Over the past decades, Mexico has experienced intense drug related violence involving major cartels and amounting in some instances to non-international armed conflict (NIAC). During the reporting period two NIACs have been identified, one between Mexico and the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) and another between the CJNG and the Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL). These conflicts evolved in a context shaped by the authorities’ kingpin strategy, cartel fragmentation and militarization, and the growing operational capacity of armed criminal groups. The confrontation between the CJNG and the CSRL remained particularly severe in Guanajuato and was associated with exceptionally high levels of lethal violence. At the same time, the Sinaloa Cartel descended into a violent internal struggle after high-profile arrests in 2024, while Mexican security operations intensified under President Sheinbaum and the death of El Mencho in 2026 triggered widespread retaliatory attacks by the CJNG.
Classifications and Parties to the Conflicts
- Non-international armed conflict between Mexico and Jalisco Cartel New Generation (CJNG)
- Non-international armed conflict between Jalisco Cartel New Generation (CJNG) and Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)
During the reporting period in Mexico, civilians were exposed to lethal violence in public spaces and to recurrent attacks affecting civilian objects, including the burning of vehicles, market stalls, and businesses. Criminal groups, notably the CJNG, also deployed improvised explosive devices, including from drones, and placed anti-personnel mines, to control territory and deter rivals and security forces, thereby heightening risks to civilians, especially in rural areas. The CJNG was found to have repeatedly killed civilians and engaged in forced recruitment, arbitrary deprivation of liberty through kidnapping, torture and ill-treatment, and enforced disappearances. Authorities were also accused of torture and arbitrary detention, while ineffective investigations continued to aggravate the nationwide crisis of disappearances.
Historical Background
Origins and context
Over the past decades, Mexico has confronted drug-related armed violence involving several cartels, with some situations previously classified as non-international armed conflicts (NIAC). While, in 2022, the conflicts were declassified despite violence remaining sufficiently intense, owing to growing fragmentation and the resulting difficulty of attributing incidents to specific armed actors, available information indicates that the NIAC between Mexico and the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) has persisted. During the reporting period, two NIACs are identified, one opposing Mexico and the CJNG, and the other between the CJNG and the Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL).
Kingpin strategy and fragmentation
The adoption of the ‘kingpin’ strategy by the Mexican authorities resulted in successive arrests and prosecutions of cartel leadership. These leadership takedowns have contributed to decentralization, splintering, and rivalry among cartels, with recurrent short-term spikes in lethal violence.
Militarization and cartel capabilities
The adoption of paramilitary tactics, the recruitment of deserters from the Mexican military, and the reinvestment of substantial criminal revenues into recruitment and weapons procurement have increased cartels’ strike capability and sustained cycles of violence.
Key cartels
The Sinaloa Cartel has operated as a decentralized federation with transnational reach, diversified illicit portfolios, military grade weaponry, and has demonstrated the capacity for large-scale violent operations supported by corruption. The arrest (in 2016) and extradition to the United States (in 2017) of its leader, ‘El Chapo’, led to internal fracturing and a spike in violence. The CJNG emerged from Milenio Cartel fragmentation, combined a comparatively integrated organization with military-style methods and an extreme – and often highly public – use of violence, and developed broad territorial and transnational presence. The CSRL formed in Guanajuato to resist rival incursions, later expanded beyond fuel theft and, following the capture of its leader, reportedly evolving into a more horizontal network.
CJNG-CSRL tensions
Escalating rivalry, including retaliatory violence and attacks affecting civilians and security forces, has driven severe insecurity and violence in Guanajuato, and led Mexico to prioritize disruption of the CSRL.
Key Developments (2023–2026)
The reporting period saw several major developments:
- Continued fighting between the CJNG and the CSRL: Despite the authorities’ crackdown and the CSRL’s reported decentralization, the group remained active in Guanajuato during the reporting period, continued to perpetrate lethal violence, retained control over multiple municipalities, and kept fighting the CJNG across the state. This confrontation was associated with exceptionally high levels of killings in Guanajuato. The CSRL reportedly sustained its position through support in weapons and fighters from other criminal groups, including factions of the Sinaloa and Gulf cartels.
- Escalating violence within the Sinaloa Cartel: After the July 2024 arrest of El Mayo and a son of El Chapo by US authorities, intra-cartel violence escalated into a severe internal war, amid accusations of betrayal. The escalation was marked by increased homicides, disappearances, and armed confrontations, including in urban centres.
- Intensification of security operations against cartels: Following President Sheinbaum’s October 2024 inauguration, security operations and related clashes reportedly intensified amid US pressure and threats of unilateral use of force, and included the transfer of high-profile suspects to the United States.
- Neutralization of the CJNG’s leader: In February 2026, Mexican forces attempted to capture El Mencho, who died during the operation, which triggered widespread retaliatory attacks by the CJNG.
Legal Classification
The intensity of the conflict and organization of the parties are the only two criteria to determine whether a NIAC exists. The purpose of the armed forces to engage in acts of violence or the fact that they seek to achieve some further objective is irrelevant. Although respective cartels operate through fluid, decentralized and sometimes fragmented arrangements, such structures can still meet the organization threshold where leadership can coordinate operations across semi-autonomous subunits, assign tasks, redeploy units, and retain or delegate operational control.
Non-International Armed Conflicts
Jalisco Cartel New Generation vs Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima
The confrontation between the CJNG and the CSRL remained a NIAC during the reporting period. The CJNG continued to display a sufficient degree of organization, while the CSRL, though weakened after the arrest of its leader, ‘El Marro’, in 2020 and reportedly operating through relatively autonomous cells, retained coordination among regional leaders across Guanajuato. Reports also indicate continued direction by El Marro from detention through intermediaries, propaganda practices and public messaging, as well as recruitment of former Colombian military or paramilitary personnel, supporting the conclusion that the CSRL remained sufficiently organized. Violence, while reportedly lower than earlier peaks, continued at a high level and was often directed against civilians and civilian assets as a deliberate method of gaining territorial control. Guanajuato was reported as Mexico’s deadliest state in 2025, with continued mass-casualty incidents and other lethal attacks into early 2026.
Mexico vs Jalisco Cartel New Generation
The CJNG combined a centralized hierarchy under its leader, ‘El Mencho’, with a franchise-based model relying on regional cells and alliances with local actors, supported by substantial financial resources, corruption, territorial and social control, paramilitary recruitment and training, and coordinated messaging. It also demonstrated a capacity to recruit and train in a military-style manner, including through forced recruitment. In terms of intensity, the CJNG employed military grade weaponry and tactics, including explosive-carrying drones, mines, armoured vehicles and coordinated attacks against security forces, alongside widespread violence affecting civilians. Reported retaliatory operations after leadership losses, marked by coordinated attacks, roadblocks and arson across several regions, indicate protracted armed violence, even though the death of its leader has markedly increased the risk of fragmentation.
Parties to the Conflict(s)
State Parties
- Mexico
Non-State Parties
- Jalisco Cartel New Generation (CJNG)
- Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)
Other Non-State Actors Involved
- Chapitos
- Mayiza
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS
During the reporting period in Mexico, civilians were subjected to lethal violence in public spaces, including by shootings. At the same time, criminal groups used improvised explosive devices, including using drones and anti-personnel mines, to control territory and deter rivals and security forces. These practices heightened risks for civilians and raised concerns under the customary IHL regulating the conduct of hostilities.
Customary IHL protects civilians unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities, and prohibits attacks directed against civilians, while incidental harm must remain proportionate and subject to feasible precautions. During the reporting period, armed men opened fire on civilians gathered at a football pitch in Salamanca, Guanajuato, killing and injuring local people, including at least one woman and one child, in circumstances suggesting indiscriminate firing. The perpetrators’ affiliation with the CJNG or the CSRL was not known. Guanajuato registered the highest number of murders in Mexico in 2025.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE
Customary IHL limits attacks to military objectives and protects civilian objects. Setting fire to vehicles, stalls, and businesses, including petrol stations, is unlawful.
Customary IHL limits attacks to military objectives and prohibits directing attacks against civilian objects, which remain protected unless they make an effective contribution to military action by their nature, location, purpose, or use. The setting on fire of vehicles, market stalls, and businesses, including petrol stations, breaches this rule.
VIOLATIONS AGAINST PERSONS IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY
In Mexico, CJNG violence in its NIAC with the authorities and CSRL reportedly involved repeated killings of civilians and forced recruits, alongside arbitrary deprivation of liberty through kidnappings or deception and coercive recruitment in paramilitary camps. Torture and other ill-treatment were attributed both to authorities in detention and to CJNG practices. Enforced disappearances were a worsening nationwide pattern, particularly in Jalisco, linked to recruitment methods and clandestine graves, amid criticism of slow and ineffective investigations. Cartel killings were also concealed through burning, dismemberment, acid dissolution, and unmarked burials, with mutilation of bodies reported in the CJNG – CSRL conflict.
The CJNG has reportedly repeatedly murdered civilians during its NIACs with the authorities and the CSRL, including civilians burned to death following the killing of El Mencho. Killings were also linked to forced recruitment and paramilitary training camps where recruits were compelled, under threats and ill-treatment, to kill and cremate fellow recruits. In March 2025, an extermination and forced labour site in Jalisco was reported to contain human remains, alongside ovens and bone fragments. The site is alleged to have been used to torture victims before they were burnt.