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Non-international armed conflicts in Sudan

Reporting period: July 2024 - June 2025

©UNHCR/Ala Kheir. October 21 2025. Families recently displaced from El Fasher are waiting to receive food aid alongside long-time residents in Omdurman, Sudan's second-largest city.
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Snapshot

Since independence in 1956, Sudan has faced recurrent non-international armed conflicts (NIACs), including the Darfur war between government forces and Janjaweed militias on one side and Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on the other, and long-running fighting with Sudan People’s Liberation Movement Army North (SPLM-N) factions in Kordofan and Blue Nile. After the 2019 transition, disputes over integrating the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) triggered large-scale hostilities from April 2023, spreading from Khartoum to Darfur and Kordofan and marked by very widespread and serious IHL violations. During the period, the SAF retook parts of Khartoum and other towns while the RSF retained much of Darfur and Kordofan and maintained the siege of El Fasher amid famine, cholera and severe access constraints. Conflict dynamics became more complex due to shifting alliances, RSF-SPLM-N (al-Hilu) cooperation, moves toward a parallel authority, alleged United Arab Emirates (UAE), Russian and Ukrainian involvement, cross-border incidents with South Sudan and the activity of communal and foreign militias.

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The Armed Conflicts

I. Classifications and Parties to the Conflicts

  1. Non-International Armed Conflict between Sudan (supported by the Darfur Joint Protection Forces (DJPF)) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)
  2. Non-International Armed Conflict between Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM-N) (al-Hilu faction)
  3. Non-International Armed Conflict between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM-N) (al Hilu faction)
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Civilian Harm

Across Sudan’s armed conflicts, particularly the NIAC between the SAF and the RSF, civilians were subjected to sustained, often ethnically targeted, attacks that caused large scale deaths, injuries and mass displacement. Both parties carried out indiscriminate bombardment of towns, villages, markets and displacement camps. They also repeatedly struck medical and humanitarian facilities, and damaged water and electricity infrastructure, contributing to famine, cholera and the near collapse of health care. Siege tactics and restrictions on relief, primarily attributable to the RSF but also involving the SAF and in one locality the SPLM-N (al Hilu), aggravated hunger and malnutrition. Persons in their power endured executions, torture, arbitrary detention, hostage taking, enforced disappearances, widespread sexual violence and child recruitment, with persons with disabilities facing heightened and often long-term harm.

Historical Background

Since independence in 1956, Sudan has faced recurrent armed conflicts.

Darfur

In 2003, hostilities erupted in Darfur between government forces and Janjaweed militias on one side and rebel movements, notably the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), on the other, with civilians subjected to severe abuses.

Kordofan and Blue Nile

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM-N) has, for more than a decade, fought the government in Kordofan and Blue Nile and split into two factions in 2017.

Political transition and rivalry within the security apparatus

Following the ouster of President Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, a transitional government assumed power. Divisions over integrating into the national armed forces the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – a paramilitary body of former Janjaweed fighters – triggered confrontation between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF.

Outbreak and spread of hostilities

Fighting between the SAF and the RSG broke out in Khartoum in mid-April 2023 and quickly spread to Darfur and Kordofan. The violence has been intense, with very widespread and serious violations of IHL by both parties.

Actors, alignments and societal fault lines

The Darfur Joint Protection Force (DJPF) initially claimed neutrality, but elements later fought alongside the SAF against the RSF. The RSF’s composition of former Janjaweed fighters shapes hostility in Darfur and deepens ethnic tensions.

Key Developments (2023–2025)

The reporting period saw several major developments:

  1. SAF retakes control of the Presidential Palace and makes territorial gains: From September 2024 to May 2025, the SAF regained large areas from the RSF, including parts of Khartoum and Bahri, Wad Madani, Um Rawaba, and el-Obeid. On 20 May 2025, it asserted full control of Khartoum and the Presidential Palace. Government control consolidated in the north and east while the RSF held much of Darfur and Kordofan.
  2. Siege of El Fasher continues: Since May 2024, RSF encirclement severed supply lines, enabling sustained operations around the SAF 6th Infantry Division. Civilians faced acute shortages and escalating urban warfare in and around El Fasher.
  3. Famine in Sudan: Famine was confirmed in Sudan in 2024, specifically in parts of North Darfur, Zamzam internally displaced (IDP) camp, and the Nuba Mountains, and the crisis expanded in 2025. Food insecurity affected tens of millions, humanitarian access was repeatedly disrupted, and residents in El Fasher endured prolonged siege conditions.
  4. Cholera outbreak in Darfur: Cholera waves, including January 2025, spread amid attacks on power and water systems, overcrowded displacement sites and prolonged outages, with cases reported across most Sudanese states.
  5. Moves towards a parallel government: In February 2025, the RSF and allies endorsed a charter to form a parallel authority in RSF-held areas while rival consultations continued in Port Sudan.
  6. New Alliances and Neutral Actors: Sudan Liberation Movement faction led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur (SLM/A-AW) largely remained neutral despite isolated clashes with the RSF in late 2023 and March 2024. In January 2025, Sudan Liberation Movement faction ‘Call of the Homeland’ (SLM/A-CH) split and aligned with the SAF, with no recorded clashes. In February 2025, the RSF and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM-N) (al-Hilu faction) joined forces and provided RSF safe haven, medical access, and training space, but impeded aid delivery in the Nuba Mountains.
  7. Possible foreign involvement: Sudan files a case against the United Arab Emirates (UAE) at the International Court of Justice (ICJ): On 5 March 2025, Sudan filed an application alleging UAE support to the RSF’s ‘acts of genocide’. On 5 May 2025, the ICJ found it lacked jurisdiction. RSF began daily drone strikes on Port Sudan on 4 May 2025.
  8. Activities of Russia’s Africa Corps and the remnants of the Wagner Group and Continued presence of Ukrainian Special Forces: Russian involvement shifted from Wagner to Africa Corps, with opaque footprints and arms support to the SAF, while remnants reportedly facilitated RSF supply. Ukrainian special forces operated in Sudan in 2023 and 2024
  9. Armed incident between South Sudan’s Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO) and the RSF: In March 2025, the RSF clashed with the SPLA-IO near Dukduk. SPLA-IO unit of about 400 fighters were allegedly collecting weapons from the SAF, and this incident also suggests that the RSF might be operating in South Sudan
  10. Local militias and other actors: Communal and foreign militias were active across several theatres, with the Darfur Communal Militia most prominent, and additional Libyan and South Sudanese groups contributing to localized violence and instability.
  11. The Fall of El Fasher: In November 2025, El Fasher fell to the RSF after an eighteen-month siege, followed by widespread and extreme violence against civilians in and around the city.

Non-International Armed Conflicts

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SAF (supported by DJPF) vs the RSF

Non-international armed conflicts between the SAF (supported by the Darfur Joint Protection Forces (DJPF) and the RSF

The non-international armed conflict (NIAC) that ignited on 15 April 2023 between the SAF and the RSF spread rapidly from Khartoum to Kordofan and Darfur. Hostilities have persisted through 2025 and involved frequent clashes, large troop deployments, extensive use of air and drone strikes, heavy artillery and armoured systems, widespread destruction and massive displacement, thereby meeting the intensity threshold. The RSF qualifies as a dissident armed force displaying a sophisticated organizational structure, with a hierarchical command under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, internal discipline, recruiting and training capacity, access to military-grade equipment, and logistics supported by looting, smuggling and external backing. Its control of territory means that Additional Protocol II of 1977 is applicable to the NIAC. For, despite SAF recovery of certain areas, the RSF have retained stable and functional control in many, including around El Fasher (which they overran in October 2025), enabling them to conduct sustained and coordinated operations. The DJPF has not reached a separate intensity threshold vis-à-vis the RSF, yet through coordinated recruitment, mobilization and joint operations in support of the SAF it becomes a party to the pre-existing conflict under the support-based approach. The NIAC remains ongoing as an Additional Protocol II-type conflict.

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SAF vs SPLM-North (al-Hilu faction)

Non-international armed conflict between the SAF and the SPLM-North (al-Hilu faction)

Hostilities between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the SPLM-N (al-Hilu faction), rooted in earlier mobilization and a 2017 split, persisted in South Kordofan during the period. Fighting included a major February 2025 attack on Kadugli with repeated shelling to isolate the city, which caused significant casualties, damage, and displacement. The group retained and captured heavy weaponry, including tanks, armoured vehicles, rocket launchers and artillery. In terms of organization, Abdel Aziz al Hilu holds central authority, supported by a disciplinary framework, code of conduct and human rights court, and designated spokespersons and official communications. The SPLM-N (al-Hilu faction) exercises stable control over territory it calls New Sudan, centred on the Nuba Mountains and large parts of South Kordofan, with pockets in Blue Nile and positions around Kadugli. This control, maintained through defensive engagement, enables concerted and sustained military operations and fulfilment of Additional Protocol II’s requirements. Taken together, these elements confirm an Additional Protocol II-type NIAC.

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RSF vs SPLM-North (al-Hilu faction)

Non-international armed conflict between the RSF and the SPLM-North (al-Hilu faction)

Hostilities between the RSF and SPLM-N (al Hilu faction) constitute a NIAC since at least April 2023, when the latter adopted a defensive posture to retain the Nuba Mountains and protect populations under its authority. A February 2025 alliance between them did not end their conflict, in the absence of a lasting cessation of armed confrontations. Clashes recurred in December 2023, January and February 2024, and again in August and September 2024, provoking displacement around Dilling. Both parties possess military weaponry, with RSF operations featuring machine gun attacks on motorcycles, large vehicle fleets, modern artillery and armed drones. Fighting intensified in early January 2024 in South Kordofan as control of South Dilling and adjacent areas was contested. SPLM-N (al Hilu) continues to defend and maintain territory in South Kordofan, evidencing protracted armed violence that meets the intensity requirement. Each party remains sufficiently organized for IHL purposes, and the pre-existing NIAC persisted throughout the period.

Parties to the Conflict

State Party

  • Sudan

Non-State Parties

  • Rapid Support Forces (RSF)
  • Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM-N) (al-Hilu faction)
  • Darfur Joint Protection Forces (DJPF)

Other Main Actors

Other Non-State Actors Involved

  • Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army–North Agar (SPLM/N-Agar)
  • Sudan Liberation Movement faction led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur (SLM/A-AW)
  • Sudan Liberation Movement faction ‘Call of the Homeland’ (SLM/A-CH)

 

Foreign Involvement

  • Ukrainian Special Forces
  • Russian Africa Corps
  • United Arab Emirates

ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS

Across Sudan’s armed conflicts, civilians have been subjected to sustained and coordinated attacks, particularly in the NIAC between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), through artillery, airstrikes, and drone strikes that caused large-scale civilian deaths and injuries. Civilians were repeatedly targeted on ethnic grounds or because of real or perceived allegiance, including reprisals during shifts in territorial control. The RSF perpetrated massacres and other widespread abuses, including conduct that could amount to crimes against humanity. The SAF were also reported to have perpetrated retaliatory and ethnically motivated attacks on unarmed civilians. The fall of El Fasher to the RSF in November 2025 involved systematic massacres of civilians, including hospital patients and staff.

Attacks against Markets

In areas controlled by the RSF, the SAF repeatedly conducted airstrikes on busy markets, often invoking an alleged military presence. Even where fighters were present, the conduct raised concerns under the IHL rules of proportionality and precautions in attack, as attacks during peak hours caused extensive civilian deaths and injuries and destroyed shops and nearby homes. The reported use of imprecise munitions, including barrel bombs, further amplified civilian harm, killed livestock, and disrupted food access, particularly where markets were among the last available sources of supplies. The RSF also shelled and bombed markets in Omdurman and North Darfur, including in and around El Fasher and in a displacement camp, producing significant civilian casualties and damaging livelihoods. In addition, RSF ground offensives were reported to have set markets ablaze and to have destroyed farmland and crops, compounding civilian hardship.

Attacks against Medical and Humanitarian Personnel

Medical and humanitarian personnel were repeatedly attacked in Sudan, in breach of the special protection IHL affords them. Although both the SAF and the RSF were reported to have deliberately targeted medical personnel, the RSF were responsible for most recorded incidents, including lethal attacks on medical facilities and gunfire against ambulances during patient transfers. The attacks caused the last operating clinic capacity in Zamzam IDP camp to close. Humanitarian workers were also frequently affected by violence, including direct attacks, with incidents involving the WFP and a joint WFP and UNICEF convoy, as well as an attack on ICRC vehicles. Attribution varied across incidents, engaging responsibility of both the SAF and the RSF.

ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE

During the reporting period, the SAF and the RSF conducted attacks that indiscriminately struck enemy held areas, repeatedly affecting civilian homes and a wide range of civilian facilities, including schools, mosques, markets, medical and humanitarian facilities, water points and power-generating plants. Air and artillery strikes by both parties hit densely populated locations, including IDP camps and both urban and rural settlements, and some attacks were carried out on ethnic grounds. Pillage of civilian property was also recurrent. These patterns raise serious concerns under IHL regarding distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack, the special protection of medical facilities and objects indispensable to civilian survival, and the prohibition of pillage. Some of the bombardment was violence intended to spread terror among the civilian population and violate IHL, as well as amounting to crimes against humanity.

Attacks against Towns, Villages, and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camps

After the April 2023 to January 2024 ceasefire, El Fasher became a central battleground in Darfur, with the RSF and allied forces repeatedly shelling SAF-held neighbourhoods and surrounding towns and villages, including predominantly non-Arab communities, and conducting sustained attacks on nearby IDP camps. Abu Shouk, Shagra, and Zamzam were repeatedly struck, with shelling and ground operations destroying shelters and key services and driving further displacement. The SAF also shelled and bombed RSF-controlled areas, including residential zones and parts of displacement sites. Across Sudan, both the RSF and the SAF launched retaliatory attacks on towns and villages perceived as supporting the adversary, involving arson, looting, and large-scale displacement. In late 2025, after a prolonged siege, El Fasher fell to the RSF, followed by widespread exactions against fleeing civilians.

VIOLATIONS AGAINST PERSONS IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY

Persons in the power of the SAF and RSF were subjected to a myriad of abuses, including executions, torture, arbitrary deprivation of liberty, hostage-taking, enforced disappearances and sexual violence. In several cases, these IHL violations were motivated by ethnic considerations and/or alleged affiliations. Children were also recruited and used in hostilities, while persons with disabilities faced heightened vulnerability.

Murder of Civilians and Persons Hors de Combat

Throughout the reporting period, the SAF and the RSF, as well as their allies, repeatedly murdered civilians and persons hors de combat, often in connection with torture and retaliatory violence. Reports describe summary executions of detainees and unarmed adversaries by both parties, sometimes followed by mutilation, and deaths in detention linked to torture or starvation, as evidenced by the discovery of mass graves closed to sites previously held by the RSF. The RSF were also repeatedly accused of murdering fleeing civilians at roads and checkpoints and of executing IDPs and other civilians on ethnic and reprisal grounds, including during operations around Zamzam and in RSF controlled areas. Similar patterns were attributed to the SAF and allied forces in recaptured areas, where civilians and alleged RSF supporters were beaten, executed, and in some cases mutilated. After El Fasher fell to the RSF, accounts describe massacres of unarmed civilians alongside continued violence during flight.