Non-international armed conflicts in Central African Republic

The pre-existing NIAC pitting CAR, which is militarily supported by Africa Corps, against 3R continued throughout the reporting period. Africa Corps, which is supporting government operations, has fought alongside government forces and been attacked by 3R. MINUSCA has provided general security support through deployments such as temporary operating bases, but does not have a combat role. Although 3R initially sought to protect herds from anti-Balaka militias and later aligned with the CPC, the conflict predates the coalition’s formation and 3R also carried out operations outside it. Despite the April 2025 N’Djamena Agreement and subsequent implementation meetings, tensions persisted, the resumption of hostilities remained possible, and 3R continued to exist. Therefore, the agreement did not terminate the conflict. On the contrary, 3R is considered one of the most active non-State armed groups in CAR and hostilities have remained sufficiently intense, with recurring clashes causing casualties and infrastructure destruction, shifting territorial controls, and the use of transportable weapons, including improvised explosive devices (IED) and landmines, contributing to displacement. Although information on 3R’s command is limited, it has political and military divisions, a hierarchical cell-based structure, identifiable leadership, and the capacity to mobilize forces, impose discipline, sustain operations, and conduct both large-scale and guerrilla attacks. Accordingly, 3R meets the organization criterion, and the NIAC persisted.

The persisting hostilities between CAR armed forces (FACA) and the UPC qualifies as a NIAC. Africa Corps has provided military support to the FACA in areas of active fighting and has itself been subjected to direct attacks by the UPC. In parallel, MINUSCA has offered security support, including through the establishment of temporary operating bases. The intensity threshold is met by recurrent armed confrontations between FACA and UPC, including repeated attacks against military positions, coordinated operations and counter-operations supported by air power, reported casualties, destruction, and displacement, with clashes also occurring bilaterally outside broader alliance dynamics (UPC belonged first to CPC and then to CPC-F). The organization requirement is satisfied notwithstanding limited public information, given identified senior leadership, an effective hierarchical command over a large force with ranks, operational coordination, external logistical supply channels, and unity of voice through designated representation. The peace agreement concluded on 19 April 2025 has not yet terminated the NIAC given that UPC continues to exist, tensions remained high, and hostilities could resume.

The CPC emerged in late 2020 as an alliance of influential armed groups – Front for the Renaissance of the Central African Republic (FPRC), 3R, UPC, Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique/Central African Patriotic Movement (MPC) and two anti-balaka factions (Mokom and Ngaissona) – opposing the government and rejecting the 2019 political agreement. It later experienced internal disagreements and shifts in membership, with further fragmentation in August 2024 that led to the creation of the CPC-F dissident faction. FACA has fought the CPC with the support of Africa Corps. Regarding the intensity criterion, the relevant assessment turns on aggregated intensity where sufficiently organized armed groups fight in a coordinated coalition. During the reporting period, recurrent clashes between the CPC and FACA, marked by lethal attacks, destruction of civilian property, displacement, and the use of IEDs, grenades and landmines, continued to satisfy the criterion. That is so, notwithstanding a lull in reported attacks after January 2025, which does not necessarily indicate termination of the conflict. Regarding organization, the CPC has a common leadership and coordination structure, defined roles and channels for instruction, and the capacity to coordinate simultaneous attacks and joint operations against FACA. Taken together, these elements indicate that the NIAC between CAR and CPC continued during the reporting period.

The CPC-F emerged in August 2024 as a splinter from the CPC following internal tensions, including disputes surrounding Ali Darassa’s announced willingness to pursue an agreement with the government and his subsequent dismissal. After the split, Darassa did not comply with government demands to enter the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation (DDRR) process, raising doubts about the sincerity of his commitment to the peace process. The CPC-F publicly resumed hostilities from late October 2024 and reiterated its objective of overthrowing the government. FACA has fought the CPC-F with the support of Africa Corps. Given the coalition nature of the CPC-F, the assessment relies on aggregated intensity where multiple sufficiently organized armed groups fight in a coordinated alliance. Reported clashes, including coordinated attacks on remote outposts, destruction and looting of civilian property, and subsequent displacement, as well as further engagements involving Africa Corps, indicate that the intensity threshold is met. As regards organization, the CPC-F is described as having a coalition leadership and coordination structure, and its constituent groups (Anti-Balaka (Mokom faction), FPRC, MPC and UPC) are assessed as sufficiently organized, enabling the alliance to coordinate operations and to qualify as a party to this NIAC ignited during the reporting period.

AAKG fighters who were not incorporated into FACA have continued to operate as ‘AAKG non formés’, alongside elements who reportedly defected from the integrated WTA unit and returned to the bush, amid tensions linked to perceived unfulfilled integration promises and disagreements over negotiations with the UPC concerning grazing areas. These dynamics coincided with renewed calls for disarmament or reintegration that did not halt the violence. Hostilities between the AAKG, supported by former WTA elements, and the FACA, which has received military support from Africa Corps, were characterized by repeated clashes over several months. They included multi-day operations around Zemio, resulting in casualties, destruction, and displacement, as well as ambushes against MINUSCA that prompted the deployment of a Quick Reaction Force and additional armoured personnel. The recurrence, duration, and ferocity of hostilities satisfy the intensity requirement. Although information on internal discipline is limited, available material indicates a continuing tiered hierarchy with identifiable commanders and a spokesperson, logistical access and support networks, and the capacity to plan operations. The organization criterion is therefore met, and a new NIAC between CAR and AAKG (with occasional support from WTA elements) ignited during the period under review.

The NIAC between the UPC and the AAKG originated in the context of AAKG’s armed opposition to UPC control in Haut Mbomou and its stated objective of transferring authority in areas it considered liberated to State forces. During the reporting period, the AAKG split following the integration of a significant contingent of fighters into FACA as the WTA unit, leaving a remnant operating as ‘AAKG non formés’. The pre-existing conflict therefore continued between the UPC and this AAKG remnant. Prior to the lull observed from July 2024, hostilities were characterized by frequent clashes and the use of military-type weapons on both sides, with repeated engagements supporting the assessment of protracted armed violence. The subsequent decrease in direct fighting does not in itself indicate the end of the conflict, as neither party has ceased to exist, and the available information does not demonstrate a lasting cessation without a real risk of resumption. The persistence of the ‘AAKG non formés’, the diversion of AAKG capacity toward fighting other adversaries since April 2025, and continued targeting of Fulani civilians on suspicion of association with the UPC all point to an enduring risk of renewed confrontation. Both the UPC and the AAKG meet the organization criterion under IHL. As a result, the NIAC between the UPC and the remnants of the former AAKG continued throughout the reporting period.