India – Pakistan

In May 2025, India and Pakistan engaged in a short-lived international armed conflict (IAC). This IAC was regulated by customary international humanitarian law (IHL), in particular Hague Law rules governing the conduct of hostilities. Both States are party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, but neither State is party to Additional Protocol I of 1977.

India and Pakistan have long had a tense relationship that stems from a dispute on the Kashmir region, straddled between India, Pakistan, and China. Upon being decolonized in August 1947, British India was partitioned into Muslim-majority Pakistan and Hindu-majority India.¹Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict Between India and Pakistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 February 2026; ‘1947: Maharaja Hari Singh signs Instrument of Accession’, Frontline: The Hindu, 10 August 2022. The Muslim-majority Kashmir region was, under the terms of decolonization, permitted to decide whether it would join India or Pakistan.²‘Kashmir: Why India and Pakistan fight over it’, BBC, 7 May 2025; ‘Kashmir profile’, BBC, 10 March 2025. At this time, Hari Singh was the Hindu leader of the Kashmir region.³‘Kashmir profile’, BBC, 10 March 2025. Singh at first sought for the Kashmir region to be independent,⁴Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict Between India and Pakistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 February 2026; ‘1947: Maharaja Hari Singh signs Instrument of Accession’, Frontline: The Hindu, 10 August 2022; ‘History Today: When Maharaja Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir sent Instrument of Accession to India’, Firstpost, 26 October 2025 and so delayed deciding on which State the region would join if indeed it was to join a State.⁵‘Kashmir profile’, BBC, 10 March 2025. He therefore asked for a ‘standstill’ until a decision could be made.⁶‘1947: Maharaja Hari Singh signs Instrument of Accession’, Frontline: The Hindu, 10 August 2022; ‘Kashmir profile’, BBC, 10 March 2025. Singh, however, was not well-liked by the Muslim-majority population in Kashmir.⁷‘1947: Maharaja Hari Singh signs Instrument of Accession’, Frontline: The Hindu, 10 August 2022.

Starting on 22 October 1947 and extending over the next few days, Pakistan invaded and captured several towns in Kashmir.⁸‘1947: Maharaja Hari Singh signs Instrument of Accession’, Frontline: The Hindu, 10 August 2022; ‘Kashmir profile’, BBC, 10 March 2025; ‘History Today: When Maharaja Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir sent Instrument of Accession to India’, Firstpost, 26 October 2025; S. Y. Shah, ‘October 22, 1947: Operation Gulmarg and a Black Day in History of Kashmir’, News18, 22 October 2021; M. Moshin, ‘In 1947 Operation Gulmarg a Doomed Blotch’, Brighter Kashmir, 23 October 2021. To fight this, Singh sought help from India who only agreed to help if Singh signed the Instrument of Accession which temporarily handed the Kashmir region to India.⁹Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict Between India and Pakistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 February 2026; ‘1947: Maharaja Hari Singh signs Instrument of Accession’, Frontline: The Hindu, 10 August 2022; ‘Kashmir profile’, BBC, 10 March 2025. Singh did so on 26 October 1947, ending the Kashmir’s seventy-three days of independence.¹⁰Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict Between India and Pakistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 February 2026; ‘1947: Maharaja Hari Singh signs Instrument of Accession’, Frontline: The Hindu, 10 August 2022; ‘Kashmir profile’, BBC, 10 March 2025. India immediately started fighting Pakistan, starting the first war over Kashmir.¹¹‘Kashmir: Why India and Pakistan fight over it’, BBC, 7 May 2025; ‘History Today: When Maharaja Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir sent Instrument of Accession to India’, Firstpost, 26 October 2025. At least two more conflicts have broken out between the two States since then.¹²‘Kashmir: Why India and Pakistan fight over it’, BBC, 7 May 2025; L. Maizland, ‘Kashmir: What to Know About the Disputed Region’, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 August 2019; K. Bokhari, ‘China Joins India and Pakistan in the Kashmir Battlespace’, New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 18 June 2020; T. Biscontini, ‘Line of Control’, EBSCO, 2023.

Kashmir is subject to territorial claims by China, India, and Pakistan.¹³L. Maizland, ‘Kashmir: What to Know About the Disputed Region’, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 August 2019; T. Annakkarage, ‘Kashmir: The identity crisis at the heart of the three-way territorial contest’, Lowy Institute: The Interpreter, 23 June 2025; A. Hussain, ‘Pahalgam attack: A simple guide to the Kashmir conflict’, Al Jazeera, 2 May 2025. China has claimed only part of the territory, namely Aksai Chin and Shaksgam Valley,¹⁴K. Bokhari, ‘China Joins India and Pakistan in the Kashmir Battlespace’, New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 18 June 2020; T. Annakkarage, ‘Kashmir: The identity crisis at the heart of the three-way territorial contest’, Lowy Institute: The Interpreter, 23 June 2025; ‘China rejects India’s claim over Shaksgam valley in Kashmir, asserts territory belongs to Beijing’, Dawn, 13 January 2026 gaining control of Aksai Chin during its 1962 war with India and receiving Shaksgam Valley from Pakistan in 1963.¹⁵T. Annakkarage, ‘Kashmir: The identity crisis at the heart of the three-way territorial contest’, Lowy Institute: The Interpreter, 23 June 2025; C. Arpi, ‘New Chinese Road in Shaksgam Valley: A Brief Historical Background’, Shiv Nadat Institution of Eminence, 10 June 2024; O. Guillard, ‘China’s unilateral attempt to alter status quo of South Asian Nations’, Institut d’études de géopolitique appliquée, 10 July 2024. According to Pakistan, the rest of the Kashmir region is ‘fundamental to founding it’s Islamic identity’ and, because majority of the population in the region is Muslim, it belongs to Pakistan.¹⁶T. Annakkarage, ‘Kashmir: The identity crisis at the heart of the three-way territorial contest’, Lowy Institute: The Interpreter, 23 June 2025. India has asserted that the entire territory belongs to it, rejecting both China and Pakistan’s claims.¹⁷T. Annakkarage, ‘Kashmir: The identity crisis at the heart of the three-way territorial contest’, Lowy Institute: The Interpreter, 23 June 2025; ‘China rejects India’s claim over Shaksgam valley in Kashmir, asserts territory belongs to Beijing’, Dawn, 13 January 2026; O. Guillard, ‘China’s unilateral attempt to alter status quo of South Asian Nations’, Institut d’études de géopolitique appliquée, 10 July 2024. Between India and Pakistan, the Kashmir region is divided by the Line of Control.¹⁸L. Maizland, ‘Kashmir: What to Know About the Disputed Region’, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 August 2019; T. Biscontini, ‘Line of Control’, EBSCO, 2023. India controls about forty-five per cent of Kashmir with Pakistan controlling the rest (not including those parts over which China has control).¹⁹L. Maizland, ‘Kashmir: What to Know About the Disputed Region’, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 August 2019; P. Mishra, ‘History of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK)’, Jagran Josh, 11 May 2025. In India, the region was the only Muslim-majority state in the country and was known as Jammu and Kashmir.²⁰L. Maizland, ‘Kashmir: What to Know About the Disputed Region’, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 August 2019.

Following the end of the first war over Kashmir, India and Pakistan signed the 1949 Karachi Agreement in which the United Nations (UN) drew a Ceasefire Line through the Kashmir region, splitting it between the two States.²¹P. Mishra, ‘History of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK)’, Jagran Josh, 11 May 2025; ‘Agreement between Military Representatives of India and Pakistan Regarding the Establishment of a Cease-Fire Line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, 29 July 1947’, Security Council Report; D. Sharma, ‘What Is The Simla Agreement And How Pak Has Violated It In The Past’, NDTV, 24 April 2025. In 1972, this line was renamed the Line of Control (LoC) in the Simla Agreement which ushered in a ceasefire between India and Pakistan following a seven-month-long war between the two nations.²²Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict Between India and Pakistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 February 2026; A. Hussain, ‘Kashmir attack: Why Pakistan’s threat to suspend Simla Agreement matters’, Al Jazeera, 28 April 2025; ‘Agreement on Bilateral Relations between the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan (Simla Agreement), 2 July 1972’, Security Council Report. In the Simla Agreement, Pakistan and India agreed to solve their territorial dispute peacefully, to establish the LoC, and to not change this line unilaterally.²³‘Agreement on Bilateral Relations between the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan (Simla Agreement), 2 July 1972’, Security Council Report.

Since 1947, those in Indian-controlled Kashmir have enjoyed some kind of political autonomy from the Indian government.²⁴L. Maizland, ‘Kashmir: What to Know About the Disputed Region’, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 August 2019; R. Venkataramakrishnan, ‘Explainer: How BJP is proposing to change Jammu & Kashmir and what that means’, Scroll.in, 5 August 2019; D. Lawler, ‘India leaves Kashmir in the dark as it erases special status’, Axios, 5 August 2019. However, the region lost this autonomy in August 2019 when the provision in India’s constitution granting it this power was abolished (see below).²⁵L. Maizland, ‘Kashmir: What to Know About the Disputed Region’, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 August 2019; R. Venkataramakrishnan, ‘Explainer: How BJP is proposing to change Jammu & Kashmir and what that means’, Scroll.in, 5 August 2019; D. Lawler, ‘India leaves Kashmir in the dark as it erases special status’, Axios, 5 August 2019. The territory is to be split into two union territories, allowing the Indian government to have greater control over the affairs of the region.²⁶L. Maizland, ‘Kashmir: What to Know About the Disputed Region’, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 August 2019; R. Venkataramakrishnan, ‘Explainer: How BJP is proposing to change Jammu & Kashmir and what that means’, Scroll.in, 5 August 2019. The move was seen as India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, showing his support for Hindu nationalism and right-wing sentiments in India.²⁷R. Venkataramakrishnan, ‘Explainer: How BJP is proposing to change Jammu & Kashmir and what that means’, Scroll.in, 5 August 2019; D. Lawler, ‘India leaves Kashmir in the dark as it erases special status’, Axios, 5 August 2019. It drew ire from Pakistan and those living in Indian-controlled Kashmir.²⁸Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict Between India and Pakistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 February 2026.

India’s claim to Kashmir is drawn from the Instrument of Accession, but the existence of this document is contested.²⁹Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict Between India and Pakistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 February 2026; ‘Kashmir profile’, BBC, 10 March 2025; A. Jaaved, ‘Myth of Kashmir’s accession to India’, Modern Diplomacy, 6 February 2019; ‘BRIEF: What is the Instrument of Accession and Why Does it Matter?’, Kashmir Law and Justice Project, 27 October 2024. India has never submitted the document to the United Nations and in 1995, claimed that the original document was lost or stolen.³⁰A. Jaaved, ‘Myth of Kashmir’s accession to India’, Modern Diplomacy, 6 February 2019. Even if it does exist, its legal validity has been contested on several grounds, including that Hari Singh did not have the ability to bind the Kashmir region to any agreement at the time.³¹‘BRIEF: What is the Instrument of Accession and Why Does it Matter?’, Kashmir Law and Justice Project, 27 October 2024. India argues that, since those in Indian-controlled Kashmir have participated in Indian state-level and national elections, it is an indication that the region has acquiesced to and accepted Indian control, whereas Pakistan argues that a referendum should be held to allow those in Kashmir to exercise their right to self-determination.³²‘Kashmir profile’, BBC, 10 March 2025; A. Jaaved, ‘Myth of Kashmir’s accession to India’, Modern Diplomacy, 6 February 2019.

India and Pakistan are both nuclear powers.³³Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict Between India and Pakistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 February 2026; B. Kuchay, ‘What prompted India-Pakistan ceasefire pact along Kashmir border?’, Al Jazeera, 9 March 2021. The neighbouring States have fought several wars against each other, although in 2003 they signed a ceasefire to stabilize relations and interactions at the LoC.³⁴B. Kuchay, ‘What prompted India-Pakistan ceasefire pact along Kashmir border?’, Al Jazeera, 9 March 2021. Frequent skirmishes at the LoC led to fears of further hostilities, though both States reaffirmed their commitment to the 2003 ceasefire in 2021.³⁵B. Kuchay, ‘What prompted India-Pakistan ceasefire pact along Kashmir border?’, Al Jazeera, 9 March 2021; D. Ghoshal, ‘India, Pakistan militaries agree to stop cross-border firing in rare joint statement’, Reuters, 25 February 2021; ‘Joint Statement’, Indian Ministry of Defence, 25 February 2021.

Indian Supreme Court Decision on the 2019 Revocation of Jammu and Kashmir’s Autonomy

In 2019, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BPJ), the ruling party in India, announced the revocation of Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian Constitution which granted autonomy to what was called the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) state in India-controlled Kashmir.³⁶H. Shah and M. Dalton, ‘Indian Revocation of Kashmir’s Special Status’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 August 2019; J. Lunn, ‘Kashmir: The effects of revoking Article 370’, UK Parliament: House of Commons Library, 8 August 2019; ‘Article 370: What happened with Kashmir and why it matters’, BBC, 6 August 2019. The autonomy was granted to Jammu and Kashmir through the Instrument of Accession signed by Hari Singh, the leader of what was then an independent Kashmir in 1947, who accorded temporary sovereignty of Kashmir to India on certain conditions of autonomy (see above).³⁷H. Shah and M. Dalton, ‘Indian Revocation of Kashmir’s Special Status’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 August 2019; ‘Article 370: What happened with Kashmir and why it matters’, BBC, 6 August 2019; ‘Article 370: India strips disputed Kashmir of special status’, BBC, 5 August 2019.

Under Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian Constitution, while New Delhi was in charge of the foreign affairs and defense of J&K, the state was allowed to create its own laws through its own state legislature.³⁸H. Shah and M. Dalton, ‘Indian Revocation of Kashmir’s Special Status’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 August 2019; J. Lunn, ‘Kashmir: The effects of revoking Article 370’, UK Parliament: House of Commons Library, 8 August 2019; ‘Article 370: What happened with Kashmir and why it matters’, BBC, 6 August 2019; ‘Article 370: India strips disputed Kashmir of special status’, BBC, 5 August 2019. One of the more important consequences of this is that J&K limited who could own property and gain permanent residence status in J&K, restricting this to local Kashmiris for the most part.³⁹H. Shah and M. Dalton, ‘Indian Revocation of Kashmir’s Special Status’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 August 2019; ‘Article 370: What happened with Kashmir and why it matters’, BBC, 6 August 2019. The move to revoke J&K autonomy was seen locally as an attempt by the BJP to change the majority-Muslim demographic make-up of the region.⁴⁰H. Shah and M. Dalton, ‘Indian Revocation of Kashmir’s Special Status’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 August 2019; ‘Article 370: What happened with Kashmir and why it matters’, BBC, 6 August 2019; ‘Article 370: India strips disputed Kashmir of special status’, BBC, 5 August 2019. The BJP for its part had long sought to revoked Articles 370 and 35A, saying that it was necessary to better integrate India and bring the J&K region onto the same footing as the rest of India.⁴¹J. Lunn, ‘Kashmir: The effects of revoking Article 370’, UK Parliament: House of Commons Library, 8 August 2019; ‘Article 370: What happened with Kashmir and why it matters’, BBC, 6 August 2019; ‘Article 370: India strips disputed Kashmir of special status’, BBC, 5 August 2019.

Another step the Indian government took was to break up the state into two smaller federal (or union) territories.⁴²J. Lunn, ‘Kashmir: The effects of revoking Article 370’, UK Parliament: House of Commons Library, 8 August 2019; ‘Article 370: What happened with Kashmir and why it matters’, BBC, 6 August 2019. Expecting the move to draw public backlash (indeed, many Kashmiris were angry⁴³‘Article 370: Kashmiris express anger at loss of special status’, BBC, 7 August 2019), the Indian government sent thousands of troops into J&K and implemented a telecommunications and media blackout before announcing the revocation.⁴⁴H. Shah and M. Dalton, ‘Indian Revocation of Kashmir’s Special Status’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 August 2019; J. Lunn, ‘Kashmir: The effects of revoking Article 370’, UK Parliament: House of Commons Library, 8 August 2019; ‘Article 370: India strips disputed Kashmir of special status’, BBC, 5 August 2019; A. A. Wani, ‘Jammu and Kashmir in the Aftermath of August 2019’, French Institute of International Relations, 25 February 2025. Pakistan criticized the move, calling it illegal but India stated that the move did not alter the LoC.⁴⁵‘Article 370: India strips disputed Kashmir of special status’, BBC, 5 August 2019; ‘Prepared to go to any extent to fulfil our obligations to Kashmiri people: ISPR’, Dawn, 6 August 2019. Pakistan also recalled its top diplomat to India, expelled India’s High Commissioner to Pakistan, suspended bilateral trade with India, and vowed to take the matter to the United Nations.⁴⁶J. Lunn, ‘Kashmir: The effects of revoking Article 370’, UK Parliament: House of Commons Library, 8 August 2019; ‘Article 370 move leaves Pak fuming: Imran Khan severes ties with India, suspends trade, closes airspace’, India Today, 8 August 2019.

During the reporting period, India’s Supreme Court heard a challenge to the revocation, with critics arguing that the Indian Parliament did not have the authority to revoke the Article and that only the Constituent Assembly of Indian-controlled Kashmir could do that.⁴⁷‘What’s Article 370? What to know about India top court verdict on Kashmir’, Al Jazeera, 11 December 2023. Due to fears of retaliation from and surveillance by the Indian government, media coverage on the oral petitions for the case in August 2023 was minimal.⁴⁸‘Asia-Pacific: Indian-Pakistan (Kashmir)’, International Crisis Group, August 2023. Hearings took place from 3 August to 11 September,⁴⁹‘Channel Archives’, Supreme Court Observer with the Court reserving judgement on 11 September 2023.⁵⁰G. Kashyap, ‘Supreme Court Hears Challenge to the Abrogation of Article 370: Day 16’, Supreme Court Observer, 11 September 2023. Judgement was eventually delivered on 11 December 2023 and the Court upheld the revocation of Articles 370 and 35A.⁵¹‘What’s Article 370? What to know about India top court verdict on Kashmir’, Al Jazeera, 11 December 2023; M. Sebastian and S. Hrishikesh, ‘Article 370: India Supreme Court upholds repeal of Kashmir’s special status’, BBC, 11 December 2023. The Court held that J&K should have no autonomy rights and that its special status had been a ‘temporary provision’ that was a response to conditions of war in J&K.⁵²‘What’s Article 370? What to know about India top court verdict on Kashmir’, Al Jazeera, 11 December 2023; M. Sebastian and S. Hrishikesh, ‘Article 370: India Supreme Court upholds repeal of Kashmir’s special status’, BBC, 11 December 2023. Prime Minister Modi welcomed the decision, calling it ‘a promise of a brighter future’ for a ‘more united India’.⁵³‘What’s Article 370? What to know about India top court verdict on Kashmir’, Al Jazeera, 11 December 2023.

Pakistan rejected the decision, stating that it ‘does not acknowledge the supremacy of the Indian Constitution over Jammu and Kashmir’ and that the decision did not recognize the international legal dimension of the territorial dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.⁵⁴A. Mehmood, ‘Pakistan Rejects Indian Supreme Court’s Decision on Jammu and Kashmir’s Special Status’, The Media Line, 13 December 2023; ‘How Pakistan reacted to Supreme Court verdict on Article 370 abrogation’, Hindustan Times, 12 December 2023; N. Subramanian, ‘Pakistan’s options after Article 370 verdict: Can it do the unthinkable?’, News Laundry, 19 December 2023. Pakistan also sent letters to the UN Security Council, adopting the position that the Supreme Court’s decision violates international law and urging the Security Council to reverse India’s ‘illegal and unilateral actions’ in J&K.⁵⁵B. S. Syed, ‘Pakistan seeks reversal of illegal Indian actions on Kashmir’, Dawn, 17 December 2023.

Border Skirmishes Along the LoC

India and Pakistan frequently engage in border skirmishes along the LoC in Kashmir.⁵⁶‘Ceasefire intact, clarifies Indian Army amid cross-LoC flare-up reports’, Hindustan Times, 13 February 2025; P. Ashiq, ‘J&K Lieutenant Governor Manoj Sinha: India Army fully capable of dealing with any type of situation along borders’, The Hindu, 17 February 2025. Several instances were reported during the reporting period. In June 2023, Pakistan accused India of killing two civilians and injuring one other at the LoC in the Sattwal sector of Pakistani-controlled Kashmir.⁵⁷‘Pakistan army says two civilians killed by Indian forces’, Reuters, 24 June 2023; A. Gul, ‘Pakistan: Civilians Killed in Kashmir in Indian Cross-Border Fire’, Voice of America, 24 June 2023; ‘Pakistan accuses Indian troops of killing 2 civilians in cross-border incident in Kashmir’, Associated Press News, 24 June 2023. Pakistan described the Indian cross-border shelling as ‘unprovoked’ and a violation of a ceasefire between the two States, going on to declare that the it had a right to respond.⁵⁸‘Pakistan army says two civilians killed by Indian forces’, Reuters, 24 June 2023; A. Gul, ‘Pakistan: Civilians Killed in Kashmir in Indian Cross-Border Fire’, Voice of America, 24 June 2023; ‘Pakistan accuses Indian troops of killing 2 civilians in cross-border incident in Kashmir’, Associated Press News, 24 June 2023. Pakistan summoned the Indian Charge d’Affaires to explain the action, and while the Indian government did not publicly respond to the allegations,⁵⁹A. Gul, ‘Pakistan: Civilians Killed in Kashmir in Indian Cross-Border Fire’, Voice of America, 24 June 2023; ‘Pakistan army says two civilians killed by Indian forces’, Ariana News, 25 June 2023 the Indian army tweeted that soldiers and police intercepted and ‘engaged’ with Pakistani infiltrators at the border.⁶⁰‘Pakistan accuses Indian troops of killing 2 civilians in cross-border incident in Kashmir’, Associated Press News, 24 June 2023; ‘LoC Firing: India Claims Infiltration Foiled, Pakistan Alleges Civilian Was Killed’, The Wire, 22 August 2023. The army also stated that one Indian soldier was injured.⁶¹‘Pakistan accuses Indian troops of killing 2 civilians in cross-border incident in Kashmir’, Associated Press, 24 June 2023; ‘LoC Firing: India Claims Infiltration Foiled, Pakistan Alleges Civilian Was Killed’, The Wire, 22 August 2023. This was the first violation of the 2003 ceasefire since it was reaffirmed in 2021 (see above).⁶²‘Pakistan army says two civilians killed by Indian forces’, Reuters, 24 June 2023; A. Gul, ‘Pakistan: Civilians Killed in Kashmir in Indian Cross-Border Fire’, Voice of America, 24 June 2023.

On two separate occasions in August 2023, the Indian army killed three people it called ‘terrorists’ attempting to cross the LoC into Indian-controlled Kashmir.⁶³‘LoC Firing: India Claims Infiltration Foiled, Pakistan Alleges Civilian Was Killed’, The Wire, 22 August 2023; ‘Infiltration bid foiled near LoC in Poonch, two terrorists killed: Army’, The Hindu, 21 August 2023. Responding to the later of these two events, Pakistan accused India of again killing a civilian ‘unprovoked’ and of violating the ceasefire, going on to make it explicit that ‘all necessary measures’ would be taken to protect Pakistani life and property.⁶⁴‘LoC Firing: India Claims Infiltration Foiled, Pakistan Alleges Civilian Was Killed’, The Wire, 22 August 2023; ‘Civilian martyred in India’s ‘unprovoked’ cross-LoC firing in Nikial Sector’, The International News, 21 August 2023.

The two States directly engaged each other twice in October 2023 when they exchanged gunfire along the LoC.⁶⁵‘Asia-Pacific: Indian-Pakistan (Kashmir)’, International Crisis Group, October 2023; R. K. Khajuria, ‘Pakistan troops start unprovoked firing in Jammu’s Arnia, RS Pura sectors’, Hindustan Times, 27 October 2023; ‘Cross-border firing stops along IB in Jammu, border dwellers start returning home’, The Hindu, 27 October 2023; I. Sajid and R. ul Khaliq, ‘Pakistan, India trade fire across Kashmir border’, AA, 27 October 2023;D. Hooda, ‘The 2021 India-Pakistan Ceasefire and the Road Ahead’, New Delhi: Council for Strategic and Defense Research, April 2025; ‘Alarm in border areas after ‘heavy Indian firing’’, Dawn, 27 October 2023. In an incident on 17 October, Indian Border Security Forces (BSF) accused Pakistani snipers of opening fire unprovoked.⁶⁶R. K. Khajuria, ‘Pakistan troops start unprovoked firing in Jammu’s Arnia, RS Pura sectors’, Hindustan Times, 27 October 2023; ‘Cross-border firing stops along IB in Jammu, border dwellers start returning home’, The Hindu, 27 October 2023; ‘2 BSF personnel injured in unprovoked firing by Pakistan in Jammu’, India Today, 18 October 2023. As a response, the BSF returned fire.⁶⁷‘2 BSF personnel injured in unprovoked firing by Pakistan in Jammu’, India Today, 18 October 2023. Two BSF troopers were injured.⁶⁸R. K. Khajuria, ‘Pakistan troops start unprovoked firing in Jammu’s Arnia, RS Pura sectors’, Hindustan Times, 27 October 2023; ‘Cross-border firing stops along IB in Jammu, border dwellers start returning home’, The Hindu, 27 October 2023; ‘2 BSF personnel injured in unprovoked firing by Pakistan in Jammu’, India Today, 18 October 2023. A similar incident took place on 26/27 October; the two sides traded fire, with India again accusing Pakistan of firing first and unprovoked while Pakistan accused India of ‘openly violating the [2003] ceasefire’.⁶⁹R. K. Khajuria, ‘Pakistan troops start unprovoked firing in Jammu’s Arnia, RS Pura sectors’, Hindustan Times, 27 October 2023; ‘Cross-border firing stops along IB in Jammu, border dwellers start returning home’, The Hindu, 27 October 2023; I. Sajid and R. ul Khaliq, ‘Pakistan, India trade fire across Kashmir border’, AA, 27 October 2023; ‘Alarm in border areas after ‘heavy Indian firing’’, Dawn, 27 October 2023; A. Sharma, ‘Cross-border shelling shatters fragile peace after ceasefire revival in Jammu and Kashmir’, Frontline: The Hindu, 27 October 2023. Military sources cited in Pakistani media claimed that Pakistani forces were shooting down a drone that was entering Pakistani airspace.⁷⁰‘Alarm in border areas after ‘heavy Indian firing’’, Dawn, 27 October 2023. Military sources in Indian media offer a different picture, stating that Pakistani Rangers started the exchange when they targeted the Vikram post on the Indian side of the LoC.⁷¹R. K. Khajuria, ‘Pakistan troops start unprovoked firing in Jammu’s Arnia, RS Pura sectors’, Hindustan Times, 27 October 2023. The fighting reportedly lasted eight hours, with Indian media reporting that Pakistan fired heavy machine guns and mortar shells into Indian-Kashmir, reportedly hitting some surrounding villages and prompting several people in the villages to flee.⁷²R. K. Khajuria, ‘Pakistan troops start unprovoked firing in Jammu’s Arnia, RS Pura sectors’, Hindustan Times, 27 October 2023; ‘Cross-border firing stops along IB in Jammu, border dwellers start returning home’, The Hindu, 27 October 2023; A. Sharma, ‘Cross-border shelling shatters fragile peace after ceasefire revival in Jammu and Kashmir’, Frontline: The Hindu, 27 October 2023; P. Ashiq, ‘Shelling by Pakistan triggers scare in Jammu’s Arnia’, The Hindu, 28 October 2023. Two Indian BSF troopers and one Indian civilian were injured.⁷³A. Mallick, ‘Jammu and Kashmir: Cross-border firing between Pak Rangers, BSF stops, locals say ‘Pakistan cannot be trusted’’, India TV News, 27 October 2023. Another incident of this nature took place on 8–9 November 2023, with India again claiming that Pakistan opened fire unprovoked.⁷⁴‘Indian soldier dies in India-Pakistan ceasefire violation in Kashmir’, EFE, 9 November 2023; ‘Indian and Pakistani soldiers trade fire in disputed Kashmir, killing 1 Indian soldier’, Associated Press, 10 November 2023. India again responded and one Indian BSF trooper died.⁷⁵‘Indian soldier dies in India-Pakistan ceasefire violation in Kashmir’, EFE, 9 November 2023.

In September 2024, one Indian BSF trooper was injured by what India called ‘an unprovoked firing incident’ across the LoC. India responded with fire and later called the attack a violation of the 2003 ceasefire.⁷⁶‘Pakistani forces open fire along IB in Jammu, BSF trooper injured’, PGurus, 11 September 2024; ‘BSF jawan injured in unprovoked firing by Pak troops in Jammu’s Akhnoor: officials’, The Hindu, 11 September 2024. A February 2025 incident again saw Pakistan firing on Indian BSF troopers along the LoC, with the latter returning fire.⁷⁷‘Asia-Pacific: Indian-Pakistan (Kashmir)’, International Crisis Group, February 2025; ‘Pakistani troops opened small arm fire on Indian post at LoC in Poonch: Army’, The Hindu, 16 February 2025. Also in February 2025, two Indian soldiers were killed by an improvised explosive device blast along the LoC and one was killed by a suspected Pakistani sniper.⁷⁸‘Asia-Pacific: Indian-Pakistan (Kashmir)’, International Crisis Group, February 2025; ‘Captain among two soldiers killed in IED blast close to LoC in Jammu’s Akhnoor’, The Hindu, 11 February 2025; J. Ali, ‘Two Soldiers Killed, One Injured By IED Blast in Jammu’, The Wire, 11 February 2025. Later in February 2025, military officials from the two sides met to address the increase in the skirmishes.⁷⁹‘Asia-Pacific: Indian-Pakistan (Kashmir)’, International Crisis Group, February 2025; V. Gupta, ‘Brigade Commanders From India And Pakistan Meet At LoC’s Chakkan-Da-Bagh To Discuss Ceasefire Violations’, Swarajya Magazine, 21 February 2025. Despite this, further skirmishes reportedly occurred both before the four-day conflict (see below) in April 2025⁸⁰‘Pakistan Opens Firing Across Line Of Control, India Retaliates’, NDTV, 25 April 2025 and afterwards in October⁸¹‘J&K: Pakistan violates ceasefire in Lipa valley, faces fierce Indian Army retaliation for unprovoked firing’, Organiser, 28 October 2025 and September 2025.⁸²‘India, Pak troops exchange brief fire at LoC, months after Op Sindoor: Sources’, India Today, 21 September 2025.

Attack in Pahalgam

On 22 April 2025, a group of militants approached and opened fire on a group of tourists in a popular picturesque meadow near Pahalgam in Indian-controlled Kashmir.⁸³R. Mogul et al, ‘A tourist massacre in Kashmir is escalating tensions between India and Pakistan. Here’s what we know’, CNN, 28 April 2025; E. Mitra et al, ‘Dozens killed as gunmen massacre tourists in Kashmir beauty spot’, CNN, 23 April 2025; A. Das et al, ‘A Perfect Day in a Gentle Meadow Is Shattered by Bloody Carnage’, The New York Times, 23 April 2025. Twenty-six people were killed and seventeen were injured.⁸⁴E. Mitra et al, ‘Dozens killed as gunmen massacre tourists in Kashmir beauty spot’, CNN, 23 April 2025. Twenty-five of the victims were Indian, with reports varying on whether the final victim was Nepalese⁸⁵E. Mitra et al, ‘Dozens killed as gunmen massacre tourists in Kashmir beauty spot’, CNN, 23 April 2025; ‘Pahalgam terror attack: A tribute to the victims’, The Hindu; ‘‘Act of war’: What happened in Kashmir attack that killed 26 tourists?’, Al Jazeera, 23 April 2025 or a local Kashmiri man.⁸⁶P. Ashiq, ‘NIA charges four LeT-TRF terrorists in Pahalgam attack’, The Hindu, 16 December 2025. The gunmen emerged from a nearby forest in camouflage, going on to reportedly target male Indians – all of the victims were men⁸⁷‘‘Act of war’: What happened in Kashmir attack that killed 26 tourists?’, Al Jazeera, 23 April 2025 and most were Hindu⁸⁸N. Farooquee, ‘India hunts suspects days after deadly Kashmir attack’, BBC, 28 April 2025; P. MacRae, ‘The domestic pressures shaping India’s response to Kashmir attacks’, The Guardian, 25 April 2025; ‘India-Pakistan: Avoiding a War in Waiting’, International Crisis Group, 17 September 2025 – telling surviving family members to ‘go back and tell your government what happened’, ostensibly referencing Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government.⁸⁹E. Mitra et al, ‘Dozens killed as gunmen massacre tourists in Kashmir beauty spot’, CNN, 23 April 2025; A. Das et al, ‘A Perfect Day in a Gentle Meadow Is Shattered by Bloody Carnage’, The New York Times, 23 April 2025.

Immediately after the attack a statement placed on social media and signed by The Resistance Front (TRF), believed to be an off-shoot of Lashkar-e-Taibi (LeT),⁹⁰‘Lashkar-e-Tayyiba’, Australian Government: Australian National Security, 22 September 2024 claimed responsibility for the attack.⁹¹E. Mitra et al, ‘Dozens killed as gunmen massacre tourists in Kashmir beauty spot’, CNN, 23 April 2025; ‘‘Act of war’: What happened in Kashmir attack that killed 26 tourists?’, Al Jazeera, 23 April 2025; ‘India-Pakistan: Avoiding a War in Waiting’, International Crisis Group, 17 September 2025. The statement said the attack was a response to the change in demographics of the area, specifically the influx of Indian citizens who had been granted residency permits to live and work in Kashmir.⁹²E. Mitra et al, ‘Dozens killed as gunmen massacre tourists in Kashmir beauty spot’, CNN, 23 April 2025; ‘‘Act of war’: What happened in Kashmir attack that killed 26 tourists?’, Al Jazeera, 23 April 2025. Neither Al Jazeera⁹³‘‘Act of war’: What happened in Kashmir attack that killed 26 tourists?’, Al Jazeera, 23 April 2025 nor CNN⁹⁴E. Mitra et al, ‘Dozens killed as gunmen massacre tourists in Kashmir beauty spot’, CNN, 23 April 2025 could verify the authenticity of the statement and International Crisis Group later reported that the group retracted their statement.⁹⁵‘India-Pakistan: Avoiding a War in Waiting’, International Crisis Group, 17 September 2025. The Hindu reported that the TRF ‘unequivocally den[ies] any involvement in the Pahalgam incident’, going on to call the attempt to attribute the attack to them as ‘part of an orchestrated campaign to malign the Kashmiri resistance’ that they blamed on ‘Indian cyber-intelligence operatives’.⁹⁶‘The Resistance Front denies involvement in Pahalgam attack as global pressure mounts’, The Hindu, 16 April 2025. Indian authorities did not immediately name the group they attributed the attack to,⁹⁷N. Farooquee, ‘India hunts suspects days after deadly Kashmir attack’, BBC, 28 April 2025 but some officials told Al Jazeera that there were four attackers – two from Pakistan and two from Indian-controlled Kashmir.⁹⁸‘‘Act of war’: What happened in Kashmir attack that killed 26 tourists?’, Al Jazeera, 23 April 2025. A few days later, the number of attackers was revised to three when police named three suspects in the attack: two Pakistani men and one local Indian-Kashmiri man, all three connected to LeT.⁹⁹R. Mogul et al, ‘A tourist massacre in Kashmir is escalating tensions between India and Pakistan. Here’s what we know’, CNN, 28 April 2025.

The response from India was both internal and external. Internally, Indian authorities arrested and detained about 2,800 people, detaining some for prolonged periods and without charges or trials.¹⁰⁰N. Farooquee, ‘India hunts suspects days after deadly Kashmir attack’, BBC, 28 April 2025; ‘UN experts alarmed by Indian counter-terrorism operations violating human rights in Jammu and Kashmir’, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 24 November 2025. Some people were also reportedly tortured and restricted from sharing with others that they were being detained.¹⁰¹‘UN experts alarmed by Indian counter-terrorism operations violating human rights in Jammu and Kashmir’, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 24 November 2025. In addition, houses of suspected militants in Indian-controlled Kashmir were demolished by authorities in the region.¹⁰²N. Farooquee, ‘India hunts suspects days after deadly Kashmir attack’, BBC, 28 April 2025; ‘UN experts alarmed by Indian counter-terrorism operations violating human rights in Jammu and Kashmir’, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 24 November 2025. Kashmiri students across India also reported an increase in attacks or threats of attacks,¹⁰³N. Farooquee, ‘India hunts suspects days after deadly Kashmir attack’, BBC, 28 April 2025; Y. Sharma, ‘‘We’re cursed’: Kashmiris under attack across India after Pahalgam killings’, Al Jazeera, 25 April 2025 with some reportedly subjected to increased surveillance by the Indian government.¹⁰⁴‘UN experts alarmed by Indian counter-terrorism operations violating human rights in Jammu and Kashmir’, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 24 November 2025. Anti-Muslim rhetoric also emanated from extremist Hindu groups in other parts of India.¹⁰⁵‘UN experts alarmed by Indian counter-terrorism operations violating human rights in Jammu and Kashmir’, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 24 November 2025; Y. Sharma, ‘‘We’re cursed’: Kashmiris under attack across India after Pahalgam killings’, Al Jazeera, 25 April 2025.

As for the external consequences, India blamed Pakistan-based militants for the attack, in the same breath accusing Pakistan of not doing enough to stop cross-border terrorism and, as such, having a hand in the attack.¹⁰⁶Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict Between India and Pakistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 February 2026; A. Hussain, ‘Pahalgam attack: A simple guide to the Kashmir conflict’, Al Jazeera, 2 May 2025; ‘India-Pakistan: Avoiding a War in Waiting’, International Crisis Group, 17 September 2025. Pakistan denied any part in it.¹⁰⁷A. Hussain, ‘Pahalgam attack: A simple guide to the Kashmir conflict’, Al Jazeera, 2 May 2025; R. Mogul et al, ‘A tourist massacre in Kashmir is escalating tensions between India and Pakistan. Here’s what we know’, CNN, 28 April 2025; S. Masood, ‘Crisis Deepens for India and Pakistan Over Kashmir Attack’, The New York Times, 24 April 2025.

Protests within India put pressure on the State to take action against Pakistan.¹⁰⁸Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict Between India and Pakistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 February 2026; R. Mogul et al, ‘A tourist massacre in Kashmir is escalating tensions between India and Pakistan. Here’s what we know’, CNN, 28 April 2025; P. MacRae, ‘The domestic pressures shaping India’s response to Kashmir attacks’, The Guardian, 25 April 2025; ‘India-Pakistan: Avoiding a War in Waiting’, International Crisis Group, 17 September 2025. India did respond with punitive diplomatic measures, closing the only border between the two States, forbidding Pakistani-registered aircraft from using Indian airspace and suspending the Indus Waters Treaty (see below) until Pakistan ceased its support for ‘cross-border terrorism’.¹⁰⁹Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict Between India and Pakistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 February 2026; ‘India-Pakistan: Avoiding a War in Waiting’, International Crisis Group, 17 September 2025; S. Masood, ‘Crisis Deepens for India and Pakistan Over Kashmir Attack’, The New York Times, 24 April 2025; ‘Statement by Foreign Secretary on the decision of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS)’, Government of India Ministry of External Affairs, 23 April 2025. Pakistan responded with its own similar diplomatic moves and called on India to provide evidence that Pakistan had supported or was responsible for the attack.¹¹⁰Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict Between India and Pakistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 February 2026; R. Mogul et al, ‘A tourist massacre in Kashmir is escalating tensions between India and Pakistan. Here’s what we know’, CNN, 28 April 2025; ‘Pakistan announces retaliatory measures against India after Kashmir attack’, Al Jazeera, 24 April 2025. The event also sparked further border skirmishes,¹¹¹Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict Between India and Pakistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 February 2026; ‘India and Pakistan continue to trade fire across Kashmir border’, Al Jazeera, 28 April 2025 and tensions between the two States increased significantly, with many in Pakistan believing that India would imminently launch a military attack.¹¹²Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict Between India and Pakistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 February 2026; A. Hussain, ‘Pahalgam attack: A simple guide to the Kashmir conflict’, Al Jazeera, 2 May 2025; S. Masood, ‘Crisis Deepens for India and Pakistan Over Kashmir Attack’, The New York Times, 24 April 2025. In May, India did initiate airstrikes on Pakistan (see below).

On 28 July, Indian security forces killed three militants in a firefight in Dachigam in Indian-controlled Kashmir, identifying them as the Pahalgam attackers.¹¹³‘Asia-Pacific: Indian-Pakistan (Kashmir)’, International Crisis Group, July 2025; ‘Three suspected rebels killed in firefight in India-administered Kashmir’, Al Jazeera, 28 July 2025; M. Mashal and H. Kumar, ‘India Says It Killed 3 Militants Behind Spring Terrorist Attack in Kashmir’, The New York Times, 29 July 2025; M. Sebastian, ‘India says it killed militants who shot dead tourists in Kashmir’, BBC, 29 July 2025; ‘India claims to have killed all suspects of Kashmir’s Pahalgam attack’,  Al Jazeera, 29 July 2025. The attackers were identified as being Pakistani nationals.¹¹⁴M. Mashal and H. Kumar, ‘India Says It Killed 3 Militants Behind Spring Terrorist Attack in Kashmir’, The New York Times, 29 July 2025; M. Sebastian, ‘India says it killed militants who shot dead tourists in Kashmir’, BBC, 29 July 2025. Pakistan denied that the militants were Pakastani but India’s Home Minister Amit Shah told Parliament that the identity of the militants was confirmed with forensic tests.¹¹⁵M. Sebastian, ‘India says it killed militants who shot dead tourists in Kashmir’, BBC, 29 July 2025. These claims have not been independently verified.¹¹⁶M. Sebastian, ‘India says it killed militants who shot dead tourists in Kashmir’, BBC, 29 July 2025. The Indian action apparently came as a response to growing criticism of Modi’s government’s perceived lack of action in arresting those responsible for the attack as well as for the inability to properly address terrorism generally.¹¹⁷M. Mashal and H. Kumar, ‘India Says It Killed 3 Militants Behind Spring Terrorist Attack in Kashmir’, The New York Times, 29 July 2025; M. Sebastian, ‘India says it killed militants who shot dead tourists in Kashmir’, BBC, 29 July 2025.

In December 2025, India’s National Intelligence Agency filed a 1,597 page indictment, charging a further three people and the LeT and RTF for the attacks.¹¹⁸P. Ashiq, ‘NIA charges four LeT-TRF terrorists in Pahalgam attack’, The Hindu, 16 December 2025; C. Mollan, ‘India charges Pakistan-based militant groups in Pahalgam attack’, BBC, 16 December 2025. The three people charged include the two men arrested in June and another man accused by the Agency of being a ‘Pakistani terrorist handler’.¹¹⁹C. Mollan, ‘India charges Pakistan-based militant groups in Pahalgam attack’, BBC, 16 December 2025.

Suspension of the Indus Water Treaty

One of the punitive measures India instituted against Pakistan in the wake of the Pahalgam attack (see above) was the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT).¹²⁰T. van Lossow and A.Singh, ‘Indus Water Treaty 2025: A pause of cooperation, not an end’, Clingendael, July 2025, 1; A. Hussain, ‘Can India stop Pakistan’s river water — and will it spark a new war?’, Al Jazeera, 9 July 2025. The IWT was signed by India, Pakistan, and the World Bank in 1960¹²¹‘Fact Sheet: The Indus Waters Treaty 1960 and the Role of the World Bank’, World Bank, 11 June 2018, Updated 21 June 2023 and concerns the sovereign ownership and use of the six rivers in the Indus Basin which run through India, Pakistan, and the disputed Kashmir region.¹²²T. van Lossow and A.Singh, ‘Indus Water Treaty 2025: A pause of cooperation, not an end’, Clingendael, July 2025, 2; A. Hussain, ‘Can India stop Pakistan’s river water — and will it spark a new war?’, Al Jazeera, 9 July 2025; ‘How India and Pakistan’s co-operation over water has avoided conflict’, Vision of Humanity, 3 November 2025. Most of Pakistan’s population relies on this Basin and the IWT for food, energy, and economic security.¹²³T. van Lossow and A.Singh, ‘Indus Water Treaty 2025: A pause of cooperation, not an end’, Clingendael, July 2025, 3; A. Hussain, ‘Can India stop Pakistan’s river water — and will it spark a new war?’, Al Jazeera, 9 July 2025. India too benefits from the IWT through food security and development of its hydropower sector.¹²⁴T. van Lossow and A.Singh, ‘Indus Water Treaty 2025: A pause of cooperation, not an end’, Clingendael, July 2025, 3.

Despite the tensions between India and Pakistan over the decades, with some of those tensions boiling over into conflict, neither State had ever suspended the treaty¹²⁵T. van Lossow and A.Singh, ‘Indus Water Treaty 2025: A pause of cooperation, not an end’, Clingendael, July 2025, 1; A. Hussain, ‘Can India stop Pakistan’s river water — and will it spark a new war?’, Al Jazeera, 9 July 2025; ‘How India and Pakistan’s co-operation over water has avoided conflict’, Vision of Humanity, 3 November 2025; N. S. Khadka, ‘Can India really stop river water from flowing into Pakistan?’, BBC, 25 April 2025 until the Pahalgam attack.¹²⁶T. van Lossow and A.Singh, ‘Indus Water Treaty 2025: A pause of cooperation, not an end’, Clingendael, July 2025, 1; A. Hussain, ‘Can India stop Pakistan’s river water — and will it spark a new war?’, Al Jazeera, 9 July 2025.

The day after India announced it was suspending the IWT, Pakistan called the move ‘an act of war’.¹²⁷A. Hussain, ‘Can India stop Pakistan’s river water — and will it spark a new war?’, Al Jazeera, 9 July 2025; S. M. Baloch, ‘‘India can starve us’: farmers in Pakistan decry suspension of crucial water treaty’, The Guardian, 29 April 2025. One official told The Guardian, that India had been wanting to withdraw from the IWT for some time and used the Pahalgam attack as an excuse.¹²⁸S. M. Baloch, ‘‘India can starve us’: farmers in Pakistan decry suspension of crucial water treaty’, The Guardian, 29 April 2025. India has been seeking to modify the IWT, citing a change in circumstances and needs,¹²⁹N. S. Khadka, ‘Can India really stop river water from flowing into Pakistan?’, BBC, 25 April 2025 and one expert suggested this was the real reason for the suspension.¹³⁰‘Kashmir attack: Does India’s Indus Waters Treaty freeze threaten Pakistan?’, Al Jazeera, 24 April 2025.

After the end of the four-day conflict (see below), Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif spoke to the Pakistani military, during which he publicly invited India to a dialogue on Kashmir and water distribution between the two States.¹³¹S. I. Raza, ‘Pakistan invites India for ‘comprehensive dialogue’ on Kashmir’, Dawn, 15 May 2025; ‘Pak PM says,’We crushed India’s pride’:Sindhu water is our red line; Pakistan to give ₹14 crore to terrorist Masood Azhar’, Bhaskar English, 15 May 2025. Sharif called water Pakistan’s ‘red line’ going on to warn India not to ‘even think about diverting’ their water.¹³²‘Asia-Pacific: Indian-Pakistan (Kashmir)’, International Crisis Group, May 2025; S. I. Raza, ‘Pakistan invites India for ‘comprehensive dialogue’ on Kashmir’, Dawn, 15 May 2025; ‘Pak PM says,’We crushed India’s pride’:Sindhu water is our red line; Pakistan to give ₹14 crore to terrorist Masood Azhar’, Bhaskar English, 15 May 2025. At a rally a few days later, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that ‘Pakistan will not receive a single drop of water from India’s share’ as long as it ‘persists in exporting terrorism’.¹³³‘Asia-Pacific: Indian-Pakistan (Kashmir)’, International Crisis Group, May 2025; ‘No water for Pakistan from ‘Indian rivers’: Modi’, Dawn, 23 May 2025; ‘“Rahim Yar Khan Airbase Is In ICU”: PM Modi Takes Dig At Pakistan’, NDTV, 22 May 2025. Similar rhetoric was adopted by India’s Home Minister Amit Shah in June when he told The Times of India newspaper that the IWT ‘will never be restored’, going on to say that India would use water that ‘rightfully belongs to it’ and the ‘Pakistan will be starved of water that it has been getting unjustifiably’.¹³⁴A. Diwakar and S. Singh, ‘India’s gone from despair to optimism in 11 yrs: Home minister Amit Shah’, Times of India, 25 June 2025.

Pakistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs said the ‘statements reflected a brazen disregard for international law’, and that Pakistan remained committed to the treaty.¹³⁵‘FO assails Indian home minister’s ‘brazen disregard’ for int’l agreements with remarks on never restoring IWT’, Dawn, 21 June 2025. The suspension of the IWT is seen as illegal in Pakistan’s Senate.¹³⁶‘No water for Pakistan from ‘Indian rivers’: Modi’, Dawn, 23 May 2025. There is no suspension clause in the treaty itself, and it can only be terminated or modified,¹³⁷‘The Indus Waters Treaty 1960 (with annexes). Signed at Karachi, on 19 September 1960’, United Nations Treaty Series and experts believe that India cannot lawfully suspend the operation of the treaty.¹³⁸‘Kashmir attack: Does India’s Indus Waters Treaty freeze threaten Pakistan?’, Al Jazeera, 24 April 2025; T. Kebebew et al, ‘A Treaty on the Brink? India’s Suspension of the IWT and the Case for Cooperative Transboundary Water Governance’, International Water Law Project Blog, 16 June 2025.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration issued an Award on Issues of General Interpretation of the Indus Water Treaty on 8 August 2025 in which it addressed certain preliminary matters and set out issues to be considered in the first phase of the merits of the case brought by Pakistan.¹³⁹PCA, ‘In the Matter of the Indus Waters Western Rivers Arbitration before the Court of Arbitration Constituted in Accordance with the Indus Waters Treaty 1960 between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of India’, Award on Issues of General Interpretation of the Indus Waters Treaty, 8 August 2025, paras 12 and 13. Among other findings, the PCA found a ‘general rule that India shall “let flow” the waters of the Western Rivers for Pakistan’s unrestricted use’.¹⁴⁰PCA, ‘In the Matter of the Indus Waters Western Rivers Arbitration before the Court of Arbitration Constituted in Accordance with the Indus Waters Treaty 1960 between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of India’, Award on Issues of General Interpretation of the Indus Waters Treaty, 8 August 2025, para 811(D)(1). It also remained seized of other disputes that Pakistan included in its initial request for arbitration.¹⁴¹PCA, ‘In the Matter of the Indus Waters Western Rivers Arbitration before the Court of Arbitration Constituted in Accordance with the Indus Waters Treaty 1960 between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of India’, Award on Issues of General Interpretation of the Indus Waters Treaty, 8 August 2025, para 811(V). Pakistan welcomed the decision,¹⁴²A. Momand, ‘Govt hails Hague court’s award saying India must ‘let flow’ waters of western rivers for Pakistan’s ‘unrestricted use’’, Dawn, 11 August 2025 and called on India to reinstate the functioning of the IWT.¹⁴³S. Nath, ‘After Asim Munir, Bilawal Bhutto’s War Threats, Pakistan’s “Water” Request To India’, NDTV, 12 August 2025; A. Momand, ‘Pakistan hails Hague court order telling India to ‘let flow’ rivers’, Asia News Network, 12 August 2025. More hostile rhetoric came from its Amry Chief who warned that Pakistan would respond militarily of India blocked water from flowing into Pakistan.¹⁴⁴‘Pakistan welcomes arbitration court’s new ruling on Indus Waters Treaty’, TRT World, 11 August 2025.

India rejected the PCA’s finding, again adopting the position that it does not recognize the Court or its competence on this matter.¹⁴⁵‘India Rejects Hague Court Ruling on Indus Waters Treaty, Cites Security Concerns Amid Rising Tensions’, The Logical Indian, 12 August 2025; R. Goreja, ‘India rejects Arbitration Court ruling on IWT, questions legitimacy’, Business Standard, 14 August 2025.

Acrimonious Rhetoric Between India and Pakistan

Acrimonious rhetoric between the two States concerns allegations of supporting or carrying out terrorism. In June, India’s Jaishankar stated that India was not prepared to ‘put up with cross-border terrorism from Pakistan’.¹⁴⁶‘Top news of the day: June 8, 2023’, The Hindu, 8 June 2023. Also in June, a joint statement from Modi and then US President Joe Biden, released after Modi’s official visit to the United States, called on Pakistan to ensure that its territory is not used for terrorist activities.¹⁴⁷‘India-USA Joint Statement during the Official State visit of Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi to USA’, Government of India Ministry of External Affairs, 23 June 2023. Pakistan was angered by these remarks, calling them ‘unwarranted, one-sided and misleading’ as well as ‘contrary to diplomatic norms’.¹⁴⁸N. Guramani, ‘‘Misleading, unwarranted’: Pakistan says US-India statement contrary to diplomatic norms’, Dawn, 23 June 2023; K. Singh, ‘Pakistan hits out at US and India after Biden-Modi meeting’, Reuters, 23 June 2023. The spokesperson of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, Mumtaz Zahra Baloch, not only accused the US-Indian statement of erasing the contribution Pakistan had made to fighting terrorism but also shot back, stating that India was a ‘State-sponsor of terrorism’.¹⁴⁹N. Guramani, ‘‘Misleading, unwarranted’: Pakistan says US-India statement contrary to diplomatic norms’, Dawn, 23 June 2023; K. Singh, ‘Pakistan hits out at US and India after Biden-Modi meeting’, Reuters, 23 June 2023. The US embassy’s deputy chief of the mission was also summoned by Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry over the statement.¹⁵⁰‘Pakistan summons US embassy staff over Biden-Modi statement’, Al Jazeera, 27 June 2023. 

In further fallout from the US-Indian statement, in June and July 2023, India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh sparked fears that India would soon be crossing the LoC and starting a conflict with Pakistan.¹⁵¹A. K. Sahay, ‘What Lies Behind Rajnath Singh’s Calls for the Crossing the LoC – War or Politics?’, The Wire, 30 July 2023. In June, Singh stated that India would ‘not need to work much to take back’ Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, going on to call Pakistan’s presence in Kashmir an illegal occupation.¹⁵²A. Sharma, ‘Rajnath tells Pakistan: Don’t need to work much to take back Pakistan-occupied Kashmir’, Indian Express, 26 June 2023. Making similar comments in July, Singh stated that India ‘will not hesitate in crossing the LoC’ in order to safeguard its interests.¹⁵³‘Pakistan criticises Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s LoC crossing remarks, terms it ‘belligerent rhetoric’’, Livemint, 27 July 2023. Pakistan responded by warning India to ‘exercise utmost caution’ in their rhetoric, calling it a ‘threat to the regional peace and stability’.¹⁵⁴‘Pakistan criticises Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s LoC crossing remarks, terms it ‘belligerent rhetoric’’, Livemint, 27 July 2023. India’s Jaishankar, similarly called Pakistan’s presence in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir an illegal occupation on two different occasions in March and May 2025.¹⁵⁵‘“Waiting For Return Of Stolen Part Of Kashmir”: S Jaishankar Calls Out Pakistan’, NDTV World, 6 March 2025; ‘“Illegal occupiers should return their illegally occupied parts to rightful owner: EAM Jaishankar on PoK’, The Economic Times, 22 May 2025. The position was repeated by the Foreign Affairs Office in August 2025.‘Question No- 2071 Status of PoK on Indian Map’, Government of India Ministry of External Affairs, 1 August 2025.

Similar rhetoric flew between the two States in the months before and after the 2025 four-day conflict (see below). On a US-based podcast released in March, Prime Minister Modi accused Pakistan of being the ‘epicentre of turmoil’ for both India and the world because ‘terrorism and the terrorist mindset are deeply rooted in Pakistan’.¹⁵⁶‘Every attempt at peace was met with hostility, betrayal: PM Modi calls out Pakistan’s ‘terrorist mindset’’, New Indian Express, 16 March 2025; ‘‘Epicentre of turmoil for world:’ PM Modi slams Pakistan’s ‘terrorist mindset’, hopes it mends ways’, Firstpost, 16 March 2025. Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded by accusing India of holding regional stability ‘hostage’ to its ‘hegemonic ambitions’, going on to accuse India of ‘orchestrating… terrorism in foreign territories’¹⁵⁷‘Pakistan dismisses Modi’s regional peace statement as ‘misleading, one-sided’’, The Express Tribune, 17 March 2025; B. S. Syed, ‘India slammed for holding regional peace hostage’, Dawn, 18 March 2025 and of ‘fomenting militancy on Pakistan’s soil’.¹⁵⁸B. S. Syed, ‘India slammed for holding regional peace hostage’, Dawn, 18 March 2025; U. Naqushbandi, ‘Pak: Modi’s remarks on podcast ‘misleading’’, The Tribune India, 18 March 2025. Comments from India after the conflict were more hostile with the Chief of Army Staff, General Upendra Dwivedi, stating that India was ‘fully prepared’ for further conflict with Pakistan and that it would ‘not show restraint’ the next time, warning Pakistan that if it wanted to ‘remain on the world map’ it would have to stop State-sponsored terrorism.¹⁵⁹A. Kumar, ‘‘If Pakistan wants to remain in geography…’: Army Chief warns that India ‘will not show restraint this time’’, Financial Express, 3 October 2025.

About two weeks later, Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Syed Asim Munir, stated that Pakistan would ‘never be intimidated’ or ‘coerced by rhetoric’ and would ‘respond decisively’ to provocation.¹⁶⁰‘Pakistan Army chief’s latest barb at India: ‘No space for war in a nuclearised environment’’, Telegraph India, 18 October 2025. The same day India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh stated that every inch of Pakistan was in reach of India’s weaponry, and that the conflict in May was ‘just a trailer’.¹⁶¹M. Kumar, ‘Every inch of Pakistan territory within BrahMos range, Operation Sindoor was only a trailer: Rajnath Singh’, The Hindu, 18 October 2025.

State Parties

• India
• Pakistan