central command has encountered significant obstacles. Persistent divisions among these various groups have led to continued clashes, particularly between factions affiliated with the interim government and remnants of pro-Assad groups. In early March, these tensions led to mass killings of civilians, particularly among the Alawite community, as well as attacks against civilian infrastructures.²⁸As of March 2025, the level of intensity and organization of the PFGF was such as to amount to a NIAC.

Between 28 and 30 April 2025, a further series of violent incidents occurred between pro-governmental forces and Druze militias in the predominantly Druze areas in Syria. These incidents killed many, including a significant number of civilians, and involved considerable destruction of buildings, underscoring the challenges facing the interim government in its efforts to exert centralized authority over the various Syrian factions.²⁹

The change of government also redefined the role of external powers involved in armed conflicts in Syria. Russia’s long-standing military presence, as a strong ally of the former Syrian government, is now in flux, with uncertainty surrounding the future status of its military bases and personnel.³⁰ Similarly, Iran and Hezbollah lost their direct influence in Syria but appear to be exploring new avenues of engagement with the transitional authorities.³¹ The withdrawal of Iranian forces from Syrian territory by January 2025 resulted in the absence of further hostilities between Iran and Israel on Syrian territory.³²

Islamic State’s activities in Syria

The reporting period also saw a resurgence in Islamic State activity. Reports indicate that, in 2023, the group was responsible for more than 200 attacks, resulting in hundreds of casualties, including the deaths of more than 285 soldiers and at least 231 civilians. By 2024, this number had more than tripled, with Islamic State conducting around 700 attacks, killing more than 750 military personnel and civilians.³³ Islamic State maintained a persistent and strong operational presence in the first half of 2025.

Against this background, the interim Syrian government has maintained military pressure on Islamic State.³⁴ Likewise, the CJTF-OIR increased its operations against Islamic State in December 2024 during the HTS takeover of Syria.³⁵ In January 2025, however, the new US administration signalled plans to significantly reduce its military presence in Syria. At the same time, the Global Coalition had reaffirmed its commitment to counter-Islamic State operations in Syria, extending its mission through at least 2026.³⁶ Although the relationship between Syria and the Global Coalition has improved since the change of government, it has not publicly expressed its consent to the CJTF-OIR activities on its territory.

Türkiye’s military presence in Syria

Türkiye and the SNA forces it has been backing progressively increased the number and extent of their military operations in Syria through to March 2025. Since 2022, their attacks against the SDF have significantly intensified.³⁷ Renewed tensions arose in late 2024 when the SDF took control of several towns formerly controlled by the former Syrian regime. The Turkish-backed SNA launched an offensive against SDF-controlled areas, including Manbij, Kobani, and the east of Aleppo. As part of this offensive, Türkiye conducted airstrikes that led to the death and injury of many SDF fighters as well as civilians, and the destruction of critical infrastructure within SDF-controlled territory. Hostilities between the two parties near the Tishreen Dam in December 2024 and January 2025 led to significant disruptions in water and electricity supply, rendering essential facilities, including hospitals, inoperable for millions of people.³⁸

The conflict between the SDF and Türkiye, as well as Turkish-backed SNA factions, continues despite the interim government’s efforts to unify Syrian opposition groups under its banner. Some developments may be expected following the agreement signed between the interim government and the SDF, as well as the announcement in June 2025 that Türkiye had entered into direct communication with the SDF leadership under US mediation.³⁹ Türkiye has also deepened cooperation with the interim Syrian government, including offering its military assistance and capacity-building support for counterterrorism.⁴⁰ Despite this progress, the interim government of Syria has not expressed its consent to Türkiye’s military activities on its territory.

Israel’s military presence in Syria

Following the situation in Gaza from October 2023,⁴¹ Israel intensified its campaign of airstrikes targeting Iranian, Syrian, and Hezbollah positions in Syria, including beyond the 1974 disengagement line. With the change of the Syrian government, Israel’s military activities in Syria further increased.⁴² Israel launched regular airstrikes across Syria, destroying key strategic military facilities, including airfields, anti-aircraft batteries, missiles, drones, fighter jets, tanks, weapon depots and production sites, and naval facilities. A number of airstrikes were also launched to protect Druze communities that had been involved in fighting the new governmental forces.⁴³

As of early 2025, Israel had declared an indefinite military presence on Mount Hermon; sent its troops to the demilitarization areas in southern Syria; and announced plans to expand settlements beyond the occupied Golan Heights. By March 2025, Israel had seized control over key strategic terrain from the Syrian armed forces.⁴⁴ In response, the interim Syrian government regularly denounced Israel’s attacks and publicly called on Israel to withdraw from Syrian territory, while reaffirming its commitment to the 1974 ceasefire agreements.⁴⁵

Growing tensions between the United States and the IRI

The situation in Gaza also marked the increase in violent confrontations between US forces and Iran-linked militia groups, operating under the banner of IRI.⁴⁶ The most destructive attack claimed by the IRI occurred on US forces stationed in north-eastern Jordan near the Syrian border on 28 January 2024, killing three US soldiers and injuring 47 others.⁴⁷ Between October 2023 and late January 2024, the IRI reportedly launched more than 150 coordinated rocket and drone attacks targeting US military personnel and infrastructure across Iraq and Syria.⁴⁸

US armed forces responded to these attacks with a series of airstrikes against the militia’s strategic locations, including weapon and ammunition facilities, safe houses and training areas. On 27 October 2023, US forces conducted 16 airstrikes: 12 in Iraq and 4 in Syria.⁴⁹ A further series of airstrikes, employing long-range bombers and precision munitions, was conducted in early February 2024, against command and control operations centres, intelligence centres, rockets, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicle storage, and logistics and munition supply chain facilities. At least 85 targets were reportedly hit during these operations. ⁵⁰

The frequency of reported violent confrontations between the US forces and the IRI progressively declined after February 2024.⁵¹ In August and November 2024, sporadic violent confrontations continued to be reported during which US and coalition personnel sustained injuries.⁵² Since the change of government in Syria and thus the withdrawal of Iranian presence in Syria, no incidents have been reported between the US forces and the IRI in Syria. However, in early 2025, different Shia militia factions of the IRI sent public announcements warning about the potential resumption of their attacks against US forces in Iraq and Syria, especially if these do not withdraw by the end of 2026.⁵³

The fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime on 8 December 2024 and the subsequent assumption of power by an interim government under the presidency of Ahmed al-Sharaa, the leader of HTS, raises a key preliminary legal question: whether this new entity qualifies as the government of Syria.

For the purposes of IHL, the prevailing legal standard for determining governmental status is one of effectiveness. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) affirms that ‘the key condition for the existence of a government is its effectiveness, that is, its ability to exercise effectively functions usually assigned to a government within the confines of a State’s territory, including the maintenance of law and order’.⁵⁴ International recognition or political legitimacy are not determinants under IHL. It adopts a pragmatic approach that prioritizes facts on the ground over formal recognition.

The interim government continues to face political fragmentation, particularly among Syria’s diverse minority groups, which it attempts to mitigate through efforts to forge a more inclusive political transition. Moreover, its territorial control over some parts of Syrian territory is contested. Still, the interim government led by al-Sharaa exercises control over the largest part of Syrian territory by far and performs core governmental functions.⁵⁵. The announcement on 13 March 2025 of a transitional legal framework, valid for five years, and the appointment of a 23-member transitional cabinet support the argument that the interim leadership is operating as both a de facto and a de jure government.⁵⁶ This is further evidenced by its ongoing negotiations with foreign States, including Türkiye,⁵⁷ the European Union (EU),⁵⁸ the United States,US State Department of State,⁵⁹ and several member States of the Arab League.⁶⁰

In conclusion, based on the current facts, the interim government under the HTS leadership of al-Sharaa satisfies the effectiveness criterion and is the new governmental authority of Syria. As a result, the HTS ceases to exist as a non-State armed group,⁶¹ leading to the termination of the NIACs to which the HTS was a party: the NIAC between the HTS and the former Syrian government and the NIAC between the HTS and Islamic State.

For an IAC to exist, there must have been a resort to armed force involving at least two states. The ICRC confirms that an IAC is also initiated based on a unilateral attack that includes ‘attacks directed towards the territory, population or infrastructure of a state’.⁶² To determine if the continued military presence of a foreign State’s armed forces amounts to an IAC between the foreign State and the territorial State, it must be assessed whether the territorial State has consented to the foreign State’s presence.

As stated by the ICRC in its commentaries: ‘Any unconsented-to military operations by one State in the territory of another State should be interpreted as an armed interference in the latter’s sphere of sovereignty and thus may be an international armed conflict under Article 2(1).⁶³ Consent ‘must have been previously expressed or established […]. It must be valid, i.e. given by an authority authorized to do so on behalf of the State, and given without any coercion from the intervening State. […] However, the existence of such consent might be very difficult to establish for a number of reasons. States often do not publicize their consensual agreements.’⁶⁴ Consent may be withdrawn at any time, without further formality, including by protesting against the presence of foreign troops initially authorized.⁶⁵

International Armed Conflict between Syria and the CJTF-OIR

Since September 2014, Syria has been involved in an IAC with States contributing to the CJTF-OIR because they have been targeting Islamic State on Syrian territory without Syrian government consent. ¹

The situation has remained unchanged under the leadership of the interim Syrian government established in December 2024. The interim government has not explicitly expressed its consent to the CJTF-OIR activities on its territory. It is true that the interim Syrian government has faced substantial international pressure, particularly to secure diplomatic recognition and alleviate sanctions, in order to facilitate Syria’s economic recovery.² But until the situation is known to have changed, the legal status of the conflict between Syria and States contributing to the CJTF-OIR remains viewed as an IAC.

1
(See Historical Background)
2
ISPI, Challenges for Syria’s Economic Recovery and Reconstruction Process, 18 April 2025.

International Armed Conflict between Israel and Iran

Since 2017, Israel has conducted airstrikes on Syrian territory against Iranian-backed militias as well as Iranian military forces on several occasions, which formed the basis for classifying the conflict as an IAC between Israel and Iran. (See Armed Conflict(s) Overview)

However, the situation shifted with the change of the Syrian government in December 2024, following which Iranian armed forces reportedly withdrew from Syrian territory (See ‘Major events and developments’). As noted earlier, no further incidents between Israel and Iran on Syrian territory have been reported since that date. Therefore, with the withdrawal of Iranian forces from Syrian territory as of at least January 2025, and the absence of further hostilities on Syrian territory, the IAC between Israel and Iran may persist, but it has not been taking place on Syrian territory.

In order to establish that a territory is occupied, three cumulative conditions must be fulfilled, namely:

‘The armed forces of a State are physically present in a foreign territory without the consent of the effective local government in place at the time of the invasion;
The effective local government in place at the time of the invasion has been or can be rendered substantially or completely incapable of exerting its powers by virtue of the foreign forces’ unconsented-to presence;
The foreign forces are in a position to exercise authority over the territory concerned (or parts thereof) in lieu of the local government.’⁶⁶

Military presence of Israel in the Golan Heights and Mount Hermon

As noted above,¹ Israel seized control over the Golan Heights from Syria on 10 June 1967, during the final day of the Six-Day War, leading to the displacement of most of the Syrian population on the territory. Israel’s subsequent presence and administration of the Golan Heights, a region internationally recognized as part of Syria² satisfy the effective control test.

Syria has continuously contested Israeli presence in the Golan Heights, and internationally, Israel’s annexation of the region has continuously been condemned.³ As Syria did not consent to Israel’s presence, this establishes Israel as the Occupying Power.

Following the outbreak of the conflict between Hamas and Israel in October 2023, Israel has expanded its military presence on the ground beyond the Syrian territory already under its control.⁴ Moreover, following the change of Syrian government, Israel conducted a new series of airstrikes across Syria, averaging one attack every three to four days between December 2024 and June 2025,⁵ all without the consent of Syria. These military operations carried out on Syrian territory outside the areas over which Israel has yet established effective control should be seen as part of an IAC between Israel and Syria.

1
See ‘Historical Background’
2
See UNSC, Resolution 497 (1981), 17 December 1981; UNGA, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 2015 (A/Res/70/91), 15 December 2015; ICRC, What does the law say about the responsibilities of the Occupying Power in the occupied Palestinian territory?, 26 July 2024
3
See ‘Historical Background’
4
See ‘Historical Background’
5
M. A. Hussein, Mapping Israel’s expanding air attacks across Syria Al Jazeera, 4 June 2025

Military presence of Türkiye in northern Syria

As noted earlier,¹ despite the end of Operation Euphrates Shield in northern Syria to combat Islamic State and curb the SDF’s presence in Syria, Türkiye retained its troops, maintaining control and supporting local governance and rebel forces in Northern Syria². In the following years, it progressively expanded its presence in northern Syria, consolidating control over border towns and strategically securing its de facto authority over the region³. As this was carried out without the consent of the Syrian government, Türkiye’s prolonged presence in northern Syria is a military occupation.

Following the change of the Syrian government, Türkiye further expanded its military activities on the ground, establishing bases, deploying ground troops, and conducting military operations against the SDF beyond the Syrian territory already under its control⁴. There is insufficient evidence, however, to conclude that it has effective control such as to constitute belligerent occupation.

Moreover, the interim government’s renewed relationship with Türkiye raises questions regarding Syrian consent to Türkiye’s presence. As noted earlier, the interim Syrian government has developed a close relationship with Türkiye, and ongoing negotiations are underway for military collaboration, particularly in the context of counterterrorism efforts.⁵. However, Syria has not publicly expressed its consent for Türkiye’s military presence and military operations against the SDF on its territory. Considering that certain military operations conducted by Türkiye pose considerable risks to the interim government’s efforts to integrate the SDF into its armed forces, it would not be correct to consider the lack of public denunciation regarding Türkiye’s actions as amounting to consent. Thus, until more conclusive evidence of consent can be established, the situation in northern Syria that is under Türkiye’s effective control continues to be viewed as an occupation.

1
See ‘Historical background’.
2
A. Stein, H. Abouzahr, and R. Komar, ‘How Turkey Is Governing in Northern Aleppo’, Syria Deeply, 20 July 2017
3
See ‘Historical Background’
4
See ‘Key developments’
5
See ‘Key developments’

Two criteria need to be assessed in order to determine whether a situation of armed violence amounts to a NIAC:

First, the level of armed violence must reach a certain degree of intensity and regularity that goes beyond internal disturbances and tensions.
Second, in every NIAC, at least one side in the conflict must be a non-State armed group that exhibits a certain level of organization in order to qualify as a party to the NIAC. Government forces are presumed to satisfy the criteria of organization. ⁶⁷

Various indicative factors are used to assess whether a given situation has met the required intensity threshold, such as the number, duration and intensity of individual confrontations; the types of weapons and military equipment used; the number of persons and types of forces participating in the fighting; the number of casualties; the extent of material destruction; the number of civilians fleeing and the involvement of the UN Security Council.⁶⁸

A series of indicative factors are generally used to assess whether armed groups exhibit the required degree of organization, such as the existence of a command structure and disciplinary rules and mechanisms; the ability to procure, transport and distribute arms; the ability to plan, coordinate and carry out military operations; and the ability to negotiate and conclude agreements, e.g. ceasefire or peace agreements. If the minimum criterion for organization of the armed groups is not fulfilled, there is no armed conflict.⁶⁹

Non-international armed conflicts involving Islamic State

Islamic State, also known as Da’esh, emerged from the Islamic State of Iraq, an alliance of Sunni insurgent factions formed in 2006 and initially dominated by al-Qaeda in Iraq.See Armed Conflicts in Iraq Following its expansion into Syria in 2012 and the ending of relations with al-Qaeda and its affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra in 2013, the armed group solidified its position as a distinct entity, operating under the name of Islamic State. Despite Islamic State’s significant territorial defeat in 2019,⁷⁰ the findings demonstrate that Islamic State retains a level of organisation that meets the threshold to be considered a non-State armed group for the purpose of IHL.⁷¹

Non-international armed conflict involving the CJTF-OIR and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) against Islamic State

As noted earlier,¹ in March 2025, the interim Syrian government signed an agreement with the SDF, which included a plan for the SDF to dissolve and integrate into the Syrian army’s structures. As of June 2025, the nature of this integration, however, remained uncertain. Reports suggest that the implementation of the agreement continues to be subject to differences between the parties, including the degree of military integration, as the SDF seeks to remain autonomous.² In light of the foregoing, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the SDF has been formally integrated into the Syrian armed forces.³

Considering that States contibuting to the CJTF-OIR and the SDF have closely collaborated in their fight against Islamic State since the beginning of the NIAC against Islamic State,⁴, the question arises whether it is sufficiently close and coordinated to warrant treating them as co-belligerents or parties on the same side of a NIAC.⁵

As a precondition, the SDF must be sufficiently organized in and of itself to meet the threshold of organisation under IHL.⁶ Formed in 2015, the SDF comprises a coalition of eight distinct militias, united under a single organizational entity to coordinate and mount military operations, particularly in partnership with the CJTF-OIR against Islamic State. It is mainly composed of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), alongside Arab, Turkmen, Assyrian, and Armenian components.

The SDF has inherited a robust and identifiable command and control structure from the YPG, including a Military Council representing leaders of all member groups, a General Commander, a General Command body, and a Military Discipline Committee. While decision-making mechanisms emphasize collective leadership, these structures still reflect a functional and accountable chain of command.⁷

The SDF’s internal structure is built on clearly established training protocols and a robust military infrastructure, ensuring discipline, professionalism, and cohesion among its ranks. This includes regularized military education and internal enforcement of disciplinary norms.⁸

Moreover, the SDF possesses the material, logistical, and financial means necessary to conduct prolonged and coordinated military operations. Its forces are salaried, both through political structures and external support, suggesting financial sustainability.⁹ It has acquired significant quantities of military equipment through both battlefield gains and direct support from external actors.¹⁰

The SDF has also demonstrated its ability to exercise significant control over territory in Syria. Following the territorial defeat of Islamic State in March 2019, the SDF was designated the official military force of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), a political entity exercising de facto authority over significant regions in northern Syria.¹¹ In these territories, the AANES has established functioning State-like institutions, including policing, a judiciary, education systems, local governance mechanisms, and a resource-based economic framework. The SDF, as its military arm, provides security, controls detention facilities and camps, and engages in sustained military operations to defend these areas from external threats.¹²

The AANES and SDF have demonstrated the capacity to engage coherently with external actors, including States in the region and the 82 members of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.¹³ This ability to ‘speak with one voice’ further evidences the existence of a centralized political-military apparatus and reinforces the SDF’s status as a highly organized armed group.

On the basis of the foregoing, it is clear that the SDF possess the level of organization required under IHL to be considered a non-State armed group party to a NIAC.

Turning to the level of coordination between the SDF and States contributing to the CJTF-OIR, since 2017, the SDF, supported by the CJTF-OIR, has been involved in military raids against Islamic State and has continued to participate in partnered operations with the CJTF-OIR throughout the reporting period. There is significant evidence demonstrating that the CJTF-OIR provides ongoing and essential military support to the SDF, including weapons, intelligence, logistics, training, and air support. Hence, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the level of coordination and mutual support aligns with the level of support necessary to be regarded as parties (‘co-belligerent’) to the same NIAC.¹⁴ This means that in assessing the threshold of intensity, the activities of both the SDF and the CJTF-OIR against the Islamic State can be aggregated.

Despite its significant loss of control over Syrian and Iraqi territory in 2019, Islamic State continues to control territory in Syria, in particular in the eastern province of Deir Ez Zor.¹⁵ The recent resurgence of Islamic State’s attacks since 2023 demonstrates its ongoing ability to carry out sustained operations in Syria. Between January and June 2025, more than 100 attacks in areas controlled by the SDF were reported, leading to casualties among SDF fighters and civilians.¹⁶ The number of Islamic State attacks continues to escalate, despite the CJTF-OIR and SDF joint military operations against the armed group, including through large-scale airstrikes and ground operations, targeting critical Islamic State positions in the Syrian desert, including Islamic State leaders, operatives and camps.¹⁷ These violent confrontations attest to the continued existence of protracted and organized military engagement between Islamic State and the CJTF-OIR alongside SDF, satisfying the intensity criterion for the existence of a NIAC.

In light of the foregoing, the situation in Syria involving hostilities between the SDF, backed by States contributing to the CJTF-OIR, and Islamic State continues to satisfy both the intensity and organisation criteria to be classified as a NIAC.

1
See ‘Key developments’
2
W. van Wilgenburg, Facilitating the New SDF Agreement Is Key to Stabilizing Syria, 2 April 2025.
3
See ICRC, How is the term “armed conflict” defined in international humanitarian law?, Opinion Paper, 2024, p 17.
4
See ‘Historical Background’
5
See ICRC, How is the term “armed conflict” defined in international humanitarian law?, Opinion Paper, 2024, pp 16-17
6
See ICRC, How is the term “armed conflict” defined in international humanitarian law?, Opinion Paper, 2024, p. 16.
7
D. Vestenskov and A. Høj Fierro, Internal Kurdish Coherence, Scandinavian Military Studies. (2019), pp 30–31
8
M. Knights, and W. van Wilgenburg. Accidental Allies: The U.S.–Syrian Democratic Forces Partnership Against the Islamic State, London: I.B. Tauris, 2022, pp 33–36
9
M. Knights, and W. van Wilgenburg. Accidental Allies: The U.S.–Syrian Democratic Forces Partnership Against the Islamic State, London: I.B. Tauris, 2022, p 190
10
D. Vestenskov and A. Høj Fierro, Internal Kurdish Coherence, Scandinavian Military Studies. (2019), pp 30–31.
11
European Union Agency for Asylum, Country Guidance: Syria, April 2024, p. 23
12
M. Nicholasen, Survival and Self-Determination in Northeast Syria, 10 April 2024
13
W. Smith, The End of the Road for the Syrian Democratic Forces, 28 March 2025
14
USCENTCOM, Coalition Forces Coordinate, Work With Syrian Partner Forces, 10 April 2025; Syrian Democratic Forces, Enabled by CENTCOM Forces, Capture ISIS Cell Leader, 8 March 2025
15
Twentieth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by Islamic State (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, UN Doc S/2025/72, 31 January 2025, para 6.
16
SOHR, Amid efforts by Coalition to decrease its military presence in eastern Euphrates, 5 June 2025.
17
See ‘Key developments’

Non-international armed conflict between Syria and Islamic State

From the areas that Islamic State continues to control in the eastern province of Deir Ez Zor, Islamic State has managed to increasingly expand its activities against the Syrian government to Homs, as well as Hama and Raqqa.¹

In 2024, ambushes against the former Syrian government gained in regularity, some demonstrating a high level of coordination and using heavy weaponry, including missiles and light rockets. These incidents have led to significant casualties among the Syrian armed forces, their facilities, as well as harm to civilians and their livelihoods.² More recently, Islamic State has demonstrated that it retains its operational capacity, also in light of the interim government’s efforts to defeat Islamic State’s presence. On 18 May 2025, for instance, Islamic State killed or wounded five Syrian soldiers through the use of an explosive device in the eastern town of Mayadin.³ Similarly, on 22 June 2025, Islamic State’s suicide bomb attack on a church in Damascus killed at least 22 individuals and wounded 63 others.⁴

Hence, the frequency, organization, and sophistication of the attacks involving Islamic State and the Syrian government remain sufficient to satisfy the intensity threshold under IHL. Given that Islamic State fulfils the organization criterion,⁵ ⁶ Although evidence suggests that Islamic State continues to exercise control over certain parts of the territory such as to carry out sustained and concerted military operations, Syria is not a party to Additional Protocol II of 1977 and that treaty is not applicable.

1
See ‘Key developments’
2
Gregory Waters, ISIS Insurgency, Syria, 15 October 2024
3
A. Y. Zelin, The Islamic State Attacks the New Syrian Government, The Washington Institute, 19 May 2025.
4
Christou, Islamic State suicide bombing in Damascus church kills 22 and injures 63, The Guardian, 22 June 2025.
5
See ‘Armed conflicts in Iraq it can be concluded that a NIAC between the Syrian government and Islamic State is ongoing.
6
See UNSC, Twentieth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by Islamic State (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, UN Doc S/2025/72, 31 January 2025, para 6; Masood Al Hakari, Without a Caliphate, But Far from Defeated: Why Da’esh/ISIS Remains a Threat in Syria in 2025, PRIF Blog, 7 April 2025.

Non-international armed conflict between the United States (US) and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) (Iraq)

As noted,¹ a growing number of violent confrontations between the US and IRI were reported following the situation in Gaza in October 2023.² In the period between October 2023 and late January 2024, Iran-linked militias had reportedly launched more than 150 rocket and drone attacks on US military personnel and facilities located in Iraq and Syria, causing significant destruction and injury.³ Notably, the Al-Asad airbase in western Iraq, a key installation housing US troops and equipment, was regularly subjected to attack since October 2023. The US conducted, allegedly in response, regular airstrikes targeting facilities used by these groups, including training areas, weapon and ammunition storage, and safe houses.⁴ These incidents led to substantial physical damage and multiple casualties on both sides.

In terms of organization, the IRI constitutes a network of Shia militias that emerged with a common ideological and operational objective. The IRI is characterized by a decentralized and fragmented structure, with a wide range of loosely aligned armed groups, such as Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HHN), Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS). Formally, these factions are part of the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU), which is an umbrella term for multiple factions of militias formally part of the Iraqi security forces. The PMU initially emerged as a crucial actor in combating and defeating ISIL after the defeat of the Iraqi security forces in Mosul in June 2014. While factions within the PMU continue their anti-ISIL operations, the IRI factions have gradually expanded their influence over Iraqi and Syrian territory, with the aim of reducing the US presence in Iraq and Syria.⁵

Although formally part of the Iraqi armed forces, like many other factions within the PMU, they operate independently from the Iraqi State.⁶ Various sources affirm that each of the IRI factions relies on its own chain of command.⁷ Although the IRI is not a singular entity with a unified command, each constituent militia independently meets the organizational criteria set out in IHL.⁸

All IRI factions have clearly established hierarchical and compartmentalized military leadership and administrative structures. The KH, for instance, is led by a secretary general, working alongside an advisory council, to formulate strategy and actions. Under these two entities are offices divided into different branches, including a Police Bureau and a Military Bureau. Militarily, the factions organize their forces into distinct operational units.⁹

The estimated numbers of fighters within each faction diverge markedly. For the two largest factions, KH and AAH, estimates range from 5,000 up to 30,000 fighters. In terms of logistics and training capabilities, evidence suggests that their fighters all receive training from the Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and Hezbollah. As part of the PMU, they receive funding and training from the Iraqi government. Additionally, the IRGC-QF provides them with significant financial and material support, including drones, rifles, rockets, and systems for launching anti-missiles, as well as training in using these weapons.¹⁰ The sophistication of the attacks using drones and heavy weaponry attests to these factions’ capacities to organize themselves and execute military strategies effectively¹¹ As to their outreach and communication capabilities, the militias have their respective dedicated media wings that provide morale-boosting battlefield updates, propaganda videos, and serve as recruitment tools for new fighters. Their media network includes websites, social media accounts, and satellite channels¹²

Despite maintaining operational autonomy and distinct chains of command, these factions demonstrate a certain level of coordination within their alliance beyond their shared operational objectives. Their fighters reportedly fought regularly in support of the Assad regime.¹³ The establishment of a shared communication network also contributed to their ability to promote a unified narrative.¹⁴ Operationally, the groups have demonstrated their capacity to carry out coordinated attacks across borders. On 18 October 2023, the IRI executed simultaneous strikes on the Ain Asad airbase and the Harir US base in Iraq.¹⁵ Taken together, these elements underscore a level of coordination between the militias that are part of the IRI’s network, making it sufficient to consider them as a decentralized armed group party to a NIAC.¹⁶

Although supported materially and financially by Iran, there is insufficient conclusive factual evidence to determine that these factions operated under its direct control and command. While the evidence clearly demonstrates that Iran significantly contributes to the group’s equipment, financing, and training, and shares strategic and ideological aims with these groups, there is a lack of factual evidence that demonstrates it is involved in the general planning of their military activities.¹⁷

In conclusion, the factual patterns between October 2023 and February 2024 meet the intensity threshold, and the parties to the conflict are sufficiently organized for the situation to be classified as an NIAC. Iraq is not a party to AP II, but customary IHL remains applicable.

The significant decline in violent confrontations from February 2024 onwards signalled the end of the armed conflict.

1
See ‘Major events and developments’.
2
See ‘Armed Conflicts in Israel’.
3
See ‘Armed Conflicts in Syria’.
4
J. Clark, U.S. Strikes Targets in Iraq and Syria in Response to Deadly Drone Attack, 2 February 2023.
5
A. Majidyar, ‘Iran-Backed Iraqi Militia Leader Intensifies Propaganda against U.S. and Its Allies’, Middle East Institute, 1 August 2017.
6
See European Union Agency for Asylum, Country Guidance: Iraq, p. 16.
7
I. Rudolf, All the Mahdi’s Men: Contextualising Nuances Within Iraq’s Islamic Resistance, Routledge, 18 May 2024.
8
See ICRC, How is the term “armed conflict” defined in international humanitarian law?, Opinion Paper, 2024, p. 16.
9
M. Knights, Back into the Shadows? The Future of Kata’ib Hezbollah and Iran’s Other Proxies in Iraq, Washington Institute, October 2020.
10
I. Rudolf, All the Mahdi’s Men: Contextualising Nuances Within Iraq’s Islamic Resistance, Routledge, 18 May 2024; Crispin Smith and Michael Knights, Remaking Iraq: How Iranian-Backed Militias Captured the Country, Just Security, 20 March 2023.
11
.See also M. Knights, A. al-Kaabi, H. Malik, Tracking Anti-U.S. and Anti-Israel Strikes From Iraq and Syria During the Gaza Crisis, Policy Analysis, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 3 December 2024.
12
.See https://www.kataibhezbollah.me/; https://www.aletejahtv.iq/.
13
W. Posch, Schiitische Milizen im Irak und in Syrien Volksmobilisierungseinheiten und andere.
14
See IRI Telegram channel established on 18 October 2023.
15
N. Şaban, Analyzing Iranian-Orchestrated Attacks on U.S. Bases in Syria and Iraq Post Gaza War, OMRAN, 7 March 2024.
16
ICRC, The Roots of Restraint in war, 2018, pp. 45–47.
17
I. Rudolf, All the Mahdi’s Men: Contextualising Nuances Within Iraq’s Islamic Resistance, Routledge, 18 May 2024.

Non-international armed conflict involving Türkiye and the Syrian National Army (SNA) against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)

Since October 2019, there have been regular confrontations between the SDF and Türkiye and the Turkish-backed SNA. The SDF is sufficiently organized to be considered an armed group under IHL.¹ Considering the close relationship between the SNA and Türkiye in these confrontations,² the question arises whether it is sufficiently close and coordinated to warrant treating them as co-belligerents or parties on the same side of an NIAC.³

As a precondition, the SNA must be sufficiently organized in and of itself to meet the threshold of organization under IHL. The SNA emerged from the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which originally formed in July 2011 by defectors from the Syrian armed forces. The FSA evolved into a coalition of affiliated rebel factions actively participating in hostilities against both the Syrian government and the Islamic State. Following its gradual weakening in 2016, Türkiye began to reassemble a coalition of armed groups, many of whom were former FSA fighters, under the banner of the SNA to create a more cohesive opposing force. Despite its decentralized nature, the different factions of the SNA all formally operate under the supervision of the Syrian Interim Government (SIG), an alternative government formed by a coalition of Syrian opposition organisations. This overarching hierarchical structure leaves significant decision-making autonomy to the leaders of the different factions.⁴ In response to internal rivalries, Türkiye reportedly implemented a restructuring plan for the SNA, including a centralized command structure.

Further attesting to its organizational capacity is the SNA efforts to regulate the conduct of its members. Notably, in 2018, it adopted a Code of Conduct, signifying the presence of internal norms and disciplinary mechanisms.⁵ Additionally, the signing of joint declarations, which commit to protecting civilian infrastructure and ensuring humanitarian access, reflects the SNA’s capacity to bind its members and express collective policy positions in alignment with IHL.⁶

The SNA reportedly controls two areas in Syria along the Turkish border⁷ and continues to conduct military operations to establish its control further. On 30 November 2024, the SNA, backed by Türkiye, launched an operation to regain control over territories under the control of the SDF. While the operation involved intense and violent clashes between the SNA and SDF, leading to significant death and destruction on both sides as well as civilians, it managed to push the SDF to withdraw from certain parts of northern Syria.⁸ This attests to the SNA’s continued military presence and the capacity to conduct sustained operations across various fronts. Moreover, with an estimated strength of approximately 70,000 fighters across over 40 factions, the SNA demonstrates a degree of permanence and coordination testifying also to its organized nature.⁹

Based on the foregoing, it can be concluded that despite its decentralized nature and internal divisions, the group retains sufficient unity and coordination to be considered an organized armed group under IHL.

Since October 2018, the SNA, backed by Türkiye, has engaged in combat with the SDF and has continued to participate in partnered operations with Türkiye throughout the reporting period. Evidence demonstrates that Türkiye provides ongoing and essential military support to the SNA, including weapons, intelligence, logistics, training, and air support. Hence, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the level of coordination and mutual support aligns with the level of support necessary to be regarded as both parties (‘co-belligerent’) to the same NIAC.¹⁰ Accordingly, in assessing the threshold of intensity, the activities of both the SNA and Türkiye against the SDF can be aggregated.

As noted earlier, Türkiye and the SNA have significantly increased their operations against the SDF since 2022, resulting in the killing of SDF fighters, including their commander. Renewed tensions arose in late 2024. The Turkish-backed SNA launched an offensive against SDF-controlled areas, including Manbij, Kobani and the east of Aleppo. The confrontations between Türkiye and Turkish-backed SNA and SDF led to the death and injury of many SDF fighters as well as civilians, and the destruction of critical infrastructure within the SDF-controlled territory.¹¹ The confrontations between Türkiye and Turkish-backed armed groups with the SDF have decreased but not halted despite the SDF agreement with the interim Syrian government concerning a ceasefire and the SDF’s integration into the government’s military forces. ¹² Given that both intensity and organization criteria are fulfilled, a NIAC between Türkiye and the SNA against the SDF is ongoing. Yet, given the ongoing negotiations concerning the potential integration of the SDF into the reconstituted Syrian armed forces, the situation warrants continued monitoring and legal reassessment.¹³

1
See legal analysis in ‘Non-international armed conflict involving the CJTF-OIR and the SDF against Islamic State’
2
See ‘Historical Background’
3
See ICRC, How is the term “armed conflict” defined in international humanitarian law?, Opinion Paper, 2024, pp 16–17.
4
Ö. Özkizilcik, The Syrian National Army (SNA): Structure, Functions, and Three Scenarios for its Relationship with Damascus, GCSP, Discussion Paper, October 2020
5
L. Kemal, From rebel factions to an army: Efforts to tame the Syrian National Army, Atlantic Council, 18 June 2024
6
Geneva Call, Syria, 10 June 2025
7
ETANA, Syria Update, 7 May 2025
8
H. J. Barkey, What Role Is Turkey Playing in Syria’s Civil War?, Council on Foreign Relations, 6 December 2024.
9
IISS, The Military Balance, Volume 123, 2023, p. 356.
10
See Engin Yüksel, Strategies of Turkish proxy warfare in northern Syria, CRU Report, 2019, pp 6-7; Can Kasapoglu, The Syrian National Army and the Future of Turkey’s Frontier Land Force, The Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor, Vol 19, No 5 (12 March 2021), pp. 7-8.
11
See ‘Key developments’
12
ACLED, Regional Overview Middle East May 2025, 8 May 2025
13
See ‘Key developments’.

Non-international armed conflict between Israel and Hezbollah (spillover)

Since 2013, Hezbollah has formally deployed fighters to support the Assad government on Syrian territory, and it has frequently engaged in confrontations with the Israeli armed forces since then. In July 2019, Hezbollah declared it had started relocating troops nearer to the Lebanese border, while still keeping a limited presence in Syria,¹resulting in a reduction in violent incidents between the two parties on Syrian territory.

The situation, however, took a notable turn on 8 October 2023, following the events unfolding in Gaza. Hezbollah conducted regular attacks, targeting the locations of the IDF military along the border with Lebanon, including within Israeli-occupied territory in Syria.² Such cross-border incidents involving Hezbollah and the IDF persisted throughout the reporting period;³ providing sufficient evidence to classify the situation as a spillover of the NIAC between the two parties in Lebanon.⁴

1
Milddle East Monitor, Hezbollah withdraws troops from Syria to the Lebanon border, 16 July 2019
2
Al Jazeera, Hezbollah ‘treads carefully’ as it shells Israeli position, 9 October 2023.
3
ACLED, Mapping the 25 August Israel and Hezbollah attacks, 30 August 2024; A. Mehvar, Q&A: Behind the data on the Israel-Hezbollah war, ACLED, 1 November 2024
4
See ‘Armed conflicts in Israel’ and ‘Armed conflicts in Lebanon’.

Non-international armed conflict between Syria and pro-former government fighters (PFGF)

Since the change of government in December 2024, clashes have persisted between the newly formed interim government and remnants of the former government’s security forces.¹ These confrontations largely stemmed from the interim government’s efforts to disarm various factions of the PFGF, which resisted disarmament and challenged the authority of the new government.² While these incidents involved significant levels of violence, available evidence suggests that the groups engaged were initially not hierarchically organized, and it is unclear whether they acted pursuant to any formal orders.

A notable shift in the organizational dynamics of the PFGF became apparent during the events of March 2025. At that time, coordination among different factions of the PFGF began to emerge. Although the structure and personnel of the former government are no longer followed, similar patterns of combined military and intelligence operations were observed.³ Current estimates indicate that the group comprises between 2000 and 4000 fighters.⁴ Operations in March demonstrated a discernible level of coordination. Furthermore, the Council for the Liberation of Syria’s claim of responsibility for these attacks reflects the group’s ability to act and communicate with a unified voice.

On this basis, it is concluded that, notwithstanding the PFGF’s previously decentralized nature, the group has retained sufficient unity and coordination since March 2025 to be classified as an organized armed group under IHL. Consequently, the situation between the PFGF and the interim Syrian government since that time constituted a NIAC within the meaning of IHL.

1
See ‘Key developments’
2
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, ‘Violations against Civilians in Coastal and Western Central Syria in January – March 2025 (Human Rights Council 2025) A/HRC/59/CRP.4, paras 14-16.
3
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, ‘Violations against Civilians in Coastal and Western Central Syria in January–March 2025, UN Doc A/HRC/59/CRP.4, 2025, paras 26–27.
4
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, ‘Violations against Civilians in Coastal and Western Central Syria in January–March 2025, UN Doc A/HRC/59/CRP.4, 2025, para 27, and p 55.

Clashes between Israel and Shia militias

Reports indicate sporadic armed clashes between Israeli forces and Shia militias, though the precise identity of the non-State armed groups involved often remains unclear. Some reports suggest that a significant number of these attacks, following 7 October 2023, can be attributed to the IRI.⁷² Yet, there remains insufficient verifiable and sometimes conflicting information to confirm these findings, as sources tend to refer to Shiite militias more broadly.⁷³

The inability to reliably identify the specific Shia militias involved and verify their claims weakens the assessment of organizational structure as well as the attribution of casualties, injuries, and property damage to fighting between the precise Shia militias and Israeli forces. Based on the available information, these violent confrontations cannot be considered to reach the intensity and organizational threshold to constitute a NIAC. If future evidence reveals sustained hostilities or a clearly identifiable militia organization, reassessment would be warranted.

Clashes between Syria and Lebanese militias

Since its establishment, the interim Syrian government has engaged in violent incidents with Lebanese militia fighters near the Lebanon-Syria border, reportedly to disrupt drug trafficking and arms smuggling linked to Lebanese Hezbollah.⁷⁴ These incidents have escalated significantly since early 2025, with heavy exchanges of fire and use of mortar shells reported along the border between Syrian regime forces and Lebanese factions.⁷⁵ These incidents have led to regular casualties on both sides as well as captives. These incidents reportedly also led to some civilian injury and death, and prompted some families to flee from their villages situated in the targeted cross-border area.⁷⁶

Although some reports suggest that Hezbollah was involved in some of these incidents, publicly available information remains inconclusive. Hezbollah regularly denied involvement, and some reports pointed to local clans in the border region not directly affiliated with Hezbollah, but which have been involved in cross-border smuggling, as being behind those incidents.⁷⁷ Therefore, despite the growing level of intensity of the incidents, there remains insufficient available evidence to attribute these to clearly identifiable organized armed groups. As a result, the situation cannot be classified as a NIAC.

Clashes between Syria and various armed factions

Since the change of government in Syria, regular violent incidents involving local militias, some of which were affiliated with the former government, and Sunni fighters reportedly aligned with the new central authority in Syria, were reported. As noted above,See ‘Historical Background’ many of these incidents have resulted in significant civilian deaths and damage to civilian infrastructure. Yet, the involvement of a multiplicity of actors, as well as the geographically dispersed nature of the incidents, complicates the legal assessment of the required intensity and organizational threshold to classify all these incidents as part of an NIAC.

Except for those incidents that occurred as part of the NIAC between Syria and the PFGF since March 2025,See NIAC between Syria and the PFGF based on the currently available information, these violent confrontations cannot be considered to reach the intensity and organisational threshold to constitute a NIAC. If future evidence reveals a clearly identifiable militia organization involved in sustained violent incidents against Syrian armed forces, reassessment will be warranted.

State Parties

United States
Iran
Israel
Syria
Türkiye
States contributing to the Combined Joint Task Force of Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), including the United Kingdom, Spain, Canada, Australia (at least until December 2024), Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy.

Non-state parties

A wide array of non-State armed groups are active in Syria. Below is a selection of the most important armed groups or alliances:

Hezbollah (Lebanese)
Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI)
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Islamic State)
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
Syrian National Army (SNA)
Pro-former government fighters (PFGF)

1
Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012; Center for Preventive Action, Conflict in Syria, Council on Foreign Relations, 14 May 2025.
2
Global Coalition, Our Mission, 6 June 2024.
3
See ‘Armed Conflicts in Iraq’; it includes States such as the US OIR-CJTF, United States, 2 March 2016, the UK GOV.UK, Update: air strikes against Daesh, 27 April 2024, Spain Gobierno de Espana, Operation Support to Iraq, 14 July 2025, France Ministère des Armées, Dossier de Press Chammal, December 2023, Canada OIR-CJTF, Canada, 10 March 2016, Australia (until December 2024) OIR-CJTF, Australia, 2 March 2016, Germany Die Bundesregierung, Bundeswehr setzt Einsatz im Irak fort, 13 September 2023, the Netherlands Ministerue van Defensie, Nederland levert helikopters en troepencommandant voor NAVO-missie Irak, 29 September 2023, Belgium The Brussels Times, Tenth anniversary of Belgium’s involvement in the fight against ISIS, 24 September 2024, and Italian Institute for International Political Studies, In Iraq, Italy and France Are Looking for a Primary Role to Play, 12 October 2021
4
Identical Letters Dated 17 September 2015 From the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary General and the President of the Security Council, UN doc S/2015/719, 21 September 2015
5
Al Jazeera, Islamic State defeated in final Syria victory: SDF, 23 March 2019 as well as, in separate operations, the Syrian government, supported by Russian armed forces,Reuters, Syria’s Assad wrote to Putin over military support: statement, 30 September 2015
6
US DoD, Statement From Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Jonathan Hoffman, 29.12.2019
7
Republic of Türkiye, PKK, 6 June 2025.
8
European Parliament, Turkey’s military operations in Syria and its impact on relations with the EU, November 2019
9
See H. Haid, Post-ISIS Governance in Jarablus: A Turkish-led Strategy, Research Paper, Chatham House, 26 September 2017; A. Stein, H. Abouzahr, and R. Komar, ‘How Turkey Is Governing in Northern Aleppo’, Syria Deeply, 20 July 2017
10
See ‘Turkish Forces Launch Operation against crime group in Syria’s Afrin’, Daily News, 19 November 2018; ‘Turkey open new health centre in Syria’s Afrin’, Daily News, 6 December 2018; ‘Syrian rebels build an army with Turkish help, face challenges’, Reuters, 12 August 2018
11
‘Turkey’s Syria offensive explained in four maps’, BBC, 14 October 2019
12
See ‘Key developments’
13
See UNSC, Resolution 497 (1981), 17 December 1981; UNGA, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 2015 (A/Res/70/91), 15 December 2015; ICRC, What does the law say about the responsibilities of the Occupying Power in the occupied Palestinian territory?, 26 July 2024.
14
UNGA, Verbatim Record of the 5th Meeting, 2 February 1982
15
UNDOF, Mandate, December 2024
16
G. Golan, Israeli Peacemaking since 1967: Factors behind the Breakthroughs and Failures (Routledge 2015), pp 57–93.
17
‘Golan Heights: Trump signs order recognising occupied area as Israeli’, BBC News, 25 March 2019.
18
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 2015 (A/Res/70/91), 15 December 2015; The Syrian Golan – draft General Assembly Resolution (A/79/L.19) (adopted), 22 November 2024.
19
See Tel Aviv University, The Institute for National Security Studies, ‘Real-time Updates’, 6 June 2025.
20
See ‘Armed Conflicts in Lebanon’
21
BBC,‘Syria war: Idlib ceasefire between Russia and Turkey begins’, 6 March 2020.
22
S. Firth, ‘Civilians bear the brunt of escalating violence in Syria’s Idlib’, Al Jazeera, 23 August 2021
23
Z. Mehchy, H. Haid and L. Khatib, Assessing control and power dynamics in Syria, Chatham House, November 2020
24
Z. Mehchy, H. Haid and L. Khatib, Assessing control and power dynamics in Syria, Chatham House, November 2020.
25
A. Belkaïd, The fall of the house of Assad, Le Monde diplomatique, January 2025; S. Belhadj Klaz, The Collapse of the Syrian Regime or How the Intelligence Services Disintegrated the Army, 16 December 2024.
26
R. Geist Pinfold, Why is Israel Escalating its Strikes Against Syria?, RUSI, 9 May 2025
27
W. Christou, Syrian government reaches deal with Kurdish-led SDF to integrate north-east region, The Guardian, 10 March 2025
28
Statement by the President of the UN Security Council, 14 March 2025.
29
W. Christou, Deadly Syria clashes continue for second day outside Damascus, 30 April 2025.
30
B. Roger, Emmanuel Grynszpan, Frédéric Bobin, The fall of Bashar al-Assad, a blow for Russia in Africa, Le Monde, 21 December 2024
31
S. Adar et al., The Fall of the Assad Regime: Regional and International Power Shifts, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 25 February 2025.
32
M. Brennan, J. LaPorta, O. V. Gazis, J. Jacobs, E. Watson, Israel launches strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites and other targets; Iran launches retaliatory drone strike, CBN news, 13 June 2024; The New Arab, Israel says killed top Iran commander and aide to the supreme leader, 17 June 2025
33
ACLED, ACLED Regional Overview Middle East: January 2025, 15 January 2025.
34
C. Lister, It’s Time for Syria’s Kurds to Fold, Foreign Policy, 20 February 2025
35
USCENTCOM, US Central Command, conducts dozens of airstrikes to eliminate ISIS camps in central Syria, 8 December 2024.
36
The US Embassy in Syria, Announcing the timeline for the end of the military mission of the Global Coalition to defeat ISIS in Iraq, 27 September 2024.
37
A. Ismail and L. Masri, As Turkey intensifies war on Kurdish militants in Iraq, civilians are suffering, Reuters, 10 October 2023
38
Human Rights Watch, Northeast Syria: Apparent War Crime by Türkiye-Backed Forces, 30 January 2025
39
R. Soylu, Turkey and SDF hold direct talks under US mediation, 3 June 2025
40
R. Soylu, Turkey offers military aid to Syria for counterterrorism during unprecedented Ankara visit, 15 January 2025
41
See ‘Armed conflicts in Israel’
42
See M. Krever, Israel strikes Syria 480 times and seizes territory as Netanyahu pledges to change face of the Middle East, CNN, 11 December 2024
43
UN News, Guterres condemns violence against civilians in Syria, urges Israel to stop attacks, 2 May 2025; R. Geist Pinfold, Why is Israel Escalating its Strikes Against Syria?, RUSI, 9 May 2025.
44
R. Geist Pinfold, Why is Israel Escalating its Strikes Against Syria?, RUSI, 9 May 2025
45
Syria interim president seeks pressure on Israel to withdraw from south, France 24, 4 March 2025
46
ACLED, Regional Overview Middle East: July 2024, 9 August 2024
47
US DoD, 3 U.S. Service Members Killed, Others Injured in Jordan Following Drone Attack, 29 January 2024
48
C. Schaer, US troops in the Middle East: Soldiers in the line of fire, Deutsche Welle, 30 January 2024
49
J. Gregory and F. Gardner, US strikes Syria bases used by Iran-linked groups, BBC News, 27 October 2023
50
USCENTCOM, CENTCOM Statement on U.S. Strikes in Iraq and Syria, 2 February 2024
51
ACLED, Regional Overview Middle East: July 2024, 9 August 2024
52
USCENTCOM, U.S. Central Command Forces Strike Iranian Aligned Targets in Syria in Response to Attacks on U.S. Personnel on 12 November, 12 November 2024.
53
K. Wells et al. Iran Update, ISW Press, 4 April 2025.
54
ICRC, 2016 Commentary, para 234
55
P. Loft and C. Mills, Syria after Assad: Consequences and interim authorities 2025, House of Commons Library, 13 March 2025
56
UN, Highlights of the Noon Briefing By Stéphane Dujarric Spokesperson for Secretary-General António Guterres, 13 March 2025.
57
Al Jazerra, Syria’s al-Sharaa meets Erdogan in Turkiye as sanctions lifted, 24 May 2025
58
Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Etrangère, Syria – Decision to lift european economic sanctions, 20 May 2025,
59
Ending the Syria Sanctions Program for the Benefit of the Syrian People, 30 June 2025
60
Al Jazeera, Eight Arab countries vow to support ‘peaceful transition process’ in Syria, 14 December, 2024; See also Security Council Report, Syria: Briefing and Consultations, 20 May 2025
61
ICRC, 2017 Commentary, para 511
62
ICRC, How is the term “Armed Conflict” defined in international humanitarian law?, 16 April 2024, p. 9.
63
’ICRC, 2016 Commentary, para 237.
64
ICRC, 2016 Commentary, para 263. See also: ILC, Draft articles on Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, p 73, paras 3 and 8.
65
ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005, p 168, paras 47 and 53.
66
ICRC, 2016 Commentary, para 304.
67
ICTY, The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995, para 70; ICTY, The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, Trial Chamber, Judgment, IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997, para 562.
68
For a summary, see ICTY, The Prosecutor v Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski, Trial Chamber, Judgment, IT-04-82-T, 10 July 2008, para 177.
69
For a summary, see ICTY, The Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj and others, Trial Chamber, Judgment, IT-04-84-T, 3 April 2008, para 60.
70
See ‘Armed Conflict(s) Overview’.
71
See ‘Armed Conflicts in Iraq’.
72
M. Knights, A. al-Kaabi, and H. Malik, Tracking Anti-U.S. and Anti-Israel Strikes From Iraq and Syria During the Gaza Crisis, The Washington Institute, 14 October 2024.
73
Regarding the issue of verification of claims, see also: M. Knights, A. al-Kaabi, and H. Malik, Iraqi Militias Downscaling Their Anti-Israel Actions, 26 November 2024.
74
AFP, Hezbollah Lebanon army says returned fire coming from Syria in border area, 8 February 2025
75
ACLED, Regional Overview Middle East Match, 7 March 2025
76
Al Jazeera, At least seven killed in spiralling clashes on Syria-Lebanon border, 17 March 2025
77
Al Jazeera, At least seven killed in spiralling clashes on Syria-Lebanon border, 17 March 2025

Syria

Reporting period: July 2023 - June 2025

Overview

Historical background