Non-international armed conflict in Senegal

Historical Background

Origins and context

Since 1982, the Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC) has engaged in a low-intensity armed conflict with the authorities in Senegal’s southern Casamance, a resource-rich region with significant agricultural and export production, marked by ethnic diversity dominated by the Diola and by more decentralized political traditions than northern Senegal. The conflict is driven by intertwined internal and external factors, including colonial legacies, border making, successive State policies, and perceived marginalization, alongside separatist claims of a promised path to independence. Casamance’s geographic separation from mainland Senegal by The Gambia and its proximity to Guinea-Bissau further contribute to geostrategic sensitivities.

Creation of MFDC armed wing and evolution of conflict dynamics

In 1985, the MFDC created the Atika armed wing, operational by 1990, with an initial attack on 20 April 1990 marking the military phase. The 1990s saw the peak of the rebellion, but violence persisted despite successive ceasefires, which displaced civilians near the borders with The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau.

Peace processes and fragmentation

Mediation efforts under Presidents Diouf and Wade produced accords between 2000 and 2004 without lasting peace, while the MFDC fragmented after its leader’s death in 2007 into major factions including Diakaye, a southern front, and a northern front. Under President Sall, mediation and exploratory talks continued without agreement. In March 2023, a peace agreement with MFDC Diakaye’s faction led to disarmament in 2023.

Humanitarian impact

Compared with other West African civil wars, the conflict has remained low level but has caused thousands of deaths over time, including from landmines, and caused large-scale displacement, with many fleeing to neighbouring States.

Key Developments (2023–2025)

During the reporting period, the situation saw several major developments:

1. Presidential elections in March 2024: Following attempts by former President Sall to constrain the opposition and postpone the elections, the presidential poll proceeded peacefully on 24 March 2024 with both ruling party and opposition candidates. The Electoral Commission announced Bassirou Diomaye Faye’s victory the next day and the Constitutional Court confirmed the result shortly thereafter. Presented as a leftwing pan-Africanist promising systemic change, greater sovereignty, and peace, Faye was sworn in in early April and appointed Ousmane Sonko as prime minister. Both had been released from detention shortly before the ballot under an amnesty, and Mr Sonko had been unable to run for the presidency due to a prior conviction for defamation.

2. Peace agreement signed between Senegal and the MFDC Southern Front: In February 2025, the government concluded an agreement with the MFDC faction led by César Atoute Badiate, building on earlier disarmament arrangements and facilitated by Guinea-Bissau’s president. The deal was framed as enabling investment for local communities, while Salif Sadio’s northern branch remained outside it.

3. Implementation of the ‘Diomaye Plan for Casamance’: The 2024–25 plan introduced by the new Senegalese government aims at lasting peace through development-oriented structural projects, including regional steering committees, institutional strengthening, demining, and support to local enterprises.

4. Departure of French troops from Senegal: Invoking sovereignty, the new government requested the withdrawal of France’s long-standing military contingent. Dakar and Paris agreed a phased departure with a joint commission and the final handover of bases in July 2025. France portrayed the move as part of a shift toward flexible partnerships, with continued training or targeted support depending on specific needs.