Ethiopia has experienced recurrent armed violence rooted in regional disputes and contested centre-periphery relations. The 1998–2000 international armed conflict with Eritrea formally ended with the Algiers Agreement, which also established the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission. A significant non-international armed conflict between federal authorities and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) formally ceased with the 2022 Pretoria Agreement, but the presence of Eritrean troops in Ethiopia, delayed demobilization and intra TPLF rivalries have generated localized confrontations and a volatile environment in Tigray. In Amhara, exclusion of Fano militias from the Pretoria arrangements and the decision to disband regional special forces fuelled escalating confrontations with federal forces, including fighting involving drones and heavy weapons. In Oromia, Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) – Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) combat and OLA attacks on civilians continued despite partial disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) steps with a splinter faction.
Classifications and Parties to the Conflicts
- Non-International Armed Conflict between the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) and Fano Amhara militias
- Non-International Armed Conflict between the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)
Across Ethiopia’s non-international armed conflicts, the ENDF, the OLA and Fano militias repeatedly targeted civilians or conducted indiscriminate attacks, including drone strikes on populated areas, causing deaths, injuries and destruction of civilian objects. Medical personnel and facilities were attacked, ambulances were seized and staff intimidated, degrading essential health services despite their special protection under IHL. Hostilities drove large scale displacement and contributed to acute malnutrition, while insecurity, kidnappings and obstruction severely restricted humanitarian access. Persons in the power of parties faced abductions, hostage-taking with ransom demands, torture, summary executions and mass arbitrary arrests, including on ethnic grounds. All parties recruited and used children, conflict-related sexual violence remained widespread, and persons with disabilities faced heightened vulnerability and limited access to inclusive services.
Historical Background
Ethiopia faces recurrent armed violence driven by regional and cross-border disputes.
Eritrea-Ethiopia
Following Eritrea’s independence in 1993, bilateral tensions over trade, sea access, and borders escalated into a two-year IAC beginning in 1998. The Algiers Agreement of 12 December 2000 formally ended the war and established the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission.
Tigray
A significant NIAC opposed federal authorities and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) from 2020 to 2022 after nationwide protests in 2018. Eritrean forces and Amhara formations supported the federal side. The Pretoria Agreement of November 2022 ended active hostilities. However, post-agreement repercussions, including the presence of Eritrean troops in Ethiopia, persisted.
Oromia
After the designation of the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) as a terrorist organization in May 2021 and its subsequent alliance with the TPLF in August 2021, clashes with federal forces began in October 2021 and intensified in 2022. Despite talks in 2023, engagements on the battlefield continued in 2024.
Amhara
Tensions between federal forces and Fano militias stem from exclusion of the latter from the Pretoria Agreement, unmet political claims, and the April 2023 decision to disband regional special forces. Confrontations have markedly escalated since April 2023 and spread across the region.
Key Developments (2023–2025)
The reporting period saw several major developments:
- Tigray region: Despite the 2022 Pretoria agreement, reports indicate a continued Eritrean military presence in border districts while Eritrea denies maintaining control over any Ethiopian territory. Active hostilities have not been recorded, yet border deployments and political tensions in early 2025 created a volatile environment. Demobilization of former TPLF members has been delayed, and intra-TPLF rivalries escalated into localized confrontations driven by power struggles, control over resources, and divergent readings of the agreement, temporarily challenging the Tigray Interim Administration’s authority.
- Amhara region: From April 2023, confrontations between Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) and Fano Amhara escalated, prompting a state of emergency in August. Urban clashes gave way to rural fighting marked by drone use and heavy weapons, with civilians repeatedly affected. Control of towns shifted at points in 2023, and major engagements recurred through late 2024 and early 2025. Fano also confronted other militias, expanding influence in parts of western Amhara and triggering displacement.
- Oromia region: ENDF-OLA combat persisted in 2023–24 alongside OLA attacks on civilians. A December 2024 agreement with a splinter OLA faction initiated disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) steps in early 2025, while the main faction continued engagements. In mid-2024, overlapping clashes among OLA, Fano, and ENDF in North Shoa caused civilian casualties, displacement, and damage to infrastructure.
Non-International Armed Conflicts
The ENDF vs Fano Amhara militias
Since at least April 2023, hostilities between the ENDF and Fano Amhara have reached the required intensity for a NIAC, expanding by August 2023 across Amhara, including Bahir Dar, and featuring repeated drone and airstrikes, heavy artillery, rocket fire, and intensive shelling, with large-scale casualties and extensive damage to civilian objects and infrastructure. Although Fano is decentralized and fragmented, loosely aligned groups have operated under fluid alliances led by individual commanders with internal coordination for planning and conducting operations. As a result, Fano can be considered as a party to a NIAC. Joint actions have enabled control of key roadways by July 2024, the encirclement of Woldia in early September 2024, and a November 2024 claim of widespread regional control, even if urban holds were typically short-lived. Patterns of violence indicate growing organization, with reported attacks on ENDF tripling in July-September 2024 compared with the previous year, and communication occurring without a single unified voice. The ENDF-Fano confrontation therefore meets NIAC thresholds. Absent sufficiently stable territorial control, Additional Protocol II does not apply, while customary IHL does.
ENDF vs OLA
Hostilities between the ENDF and the OLA persisted across 2023–25, marked by recurrent military operations and, in October 2024, a escalation with air- and drone strikes against the OLA. A peace agreement with an OLA splinter in December 2024 did not halt confrontations with the founding OLA faction. The OLA maintains a politico-military command (OLF-OLA High Command, created in 2021) and an internal disciplinary system. Its strategy combines regular attacks on ENDF and communal militias, targeted killings of officials and police to disrupt administration, and hit-and-run actions, including an urban unit tasked with assassinations. The group’s stronghold lies in western Oromia, where it relies on local support. The OLA exercised control over rural and semi-rural areas in earlier years, while more recent references point to dispersed hideouts and only partial, uncertain control. Given the persistence of hostilities between the ENDF and the OLA as well as the OLA’s organization, NIAC thresholds have been satisfied during the reporting period. Additional Protocol II remains inapplicable given unproven stable territorial control, while customary IHL continues to govern.
Parties to the Conflict
State Party
- Ethiopia
Non-State Parties
- Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)
- Fano Amhara Militias
Other Main Actors
Other State Involved
- Eritrea
Other Non-State Actors Involved
- Ethnic Agaw militias
- Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS
Across Ethiopia’s non-international armed conflicts (NIACs), the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) and armed groups targeted civilians and carried out indiscriminate attacks, with ENDF drone strikes causing civilian deaths and injuries. In Amhara, medical personnel and facilities were attacked, ambulances were seized and staff intimidated for treating wounded, degrading essential health services. Drone strikes hit schools, markets, and a health centre, raising distinction and proportionality concerns. Conflict drove significant displacement in Amhara and Oromia and acute malnutrition in Gambella. Humanitarian access was severely restricted by insecurity, kidnappings, and Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) obstruction, weakening assistance to drought- and conflict-affected communities.
Across Ethiopia’s two NIACs, both State forces and armed groups targeted civilians and conducted indiscriminate attacks. The Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) carried out recurrent drone strikes that killed and maimed civilians.
Attacks against Medical Personnel
Reporting in 2024 described systematic targeting of healthcare personnel across Amhara, with the ENDF responsible for serious IHL violations that may amount to war crimes. Conduct included hospital raids, seizure of ambulances and intimidation of medical staff for treating wounded Fano fighters, undermining the protected status of impartial medical care. Health workers were arrested, tortured, and killed, and the resulting degradation of the health system left civilians without access to essential services.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE
All three parties to armed conflict – the ENDF, the OLA, and Fano militia – have regularly attacked civilian objects in their conduct of hostilities. Notably, medical facilities were repeatedly targeted, in breach of their special protection foreseen by IHL.
Attacks against Health Facilities
Despite IHL’s obligation of special protection, medical facilities in the Amhara region were repeatedly attacked, amounting to war crimes, and undermining the health system. The pattern forced many facilities to suspend services, cut off essential supplies, and prompted staff to flee, leaving civilians without basic care and afraid to seek treatment. The sustained nature of the violence indicates deliberate or reckless disregard for the protected status of medical units. In the absence of effective accountability by Ethiopian authorities for abuses by forces operating in Amhara, the likelihood of continued attacks and escalating humanitarian harm remains high.
VIOLATIONS AGAINST PERSONS IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY
Across Ethiopia’s conflicts, serious violations against persons in the hands of the parties persisted. In Oromia, the OLA abducted and killed civilians during locality attacks. The ENDF and Amhara regional forces carried out mass arbitrary arrests of ethnic Amhara. Hostage-taking by the OLA and Fano involved ransom demands, torture, and summary executions. All parties recruited children, with reports of authorities coercing boys into security forces and ENDF-linked abductions. Conflict-related sexual violence remained widespread, with antecedent abuses by Ethiopian soldiers and Eritrean forces fuelling reprisals. Persons with disabilities faced heightened vulnerability, with prevalence highest in Tigray and Amhara and limited inclusive services despite humanitarian rehabilitation support.
Reports indicate a pattern of murders of civilians following abductions during locality attacks. In Oromia, the OLA allegedly carried out killings and arson against communities suspected of supporting the Government of Ethiopia, including a late 2024 operation near Meki described as the deadliest in the region since 2022. Serious violations continued in 2025, with the OLA accused of attacking civilians in Kemashi and Arsi, causing multiple civilian deaths and injuries, including children and a religious figure.