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Non-international armed conflict between Libya (GNU) and the Islamic State Libya (IS-Libya) (conflict ended in 2023) 

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Non-international armed conflict between Libya (GNU) and the Islamic State Libya (IS-Libya) (conflict ended in 2023) 

By juliette

Background 

There was a proliferation of militant Islamist movements in Libya after the ousting of al-Qaddafi in 2011.1W. Lacher, ‘Where Have All the Jihadists Gone? The Rise and Mysterious Fall of Militant Islamist Movements in Libya’, Stiftung Wissenschraft und Politik, Research Paper 10, June 2024, 5. One of the groups emerging in this context was the so-called ‘Battar Brigade’, which consists of Libyan nationals who fought for the Islamic State (ISIL or IS) in Syria.2‘ISIS-Libya (ISIS-L)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, June 2023. Returnees from this group created the ‘Islamic Youth Shura Council’, which was acknowledged as a new branch of ISIL, the ‘Islamic State Libya’ (hereafter IS-Libya), in October 2014.3‘ISIS-Libya (ISIS-L)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, June 2023. 

Western-based militias initially refrained from engaging with IS-Libya as they were reluctant to engage in a second conflict while already fighting against Haftar’s eastern-based forces.4W. Lacher, ‘Where Have All the Jihadists Gone? The Rise and Mysterious Fall of Militant Islamist Movements in Libya’, Stiftung Wissenschraft und Politik, Research Paper 10, June 2024, 8. IS-Libya took advantage of this reluctance, forming local branches in Benghazi and Derna, and taking control of the city of Sirte.5W. Lacher, ‘Where Have All the Jihadists Gone? The Rise and Mysterious Fall of Militant Islamist Movements in Libya’, Stiftung Wissenschraft und Politik, Research Paper 10, June 2024, 8; ‘History of ISIS in Libya’, Libya Security Monitor.   

The GNA (now GNU) was officially formed in December 2015,6Center for Preventative Action, ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2024; ‘Libyan Political Agreement As Signed on 17 December 2015’, United Nations Support Mission in Libya; ‘The Libyan Political Agreement: Time for a Reset’, International Crisis Group, 4 November 2016; M. Fitzgerald and M. Toaldo, ‘A quick guide to Libya’s main players’, European Council on Foreign Relations, 19 May 2016 and shortly after this, in May 2016, it launched a large-scale military offensive on ISIL-Libya fighters in Sirte. It was supported by a coalition of militias dubbed Bunyan al-Marsus and international forces, such as the US.7E. Estelle Perez, ‘GNA-Allied Forces Seize Momentum against ISIS in Sirte’, Critical Threats, 10 June 2016; ‘History of ISIS in Libya’, Libya Security Monitor. 

The US categorized IS-Libya as a terrorist organization in 2016.8‘ISIS-Libya (ISIS-L)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, June 2023. The GNA authorized air strikes against IS-Libya in Sirte, which were carried out by AFRICOM starting on 1 August 2016.9‘History of ISIS in Libya’, Libya Security Monitor; S. Ackerman et al, ‘US launches airstrikes against Isis in Libya’, The Guardian, 1 August 2016; ‘Statement by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on US Air Strike in Libya’, US Department of War, 1 August 2016. By December 2016, the GNA and its support forces had recaptured Sirte from IS-Libya control.10W. Lacher, ‘Where Have All the Jihadists Gone? The Rise and Mysterious Fall of Militant Islamist Movements in Libya’, Stiftung Wissenschraft und Politik, Research Paper 10, June 2024, 8. AFRICOM airstrikes continued in the ensuing months, targeting IS-Libya fighters who had retreated to rural areas in central and southern Libya.11W. Lacher, ‘Where Have All the Jihadists Gone? The Rise and Mysterious Fall of Militant Islamist Movements in Libya’, Stiftung Wissenschraft und Politik, Research Paper 10, June 2024, 8.  

This defeat weakened IS-Libya significantly and it never regained its pre-2016 strength.12K. Rempfer, ‘US strikes culled ISIS-Libya encampments, unlikely to return to pre-2016 levels, defense official says’, Army Times, 14 October 2019. In recent years, the threat of terrorism, including attacks perpetrated by IS-Libya, has gradually decreased.13D. Cristiani, ‘Weakened ISIS Eyes Resurgence in Libya’, Libya Tribune, 25 October 2025. The latest IS-Libya operations of note in western Libya were reported in October 2022 in Tripoli and the Western Region.14‘CTF mobilises in Tripoli in response to ISIS threat’, Libya Security Monitor, 29 October 2022. 

Intensity 

While IS-Libya was not reported to exercise control over any territory in Libya by the end of 2024, Libyan intelligence reports did reveal that IS-Libya cells remained active in logistical ISIL activities in southern Libya throughout 2025.15D. Cristiani, ‘Weakened ISIS Eyes Resurgence in Libya’, Libya Tribune, 25 October 2025. IS-Libya, although not actively fighting, continues to exist. Although there was no recorded fighting between IS-Libya and the GNU during the reporting period, a weapons stockpile was discovered by Libyan authorities in Sabha, south-western Libya. Authorities found mortars, anti-aircraft guns, explosives, and large quantities of ammunition being stockpiled.16D. Cristiani, ‘Weakened ISIS Eyes Resurgence in Libya’, Libya Tribune, 25 October 2025. The ISIL publication, al-Naba, in an editorial published on 11 September 2025, called for a revitalization of jihad in Libya through IS-Libya.17D. Cristiani, ‘Weakened ISIS Eyes Resurgence in Libya’, Libya Tribune, 25 October 2025; D. Cristiani, ‘Weakened Islamic State Eyes Resurgence in Libya’, Jamestown, 22 October 2025.  

Organization 

Abdul Salam Darak Allah is reported to be the leader of IS-Libya.18‘Eighteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat’, UN Doc S/2024/117, 31 January 2024, para 32;  ‘Sixteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat’, UN Doc S/2023/76, 1 February 2023, para 24. Abdul Salam Darak exercises authority over the military wing of IS-Libya which, as of 2024, consisted of about 150 to 400 fighters.19‘Eighteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat’, UN Doc S/2024/117, 31 January 2024, para 32. Fighters are divided into cells with approximately thirty to forty fighters each.20‘Sixteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat’, UN Doc S/2023/76, 1 February 2023, para 24. The existence of leadership and a tiered structure (through fighters divided into cells) allows for discipline and the ability to adhere to IHL. 

IS-Libya remains sufficiently organized to recruit and distribute fighters to other ISIL affiliates and to raise funds through criminal network activities.21M. Ahmed, ‘Guterres warns of ISIS in Libya merging with criminal networks in Sahel region’, The Libya Observer, 20 August 2025. IS-Libya’s logistical capacity is further illustrated by its ability to smuggle arms 22‘Twenty-first report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat’, UN Doc S/2025/496, 1 August 2025, para 12 and oil.23‘Sixteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat’, UN Doc S/2023/76, 1 February 2023, para 24. IS-Libya raises funds through human trafficking24‘Eighteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat’, UN Doc S/2024/117, 31 January 2024, para 32 and kidnapping.25‘Sixteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat’, UN Doc S/2023/76, 1 February 2023, para para 24.  

All ISIL branches speak with one voice through al-Naba, the ISIL weekly newsletter, which issues statements on behalf of IS-Libya.26D. Cristiani, ‘Weakened ISIS Eyes Resurgence in Libya’, Libya Tribune, 25 October 2025. 

Despite IS-Libya currently being degraded and non-operational on the military front,27D. Cristiani, ‘Weakened ISIS Eyes Resurgence in Libya’, Libya Tribune, 25 October 2025; A. Shutni, ‘The Islamic State in 2025: an Evolving Threat Facing a Waning Global Response’, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 11 July 2025 IS-Libya remains sufficiently organized as demanded by IHL.