The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has experienced cyclical violence from colonial exploitation and post-independence dictatorship through the regionalized Congo wars, leaving enduring armed group proliferation and state fragility. In eastern DRC, the resurgence of March 23 Movement (M23), the threat posed by organized armed groups, including the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), and large-scale internal displacement illustrate the persistence of non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) shaped by foreign involvement and competing regional deployments. During the reporting period, Rwanda’s presence and support to M23 drew growing international condemnation, while the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) faced violent contestations and contentious discussions on withdrawal. The state of siege in Ituri and North Kivu, contested elections and the creation of the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) with M23 coupled with fragmented peace initiatives, expanded regional military operations and renewed international accountability efforts contributed to the polarization and volatility of the situation.
Classifications and Parties to the Conflicts
- International Armed Conflict between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (and its support forces) and Rwanda
- International Armed Conflict between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (and its support forces) and the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF)
- International Armed Conflict between the DRC (and its support forces) and Rwanda through the proxy March 23 Movement (M23)
- Military Occupation of DRC by Rwanda, including through the March 23 Movement (M23) acting as a proxy armed group for Rwanda
- Non-International Armed Conflict between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (and its support forces) and Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
- Non-International Armed Conflict between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (and its support forces) and the Cooperative for the Developments of the Congo (CODEGO)
- Non-International Armed Conflict between the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the March 23 Movement (M23)
- Non-International Armed Conflict between the Cooperative for the Developments of the Congo (CODEGO) and the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF)
- Non-International Armed Conflict between the Cooperative for the Developments of the Congo (CODECO) and Zaïre
Civilian harm in the DRC intensified during the period, with ADF, M23 with Rwandan backing, Cooperative for the Developments of the Congo (CODEGO), Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) units and other armed actors conducting heavy shelling, bombings and raids on villages, internally displaced persons (IDP) sites, markets, homes and health and humanitarian facilities in disregard of obligations of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack. Widespread killing, including summary executions and ethnically targeted massacres, abductions followed by mass murder, hostage taking, enforced disappearance, pillage, destruction of property and forced labour were documented and in some instances characterized as war crimes and possibly crimes against humanity. Severe food insecurity, large-scale forced displacement often through unlawful orders to empty areas and systematic interference with humanitarian relief undermined objects indispensable to civilian survival. Conflict-related sexual violence reached epidemic levels and child recruitment by multiple parties was described as unprecedented, while journalists faced pervasive violence, censorship and threats of capital punishment for conflict reporting.
Historical Background
Colonial rule, dictatorship, civil war
From the late nineteenth century until 1960, the territory of present-day Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) experienced successive forms of external domination, first as the personal possession of Leopold II and then as a Belgian colony. This period is characterized as exploitative, with mass loss of life linked to slavery and forced labour, as well as disease and famine. Following independence, the country was subjected to prolonged dictatorial rule under Mobutu Sese Seko from 1965 to 1997, during which it was renamed Zaire and governed through coercive control.
Regionalization of armed conflict and the Congo wars
In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, close to two million refugees, including perpetrators, fled to eastern Congo, exacerbating an already severe crisis. Hutu extremists organized a militia and Tutsis formed counter militias. The First Congo War of 1996 to 1997 involved several African States, notably Angola, Rwanda, and Uganda, and was coordinated with Laurent Kabila, who became president in 1997. In 1998, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi attacked the DRC, initiating the Second Congo War from 1998 to 2003. President Kabila secured support from Angola, Namibia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe through mining concessions. The Lusaka Peace Accord of July 1999 was signed but not fully implemented and led to the deployment of 5,000 UN peacekeepers (the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUC). Following Laurent Kabila’s assassination in 2001, Joseph Kabila took power, and the Pretoria Accord later ended hostilities formally, yet unrest and economic collapse persisted.
Armed group dynamics and recent developments
The March 23 Movement’s (M23) formation, comprising predominantly ethnic Tutsis, and its 2012 to 2013 campaign prompted the establishment of an offensive brigade under the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in 2013. Under Félix Tshisekedi, controversially re-elected in 2023, the conflict globalized through United States (US) and China involvement, alongside deployment of regional military forces: the Southern African Development Community (SADC)’s Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) between 2023 and 2025, and previously the East African Community Regional Force in the DRC (EACRF) between 2022 and 2023. M23’s resurgence, Allied Democratic Forces’ (ADF) growing threat, Operation Shujaa, and over six million internally displaced by end 2024 remain central issues in the ongoing conflicts.
Key Developments (2023–2025)
The reporting period saw the following major developments:
- International reactions to Rwandan participation in the eastern DRC conflict
Multiple States and regional organizations expressed alarm at the escalating violence in eastern DRC and condemned Rwanda’s support to M23, urging it to halt its military activities and support. UN Security Council engagement intensified following reports of a significant Rwandan military presence in North Kivu, addressing M23 advances, demanding the cessation of hostilities, and debating explicit attribution of ‘foreign support’. Several States narrowed cooperation with Rwanda through aid suspensions or targeted measures.
- Anti-MONUSCO protests and discussions about the mission’s withdrawal
MONUSCO’s mandate remained contested amid political constraints and popular dissatisfaction. Deadly anti-MONUSCO protests in Goma, involving killings, injuries, and mass detentions, accelerated calls for the Mission’s withdrawal. However, renewed M23 offensives prompted the UN and Kinshasa to slow the drawdown, extend the mandate, and keep MONUSCO deployed into 2025.
- Lifting the state of siege in Ituri and North Kivu provinces
The military-led emergency regime in North Kivu and Ituri, criticized as ineffective against armed groups and used to suppress dissent through deaths and arbitrary arrests, became a focal point of domestic pressure. Despite interim steps that effectively prolonged it, the government announced its end amid mounting public discontent.
- Contested presidential elections in December 2023
Elections were marked by significant logistical failures, extended voting, and opposition demands for a rerun. Security forces dispersed protests and opposition figures challenged the results, while Tshisekedi’s reelection was confirmed and followed by delayed government formation consolidating loyalists.
- Establishment of the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) with M23 and conflict dynamics
AFC’s launch with M23 deepened regional frictions and prompted prosecutions and death sentences in absentia against its leadership. M23’s capture of strategic towns, including major urban centres, caused extensive civilian harm and peacekeeper deaths, while some armed groups reportedly aligned with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) against M23.
- Peace initiatives and regional deployments
Regional peace processes repeatedly broke down. The SADC deployed its SAMIDRC mission but later decided to end it amid rising casualties. The March 2025 Qatar- and US-backed peace initiative produced ceasefire calls and limited withdrawals, followed in June by a bilateral DRC-Rwanda agreement requiring cessation of hostilities, non-support to armed groups, monitoring mechanisms, and Rwandan troop withdrawal. M23 signed a separate Doha framework in July 2025, while Ituri dialogue yielded a cessation of hostilities agreement between local armed groups in June 2025, which was deemed structurally fragile without reintegration and livelihoods.
- Additional conflict-related developments
The ICC prosecutor announced renewed investigations into alleged international crimes in North Kivu. Kabila’s return and presence in rebel held Goma coincided with treason proceedings and party restrictions. New armed movements emerged in Ituri, and expanded Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) and Burundian deployments raised concerns about consent, impartiality, and interstate tensions. The Human Rights Council requested an urgent OHCHR fact-finding mission on alleged violations since 2022.
International Armed Conflict
DRC vs Rwanda
During the reporting period, the FARDC, supported by MONUSCO and the Burundi Armed Forces (FDNB), and opposing forces of Rwanda acting alongside M23, were engaged in an IAC in four forms. First, hostilities amounted to a traditional IAC between the DRC and Rwanda. Second, an IAC by proxy existed between the DRC and Rwanda, with M23 operating as Rwanda’s proxy. Third, Rwanda was occupying part of the DRC with its own forces. Fourth, Rwanda’s occupation of DRC territory was operated through M23. In line with a support-based approach, MONUSCO and the FDNB were parties to the IAC between the DRC and Rwanda. Moreover, the DRC increasingly relied on private military and security companies against Rwanda and M23.
The pre-existing IAC between the DRC and Rwanda continued amid allegations and reports that Rwandan forces operated on DRC territory alongside M23 and engaged the FARDC and its supporting forces. While Rwanda and M23 disputed some claims, Rwandan forces fought with M23 on multiple occasions, including heavy fighting around Sake west of Goma and escalation leading to M23 and Rwandan forces entering and taking control of Goma, with additional presence in Petit Nord and South Kivu. Hostilities by Rwandan forces against the FARDC and supporting forces on DRC territory triggered an active IAC and IHL remains applicable notwithstanding a ceasefire as long as there is no general end to military operations. Although it is uncertain whether Rwanda continues actively fighting alongside M23, hostilities persist at least with M23, supporting the conclusion that the conflict is ongoing.
Since its resurgence in late 2021, M23 has continuously fought the FARDC, notably in North Kivu. A conflict is classified as international where a State exercises overall control over an organized armed group fighting another State, which entails more than financing or equipping and requires involvement in the coordination and general planning of the group’s military operations. Evidence indicates that M23 received direct instructions from Rwanda and its intelligence services on several occasions, including strategic decisions to seize, hold, withdraw from, or otherwise manage territory, suggesting hierarchical subordination and overall operational coordination by Rwanda. Although Rwanda and M23 have repeatedly denied any supportive relationship, UN reporting nonetheless characterizes Rwanda as exercising effective control and de facto direction over M23 operations. On that basis, the M23 is considered as acting as a Rwandan proxy, with the armed conflict between the DRC and Rwanda correspondingly taking the form of an IAC fought through a proxy.
Rwanda is physically present in parts of the DRC and exercises effective control over M23, which functions as its proxy force and carries out occupation by proxy over certain areas within the DRC. Occupation by proxy exists where a State exercises at least overall control over an organized armed group that is itself in effective control of another State’s territory without that State’s consent, prevents the pre-existing local authorities from exercising their powers, and establishes its own authority. During the reporting period, M23 and Rwanda jointly seized and consolidated strategic areas, with UN reporting indicating a substantial territorial expansion from late 2024 into January 2025 and repeated DRC calls for withdrawal. In zones under its control, M23 displaced State officials and operated a parallel governance structure, dismantling and replacing existing civil and administrative arrangements. It also imposed administrative control through appointments and institutional arrangements that enabled it to exercise authority over the population and territory. On this basis, the cumulative elements of occupation, including by proxy, are met, and Rwanda occupies parts of the DRC, both directly and through M23.
Non-International Armed Conflicts
DRC vs the ADF
The ADF, later aligned with Islamic State and operating as the Islamic State Central Africa Province since 2020, has a long-standing presence in eastern DRC, particularly around Beni, and since 2021 expanded operations northward toward Ituri. In response to a surge in attacks, FARDC, supported by the UPDF through Operation Shujaa and by MONUSCO through logistical and combat deployment, has conducted joint operations against the group, with the UPDF and MONUSCO participating as parties alongside the DRC. Violence during the reporting period remained significant, with numerous attacks causing significant civilian casualties, although clashes became less frequent in early to mid-2025, and the group adapted its methods, including improvised explosive devices (IED) tactics and increased reliance on drones and communications technology. The ADF displays responsible command and internal discipline, operates through coordinated mobile cells, and maintains stable control over areas hosting key camps, enabling sustained and concerted operations. These elements support classification as a NIAC meeting the Additional Protocol II criteria for the application of the Protocol in addition to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and customary IHL.
CODECO vs the UPDF
Uganda deployed troops from the UPDF to the DRC in early 2025, including around 1,000 who were sent to Bunia, Mahagi and Djugu in February and March in addition to forces already present under Operation Shujaa. Following this reinforcement, the first half of 2025 was marked by repeated clashes between the UPDF and CODECO, including incidents reported in February, March and May. Fighting in March 2025 was particularly intense after CODECO attacked a UPDF post in Fataki, prompting a UPDF offensive with contested casualty figures. UN experts describe weeks of intense hostilities, including frequent aerial bombardments, heavy casualties on the CODECO side, UPDF losses, and destruction of civilian homes, against a broader context of mass displacement. Given CODECO’s established organization, these engagements met the intensity threshold and a new NIAC between CODECO and the UPDF emerged during the reporting period.
FDLR vs M23
The FDLR’s military action against M23, although supported by the FARDC, appears to occur outside FARDC control, indicating a separate NIAC between the two armed groups. Since 2022, M23 and the RDF have repeatedly attacked FDLR strongholds, with M23 framing its operations as protection of the Tutsi community against the FDLR. During the reporting period, sustained clashes occurred around traditional FDLR positions and escalated into high-intensity fighting in early 2025, notably during the battle for Goma, which caused mass displacement, heavy casualties and injuries, and the detention and transfer of many FDLR fighters to Rwanda. M23’s military dominance forced FDLR withdrawals and relocations and contributed to the withdrawal of the SADC mission after significant losses. Despite fluctuations, violence remained protracted. FDLR maintains intertwined political and military branches, geographic command posts, specialized units, internal discipline mechanisms, training capacity, recruitment and diversified financing. M23 displays a centralized command, structured armed wing, territorial control, training and discipline, enabling implementation of IHL and meeting organization standard. As a result, the pre-existing NIAC between FDLR and M23 continued throughout the period.
CODECO vs Zaïre
CODECO, a predominantly Lendu armed group operating mainly in eastern Ituri, and Zaïre (the moniker used to refer to the ADCVI or ‘Front populaire d’autodéfense en Ituri’), which claims to represent Hema interests, are in direct ideological opposition rooted in intercommunal violence and competition over land and influence. After clashes resumed in 2017 and escalated in 2018, hostilities developed into a pre-existing NIAC from 2022 that remained active throughout the reporting period. Violence intensified from September 2024 in Djugu and spiked again in April 2025, with recurrent clashes and shifting territorial control, including CODECO gains around Mongbwalu and Bayali Kilo, contributing to displacement. The violence involved bladed weapons and firearms on the CODECO side and a broader arsenal on the Zaïre side including assault rifles, machine guns, and a range of explosive ordnance. CODECO’s organization is established, and Zaïre, despite describing itself as a self-defence group, displays a hierarchical structure with dispersed factions, identifiable leadership roles, training programmes, disciplinary mechanisms, coordinated planning and logistics, recruitment and weapons procurement, including alleged trafficking networks and resource-based financing. A staged disarmament ceremony did not interrupt armed confrontations. The intensity and organization thresholds are met, and the NIAC between CODECO and Zaïre continued throughout the reporting period.
DRC vs CODECO
FARDC and CODECO have engaged in sporadic clashes since 2018, and a NIAC exists between the DRC and CODECO from at least 2021, as CODECO has fought FARDC to secure control over the Djugu region while increasingly targeting civilians and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. MONUSCO has provided operational support to FARDC, including patrols, temporary bases, medical evacuations, and direct fire in response to CODECO attacks, supporting its participation as a party alongside the DRC. During the reporting period, direct FARDC-CODECO fighting was limited to a single reported clash in April 2024, yet CODECO remained active and retained territory in Ituri and North Kivu, including areas near the Ugandan border, indicating a continuing risk of renewed hostilities despite fluctuations. CODECO operates through a consolidated command structure integrating several factions, with regional autonomy for routine activity and centralized direction for joint operations, communication channels for operational instructions, and training and disciplinary mechanisms. It conducts coordinated attacks using bladed weapons, firearms, and arson, targets mining areas to sustain operations, raises funds through illicit extraction, taxation, and kidnappings, and recruits both voluntarily and by force. Accordingly, the applicable thresholds of intensity and organization remain met, and the preexisting NIAC between the DRC and CODECO continued throughout the reporting period.
Parties to the Conflict(s)
State Parties
- DRC (FARDC)
- Rwanda (RDF)
- Uganda (UPDF)
- Burundi (FDNB)
- MONUSCO (Bangladesh, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, South Africa, Tanzania, Uruguay) [mandate extended until 20 December 2025]
- East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) (Burundi, Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda) [premature expulsion in December 2023]
- SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) (Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania) [SAMIDRC withdrew in April/May 2025]
Non-State Parties
- March 23 Movement (M23)
- Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
- Cooperative for the Developments of the Congo (CODEGO)
- Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
- Zaïre
Other Main Non-State Actors
- Congo Protection
- Mai-Mai groups
- Wazalendo/ Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie (VDP)
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS
Civilians were increasingly exposed to attacks, forced displacement and food insecurity during the reporting period, raising serious concerns under IHL, including the fundamental rules governing the conduct of hostilities, the prohibition of forced displacement, and the protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.
In the DRC, attacks against civilians and civilian objects increased, with heavy artillery, shelling, and bombings and rising overall fatalities as of early 2025. As a result of a security vacuum linked to FARDC deployment against M23 and MONUSCO’s withdrawal from South Kivu, attacks against civilians intensified across armed actors, The ADF was identified as the principal main perpetrator, with attacks increasingly relying on ambushes and assaults on roads, villages and farmers, and civilian fatalities rising markedly in early 2025, particularly in Lubero and across Beni and southern Ituri. Civilian killings were also attributed to M23, with RDF support, including large-scale fatalities in North Kivu in mid-July, and to CODECO attacks on villages in Ituri, including near an IDP camp with homes burned. These patterns engage the customary IHL obligations of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE
During the reporting period, civilian objects, especially medical facilities and humanitarian facilities as well as people’s homes, were regularly attacked and looted by the ADF, M23, and CODECO. Such conduct breaches the principle of distinction, the special protection afforded to medical units, and the prohibition of pillage.
Attacks on Villages and IDP Camps
During the reporting period in the DRC, attacks on civilians and civilian objects included recurrent assaults on villages, internally displaced persons (IDP) sites and homes by the ADF, M23 and CODECO. A security vacuum linked to FARDC deployment against M23 and MONUSCO’s withdrawal from South Kivu facilitated the remobilization of armed groups and intensified harm to civilians. As M23 consolidated positions in the east, the ADF escalated violence against local communities through mass killings, looting, hostage-taking and the burning of homes, exploiting instability resulting from previous clashes involving the FARDC, M23 and RDF. CODECO also repeatedly targeted villages, including locations hosting an IDP camp in Ituri, with reports of high civilian fatalities and homes burned as bodies continued to be recovered.
VIOLATIONS AGAINST PERSONS IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY
In the DRC, serious violations of IHL perpetrated against the persons in the power of the parties to the conflicts include murder of civilians, arbitrary deprivation of liberty, hostage-taking, enforced disappearances, pillage, destruction of homes, and forced labour and military servitude in training camps. Conflict-related sexual violence was described as being of epidemic proportions, including rape, gang rape and sexual slavery, sometimes followed by executions, and affecting women, girls, men and boys. Recruitment and use of children by multiple armed actors was described as reaching an unprecedented scale. Journalists faced violence and media closures, alongside official threats of the death penalty for reporting on conflicts.
- Murder
- Arbitrary Detention
- Enforced Disappearances
- Looting and pillage
- Forced Labour
- Sexual Violence
- Recruitment of Children
- Protection of Journalists
Murder of Civilians
During the reporting period in the DRC, civilians were murdered in summary executions and other violence by State and non-state actors. M23 is alleged to have carried out mass killings in Rutshuru, including summary executions of mainly Hutu civilians across villages and farming communities, and to have committed murder as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population, alongside other abuses. Witness accounts and military sources alleged participation by Rwanda’s military, with Rwanda also identified as bearing responsibility under international law given its effective control over M23. The ADF is reported to have killed large numbers of unarmed civilians, including abduction followed by mass killing, and to have committed murder at scale over 2024 and early 2025. FARDC units are also accused of retaliatory summary executions in South Kivu, including street shootings and door to door searches targeting men and teenage boys suspected of supporting Wazalendo. These acts are framed as war crimes and, in relation to M23 and the ADF, as potentially amounting to crimes against humanity.