Non-international armed conflict between the LAAF and the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT)
By juliette
Background
The Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) was established in 2016 with the purpose of ousting then-Chadian President Idriss Déby.1AM. Bissada.‘Chad: Six things to know about the rebel group FACT’, The Africa Report, 22 April 2021; F. E. Şefkatli, ‘The Problem of Foreign Mercenaries in Libya: the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT)’, ORSAM Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 27 April 2021. The creation of FACT was a result of a split of the former Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) into three separate groups: the UFDD, led by Mahamat Nouri, the FACT, headed by Mahamat Mahadi, and the Council of Military Command for the Salvation of the Republic under Mahamat Hassani Bulmay.2‘Who are Chad’s FACT rebels and what are their goals?’, Al Jazeera, 21 April 2021.
FACT is a Chadian rebel group operating mainly from Libyan territory, crossing into Chad to conduct attacks and then retreating back into Libya.3‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, Annex 19. FACT was initially based in Jufra, Libya,4F. E. Şefkatli, ‘The Problem of Foreign Mercenaries in Libya: the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT)’, ORSAM Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 27 April 2021 until LAAF took this territory during 2017.5‘Who are Chad’s FACT rebels and what are their goals?’, Al Jazeera, 21 April 2021. After LAAF’s takeover of Jufra, FACT maintained its presence in the town and agreed to a non-aggression pact with LAAF in 2017.6F. E. Şefkatli, ‘The Problem of Foreign Mercenaries in Libya: the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT)’, ORSAM Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 27 April 2021; ‘Who are Chad’s FACT rebels and what are their goals?’, Al Jazeera, 21 April 2021; F. E. Compassionate, ‘The Problem of Foreign Mercenaries in Libya: The Front for Change and Adaptation in Chad (FACT)’, Libya Tribune, 4 May 2021. During LAAF’s offensive on Tripoli in 2019 and 2020 (see above), FACT forces were supporting LAAF in their fight against the western-based authorities.7A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021. During that time, FACT fighters were trained and armed by LAAF forces.8A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021.
The relationship between these two non-state actors, however, deteriorated during the first half of 2021 due to differences of opinion concerning the distribution of profits from fuel smuggling and the composition of internal hierarchies.9A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021. FACT moved its headquarters away from Jufra, to Um al-Aranib town which is closer to the Libya-Chad border.10A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021. Despite LAAF’s former non-aggression pact with FACT, Libya’s eastern-based government and LAAF now officially position themselves against FACT. The purpose of this policy change is to uphold LAAF’s security partnership and relationship with the Chadian government.11‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, Annex 19.
Intensity
The only recorded clash between LAAF and FACT during this reporting period occurred on 22 August 2023. LAAF employed airstrikes against FACT on the Libyan side of the Libya-Chad border following a ceasefire breach by FACT.12‘Libya’s LNA launches operations against Chad rebels along border’, Al Jazeera, 25 August 2023; ‘LNA launches campaign against FACT targets in southern Libya following Chadian airstrikes’, Libya Security Monitor, 22 August 2023; ‘Libya’s LNA launches operation near southern border after Chad clashes’, Reuters, 25 August 2023. Despite a pause in fighting since August 2023, this does not necessarily mean that the NIAC between FACT and LAAF has ended. Common Article 3 does not prescribe when NIACs come to an end but, according to the ICRC, a NIAC ends in one of two ways, namely if one of the parties to the NIAC ceases to exist, or if the fighting has stopped and there is no real risk of it resuming.13‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 18 – 19. Both parties to this pre-existing NIAC in Libya, LAAF and FACT continue to exist.
As detailed above, LAAF has officially positioned itself against FACT in order to strengthen its security partnership with the Chadian government, and has conducted airstrikes against FACT positions to support the Chadian government in its fight against FACT in the past.14‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, Annex 19. As of June 2025, FACT remains one of the most prominent and active rebel groups carrying out regular attacks in Chad.15‘Chad’, Freedom House. Fighting between LAAF and FACT could resume at any time.
Organization
Very little information is known about the command structure of FACT. What is known is that its overall commander is Mahamat Mahadi Ali who is also the group’s founder.16‘Who are Chad’s FACT rebels and what are their goals?’, Al Jazeera, 21 April 2021. Ali also serves as the spokesperson for FACT, which communicates through issuing public statements.17S. Alharathy, ‘Rebel group FACT ends ceasefire with Chadian army after attack on bases in Libya’, The Libya Observer, 20 August 2023; A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021. FACT fighters received training from LAAF and LAAF supporters, such as Russia and the UAE, prior to 2021.18A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021. Such training enables military discipline, military tactics, and the ability to comply with IHL.
FACT regularly employs cross-border guerrilla-style attacks19‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, Annex 19 from its military bases in the mountainous border regions of Southern Libya as its modus operandi.20‘Chad’, The World Factbook, 15 December 2025; D. Ekonde, ‘Chad’s latest marshal’, Africa is a Country, 20 February 2020; ‘Union of Forces for Democracy and Development’, EBSCO, 2023; A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021. On 30 October 2023, FACT’s military wing had approximately 2,000 fighters speaking to its recruitment capabilities, and 400 armoured vehicles which confirms its logistical capacity.21‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, Annex 19. FACT generates funding to support its conflict efforts through illicit cross-border trading in Libyan resources, such as oil22‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, Annex 19 and mercenary work.23A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021.
FACT remains sufficiently organized as demanded by IHL.
- 1AM. Bissada.‘Chad: Six things to know about the rebel group FACT’, The Africa Report, 22 April 2021; F. E. Şefkatli, ‘The Problem of Foreign Mercenaries in Libya: the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT)’, ORSAM Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 27 April 2021.
- 2‘Who are Chad’s FACT rebels and what are their goals?’, Al Jazeera, 21 April 2021.
- 3‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, Annex 19.
- 4F. E. Şefkatli, ‘The Problem of Foreign Mercenaries in Libya: the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT)’, ORSAM Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 27 April 2021
- 5‘Who are Chad’s FACT rebels and what are their goals?’, Al Jazeera, 21 April 2021
- 6F. E. Şefkatli, ‘The Problem of Foreign Mercenaries in Libya: the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT)’, ORSAM Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 27 April 2021; ‘Who are Chad’s FACT rebels and what are their goals?’, Al Jazeera, 21 April 2021; F. E. Compassionate, ‘The Problem of Foreign Mercenaries in Libya: The Front for Change and Adaptation in Chad (FACT)’, Libya Tribune, 4 May 2021.
- 7A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021.
- 8A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021.
- 9A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021.
- 10A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021.
- 11‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, Annex 19.
- 12‘Libya’s LNA launches operations against Chad rebels along border’, Al Jazeera, 25 August 2023; ‘LNA launches campaign against FACT targets in southern Libya following Chadian airstrikes’, Libya Security Monitor, 22 August 2023; ‘Libya’s LNA launches operation near southern border after Chad clashes’, Reuters, 25 August 2023.
- 13‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 18 – 19.
- 14‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, Annex 19.
- 15‘Chad’, Freedom House.
- 16‘Who are Chad’s FACT rebels and what are their goals?’, Al Jazeera, 21 April 2021.
- 17S. Alharathy, ‘Rebel group FACT ends ceasefire with Chadian army after attack on bases in Libya’, The Libya Observer, 20 August 2023; A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021.
- 18A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021.
- 19‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, Annex 19
- 20‘Chad’, The World Factbook, 15 December 2025; D. Ekonde, ‘Chad’s latest marshal’, Africa is a Country, 20 February 2020; ‘Union of Forces for Democracy and Development’, EBSCO, 2023; A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021.
- 21‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, Annex 19.
- 22‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya’, UN Doc S/2024/914, 13 December 2024, Annex 19
- 23A. Bish, ‘Déby’s death will fuel instability and criminal opportunity in the Sahel’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 April 2021.