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International armed conflict between Moldova and Russia

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International armed conflict between Moldova and Russia

By juliette

Approximately 1,500 Russian soldiers remain in the Transdniestria region of Moldova.1ECtHR, ‘Case of Lypovchenko and Halabudenco v the Republic of Moldova And Russia’, Judgment, 20 February 2024, para 57; ‘European Parliament resolution of 5 May 2022 on the state of play of EU-Moldova cooperation (2022/2651(RSP))’, European Union, 2022, para F; ‘From Warnings to Warfare: Russia’s Hybrid Offensive Against Moldova’s Westward Turn”’, Robert Lansing Institute, 13 October 2025. This is despite Moldova not consenting to this and the State’s repeated requests for Russia to withdraw its soldiers from Moldova’s sovereign territory.2UNGA, ‘Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 22 June 2019’, UN Doc A/RES/72/282, 26 June 2018, preambular paras 1 and 7; ‘Russia Seeks to Deploy 10K More Troops to Moldovan Breakaway Region, PM Says’, The Moscow Times, 4 June 2025. In October 2022, Moldova was once again asked Russia to withdraw its soldiers from Transdniestria.3J. Pleschberger, ‘Moldova urges Russia to withdraw troops from Transnistria’, CTGN, 28 October 2022.

In January 2025, Moldova’s prime minister said that a lasting solution to the energy crisis in Transdniestria hinged on Russia withdrawing its troops from Transdniestria.4‘Moldova PM Says Russia Troops Must Leave Transnistria to Solve Crisis’, Kyiv Post, 22 January 2025. In July 2025, European leaders called for the ‘full’ and ‘immediate’ withdrawal of all Russian military personnel and ammunition from the Transdniestrian region of Moldova, reaffirming their commitment to supporting Moldova’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and its continued path towards EU membership.5‘EU Calls for withdrawal of Russian forces from Transnistria’, Kuwait News Agency, 4 July 2025. In December 2025, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europea (OSCE) Chairperson in Office, Finland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Elina Valtonene, urged Russia to immediately and unconditionally withdraw its troops and weapons from Transdniestria.6‘OSCE Chair Calls on Russia to Withdraw Troops from Transnistria’, Mezha, 4 December 2025.           

Under IHL, a situation of occupation exists if the territory is ‘under the authority of the hostile army’, even in the absence of resistance.7‘Article 42 of Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases. The hostile foreign forces must exercise effective control over a territory without the consent of the sovereign State.8T. Ferraro and L. Cameron, ‘Article 2: Application of the Convention’, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2016, para 302. The nature of ‘effective control’ in the context of occupation is further elaborated in legal doctrine and interpretations, which establish three cumulative conditions for occupation:9‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11-12; T. Ferraro ‘Determining the Beginning and End of an Occupation Under International Humanitarian Law’, International Review of the Red Cross, 2012

  • The foreign state’s armed forces are physically present in the territory or parts of the territory of the territorial state without its consent.
  • The presence of the foreign forces prevents the effective local government in place at the time of invasion from substantially or completely exercising its powers.
  • The foreign forces are able to establish their own authority.

In Moldova, Russian Armed Forces, without Moldovan consent, remain present on sovereign Moldovan territory.10UNGA, ‘Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 22 June 2019’, UN Doc A/RES/72/282, 26 June 2018, preambular para 6 and operative para 1; A. Ali, ‘Transnistria: Russia’s Sleeper Front’, European Relations, 6 August 2025. Russia’s Fourteenth Army never withdrew from Transdniestria,11‘Transnistria profile’, BBC News, 25 October 2024 although Moldova has repeatedly called on Russia to withdraw its armed forces and weaponry from Moldovan territory.12UNGA, ‘Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 22 June 2019’, UN Doc A/RES/72/282, 26 June 2018, preambular para 7; ‘Russia Seeks to Deploy 10K More Troops to Moldovan Breakaway Region, PM Says’, The Moscow Times, 4 June 2025. In sum, Russia’s continued military presence in Transdniestria without Moldova’s consent fulfils the first requirement of occupation as demanded by IHL.

There have been reports of Russia attempting to consolidate their military presence in the region with The Moscow Times reporting in June 2025 that Russia was planning to deploy 10,000 more troops to the Moldovan breakaway region.13‘Russia Seeks to Deploy 10K More Troops to Moldovan Breakaway Region, PM Says’, The Moscow Times, 4 June 2025. This was in reference to statements by Moldova’s Prime Minister to the Financial Times, citing intelligence assessments.14H. Foy and P. Ivanova, ‘Russia wants to deploy 10,000 troops in Moldovan breakaway regio, PM warns’, Financial Times, 4 June 2025; ‘Lecartev: Russia plans for major troop buildup in Transnistria’, Ukrainian World Congress, 6 June 2025.

The second requirement for effective control necessitates that ‘the effective local government in place at the time of the invasion has been or can be rendered substantially or completely incapable of exerting its powers by virtue of the foreign forces’ unconsented-to presence’.15‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11. Moldova is incapable of exercising control over Transdniestria. The self-proclaimed ‘Moldovan Republic of Transnistria’ administers and acts as the de facto authority of Transdniestria. Indeed, the Moldovan Republic of Transnistria has its own de facto constitutional regime, de facto courts, and de facto authorities akin to police and armed forces.16ECtHR, ‘Case of Lypovchenko and Halabudenco v the Republic of Moldova And Russia’, Judgment, 20 February 2024, paras 2, 12, 14, and 57. Transdniestria has its own government, parliament, constitution, flag, and national anthem.17‘Transnistria profile’, BBC News, 25 October 2024. Moldova has not been able to exercise any authority over Transdniestria.18ECtHR, ‘Case of Lypovchenko and Halabudenco v the Republic of Moldova And Russia’, Judgment, 20 February 2024, para 55. Hence the second condition for occupation under IHL is fulfilled.   

The third requirement to qualify a situation as an occupation under IHL entails that ‘the foreign forces are in a position to exercise authority over the territory concerned (or parts thereof) in lieu of the local government.19‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee for the Red Cross, 2024, 11.  It is required that the foreign forces are in a position to exercise authority but it is not demanded that the foreign forces do exercise such authority. Russia has the ability to exercise authority in Transdniestria owing to its continued military presence. The European Court of Human Rights has recognized that the Russian Federation exercises de facto jurisdiction over Transdniestria as its regime would not be able to survive without the continued military, economic and political support of Russia.20Republic of Moldova Constitutional Court, ‘Judgment on the Interpretation of Article 11 of the Constitution (Permanent Neutrality)’, 2 May 2017, para 132; ECtHR, ‘Case of Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia’, Judgment, 8 July 2004, paras 222 and 392; ECtHR, ‘Case of Ivanţoc and Others v Moldova and Russia’, Judgment, 15 November 2011, para  101; ECtHR, ‘Case of Catan and Others v Moldova and Russia’, Judgment, Grand Chamber, 19 October 2012, paras 122 – 123.

The Council of Europe has qualified the Transdniestrian situation as a Russian occupation of Moldova.21‘Consequences of the Russian Federations Aggression against Ukraine, Opinion 300 (2022)’, Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 15 March 2022, para 5. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova drew a similar conclusion.22Republic of Moldova Constitutional Court, ‘Judgment on the Interpretation of Article 11 of the Constitution (Permanent Neutrality)’, 2 May 2017, para 134.