Historical Background
Origins and context
Since independence in 1947, Pakistan’s governance has alternated between civilian and military rule, with influential provincial leadership and shifting alliances. Political instability has been intensified by separatist and Islamist movements, prominently Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), alongside a long running Baluchistan insurgency and recurrent attacks by other Islamist armed groups in both tribal areas and major cities.
Baluchistan’s separatist aspirations
Baluch grievances over marginalization and resource control trace back to the accession of Kalat in 1948 and successive phases of unrest, with the current phase beginning in the early 2000s and involving sustained violence and displacement. The Baloch insurgency, notably the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), expanded attacks on State infrastructure and security forces, later targeting Chinese nationals and projects linked to the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and disrupting elections. Internal splits and reconfigurations produced rival factions and coalitions, including the Baloch Raaji Aajohi Sangar (BRAS) alliance, alongside a growing regional dimension involving Iran and cross-border safe haven allegations.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emergence and evolution
Formed in 2007 after earlier Pakistani counterinsurgency operations, the TTP expanded territorial influence and attacks, then weakened after leadership losses, internal fragmentation, and intensive operations from 2014. From 2018 it became more cohesive, centralizing authority and reintegrating splinter and allied groups, and shifting towards the targeting of State and military institutions. A marked rise in operational tempo occurred after 2020 with further empowerment following the Taliban return to power in Afghanistan in 2021.
Other jihadist actors
Al Qaeda’s role in Pakistan has fluctuated since 2002, adapting through local networks and affiliates, while Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K) rose from 2015 before being reduced by sustained operations, later regrouping after the Afghanistan withdrawal and continuing to mount lethal attacks in Pakistan.
Key Developments (2023–2026)
The reporting period saw several major developments:
- Escalation of terrorist attacks: Militant violence rose sharply across Pakistan, resulting in it being ranked as the country most affected by terrorism worldwide. Attacks were attributed primarily to the TTP and Baloch insurgent factions, with IS-K playing a more limited yet persistent role.
- Baloch insurgency: The insurgency escalated through a high-profile hijacking of a passenger train in which hundreds were held for days and many hostages were killed. BRAS factions also coordinated repeated surges of attacks around symbolic dates, combining strikes on security forces with checkpoint activity and disruption of electoral processes. Chinese nationals and projects associated with the CPEC remained a prominent focus, including a lethal attack on a convoy, attribution for which was contested.
- Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: Operations increased in frequency, complexity and geographic reach, combining high-value targets in border areas with urban soft targets. Despite this expansion, the group has not secured sustained territorial control or broad local support, while violence against civilians associated with the Pakistani State rose.
- The Pakistani State response: Planned nationwide offensive was announced but did not proceed, followed by the approval of a new operation and episodic local campaigns that remained limited without strengthened governance and a sustained ground presence to hold territory.
- Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan’s rapprochement and local expansion: Collaboration with other Islamist actors, alongside support from al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, facilitated cross-border capabilities, recruitment including Afghan nationals, and a footprint in additional provinces, while the group publicly framed its objectives as domestic.
- Fragmentation and spill-over of the Baloch insurgency: Further splintering occurred within Baloch coalitions, alongside intensified activity in Iran, prompting reciprocal cross-border strikes and later coordination mechanisms and joint action along the border.
- Open hostilities between Afghanistan and Pakistan: Disputes over safe haven for TTP escalated into cross-border airstrikes, a brief ceasefire, and renewed exchanges in early 2026.
Non-International Armed Conflicts
Pakistan vs the TTP, supported by Al-Qaeda and AQIS
The TTP has shifted from a loose umbrella of factions to a more centralized armed group with identifiable leadership, unified communications, and the capacity to speak with one voice, meeting the organization threshold. Its operational capacity is reflected in high-profile attacks, including the shooting of Malala Yousafzai, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, and a claimed attack on a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station in Afghanistan. It previously exercised territorial control in Pakistan’s tribal areas, including the Swat Valley, where it developed tunnel networks and improvised explosive device (IED) production sites. While comparable territorial control has not been re-established beyond roadblocks and patrols, its area of operations has expanded into provinces including Baluchistan, alongside new training camps in Afghan border provinces.
Attacks have increased in number, complexity, and geographic spread, with greater reliance on IEDs, remote attacks, and drones by both sides, and the resulting violence meets the intensity threshold for a non-international armed conflict (NIAC). Although al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and the Afghan Taliban remain distinct from the TTP, continued material support and participation by some members raises questions about support-based party status, yet available information remains insufficient to treat either as a party to the conflict. Tehreek e Jihad Pakistan (TJP) remains too opaque to be treated as participating in the same conflict.
Pakistan vs the Baloch insurgency
The Baloch insurgency is characterized by its fragmented nature and has been marked by internal divisions, preventing it from being unitary in either its goals or tactics. This fragmentation, coupled with the lack of independent monitoring and data, militates against assessing the insurgency as a whole as sufficiently organized, but some components, especially the BRAS coalition, meet the organization threshold. Formed from an initial alliance between the BLF and the BLA-Jeeyand (BLA-J) faction and later joined by other factions, the coalition has acted as a key coordinator of large-scale joint attacks on symbolic dates, claiming substantial activity in 2024 and further coordinated attacks in March 2025. The BLA-J faction expanded the number and complexity of operations, combined daily guerrilla pressure with disruption of CPEC infrastructure, carried out targeted suicide attacks including against Chinese nationals, and at times, controlled territory for extended periods. BLA-Azad violence sharply escalated from 2024, and carried out its first suicide attack in March 2025. Since 2021, coordinated attacks, suicide bombings, election-related violence, and temporary seizures of territory indicate that the situation already meets the intensity threshold required to qualify as a NIAC.
Pakistan vs Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-K)
IS-K operates across Afghanistan and Pakistan but remains principally anchored in Afghanistan, where it conducts its main recruitment and training activities. It aspires to establish a province within the self-proclaimed caliphate across Khorasan, encompassing Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan, and has also mounted attacks worldwide, including in Iran and Tajikistan. Since June 2020, it has been led by Sanaullah Ghafari, also known as Shahab al Muhajir. The group’s membership is estimated in the low thousands and recruitment extends to Central Asia and the Russian North Caucasus, with reports of indoctrination and suicide training for children. It sustains funding streams beyond the Islamic State core and has retained the ability to transfer funds despite pressure from the Afghan Taliban and Türkiye. Following its resurgence after the Afghan Taliban returned to power, attacks in Pakistan increased, yet the absence of major attacks in 2025 and early 2026 leads to the conclusion that the situation no longer qualifies as a NIAC in Pakistan.
Parties to the Conflict(s)
State Parties
- Pakistan
Non-State Parties
- Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
- Baloch Raaji Aajohi Sangar (BRAS), alternatively the Baloch Liberation Army-Jeeyand (BLA-J), and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF)
- Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K)
Other Main Actors
Other Non-State Actors Involved:
- Jaishul Adl faction (Iran)
- al-Qaeda core, AQIS and Jamaat un Ansar al-Sharia Pakistan
- Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP)
Foreign Involvement
- Afghanistan
- China
- India
- Iran