South Sudan, which seceded from Sudan and gained independence in 2011 following the north-south conflicts and the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, continues to face fragile institutions, significant opposition by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) as well as the National Salvation Front (NAS), and recurrent local violence, with stalled implementation of the 2015 and 2018 peace frameworks and worsening humanitarian conditions. During the period under review, cross-border spillover from the conflict in Sudan, disruption of the oil pipeline, and new splits in armed groups compounded the crisis. The government extended the transition period and postponed elections, reshuffled security leadership, pursued force unification and reached a limited agreement with the SPLM/A-IO Kitgwang faction, while hostilities with the main SPLM/A-IO and the NAS persisted. Clashes with White Army militias and incidents involving the RSF were also recorded. Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) deployment and renewed UN sanctions and the new UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) reflected the persistent instability.
Classification(s) and Parties to the Conflict(s)
- Non-International Armed Conflict between South Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO)
- Non-International Armed Conflict between South Sudan and the National Salvation Front (NAS)
During the reporting period, attacks on civilians in South Sudan escalated, with civilian harm peaking in early 2025 and remaining high. Improvised air-dropped barrel bombs containing highly flammable substances reportedly caused severe burns and civilian deaths, while hostilities and threats against humanitarian personnel repeatedly disrupted relief, drove acute food insecurity, and contributed to large-scale internal and cross-border displacement. Health facilities were attacked or used for military purposes. Both State forces and non-State armed groups committed murders, recruited and used children, and engaged in arbitrary detention and practices amounting to enforced disappearance. Conflict-related sexual violence, including rape, gang rape, sexual slavery, and forced marriage, remained widespread and under reported, with limited accountability.
Historical Background
Origins
Sudan’s post-colonial trajectory featured protracted conflict between the north and the south, rooted in religious and ethnic divisions and punctuated by attempts at political accommodation and recurrent breakdowns. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and John Garang, the head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A), ended the second civil war and opened the path to South Sudan’s independence in 2011, but legacies of militarization, contested identity, and centre-periphery tensions persisted.
Settlement and Secession
The 2005 comprehensive peace framework granted extensive autonomy to the South and intended to normalize relations. Fears of renewed confrontation between the North and the South were quashed as a peaceful referendum was held on 9 January 2011, with South Sudanese citizens voting overwhelmingly for independence.
Civil War and Civilian Harm in South Sudan
Power struggles within South Sudan’s leadership deteriorated into armed conflict marked by ethnically inflected violence and large-scale displacement. Both government and opposition forces attacked and ill-treated civilians.
Peace Agreements and Political Transition
Internationally brokered accords in 2015 and a revitalized framework in 2018 sought power-sharing, security sector reform, and a transitional roadmap. However, implementation has seen little progress, with repeated extensions of transitional period for implementation, limited unification of forces, repeated postponement of elections, and persistent governance dysfunction.
Security Fragmentation and Local Violence
Beyond national-level belligerents, splinter groups and communal militias contributed to a volatile security environment, particularly in the south and in Greater Equatoria, where localized disputes intersected with national dynamics.
Humanitarian Conditions and Regional Pressures
Food insecurity, climate shocks, and public health risks intensified humanitarian needs. Cross-border spillovers, including population movements linked to regional crises, compounded State capacity constraints and required continued international assistance and peace support.
Key Developments (2023–2025)
The reporting period was marked by security, political, and economic pressures. Major developments included the following:
- Heightened risk of Sudanese Civil War Spill-Over: fighting in Sudan repeatedly approached the border, prompting deployments on the South Sudan side, alleged cross-border recruitment, and sporadic clashes affecting Blue Nile, White Nile, and Upper Nile states. Refugee inflows continued with border incidents periodically raising concerns about possible escalation.
- Economic Crisis Following Oil Pipeline Damage: a rupture on the export pipeline via Sudan in February 2024 disrupted the main revenue stream, precipitating exchange-rate instability and emergency policy measures. Repair efforts were impeded by insecurity, and attempts to restart flows remained fragile amid control of key areas by Sudanese belligerents and renewed threats to facilities.
- Kenyan-Mediated Tumaini Initiative: talks launched in May 2024 in Nairobi brought government and selected armed opposition groups that had not endorsed the 2018 peace agreement to the table. Disagreements over scope and sequencing, however, led to withdrawals and subsequent stalemate in negotiations. Some groups rebranded and coalitions shifted without producing a breakthrough.
- Splintering of Thomas Cirillo’s National Salvation Front: in June 2024, a senior commander of the National Salvation Front (NAS) denounced the group’s leadership and formed the National Salvation United Forces (NSUF or NASUF), weakening the NAS militarily and territorially.
- The Ugandan People’s Defence Force presence in South Sudan: reports of UPDF incursions since June 2024 preceded their formal deployment at Juba’s request after March 2025 attacks, which included joint air-ground operations with the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) near Nasir and Wunlit.
- Extension of the transitional period and postponement of elections set for December 2024: Authorities extended the transition by two years from February 2025 and postponed elections to December 2026, citing preparatory deficits amid domestic and international criticism.
- Senior security and political leadership reforms: late 2024 to early 2025 reshuffles involved the removal of senior security chiefs and two vice presidents. The March 2025 house arrest of Machar consolidated presidential control and reshaped succession dynamics.
- Peace deal with the SPLM/A-IO Kitwang faction under Simon Gatwech Dual: after the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) split in August 2021 (Kitgwang faction) and then Agwelek’s break (Kitgwang Agwelek faction) in August 2022, a Port Sudan deal on 4 February 2025 committed Simon Gatwech (the head of SPLM/A-IO Kitgwang faction) to return to Juba within twelve months, become the SSPDF Deputy Chief of Defence Forces, integrate up to 21,900 troops, and nominate political appointees.
- Renewed efforts to unify security forces: security-force unification envisaged in 2018 largely stalled after 2022. Restart was slated for 1 March 2025, following Kuol Manyang’s 20 February 2025 appointment to chair the National Transitional Committee. Progress remains fragile amid unpaid forces, logistics shortfalls, and a renewed 2024 arms embargo.
- A growing number of clashes involving the so-called ‘White Army’: from March 2025, SSPDF confrontations with Nuer self-defence militias identifying as the White Army Militia intensified across several states.
- Two-day clash between the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the SPLA-IO: on 15–16 March 2025, RSF strikes against the SPLA-IO (military wing of SPLM/A-IO) near the border killed senior SPLA-IO commanders. There were also indications of RSF activity inside South Sudan.
- UN Security Council renewal of sanctions, embargos and UNMISS: on 30 May 2025, sanctions and the arms embargo were renewed by the UN Security Council while the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) mandate was extended to April 2026 amid persistent insecurity.
Non-International Armed Conflicts
South Sudan vs the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition
Hostilities between the SSPDF and the SPLM/A-IO amount to a NIAC that continued through the reporting period. Recurrent ground engagements across several states combined with coordinated aerial operations by the UPDF alongside the SSPDF in March 2025 reflect sustained and intense violence that generated large-scale internal displacement. Despite these offensives, the SPLM/A-IO largely retained control over its strongholds. The SPLM/A-IO exhibits a hierarchical command and formal ranking system, maintains training camps in areas under its control, and communicates through an official spokesperson and public channels, enabling discipline and the transmission of orders. Its continued territorial control is evidenced by the operation of checkpoints and taxation, supporting the planning and execution of sustained operations and indicating responsible command. These indicators satisfy the requisite organization and intensity for classifying the situation as a NIAC. Given territorial control and the capacity to implement Additional Protocol II, this armed conflict is regulated by the Protocol.
South Sudan vs the National Salvation Front
The National Salvation Front (NAS), created in 2017 by Thomas Cirillo and active mainly in Equatoria, fractured in June 2024 when defectors formed the National Salvation United Forces, yet NAS continued hostilities with the SSPDF through 2024 and 2025. Fighting involved repeated strikes on depots and bases, weapon seizures, and clashes around Magwi, Yei and Kajo-Keji, with civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects. A lull after March 2025 did not result from defeat or agreement, indicating sustained armed violence that also had sufficient intensity to amount to a NIAC. In terms of organization, NAS combines political and military components within a leadership architecture that assigns general-officer responsibilities. Thomas Cirillo serves as Chairman and Commander in Chief, with Kamilo Otwari Aleardo as Chief of Staff, and senior appointments in March 2025 further tightened command. The group’s logistics are sustained through revenue from artisanal mining and local taxation, along with materiel captured in combat. Communications are coordinated by a dedicated information structure. Therefore, the pre-existing NIAC between South Sudan and the NAS continued, although temporary base captures have not yielded stable territorial control required for Additional Protocol II to apply.
Parties to the Conflict(s) and Other Main Actor(s)
State Party
- South Sudan
- Uganda (as of March 2025)
Non-State Parties
- Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) (the term SPLM/A-IO is used here as an umbrella term for the combination of the political party SPLM-IO and its military wing SPLA-IO)
- National Salvation Front (NAS)
Other Non-State Actor
- White Army (a self-defence militia, not party to a NIAC)
Peacekeeping Operation
- UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS
Attacks on civilians escalated in early 2025 and remained high. In particular, reports indicate use of air-dropped barrel bombs with a highly flammable substance that caused civilian deaths and inflicted severe burns on survivors. Attacks and threats against humanitarian personnel by State forces and non-State armed groups repeatedly disrupted relief, driving acute food insecurity. Intensified hostilities provoked large-scale internal and cross-border displacement.
Civilians were deliberately targeted in South Sudan, with civilian harm peaking in early 2025 and remaining elevated thereafter. Both the frequency of violent incidents and the numbers killed and injured increased markedly. Although most casualties were caused by community militias and civil defence groups, incidents and victims attributable to unlawful acts by the parties to the two armed conflicts also rose significantly.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE
Health facilities were regularly attacked or used for military purposes during the reporting period.
Attacks against Health Facilities
During the period, South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) were responsible for multiple incidents in which hospitals or medical units were attacked or used for military purposes. A notable example was helicopter strike on Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital at Old Fangak, the main hospital in the area, on 3 May 2025, which caused civilian and health worker casualties and destroyed essential medical supplies. The operation followed a publicly announced threat of punitive action by the SSPDF if the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) did not release vessels allegedly hijacked at Adok Port in Leer County. With no evidence that the hospital was used for hostile acts and given that hospital’s coordinates were previously shared, the attack failed to respect distinction and the special protection of medical facilities and may amount to a war crime.
VIOLATIONS AGAINST PERSONS IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY
Both State forces and non-State armed groups committed murders, including following abductions. Children continued to be abducted, recruited, and used in hostilities by governmental and non-State forces. Parties have also conducted arbitrary detention, with some cases amounting to enforced disappearance. Conflict-related sexual violence remained widespread, including rape, gang rape, sexual slavery, and forced marriage, with very limited accountability.
Murder of Civilians
In South Sudan, incidents of murder of civilians by both State and non-State actors have been reported. In one case, armed men in military uniforms attacked a village in Central Equatoria and abducted several young civilian men, killing dozens and wounding others with machetes. The National Salvation Front (NAS) was widely blamed for the attack, although they accused the SSPDF of being responsible. Investigations by the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) were obstructed. Additionally, on 8 February 2025, two civilians were killed after allegedly witnessing government forces burning homes and looting in Nagero town.