Since 1960 Nigeria has combined ethnographic and religious diversity with recurrent and evolving violence. Since 2009, the north-east has seen prolonged insurgency by Boko Haram and its splinter group, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Despite earlier military gains by Nigerian armed forces supported by the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in 2015–16, security has since deteriorated again as terrorist and criminal networks have expanded. Other regions have faced resource-related violence, farmer-herder clashes, separatist mobilization, and gang crime, contributing to massive internal displacement. The period also featured disputed elections, strained relations with Niger, severe floods and a deepening cost of living crisis marked by protests and lethal repression. Regional cooperation through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MTJF) weakened while ISWAP operations intensified and United States (US) airstrikes were conducted with contested justification.
Classification and Parties to the Conflicts
- Non-international armed conflict between Nigeria (supported by MNJTF) and Boko Haram
- Non-international armed conflict between Nigeria (supported by MNJTF and, since 26 December 2025, the United States) and ISWAP
- Non-international armed conflict between ISWAP and Boko Haram
In the conduct of hostilities, Boko Haram and ISWAP carry out widespread attacks on farmers, villagers, and religious minorities, as well as renewed suicide bombings, systematic burning of homes and shops, and repeated assaults on churches and other cultural and religious sites. Nigerian Air Force and MNJTF airstrikes in populated areas repeatedly caused civilian casualties amid failures to verify targets, while improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on roads, markets, and public transport laid by the armed groups caused further indiscriminate harm. Medical facilities and humanitarian convoys were frequently attacked, impairing essential services. Boko Haram and ISWAP also perpetrated killings, mass abductions, hostage-taking, enforced disappearances, and sexual violence amounting to sexual slavery and forced marriage, including of children. Nigerian security forces were reported to engage in arbitrary detention, torture, deaths in custody, and enforced disappearances targeting alleged supporters, activists, and journalists. Recruitment and use of children in hostilities reached alarming levels.
Historical Background
Ethnographic diversity
Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has remained highly diverse in ethnographic composition, with marked regional religious majorities, predominantly Muslim in the north and predominantly Christian in the south.
North-east conflict dynamics
The north-east has experienced sustained armed conflict since the Boko Haram insurgency began in 2009, with hostilities concentrated in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe. Nigeria, supported since 2013 by the self-defense militia Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), recorded military gains in 2015-2016 that narrowed Boko Haram’s territorial footprint; nonetheless, insurgent tactics have adapted over time. Regional stabilization initiatives were developed from 2017 onward. Since 2020, the overall security situation has however gradually deteriorated, driven by increased terrorist threats and the spread of organized gang activity.
Boko Haram splintering and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) resurgence
The insurgency fragmented into two principal factions – Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’adati wal-Jihad (JAS, often referred to as ‘Boko Haram’) and ISWAP – both fighting the Nigerian State. ISWAP’s most effective campaign prior to 2025 occurred between 2018 and 2020, largely in northern Borno, while since January 2025 it has intensified operations through repeated targeted attacks on military facilities and infrastructure across Borno state.
Other theatres of tension
Beyond the north-east, other areas are under heightened tension due to competition over natural resources in the Niger Delta, farmer pastoralist violence over grazing routes that increasingly interacts with ethnic and religious cleavages, separatist armed struggle in the south-east linked to renewed Biafra aspirations, and escalating gang crime in the north-west, with growing concerns about Islamist organizations infiltrating gangs.
Displacement
Conflicts have generated large-scale displacement, with hundreds of thousands of new displacements in 2023 to 2024 and a total conflict-related internally displaced persons reaching several million by the end of 2024.
Key Developments
The reporting period saw several major developments:
- Challenges to Bola Tinubu’s win in the presidential election in February 2023: Bola Tinubu won the 25 February 2023 presidential election with 37 per cent of the vote. Opposition parties alleged fraud, but the Presidential Elections Petitions Tribunal dismissed their petitions on 6 September 2023, and the Supreme Court upheld the result on 26 October 2023.
- Tense relations with Niger: Following Niger’s July 2023 coup, ECOWAS imposed stringent sanctions. Niger withdrew its ambassador and diplomatic tensions rose. Defence chiefs met in Niamey on 28 August 2024, and official dialogue and cooperation mechanisms resumed in April 2025.
- Massive inflation followed by a cost-of-living crisis and protests: From late 2023, escalating inflation and food insecurity triggered labour-led protests and widespread social unrest. Deadly stampedes during food distributions and looting incidents underscored humanitarian stress. Nationwide youth-driven protests in August 2024 were met with curfews, arrests, and lethal force. Although President Tinubu called for dialogue, core protest demands remained unaddressed.
- Repeated devastating flooding: Major floods in September 2024 destroyed villages and settlements, worsened economic and food insecurity, and caused hundreds of thousands of to be displaced and killed hundreds. Severe flooding recurred in May 2025 with further deaths, displacement, and damage.
- Weakening of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF): The MNJTF was created in 1994 to combat cross-border violence around Lake Chad and facilitate cross-border movements, and has included Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria (troop-contributing countries), as well as Benin (which deploys additional non-combat troops). After having obtained operational gains against ISWAP and Boko Haram, regional cooperation deteriorated when Chad threatened to withdraw in 2024 and Niger left MNJTF in March 2025. As a result, intelligence sharing, joint operations and border security have been undermined.
- Security dynamics and armed conflict: As regional counter-terrorism cooperation weakened, ISWAP activity increased. The intensification of ISWAP operations from January 2025 onwards culminated in May 2025 with the capture of the town of Marte, a gateway to the smuggling routes around Lake Chad.
- United States (US) intervention: In December 2025, the US carried out airstrikes in Nigeria, with the government’s consent. However, the identity of the armed group targeted and the motive of ‘genocide’ against Christians cited by the US to justify these strikes remain contested.
Non-International Armed Conflicts
Nigeria (and support forces) vs Boko Haram
Since 2009, hostilities between Nigeria and Boko Haram have persisted as a NIAC. MNJTF joined this pre-existing conflict at Nigeria’s invitation within a support framework. In line with the support-based approach, troop-contributing nations are therefore parties to the NIAC alongside Nigeria, including Niger until its withdrawal in March 2025. Violence remained sustained throughout the period under review, with recurrent engagements and an escalation from late 2024, including increased reliance on airstrikes, ground operations, significant fatalities, and further destruction and displacement in affected areas. Boko Haram’s capabilities, including the use of assault rifles, heavy machine guns and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and reported acquisition of rudimentary drone technology, confirm protracted armed violence. Boko Haram also remains sufficiently organized, with identified leadership, a structured hierarchy of territorial commanders, military and civilian wings, internal religious guidance, logistical procurement and distribution, financing through taxation, theft, looting and kidnapping for ransom, and stable control over parts of the Lake Chad Region. Consequently, the NIAC continues to meet the criteria relating to organization and intensity, and the territorial control exercised by Boko Haram justifies its classification as a NIAC falling within the scope of Additional Protocol II.
Nigeria (and support forces) vs ISWAP
Since 2016, hostilities between Nigeria and ISWAP, a splinter from Boko Haram, have amounted to a NIAC. As the MNJTF joined this pre-existing conflict at Nigeria’s invitation, Cameroon, Chad and Niger until March 2025 are, or were, parties alongside Nigeria under the support-based approach. Violence remained sustained and protracted throughout the reporting period, with frequent engagements, repeated air operations and ground raids around Lake Chad and the Sambisa axis, and ISWAP counteroffensives that at times enabled it to regain or defend territory. While government and MNJTF operations in 2024 degraded ISWAP capabilities, the group mounted a significant comeback in 2025, marked by intensified and coordinated assaults against military bases, peaking in May. Stable territorial control by the end of the period, including across parts of north-eastern Borno, facilitated near-simultaneous attacks on remote objectives, satisfying the requirement of sustained and concerted operations. ISWAP increasingly employed drone technology and maintained advanced weaponry, contributing to escalating displacement. The group’s bureaucratic approach in the governance of areas under its influence, combined with a standing armed force, a collective leadership, hierarchical unit structures, internal security and disciplinary mechanisms, centralized arsenals and controlled logistics, demonstrates responsible command and the capacity to implement Additional Protocol II. ISWAP also displays a sophisticated logistical system, benefits from support provided by Islamic State and generates significant funds through criminal activity. Taken together, these elements justify the classification as an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC.
ISWAP vs Boko Haram
Since ISWAP’s separation from Boko Haram in 2016, hostilities between the two armed groups have constituted a NIAC, driven by competition for territorial control, primarily in Borno state. During the reporting period, violence remained sustained and retaliatory, with recurrent clashes across 2023 to early 2025 in and around the Lake Chad and Marte areas. Operations included offensives and counteroffensives leading to substantial losses on both sides, the destruction of property and shifts in territorial control. The conduct of hostilities also demonstrates operational sophistication, including coordinated deployments and near-simultaneous attacks. The means and methods of warfare employed further reflect intensity, with both groups employing small arms and heavier capabilities, including IEDs, anti-aircraft weapons, mortars, and drone technology to deliver explosives. These clashes have also generated displacement and overcrowding in camps. Both Boko Haram and ISWAP fulfil the organization requirement under IHL and display sophisticated command structures. The intensity and protracted nature of the fighting, combined with the level of organization of both armed groups, confirm the existence of a NIAC between ISWAP and Boko Haram throughout the reporting period.
Parties to the Conlict
State Party
- Nigeria
- The United States (US) (since 26 December 2025)
- Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) troop-contributing countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger (announced withdrawal March 2025) and Nigeria)
Non-State Parties
- Boko Haram (JAS)
- Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP)
Other main actors
Foreign Involvement
- Benin (deployment of non-combat troops within MNJTF)
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS
Nigeria saw escalating violence against civilians, with Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) attacking farmers, villagers, and religious minorities and a resurgence of suicide bombings causing major civilian harm. Military operations also generated civilian casualties, as Nigerian Air Force and Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) airstrikes in populated areas repeatedly struck civilians. Improvised explosive devices (IED) continued to kill and injure civilians. Severe malnutrition in the north affected millions of children and deaths rose amid reduced aid. Conflict and flooding resulted in widespread displacement, exacerbated by persistent pressure from armed groups.
Nigeria experienced a sharp escalation in attacks by non-state armed groups targeting civilians. Throughout the reporting period, Boko Haram and ISWAP attacked farmers, villagers and religious minorities, resulting in the killing and injury of many hundreds of civilians, including attacks framed as punishment for alleged support to the Nigerian Armed Forces. The period also saw a resurgence of suicide bombings, most attributed to Boko Haram, including coordinated blasts in Borno state across multiple locations over two days that killed and injured dozens of civilians, many of them women and children. Further explosions in the same region continued to cause significant civilian harm.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE
Boko Haram and ISWAP repeatedly attacked civilian infrastructure by burning or firing on villages, homes, and shops, often alongside indiscriminate shooting. Persistent attacks on medical activities, largely attributed to Boko Haram or ISWAP, affected many medical facilities amid insecurity and a funding crisis. Humanitarian relief was further disrupted by armed group attacks on aid convoys and premises. Boko Haram also repeatedly targeted cultural property during offensives against predominantly Christian communities.
Attacks on Villages, Homes and Shops
In north-eastern Nigeria, Boko Haram and ISWAP frequently attacked and destroyed civilian objects, notably homes and shops, including through arson and gunfire. Reports indicate that such attacks were often conducted alongside indiscriminate shooting in communities and sometimes occurred in the context of engagements with Nigerian soldiers, resulting in extensive destruction of private property. Boko Haram was reported to have attacked communities in Borno state in January 2025, setting fire to homes and causing widespread damage. ISWAP similarly claimed responsibility for an April 2025 attack in Banga village in which dozens of homes were burned.
VIOLATIONS AGAINST PERSONS IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY
Violations against persons in the hands of the enemy in Nigeria included deliberate killings and mass executions by Boko Haram and ISWAP. Nigerian security forces were accused of arbitrary detention and torture, with deaths in custody reported amid severe overcrowding and inadequate conditions of detention. Armed groups also carried out widespread abductions. Enforced disappearances affected journalists and critics and were also linked to armed group abductions. Pillage and unlawful destruction of property by Boko Haram and ISWAP were recurrent.
- Murder
- Torture
- Arbitrary Detention
- Enforced Disappearances
- Looting and pillage
- Sexual Violence
- Protection of Children
Murder of Civilians
Armed groups committed deliberate killings of civilians in Borno state, including attacks on agricultural communities in which farmers and fishermen were gathered, separated and shot at close range, with those attempting to flee pursued and killed and others injured. Evidence also emerged during the reporting period of mass executions of persons captured by armed groups, including reported video footage showing ISWAP executing groups of individuals after they confessed loyalty to the government.
Death in detention
Deaths in detention in Nigeria were reported during the reporting period, including cases occurring in suspicious circumstances. These deaths arose amid allegations of torture, extortion, and coerced confessions by Nigerian security forces, prolonged detention without due process, and severe overcrowding with outdated infrastructure. The death of a detainee in custody, given its conditions, was a potential war crime and certainly required effective investigation, alongside broader concerns regarding unlawful or arbitrary detention and inhuman or degrading treatment under IHL.