US-Venezuela

An international armed conflict (IAC) between the United States (US) and Venezuela may have been triggered as early as 18 or 23 December 2025,¹ but most likely began on 3 January 2026 when the United States invaded Venezuela and captured President Maduro.² The conflict was short-lived, with active hostilities ending the day after Maduro’s capture.

Both the United States and Venezuela are party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Other rules of customary IHL also apply to the IAC. Unlike Venezuela, the United States is not party to Additional Protocol I of 1977, meaning that the treaty was not applicable. Most of its provisions, however, are customary in nature.

The United States and Venezuela first established diplomatic relations in 1835.³ For the majority of the twentieth century, Venezuela was one of the closest US allies in Latin America, becoming one of the country’s leading oil providers, particularly during the 1990s.⁴ Following Hugo Chávez’s rise to power in 1999, he set an anti-imperialist foreign policy, raising alarms in Washington.⁵ The relationship between the United States and Venezuela has deteriorated since the Chávez era, continuing during Nicolás Maduro’s rule while ties between Venezuela and Cuba, China, Russia, and Iran have deepened.⁶ The years between 2019 and 2024 were marked by a steady build-up of tensions between the United States and Venezuela, including the imposition of US sanctions on Venezuela and accusations of narco-trafficking being made against Maduro.⁷

In 2025, tensions between the two States reached new heights. The US Department of Defence launched its ‘Operation Southern Spear’ campaign on 2 September 2025.⁸ Between 2 September 2025 and 5 January 2026, at least thirty-five strikes were recorded, killing 115 civilians with two survivors rescued.⁹ On 8 September 2025, US Secretary of State for War, Pete Hegseth said that the United States will not tolerate narco-terrorists, who he alleged are poisoning American people, in international waters.¹⁰ On 16 September 2025, following the first three strikes against vessels allegedly carrying drugs in Caribbean waters off the coast of Venezuela, President Maduro accused US President Trump of waging, what he called, ‘multifaceted war’ against Venezuela and of breaching international law.¹¹ According to Maduro, the motivation for the US attacks was regime change in order to access Venezuelan oil, and not drug interdiction, which the Trump administration had said was their primary goal in the region.¹² In a letter to Trump, Maduro initially proposed establishing direct talks and rejected accusations that Venezuela is a central transit point for international drug trafficking.¹³

Despite mixed signals, the United States has classified Operation Southern Spear as part of a non-international armed conflict (NIAC). On 17 October 2025, the US Ambassador to the United Nations, Mike Waltz, also claimed that US actions against Venezuela are being conducted in compliance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (that is to say, jus ad bellum).¹⁴ This means that the United States considers Operation Southern Spear as a self-defence operation. The Trump administration, in a notice to Congress,¹⁵ labelled Operation Southern Spear not as law enforcement, but as part of a NIAC between the United States and Caribbean drug cartels.¹⁶ Similarly, US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, as recently as January 2026, declared that the United States was ‘at war against’ drug-trafficking organizations.¹⁷ In addition to the boat strikes against suspected Venezuelan drug traffickers,¹⁸ the United States initiated a blockade against sanctioned Venezuelan-registered oil tankers in December 2025, further raising tensions between the two States.¹⁹ On 3 January 2026, the United States carried out a renewed military operation in Venezuela, dubbed ‘Operation Absolute Resolve’, through which US Armed Forces militarily invaded Caracas and removed Nicolás Maduro from his safehouse and transported him back to the United States to face trial for alleged violations of US law.²⁰

Disqualification of main opposition leader Machado for presidential elections

In 2015, the Comptroller General of Venezuela (Contraloría General de Venezuela or CGR), an autonomous constitutional body charged with ensuring the correct management and use of public assets,²¹ imposed a disqualification on Maria Corina Machado, barring her from holding any public office on the grounds of her alleged backing of US sanctions against the Maduro government and her support for the interim presidency of former deputy Juan Guaidó between 2019 and 2023.²² In a letter sent to José Brito, a member of the Venezuelan National Assembly controlled by the ruling party, the CGR disclosed in June 2023 that its 2015 sanctions against Machado were valid for a period of fifteen years.²³ Despite this disqualification imposed by the Maduro administration, Machado won the primary elections for leader of the opposition party in Venezuela, called the Unitary Democratic Platform (Plataforma Unitaria Democrática or PUD) in October 2023, securing 92.35 per cent of the vote.²⁴ Machado’s appointment was publicized by the National Primary Commission (Comisión Nacional de Primaria, CNP), an organ established by the PUD to oversee the primary elections,²⁵ after Venezuela’s Attorney General, Tarek William Saab, proclaimed a few days prior that he would launch a criminal investigation into CNP President Jesús María Casal and CNP Vice President Mildred Camero for alleged election fraud. This claim was swiftly denied by Machado during an interview with the CNN.²⁶ In late 2023, Machado turned to the Venezuelan Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia or TSJ) to review the sanctions imposed on her, arguing that she had never been notified of the disqualification.²⁷ On 26 January 2024, the TSJ endorsed Machado’s disqualification as a presidential candidate eligible for election in the 2024 Venezuelan Presidential elections without publishing its sentence.²⁸ Consequently, Edmundo González Urrutia served as the presidential candidate for the opposition.²⁹

Venezuelan presidential elections in July 2024

On 28 July 2024, Venezuela held presidential elections which were labelled as being ‘riddled with irregularities’,³⁰ with suggested electoral bias and undue influence to ensure another Maduro presidency. This was largely made possible by the National Election Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral or CNE)’s removal of opposition early in the election process.³¹ On 28 July 2024, with 80 per cent of the votes counted, the CNE, which is run by a close ally of Maduro, declared that Maduro had won 51 per cent of votes to 44 per cent for the main opposition candidate, Edmundo González.³² The robust elections system put in place by former leader Hugo Chávez made it difficult to remove all traces of the true results.³³ The opposition party put González’s tally at between 67 and 70 per cent of all votes counted.³⁴ In contradiction, Maduro, claimed that he had won 6.4 million votes, although the opposition estimates that this number is closer to 3.4 million.³⁵ The announcement of the election results provoked a wave of protests in which several people were killed and hundreds detained.³⁶

The Carter Center, an organization that has been engaged in monitoring Venezuelan elections since 1998, was invited to observe the 2024 elections but could not independently verify the outcome of the elections due to information being withheld by the CNE.³⁷ The Center had to withdraw its staff from Venezuela on 30 July 2024 due to the instability in the country that posed a security risk.³⁸ On the same day, the Center released a statement saying that the elections ‘failed to meet international standards of integrity and [could] not be considered democratic’.³⁹

According to Venezuelan NGO Acceso a la Justicia, a series of irregularities took place during election day.Firstly, around midday on 28 July 2024, and hours before the closure of polling stations, alleged polls were circulated announcing Maduro as the leader of the presidential race.⁴⁰ Witnesses for the opposition at polling stations accredited by the CNE were also allegedly intimidated into leaving and were denied access to printed ballot receipts.⁴¹ Additionally, data transmission from the voting machines was interrupted, and citizens who wanted to participate in the ‘post-verification’ were prevented from exercising this right.⁴² The CNE never published the partial results, nor have they been published based on state, municipality, and polling station. Lastly, the CNE proclaimed Maduro as the winner of the presidential elections without tallying all outstanding votes.⁴³ Opposition candidate González was forced into exile as a result of the elections,⁴⁴ and was recognized by the Biden administration as the legitimate leader of Venezuela in January 2025.⁴⁵

Several States, including the United States,⁴⁶ and international organizations did not recognize Maduro as the democratically elected leader of Venezuela. Peru, for example, simply chose to recognize opposition candidate González Urrutia as president-elect.⁴⁷ As of early August 2024, nearly twenty heads of State and high-ranking officials from countries in the Americas, Europe, and Asia called upon the electoral authority to verify all the tally sheets of impartial observers.⁴⁸ States who were hesitant to accept the accuracy of the outcome of the 2024 Venezuelan presidential elections include the United Kingdom, Chile, and Uruguay.⁴⁹ The Organization of American States (OAS) also declared that the proclaimed election results in Venezuela were unreliable.⁵⁰ Russia, China, and Cuba, however, extended their congratulations to President Maduro on his third term as president of Venezuela.⁵¹

President Trump revokes Temporary Protected Status of around 600,000 Venezuelans living in the United States

On 10 January 2025, in the last days of the Biden administration, Joe Biden extended the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) of around 600,000 Venezuelans living in the United States.⁵² Those in the United States with TPS are protected from deportation to their home States where those States are embroiled in some kind of disaster or conflict.⁵³ Venezuelans were specifically granted such status due to the political and economic crises facing the State.⁵⁴ On 28 January 2025, after taking up office, President Trump and his administration rescinded the extension.⁵⁵ On 3 October 2025, the US Supreme Court ruled that the termination of TPS for Venezuelans could take immediate effect.⁵⁶ In 2025, the United States deported more than 13,000 Venezuelans.⁵⁷

Following the US attack on Venezuela on 3 January 2026 (see above and below), there were calls for the deportation of Venezuelans to be halted and their TPS to be reinstated.⁵⁸ The Trump administration has indicated that this is unlikely to happen, with officials taking the position that Venezuela will experience peace, stability, and prosperity in the wake of the ousting of Maduro and, as such, there is no need for Venezuelans to remain in the United States.⁵⁹ While Venezuelans in the United States no longer qualify for TPS, on 4 January 2026, Kristi Noem, the Secretary of State for Homeland Security, said they can now apply for asylum.⁶⁰

US and Venezuelan cooperation on deported migrants

On 31 January 2025, Maduro agreed to accept migrants who were being deported from the United States back to Venezuela in exchange for sending US citizens detained in Venezuela back to the US, thereby scrapping his long-standing policy of not accepting deportees from the United States.⁶¹ In the following days, Maduro welcomed the deal and the expected return of the migrants.⁶² Only a few days earlier, he addressed Venezuelan migrants, telling them they were welcome to return to Venezuela.⁶³ As part of the deal, six US citizens detained in Venezuela were returned to the United States on 1 February 2025. ⁶⁴ On 11 February 2025, 190 deported Venezuelans arrived in Caracas.⁶⁵ These were the first in a series of exchanges of Venezuelan migrants with detained US citizens in Venezuela that took place in 2025.⁶⁶

In late February and early March 2025, however, the deal between the two States almost collapsed.⁶⁷ Trump accused Venezuela of not accepting deported citizens from the United States at a fast enough pace.⁶⁸ On 5 March 2025, he also announced the revocation of a licence held by oil company Chevron which allowed it to produce and export Venezuelan oil to the United States despite the sanctions in place.⁶⁹ As a result of Trump’s actions, Venezuela stopped accepting flights of deportees entirely.⁷⁰ Sources verified by The Wall Street Journal revealed that the Maduro regime had privately informed the Trump administration of its refusal to accept further deportations.⁷¹ After discussions between Maduro and Trump, Venezuela resumed accepting deportees from the United States on 24 March 2025.⁷² Venezuela seems to have made this decision in light of the US decision to deport Venezuelans to El Salvador.⁷³

About 250 people were sent from the United States to the Center for Terrorism Confinement, an El Salvadorian mega-prison, for allegedly being members of the Tren de Aragua criminal organization.⁷⁴ According to Human Rights Watch, the detainees were subjected to torture and inhuman conditions.⁷⁵ In mid-July 2025, El Salvador deported all the detainees back to Venezuela.⁷⁶ This was done in exchange for Venezuela returning ten US citizens or permanent residents that had been detained in Venezuela to the United States.⁷⁷ A further 137 Venezuelan men were sent from the United States to El Salvador and the Center for Terrorism Confinement in March 2025, an act which a US District court found to be unlawful. As such, it ordered the Trump administration to facilitate the return of the men to the United States to enjoy the due process to which they are entitled.⁷⁸

Despite heightened tensions between the two States, triggered by the US airstrikes on boats allegedly involved in trafficking drugs from Venezuela,⁷⁹ Venezuela continued to accept flights with deported migrants from the United States twice a week.⁸⁰ The Maduro regime announced in early December 2025 that the flights would continue following a request from the Trump administration, notwithstanding Trump’s announcement a few days prior that Venezuela’s airspace should be considered closed.⁸¹

US declares Tren de Aragua to be a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorists

On 20 February 2025, the United States designated Tren de Aragua and seven other cartels as both Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Specifically Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT).⁸² In response to this designation, Maduro’s government claimed that Tren de Aragua had already been dismantled by Venezuelan security bodies and that it had previously been used by the United States to destabilize Venezuela.⁸³ According to the US Department of State, Tren de Aragua is a transnational organization with origins in Venezuela but which operates across South America including in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.⁸⁴ The United States alleges that the group is a threat to US national security, economic interests, and foreign policy,⁸⁵ and has also accused the group of drug trafficking, migrant smuggling,⁸⁶ and killing US law enforcement agents.⁸⁷ In March 2025, the United States further claimed that Tren de Aragua was acting on the orders of Maduro in ‘conducting irregular warfare’ against the US.⁸⁸ However, a US intelligence assessment conducted in February 2025 concluded that Tren de Aragua was not operating under the control of Maduro and his government.⁸⁹

The official purpose of designating groups as FTOs is to deny identified individuals access to the US financial system, thereby cutting off resources that might be used to carry out attacks. Any assets of an identified person that are in the US or controlled by a person in the United States are frozen, and US ‘persons’ are not allowed to do business with these identified persons.⁹⁰ Some officials in the Trump administration, however, adopted the position that the FTO designation allows the United States to use its military to deal with the designated group.⁹¹ In July 2025, Trump signed a directive allowing the US military to start using force against the Latin American drug cartels that had been designated as FTOs.⁹² There are experts who disagree with this position, arguing that the designation does not permit the use of deadly force.⁹³

According to US officials, the 2 September 2025 US boat strike, the first in a series of strikes(see above and below), targeted and killed eleven members of Tren de Aragua.⁹⁴ Secretary of State for Defense, Pete Hegseth, declared that the Pentagon was certain that the boat contained members of the Tren de Aragua ‘narcoterrorist organization designated by the United States as trying to poison our country with illicit drugs’.⁹⁵ However, no official explanation has been offered as to how the Pentagon determined the identity of the people on the boat.⁹⁶

Operation Southern Spear, including strikes against boats allegedly carrying drugs in the Caribbean

As of 10 January 2026, the United States has struck thirty-five boats in the Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean as part of its Operation Southern Spear.¹³⁷The United States alleges that the boats are being operated by narco-terrorists that are trafficking drugs from Venezuela into the United States.¹³⁸

The first strike took place in the southern Caribbean on 2 September 2025.¹³⁹ Eleven people were killed.¹⁴⁰ Two people survived the first strike but were killed by a second strike.¹⁴¹ This drew ire from US lawmakers.¹⁴²

According to the Trump administration, the boat was operated by Tren de Aragua (see above) and was carrying narcotics.¹⁴³ However, it is unclear whether this was true. It has been reported that while some drugs that enter the United States do come from Venezuela, the number that come from Colombia and Ecuador are far higher.¹⁴⁴ Although the boat in question came from a region known to be active in the trafficking of cocaine, both migrants and victims of human trafficking are also known to depart from the area.¹⁴⁵ In his report to Congress, Trump claimed self-defence as the international legal basis for the strike.¹⁴⁶

In response to the 2 September 2025 strike, Maduro announced on 5 September 2025 that he would defend Venezuela’s sovereignty and claimed that the United States was manufacturing drug-trafficking accusations to replace his regime.¹⁴⁷ Maduro sent Trump a letter on 6 September 2025 denying his own involvement in the drug trafficking trade and offering evidence that Venezuela was not involved in drug production and trafficking.¹⁴⁸ In the same letter, he offered to engage in talks with Trump, an offer that was rebuffed.¹⁴⁹ In an effort to de-escalate the situation, Venezuela’s Minister of Defence, Vladimir Padrino, revealed on 7 September 2025 that 25,000 troops had been dispatched to the country’s border and coastal zones to counter drug trafficking.¹⁵⁰

A few days later, the US Department of Defense announced that two Venezuelan fighter jets had flown over the destroyer, the USS Jason Dunham, as it sailed through international waters in the Caribbean. Maduro claimed that the destroyer had illegally entered Venezuelan waters and seized control of a fishing vessel with nine fishermen holding them for eight hours. He also said the action was an attempt to justify ‘a military escalation’ in the Caribbean.¹⁵¹ During a press conference in Caracas on 15 September 2025, hours before a renewed US strike was announced (see below), Maduro said that the situation should not be understood as a simple tension, but as an aggression ‘on all fronts’ – judicial, political, diplomatic, and military.¹⁵² He also mentioned that relations between the two States were ‘broken’.¹⁵³

The United States mounted two more strikes in September 2025. One on 15 killed three, with Trump again claiming the boat was carrying drugs, in particular cocaine and fentanyl.¹⁵⁴ However, one of the victims identified in this attack was a Colombian fisherman, Alejandro Carranza, whose family has filed a complaint with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, alleging that the United States killed him extrajudicially.¹⁵⁵ Colombian President Gustavo Petro called the airstrike a violation of Colombian sovereignty and an act of murder.¹⁵⁶ It is unclear whether this concerns the victim whose wife told The New York Times that her husband who was killed by the strike was a fisherman.¹⁵⁷

A 19 September strike that killed three people was also explained by reference to it allegedly trafficking drugs into the United States, although the identity of the group involved, the identities of the victims, and the location of the strike were not given.¹⁵⁸

Eleven confirmed strikes and one unconfirmed strike on alleged drug-trafficking boats were carried out by the United States in October 2025.¹⁵⁹ The confirmed strikes took place on 3 October (killing four),¹⁶⁰ 14 October (killing six),¹⁶¹ 16 October (killing two and leaving two survivors who were Ecuadoran and Colombian nationals, and who subsequently returned to their respective States),¹⁶² 17 October (killing three in a strike linked by Secretary of Defence Hegseth to the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN)),¹⁶³ 21 October (killing two),¹⁶⁴ 22 October (killing three),¹⁶⁵ 24 October (killing six),¹⁶⁶ 27 October (three separate strikes on four boats in the Pacific Ocean that killed fourteen; one survivor was initially reported but could not be found and was later presumed dead),¹⁶⁷ and on 29 October (killing four).¹⁶⁸

During a speech on 5 October 2025 at a celebration of the 250^th anniversary of the US Navy, President Trump seemed to allude to a strike that occurred ‘last night’, i.e. on 4 October 2025.¹⁶⁹ This strike is unconfirmed and may well be a reference to the strike that took place on 3 October.¹⁷⁰ While on 6 October 2025, Maduro declared that his country was increasingly prepared to defend itself against the United States, whose government he accused of wanting ‘a war in the Caribbean and South America’,¹⁷¹ later that month he issued a call to President Trump during a press conference in English to avoid a war by declaring ‘Not war. Yes peace’.¹⁷²

In November 2025, the United States carried out seven strikes.¹⁷³ They took place on 1 November (killing at least three),¹⁷⁴ 4 November (killing two),¹⁷⁵ 6 November (killing three),¹⁷⁶ 9 November (two separate strikes that killed six),¹⁷⁷ 10 November (killing four),¹⁷⁸ and 15 November (killing three).¹⁷⁹

The United States conducted a further fourteen strikes in December 2025. These were on 4 December (killing four),¹⁸⁰15 December (three strikes that killed eight),¹⁸¹ 17 December (killing four),¹⁸² 18 December (killing five),J. Chin et al, ‘Timeline of Boat Strikes and Related Actions’, Just Security, 2 January 2026; ‘2 strikes on alleged drug boats kill 5 in eastern Pacific, US military says’, PBS, 19 December 2025; ‘Lethal Kinetic Strikes, Dec. 18, 2025’, US Southern Command, 18 December 2025 22 December (killing one),¹⁸³ 29 December (killing two),¹⁸⁴ 30 December (three strikes that killed at least three in total),¹⁸⁵ and 31 December (two separate strikes that killed five people),¹⁸⁶

In early December 2025, the Venezuelan Minister of the Interior and Justice, Diosdado Cabello, publicly criticized what he termed the ‘passivity’ of the International Criminal Court (ICC) surrounding the situation in Venezuela.¹⁸⁷ This followed the ICC’s announcement on 1 December 2025 that it was closing its bureau in Caracas due to a lack of ‘real progress’.¹⁸⁸ On 11 December, the Venezuelan parliament unanimously voted to withdraw from the Rome Statute. ¹⁸⁹ As of early January 2026, Venezuela had not yet submitted notice of withdrawal from the Statute.

As a result of the strikes, the United Kingdom and Colombia stopped sharing intelligence with the United States on activities taking place in the region of the strikes.¹⁹⁰ In addition, States in the Five Eyes organisation (consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia) also stopped sharing Caribbean-based intelligence after voicing concerns with the US actions.¹⁹¹

The US Department of Defence renamed the Department of War

On 5 September 2025, President Trump issued an executive order to change the Department of Defense back to its original name, the Department of War. The justification given was that the original name given by former US President George Washington on 7 August 1789 better reflects current US policy on ensuring peace through strength. The ‘peace through strength’ approach is described to demonstrate the ability and willingness of the US Armed Forces ‘to fight and win wars on behalf of [their] Nation at a moment’s notice, not just to defend’. The US also released their National Security Strategy in which it confirmed that the United States will assert and enforce a ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine.¹⁹² This doctrine asserts that the United States will take responsibility for the Western hemisphere and will not tolerate external influence in it.

Seizure and Blockade of Oil Tankers

On 10 December 2025, Trump announced that the US, through and interagency operation (US military and US law enforcement) had seized a sanctioned oil tanker, ‘the Skipper’, off the coast of Venezuela.¹⁹³ This ship, flying a false Guyanese flag, was transporting oil from States under US sanctions, particularly Iran and Venezuela.¹⁹⁴ The ship, which had previously operated under a different name, was officially sanctioned by the United States on 3 November 2022, citing its involvement in transporting oil to Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force.¹⁹⁵ According to The White House, it was seized of its record in transporting Iranian oil and not because of its connection to Maduro.¹⁹⁶ The vessel was said to have been near Iran in mid-September 2025, before reaching the coast of Guyana in late October 2025, although this may be incorrect because the ship had been ‘falsifying its position for a long time’.¹⁹⁷ President Trump declared that the United States would keep the oil found in the tanker.¹⁹⁸

Following this incident, Venezuela issued a statement rejecting the interception and subsequent seizure of the vessel. The statement described the action as ‘blatant theft’ and an act of ‘international piracy’.¹⁹⁹ Maduro further issued a press release stating that the Venezuelan government would ‘go before all existing international bodies to denounce this serious international crime’.²⁰⁰ The Cuban Prime Minister, Manuel Marrero, subsequently released a statement on his X account agreeing with Maduro and similarly condemning the act as international piracy.²⁰¹

The day after ‘the Skipper’ was seized, on 11 December 2025, the Trump administration issued new sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry.²⁰² Six shipping companies were listed, as well as three of Maduro’s family members and a business associate.²⁰³ It was also reported that the United States had plans to seize more tankers.²⁰⁴

On 16 December 2025, the Trump administration ordered a ‘complete blockade’ on sanctioned oil tankers leaving or heading to Venezuela.²⁰⁵ As only sanctioned oil tankers were subject to this blockade, the meaning of blockade used by the United States differs from the traditional international humanitarian law (IHL) understanding of the term.²⁰⁶ Under IHL, a blockade is employed in the context of an existing armed conflict and is ‘an operation involving naval and air forces by which a belligerent completely prevents movement by sea from or to a port or coast belonging to or occupied by an enemy belligerent’.²⁰⁷ Following the announcement of this ‘complete blockade’, the Maduro government described this action as a ‘grotesque threat’ and accused Trump of violating international law, free trade, and the freedom of navigation.²⁰⁸ The White House, in turn, stated on 7 January 2026 that as long as the proceeds of the oil go to the US, the blockade would continue as initiated by Trump on his Truth Social post on 17 December 2025.²⁰⁹

On 7 January 2026, the United States also seized what they called a ‘stateless’ vessel off the coast of Iceland after its entry into Venezuelan waters was blocked by the US Coast Guard.²¹⁰ The US Coast Guard had stopped the vessel in December 2025 off the coast of Venezuela.²¹¹ The seizures of oil tankers coupled with US sanctions halved Venezuelan oil exports.²¹²

Maria Corina Machado awarded 2025 Nobel Peace Prize

Maria Corina Machado was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 2025 in acknowledgement of ‘her tireless work promoting democratic rights for the people of Venezuela and for her struggle to achieve a just and peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy’.²¹³ The decision to award the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize to Machado sparked several controversies. Several hundred protestors gathered outside the Nobel Institute in Oslo in December 2025. The criticisms were based on the fact that Machado is a prominent figure of the Venezuelan far right movement and a key ally in the US’s pressure campaign against Venezuela.²¹⁴ Similar concerns were voiced by Colombian President Petro.²¹⁵

Machado’s political journey took off when she co-founded ‘Súmate’ in 2002, which is a volunteer group promoting political rights and monitors elections.²¹⁶ In 2005, she was invited to the White House by US President George W. Bush in her role as the director of Súmate.²¹⁷ Machado was first voted into the National Assembly of Venezuela representing the state of Miranda in 2010²¹⁸ and founded the political party ‘Vente Venezuela’ in 2012, which promotes an ‘alternative to socialism for Venezuela, based on the principles of the free market, respect for private property, and the rule of law’.²¹⁹ In February 2014, following Hugo Chávez’s death, she called for a wave of protests against Maduro’s rise to presidency known as ‘La Salida’ (The Exit), which lasted until June 2014 and killed 43 people, injured 486, and led to the arrest of a further 1,854.²²⁰ After Maduro was elected president, she quickly became the main voice of resistance to his government.²²¹ She was ejected from office and accused of treason.²²²

Machado urged people to refrain from participating in the 2018 regional and presidential elections, which several opposition parties were excluded from.²²³ In 2023, she announced her bid to run for president of Venezuela in the 2024 presidential election.²²⁴ Machado was blocked from running (see above), but put her support behind the alternative candidate Edmundo González Urrutia.²²⁵ Despite evidence that the opposition party won these elections, the Maduro regime declared itself victorious (see above).²²⁶

Only a week after receiving her Nobel Peace Prize, Machado called on President Trump to ‘Stop Maduro’s “war” on her country’.²²⁷ Machado praised the United States for the detention of Maduro in January 2026 (see below) labelling it as ‘a huge step for humanity, for freedom and human dignity’.²²⁸ These statements attracted broad criticism and backlash from politicians and civil society organizations globally.²²⁹

Phone call between President Trump and President Maduro

In a call between Trump and Maduro on 21 November 2025, Trump reportedly gave Maduro an ultimatum to quit by 28 November 2025.²³⁰ Trump offered an amnesty to Maduro and ‘those closest to’ him, also reportedly offering safe passage to Maduro’s wife and son to a third country should Maduro decide to leave office.²³¹ Maduro refused, instead demanding global amnesty from prosecution, the right to retain control of the Venezuelan armed forces if he did cede political control, the lifting of international sanctions against him and numerous senior officials, and immunity from any charges against him before the ICC.²³² A day after the date set as an ultimatum by Trump had expired, on 29 November 2025, Trump declared the Venezuelan airspace closed (see below).²³³ Maduro is said to have refused to leave office for fear of being arrested.²³⁴ Maduro reportedly sought a second phone call after this, but Trump did not respond.²³⁵

Trump declares the airspace above Venezuela closed

On 29 November 2025, Trump called on ‘Airlines, Pilots, Drug Dealers, and Human Traffickers’ to ‘consider’ the airspace above Venezuela ‘closed’.²³⁶ This statement did not provide operational details or give specify whether it was a formal executive order or a political warning.²³⁷

Caracas responded by calling Trumps’ remarks a ‘colonialist threat’ and ‘incompatible with the most fundamental principles of international law’.²³⁸ Venezuela began conducting military training exercises along its coast.²³⁹

A few days earlier, Venezuela had suspended six international air carriers from operating in its airspace, allegedly as a response to these carriers suspending flights to Venezuela following a US warning that the airspace was unsafe.²⁴⁰ Maduro’s government accused them of ‘joining the actions of state terrorism promoted by the United States’.²⁴¹

Maduro indicates a willingness to allow US companies to invest in Venezuelan minerals

On 2 January 2026, Maduro declared that he was willing to have a serious discussion with the United States on its companies investing in Venezuelan oil as well as on how to combat drug trafficking.²⁴² He declared that he was willing to engage in a dialogue with the United States ‘wherever and whenever they want’. ²⁴³ Discussions reportedly took place over the course of several months in 2025, with Maduro offering the Trump administration a ‘dominant stake’ in Venezuelan minerals, including its oil deposits.²⁴⁴ Venezuela is also said to have offered to give preferential contracts for oil and gold projects to US companies and to limit oil and other exports to China, Iran, and Russia.²⁴⁵ During the talks, Venezuela and the United States are reported to have taken significant strides on economic issues, but were not able to agree on Maduro’s political future.²⁴⁶

Venezuela even offered better investment terms to US corporations already operating in the country (such as Chevron) and were repairing relationships with US corporations that had been kicked out of the country in 2007 (such as ConocoPhillips).²⁴⁷ These talks seemed to be going well, especially for the private sector.²⁴⁸ However, the United States ultimately rejected the concessions made by Maduro and later terminated diplomatic efforts between the two States.²⁴⁹

On 9 January 2026, executives from seventeen major US and international oil companies attended a meeting with Trump at the White House to debate the reopening, investment, and possible extraction of Venezuelan oil.²⁵⁰ While Trump solicited capital and technology investment amounts of $100bn from these oil companies to revitalize facilities and reinvigorate the oil industry, the companies demand ‘solid guarantees’ concerning the security of their investments.²⁵¹ During the meeting, the US President assured them ‘total safety, total security’ to invest in Venezuela, despite the country’s history of asset seizures.²⁵²

Maduro’s indictment

In March 2020, during President Trump’s first term in office, Nicolás Maduro was charged with drug trafficking (cocaine importation conspiracy), narco-terrorism conspiracy, and possession of machine-guns.²⁵³ He was charged in New York City, Washington DC, and Miami.²⁵⁴ The indictment essentially accused Maduro of engaging in State-sponsored drug trafficking.²⁵⁵ Maduro’s wife, Cilia Flores, was also charged with drug trafficking (importing cocaine), and possession of weapons.²⁵⁶

On 5 January 2026, Maduro and Flores made their first appearance in a New York City court.²⁵⁷ It was a brief appearance where both accused were asked to enter a plea. Both pleaded not guilty.²⁵⁸ Maduro told the court that he ‘was kidnapped’, is ‘innocent’, is ‘the president of [his] country’, and that he is a ‘prisoner of war’.²⁵⁹ They were set to make their next court appearance on 17 March 2026.²⁶⁰ The trial is expected to be conducted partly in private, without the press or the public.²⁶¹

International reactions to Operation Absolute Resolve

Operation Absolute Resolve was a military operation conducted on 3 January 2026 under which the US Armed Forces invaded Caracas and removed Maduro from his safehouse and transported him back to the United States to face trial for alleged violations of US law.²⁶² Several States reacted publicly to the operation, giving their views on the legality of this operation. Many States also stated that Maduro’s regime was known for human rights violations and for the power grab in Venezuela.²⁶³

Only a few States explicitly condemned the US action as being incompatible with international law. Russiawas among the first nations to condemn the removal of the Venezuelan president.²⁶⁴ This was swiftly followed by a similar condemnation from China.²⁶⁵ President Luiz Lula da Silva of Brazil also condemned the action in his joint statement with Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Spain, and Uruguay.²⁶⁶

Mexico was concerned for its own sovereignty as it faced threats from the United States. It said that intervention in other States should not be allowed and that States in the Western Hemisphere should only aim to cooperate with one another.²⁶⁷ South Africa viewed the actions as a manifest violation of the UN Charter and called on the UN Security Council to convene as a matter of urgency.²⁶⁸

Some States, as well as the European Union, had a more nuanced and indirect approach in their reactions to the Operation. Most questioned the legitimacy of Maduro’s presidency while at the same time emphasizing its commitment to international law but without calling the United States out for its violations of international law. The United Kingdom issued a statement rejecting Maduro’s legitimacy but declaring their commitment to international law.²⁶⁹ The European Union issued a statement recalling that the principles of international law and the UN Charter must be upheld. The European Union has repeated that Maduro lacks the legitimacy of a democratically elected president, advocating for a Venezuelan-led peaceful transition to democracy in the country, respectful of its sovereignty.²⁷⁰ Australia said it was monitoring the situation, but that it has long held concerns about the situation in Venezuela. It went on to state that it continues to support international law and a peaceful, democratic transition that reflects the will of the Venezuelan people.²⁷¹ Indonesia warned that US strikes on Venezuela risked a dangerous precedent, stating that ‘Indonesia expresses its grave concern over any actions involving the use or threat of force’.²⁷² Canada welcomed the opportunity for freedom after the ousting of Maduro while also calling on all parties to respect international law.²⁷³ The German Chancellor said that the situation in Venezuela is complex but that international law must be respected, but noted that many nations, including Germany, did not recognize Maduro as president.²⁷⁴

France issued a statement shortly after the attack stating that Operation Absolute Resolve violated the prohibition on the use of forceby seizing power from the people of Venezuela. France further stated that Maduro had gravely violated the dignity and self-determination of the people of Venezuela. The post went on to reiterate that a lasting political solution cannot be imposed from outside and that sovereign peoples alone decide their future.²⁷⁵ Italy declared it had always supported the democratic ambitions of the Venezuelans, going on to reiterate that it had never recognized Maduro as the winner of the Venezuela elections while also condemning the repressive acts of his government.²⁷⁶ It went on to state that ‘[i]n line with [its] long-standing position, the Government does not consider external military action to be the way forward to bring an end to totalitarian regimes’.²⁷⁷ Türkiye expressed its hope that the situation would be resolved within the confines of international law.²⁷⁸ Japan showed concern for its citizens and voiced support for restoring democracy in Venezuela stressing the important role international law has to play to resolve this situation.²⁷⁹

A few States managed to avoid any suggestion that the United States might be acting contrary to international law. South Korea expressed the hope that democracy can be restored with due respect for the will of the Venezuelan people. ²⁸⁰ India expressed deep concern and hoped that all involved would address the issues peacefully.²⁸¹ Uganda, speaking onbehalf of the Non-Aligned States, said only that it was studying the situation.²⁸²

Some States celebrated Operation Absolute Resolve without addressing the legality of this operation. The President of Argentinaissued a statement congratulating the US.²⁸³ Israel also supported the actions.²⁸⁴ While the Chileangovernment officially condemned Maduro’s capture (see above), its far-right president-elect José Antonio Kast, who was taking office on 11 March 2026, supported the US actions, calling them ‘great news for the region’.²⁸⁵ Similarly, Paraguay said that the actions can only bring good news.²⁸⁶ and Peru celebrated the start of a new era of freedom and democracy.²⁸⁷ Ecuador also voiced support and said the end will come for the cartels across the continent.²⁸⁸

The UN Security Council met in emergency session on 5 January 2026 in New York. In his speech to the Council, the US ambassador reiterated the US position that the attack on Venezuela on 3 January 2026 was an act against ‘irregular warfare’. The ambassador reiterated that Maduro was responsible for attacks against the United States.289 The Venezuelan Ambassador, Samuel Moncada, described the US military intervention on 3 January 2026 as an ‘act of aggression’ and denounced it as ‘neocolonialism’.²⁹⁰ During the session, most Latin American countries expressed their support for Venezuela and condemned the US actions as a breach of international law. Cuba denounced the actions as ‘an imperialist and fascist aggression with objectives of domination’, while Panama urged international efforts to seek a democratic and peaceful solution, voicing concern about the situation and its possible effect on regional peace and stability. Nicaragua reiterated its commitment to the idea that Latin America and the Caribbean are zones of peace, emphasizing that all governments, particularly those in the Security Council, must respect this status.²⁹¹ UN Secretary-General António Guterres said he was ‘deeply concerned about the violation of international law norms in relation to the military action of January 3’. He reiterated the importance of respecting the principles of sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity of States, including the prohibition of the use or threat of force.²⁹²

Delcy Rodriguez named Venezuela’s interim leader

On 5 January 2026, the National Assembly of Venezuela swore in the new interim president of Venezuela, Delcy Rodriquez. She had first served as communication minister then as foreign minister in 2013 and later as Vice President since 2018.²⁹³ Rodriguez reaffirmed her opposition to the attack that led to the capture and removal of Maduro and his wife.²⁹⁴ The same day, the National Assembly inaugurated a new legislative period (2026–31) following the general election held in May 2025, and held its first session, during which 283 of the 284 elected members were sworn in.²⁹⁵ The National Assembly retained its Chavista majority.²⁹⁶

Prior to Rodriguez’s swearing-in ceremony, Congressman Nicolás Maduro Guerra, son of the ousted president, expressed his ‘unconditional support’ for Delcy Rodríguez.²⁹⁷ After her swearing-in, Rodriguez posted on social media that she was inviting the US government to work together on a cooperative agenda, oriented toward shared development’.²⁹⁸ Under this new arrangement and cooperation, the Venezuelan government agreed to let the United States sell thirty to fifty million barrels of Venezuelan oil on the global market.²⁹⁹ While US Secretary of State Marco Rubio initially questioned the legitimacy of Delcy Rodriguez’s presidency,³⁰⁰ he later said he could work better with someone like Rodriguez than Maduro, for the purpose of an immediate transition. ³⁰¹

At around the same time, in a courthouse in Brooklyn, New York, Maduro appeared in a federal court (see above).³⁰² The deposed president disputed that he was no longer in charge of Venezuela, claiming that ‘I am still the president of my country’ and ‘I am a prisoner of war’.³⁰³

International armed conflict between the United States and Venezuela (in early January 2026)

The US has, on several occasions, denied that it was involved in an armed conflict with Venezuela. Instead, the United States qualified its operations on Venezuelan sovereign soil including Operation Absolute Resolve, through which US Armed Forces militarily invaded Caracas and successfully removed Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro from his safehouse and transported him back to the United States to face trial for alleged violations of US law (see above), as law enforcement.¹ The White House released a fact sheet that lays out the actions taken by the US armed forces in Venezuela and states that it conducted an ‘extraordinary military operation in support of law enforcement’.² The Attorney General (AG) confirmed that the actions taken in order to apprehend two high-risk defendants and the AG posted on X on behalf of the AG, Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Drug Enforcement Administration.³

US presidents have a history of invoking ‘police or legal enforcement action’ rather than war, starting with the Korean war in 1950.⁴ According to a State Department Bulletin: ‘These interests of the United States are interests which the President as Commander in Chief can protect by the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States without a declaration of war. It was they which the President’s order of June 27 did protect’.⁵ The Constitution explicitly states that only Congress may declare war and therefore the United States was not at war during the ‘wars’ in Korea, Vietnam, Kosovo, Syria or Yemen. The legal position in the United States is that if Congress funds the military actions, it has agreed to the actions taken by the Executive.⁶ A declaration of war is, however, no longer required to qualify a situation as a conflict. As per Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, an armed conflict exists ‘even if the state of war’ is not recognized by one of the parties.⁷ The existence of an armed conflict is objectively determined by an analysis based on facts.⁸

Under IHL an IAC occurs when one or more states resort to armed force against another State, regardless of the motives for or the intensity of the violence.⁹ The United States used armed force against Venezuela first by striking a docking facility, reportedly located on La Guajira peninsula.¹⁰ Reports of the date of the strike, however, differ between three: the 18^th,¹¹ the 23^rd or the 24^th of December 2025.¹² These strikes were said to have been executed by the CIA.¹³

If the information provided by President Trump is accurate,¹⁴ the IAC was triggered on this occasion. If this is inaccurate, then the IAC was triggered on 3 January 2026 during the execution of Operation Absolute Resolve (see above).¹⁵

General Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of the US Military, which is the highest ranking military officer in the US Armed Forces,¹⁶ provided details on Operation Absolute Resolve at the 3 January 2026 Mar-a-Lago press conference. He explained that all components of the Joint Force of the US Military were involved in executing Operation Absolute Resolve.¹⁷

General Caine explained that it involved the military, law enforcement agencies, and intelligence services. Concerning the military component, more than 150 aircraft were launched from twenty military bases on land and sea to execute this operation.¹⁸ The extraction team entering Venezuelan airspace was transported in helicopters secured by combat aircraft including F-22s, F-35s, F-18s, EA-18s, E-2s, and B-1 bombers from the US Air Force, Navy, and Air National Guard. The air component destroyed air defence systems around Caracas to ensure safe passage of the helicopters.¹⁹ Ground forces and helicopters came under fire but all components, including a helicopter that was hit but which continued to fly, returned to the United States with no US lives lost.²⁰ It is reported that approximately seventy-five people were killed. This number includes Venezuelan military, thirty-two Cuban Special Forces members, and two civilians.²¹ The Venezuelan Interior Minister, Diosdado Cabello, announced on 7 January 2026 a death toll of ‘so far’ one hundred victims.²²

At time of reporting, the United States was not physically occupying Venezuela. This is despite President Trump’s claim after the Operation in which he suggested that the United States ‘runs’ Venezuela or that the US administration was ‘in charge’ of Venezuela.²³ These claims were dismissed by Venezuela’s interim president, Delcy Rodríguez, who asserted that no ‘external agent’ was governing the country.²⁴ Marco Rubio subsequently softened the language used by President Trump by clarifying that the United States will be involved in the direction Venezuela takes.²⁵

Under IHL, a situation of occupation exists if the territory is ‘under the authority of the hostile army’, even in the absence of any resistance.²⁶ The hostile foreign forces must exercise effective control over a territory without the consent of the sovereign State.²⁷ The nature of ‘effective control’ in the context of occupation is further elaborated in legal doctrine and interpretations, which establish three cumulative conditions for occupation:²⁸

The foreign State’s armed forces are physically present in the territory or parts of the territory of the territorial state without its consent.
The presence of the foreign forces prevents the effective local government in place at the time of invasion from substantially or completely exercising its powers.
The foreign forces are able to establish their own authority.

As stated by Marco Sassòli, the existence of an occupation is determined by facts on the ground.²⁹ At time of publishing there were no reports of any US military forces remaining in Venezuela.³⁰ In fact, statements on Operation Absolute Resolve suggests that no operators nor equipment were lost or left behind.³¹ President Trump stated on 9 January 2026 that the United States was not planning to launch further ‘strikes’ against Venezuelan territory.³² US officials arrived in Caracas on 9 January 2026 with the permission of the Venezuelan government to start diplomatic discussions with the Venezuelan government, including the possible reopening of the US Embassy.³³

The second requirement for effective control is that ‘the effective local government in place at the time of the invasion has been or can be rendered substantially or completely incapable of exerting its powers by virtue of the foreign forces’ unconsented-to presence’.³⁴ Despite initial claims by President Trump that the United States ‘runs’ Venezuela (see above),³⁵ acting President Rodríguez issued a statement that no foreign government was governing Venezuela (see above).³⁶ The Venezuelan government continued executing governmental functions in the aftermath of Operation Absolute Resolve (see above). The Assembly of Venezuela swore in vice-president Delcy Rodriguez as interim president (see above).³⁷

The third requirement entails that ‘the foreign forces are in a position to exercise authority over the territory concerned (or parts thereof) in lieu of the local government.³⁸

At the time of publishing, there was no IAC between the United States and Venezuela and no belligerent occupation.

1
H. Meko, ‘Maduro Says He Is a Prisoner of War, Not a Defendant. The Words Matter.’, The New York Times, 5 January 2026; R. L. Thayer, ‘Labeling Maduro raid a ‘law-enforcement’ operation sparks legal debate about war protections’, Stars and Stripes, 9 January 2026; The White House, X, 3 January 2026.
2
‘Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Safeguards Venezuelan Oil Revenue for the Good of the American and Venezuelan People’, The White House, 9 January 2026.
3
Attorney General Pamela Bondi, X, 4 January 2026.
4
‘The Department of State Bulletin’, Just Security, 31 July 1950, 177.
5
‘The Department of State Bulletin’, Just Security, 31 July 1950, 177.
6
W. M. Treanor, ‘Fame the Founding and the Power to Declare War’, Cornell Law Review, May 1997.
7
‘Article 2 – Application of the Convention’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases.
8
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 5.
9
ICTY, ‘Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić a/k/a “Dule”’, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, para 70 ; ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, 2024, pp. 9 – 10.
10
G. Gutierrez and E. Angulo, ‘Testigos describen una misteriosa explosión en el noroeste de Venezuela’, Noticias Telemundo, 31 December 2025; ‘Medios “ubican” el sitio de la explosión atribuida a EE.UU. en la Alta Guajira venezolana’, NTN24, 1 January 2026; W. S. Pérez, ‘Qué sabemos del ataque con dron de EE.UU. contra una instalación en territorio venezolano’, Yahoo! Noticias, 2 January 2026; ‘Presidente de Venezuela se muestra dispuesto a dialogar seriamente con EEUU’, La Nacion, 2 January 2026
11
‘Medios “ubican” el sitio de la explosión atribuida a EE.UU. en la Alta Guajira venezolana’, NTN24, 1 January 2026; G. Gutierrez and E. Angulo, ‘Testigos describen una misteriosa explosión en el noroeste de Venezuela’, Noticias Telemundo, 31 December 2025; W. S. Pérez, ‘Qué sabemos del ataque con dron de EE.UU. contra una instalación en territorio venezolano’, Yahoo! Noticias, 2 January 2026
12
N. Bertrand et al, ‘Exclusive: CIA carried out drone strike on port facility on Venezuelan coast’, CNN, 30 December 2025; J. Chin et al, ‘Timeline of Boat Strikes and Related Actions’, Just Security, 2 January 2026.
13
‘Presidente de Venezuela se muestra dispuesto a dialogar seriamente con EEUU’, La Nacion, 2 January 2026; N. Bertrand et al, ‘Exclusive: CIA carried out drone strike on port facility on Venezuelan coast’, CNN, 30 December 2025; J. E. Barnes and T. Pager, ‘C.I.A. Conducted Drone Strike on Port in Venezuela’, The New York Times, 29 December 2025.
14
D. D. Lee et al, ‘US claims attack on dock in Venezuela, as missiles also kill two in Pacific’, Al Jazeera, 30 December 2025
15
I. Swanson and R. Beitsch, ‘Maduro indicted on narco-terrorism charges after capture’, The Hill, 3 January 2026; S. Quadri, ‘Revealed: How US commandos stormed Maduro’s fortress in daring midnight raid that toppled Venezuelan dictator’, The Standard, 5 January 2026; ‘Operación “Resolución Absoluta”: La captura de Nicolás Maduro por fuerzas de EE. UU.’, Noticias Hoy; ‘Así fue “Resolución Absoluta”, el operativo de Trump para derrocar a Maduro’, Heraldo, 1 January 2026.
16
‘Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Air Force Gen. Dan Caine’, US Department of War
17
D. Caine, ‘Press Briefing on Operation Absolute Resolve’, American Rhetoric, 3 January 2026.
18
M Olay, ‘This Week in DOW: Taking Down Maduro, Seizing Suspicious Vessels, Launching Arsenal of Freedom Tour’, US Department of War, 9 January 2026.
19
D. Caine, ‘Press Briefing on Operation Absolute Resolve’, American Rhetoric, 3 January 2026. Cybercommand also shut down electricity in Caracas.S. Baker, ‘Trump says the US shut off the lights in Venezuela’s capital using ‘certain expertise.’ Here’s how it may have done it’, Business Insider, 8 January 2026.
20
D. Caine, ‘Press Briefing on Operation Absolute Resolve’, American Rhetoric, 3 January 2026; J. E. Barnes et al, ‘Inside ‘Operation Absolute Resolve,’ the US Effort to Capture Maduro’, The New York Times, 3 January 2026.
21
R. C. Berg et al, ‘Imagery from Venezuela Shows a Surgical Strike, Not Shock and Awe’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9 January 2026; ‘Balance de víctimas tras la operación militar en Venezuela que terminó con la captura de Nicolás Maduro’, El Pinguino, 7 January 2026; ‘77 muertos identificados en ataques de United States: 42 militares venezolanos, 3 civiles y 32 cubanos entre las víctimas’, Conexión Migrante, 8 January 2026; A. Rodríguez, ‘Cuba dice que 32 efectivos suyos murieron durante la captura de Maduro por parte de EEUU’, My Journal Courier, 4 January 2026.
22
‘La UE lamenta las muertes durante arresto de Maduro y dice que cifras están por confirmar’, Infobae, 8 January 2026.
23
K. Liptak et al, ‘A clearer picture is emerging of what Trump meant when he said the US will ‘run’ Venezuela’, CNN, 4 January 2026, Updated 5 January 2026; MS Now, ‘Trump admin planning to run Venezuela “from the White House”: Dem Sen.’, YouTube, 7 January 2026; A. Martínez and G. Myre, ‘Trump claims US will “run” Venezuela, but there are no troops in the country’, NPR, 5 January 2026.
24
Z. G. Ruiz, ‘Delcy Rodríguez controvierte a Trump: en el gobierno de Venezuela “no hay agente externo”’, Caracol Radio, 6 January 2026.
25
‘Live updates: US running ‘direction’ of Venezuela after Maduro ouster; Trump admin to brief some lawmakers Monday’, The Hill, 4 January 2026.
26
‘Article 42 of Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907’, ICRC International Humanitarian Law Databases.
27
T. Ferraro and L. Cameron, ‘Article 2: Application of the Convention’, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, ICRC, 2016, para 302; and ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict, RULAC, October 2015.
28
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11-12; International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict, RULAC, October 2015, 11; T. Ferraro ‘Determining the Beginning and End of an Occupation Under International Humanitarian Law’, International Review of the Red Cross, 2012
29
M. Sassòli, ‘International Humanitarian Law’, Edward Elgar, 2019.
30
A. Martínez and G. Myre, ‘Trump claims US will “run” Venezuela, but there are no troops in the country’, NPR, 5 January 2026.
31
B. Peniston, ‘How ‘Absolute Resolve’ harnessed 150 aircraft and more to launch a regime change in Venezuela’, Defense One, 3 January 2026.
32
Donald J. Trump, Post on Truth Social, 9 January 2026; R. F. Elliot et al, ‘Venezuela Updates: Trump’s Push to Invest in Venezuela Gets a Tepid Response From Oil Executives’, The New York Times, 9 January 2026, Updated 15 January 2026.
33
R. F. Elliot et al, ‘Venezuela Updates: Trump’s Push to Invest in Venezuela Gets a Tepid Response From Oil Executives’, The New York Times, 9 January 2026 (Updated 15 January 2026); ‘Resumen del conflicto Estados Unidos – Venezuela del 9 de enero de 2026 | Delcy Rodríguez agradece a Sánchez la condena de España a la “agresión” de EE.UU.’, RTVE, 9 January 2026; E. Tzompa, ‘Venezuela recibirá delegación diplomática de EE. UU. tras captura de Maduro’, El Epoch, 9 January 2026; DW Español, ‘DW Noticias 9 de enero: Funcionarios del Departamento de Estado estadounidense llegan a Caracas’, YouTube, 10 January 2026.
34
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11.
35
K. Liptak et al, ‘A clearer picture is emerging of what Trump meant when he said the US will ‘run’ Venezuela’, CNN, 4 January 2026, Updated 5 January 2026
36
‘“No external agents governing Venezuela”: Acting President Delcy Rodriguez rejects US-led transition claims’, Lokmat Times, 7 January 2026; ‘Delcy Rodríguez: There is no external agent governing Venezuela’, Ultimas Noticias, 6 January 2026.
37
‘Delcy Rodriguez formally sworn in as Venezuela’s interim president’, Reuters, 5 January 2026.
38
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11.

State Parties

United States
Venezuela

1
J. E. Barnes and T. Pager, ‘C.I.A. Conducted Drone Strike on Port in Venezuela’, The New York Times, 29 December 2025; N. Bertrand et al, ‘Exclusive: CIA carried out drone strike on port facility on Venezuelan coast’, CNN, 30 December 2025
2
K. Liptak et al, ‘Inside the operation: How the US moved to capture Nicolás Maduro’, CNN, 4 January 2026.
3
‘A guide to the United States’ History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776: Venezuela’, US Department of State: Office of the Historian.
4
‘Venezuela y Estados Unidos: una relación de altibajos históricos’, Al Diálogo, 26 August 2025; E. Duhamel et al, ‘When the US and Venezuela were ‘best friends’: A four-minute history’, Le Monde, 13 January 2026.
5
‘Venezuela y Estados Unidos: una relación de altibajos históricos’, Al Diálogo, 26 August 2025.
6
C. Caraballo and J. I. de Onzono, ‘Aliados del ‘oro negro’ venezolano: la red que el chavismo tejió con Cuba, China, Rusia e Irán’, Euronews, 13 January 2026; M. Burgués, ‘La relación entre EEUU y Venezuela, plagada de desencuentros en la era Chávez’, La Razón Hemeroteca, 5 March 2013.
7
‘Current U.S.-Venezuela Relations: Sanctions and Policy’, Legal Clarity, 11 December 2025; ‘EE. UU. y Venezuela: la historia de sus principales disputas’, El Espectador, 3 January 2026.
8
M. Olay, ‘Pentagon Provides Update on Operation Southern Spear, Reaffirms Socom Called for Second Strike on Drug Boat’, US Department of War, 2 December 2025; ‘Trump anunció que Estados Unidos ataca segunda embarcación con supuestos narcotraficantes venezolanos’, El Heraldo, 15 September 2025.
9
L. Gamio et al, ‘Tracking US Military Killings in Boat Attacks’, The New York Times, Last Updated 10 January 2026; J. Chin et al, ‘Timeline of Boat Strikes and Related Actions’, Just Security, 2 January 2026; ‘Una ofensiva de cinco meses: EEUU destruye más de 35 lanchas y provoca más de cien muertes’, Swiss Info, 1 January 2026.
10
M. Olay, ‘Hegseth Emphasizes Anti-Narco-Terrorism Mission During Caribbean Trip’, US Department of War, 9 September 2025.
11
‘Maduro denuncia que EE.UU. impone una guerra de múltiples frentes y contraviene normas internacionales’, Demócrata, 17 September 2025; ‘Maduro dice que «amenazas militares» de EE.UU. son un «problema de carácter internacional»’, Swiss Info, 17 September 2025; ‘Maduro acusa a EEUU de someter a Venezuela a una “guerra multiforme” y violar el Derecho Internacional’, Infobae, 18 September 2025.
12
J. Turkewitz and I. Herrera, ‘Maduro califica de ‘crimen alevoso’ el ataque estadounidense contra una embarcación, mientras Trump anuncia otro’, Infobae, 15 September 2025; J. Turkewitz and I. Herrera, ‘Maduro califica de ‘crimen alevoso’ el ataque estadounidense contra una embarcación, mientras Trump anuncia otro’, The New York Times, 15 September 2025.
13
‘Maduro le envió una carta a Trump en medio de las tensiones: rechazó las acusaciones de narcotráfico y propuso abrir un canal de diálogo’, Infobae, 20 September 2025.
14
D. Bio, ‘US Ambassador To The UN Claims Pressure Campaign Against Venezuela Is ‘Consistent With The Law Of Armed Conflict’’, The Latin Times, 17 October 2025; Ambassador Mike Waltz, X, 17 October 2025.
15
‘1534 Notice to Congress’, Just Security, October 2025
16
L. Gamio et al, ‘Tracking US Military Killings in Boat Attacks’, The New York Times, Last Updated 10 January 2026; C. Savage and E. Schmitt, ‘Trump ‘Determined’ the US Is Now in a War With Drug Cartels, Congress Is Told’, The New York Times, 2 October 2025; E. Goodin and A. María Delgado, ‘Trump declara a EEUU en ‘conflicto armado’ con cárteles de la droga en el Caribe’, El Nuevo Herald, 2 October 2025; ‘EEUU sopesa qué hacer con Venezuela tras declararse en «conflicto armado» contra los cárteles’, Swiss Info, 8 October 2025.
17
M. Rubio, ‘Secretary of State Marco Rubio with Kristen Welker of NBC’s Meet the Press’, US Department of State, 4 January 2026.
18
M. Rios et al, ‘A timeline of US strikes on boats that have killed 115’, CNN, 3 January 2026; I. E. Barros Leal and G. Glatsky, ‘A Timeline of Tension Between the US and Venezuela’, The New York Times, 3 January 2026, Updated 7 January 2026
19
E. Wong et al, ‘Trump Orders Blockade of Some Oil Tankers to and From Venezuela’, The New York Times, 16 December 2025; Donald J. Trump, Truth Social, 17 December 2025; ‘Expertos de la ONU condenan el bloqueo y la agresión de Estados Unidos contra Venezuela’, United Nations Human Rights Office for the High Commissioner, 24 December 2025.
20
I. E. Barros Leal and G. Glatsky, ‘A Timeline of Tension Between the US and Venezuela’, The New York Times, 3 January 2026, Updated 7 January 2026; G. Evans, ‘Spies, drones and blowtorches: How the US captured Maduro’, BBC, 4 January 2026; J. E. Barnes et al, ‘Inside ‘Operation Absolute Resolve,’ the US Effort to Capture Maduro’, The New York Times, 3 January 2026.
21
‘Contraloría General de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela’, Diccionario Panhispánico del Español Jurídico
22
‘Inhabilitan para ocupar cargos públicos por 15 años a María Corina Machado, una de las precandidatas presidenciales más populares de Venezuela’, BBC, 30 June 2023; M. R. Pompeo, ‘Recognition of Juan Guaido as Venezuela’s Interim President’, US Department of State, 23 January 2019.
23
‘Inhabilitan para ocupar cargos públicos por 15 años a María Corina Machado, una de las precandidatas presidenciales más populares de Venezuela’, BBC, 30 June 2023; R. Luján, ‘Contraloría venezolana confirma inhabilitación de María Corina Machado por 15 años’, Bloomberg Línea, 30 June 2023; ‘La Contraloría inhabilita pero calla ante la Gran Corrupción’, Transparencia Venezuela.
24
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, ‘Venezuela: The Democratic Unitary Platform (Plataforma Unitaria Democrática, PUD) [Unitary Platform (Plataforma Unitaria, PU)] political alliance, including the parties making up the alliance, its political agenda, structure, and leadership; whether documents are issued to its members; treatment of its members by authorities (2023–February 2025) [VEN202203.E]’, Ecoi.net, 6 March 2025; I. Santaeulalia and J. Diego Quesada, ‘María Corina Machado arrasa en las primarias de la oposición en Venezuela’, El País, 23 October 2025; I. Valdés, ‘Proclaman a María Corina Machado ganadora de las primarias opositoras en Venezuela’, CNN, 26 October 2023.
25
M. I. Puerta Riera, ‘¿Cómo será el proceso electoral de la oposición en Venezuela?’, Idea International, 3 March 2023; Comisión Nacional de Primaria VE, X
26
I. Valdés, ‘Proclaman a María Corina Machado ganadora de las primarias opositoras en Venezuela’, CNN, 26 October 2023; F. del Rincón, ‘Machado responde a la investigación contra la CNP y dice que son cargos “absurdos”’, CNN, 26 October 2023.
27
‘La Contraloría explica al Supremo las razones de la inhabilitación de María Corina Machado’, Swiss Info, 25 December 2023.
28
‘El TSJ avala la inhabilitación contra María Corina Machado sin publicar su sentencia y fuera de lapso’, Acceso a la Justicia, 30 January 2024; ‘La Corte Suprema de Venezuela ratificó la inhabilitación de María Corina Machado’, Infobae, 26 January 2024; ‘Venezuela’s Supreme Court disqualifies opposition leader from running for president’, Le Monde, 27 January 2024; ‘Venezuelan Supreme Court Bans Maduro’s Top Competitors’, Confidencial, 29 January 2024.
29
R. Rodríguez Rosas, ‘María Corina Machado: Tenemos un candidato que apoya todo el mundo’, Efecto Cocuyo, 20 April 2024.
30
I. E. Barros Leal and G. Glatsky, ‘A Timeline of Tension Between the US and Venezuela’, The New York Times, 3 January 2026, Updated 7 January 2026
31
‘Venezuela’, Freedom House, 2024; ‘Observation of the 2024 Presidential Election in Venezuela’, The Carter Center, July 2024; ‘El Consejo Nacional Electoral anuncia el triunfo de Nicolás Maduro en las elecciones presidenciales de Venezuela y la oposición rechaza los resultados’, BBC, 28 July 2024; ‘Más de 6 irregularidades empañaron las elecciones presidenciales del 28J’, Acceso a la Justicia, 2 August 2024.
32
V. Buschschlüter, ‘Venezuela’s Maduro declared winner in disputed vote’, BBC, 20 July 2024; ‘Más de 6 irregularidades empañaron las elecciones presidenciales del 28J’, Acceso a la Justicia, 2 August 2024; ‘CNE dice que Maduro ganó la elección presidencial de Venezuela con 51,2 % de los votos; oposición denuncia “fraude”’, Voice of America, 28 July 2024.
33
J. Corrales and D. Kronick, ‘How Maduro Stole Venezuela’s Vote’, Journal of Democracy, January 2025.
34
V. Buschschlüter, ‘Venezuela’s Maduro declared winner in disputed vote’, BBC, 20 July 2024; ‘Who is Edmundo Gonzalez, exiled Venezuelan opposition leader likely to become president?’, The Week, 3 January 2026; A. Kurmanaev and E. Singer, ‘Investigadores de oposición hablan de una contundente derrota de Maduro en Venezuela’, The New York Times, 31 July 2024; J. Corrales and D. Kronick, ‘How Maduro Stole Venezuela’s Vote’, Journal of Democracy, January 2025; ‘Resultados de elecciones en Venezuela son «improbables», dicen expertos a CNN’, CubaNet, 8 August 2024.
35
R. Garcia Cano and K. Toropin, ‘Why is the US deploying warships to South America? 4 things to know’, PBS, 29 August 2025; ‘Nicolás Maduro podría perder elecciones en Venezuela: Actas darían la ventaja a Edmundo González’, El Financiero, 2 August 2024.
36
‘Más de 6 irregularidades empañaron las elecciones presidenciales del 28J’, Acceso a la Justicia, 2 August 2024; ‘Cronología de las protestas en Venezuela tras la reelección de Maduro, en imágenes’, El País, 29 July 2024; F. Robles, ‘Estallan protestas en Venezuela tras una votación cuestionada y denunciada por muchos países’, The New York Times, 29 July 2024; ‘Venezuela: Represión brutal desde las elecciones’, Human Rights Watch, 30 April 2025.
37
‘Observation of the 2024 Presidential Election in Venezuela’, The Carter Center, July 2024; ‘Más de 6 irregularidades empañaron las elecciones presidenciales del 28J’, Acceso a la Justicia, 2 August 2024.
38
‘Observation of the 2024 Presidential Election in Venezuela’, The Carter Center, July 2024.
39
‘Observation of the 2024 Presidential Election in Venezuela’, The Carter Center, July 2024; ‘Más de 6 irregularidades empañaron las elecciones presidenciales del 28J’, Acceso a la Justicia, 2 August 2024.
40
‘Más de 6 irregularidades empañaron las elecciones presidenciales del 28J’, Acceso a la Justicia, 2 August 2024.
41
V. Buschschlüter, ‘Venezuela’s Maduro declared winner in disputed vote’, BBC, 20 July 2024; ‘Más de 6 irregularidades empañaron las elecciones presidenciales del 28J’, Acceso a la Justicia, 2 August 2024.
42
‘Más de 6 irregularidades empañaron las elecciones presidenciales del 28J’, Acceso a la Justicia, 2 August 2024.
43
‘Más de 6 irregularidades empañaron las elecciones presidenciales del 28J’, Acceso a la Justicia, 2 August 2024. Several other irregularities were reported.A. Hernández, ‘Cómo funciona el proceso electoral en Venezuela y por qué han puesto en duda el resultado de los comicios’, BBC, 29 July 2024; ‘Más de 6 irregularidades empañaron las elecciones presidenciales del 28J’, Acceso a la Justicia, 2 August 2024.
44
‘Who is Edmundo Gonzalez, exiled Venezuelan opposition leader likely to become president?’, The Week, 3 January 2026; J. Rueda et al, ‘El candidato opositor Edmundo González sale de Venezuela para solicitar asilo en España’, AP News, 8 September 2024; J. Diego Quesada and M. González, ‘Así se fraguó el exilio de Edmundo González, la jugada que cambia el tablero político en Venezuela’, El País, 14 September 2024
45
I. E. Barros Leal and G. Glatsky, ‘A Timeline of Tension Between the US and Venezuela’, The New York Times, 3 January 2026, Updated 7 January 2026; ‘Remarks at a UN Security Council Briefing on Venezuela’, United States Mission to the United Nations, 5 January 2026.
46
‘Condemning Maduro’s Illegitimate Attempt to Seize Power in Venezuela and Announcing New Actions Against his Regime and Support to support Venezuelans’, US Embassy in Chile. 10 January 2025
47
‘Más de 6 irregularidades empañaron las elecciones presidenciales del 28J’, Acceso a la Justicia, 2 August 2024; R. McCubbin, ‘Perú reconoce a Edmundo González como presidente electo de Venezuela: continúan las presiones contra Nicolás Maduro’, Infobae, 7 January 2025; ‘Perú respalda a Edmundo González y no reconoce reelección de Maduro’, Diario Los Américas, 7 January 2025.
48
‘Más de 6 irregularidades empañaron las elecciones presidenciales del 28J’, Acceso a la Justicia, 2 August 2024.
49
V. Buschschlüter, ‘Venezuela’s Maduro declared winner in disputed vote’, BBC, 20 July 2024; Gabriel Boric Font, X, 29 July 2024; ‘Más de 6 irregularidades empañaron las elecciones presidenciales del 28J’, Acceso a la Justicia, 2 August 2024; ‘Uruguay exige “sensatez y cordura” en Venezuela y pide una “verificación imparcial” del resultado electoral’, Ámbito, 16 August 2024.
50
‘Venezuela Vote Results Unreliable, Says OAS Body’, International Center for Transitional Justice, 31 July 2024; ‘OAS Adopts Resolution on the Situation in Venezuela’, US Mission to the Organization of American States, 16 August 2024; ‘OAS General Secretariat Demands Verification of Voting Records in Venezuelan Electoral Process’, Organization for America States, 2 August 2024.
51
V. Buschschlüter, ‘Venezuela’s Maduro declared winner in disputed vote’, BBC, 20 July 2024; G. Faulconbridge, ‘Putin hails Maduro’s win, Kremlin says it is deepening ties’, Reuters, 29 July 2024; ‘Putin Congratulates Venezuela’s Maduro on Election Victory’, The Moscow Times, 29 July 2024; ‘Cuba President Congratulates Maduro On “Historic Electoral Triumph”’, Barron’s, 29 July 2024; ‘Presidente cubano felicita a Nicolás Maduro por su victoria electoral’, Prensa Latina, 20 July 2024; L. Lee, ‘China’s Xi congratulates Venezuela’s Maduro on reelection’, Reuters, 30 July 2024; C. Qingqing and B. Yunyi, ‘China congratulates Maduro on election as Venezuelan president’, Global Times, 20 July 2024.
52
‘DHS to Extend Temporary Protected Status for Venezuela’, US Department of Homeland Security, 10 July 2025; ‘Biden extends temporary protections for more than 800,000 immigrants’, The Guardian, 10 January 2025.
53
‘Biden extends temporary protections for more than 800,000 immigrants’, The Guardian, 10 January 2025; L. Chao-Fong, ‘Trump revokes temporary protected status for 600,000 Venezuelans’, The Guardian, 29 January 2025; A. Howe, ‘Supreme Court allows Trump to remove protected status from Venezuelan nationals’, SCOTUS Blog, 3 October 2025.
54
‘DHS to Extend Temporary Protected Status for Venezuela’, US Department of Homeland Security, 10 July 2025; ‘Biden extends temporary protections for more than 800,000 immigrants’, The Guardian, 10 January 2025; M. Smith, ‘Activists call for reinstatement of protected status for Venezuelan immigrants following Maduro ouster’, Denver7, 8 January 2026.
55
L. Chao-Fong, ‘Trump revokes temporary protected status for 600,000 Venezuelans’, The Guardian, 29 January 2025; M. Gallardo, ‘Local advocates ask Trump admin. to reinstate Venezuelans’ TPS, stop deportations amid uncertainty’, ABC7 Eyewitness News, 6 January 2026.
56
‘Temporary Protected Status Designated Country: Venezuela’, US Citizenship and Immigration Services, 23 October 2025; A. Howe, ‘Supreme Court allows Trump to remove protected status from Venezuelan nationals’, SCOTUS Blog, 3 October 2025; ‘Trump Administration Scores Major Supreme Court Legal Victory, Ending de Facto Amnesty Program’, US Department of Homeland Security, 3 October 2025.
57
M. Gallardo, ‘Local advocates ask Trump admin. to reinstate Venezuelans’ TPS, stop deportations amid uncertainty’, ABC7 Eyewitness News, 6 January 2026; ‘New ICE Flight Monitor Report Shows Avelo Airlines Flew Nearly One in Five ICE Flights as part of Massive Expansion of ICE Domestic Transfer and Deportation Flights’, Human Rights First, 12 January 2026; ‘Venezuela seguirá recibiendo vuelos de deportación pese al cierre de espacio aéreo anunciado por Trump’, Ciber Cuba, 2 December 2025.
58
M. Gallardo, ‘Local advocates ask Trump admin. to reinstate Venezuelans’ TPS, stop deportations amid uncertainty’, ABC7 Eyewitness News, 6 January 2026; M. Smith, ‘Activists call for reinstatement of protected status for Venezuelan immigrants following Maduro ouster’, Denver7, 8 January 2026.
59
M. Gallardo, ‘Local advocates ask Trump admin. to reinstate Venezuelans’ TPS, stop deportations amid uncertainty’, ABC7 Eyewitness News, 6 January 2026; P. Alvarez and C. E. Sholchet, ‘Hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans still face deportation from US after Maduro capture’, CNN, 7 January 2026.
60
M. Rego, ‘Noem: Venezuelans under TPS can apply for refugee status’, The Hill, 4 January 2026; T. Thomas, ‘Confusion grows among Philadelphia Venezuelans after DHS clarification on refugee status’, ABC6 Eyewitness News, 7 January 2026.
61
‘Venezuela sends planes to fetch irregular migrants from US’, France 24, 11 February 2025; V. Buschschlüter, ‘US deportations to Venezuela resume after dispute’, BBC, 24 March 2025; ‘Logros alcanzados entre EE UU y Venezuela antes de suspensión del acuerdo de repatriación’, El Nacional, 1 December 2025; R. Garcia Cano, ‘Venezuela seguirá aceptando vuelos de deportación de EE.UU. pese a afirmación de Trump sobre el cierre de su espacio aéreo’, Noticias Telemundo, 3 December 2025.
62
D. O’Sullivan, ‘With Trump now in office, Venezuela wants its migrants back, Maduro says’, Euro News, 22 January 2025.
63
M. Sorto and M. Torres, ‘Maduro dice a los migrantes venezolanos que si en EE.UU. no los quieren “nosotros sí los queremos”’, CNN, 29 January 2025.
64
‘Venezuela releases 6 US detainees after Trump envoy’s meeting with Maduro’, CBS News, 1 February 2025; ‘Venezuela sends planes to fetch irregular migrants from US’, France24, 11 February 2025.
65
S. Ramirez, ‘VOA Spanish: First flights with deportees from US arrive in Venezuela’, Voice of America, 11 February 2025; ‘Two flights carrying US deportees heading to Venezuela, alleged gang members aboard’, Reuters, 11 February 2025; ‘Venezuela sends planes to fetch irregular migrants in US’, Le Monde, 10 February 2025.
66
S. Pozzebon, ‘Venezuela’s Maduro wrote to Trump after US strike on alleged drug boat’, CNN, 21 September 2025; A. Kurmanaev et al, ‘Venezuela’s Maduro Offered the US His Nation’s Riches to Avoid Conflict’, The New York Times, 10 October 2025; ‘US deports 177 Venezuelan migrants from Guantanamo Bay’, Al Jazeera, 21 February 2025; J. Olivares, ‘Venezuelan immigrants deported from US to Venezuela via Honduras’, The Guardian, 24 March 2025.
67
K. Epstein, ‘Venezuela to resume repatriation of migrants after deal with US’, BBC, 22 March 2025.
68
V. Buschschlüter and I. Wells, ‘Trump cancels oil deal in major blow to Venezuela’, BBC, 27 February 2025.
69
V. Buschschlüter and I. Wells, ‘Trump cancels oil deal in major blow to Venezuela’, BBC, 27 February 2025; V. Buschschlüter, ‘US deportations to Venezuela resume after dispute’, BBC, 24 March 2025; ‘EE.UU. da un mes a Chevron para finalizar operaciones en Venezuela’, El Diaro, 11 March 2025; B. Lefebvre, ‘Trump pulls Chevron license to export Venezuela oil, reversing Biden deal’, Politico, 26 February 2026.
70
L. De Jesús, ‘Maduro ahora se niega a recibir a venezolanos deportados tras dura medida de Trump’, El Diario, 11 March 2025; R. Vaz, ‘Venezuela To Reject Further Deportation Flights as US Ramps Up Economic Sanctions’, Venezuela Analysis, 9 March 2025.
71
L. De Jesús, ‘Maduro ahora se niega a recibir a venezolanos deportados tras dura medida de Trump’, El Diario, 11 March 2025; K. Vyas and V. Bergengruen, ‘Trump Deportation Plans Hit New Obstacle in Venezuela’, The Wall Street Journal, 7 March 2025.
72
K. Epstein, ‘Venezuela to resume repatriation of migrants after deal with US’, BBC, 22 March 2025; V. Buschschlüter, ‘US deportations to Venezuela resume after dispute’, BBC, 24 March 2025; ‘Venezuela to resume repatriation of migrants after deal with US, official says’, NBC Miami, 22 March 2025; J. Olivares, ‘Venezuelan immigrants deported from US to Venezuela via Honduras’, The Guardian, 24 March 2025; ‘El régimen de Nicolás Maduro anunció que reanudará los vuelos de repatriación de migrantes venezolanos con EEUU’, Infobae, 22 March 2025.
73
K. Epstein, ‘Venezuela to resume repatriation of migrants after deal with US’, BBC, 22 March 2025; ‘El régimen de Nicolás Maduro anunció que reanudará los vuelos de repatriación de migrantes venezolanos con EEUU’, Infobae, 22 March 2025.
74
A. Reichlin-Melnick, ‘United States Frees Venezuelans Held in El Salvador Following Prisoner Swap’, American Immigration Council, 21 July 2025; ‘US/El Salvador: Torture of Venezuelan Deportees’, Human Rights Watch, 12 November 2025; ‘“You Have Arrived in Hell”: Torture and Other Abuses Against Venezuelans in El Salvador’s Mega Prison’, Human Rights Watch, 12 November 2025; ‘Venezuela frees 10 Americans in swap for deported men in El Salvador’, Al Jazeera, 18 July 2025.
75
‘“You Have Arrived in Hell”: Torture and Other Abuses Against Venezuelans in El Salvador’s Mega Prison’, Human Rights Watch, 12 November 2025; ‘US/El Salvador: Torture of Venezuelan Deportees’, Human Rights Watch, 12 November 2025.
76
‘US/El Salvador: Torture of Venezuelan Deportees’, Human Rights Watch, 12 November 2025; Nayib Bukele, X, 18 July 2025; A. Reichlin-Melnick, ‘United States Frees Venezuelans Held in El Salvador Following Prisoner Swap’, American Immigration Council, 21 July 2025; ‘Bukele devuelve a Caracas a los migrantes deportados por EE.UU. a El Salvador a cambio de la liberación de 10 estadounidenses y decenas de presos venezolanos’, BBC, 18 July 2025.
77
‘US/El Salvador: Torture of Venezuelan Deportees’, Human Rights Watch, 12 November 2025; Nayib Bukele, X, 18 July 2025; J. Warner, ‘Looking back: Prisoners freed from Venezuelan custody land in San Antonio’, News 4 San Antonio, 3 January 2026; ‘Venezuela frees 10 Americans in swap for deported men in El Salvador’, Al Jazeera, 18 July 2025; ‘Bukele devuelve a Caracas a los migrantes deportados por EE.UU. a El Salvador a cambio de la liberación de 10 estadounidenses y decenas de presos venezolanos’, BBC, 18 July 2025.
78
D. Guldogan, ‘Judge orders US to facilitate return of Venezuelans deported to El Salvador: Report’, AA, 23 December 2025; ‘US judge orders return of 137 Venezuelans deported to El Salvador, Bloomberg News reports’, Reuters, 23 December 2025; ‘US judge orders return of 137 Venezuelans deported to El Salvador’, VisaHQ, 24 December 2025.
79
‘Venezuela says migrant repatriation flight suspended, US says they will continue’, Reuters, 12 December 2025
80
J. Turkewitz, ‘Fear and Hope in Venezuela as US Warships Lurk’, The New York Times, 28 September 2025, Updated 29 September 2025; R. Garcia Cano, ‘Venezuela seguirá aceptando vuelos de deportación de EE.UU. pese a afirmación de Trump sobre el cierre de su espacio aéreo’, Noticias Telemundo, 3 December 2025; R. Garcia Cano, ‘Venezuela seguirá aceptando migrantes deportados pese a dichos de Trump sobre espacio aéreo’, AP News, 3 December 2025.
81
R. Garcia Cano, ‘Venezuela seguirá aceptando vuelos de deportación de EE.UU. pese a afirmación de Trump sobre el cierre de su espacio aéreo’, Noticias Telemundo, 3 December 2025; ‘Trump advierte a pilotos, aerolíneas y supuestos “narcos” que EE.UU. ha cerrado el espacio aéreo de Venezuela’, Noticias Telemundo, 29 November 2025; R. Garcia Cano, ‘Venezuela seguirá aceptando migrantes deportados pese a dichos de Trump sobre espacio aéreo’, AP News, 3 December 2025; ‘Venezuela seguirá recibiendo vuelos de deportación pese al cierre de espacio aéreo anunciado por Trump’, Ciber Cuba, 2 December 2025.
82
‘Designation of International Cartels’, US Department of State, 20 February 2025; R. Garcia Cano, ‘Why is the US deploying warships to South America? 4 things to know’, PBS, 29 August 2025; T. Hansson, ‘US declares Tren de Aragua, other cartels are global terrorist organizations’, Reuters, 20 February 2025; M. Kahn, ‘White House grounds for strike on alleged drug boat is a murky legal issue’, ABC News, 4 September 2025; ‘Trump clasifica al Tren de Aragua y a carteles mexicanos como organizaciones terroristas’, Swiss Info, 21 January 2025; J. M. Zuloaga, ‘Trump declara al “tren de Aragua” como organización terrorista’, La Razón Internacional, 26 January 2025.
83
D. Bio, ‘Venezuela’ Says Tren de Aragua Was Used By US Agencies To ‘Destabilize’ The Country’, The Latin Times, 21 February 2025; Elyangelica González, X, 21 February 2025.
84
‘Designation of International Cartels’, US Department of State, 20 February 2025.
85
‘Justice Department Highlights Nationwide Crackdown on Tren de Aragua’, US Department of Justice, 18 December 2025; T. Hansson, ‘US declares Tren de Aragua, other cartels are global terrorist organizations’, Reuters, 20 February 2025
86
R. Garcia Cano, ‘Why is the US deploying warships to South America? 4 things to know’, PBS, 29 August 2025
87
‘Designation of International Cartels’, US Department of State, 20 February 2025.
88
‘Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of The United States by Tren De Aragua’, The White House, 15 March 2025; J. E. Barnes and T. Pager, ‘Trump Administration Authorizes Covert C.I.A. Action in Venezuela’, The New York Times, 15 October 2025.
89
C. Savage and J. E. Barnes, ‘Intelligence Assessment Said to Contradict Trump on Venezuelan Gang’, The New York Times, 20 March 2025; J. E. Barnes et al, ‘Trump Appointee Pressed Analyst to Redo Intelligence on Venezuelan Gang’, The New York Times, 16 May 2025.
90
M. Kahn, ‘White House grounds for strike on alleged drug boat is a murky legal issue’, ABC News, 4 September 2025.
91
M. Kahn, ‘White House grounds for strike on alleged drug boat is a murky legal issue’, ABC News, 4 September 2025.
92
H. Cooper et al, ‘Trump Directs Military to Target Foreign Drug Cartels’, The New York Times, 8 August 2025; ‘Trump signs order authorising military action against cartels: Reports’, Al Jazeera, 8 August 2025; L. Trenta, ‘US force has been used against drug traffickers before – but Trump’s plan is a dangerous escalation’, The Conversation, 12 August 2025.
93
M. Kahn, ‘White House grounds for strike on alleged drug boat is a murky legal issue’, ABC News, 4 September 2025.
94
M. Kahn, ‘White House grounds for strike on alleged drug boat is a murky legal issue’, ABC News, 4 September 2025; ‘Trump dice que el ataque contra bote con drogas en el Caribe tenía como objetivo al Tren de Aragua y dejó 11 muertos’, Noticias Telemundo, 2 September 2025, Updated 3 September 2025; ‘US: Maritime Strikes Amount to Extrajudicial Killings’, Human Rights Watch, 18 September 2025; Karoline Leavitt, Post on X, 2 September 2025.
95
M. Kahn, ‘White House grounds for strike on alleged drug boat is a murky legal issue’, ABC News, 4 September 2025; K. Breen, ‘Hegseth warns “narco-terrorists will face the same fate” after US military strikes boat off Venezuela’, CBS News, 3 September 2025; S. Dover, ‘US under fire for drug-trafficking strikes at sea’, SBS News, 3 December 2025.
96
M. Kahn, ‘White House grounds for strike on alleged drug boat is a murky legal issue’, ABC News, 4 September 2025.
97
C. Savage, ‘Trump Team Calls Maduro a ‘Cartel’ Boss. That Word Doesn’t Mean What You Think’, The New York Times, 18 November 2025; ‘The US labels Venezuela’s Cartel de los Soles as a terrorist group led by Maduro’, Northwest Public Broadcasting, 23 November 2025
98
E. Mohamed, ‘Why has Venezuela banned six international airlines amid US tensions?’, Al Jazeera, 28 November 2025; M. Rubio, ‘Terrorist Designations of Cartel de los Soles’, US Department of State, 16 November 2025; I. Wells and L. Blasey, ‘US to designate Venezuela’s Cartel de los Soles as terrorists’, BBC, 17 November 2025.
99
B. Finley et al, ‘A timeline of US military escalation against Venezuela leading to Maduro’s capture’, PBS, 3 January 2025; H. Cooper et al, ‘Trump Directs Military to Target Foreign Drug Cartels’, The New York Times, 8 August 2025.
100
‘The US labels Venezuela’s Cartel de los Soles as a terrorist group led by Maduro’, Northwest Public Broadcasting, 23 November 2025; L. Janezki, ‘Venezuela rejects US terrorist designation as ‘ridiculous lie’’, Berliner Tageblatt, 24 November 2025; D. Psaledakis and P. Zengerle, ‘US labels another Venezuelan group as terrorist, ramping up pressure’, Reuters, 25 November 2025; A. Walsh, ‘Venezuela condemns Trump airspace closure warning’, BBC, 30 November 2025; E. Mohamed, ‘Why has Venezuela banned six international airlines amid US tensions?’, Al Jazeera, 28 November 2025.
101
T. Rogero et al, ‘Deadly airstrikes and a military buildup: how the US pressure campaign against Venezuela has unfolded in the Caribbean’, The Guardian, 24 November 2025; T. Rogero, ‘Is US preparing to attack Venezuela and how has Maduro regime responded?’, The Guardian, 12 November 2025; E. Camhaji, ‘El cartel de los Soles, la red criminal que enfrenta a Estados Unidos y Venezuela’, El País, 7 September 2025; ‘The US labels Venezuela’s Cartel de los Soles as a terrorist group led by Maduro’, Northwest Public Broadcasting, 23 November 2025; ‘What Is ‘Cartel Of The Suns’ And Why Is It Central To Case Against Maduro’, NDTV World, 5 January 2026.
102
‘The US labels Venezuela’s Cartel de los Soles as a terrorist group led by Maduro’, Northwest Public Broadcasting, 23 November 2025.
103
C. Savage, ‘Trump Team Calls Maduro a ‘Cartel’ Boss. That Word Doesn’t Mean What You Think’, The New York Times, 18 November 2025.
104
‘Cartel of the Suns’, InSight Crime, 22 September 2025.
105
‘Cartel of the Suns’, InSight Crime, 22 September 2025.
106
‘Cartel of the Suns’, InSight Crime, 22 September 2025.
107
C. Savage, ‘Trump Team Calls Maduro a ‘Cartel’ Boss. That Word Doesn’t Mean What You Think’, The New York Times, 18 November 2025; ‘The US labels Venezuela’s Cartel de los Soles as a terrorist group led by Maduro’, Northwest Public Broadcasting, 23 November 2025.
108
‘The US labels Venezuela’s Cartel de los Soles as a terrorist group led by Maduro’, Northwest Public Broadcasting, 23 November 2025; ‘What Is ‘Cartel Of The Suns’ And Why Is It Central To Case Against Maduro’, NDTV World, 5 January 2026.
109
‘The US labels Venezuela’s Cartel de los Soles as a terrorist group led by Maduro’, Northwest Public Broadcasting, 23 November 2025.
110
C. Savage, ‘Trump Team Calls Maduro a ‘Cartel’ Boss. That Word Doesn’t Mean What You Think’, The New York Times, 18 November 2025.
111
N. Bertrand, ‘US military deploying over 4,000 additional troops to waters around Latin America as part of Trump’s counter-cartel mission’, CNN, 15 August 2025; K. Robertson, ‘Timeline: US Military Ramp-Up in the Caribbean Culminates in Capture of Maduro’, AS/COA, 7 January 2026; J. Horton et al, ‘Tracking build-up of US military planes and warships near Venezuela’, BBC, 17 December 2025.
112
B. Finley et al, ‘A timeline of US military escalation against Venezuela leading to Maduro’s capture’, PBS, 3 January 2025; B. Finley et al, ‘A timeline of the US military’s buildup and strikes against Venezuela leading to Maduro’s capture’, AP News, 3 January 2026; T. Rogero et al, ‘Deadly airstrikes and a military buildup: how the US pressure campaign against Venezuela has unfolded in the Caribbean’, The Guardian, 24 November 2025
113
R. Garcia Cano, ‘Why is the US deploying warships to South America? 4 things to know’, PBS, 29 August 2025.
114
R. Garcia Cano, ‘Why is the US deploying warships to South America? 4 things to know’, PBS, 29 August 2025.
115
W. Mellow, ‘Mapping the US Military Buildup Near Venezuela’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2 December 2025; B. Finley et al, ‘A timeline of US military escalation against Venezuela leading to Maduro’s capture’, PBS, 3 January 2025.
116
B. Finley et al, ‘A timeline of US military escalation against Venezuela leading to Maduro’s capture’, PBS, 3 January 2025.
117
B. Finley et al, ‘A timeline of US military escalation against Venezuela leading to Maduro’s capture’, PBS, 3 January 2025.
118
A. Chávez Alava, ‘Venezuela Denounces US Military Threat at UN, Mobilizes Troops to Patrol Territorial Waters and Border’, Venezuela Analysis, 27 August 2025; Yván Gil Pinto, Telegram, 26 August 2025.
119
M. Grippo, ‘“Seremos su pesadilla”: Venezuela amenaza a Estados Unidos por despliegue militar’, France24, 31 August 2025; I. Ali, ‘US-Venezuela tensions rise as US warships arrive in Southern Caribbean’, Reuters, 29 August 2025; ‘Maduro ready to declare ‘republic in arms’ if US forces attack Venezuela’, Al Jazeera, 1 September 2025.
120
US deploys aircraft carrier to Caribbean as war fears rise – DW – 10/25/2025; T. Rogero et al, ‘Deadly airstrikes and a military buildup: how the US pressure campaign against Venezuela has unfolded in the Caribbean’, The Guardian, 24 November 2025.
121
C. Burchett, ‘‘Peace through strength’: Ford carrier strike group deploys to European theater’, Stars and Stripes, 24 June 2025.
122
M. Shelbourne and S. Lagrone, ‘Hegseth Orders USS Gerald R. Ford to US Southern Command’, US Naval Institute, 24 October 2025.
123
‘“Se están inventando una guerra”: Maduro respondió al despliegue militar de Estados Unidos en el Caribe’, Noticias RCN, 24 October 2025.
124
J. Stepansky, ‘Trump, US officials discuss Venezuela amid concerns over military build-up’, Al Jazeera, 1 December 2025; W. Mellow, ‘Mapping the US Military Buildup Near Venezuela’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2 December 2025.
125
K. Robertson, ‘Timeline: US Military Ramp-Up in the Caribbean Culminates in Capture of Maduro’, AS/COA, 7 January 2026; R. Garcia Cano, ‘Why is the US deploying warships to South America? 4 things to know’, PBS, 29 August 2025; ‘Nicolás Maduro convoca a una jornada el fin de semana de alistamiento de las «fuerzas milicianas»’, EFE, 22 August 2025.
126
R. Garcia Cano, ‘Why is the US deploying warships to South America? 4 things to know’, PBS, 29 August 2025; ‘Nicolás Maduro convoca a una jornada el fin de semana de alistamiento de las «fuerzas milicianas»’, EFE, 22 August 2025.
127
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128
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‘Blockade’, International Committee of the Red Cross: How Does Law Protect in War.
208
‘“Amenaza grotesca”: la reacción de Venezuela tras el anuncio de Trump de un bloqueo a petroleros’, El País, 17 December 2025; ‘Venezuela tacha de “grotesca amenaza” el anuncio de Trump sobre “supuesto bloqueo naval”’, Diario Libre, 16 December 2025; ‘Venezuela califica de ‘irracional’ el bloqueo anunciado por Donald Trump a buques petroleros’, El Universo, 16 December 2025.
209
Donald J. Trump, Post on Truth Social, 17 December 2025; K. Maher and K. Liptak, ‘Trump orders ‘total and complete blockade’ of sanctioned oil tankers coming to and leaving Venezuela’, CNN, 16 December 2025, Updated 17 December 2025; K. Winston and E. Brennan, ‘US plans to lift oil blockade on Venezuela with oil proceeds controlled by US: Wright’, S&P Global, 7 January 2026.
210
L. Oelofse et al, ‘Venezuela: Rodriguez ‘open’ to oil deal as US seizes tankers’, Deutsche Welle, 7 January 2026; R. McLaughlin and C. McLaughlin, ‘A Law of the Sea Assessment of the US boarding of the Bella 1 / Marinera’, Just Security, 14 January 2026; I. Ali and P. Stewart, ‘Exclusive: US seizes Venezuela-linked, Russian-flagged oil tanker after weeks-long pursuit’, Reuters, 7 January 2025.
211
E. Schmitt et al, ‘Crew Paints Russian Flag on Tanker Pursued by the US Coast Guard’, The New York Times, 30 December 2025.
212
‘Venezuela’s Maduro willing to hold ‘serious’ talks with US’, Reuters, 2 January 2026.
213
‘Maria Corina Machado’, The Nobel Prize; A. M. Valencia, ‘La líder opositora venezolana María Corina Machado gana el premio Nobel de la Paz 2025’, BBC, 10 October 2025; ‘¿Quién es María Corina Machado, ganadora del Premio Nobel de la Paz?’, CNN, 8 December 2025.
214
‘Noruega: masivas manifestaciones contra entrega del Nobel de la Paz a María Corina Machado’, TeleSURtv.net, 9 December 2025; R. Vaz, ‘International Organizations and Activists Reject Far-Right Machado Nobel Peace Prize’, Venezuela Analysis, 13 October 2025; A. Crawford, ‘Debate en Noruega por el Nobel de Paz a María Corina Machado y su postura frente a Maduro’, Bloomberg, 9 December 2025; ‘Protest held in Oslo against Nobel Peace Prize winner Machado’, Reuters, 10 December 2025.
215
K. Lacheros, ‘Petro atacó duramente a María Corina Machado tras Nobel de Paz 2025: “No defiendo a Maduro, pero…”’, Infobae, 11 October 2025; ‘Colombia’s FM Snubs Machado’s Nobel Peace Prize After Daring Escape’, The City Paper, 11 December 2025.
216
L. Harvey et al, ‘Venezuela’s Machado arrives in Norway hours after Nobel Peace Prize ceremony’, CNN, 10 December 2025, Updated 11 December 2025; ‘María Corina Machado Seleccionada Para El “Yale World Fellowship”’, Súmate, 22 December 2009.
217
‘¿Quién es María Corina Machado, ganadora del Premio Nobel de la Paz?’, CNN, 8 December 2025.
218
L. Harvey et al, ‘Venezuela’s Machado arrives in Norway hours after Nobel Peace Prize ceremony’, CNN, 10 December 2025, Updated 11 December 2025; ‘¿Quién es María Corina Machado, ganadora del Premio Nobel de la Paz?’, CNN, 8 December 2025
219
‘¿Quién es María Corina Machado, ganadora del Premio Nobel de la Paz?’, CNN, 8 December 2025.
220
L. Harvey et al, ‘Venezuela’s Machado arrives in Norway hours after Nobel Peace Prize ceremony’, CNN, 10 December 2025, Updated 11 December 2025; ‘¿Quién es María Corina Machado, ganadora del Premio Nobel de la Paz?’, CNN, 8 December 2025.
221
A. M. Valencia, ‘La líder opositora venezolana María Corina Machado gana el premio Nobel de la Paz 2025’, BBC, 10 October 2025; ‘¿Quién es María Corina Machado, ganadora del Premio Nobel de la Paz?’, CNN, 8 December 2025.
222
E. Wong et al, ‘Trump Orders Blockade of Some Oil Tankers to and From Venezuela’, The New York Times, 16 December 2025; ‘¿Quién es María Corina Machado, ganadora del Premio Nobel de la Paz?’, CNN, 8 December 2025.
223
‘¿Quién es María Corina Machado, ganadora del Premio Nobel de la Paz?’, CNN, 8 December 2025.
224
E. Wong et al, ‘Trump Orders Blockade of Some Oil Tankers to and From Venezuela’, The New York Times, 16 December 2025; ‘¿Quién es María Corina Machado, ganadora del Premio Nobel de la Paz?’, CNN, 8 December 2025.
225
‘¿Quién es María Corina Machado, ganadora del Premio Nobel de la Paz?’, CNN, 8 December 2025.
226
‘Maria Corina Machado’, The Nobel Prize; R. Garcia Cano, ‘Why is the US deploying warships to South America? 4 things to know’, PBS, 29 August 2025; J. Turkewitz, ‘Fear and Hope in Venezuela as US Warships Lurk’, The New York Times, 28 September 2025, Updated 29 September 2025.
227
‘Nobel Peace Prize winner Maria Corina Machado calls on Trump’s support to stop Maduro’s ‘war’ in Venezuela’, Firstpost, 16 October 2025; A. Wise, ‘Nobel Prize winner Machado says Venezuela is in “chaos” under current regime’, WUNC News, 11 October 2025; ‘María Corina Machado calls for international support for a peaceful transition: “Venezuela is experiencing decisive hours.”’, Ciber Cuba, 12 November 2025; B. Stockwell, ‘Venezuela’s Nobel Peace Prize winner calls on Trump to stop Maduro’s ‘war’ on her country’, CNN, 15 October 2025, Updated 16 October 2025.
228
H. R. Morales, ‘Maria Corina Machado Says She Plans to Return to Venezuela ‘As Soon as Possible’ After Maduro’s Arrest’, The Latin Times, 7 January 2026; K. Guilbert, ‘María Corina Machado propone a Trump compartir el Nobel de la Paz para rebajar las tensiones’, Euro News, 6 January 2026; O. O’Connell and R. Bosotti, ‘Trump says ‘many’ Cuban soldiers killed in Venezuela raid but calls operation ‘brilliant’’, BBC, 6 January 2026.
229
K. Aliyev, ‘Machado’s Nobel Peace Prize draws mixed global reaction’, A Newz, 13 October 2025; J. Carbajal, ‘El Comité del Nobel advierte que María Corina Machado no puede transferir su Premio de la Paz a Donald Trump’, Wired, 11 January 2026; E. Camhaji, ‘María Corina Machado’s Nobel Prize thrusts the Venezuelan opposition onto the world stage’, El País, 9 December 2025; R. Vaz, ‘International Organizations and Activists Reject Far-Right Machado Nobel Peace Prize’, Venezuela Analysis, 13 October 2025.
230
T. Phillips, ‘Trump reportedly gave Maduro ultimatum to relinquish power in Venezuela’, The Guardian, 1 December 2025; W. Mellow, ‘Mapping the US Military Buildup Near Venezuela’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2 December 2025; M. V. Liy, ‘Trump to assess next steps in Venezuela after meeting with advisers’, El País, 2 December 2025; R. García Melero, ‘Trump dice que “muy pronto” comenzarán los ataques por tierra contra narcotraficantes en Venezuela’, RTVE, 2 December 2025; S. P. Ochoa, ‘Una llamada, el ultimátum y la presión militar: lo que dejan ver los acercamientos entre Trump y Maduro’, El Colombiano, 1 December 2025.
231
T. Phillips, ‘Trump reportedly gave Maduro ultimatum to relinquish power in Venezuela’, The Guardian, 1 December 2025; M. V. Liy, ‘Trump to assess next steps in Venezuela after meeting with advisers’, El País, 2 December 2025; S. P. Ochoa, ‘Una llamada, el ultimátum y la presión militar: lo que dejan ver los acercamientos entre Trump y Maduro’, El Colombiano, 1 December 2025.
232
T. Phillips, ‘Trump reportedly gave Maduro ultimatum to relinquish power in Venezuela’, The Guardian, 1 December 2025; M. V. Liy, ‘Trump to assess next steps in Venezuela after meeting with advisers’, El País, 2 December 2025; S. P. Ochoa, ‘Una llamada, el ultimátum y la presión militar: lo que dejan ver los acercamientos entre Trump y Maduro’, El Colombiano, 1 December 2025.
233
R. García Melero, ‘Trump dice que “muy pronto” comenzarán los ataques por tierra contra narcotraficantes en Venezuela’, RTVE, 2 December 2025.
234
J. Turkewitz, ‘Fear and Hope in Venezuela as US Warships Lurk’, The New York Times, 28 September 2025, Updated 29 September 2025.
235
T. Phillips, ‘Trump reportedly gave Maduro ultimatum to relinquish power in Venezuela’, The Guardian, 1 December 2025; M. V. Liy, ‘Trump to assess next steps in Venezuela after meeting with advisers’, El País, 2 December 2025.
236
J. Olivares, ‘Venezuela denounces ‘colonialist threat’ as Trump orders airspace closed’, The Guardian, 29 November 2025; A. Walsh, ‘Venezuela condemns Trump airspace closure warning’, BBC, 30 November 2025; ‘Venezuela denounces Trump’s airspace remarks as ‘colonialist threat’’, Al Jazeera, 29 November 2025; I. E. Barros Leal and G. Glatsky, ‘A Timeline of Tension Between the US and Venezuela’, The New York Times, 3 January 2026, Updated 7 January 2026.
237
J. Maturana, ‘Trump ordena cerrar el espacio aéreo de Venezuela “en su totalidad”’, Euro News, 29 November 2025.
238
J. Olivares, ‘Venezuela denounces ‘colonialist threat’ as Trump orders airspace closed’, The Guardian, 29 November 2025; A. Walsh, ‘Venezuela condemns Trump airspace closure warning’, BBC, 30 November 2025; ‘Venezuela denounces Trump’s airspace remarks as ‘colonialist threat’’, Al Jazeera, 29 November 2025; S. Dorn, ‘Venezuela Rejects Trump’s Push To Close Airspace As ‘Colonialist Threat’’, Forbes, 29 November 2025
239
A. Walsh, ‘Venezuela condemns Trump airspace closure warning’, BBC, 30 November 2025.
240
E. Mohamed, ‘Why has Venezuela banned six international airlines amid US tensions?’, Al Jazeera, 28 November 2025; ‘Venezuela denounces Trump’s airspace remarks as ‘colonialist threat’’, Al Jazeera, 29 November 2025; J. Olivares, ‘Venezuela denounces ‘colonialist threat’ as Trump orders airspace closed’, The Guardian, 29 November 2025; S. Dorn, ‘Venezuela Rejects Trump’s Push To Close Airspace As ‘Colonialist Threat’’, Forbes, 29 November 2025; S. Ray, ‘Varias aerolíneas suspenden vuelos a Venezuela tras advertencia de la FAA sobre una “mayor actividad militar”’, Forbes, 24 November 2025.
241
‘Venezuela revoca permisos para operar en el país a Latam y a otras cinco aerolíneas: Las acusa de “terrorismo”’, Emol, 27 November 2025.
242
‘Venezuela’s Maduro willing to hold ‘serious’ talks with US’, Reuters, 2 January 2026.
243
‘Presidente de Venezuela se muestra dispuesto a dialogar seriamente con EEUU’, La Nacion, 2 January 2025; ‘Maduro dice que está abierto a dialogar con EEUU sobre narcotráfico y petróleo “donde y cuando quieran”’, El Observador, 2 January 2025.
244
A. Kurmanaev et al, ‘Venezuela’s Maduro Offered the US His Nation’s Riches to Avoid Conflict’, The New York Teams, 10 October 2025, Updated 18 October 2025; ‘New York Times asegura que Maduro le ofreció minerales y petróleo a Trump a cambio de no iniciar acciones militares’, El Colombiano, 10 October 2025.
245
A. Kurmanaev et al, ‘Venezuela’s Maduro Offered the US His Nation’s Riches to Avoid Conflict’, The New York Teams, 10 October 2025, Updated 18 October 2025; J. Turkewitz, ‘Fear and Hope in Venezuela as US Warships Lurk’, The New York Times, 28 September 2025, Updated 29 September 2025; ‘New York Times asegura que Maduro le ofreció minerales y petróleo a Trump a cambio de no iniciar acciones militares’, El Colombiano, 10 October 2025.
246
J. Turkewitz, ‘Fear and Hope in Venezuela as US Warships Lurk’, The New York Times, 28 September 2025, Updated 29 September 2025; ‘New York Times asegura que Maduro le ofreció minerales y petróleo a Trump a cambio de no iniciar acciones militares’, El Colombiano, 10 October 2025.
247
A. Kurmanaev et al, ‘Venezuela’s Maduro Offered the US His Nation’s Riches to Avoid Conflict’, The New York Teams, 10 October 2025, Updated 18 October 2025.
248
A. Kurmanaev et al, ‘Venezuela’s Maduro Offered the US His Nation’s Riches to Avoid Conflict’, The New York Teams, 10 October 2025, Updated 18 October 2025.
249
A. Kurmanaev et al, ‘Venezuela’s Maduro Offered the US His Nation’s Riches to Avoid Conflict’, The New York Teams, 10 October 2025, Updated 18 October 2025; I. E. Barros Leal and G. Glatsky, ‘A Timeline of Tension Between the US and Venezuela’, The New York Times, 3 January 2026, Updated 7 January 2026; ‘New York Times asegura que Maduro le ofreció minerales y petróleo a Trump a cambio de no iniciar acciones militares’, El Colombiano, 10 October 2025.
250
L. Aratani, ‘Trump promises oil companies ‘total safety’ in Venezuela as he urges them to invest billions’, The Guardian, 9 January 2026; ‘Qué compañías petroleras participaron en la reunión con Trump sobre Venezuela’, El Diario, 9 January 2026.
251
‘Qué compañías petroleras participaron en la reunión con Trump sobre Venezuela’, El Diario, 9 January 2026; ‘Petroleras pidieron garantías a EE UU antes de comprometerse a invertir en Venezuela’, El Diario, 9 January 2026; L. Aratani, ‘Trump promises oil companies ‘total safety’ in Venezuela as he urges them to invest billions’, The Guardian, 9 January 2026.
252
L. Aratani, ‘Trump promises oil companies ‘total safety’ in Venezuela as he urges them to invest billions’, The Guardian, 9 January 2026; ‘Trump promises oil executives ‘total safety’ if they invest in Venezuela’, Independent, 10 January 2026.
253
‘Nicolás Maduro Moros and 14 Current and Former Venezuelan Officials Charged with Narco-Terrorism, Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Criminal Charges’, US Department of Justice: Archives, 26 March 2020; US District Court for the Southern District of New York, ‘United States of America v Nicolás Maduro Moros and Others’, Superseding Indictment, 5 March 2020; District Court for the Southern District of New York, ‘United States of America v Nicolás Maduro Moros and Others’, Sealed Superseding Indictment, 8 January 2026; ‘The Charges Against Nicolás Maduro: What the Indictment Alleges’, Jurist, 5 January 2025.
254
‘Nicolás Maduro Moros and 14 Current and Former Venezuelan Officials Charged with Narco-Terrorism, Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Criminal Charges’, US Department of Justice: Archives, 26 March 2020.
255
‘The Charges Against Nicolás Maduro: What the Indictment Alleges’, Jurist, 5 January 2025; E. Lee and R. Beitsch, ‘Maduro, wife face new indictment: What we know about the case’, The Hill, 3 January 2026.
256
‘The Charges Against Nicolás Maduro: What the Indictment Alleges’, Jurist, 5 January 2025; United States District Court: Southern District of New York, ‘United States of America v Nicolás Maduro Moros and Others’, Sealed Superseding Indictment, 8 January 2026.
257
D. Slack et al, ‘What is Maduro charged with and what is the evidence?’, BBC, 6 January 2025; ‘‘I’m still president,’ says Venezuela’s abducted leader Maduro in NYC court’, Al Jazeera, 5 January 2026.
258
‘‘I’m still president,’ says Venezuela’s abducted leader Maduro in NYC court’, Al Jazeera, 5 January 2026; S. Shamin, ‘Maduro says he’s a ‘prisoner of war’: Why that matters’, Al Jazeera, 6 January 2025.
259
S. Shamin, ‘Maduro says he’s a ‘prisoner of war’: Why that matters’, Al Jazeera, 6 January 2025; ‘‘I’m still president,’ says Venezuela’s abducted leader Maduro in NYC court’, Al Jazeera, 5 January 2026.
260
D. Slack et al, ‘What is Maduro charged with and what is the evidence?’, BBC, 6 January 2025.
261
D. Slack et al, ‘What is Maduro charged with and what is the evidence?’, BBC, 6 January 2025.
262
G. Evans, ‘Spies, drones and blowtorches: How the US captured Maduro’, BBC, 4 January 2026; J. E. Barnes et al, ‘Inside ‘Operation Absolute Resolve,’ the US Effort to Capture Maduro’, The New York Times, 3 January 2026; I. E. Barros Leal and G. Glatsky, ‘A Timeline of Tension Between the US and Venezuela’, The New York Times, 3 January 2026, Updated 7 January 2026.
263
K. Breen and H. Ott, ‘Global reaction to US strikes on Venezuela includes condemnation, concern for foreign nationals’, CBS News, 5 January 2026.
264
‘Russia Demands Release of Maduro After US Military Strikes Venezuela’, The Moscow Times, 3 January 2026; B. Eruygur, ‘Russia says US military strikes on Venezuela ‘deeply concerning, condemnable’’, AA, 3 January 2026.
265
I. Bonet, ‘Maduro’s downfall puts China’s relationship with Venezuela to the test’, El País, 4 January 2026; ‘China strongly condemns US aggression against Venezuela, kidnapping of President Maduro’, Friends of Socialist China, 4 January 2026.
266
‘Joint Statement of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay and Spain on the Events in Venezuela’, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Colombia, 4 January 2026.
267
‘Claudia Sheinbaum: Cooperation Yes, Intervention No’, Progressive International, 5 January 2026.
268
‘South Africa urges UN Security Council Session following unilateral military action in Venezuela’, Department of International Relations and Cooperation, South Africa, 3 January 2026.
269
Yvette Cooper, Post on X, 3 January 2026.
270
Kaja Kallas, Post on X, 4 January 2026.
271
Anthony Albanese, Post on X, 3 January 2026.
272
‘Indonesia warns US strike on Venezuela risks dangerous precedent’, Antara, 5 January 2026.
273
Mark Carney, X, 4 January 2026.
274
Bundeskanzler Friedrich Merz, X, 3 January 2026; Bundeskanzler Friedrich Merz, X, 3 January 2026.
275
Jean-Noël Barrot, Post on X, 3 January 2026.
276
‘Statement by Palazzo Chigi on developments in the situation in Venezuela’, Italian government, Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 3 January 2026.
277
‘Statement by Palazzo Chigi on developments in the situation in Venezuela’, Italian government, Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 3 January 2026.
278
‘No: 1, 3 January 2026, Regarding the Recent Developments in Venezuela’, Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 January 2026.
279
‘Situation in Venezuela (Detention of President Maduro by the United States of America) (Statement by Press Secretary KITAMURA Toshihiro)’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 4 January 2026.
280
‘Spokesperson’s Statement on the Situation in Venezuela’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Republic of Korea, 4 January 2026.
281
‘Press Release on recent developments in Venezuela’, Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India, 4 January 2026.
282
A. Mutambo, ‘Africa’s cautious response to US capture of Venezuela’s president’, The East African, 7 January 2026.
283
‘Comunicado Oficial Número 126’, Argentina.Gob, 3 January 2026.
284
Gideon Sa’ar, X, 3 January 2026.
285
‘Kast califica la detención de Maduro como “una gran noticia para la región”’, Radio UChile, 3 January 2026.
286
‘Peña sobre la captura de Maduro: “Su caída solo puede ser una buena noticia”’, La Politica, 3 January 2026
287
E. Astonitas, ‘“Venezuela inicia una nueva era en democracia y libertad”: José Jerí se pronuncia tras captura de Nicolás Maduro’, RPP, 3 January 2026.
288
‘World reacts to US strikes on Venezuela’, Reuters, 4 January 2026.
289
‘Remarks at a UN Security Council Briefing on Venezuela’, United States Mission to the United Nations, 5 January 2026.
290
‘Venezuela: La ONU y América Latina claman por la paz y el respeto del derecho internacional’, United Nations Geneva, 5 January 2026.
291
‘Venezuela: La ONU y América Latina claman por la paz y el respeto del derecho internacional’, United Nations Geneva, 5 January 2026.
292
‘Venezuela: La ONU y América Latina claman por la paz y el respeto del derecho internacional’, United Nations Geneva, 5 January 2026.
293
A. Watkins and V. Mather, ‘Who Is Delcy Rodríguez?’, The New York Times, 5 January 2026
294
‘Delcy Rodriguez sworn in as Venezuela’s president after Maduro abduction’, Al Jazeera, 5 January 2026; R. Jara, ‘Delcy Rodríguez jura como presidenta encargada de Venezuela: “Vengo con dolor por el secuestro de nuestros héroes”’, Emol, 5 January 2026.
295
‘El presidente del Parlamento de Venezuela declara como principal objetivo el retorno de Nicolás Maduro’, Europa Press, 5 January 2026; ‘Parlamento venezolano inaugurará legislatura en plena incertidumbre tras captura de Maduro’, El Heraldo, 4 January 2026.
296
R. Jara, ‘Delcy Rodríguez jura como presidenta encargada de Venezuela: “Vengo con dolor por el secuestro de nuestros héroes”’, Emol, 5 January 2026.
297
R. Jara, ‘Delcy Rodríguez jura como presidenta encargada de Venezuela: “Vengo con dolor por el secuestro de nuestros héroes”’, Emol, 5 January 2026.
298
A. Watkins and V. Mather, ‘Who Is Delcy Rodríguez?’, The New York Times, 5 January 2026; ‘Delcy Rodríguez llama al diálogo y busca bajar la tensión con Estados Unidos’, El País, 5 January 2026; I. Guerra, ‘Delcy Rodríguez celebra su primer consejo de ministros y llama a Trump a trabajar en una “agenda de cooperación”’, Emol, 4 January 2026.
299
M. Parraga and E. Banco, ‘Venezuela to export $2 billion worth of oil to US in deal with Washington’, Reuters, 7 January 2026; M. Silva, ‘Trump anuncia acuerdo con Venezuela para la entrega de “30 a 50 millones de barriles” de petróleo a Estados Unidos’, Emol, 6 January 2026; ‘Trump reclama el petróleo venezolano: anuncia hasta 50 millones de barriles para empresas de EEUU’, Marco Press, 7 January 2026.
300
‘Rubio claims US is running ‘the direction’ of Venezuela situation’, Good Morning America, 4 January 2026; N. Proaño, ‘Marco Rubio no considera a Delcy Rodríguez como líder legítima de Venezuela’, Metro Ecuador, 4 January 2026
301
‘Parlamento venezolano inaugurará legislatura en plena incertidumbre tras captura de Maduro’, El Heraldo, 4 January 2026; N. Proaño, ‘Marco Rubio no considera a Delcy Rodríguez como líder legítima de Venezuela’, Metro Ecuador, 4 January 2026; G. Esparza, ‘EE.UU. apuesta por Delcy Rodríguez para una transición inmediata en Venezuela y descarta, por ahora, a María Corina Machado, según Marco Rubio’, El Imparcial, 4 January 2026.
302
‘Live Updates: Removed Venezuelan leader Maduro makes first appearance in US court after capture’, PBS, 5 January 2026.
303
H. Meko, ‘Maduro Says He Is a Prisoner of War, Not a Defendant. The Words Matter.’, The New York Times, 5 January 2026.

US-Venezuela

Reporting period: July 2025 - June 2026

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (2023-2025)