Non-international armed conflict between Yemen and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

26 March 2026

Background

The predecessor of AQAP, known as the Islamic Jihad Movement (IJM), emerged in the 1990s, recruiting among Arab jihadist volunteers returning from Afghanistan and maintaining ties with Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Islamist movements born of IJM had close links with President Saleh’s regime. The Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA), which was founded in the late 1990s with IJM remnants, conducted the first major attacks against Western interests in the region against the US warship USSCole in the port of Aden on 12 October 2000. After the 11 September 2001 attacks, President Saleh turned against Al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadist groups. AQAP was founded in 2009 by Nasir al-Wuhayshi as a merger of various Al-Qaeda branches in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Before the popular uprising of 2011, AQAP was only a marginal, though serious threat, with at most several hundred fighters.¹

Since 2009, the United States has regularly conducted air strikes against AQAP, with the apparent consent of the Government of Yemen. Against the background of the insurgency in Yemen, the United States increased the frequency of their drone strikes and broadened the US mission to include wider support to the government against the insurgency by AQAP. Hence, the United States could be considered a party to the armed conflict opposing the Government of Yemen and AQAP as of at least 2012.² In 2016, thirty-five airstrikes were reported, and in 2017, about 130 airstrikes were directed at AQAP and militants associated with the self-proclaimed Islamic State. Since then, the frequency of airstrikes has decreased, although they still occur.³

In 2011, AQAP reorganized to take advantage of the security vacuum in Yemen caused by the popular uprising. It sought to distinguish its earlier international terrorist agenda from newly acquired domestic territorial ambitions. AQAP seized control in and around several cities in southern Yemen. This enabled the group to assume control over several towns in the south of Yemen, such as Zinjibar, the capital of the Abyan governorate. In 2011–12, this resulted in several small Islamic emirates being declared by AQAP.⁴ This was accompanied by an outbreak of violence in the south of Yemen between a combination of Yemeni security services and local militias (known as Popular Committees) on the one hand, and AQAP fighters on the other. The situation escalated and the confrontations continued.⁵

Following the inauguration of President Hadi, AQAP intensified its attacks on government targets. For example, on 21 May 2012, a suicide bomber attacked a military parade in Sana’a killing ninety-six members of the government’s armed forces and wounding over 200 people.⁶ As a reaction, airstrikes were conducted by the Yemeni Air Force and Navy against AQAP in the south. In May 2012, government forces ousted AQAP from Abyan.⁷ There has been an armed conflict between IRG forces and AQAP since March 2011.⁸

In recent years, AQAP has been weakened and has lost control over previously held regions, resulting in a reduction in its activities and a shift to hit-and-run guerrilla tactics rather than seizing large and populated areas. The fighting has continued at a slow pace, although AQAP entered a phase of retrenchment in which they were less active. A major Houthi offensive in Al-Bayda in 2020 expelled AQAP from its stronghold in Al-Qayfa and pushed it into more marginal, south-eastern parts of the governorate, prompting UN experts to describe AQAP as perhaps at its weakest by the end of 2020. The killing of long-time leader Qasim al-Raymi in a US operation was announced in early 2020. Combined with earlier losses in the top echelon, this deepened a crisis of leadership (see above) and strategy, with analysts highlighting ideological disputes and competition within the wider Al-Qaeda network.⁹

Intensity

Attacks between Yemen and AQAP took place during October 2023,¹⁰ March 2024,¹¹ April 2024,¹² and in February 2025.¹³

During October 2023 AQAP used airstrikes and struck a critical Yemeni military base called Marra in Shabwa governorate in south Yemen by missile. This was a critical base from which Yemen launched anti-AQAP operations.¹⁴ During February 2025, Yemen (with the United States) launched several airstrikes against AQAP, killing much of AQAP’s leadership.¹⁵

AQAP’s arsenal consists of weaponized drones, IEDs,¹⁶ vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs),¹⁷ small arms and light weapons and related ammunition, hand-grenades, landmines, thermobaric rockets, and man-portable air defence systems.¹⁸ During the reporting period, the Yemeni government and support forces responded to this group mostly through air strikes.¹⁹

Despite a de-escalation of violence generated in the fighting between Yemen and AQAP, this conflict has not ended.

Organization

AQAP operates within the broader global al-Qaeda network and follows a hierarchical structure which is typical of al-Qaeda affiliates.²⁰ This non-State actor is essentially divided into a political wing, an armed wing, and a religious wing. The Shura Council provides ideological guidance across all AQAP structures.²¹ Leadership turnover (see above) is accelerated by counterterrorist operations mostly executed by the United States, hindering the ability to report on the incumbents of top leadership positions as leadership retreats into secrecy in order to survive.²² Internal power struggles at a top level have resulted in assassinations of key leadership figures throughout 2024 leading to further instability as ranks are filled as leaders are killed.²³

Despite its top tiers being filled with inexperienced leaders, the tiered structure held at time of reporting.²⁴ Organizational cohesion is achieved, despite rapid leadership changes, through an extremist interpretation of Sharia law and enforcement of ideological beliefs aligned with al-Qaeda’s global jihadist doctrine.²⁵ AQAP’s ability to release detainees²⁶ and tiered organizational structure confirms that it is sufficiently organized to apply IHL.

Operational data published by AQAP indicates that between August 2022 and August 2024 the group claimed to have conducted 139 IED detonations, fifteen drone strikes, seven ambushes, eighteen sniper attacks, sixteen mortar attacks, four rocket launches, and one suicide operation.²⁷ Tactics employed by AQAP frequently resemble guerilla and opportunistic terror or suicide-like activities,²⁸ and on occasion drone strikes. Hit and run tactics against Yemeni Armed Forces is frequently employed – the group uses mountainous terrain as camouflage and a vantage point to execute a quick attack and then retreat into the mountains.²⁹ It is suggested that the Houthis are a logistical and weapons supply partner for AQAP.³⁰ AQAP’s fund raising efforts are channelled through crypto currency and digital wallets and often also involves illicit smuggling activities facilitated by the Houthi’s.³¹

AQAP’s ability to negotiate a ceasefire agreement during 2024 with the Houthis³² as well as the release of detainees in March 2025³³ is a further illustration that, despite rapid leadership changes, cohesion and unity of voice remains.

AQAP remained sufficiently organized under IHL throughout the reporting period.

The NIAC between Yemen and AQAP continued throughout the reporting period, albeit at a lessened level of violence.

1
‘Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base’, International Crisis Group: Middle East Report No. 174, 2 February 2017, 3; P. Salisbury, ‘Misunderstanding Yemen’, International Crisis Group, 20 September 2021; R. Malhotra, ‘Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’, in S. N. Romaniuket al,(eds), Handbook of Terrorist and Insurgent Groups: A Global Survey of Threats, Tactics, and Characteristics, CRC Press, 2024, 496–97.
2
D. Pearlstein, ‘The Yemen War’, Opinio Juris, 18 July 2012; R. Chesney, ‘Reactions to the ACLU Suit: There is Armed Conflict in Yemen, and the US Is Party to it’, Lawfare, 18 July 2012.
3
M. Zenko and J. Wilson, ‘How Many Bombs Did the United States Drop in 2016?’, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 January 2017; J. Purkiss and J. Serle, ‘Yemen: reported US covert actions 2017’, Bureau of Investigative Journalism; P. Bergenet al, ‘America’s Counterterrorism Wars: The War in Yemen’, New America, Last updated 17 June 2021; L. Hartig and O. Hathaway, ‘Still at War: The United States in Yemen’, Just Security, 24 March 2022; K. Robinson, ‘Yemen’s Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering’, Council on Foreign Relations, Updated 1 May 2023.
4
‘Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base’, International Crisis Group: Middle East Report No. 174, 2 February 2017, 6–7; S. Arraf, ‘Armed Conflicts in Yemen in 2017: An Increasingly Complicated Mosaic’ in A. Bellal (ed), The War Report: Armed Conflicts in 2017, Geneva Academy, 2018, 154; A. Carboni and M. Sulz, ‘The wartime transformation of AQAP in Yemen’, ACLED, 14 December 2020.
5
S. Haddad, ‘Yemen’, in L. Arimatsu and M. Choudhury (eds), The Legal Classification of the Armed Conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Libya, Chatham House, 2014, 29; N. Al-Dawsari, ‘The Popular Committees of Abyan, Yemen: A necessary evil or an opportunity for security reform’, Middle East Institute, 5 March 2014.
6
M. Ghobari and T. Finn, ‘Suicide bomber kills 90 in Yemen, al Qaeda vows more attacks’, Reuters, 21 May 2012; S. Haddad, ‘Yemen’, in L. Arimatsu and M. Choudhury (eds), The Legal Classification of the Armed Conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Libya, Chatham House, 2014, 24–25.
7
‘Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base’, International Crisis Group: Middle East Report No. 174, 2 February 2017, 7.
8
HRC, ‘Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014: Detailed findings of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen’, UN Doc A/HRC/45/CRP.7, 29 September 2020, para 34.
9
V. d’Hauthuille, ‘Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Sustained Resurgence in Yemen or Signs of Further Decline?’, ACLED, 6 April 2023; Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict in Yemen and the Red Sea’, Council for Foreign Relations, 28 February 2026.
10
‘انفجار بسيارة مفخخة للقاعدة يستهدف موكب مسؤول في قوات الانتقالي في أبين جنوبي اليمن’, Arabic News, 2 October 2023; ‘YCO Situation Update: October 2023’, ACLED, 10 November 2023; ‘What is the truth about the targeting of Camp Marra in Ataq?’, Southern Vision, 11 October 2023; ‘AQAP claims a missile attack against the largest military camp in Shabwa’, South 24, 10 October 2023; ‘Killed in an ambush targeting the Transitional Forces in Modia’, Al Janoob Al Youm, 22 October 2023
11
‘An al-Qaida attack in Yemen kills 2 troops loyal to a secessionist group, officials say’, Associated Press, 25 March 2024; A. Lucente, ‘Al-Qaeda attack in Yemen kills 2 members of southern forces’, Al-Monitor, 25 March 2024
12
‘Explosion kills six south Yemen rebel troops in suspected al-Qaeda attack’, The Jerusalem Post, 30 April 2024; ‘Suspected al-Qaeda explosion kills 6 troops loyal to secessionist group in Yemen’, Al Arabiya, 30 April 2024
13
‘A Prominent Leader In Al Qaeda Killed In Marib’, Yemen Monitor, 8 February 2025; ‘Killed and wounded in the ranks of the transitional militia in violent confrontations in Abyan. Among them is a leader’, Al Mawqae Post, 27 February 2025; ‘Western Raids and ‘Arrows of the East’ create an AQAP Leadership Vacuum’, 23 February 2025.
14
‘AQAP claims a missile attack against the largest military camp in Shabwa’, South 24, 10 October 2023.
15
‘Killed and wounded in the ranks of the transitional militia in violent confrontations in Abyan. Among them is a leader’, Al Mawqae Post, 27 February 2025; ‘Western Raids and ‘Arrows of the East’ create an AQAP Leadership Vacuum’, 23 February 2025.
16
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014)’, UN Doc S/2025/650, 17 October 2025, 15
17
‘Prominent security commander survives car bombing attack in Abyan’, South 24, 2 October 2023
18
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014)’, UN Doc S/2024/731, 11 October 2024, 11.
19
‘Killed and wounded in the ranks of the transitional militia in violent confrontations in Abyan. Among them is a leader’, Al Mawqae Post, 27 February 2025; ‘Western Raids and ‘Arrows of the East’ create an AQAP Leadership Vacuum’, 23 February 2025.
20
‘Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’, Australian National Security: Australian Government, 22 September 2024; ‘al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, 19 January 2010.
21
‘Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’, Australian National Security: Australian Government, 22 September 2024; ‘al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, 19 January 2010.
22
V. d’Hauthuille, ‘Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Sustained Resurgence in Yemen or Signs of Further Decline?’, ACLED, 6 April 2023; ‘Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’, Australian National Security: Australian Government, 22 September 2024; ‘Western Raids and ‘Arrows of the East’ create an AQAP Leadership Vacuum’, 23 February 2025.
23
W. Clough, ‘Houthis Draw Blood in First Commercial Shipping Casualties’, The Yemen Review, Sana’a Center, January-March 2024, 23; ‘حضرموت.. وفاة قيادي بالقاعدة في منطقة نفوذ إخواني’, Al-Ayyam, 1 April 2024; ‘Al Qaeda leaders die in mysterious circumstances amid disagreements that plague the organization’, Almontasaf, 2024.
24
V. d’Hauthuille, ‘Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Sustained Resurgence in Yemen or Signs of Further Decline?’, ACLED, 6 April 2023; ‘Western Raids and ‘Arrows of the East’ create an AQAP Leadership Vacuum’, 23 February 2025.
25
‘al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’, Counter Terrorism Guide, 19 January 2010.
26
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014)’, UN Doc S/2024/731, 11 October 2024, para 11
27
‘Suicide car bomb targets Southern forces in Abyan, leaving 16 dead’, South 24, 17 August 2024.
28
V. d’Hauthuille, ‘Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Sustained Resurgence in Yemen or Signs of Further Decline?’, ACLED, 6 April 2023
29
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014)’, UN Doc S/2023/833, 2 November 2023, 15-16.
30
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014)’, UN Doc S/2024/731, 11 October 2024, para 11.
31
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014)’, UN Doc S/2025/650, 17 October 2025, 19.
32
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014)’, UN Doc S/2024/731, 11 October 2024, 11
33
‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014)’, UN Doc S/2025/650, 17 October 2025, 19