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Non-international armed conflict between LAAF and IS-Libya

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Non-international armed conflict between LAAF and IS-Libya

By juliette

Background 

The conflict between LAAF1W. Lacher, ‘Who is Fighting Whom in Tripoli? How the 2019 Civil War is Transforming Libya’s Military Landscape’, Small Arms Survey, Briefing Paper, August 2019, Endnote 3;  ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2022/427, 27 May 2022, Annex 2; ‘Libya: One year after resolution 56/16, the human rights situation remains dire and domestic accountability efforts inadequate’, The International Commission of Jurists, September 2025, 5 and IS-Libya has its origins in ‘Operation Dignity’ launched on 16 May 2014.  The purpose of ‘Operation Dignity’ was to erase Islamist militias from Benghazi.2N. Missaglia, ‘Chaos in Libya: A Background’, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 4 July 2017; T. Eaton and A. R. Alageli, ‘The Development of Libyan Armed Groups Since 2014’, Chatham House, 17 March 2020, Updated 1 June 2021. General Khalifa Haftar, the architect of ‘Operation Dignity’, sought to use this powerplay to strengthen his influence over the eastern part of Libya.3T. Eaton and A. R. Alageli, ‘The Development of Libyan Armed Groups Since 2014’, Chatham House, 17 March 2020, Updated 1 June 2021; E. Badi, ‘Libyan Arab Armed Forces (Libya)’, European Council on Foreign Relations.  

Despite being at its peak strength, with an estimated 6,000 fighters, and exercising control over the town of Sirte in 2015 and 2016,4‘ISIS-Libya (ISIS-L)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, June 2023 IS-Libya was significantly weakened in December 2016 by a coalition made up of western-based authorities and international support, and driven out of Sirte (see above).5N. Missaglia, ‘Chaos in Libya: A Background’, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 4 July 2017. A separate operation by Haftar against IS-Libya was launched in 2017 in Derna,6T. Eaton and A. R. Alageli, ‘The Development of Libyan Armed Groups Since 2014’, Chatham House, 17 March 2020, Updated 1 June 2021 a town previously captured by IS-Libya during 2014.7N. Missaglia, ‘Chaos in Libya: A Background’, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 4 July 2017. This operation concluded in June 2018, with LAAF emerging victorious.8T. Eaton and A. R. Alageli, ‘The Development of Libyan Armed Groups Since 2014’, Chatham House, 17 March 2020, Updated 1 June 2021. 

A significantly weakened IS-Libya regrouped and started operating in small and mobile cells as of 2018.9‘Sixteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat’, UN Doc S/2023/76, 1 February 2023, para 24; ‘ISIS-Libya (ISIS-L)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, June 2023. The frequency of IS-Libya’s attacks gradually declined after 2018.10J. Warner, et al, ‘Outlasting the Caliphate: The Evolution of the Islamic State Threat in Africa’, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, November/December 2020. 

Intensity 

The most recent recorded clash of note between LAAF and IS-Libya took place in November 2022, when seven IS-Libya fighters were killed in an operation launched by LAAF in the border region with Chad.11‘LNA kills 7 ISIS operatives in security operation near Qatrun’, Libya Security Monitor, 16 November 2022. Both parties to the former NIAC in Libya continue to exist. 

LAAF remains combat-ready as illustrated through its military parades and exercises putting its newly acquired equipment, maritime vessels, and extensive arsenal on full display.12‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, 2. Similarly, IS-Libya keeps a stockpile of military-grade weaponry ensuring it remains equipped to engage in conflict.13D. Cristiani, ‘Weakened ISIS Eyes Resurgence in Libya’, Libya Tribune, 25 October 2025. In addition to the stockpiling of weapons, the UN Secretary-General, in his twenty-first report on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security, found that Africa remained home to the majority of Islamic State activity globally.14‘Twenty-first report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat’, UN Doc S/2025/496, 1 August 2025, paras 4 and 10; ‘Counter-Terrorism: Briefing on the Secretary-General’s Strategic-Level Report on ISIL/Da’esh’, Security Council Report, 18 August 2025. IS-Libya remained active through community outreach in Sabha, a town under the control of Khalifa Haftar’s forces, as of October 2024, trying to rebuild support from local populations.15‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, para 26. These efforts indicate that IS-Libya aims to, eventually, regain territorial control over parts of Libya which are currently controlled by the eastern-based authorities.  

The risk of resumption of fighting between IS-Libya and LAAF remains real.  

Organization 

LAAF 

LAAF’s military wing is commanded by General Khalifa Haftar.16‘Libya, the spokesperson of Haftar’s forces: Reinforcements in the south to protect the borders with Mali, Niger and Chad’, Nova News, 11 August 2024. Brigadier General Saddam Haftar served as his deputy17J.Jawhar, ‘Libyan National Army Expands its Influence in the South’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 31 October 2025 and chief of staff as of 16 May 2024.18‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, para 21 and Annex 10. Saddam Haftar’s portfolio includes the LAAF’s land forces, external relations strategy, and economic interests.19‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, 2. Major General Ahmed Al-Mismari serves as the spokesperson of the LAAF.20‘Libyan Army Spokesperson: We Welcome All Political Solutions to Solve Crisis’, Libyan Review, 18 January 2021. The military wing of LAAF is divided into brigades and battalions.21‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2025/673, 15 September 2023, para 19. As the LAAF’s military wing originated through an alliance of armed groups, there remain a few groups in eastern Libya who are not under the direct control of General Saddam Haftar.22T. Eaton, ‘The Libyan Arab Armed Forces’, Chatham House, 2 June 2021, Updated 7 June 2021. All top military positions are, however, filled by family members belonging to the Haftar clan or its inner circle.23‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2025/673, 15 September 2023, para 19.  

Apart from the formal structures of the military wing, the LAAF structure does include local militias24‘Libya: One year after resolution 56/16, the human rights situation remains dire and domestic accountability efforts inadequate’, The International Commission of Jurists, September 2025, 5 and tribal self-defence forces.25‘Interim Strategic Assessment of EUBAM Libya 2024’, European External Action Service, Working Document, 5 June 2024, para 6. LAAF forces, when not engaged in fighting, patrol areas under LAAF control in southern Libya to ensure stability.26‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, para 25. LAAF fighters have received training from Jordan, Egypt, and the UAE.27W. Lacher, ‘Libya’s Militias Have Become the State’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Comment 44, July 2023, 3. Elements of LAAF forces received training from AFRICOM instructors during the wargames held as part of Operation Flintlock hosted by Ghana during 2024.28‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, para 82. LAAF fighters are disciplined and have the ability to implement IHL owing to the LAAF’s hierarchal structure and military training.  

LAAF’s logistical capacity benefits from its control over the territorial waters of eastern Libya and the old Benghazi harbour.29‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, para 19. Exclusive control over the old Benghazi harbour gave LAAF control over maritime traffic and routes in the vicinity of this harbour.30‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, para 10. LAAF raises funds through its fuel smuggling,31‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, paras 20 and 106 – 110 human and migrant smuggling,32‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, para 51 as well as gold33‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, para 23 and drug smuggling.34W. Lacher, ‘Libya’s Militias Have Become the State’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Comment 44, July 2023, 2.  

LAAF remains sufficiently organized as demanded by IHL.  

IS-Libya (see above) 

The NIAC between LAAF and IS-Libya ended in 2023.