Skip to content

Non-international armed conflict between Mexico and Jalisco Cartel New Generation (CJNG)

[] // resources/views/partials/content-single-conflict.blade.php

Non-international armed conflict between Mexico and Jalisco Cartel New Generation (CJNG)

By clemence

Organization

Before his killing, the CJNG was run by El Mencho under a highly hierarchical and centralized command structure,1S. Pellegrini and M. F. Arocha, ‘Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)’, ACLED, 14 April 2023; O. Holmes et al., ‘Violence in Mexico after military kills notorious drug cartel boss – a visual guide’, The Guardian, 23 February 2026. with high-ranking CJNG members who reported directly to him and were, for instance, involved in brokering the alliance allegedly formed with Chapitos (see above).2P. Asmann, ‘What’s Next for Mexico’s CJNG After the Killing of ‘El Mencho’? ‘, InSight Crime, 23 February 2026; ‘5 CJNG Hotspots to Watch After El Mencho’s Killing in Mexico’, InSight Crime, 24 February 2026. The CJNG comprised an armed wing composed of specialized units carrying out distinct military functions: territorial conquest (Grupo Élite), personal protection (Fuerzas Especiales Mencho) and a drone unit conducting intelligence and targeted killings (Operadores Droneros).3C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026. It has also been described by the US government as functioning ‘as quasi-governmental entit[y], controlling nearly all aspects of society’.4US Presidential Document, Executive Order 14157, Federal Register: The Daily Journal of the United States Government, 20 January 2025.

Beyond its core membership, the CJNG has maintained a unique franchise-based structure, with relatively autonomous regional factions or cells operating under the cartel’s label and financial network and aligning with dozens of other local criminal actors to manage illicit activities and to expand its territorial control outside its strongholds.5DEA, ‘The Jalisco New Generation Cartel’, Command & Control: Cartels; S. Pellegrini and M. F. Arocha, ‘Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)’, ACLED, 14 April 2023; P. Asmann, ‘What’s Next for Mexico’s CJNG After the Killing of ‘El Mencho’?’, InSight Crime, 23 February 2026; C. Flores, ‘Will Mexico’s Jalisco cartel’s violent biz model survive El Mencho’s death?’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2026; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026. The CJNG has an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 members.6C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026

Active in several illicit economies – including drug production and trafficking as its main activities, but also extortion, fuel theft, illegal mining, migrant smuggling and money laundering (see above) – the CJNG has been described as deploying substantial financial resources and exploiting corrupt officials. Its financial branch, the so-called ‘Los Cuinis’, maintains an extensive network for laundering illicit proceeds, including through Chinese money laundering networks, cryptocurrencies, bulk cash smuggling, and trade-based money laundering.7DEA, ‘The Jalisco New Generation Cartel’, Command & Control: Cartels; P. Asmann, ‘What’s Next for Mexico’s CJNG After the Killing of ‘El Mencho’? ‘, InSight Crime, 23 February 2026. As a result, the CJNG has controlled increasing swaths of Mexico’s economy,8‘An atmosphere of terror’: the bloody rise of Mexico’s top cartel’, The Guardian, 2 April 2021. as well as of regional and global illicit markets.9S. Henkin, ‘Tracking Cartels Infographic Series: The Violent Rise of Cártel de Jalisco Nuevo Generación (CJNG)’, START, June 2020.

According to analysts, the combination of highly vertically integrated command structure and franchise-based model has enabled the CJNG to expand into nearly all Mexican states, establishing territorial and social control that has facilitated its infiltration of political and judicial institutions, as well as the State security and economic sectors.10S. Henkin, ‘Tracking Cartels Infographic Series: The Violent Rise of Cártel de Jalisco Nuevo Generación (CJNG)’, START, June 2020; ‘What’s Next for Mexico’s CJNG After the Killing of ‘El Mencho’? ‘, InSight Crime, 23 February 2026; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026. Several powerful commanders have exerted considerable influence in key Mexican states, where the CJNG’s territorial footprint in Mexico is currently described as follows: hegemony in Aguascalientes, Colima, Jalisco and Nayarit states, control over roughly half of the country, notably western Mexico and Pacific Coast region, and influence across most of the remaining territory.11S. Henkin, ‘Tracking Cartels Infographic Series: The Violent Rise of Cártel de Jalisco Nuevo Generación (CJNG)’, START, June 2020; S. Pellegrini and M. F. Arocha, ‘Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)’, ACLED, 14 April 2023; P. Asmann, ‘What’s Next for Mexico’s CJNG After the Killing of ‘El Mencho’? ‘, InSight Crime, 23 February 2026; L. Schmidt, V. Dittmar and P. Asmann, ‘5 CJNG Hotspots to Watch After El Mencho’s Killing in Mexico’, InSight Crime, 24 February 2026; C. Flores, ‘Will Mexico’s Jalisco cartel’s violent biz model survive El Mencho’s death?’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2026; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026. It has largely defeated the Los Zetas and Gulf Cartel factions in central Mexico.S. Henkin, ‘Tracking Cartels Infographic Series: The Violent Rise of Cártel de Jalisco Nuevo Generación (CJNG)’, START, June 2020.

Mexican States Where the CJNG Controls – and Contests – Territory, February 2026. ©InSight Crimes

The CJNG has, however, faced contestation and, at the time of writing, has notably failed to overpower the CSRL in Guanajuato. It also continues to fight security forces and local rivals in Baja California and Michoacán.12S. Henkin, ‘Tracking Cartels Infographic Series: The Violent Rise of Cártel de Jalisco Nuevo Generación (CJNG)’, START, June 2020; S. Pellegrini and M. F. Arocha, ‘Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)’, ACLED, 14 April 2023; ‘5 CJNG Hotspots to Watch After El Mencho’s Killing in Mexico’, InSight Crime, 24 February 2026. The alliance reportedly formed with the Chapitos has presumably reinforced the CJNG’s influence in Sinaloa and Baja California states. El Mencho’s death, however, could end up favouring the Mayiza in their fight against the Chapitos and, in turn, threatening CJNG’s presence in the area.135 CJNG Hotspots to Watch After El Mencho’s Killing in Mexico’, InSight Crime, 24 February 2026.

Regarding military recruiting and training, the CJNG has run dozens of paramilitary-style training camps, notably in the Sierra de Ahuisculco, a mountain range in Jalisco, where people are lured with promises of legitimate jobs or kidnapped, and then forced, under threats and ill-treatment, to train with firearms, join the cartel, and kill and cremate fellow recruits (particularly those who resist or are deemed to be of no use).14A. Guillén and D. Petersen, ‘El regreso del infierno; los desaparecidos que están vivos’,Quinto Elemento Lab, 4 February 2019; ‘‘An atmosphere of terror’: the bloody rise of Mexico’s top cartel’, The Guardian, 2 April 2021; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026. Additionally, it has previously conducted aerial propaganda drops, 15J. P. Sullivan, ‘Crime wars: Operational perspectives on criminal armed groups in Mexico and Brazil’, International review of the Red Cross, No. 923, June 2023, p 857. and has been described as engaging in ‘spectacular displays of narco-messaging (propaganda, notices, and threats)’ and as being ‘social media savvy’,16S. Henkin, ‘Tracking Cartels Infographic Series: The Violent Rise of Cártel de Jalisco Nuevo Generación (CJNG)’, START, June 2020. See also: .‘Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)’, InSight Crime, 19 September 2025 Taken together, these practices evidence its ability to speak with one voice.

Its capacity to conduct coordinated and sustained military-type attacks has been observed since at least 2015 and was again in evidence during retaliatory attacks following El Mencho’s death in late February 2026 (see below). The CJNG’s power has been described as rooted in its paramilitary force, relying on extortion, brutal violence and enforced disappearances to seize territory, strengthen its control and facilitate forced recruitment.17C. Flores, ‘Will Mexico’s Jalisco cartel’s violent biz model survive El Mencho’s death?’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2026. Such capacity has persisted after the death of El Mencho: according to the Mexican Ministry of Defence, attacks in Jalisco were coordinated by El Mencho’s right-hand and financial head of the CJNG, known as ‘El Tuli’, who was then killed when Mexican security forces attempted to arrest him.18R. Cortes, A. Pelaez-Fernandez and S. Morland, ‘Romantic tryst led to Mexican cartel leader’s capture, death’, Reuters, 23 February 2026; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026. However, as observed by some analysts, since there is no direct heir nor official successor to El Mencho and given the size and territorial reach of the CJNG, risks of fragmentation, with the possible involvement of other armed actors, are considered very high.19O. Holmes et al., ‘Violence in Mexico after military kills notorious drug cartel boss – a visual guide’, The Guardian, 23 February 2026; P. Asmann, ‘What’s Next for Mexico’s CJNG After the Killing of ‘El Mencho’? ‘, InSight Crime, 23 February 2026; L. Callaghan, ‘A cartel boss is dead, but normal Mexicans always pay the price’, The Times, 28 February 2026; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026. Nonetheless, as things stand at time of writing, the CJNG has displayed a sufficient level of organization and, compared with other cartels, a more integrated structure.

Intensity

The CJNG distinguishes itself through its military-type training and deployment tactics.20S. Henkin, ‘Tracking Cartels Infographic Series: The Violent Rise of Cártel de Jalisco Nuevo Generación (CJNG)’, START, June 2020; C. Flores, ‘Will Mexico’s Jalisco cartel’s violent biz model survive El Mencho’s death?’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2026. The CJNG has also displayed an arsenal of military-grade weaponry, including drones carrying explosive devices, landmines, assault rifles, grenade and rocket launchers, armoured vehicles (some with mounted machine guns). This was illustrated by material recovered at the site of the raid that led to El Mencho’s death, which included armoured vehicles and rocket launchers, as well as by a recent international operation against individuals charged with conspiracy to provide military-grade weapons to the CJNG, such as machine guns, rocket launchers, sniper rifles, and AK-47 rifles, and potentially surface-to-air missiles and advanced anti-aircraft systems, with a total value of around US$58 million.21F. Naim, ‘Morocco Helps US Target Global Arms Network Linked to Mexican CJNG Cartel’, Morocco World News, 27 March 2026 The CJNG is also notorious for aggressively engaging Mexican military forces and conducting coordinated attacks, including downing a helicopter and killing six soldiers in 2015 with rocket-propelled grenades, and attempting to assassinate the head of Mexico City’s police force with grenades and high-powered rifles in 2020.22Mexico declares all-out war after rising drug cartel downs military helicopter’, The Guardian, 5 May 2015; ‘México: Cártel de Jalisco exhibe su arsenal’, Teletrece on Youtube, 20 July 2020; ‘‘An atmosphere of terror’: the bloody rise of Mexico’s top cartel’, The Guardian, 2 April 2021; S. Pellegrini and M. F. Arocha, ‘Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)’, ACLED, 14 April 2023; J. P. Sullivan, ‘Crime wars: Operational perspectives on criminal armed groups in Mexico and Brazil’, International review of the Red Cross, No. 923 (June 2023), pp 857 and 866–68; ‘Who was El Mencho, the former police officer who co-founded an ultraviolent cartel in Mexico?’, The Guardian, 23 February 2026; R. Cortes, A. Pelaez-Fernandez and S. Morland, ‘Romantic tryst led to Mexican cartel leader’s capture, death’, Reuters, 23 February 2026; C. Flores, ‘Will Mexico’s Jalisco cartel’s violent biz model survive El Mencho’s death?’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2026.C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026. In reaction, the Mexican government deployed the newly established National Guard in 2019 and a massive contingent of soldiers in February 2026, rather than relying solely on ordinary police operations.23C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026

More broadly, the CJNG is specifically known for its level of brutality that has been described as comparable to that of Los Zetas (see above).24C. Flores, ‘Will Mexico’s Jalisco cartel’s violent biz model survive El Mencho’s death?’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2026. From January 2024 to 16 February 2026, thousands of violent incidents across Mexico, largely concentrated in Jalisco, were attributed to the CJNG and affiliated groups.25O. Holmes et al., ‘Violence in Mexico after military kills notorious drug cartel boss – a visual guide’, The Guardian, 23 February 2026.

Violent CJNG activity in Mexico, 1 January to 16 February 2026. ©The Guardian, 2026

Initially, this violence predominantly targeted civilians, accounting for over forty per cent of their violent activity, but has since increasingly included clashes with armed groups and/or security forces.26S. Pellegrini and M. F. Arocha, ‘Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)’, ACLED, 14 April 2023.

In February 2025, US president Donald Trump designated the CJNG as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, emphasizing ‘its intimidating acts of violence, including attacks on Mexican military and police with military grade weaponry, the use of drones to drop explosives on Mexican law enforcement, and assassinations or attempted assassinations of Mexican officials’.27US Department of State, ‘Designation of International Cartels’, Fact sheet, 20 Feburary 2025; US Department of State, Executive Order 13224, 20 February 2025; C. Flores, ‘Will Mexico’s Jalisco cartel’s violent biz model survive El Mencho’s death?’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2026. In July of the same year, an indictment in the state of Virginia against a Bulgarian arms smuggler revealed that the cartel was attempting to purchase approximately US$58 million worth of weapons, including surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft systems (ZU-23).28US Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Virginia, ‘Bulgarian arms trafficker and three others indicted for conspiring to supply military-grade weaponry to Mexican drug cartels’, Press Release, 20 July 2025; C. Flores, ‘Will Mexico’s Jalisco cartel’s violent biz model survive El Mencho’s death?’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2026.

On 22 February 2026, in the course of the operation leading to the killing of El Mencho and several of his accomplices, a Mexican Army helicopter was hit by the CJNG and forced to make an emergency landing, without any of the soldiers on board being killed.29C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026. Following the operation, the CJNG launched coordinated retaliatory attacks, including through the reported use of explosive-laden drones,30S. Pellegrini, ‘Mexico: El Mencho’s killing triggers nationwide escalation — Expert comment’, ACLED, 23 February 2026; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026. that killed twenty-five Mexican soldiers. Around thirty cartel operatives and one bystander were also reported killed in the ensuing clashes. In total, more than 70 attacks were recorded in Guanajuato alone.31O. Holmes et al., ‘Violence in Mexico after military kills notorious drug cartel boss – a visual guide’, The Guardian, 23 February 2026; R. Cortes, A. Pelaez-Fernandez and S. Morland, ‘Romantic tryst led to Mexican cartel leader’s capture, death’, Reuters, 23 February 2026; ‘El Mencho: Mexico officials say 25 soldiers killed after cartel raid’, Al Jazeera, 23 February 2026; ‘Key events in Mexican operation to capture cartel leader ‘El Mencho’’, Reuters, 23 February 2026; C. Flores, ‘Will Mexico’s Jalisco cartel’s violent biz model survive El Mencho’s death?’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2026; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026. The cartel also erected hundreds of roadblocks across Jalisco and, to a lesser extent, in dozens of other Mexican states, and set vehicles, stalls, and businesses ablaze, including gas stations, and, reportedly, people as well. Armed assaults were also carried out against banks, shops, and government infrastructure. 32Cortes, A. Pelaez-Fernandez and S. Morland, ‘Romantic tryst led to Mexican cartel leader’s capture, death’, Reuters, 23 February 2026; ‘El Mencho: Mexico officials say 25 soldiers killed after cartel raid’, Al Jazeera, 23 February 2026; O. Holmes et al., ‘Violence in Mexico after military kills notorious drug cartel boss – a visual guide’, The Guardian, 23 February 2026; L. Callaghan, ‘A cartel boss is dead, but normal Mexicans always pay the price’, The Times, 28 February 2026; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026. Although Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum stated on 23 February 2026 that the situation was normalizing and roadblocks were under control, around 2,500 additional Mexican troops were deployed to Jalisco at the same time, as locals and tourists were urged to remain confined or fled the surge in violence in the area. Across Jalisco and several other states, airlines cancelled flights, public transport was interrupted, banks were closed and shuttered, and schools and universities suspended classes.33O. Holmes et al., ‘Violence in Mexico after military kills notorious drug cartel boss – a visual guide’, The Guardian, 23 February 2026; R. Cortes, A. Pelaez-Fernandez and S. Morland, ‘Romantic tryst led to Mexican cartel leader’s capture, death’, Reuters, 23 February 2026; ‘Key events in Mexican operation to capture cartel leader “El Mencho”’, Reuters, 23 February 2026; ‘El Mencho: Mexico officials say 25 soldiers killed after cartel raid’, Al Jazeera, 23 February 2026; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026. The CJNG also reportedly offered a roughly $1,100 reward for every Mexican soldier killed.34R. Cortes, A. Pelaez-Fernandez and S. Morland, ‘Romantic tryst led to Mexican cartel leader’s capture, death’, Reuters, 23 February 2026; ‘Key events in Mexican operation to capture cartel leader ‘El Mencho’’, Reuters, 23 February 2026; C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026. Moreover, according to analysts, since there is no clear direct heir or successor to El Mencho, the risk of cartel power struggle that would result in a sharp escalation in violence and could draw other cartels into the fighting is very high.35O. Holmes et al., ‘Violence in Mexico after military kills notorious drug cartel boss – a visual guide’, The Guardian, 23 February 2026; P. Asmann, ‘What’s Next for Mexico’s CJNG After the Killing of ‘El Mencho’? ‘, InSight Crime, 23 February 2026; S. Collinson, ‘A cartel crackdown carries political risks for Trump’, CNN Politics, 24 February 2026. Even though no further hostilities have been reported at the time of writing,36D. Wood, ‘The Killing of “El Mencho”: Implications for the Cartels and Mexico’s Security’, Wilson Center, 24 February 2026. the intensity of the recent violence, coupled with escalation risks related to possible CJNG’s fragmentation and the Mexican authorities’ renewed reliance on the kingpin strategy, indicate that the NIAC between Mexican authorities and the CJNG remains, for the time being, ongoing.Redaelli and Arévalo arrived at a similar conclusion, at least for specific regions and during specific periods.37C. Redaelli and C. Arévalo, ‘When Cartels Fight Back: El Mencho and the NIAC Question in Mexico’, Articles of War, 23 March 2026.