Cambodia - Thailand

During the reporting period, two armed conflicts were ongoing:

An international armed conflict (IAC) between Cambodia and Thailand
A non-international armed conflict (NIAC) between Thailand and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional

An IAC between Cambodia and Thailand that began during the reporting period appeared to have ended in late December 2025. This IAC was regulated by customary international humanitarian law (IHL), in particular Hague Law rules governing the conduct of hostilities. Both States are party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Cambodia, but not Thailand, is a State Party to Additional Protocol I of 1977, meaning that the treaty does not formally apply.¹

A pre-existing NIAC persisted in southern Thailand throughout the reporting period between Thailand and theBarisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN). Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and customary IHL applies to the NIAC. Thailand is not a State Party to Additional Protocol II of 1977.² Both Cambodia and Thailand are States Parties to the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.³ Neither State is a party to the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.⁴

A new armed conflict between Cambodia and Thailand broke out in July 2025, reflecting a simmering border dispute between the two States that dates back decades. The dispute pertains to demarcated areas along the shared border of the two nations, which stretches for more than 800 kilometres, and concerns particularly claimed ownership of the temples of Prasat Ta Muen Thom and Preah Vihear in the Dângrêk mountains. The border was drawn by French cartographers in 1904 and 1907, when France was the colonial ruler in Cambodia.⁵ After Cambodia’s independence in 1953, Thai troops occupied the temple of Preah Vihear, which led to Cambodia taking the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In 1962, the Court ruled that the temple belonged to Cambodia.⁶ The court ruled that the temple fell under the control of Cambodia but only due to the principle of estoppel in that Thailand had accepted Cambodian control for fifty years.⁷ This left the status of the surrounding area unresolved.⁸

In 2011, clashes between Cambodian and Thai forces in the vicinity of Preah Vihear killed at least sixteen people. A further judgment by the ICJ reaffirmed that the temple and only the area immediately surrounding it are within the territory of Cambodia.⁹ Several years of relative calm followed.

**Thailand-Cambodia Border Conflict (2025)** ©Britannica

In addition to the border dispute with Cambodia, Thailand has experienced internal strife, particularly in its southern regions.¹⁰ The Thai army has mounted several coups since the transition of the Thai Kingdom into a constitutional monarchy in 1932, resulting in an unstable political landscape.¹¹ In the south of Thailand, a separate NIAC between the Thai army and the BRN has been ongoing since 2004.¹² The armed group is committed to securing self-determination for Malay Muslims. As part of its armed struggle, the BRN has consistently targeted civilians, including Buddhist monks, teachers, police officers, older persons, and children.¹³ Thai authorities have perpetrated widespread torture in repressing the rebellion. The first major attack on BRN and other militia groups occurred on 28 April 2004. The Thai authorities opened fire on a mosque, the Krue Se Mosque,¹⁴ which killed thirty-two fighters and at least three Thai soldiers.¹⁵ In October 2004, the Thai military was responsible for a further seventy-eight deaths when they crammed 1,300 people into twenty-six military trucks to be transported 150 kilometres to an army detention center, crushing the victims to death.¹⁶ These two events led to a sharp increase in the success of BRN’s recruitment efforts among other Malay-Muslims.¹⁷

An emergency decree was imposed over Thailand’s three southernmost provinces in 2005, allowing the security forces to detain suspects without charge for up to thirty days. It also gave security personnel immunity from prosecution for any actions they carried out in the line of duty.¹⁸ Only a year later, in September 2006, the Thai government was overthrown in a coup d’état.¹⁹ Taking advantage of this political instability, the BRN consolidated control over other groups, such as the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and the Gerakan Mujahideen Islami Pattani (GMIP), between 2007 and 2012.²⁰

An initial attempt at brokering a lasting truce between the parties to the conflict was an agreement toward peace between the BRN and Thailand in 2013.²¹ This agreement was, however, jeopardised by another coup in 2014.²² Both the military and BRN regrouped in the years between 2014 and 2019. The Thai military increased surveillance and reduced freedom of movement in the south. Malaysia entered as a mediator between the two parties in 2019. These negotiations led to a limited ceasefire in 2022 during Ramadan.²³ The talks between the two parties, however, remained stuck on the question of self-determination for the ethnic Malay-Muslim people of the south.²⁴ This has led to a stalemate between the BRN and the Thai government. The Thai government uses its military to exercise territorial control in the south,²⁵ but attacks attributable to the insurgent groups are still occurring there.²⁶

In April 2024, Myanmar’s conflict saw one of its greatest escalations so far, when the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) battled the Tatmadaw for control of Myawaddy town in Myanmar’s southern Kayin State, which is a strategic trade hub on the Thai border.⁵⁶ On 11 April 2024, the remaining 200 Tatmadaw soldiers withdrew from Myawaddy town and took shelter close to Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge No. 2.⁵⁷ In the wake of this situation, Thai authorities reinforced security at the border and directed the air force to attack any Myanmar aircraft entering Thai airspace.⁵⁸ Following an announcement by the Thai government on 9 April 2024 concerning Thailand’s willingness to take in up to 100,000 refugees from Myanmar, thousands of people crossed the border into Thailand in the following days.⁵⁹

A UN Human Rights Council report published in June 2024 revealed that Thai financial institutions had reportedly been implicated in half of Myanmar’s arms and materiel acquisitions in 2023.⁶⁰ On 11 July 2024, in the aftermath of the report’s release, bank officials were ordered come before Thailand’s House Committee on National Security, Border Affairs, National Strategy and Reforms in which they responded to questions.⁶¹ On 19 July 2024, committee chairman and MFP member Rangsiman Rome said he had not found evidence that Thai banks had broken the law.⁶² A few days later, on 24 July 2024, Thai Foreign Minister Maris Sangiampongsa created a task force dedicated to investigating and preventing such activities.⁶³ In a further incident, in November 2024, the Thai Minister of Defense accused Myanmar’s navy of opening fire on two Thai fishing boats supposedly within Myanmar’s territorial waters near Thailand’s Ranong province on 30 November.⁶⁴

Dissolution of Move Forward Party

Following Pita’s suspension from office in July 2023 (see above), the Constitutional Court declared, on 24 January 2024, that he had not breached election law.⁶⁵ Nonetheless, the same Court found on 31 January 2024 that MFP’s endeavours to reform Thailand’s lèse-majesté law contravened the Constitution and had to end.⁶⁶ Following this judgment, a petition was filed with the Electoral Commission on 1 February 2024 aiming for the dissolution of the MFP by the Constitutional Court.⁶⁷ After considering the petition, the Election Commission submitted a separate petition to the Constitutional Court on 18 March 2024 requesting the Court to disband the MFP.⁶⁸ The petition was accepted by the Constitutional Court on 3 April 2024.⁶⁹ Four months later, on 7 August 2024, the Constitutional Court handed down its unanimous ruling, ordering the MFP to be dissolved.⁷⁰ Pita and ten other party executives were barred from taking up any public office for ten years.⁷¹ The ruling was met with international criticism.⁷² The 143 MFP members who remained in parliament founded a new opposition party named People’s Party or ‘Prachachon’ on 9 August 2024, installing tech businessman Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut as their party leader.⁷³ On 8 August 2024, the National Anti-Corruption Commission Office launched a lèse-majesté investigation into forty-four former MFP MPs, including Natthaphong.⁷⁴ The forty-four MPs were notified on 14 February 2025 that they were going to be indicted on charges of lèse-majesté by the National Anti-Corruption Commission Office.⁷⁵ As of December 2025, the case had not yet been decided.⁷⁶

Removal of Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin and election of Paetongtarn Shinawatra

On 17 May 2024, a petition was filed to the Constitutional Court by forty senators seeking the dismissal of Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin and his Office Minister Pichit Chuenban for alleged ethics infringements, given that Pichit had previously completed a six-month prison sentence in 2008 for contempt of court.⁷⁷ Pichit stepped down on 21 May 2024.⁷⁸ Three months later, on 14 August 2024, the Constitutional Court dismissed Srettha Thavisin as Prime Minister for ethical violations.⁷⁹ Paetongtarn Shinawatra, a party member of the PTP and considered by some as a political proxy for her father, Thaksin Shinawatra, was elected the new Prime Minister by the House of Representatives on 16 August 2024.⁸⁰ Prime Minister Paetongtarn and her cabinet were sworn in on 6 September 2024.⁸¹ In a development similar to that experienced by Srettha Thavisin, a petition was filed with the Election Commission on 9 October 2024 seeking to examine whether Ms Shinawatra had violated ethics by installing two advisers with criminal records.⁸² Additionally, forty-seven complaints were filed against Paetongtarn’s ruling party by 10 December 2024, all of which were aimed at dissolving the PTP.⁸³ The charges were dismissed due to lack of evidence.⁸⁴ Amid mounting political tensions surrounding allegations of mismanagement and serving her father’s interests, Paetongtarn survived a no-confidence vote on 26 March 2025.⁸⁵

Peace dialogue between Thailand and BRN

Despite several attempts at brokering peace deals with the BRN since 2013,⁸⁶ the insurgency in Thailand’s southern provinces continues until today (see below). During the reporting period, the peace dialogue continued under Malaysian mediation, but faced numerous hurdles.⁸⁷ On 27 November 2023, then-newly elected Prime Minister, Srettha Thavisin, assigned Chatchai Bangchuad, the Deputy Secretary-General of the National Security Council, to head the government delegation in the forthcoming negotiations with the BRN.⁸⁸ Two months later, on 10 January 2024, the then-Deputy Prime Minister, Somsak Thepsuthin, met with one of the Malaysian mediators, General Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, after the talks between Thailand and the BRN had stalled for close to a year.⁸⁹ The seventh round of talks between government and BRN delegations was held in Kuala Lumpur on 6 and 7 February 2024.⁹⁰ Despite generally agreeing to a modified ‘Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace’, which the Malaysian mediator characterized as a ‘major breakthrough’, renewed talks were arranged for the following month to discuss technical details.⁹¹ These further negotiations were held on 20 February and 7 to 8 March 2024.⁹² The 10^th Joint Technical Committee Meeting of Joint Working Group Peace Dialogue Process (JWG-PDP) took place between 19 and 21 May 2024 in Kuala Lumpur. The meeting was dedicated to trying to reduce the level of violence and to set up monitoring mechanisms.⁹³ On 1 July 2024, Malaysia announced Datuk Seri Mohamad Rabin Basir as its new facilitator for the peace talks.⁹⁴

In a setback to the peace talks, the BRN released a statement on 14 December 2024 condemning the government’s ‘negligence’.⁹⁵ The statement criticized newly appointed Prime Minister Paethongtarn Shinawatra for not yet selecting a new head to lead the government delegation at the peace talks, following the promotion of the previous head, Chatchai, to another position.⁹⁶ The BRN’s announcement was followed by warnings that the situation could lead to a surge in violence.⁹⁷ In response to this statement, Prime Minister Paethongtarn visited Thailand’s southern Narathiwat and Yala provinces on 16 January 2025.⁹⁸ Additionally, the government, on 28 February 2025, unilaterally proclaimed a reduction of military operations during Ramadan, urging the rebels to do the same.⁹⁹ In early March 2025, the BRN put forward a draft fifteen-day ceasefire agreement to the Malaysian mediator.

But in the absence of any response by the Thai government to this proposal, the BRN stepped up its operations.¹⁰⁰ The government’s plans to lift martial law in three southernmost provinces were subsequently postponed due to ongoing violence.¹⁰¹ On 6 May 2025, the Thai Defense Minister, Phumtham Wechayachai, declared that the government would not resume peace talks with the BRN as long as they continued attacking civilians.¹⁰² This declaration followed a visit to Narathiwat by Justice Minister Thawee Sodsong the day before.¹⁰³ The same day, the BRN denied they had a policy of attacking civilians and civilian objects and expressed their condolences to the families of the victims.¹⁰⁴ Following the election of Anutin Charnvirakul as Prime Minister in September 2025, he appointed General Somsak Rungsita as the new head of the Peace Dialogue Panel, after the position had been unoccupied since mid-2023.¹⁰⁵ Anutin also visited Thailand’s southern provinces on 11 October 2025.¹⁰⁶ In a major breakthrough, both sides met on 11 November 2025 and issued a joint statement, on 14 November 2025, committing to officially resuming the peace dialogue after a break of almost two years.¹⁰⁷ The Thai and BRN delegations met on 8 to 10 December 2025 and came to a preliminary agreement on three objectives for resolving the insurgency in the deep south.¹⁰⁸

Build-up of tensions between Thailand and Cambodia

Against the backdrop of the long-standing border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia (see above), the plans of both governments to reopen discussions on the joint development of an area in the Gulf of Thailand based on a 2001 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) caused political unrest in November 2024.¹⁰⁹ As both States’ claims over the area overlap,¹¹⁰ the Thai opposition party, Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP), asserted that the governments’ renewed negotiations with Cambodia were detrimental to Thailand’s territorial sovereignty by implicitly legitimizing Cambodia’s claims, and called for Thailand’s withdrawal from the MoU.¹¹¹ In response, Phumtham Wechayachai, the then Thai Minister of Defence and Deputy Prime Minister, as well as Anutin Charnvirakul, the then Thai Minister of Interior and also Deputy Prime Minister, travelled to Koh Kut island, one of the disputed locations in the eastern province of Trat.¹¹² Thailand’s Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Maris Sangiampongsa, backed the deal, explaining that the MoU simply sets out a framework for negotiations regarding maritime boundary delimitations and the distribution of economic benefits from the use of fossil fuels.¹¹³ He stressed that all decisions were to be made by a Joint Technical Committee (JTC), which was relaunched in November 2024 and comprised members from both States, as required by the MoU.¹¹⁴ A petition filed by Thai citizens with the Constitutional Court challenging the MoU was rejected by the Court on 22 November 2024.¹¹⁵ A prominent opposition figure, Sondhi Limthongkul, subsequently threatened to hold street protests against the Thai government.¹¹⁶ On 9 December, Sondhi handed in a letter to the Government House, setting out several demands, including a review of the MoU by the Constitutional Court.¹¹⁷

Shortly after the eruption of political unrest over the 2001 MoU, Lim Kimya, a prominent Cambodian opposition politician, was killed in Bangkok on 7 January 2025 by Thai national and former marine Ekkalak Paenoi, shortly after he had entered the country via bus with his wife.¹¹⁸ Ekkalak’s motivation for the assassination is suspected to be political.¹¹⁹ French and Cambodian national Kimya had previously been a member of parliament for the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) from 2013 to 2017, which had been banned by Cambodian authorities in 2017 on allegations of treason.¹²⁰ Ekkalak was sentenced to life imprisonment by a Thai court in October 2025.¹²¹

Over the following months, tensions between Thai and Cambodian troops steadily rose along their shared border.¹²² In February 2025, Thai troops confronted a group of Cambodian soldiers who were singing their national anthem at Ta Muen Thom temple in Thailand’s Surin province.¹²³ The temple was temporarily closed in the aftermath of this incident, but reopened in early March 2025 after the dispute had seemingly been resolved.¹²⁴

Stepping up of border patrols along the Thai-Lao PDR border

On 3 and 4 May 2025, heavy clashes erupted between the Lao army and suspected Hmong militants reportedly working with armed drug traffickers in Laos’ Bokeo province in close proximity to the Thai border. The fighting left five Lao soldiers dead. Additionally, stray fire hit civilian homes in Thailand’s Wiang Kaen district in the northern Chiang Rai province. These developments led the Thai military to intensify its border patrols along the Thai-Laos border and increase naval patrols along the Mekong River.¹²⁵

Political crisis in Thailand over handling of conflict with Cambodia

On 18 June 2025, Hun Sen, Cambodia’s Senate President and former Cambodian Prime Minister, held a phone call with Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra during which she expressed her willingness to reconcile with Hun Sen regarding their States’ border dispute and criticized one of her own military commanders by calling him ‘the opposition’.¹²⁶ Hun Sen later leaked the recorded phone call, which led to massive political unrest in Thailand.¹²⁷ While Paetongtarn justified her actions, claiming that she had been attempting to broker a diplomatic breakthrough with Hun Sen,¹²⁸ her largest coalition partner, the conservative Bhumjaithai party, pulled out of government on 18 June 2025, declaring a week later that it would push for a no-confidence vote.¹²⁹

The apparent rift between Thailand’s government and its military fuelled concerns that another coup could be on the horizon.¹³⁰ Military chief General Pana Klaewplodthuk, however, reiterated his dedication to the democratic system on 19 June 2025.¹³¹ But the incident also sparked a wave of protests between 19 and 24 June 2025, with more than 10,000 participants rallying in Bangkok on 28 June 2025 demanding Paetongtarn’s resignation.¹³²

On 1 July 2025, Thailand’s Constitutional Court temporarily removed Paetongtarn as Prime Minister while charges of ethical misconduct and breach of the Constitution were being investigated.¹³³ She was replaced by Phumtham Wechayachai, the former Minister of Defence, on 3 July 2025 on an acting basis.¹³⁴ Almost two months later, on 29 August 2025, the Constitutional Court removed Paetongtarn from office entirely.¹³⁵ Paetongtarn Shinawatra is the fifth Thai Prime Minister whose term ended through a removal by the Constitutional Court, with her four predecessors also belonging to administrations endorsed by her father Thaksin Shinawatra.¹³⁶

Anutin Charnvirakul of the Bhumjaithai Party was elected Thailand’s new Prime Minister by the parliament on 5 September 2025.¹³⁷ The Supreme¹³⁸ Anutin vowed to dissolve the parliament within four months and backed the idea of drawing up a new Constitution.¹³⁹ He was formally appointed by King Maha Vajiralongkorn on 19 September 2025 and his new cabinet was sworn in on 24 September.¹⁴⁰

Three months later, on 11 December 2025, Anutin declared his intention to dissolve the parliament following strong disagreements during a parliamentary debate on constitutional amendments.¹⁴¹ Anutin’s request was accepted by the Thai King on 12 December 2025 and a new election date was set for 8 February 2025.¹⁴²

Border incidents and reactions by Thailand and Cambodia

Following several years of relative calm, an exchange of gunfire took place near Chong Bok in Thailand’s Ubon Ratchathani province, during which Cambodian and Thai soldiers exchanged fired over a period of ten minutes. One Cambodian soldier was killed.¹⁴³ In the aftermath of the incident, Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, and Cambodia’s Prime Minister, Hun Manet, held talks on 28 May 2025 and agreed to avert a recurrence.¹⁴⁴ Nevertheless, on 7 June 2025, the Thai military declared it would take control of all border posts with Cambodia and restrict their opening hours.¹⁴⁵ Cambodia submitted the disagreement over the four temples to the ICJ on 15–16 June 2025,¹⁴⁶ while also urging Thailand to reinstate regular border opening hours.¹⁴⁷ On 17 June 2025, it imposed a ban on imports of Thai produce, such as fruit and vegetables, as well as electricity, films, and TV series.¹⁴⁸ In reaction to the ban, Thai citizens were prohibited from entering Cambodia through the Sa Kaeo border post the same day.¹⁴⁹ Then on 23 June 2025, all land crossings along the shared border between Thailand and Cambodia were closed by the Thai army.¹⁵⁰ During a visit to his troops in the border region, Hun Manet declared that his country did not want war, but would neither it ‘stand by and… be abused’.¹⁵¹ Despite this statement, on 26 June 2025, the Thai National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission instructed all Thai service providers to cease supplying broadband and mobile internet services to Cambodia. The operation was said to be part of an initiative to crack down on call centre scammers and cybercrime.¹⁵² The same day, Hun Sen, Cambodia’s Senate President and former prime minister, publicly warned Thaksin Shinawatra that he would reveal his ‘treasonous activities’, including his alleged betrayal of the Thai monarchy.¹⁵³

Following several months of heightened tensions between the two States, renewed skirmishes occurred at Ta Mone Thom temple between Thai and Cambodian soldiers on 13 and 15 July 2025.¹⁵⁴ In response, Hun Manet announced on 14 July 2025 the planned introduction of military conscription in Cambodia starting from 2026.¹⁵⁵ In the aftermath of a number of landmine explosions in a disputed border area, Thailand withdrew its ambassador to Cambodia and expelled Cambodia’s ambassador to Thailand on 23 July 2025. The Thai government had claimed that the blasts were from mines newly laid by the Cambodian army.¹⁵⁶

In the aftermath of these landmine incidents, hostilities between Cambodia and Thailand resumed between 24 and 28 July 2025, with each side accusing the other of having initiated the fighting. Fighting spread to a dozen border sites, leaving at least forty-eight people dead and more than 300,000 civilians displaced.¹⁵⁷

A relative calm returned to the disputed areas in August 2025, following a ceasefire brokered in Kuala Lumpur on 28 July 2025 with the intervention of US President Donald Trump.¹⁵⁸ But more landmines exploded in the disputed border area on 9, 12, and 27 August 2025 in the Thai provinces of Sisaket and Surin, leaving five Thai soldiers injured.¹⁵⁹ These incidents led Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maris Sangiampongsa, to submit a letter to the UN Security Council through Ambassador Cherdchai Chaivaivid, the Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations, on 13 August 2025 in which the actions it said Cambodia had undertaken were ‘acts of aggression’.¹⁶⁰ He also contacted both the UN Secretary-General and Japan, which was presiding over the 22^nd Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in Geneva in early December 2025,¹⁶¹ calling for an investigation into Cambodia’s alleged violations of the Convention.¹⁶² On 27 and 28 August 2025, the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Geneva and met with representatives from UN agencies and the ICRC to further discuss the alleged violations of the Convention.¹⁶³ In late August 2025, the Thai army imposed martial law in Ban Nong Chan village in Khok Sung district (Sa Kaeo province), after claims emerged that Cambodia was encouraging its citizens to cause disturbances in the village.¹⁶⁴ In compliance with Section 11 of Thailand’s 2014 Martial Law Act, the declaration set out a designated peacekeeping area and specific measures.¹⁶⁵ These included an ultimatum to Cambodia to evacuate its citizens within two months, under threat of deportation in the event of non-compliance.¹⁶⁶ The Cambodian government publicly dismissed this threat and deadline on 4 September 2025.¹⁶⁷