Lebanon

Multiple armed conflicts were occurring on the territory of Lebanon during the reporting period:

Shebaa Farms claimed by Lebanon, and other Lebanese territories remain under occupation by Israel.
An international armed conflict (IAC) exists between Lebanon and Israel as of 8 October 2023, due to Israel’s use of force against non-state armed groups on Lebanese territory without Lebanon’s consent.
A non-international armed conflict (NIAC) between Israel and a non-state armed group, Hezbollah has been ongoing since the end of November 2023, primarily in the south of Lebanon.

The law of occupation applies to the belligerent occupation of Lebanese territory by Israel. The law of military occupation is set out in Hague Convention IV of 1907 and the annexed Regulations, Geneva Convention IV of 1949 and Additional Protocol I of 1977. Israel and Lebanon are parties to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, but only Lebanon is party to the Additional Protocol I of 1977.

Customary international humanitarian law (IHL) is also applicable during an occupation; it complements applicable treaty law and binds all parties to the conflict.

In addition to the law of occupation, the existence of an IAC between Israel and Lebanon, triggered by Israel’s use of force against a non-state actor on Lebanese territory without Lebanon’s consent, triggers the application of a broader body of treaty and customary IHL.

The NIAC between Israel and Hezbollah is regulated by Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, ¹ and customary IHL applicable to NIACs.

Since gaining independence in 1943 from a two-decades-long French mandate, Lebanon has been plagued by recurring armed conflicts and chronic instability. Although Lebanon played a minimal role in the 1967 Six-Day War by Arab states against Israel, ² the war had lasting repercussions for Lebanon. During the conflict, Israel captured the Shebaa Farms, a narrow strip of land it considers part of the Golan Heights, but which Lebanon claims as its own territory. Israel purported to annex the Golan Heights, including Shebaa Farms, in 1981, but this claim is invalid as accretion of territory by force is not lawful. ³ In 1974, the United Nations declared Shebaa Farms a part of Israeli-occupied Syrian territory. ⁴ However, following Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000, after an 18-year-long occupation, Hezbollah asserted that the withdrawal had been incomplete and claimed the Shebaa Farms as Lebanese, not Syrian, territory. ⁵

The Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990), a devastating internal conflict, began as an armed confrontation between Christian militias and a coalition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Druze, and Muslim militias. ⁶ The war drew in regional and international actors, notably Syria and Israel. Syrian forces entered Lebanon in 1976 and remained until their withdrawal in 2005. Israel intervened militarily on two occasions: first, in 1978 (briefly), and then in a full-scale invasion in 1982 which led to the occupation of a security zone in southern Lebanon that lasted until 2000. During this period, in response to the deteriorating security situation, the United Nations (UN) established the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978 to monitor the cessation of hostilities and support the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty in the south. UNIFIL’s mandate has since evolved to adapt to the shifting reality on the ground. ⁷

Hezbollah emerged during the 15-year-long Lebanese Civil War. A Shiite Muslim political party and militant organization based in Lebanon, Hezbollah is often described as operating as ‘a state within a state’ due to its military, political, and social influence. Hezbollah is fully backed by Iran and is ideologically influenced by the ideas of Ayatollah Khomeini and the programme of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. It also maintains close ties to a broader network of Iran-aligned non-state armed groups. It is politically motivated by violent opposition to Israel and resistance to Western influence in the Middle East. ⁸

During the first two decades of its existence, Hezbollah prioritized driving the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) out of southern Lebanon. ⁹ In 2006, Israel again invaded southern Lebanon, ¹⁰ which not only involved an international armed conflict but also an extraterritorial NIAC against Hezbollah. Despite the conflict lasting only thirty-four days, Hezbollah continued in acts of violence against Israel, justifying its actions by reference to Israel’s continued military presence on the Lebanon-Israel-Syria border. ¹¹ Hezbollah launched isolated missile attacks against the Israeli presence in the Shebaa Farms in 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024. ¹²

Hezbollah’s attack on Israel on 12 July 2006 and the subsequential conflict triggered the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 on 11 August 2006 which specifically called for the cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. This resolution further signifies that Hezbollah had the capacity to achieve its objectives by conducting military operations in an organized manner and that the group has been successful in engaging in military tactics. ¹³

Beyond Lebanon, Hezbollah has played a substantial role in regional conflicts, particularly, the Syrian armed conflict in which it provided crucial support to the Assad regime. ¹⁴ Hezbollah was militarily active there from 2013 onwards. ¹⁵ At that time and place, it was sufficiently organized to be considered a non-state party to the Syrian conflict. ¹⁶

The group is also implicated in attacks against United States (US) personnel and interests in the Middle East. ¹⁷

2023: Clashes and violations

In September 2023, UNIFIL intervened to de-escalate a potential confrontation between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the IDF near the disputed Shebaa Farms area. ¹⁸ In October, Human Rights Watch confirmed that Israel had used white phosphorus munitions in both Gaza and southern Lebanon, raising serious concerns under IHL. ¹⁹

In December, both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reported that Israeli forces had targeted journalists in southern Lebanon. The attack, involving artillery shelling, killed one journalist and injured six others. Both organizations concluded that this was likely a direct attack on civilians and called for it to be investigated as a possible war crime. ‘²⁰

Also in December, the Lebanese Parliament voted to extend the term of Joseph Aoun as commander of the LAF for one additional year. ²¹ Meanwhile, UN Secretary-General António Guterres officially closed the Special Tribunal for Lebanon after fourteen years of investigating the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Hezbollah members were accused and convicted of his murder. ²²

2024: Targeted Assassinations on High Value Targets

Throughout 2024, Israel conducted a series of targeted assassinations against senior Hezbollah and Hamas figures in Lebanon, significantly escalating the intensity of cross-border hostilities. On 2 January, Saleh al-Arouri, deputy chairman of Hamas’s political bureau, was killed in an Israeli airstrike in the Dahieh neighbourhood of Beirut. ²³ Wissam al-Tawil, deputy commander of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force, was killed in an Israeli strike in Majdel Selm on 8 January. ²⁴ Following a Hezbollah drone attack on Israeli forces, Israel retaliated by targeting Ali Hussein Barij, commander of Hezbollah’s air force in southern Lebanon on 9 January. ²⁵ On 8 February, Abbas al-Dabs, a regional Hezbollah commander, was killed in an Israeli drone strike targeting his vehicle. ²⁶ An Israeli airstrike on a car in Naqoura on 2 March killed a senior Hezbollah official and two other members of the group’s Imam Hussein Division. Hassan Nasrallah’s grandson, who was also a member of Hezbollah, was reportedly among the dead. ²⁷

On 17 June, Hezbollah commander Muhammad Ahmed Ayoub was killed in an Israeli airstrike in Selaa, with further strikes occurring against Hezbollah targets across southern Lebanon. ²⁸ On 3 July, Mohammed Nasser, a senior Hezbollah field commander, was targeted in Tyre. ²⁹ On 20 September, Israeli airstrikes in Dahieh killed Hezbollah commander Ibrahim Aqil and Ahmed Wahbi, a senior Radwan Force leader who had directed operations during the Gaza war. ³⁰ On 24 September, Ibrahim Qubaisi, commander of Hezbollah’s missile and rocket forces, was killed in an Israeli airstrike in Beirut. ³¹

The killing of Hassan Nasrallah/changes in Hezbollah leadership

On 27 September 2024, Israeli aircraft bombed what was described by Israeli officials as Hezbollah’s central headquarters, located beneath residential buildings in the Haret Hreik neighbourhood of southern Beirut. The airstrike reportedly employed bunker-buster munitions to target Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, who was said to be in an underground command facility at the time. On 28 September, Hezbollah confirmed Nasrallah’s death. ³² The strike was described as the most significant targeted killing in Israel’s history to date. ³³

Nasrallah’s killing was the latest in a broader series of Israeli strikes against so-called ‘high-value targets’ (HVTs) since 7 October 2023. These are often referred to as ‘decapitation strikes’, aimed at disrupting the adversary’s command and control by eliminating key leadership figures. ³⁴

Following the strike, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared, ‘Nasrallah was not a terrorist; he was the terrorist’, stating that his killing was necessary to achieve Israel’s strategic objectives, including the safe return of residents to northern Israel and a lasting shift in the regional balance of power. In contrast, Russia condemned the strike as an act of ‘political murder’ and called on Israel to cease hostilities in Lebanon. ³⁵

In November 2024, Mohammad Afif, Hezbollah’s media chief, and three other people, were killed in an Israeli airstrike targeting the offices of the Lebanese branch of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party – Syria Region in Ras el-Nabaa, Beirut. ³⁶

The Pager Attacks

On 17 and 18 September 2024, an IDF action exploded multiple pagers used by Hezbollah operatives but also by civilians. ³⁷ Approximately 3,000 of 5,000 pagers used by Hezbollah operatives as a means of communication exploded when a coded message simultaneously activated the pagers. ³⁸ The first round of blasts began in Beirut and in several other areas at about 3:30 pm local time on 17 September and another round the following day at around 5 pm, ³⁹ causing fatalities among Hezbollah operatives and civilians in Lebanon and Syria. ⁴⁰ At the time, at least twenty people were reportedly killed, including sixteen Hezbollah fighters, ⁴¹ and more than 3,000 others were injured, including an Iranian ambassador. ⁴²

Ceasefire agreement of 26 November 2024

A ceasefire agreement was reached on 26 November 2024 and became operational on 27 November 2024. The agreement entailed, inter alia, a halt to hostilities starting 27 November, with Israel ceasing offensive operations, Lebanon preventing Hezbollah attacks, both sides committing to UNSC Resolution 1701, coordinated troop deployment and arms control, international monitoring, and indirect US- and UN-facilitated talks to resolve border disputes. ⁴³

The ceasefire agreement facilitates a sixty-day transition period, which includes the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon. The IDF withdrew from most positions in southern Lebanon on 18 February 2025, retaining control of five strategic sites in addition to the disputed Shebaa Farms area. ⁴⁴ Despite ongoing border negotiations, Israeli officials, including Foreign Minister Israel Katz, confirmed that regardless of the outcome of talks, the IDF would maintain its presence at these five positions. ⁴⁵ The IDF has communicated that it will complete the withdrawal only once the LAF takes full control over southern Lebanon and replaces Hezbollah. ⁴⁶ As of 30 June 2025, the IDF had not withdrawn from southern Lebanon. ⁴⁷

Post-ceasefire

Tensions reignited on 22 March 2025 when at least five rockets were fired from Lebanon toward the Israeli town of Metula, causing no casualties. ⁴⁸ In retaliation, the IDF launched artillery and airstrikes on southern Lebanon, resulting in at least one fatality. ⁴⁹ On 28 March, the situation escalated further when the IDF conducted airstrikes on Beirut, the first strikes on the capital since the ceasefire took effect, after additional rocket fire from Lebanon. ⁵⁰ Rockets have been fired from Lebanon on at least two occasions since the ceasefire, although Hezbollah has denied involvement. ⁵¹ Hamas later claimed responsibility, stating that individuals unaffiliated with its leadership had fired the rockets and handing over three suspects to the Lebanese security forces. ⁵²

Israeli airstrikes have continued across Lebanon, targeting sites in the Bekaa Valley, ⁵³ southern Lebanon, ⁵⁴ and on 5 June 2025, Israel launched airstrikes on suspected Hezbollah drone production factories in southern Beirut. ⁵⁵

On 30 June 2025, an Israeli official stated that peace negotiations with Lebanon cannot move forward until Hezbollah is disarmed. While Israel recognizes Lebanon’s attempts to dismantle Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, it believes this task is extremely challenging. Israeli strikes on Hezbollah targets have continued despite the ceasefire agreement in place. ⁵⁶

Election of a new President 9 January 2025

On 9 January 2025, the Lebanese Parliament elected army commander Joseph Aoun as President, ending a prolonged presidential vacuum that had persisted since October 2022 when Michel Aoun left office and lawmakers failed to agree on a successor. ⁵⁷ The decision to convene a new parliamentary session for the purposes of voting for a new president was announced one day after the November 2024 ceasefire approved by Israel and the Lebanese government came into effect. ⁵⁸

In the first round of voting, lawmakers from the pro-Hezbollah bloc submitted blank ballots; describing it as a deliberate tactic to delay the process, and acting as ‘protectors of national understanding’ and opposing all forms of foreign interference, having ‘shed blood for this country’. ⁵⁹ Winning the second round of voting, Joseph Aoun assumed office while retaining his role as commander of the LAF, becoming the country’s 14^th President and the fifth military commander to hold the position. ⁶⁰

On 13 January, President Aoun nominated Nawaf Salam, then serving as a judge at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), as prime minister. Parliament confirmed the nomination later that same day. ⁶¹ Judge Nawaf Salam resigned as member of the ICJ the following day. ⁶²

Municipal elections: May 2025

In May 2025, Lebanon held municipal elections that were widely seen as a litmus test for Hezbollah’s popular support, particularly in the south. ⁶³ This is Beirut, 3 May 2025. Voting occurred over the course of four weeks, starting in Mount Lebanon, then moving through the northern districts, Beirut, and the Bekaa Valley, and concluding in southern Lebanon. Despite suffering political and military setbacks during fourteen months of conflict with Israel, Hezbollah retained its core voter base. Along with its political ally, the Amal Movement, Hezbollah secured victories in dozens of municipalities. Although establishment parties won the majority of seats nationwide, reformist and anti-establishment candidates also made gains, including in areas historically dominated by Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. ⁶⁴

Lebanon requests renewal of UN peacekeeping mandate

In June 2025, the Lebanese government formally requested the extension of the mandate of UNIFIL for an additional year to 31 August 2026. ⁶⁵ The existing mandate was due to expire on 31 August 2025, unless renewed by the UN Security Council. Lebanon reaffirmed its commitment to UNIFIL’s presence and ongoing cooperation under UNSC Resolution 1701. ⁶⁶

Lebanon and Israel were engaged in two different legal types of IACs during this reporting period.

The first type of IAC concerns the Israeli military occupation of Lebanese territory, particularly the Shebaa Farms. S. Hijazi and Z. Antonios, ⁶⁷

The second type is an active IAC beginning on 8 October 2023, when Israel launched military operations against non-state armed groups operating in Lebanese territory without the consent of the Lebanese government, thereby meeting the legal threshold for an IAC under IHL. ⁶⁸

Israel’s Military Occupation of Lebanese Territory

Israel seized control of the Shebaa Farms during the 1967 Six-Day War and has retained control over the area ever since. The Shebaa Farms are currently administered by Israel as part of the Golan Heights. Israel maintains that the territory was Syrian at the time of capture and therefore forms part of its broader occupation of the Golan Heights. ¹

However, Lebanon claims the Shebaa Farms as part of its own territory, and Syria has supported this position, although neither nation has concluded a binding treaty to formalise their border or resolve the issue. During the 1950s, Syria had exploited this border ambiguity by establishing military posts in the Shebaa Farms and registering residents as Syrian nationals in a 1960 census. ²

In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon in response to cross-border attacks by Palestinian militants. Israeli forces, alongside allied Maronite Christian militias, advanced as far as Beirut during the early stages of the intervention. While Israel withdrew from the capital by late September 1982, it continued to occupy southern Lebanon until May 2000. ³ Following this withdrawal, Lebanon began asserting a formal claim over the Shebaa Farms, an area relatively unknown to many Lebanese citizens prior to that time. ⁴ Lacking a definitive border treaty, the UN relied on existing maps to determine the line of withdrawal. These maps placed the Shebaa Farms within the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, leading the UN to certify in 2000, ⁵ that Israel had fully withdrawn from Lebanese territory in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 425. ⁶

The international community largely continues to view the Shebaa Farms as part of Syrian territory occupied by Israel, while Lebanon insists that Israel failed to complete its withdrawal from southern Lebanon and remains in occupation of Lebanese territory. ⁷This unresolved status means that, as of 2025, the situation surrounding the Shebaa Farms is best characterized as a territorial dispute at the heart of the IAC between Lebanon and Israel. ⁸

In addition to Shebaa Farms, Israel reportedly continues to control at least five other positions along the Lebanese border, including areas in the Tyre, Bint Jbeil, and Marjayoun districts. ⁹ These positions have drawn criticism, particularly as they are accompanied by frequent ceasefire violations since the agreement of 27 November 2023. ¹⁰

Under IHL, a situation of occupation exists if the territory is ‘under the authority of the hostile army’, even in the absence of resistance. ¹¹ The hostile foreign forces must exercise effective control over a territory without the consent of the sovereign state. ¹² The nature of ‘effective control’ in the context of occupation is further elaborated in legal doctrine and interpretations, which establish three cumulative conditions for occupation: ¹³

The foreign state’s armed forces are physically present in the territory or parts of the territory of the territorial state without its consent.
The presence of the foreign forces prevents the effective local government in place at the time of invasion from substantially or completely exercising its powers.
The foreign forces are able to establish their own authority.

The three requirements are unpacked below, with the conclusion that these conditions are met in the case of Israel’s continued presence in the Shebaa Farms and the adjacent areas in southern Lebanon.

With respect to the first requirement, Israel seized control of the Shebaa Farms during the 1967 Six-Day War and has retained control since. ¹⁴ Maps used by the UN in demarcating the Blue Line (the line of withdrawal) ¹⁵, United Nations Peacekeeping, 5 March 2021 do not conclusively show the border between Lebanon and Syria in the area, although they consider at least a part of the Shebaa Farms is in southern Lebanon and, therefore, occupied by Israel. ¹⁶Syria itself agrees that the Shebaa Farms are within Lebanese territory, ¹⁷ although Israel considers the area to be inside Syria’s border and continues to occupy the territory.

Nevertheless, disputed territorial title does not preclude a classification as an occupation. As clarified by Sassòli, occupation is determined by facts on the ground, not by legal title or by recognition ¹⁸ of the situation as a belligerent occupation. Further, Article 47 of Geneva Convention IV explicitly stipulates that annexation of an occupied territory does not deprive its population of the Convention’s protections,¹⁹ and annexation does not make the Convention

In sum, Israel’s continued military presence and administration of parts of southern Lebanon and the Shebaa Farms, without Lebanon’s consent, and the reality that this impedes the exercise of Lebanese sovereignty fulfils this first requirement.

The second requirement for effective control necessitates that ‘the effective local government in place at the time of the invasion has been or can be rendered substantially or completely incapable of exerting its powers by virtue of the foreign forces’ unconsented-to presence’. ²⁰

The third requirement entails that ‘the foreign forces are in a position to exercise authority over the territory concerned (or parts thereof) in lieu of the local government. ²¹ Although the farms are uninhabited, Israel hosts several outposts, ²² in this 28 square kilometre strip of land. ²³ Due to the presence of such military postings and the use of force by Israel, Lebanon is prevented from exerting its authority over the territory, ²⁴ and therefore this requirement is fulfilled.

Another territory that remains occupied by Israel includes Ghajar town. Ghajar is a village west of the Shebaa Farms where residents have dual Israeli-Lebanese citizenship. The village was divided by the Blue Line with the northern half located on the Lebanese side and the southern portion in the Golan Heights. A fence divided these two parts until 2006 when conflict was triggered between Israel and Hezbollah, and Israel reoccupied the northern parts of Ghajar. ²⁵ As Israel re-occupied the northern part of Ghajar without the permission of Lebanon, the first requirement for effective control ²⁶ was met as of 2006. Israel consolidated control over the entire village. During 2022, Ghajar’s local council erected a fence on the northern border of this village to close it off from its Lebanese surroundings. ²⁷ The Israeli army completed construction of this fence in July 2023. ²⁸. Ghajar town was now completely cut off from Lebanese control and the local government in the north remained paralysed, therefore the second requirement for effective control was cemented. ²⁹ Israel and the local government under its control allows visitors to enter but only with permission of the IDF and the local government. ³⁰ Lebanon does not exert any control over this town. All three requirements are thus satisfied, and Israel continues to occupy Ghajar town.

Further, as mentioned above, in addition to the Shebaa Farms, it has been suggested that Israel continues to occupy five positions along the Lebanese border. These include Laboune Hill in the Tyre district, Jabal Balat and Jal al-Deir in the Bint Jbeil district, and a position along the Markaba-Houla road and Hamames Hill, both located in the Marjayoun district. ³¹ Reportedly, these outposts are manned by full Israeli army companies and were selected for their strategic elevation and proximity to northern Israeli towns. ³² Israel has not indicated a timeline for withdrawal; instead, it ties its continued occupation to the Lebanese army’s ability to neutralize Hezbollah. ³³ In March 2025, it was reported that Israel plans to continue occupying the five positions until the ‘Lebanese army stabilizes the situation in southern Lebanon and ensures Hezbollah no longer is a threat’. ³⁴ Lebanon has condemned the occupation of these positions as a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. ³⁵ In June 2025, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz confirmed the indefinite nature of Israel’s military presence in these positions. ³⁶

In sum, Israel’s continuing administration of the Shebaa Farms, which were not under its control prior to 1967, constitutes a belligerent occupation. Thus, Israel is the occupying power.

A ceasefire agreement was reached on 26 November 2024 and became operational on 27 November 2024. ³⁷ The termination of an IAC does not necessarily coincide with peace treaties or ceasefires, which may be unstable or incomplete. Instead, the end of an IAC must be assessed based on the facts on the ground, with reference to the applicable legal criteria under IHL. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), this occurs at the general close of military operations meaning the cessation of all active hostilities and military movements of a belligerent nature, such that the likelihood of renewed conflict can reasonably be ruled out. ³⁸An occupation, specifically, ends when any of the three cumulative conditions for the occupation ceases to be met. ³⁹ As the ceasefire agreement did not impact any of the three factors, it does not end the IAC between Israel and Lebanon because Israel continues to occupy parts of Lebanese territory, ⁴⁰ even if ground forces withdrew from the rest of Lebanese territory. ⁴¹

1
‘Six-Day War’, Britannica, 28 July 2025; and A. Zeidan, ‘Shebaa Farms’, Britannica.
2
A. Kaufmann, ‘The Israel-Hezbollah Conflict and the Shebaa Farms’, The Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, 13 November 2006; and ‘Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon (2000)’, Economic Cooperation Foundation, 24 to 25 May 2000.
3
E. Pace, ‘Israel Units Start the Withdrawal from Beirut Area’, New York Times, 4 September 1983.
4
S. Hijazi and Z. Antonios, ‘To whom do Shebaa Farms belong?’, L’Orient Today, 24 January 2024; J. A. Gross, ‘IDF to recognize 18-year occupation of south Lebanon as official campaign’, The Times of Israel, 4 November 2020; and L. Berman, ‘Two decades on, Israel confronts legacy of ‘forgotten’ south Lebanon occupation’, The Times of Israel, 18 June 2021.
5
‘Security Council Endorses Secretary-General’s Conclusion on Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon as of 16 June’, United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 18 June 2000
6
UNSC, ‘Resolution 425 (1978)’, UN Doc S/Res/425(1978), 19 March 1978.
7
‘Shebaa Farms: Joumblatt faces backlash over territory’s disputed identity’, L’Orient Today, 3 July 2025; A. Zeidan, ‘Shebaa Farms’, Britannica; A. Kaufmann, ‘Amid war, resolving Lebanon-Israel territorial disputes unlikely’, Middle East Institute, 8 March 2024; M. Geldi, ‘Ottoman archives prove Shebaa Farms belong to Lebanon’, AA, 3 May 2019; S. Hijazi and Z. Antonios, ‘To whom do Shebaa Farms belong?’, L’Orient Today, 24 January 2024; ‘Shebaa Farms: Claimed By Israel, Lebanon and Syria’, PMF IAS, 18 December 2023; and ‘Shebaa Farms key to Levant hydro-diplomacy’, The New Humanitarian, 10 September 2009.
8
A. Zeidan, ‘Shebaa Farms’, Britannica; A. Kaufmann, ‘Amid war, resolving Lebanon-Israel territorial disputes unlikely’, Middle East Institute, 8 March 2024; ‘Shebaa Farms: Joumblatt faces backlash over territory’s disputed identity’, L’Orient Today, 3 July 2025; ‘Shebaa Farms: Disputed Territory and Geopolitical Flashpoint’, Sriram’s IAS, 10 July 2024; ‘What the Struggle Over a Cease-Fire Could Mean for US-Israeli Unilateralism’, Institute for Palestine Studies (at Wayback Machine), 4 August 2006.
9
‘Lebanese army deploys to south as Israel maintains five military positions’, The New Arab, 11 March 2025.
10
‘Shebaa Farms: Joumblatt faces backlash over territory’s disputed identity’, L’Orient Today, 3 July 2025.
11
‘Article 42 of Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907’, ICRC International Humanitarian Law Databases.
12
T. Ferraro and L. Cameron, ‘Article 2: Application of the Convention’, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, ICRC, 2016, para 302; and ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict, RULAC, October 2015.
13
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11-12; International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict, RULAC, October 2015, 11; T. Ferraro ‘Determining the Beginning and End of an Occupation Under International Humanitarian Law’, International Review of the Red Cross, 2012:
14
‘Six-Day War’, Britannica, 28 July 2025.
15
‘It’s time to talk about the Blue Line: Constructive re-engagement is key to stability’
16
F. C. Hof. ‘A Practical Line: The Line of Withdrawal from Lebanon and Its Potential Applicability to the Golan Heights’, Middle East Journal, 2001.
17
‘The Syrian Golan’, Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations,
18
M. Sassòli, ‘International Humanitarian Law’, Edward Elgar, 2019
19
‘Article 47 – Inviolability of rights’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases,
20
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11. The Shebaa Farms are administered by Israel as part of the Golan Heights. A. Zeidan, ‘Shebaa Farms’, Britannica.
21
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, 2024, 11.
22
UNSC, ‘Identical letters dated 19 June 2023 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council’, UNSC Doc S/2023/459, 13 July 2023,
23
‘Briefing Notes: Gruppe 62 – Informationszentrum Asyl und Migration’, Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 25 September 2023.
24
UNSC, ‘Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2025’, UNSC S/2025/460, 11 July 2025,
25
A. Zeidan, ‘Shebaa Farms’, Britannica.
26
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11,
27
A. Zeidan, ‘Shebaa Farms’, Britannica.
28
W. Taleb, ‘About Ghajar, the disputed village occupied by Israel’, L’Orient Today, 7 July 2023
29
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, 2024, 11.
30
‘August 2025 Monthly Forecast: Lebanon’, Security Council Report, 30 July 2025.
31
‘Lebanese army deploys to south as Israel maintains five military positions’, The New Arab, 11 March 2025.
32
‘‘A dead zone’: Why is Israel still occupying these five positions in Lebanon?’, The New Arab, 18 February 2025.
33
‘‘A dead zone’: Why is Israel still occupying these five positions in Lebanon?’, The New Arab, 18 February 2025.
34
‘Israeli occupation of south Lebanon to last ‘weeks, months’ in ‘quiet understanding’ with US: Report’, The Cradle, 4 March 2025.
35
‘Lebanon files UN complaint against Israeli violations of Resolution 1701, ceasefire agreement’, LBC International, 4 February 2025.
36
N. Homsi, ‘Lebanon warns of danger as Israeli occupation and attacks continue’, The National News, 1 June 2025.
37
J. Deeb, ‘Full text of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon’, Middle East Eye, 27 November 2024.
38
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 9 and 10.
39
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11.
40
K. Johnson, ‘The U.N. Resolution at the Heart of the Israel-Lebanon Conflict’, Foreign Policy, 14 May 2025,
41
‘Israel says troops will stay in five locations across southern Lebanon’, Al Jazeera, 17 February 2025.

International Armed Conflict between Israel and Lebanon

Following Hamas’ action in Israel on 7 October 2023, in a show of solidarity with the Palestinian people, L. Bassam, et al, ‘Israel, Hezbollah Exchange Artillery, Rocket Fire’ Reuters, 8 October 2023, Hezbollah attacked the Shebaa Farms, controlled by Israel as the occupying power, on 8 October 2023. ¹ In response, the IDF launched multiple air strikes on Lebanese territory, starting on 8 October 2023, ² and which were continuing during 2025. ³ This recent escalation of hostilities is in addition to the ongoing Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory in the Shebaa Farms.

An IAC occurs when one or more states resort to armed force against another State, regardless of the motives for or the intensity of the violence. ⁴ An IAC can be triggered by attacks that are directed towards the territory of another state. It is not necessary that attacks are directed against the armed forces of that state.

On 1 October 2024, Israel launched a ground offensive against Hezbollah crossing into Lebanese territory along the southern border with the stated purpose of conducting ‘limited, localised, and targeted raids’ against strategically significant Hezbollah targets. ⁵ The IDF’s ground offensive into southern Lebanon and an intensified frequency of airstrikes in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley and Beirut in October 2024, indicated a significant month-on-month increase in attacks launched by Israel on Lebanese territory. ⁶ The IDF further expanded its ground operation in Lebanon during November 2024. ⁷

On 27 November 2024, a ceasefire agreement was signed by Israel, Lebanon, and five mediating nations, including the United States. ⁸ The agreement mandated a sixty-day halt to hostilities, during which Israel was to withdraw its forces from southern Lebanon. ⁹ Despite the formal ceasefire, hostilities have continued across multiple regions of Lebanon, reaffirming the ongoing IAC between Israel and Lebanon. Shortly after the ceasefire, France reported 52 Israeli violations of the agreement. ¹⁰ Israel accused Hezbollah of breaching the agreement and declared its forces would remain in southern Lebanon beyond the agreed sixty-day withdrawal deadline, citing Hezbollah’s continuing threat and the Lebanese army’s alleged complicity. ¹¹ On 1 December 2024, the IDF claimed it had identified and killed Hezbollah operatives firing from a church in southern Lebanon. ¹² A few days earlier, on 28 November, Lebanon had accused Israel of conducting airstrikes and tank shelling several villages, injuring two civilians. ¹³ Tensions escalated in March 2025 when at least five rockets were launched from Lebanon toward the Israeli town of Metula, ¹⁴ followed by an IDF artillery and airstrike response which killed at least one person in southern Lebanon. ¹⁵

The situation deteriorated further with Israeli airstrikes on Beirut. ¹⁶ Since then, Israeli airstrikes have continued across Lebanese territory, including the Bekaa Valley, ¹⁷ southern Lebanon, ¹⁸ and southern Beirut. ¹⁹IHL applies to the IAC between Israel and Lebanon, despite the ceasefire agreement as the declassification of an IAC is dependent on an objective judgement of a general end to military operations with a degree of stability and permanence. ²⁰ The current round of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon reinforces the situation of an ongoing IAC between the two states, ²¹ in addition to the ongoing belligerent occupation by Israel of a part of Lebanese territory.

1
‘Israel, Hezbollah Exchange Fire, Raising Regional Tensions’, Al Jazeera, 8 October 2023.
2
D. Gritten, ‘What to Know about the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict’, BBC News, 1 October 2024,
3
L. Stephan, ‘Lebanon: Six months after a ceasefire with Israel, a low-intensity war is ongoing’, Le Monde, 23 May 2025.
4
ICTY, ‘Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić a/k/a “Dule”’, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, para 70 ; ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, 2024, pp. 9–10.
5
D. Estrin, ‘Israel Begins Ground Offensive in Lebanon’ NPR, 1 October 2024; D. Lieber, et al, ‘Israeli Special Forces Launch Raids Into Lebanon Ahead of Expected Ground Incursion’ The Wall Street Journal, 30 September 2024; and D. Byman, ‘Lessons from Israel’s Last War in Lebanon’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 October 2024.
6
A. Mehvar, et al, ‘Middle East Overview: October 2024’, ACLED, 7 November 2024.
7
A. Mehvar, et al, ‘Middle East Overview: November 2024’, ACLED, 6 December 2024.
8
D. Coote and P. Godfrey, ‘Israel-Hezbollah cease-fire: Displaced Lebanese begin to head home as guns, bombs fall silent’, UPI, 27 November 2024.
9
A. Geller, ‘What to know about the ceasefire deal between Israel and Lebanon’s Hezbollah’, AP News, 27 November 2024.
10
‘France Warns Israel of Ceasefire Collapse after Recording 52 Violations’, MTV Lebanon, 1 December 2024.
11
‘IDF warns Lebanese against return to border villages as it prepares to extend stay’, The Times of Israel, 25 January 2025.
12
‘IDF kills terrorists in southern Lebanon located near church who ‘violated ceasefire agreement’’, The Jerusalem Post, 1 December 2024.
13
B. McKernan, ‘Hezbollah keeping ‘hands on trigger’ amid fragile ceasefire with Israel’, The Guardian, 28 November 2024.
14
E. Fabian, ‘Katz: IDF will stay at 5 points in southern Lebanon regardless of border dispute talks’, Times of Israel, 14 March 2025,
15
‘One dead as Israel strikes Lebanon after cross-border rocket fire’, France 24, 22 March 2025.
16
‘Israel warns of attacks ‘everywhere’ in Lebanon after rocket fire’, France 24, 28 March 2025.
17
E. Fabian, ‘IDF targets Hezbollah weapons manufacturing, storage site in Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley’, The Times of Israel, 6 May 2025,
18
‘Israel launches wave of strikes across south Lebanon’, Al Jazeera, 29 May 2025; D. Daoud, ‘Israeli operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah: May 12 – May 18, 2025’, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 23 May 2025, and on 5 June 2025,
19
‘Israel says hits Beirut, targeting Hezbollah drone factories’, France 24, 5 June 2025.
20
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11.
21
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 11; also ICTY, ‘Prosecutor v Delalić et al’, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 16 November 1998, para 184; ICTR, ‘The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007, para 207; SCSL, ‘Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor’, Trail Chamber II,Judgment, 18 May 2012, paras 563–66),

Non-International Armed Conflict between Israel and Hezbollah

Background

Israel is engaged in an extraterritorial NIAC, ¹ whereunder Israel, through the IDF, is fighting a non-state armed group, Hezbollah, on the territory of another state, Lebanon. The fighting began on 8 October 2023, when Hezbollah launched missiles into Israel in support of the attacks of 7 October 2023. ². In response, Israel launched rockets into Lebanon against Hezbollah. ³

Intensity

Since 8 October 2023, there have been a great many strikes between Israel and Hezbollah, including rocket launches, missile strikes and drone attacks targeting various locations across northern Israel and southern Lebanon. ⁴ Hezbollah has actively employed rockets and sophisticated weaponry, such as anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and drones, which reportedly have resulted in casualties among IDF troops. ⁵

In retaliation, Israel has conducted extensive airstrikes, ⁶ aimed at dismantling Hezbollah’s military infrastructure with the primary focus on Hezbollah strongholds ⁷ in the south of Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley in the east, and the suburbs of Beirut. Reports indicate that Israel targeted high-ranking Hezbollah officials and destroyed significant stockpiles of munitions. ⁸ Despite this, Hezbollah retains a substantial arsenal and operational capacity. ⁹

The conflict between the IDF and Hezbollah escalated in September 2024 with an attack utilising electronic devices used by members of Hezbollah, ¹⁰ strikes against Lebanon, ¹¹ and the killing of Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah. B. Mroue and M. Lidman, ¹² On 1 October 2024, IDF troops crossed the border into Lebanon at the start of a ground operation. ¹³ The IDF announced the initiation of ‘limited, localised, and targeted raids’ against strategically significant Hezbollah targets. ¹⁴

On 8 October 2023, Hezbollah launched multiple guided rockets into the disputed Shebaa Farms territory held by Israel since 1967. ¹⁵ Hezbollah announced that these attacks were a show of solidarity with the Palestinian people following the attacks initiated by Hamas on 7 October. ¹⁶

Israel responded to the initial attack by Hezbollah by launching artillery fire on the village of Kfar Shouba. ¹⁷ The IDF started shelling southern Lebanon on 9 October 2023, ¹⁸ and launched missiles targeting the villages of Rmeish, Kfar Kila, al-Hamames, and Aita Al-Shabab on 17 October 2023. ¹⁹ Aerial warfare by the IDF and Hezbollah continued through November 2023. ²⁰ It was reported that the IDF was active in at least four military operations during this time and deployed anti-tank missiles, ²¹ airstrikes, ²² and drones. Hezbollah, in turn, employed mostly rockets, ²³ and anti-tank guided missiles. ²⁴ The International Crisis Group reported that by November 2023, more than eighty Hezbollah fighters and ten Israeli soldiers had been killed and that over 46,000 residents of southern Lebanon had been internally displaced. ²⁵ Despite the low level of casualties at this stage of the conflict, the number of internally displaced persons is high. The type of weapons used from the beginning of the conflict are categorized as ‘heavy’ in nature. By the end of November, the nature of the fighting satisfied the criterion of protracted armed violence. ²⁶

Isolated attacks occurred during December 2023, and the situation escalated through January 2024. ²⁷ In January, the IDF successfully targeted high-ranking Hezbollah officials. ²⁸ On 2 January, the IDF killed a senior Hamas leader, Saleh-al-Arouri, in southern Beirut. ²⁹ Hezbollah launched more than forty rockets into Israel’s Mount Meron air force base causing severe structural damage. ³⁰ This is a significant target as Meron Air Force Base primarily serves as an aerial surveillance centre, ³¹ and is the sole facility responsible for managing and controlling air operations. The base is a central hub for electronic warfare interference and is staffed by a significant number of elite Israeli officers and soldiers.

The IDF retaliated with a precision drone strike killing Hezbollah commander Wissam al-Tawil in an airstrike in southern Lebanon. ³² Wissam al-Tawil was the deputy head of the Radwan force, ³³ and is responsible for carrying out the Meron airbase attack. Hezbollah launched multiple attacks in response to the killing of Wissam al-Tawil, ³⁴ of which the most significant was a second strike against the Israeli air force control base at Mount Meron. ³⁵

Retaliatory aerial attacks of a similar nature between the IDF and Hezbollah continued during February, March, April, May, June, July, August, ³⁶ September, ³⁷ October, ³⁸ and until 24 November 2024, ³⁹ with an escalation in frequency and ferocity from September,⁴⁰ and October 2024 that marked the Israeli ground incursion into southern Lebanon. ⁴¹

On 17 and 18 September 2024, an IDF action exploded multiple pagers used by Hezbollah operatives but also by civilians. ⁴² At the time, at least 20 people were reportedly killed, including 16 Hezbollah fighters, ⁴³ and more than 3,000 were injured, including an Iranian ambassador. D. Gritten, ⁴⁴ In addition, Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, was killed by an Israeli precision strike in the south of Beirut on 27 September 2024. ⁴⁵

On 1 October 2024, the IDF began a military invasion of southern Lebanon, ⁴⁶ coined ‘Operation Northern Arrows’. It is reported that tanks and soldiers crossed the border into Lebanon from several locations, though operations were limited to areas in close proximity to the Israeli border. ⁴⁷

The first three weeks of November 2024 saw the IDF and Hezbollah fighters engaged in skirmishes in and around the town of Khiam in southern Lebanon. ⁴⁸ The IDF wanted to gain control of the town as it is considered a strategic gateway to facilitate Israeli ground operations. The IDF reported 46 fatalities ⁴⁹ from Operation Northern Arrows until the ceasefire agreement which took effect on 27 November 2024.

According to CrisisWatch, nearly 4,000 people were killed between October 2023 until the conclusion of the November 2024 ceasefire agreement. CrisisWatch further reports that as a result of the conflict, more than a million people have been internally displaced in Lebanon during this period. ⁵⁰

Recent analyses underscores Hezbollah’s evolving military capabilities. In 2024, the Armed Conflict Survey noted the group’s use of advanced weaponry, including Russian-made anti-tank guided missiles and Iranian-supplied unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), in attacks against IDF positions in northern Israel. These actions are seen as a part of a broader trend of mutual learning and operational enhancement within the network of Iranian-aligned militias, including the Houthis. ⁵¹

The fighting between the IDF and Hezbollah equates to protracted armed violence.

Organization

Hezbollah functions as a Shiite Muslim political party and an armed militant group. ⁵² It has developed a comprehensive infrastructure comprising a robust security apparatus, political institutions, and an extensive social services network, leading many observers to describe it as a ‘state within a state’.⁵³ Hezbollah’s military wing has been active from as early as 1982. ⁵⁴

As of 2024, the Congressional Research Service estimated Hezbollah’s military strength at approximately 40,000 fighters. ⁵⁵ The group is widely regarded as the most powerful armed non-state actor in Lebanon, with a vast political apparatus and tens of thousands of supporters globally. ⁵⁶ Its armed wing is considered the most dominant and sophisticated militia operating in the country. ⁵⁷

Hezbollah has a sophisticated vertical command structure. ⁵⁸ The Shura Council is the central decision-making body of Hezbollah, and the secretary general is the head of the Shura Council. ⁵⁹ The former secretary general of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, was killed on 27 September 2024 and since 29 October 2024, Naeem Qasim has served as the secretary general. ⁶⁰ The Jihad Council is one of five councils subordinate to the Shura Council and is responsible for coordinating military strategy and tactics. At least seven key positions are held at the Jihad Council, including the head of the council, the head of military operations, the head military commander, the commanders for specific regions, heads of specific military units, the head of security, and military liaisons. Several senior leaders on the Jihad Council have been killed by the IDF. ⁶¹

Hezbollah has a dedicated media liaison, ⁶² a position embedded in the Jihad Council, which enables Hezbollah to speak with one voice.⁶³ The former Hezbollah media liaison, Mohamed Afif, ⁶⁴ was killed in November 2024. Hezbollah named Youssef al-Zein as his successor. ⁶⁵

Hezbollah’s logistical capacity is a critical component of its operational strength and organizational sophistication. ⁶⁶ This capacity is underpinned by a well-designed force structure, geographically dispersed and fortified defensive positions and a substantial arsenal of heavy weaponry, including rockets, missiles and unmanned aerial systems. Hezbollah was, at the time hostilities began, regarded as one of the most heavily armed non-state actors in the world, possessing a large and sophisticated military arsenal. Its stockpile is estimated to include up to 130,000 rockets and missiles, including precision-guided munitions, drones and anti-tank weaponry, capable of striking targets deep within Israeli territory. The group benefits from substantial financial and military backing from Iran, which reportedly provides hundreds of millions of dollars annually. ⁶⁷

Hezbollah’s military personnel are estimated to range between 20,000 and 50,000 fighters, many of whom are combat-hardened from years of engagement in Syria in support of President Bashar al-Assad. Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, once claimed 100,000 fighters, but this figure is widely viewed as an exaggeration. The group’s military operations are directed by its Jihad Council, under a highly centralized and hierarchical command structure headed by the Shura Council, with the secretary-general at its apex. ⁶⁸ These features clearly demonstrate that Hezbollah meets the logistical capacity criterion for the purposes of assessing its level of organization under IHL. ⁶⁹

It is clear that Hezbollah is sufficiently organized as demanded by IHL for an armed group to be a party to an armed conflict.

A ceasefire agreement ⁷⁰ between Israel and Lebanon, representing Hezbollah, was concluded and approved by Israel’s Cabinet on 26 November 2024, taking effect the following day. This agreement was brokered with the assistance of the United States and France. The agreement includes a phased withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon over a period of sixty days, ⁷¹ concurrent with the deployment of Lebanese army personnel to the south and requires Hezbollah forces to withdraw north of the Litani River.

This ceasefire agreement does not entail the end of the NIAC between Israel and Hezbollah. A NIAC only ends when there is a lasting cessation of armed confrontation without a real risk of its resumption. ⁷² These conditions are not satisfied in the present context. Since the ceasefire, recurrent clashes continue between Israel and Hezbollah and include the exchange of fire, Israeli airstrike Hezbollah targets, and Hezbollah launches rocket and engages in cross-border operations, demonstrating ongoing violence rather than isolated ceasefire violations. ⁷³ The underlying drivers of the conflict remain unresolved, and both parties engage in mutual threats. Moreover, Israeli officials express an intention to maintain their military positions indefinitely, ⁷⁴ and Hezbollah publicly reaffirms its readiness to act militarily. This situation reflects a real risk of resumption, if not a de facto continuation of hostilities. ⁷⁵

In summary, Israel and Hezbollah are engaged in a NIAC.

1
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024,
2
International Affairs And Defence Section, ‘Israel-Hezbollah Conflict 2023/24: UK and International Response’, House of Commons Library, 12 December 2024
3
L. Bassam and others, ‘Israel, Hezbollah Exchange Artillery, Rocket Fire’, Reuters, 8 October 2023.
4
A. Mehvar, et al, ‘Middle East Overview – September 2024: Expanding Israeli Operations in Lebanon and the Escalation of the Middle East Crisis’, ACLED, 4 October 2024.
5
M. ELDoh, ‘Hezbollah’s Military Tactics in the Post-Nasrallah Era’, Geopolitical Monitor, 29 October 2024.
6
M. Jadah et al, ‘Israel Claims 4,500 Strikes on Lebanon since Fighting Began: Day 158 of the Gaza War’ L’Orient Today, 12 March 2024,
7
A. Mehvar, ‘Q&A: Behind the Data on the Israel-Hezbollah War’, ACLED, 1 November 2024,
8
‘Middle East & North Africa: Lebanon’, International Crisis Group.
9
E. Banco, ‘Exclusive: Lebanon’s Hezbollah Aims to Rebuild Longer Term despiteIsraeli Blows, US Intel Says’, Reuters, 4 December 2024.
10
A. R. Sarkar, ‘Netanyahu Confirms He Okayed Lebanon Pager Attacks That Killed 40 and Injured 3,000’ The Independent, 11 November 2024,
11
‘UNICEF Geneva Palais Briefing Note on the Impact of the Attacks in Lebanon on Children’ United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 24 September 2024,
12
‘Hezbollah Confirms Its Leader Hassan Nasrallah Was Killed in an Israeli Airstrike’, AP News, 28 September 2024.
13
D. Lieber, et al, ‘Israeli Special Forces Launch Raids Into Lebanon Ahead of Expected Ground Incursion’ The Wall Street Journal, 30 September 2024.
14
D. Byman, ‘Lessons from Israel’s Last War in Lebanon’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 October 2024.
15
L. Bassam, et al, ‘Israel, Hezbollah Exchange Artillery, Rocket Fire’ Reuters, 8 October 2023; ‘Israel, Hezbollah Exchange Fire, Raising Regional Tensions’ Al Jazeera, 8 October 2023.
16
L. Bassam, et al, ‘Israel, Hezbollah Exchange Artillery, Rocket Fire’ Reuters, 8 October 2023.
17
L. Bassam, et al, ‘Israel, Hezbollah Exchange Artillery, Rocket Fire’ Reuters, 8 October 2023.
18
Laila Bassam, et al, ‘Israel Kills Three Lebanon Militants; Israeli Officer Killed in Raid’ Reuters (9 October 2023)
19
A. Sewell and K. Chehayeb, ‘5 Hezbollah Fighters Are Killed as Tensions Flare along the Border between Lebanon and Israel’, AP News, 18 October 2023.
20
‘Middle East & North Africa: Lebanon’, International Crisis Group.
21
‘Escalation in the North: Israeli Civilian Killed by Hezbollah, Rockets Hit Kiryat Shmona’, All Israel News, 5 November 2023,
22
‘Hezbollah Says Israel to “pay Price” after Strike Kills 3 Children in Lebanon’, Reuters, 6 November 2023,
23
‘Hamas Says Launched 16 Rockets From Lebanon At Israel’, NDTV, 6 November 2023,
24
A. Khan, ‘Hezbollah Shoots down Israeli Drone in Nabatieh Region’, News9live, 5 November 2023.
25
‘Middle East & North Africa: Lebanon’, International Crisis Group.
26
M. M. Bradley, ‘Revisiting the Notion of “Intensity” Inherent in Common Article 3: An Examination of the Minimum Threshold Which Satisfies the Notion of “Intensity” and a Discussion of the Possibility of Applying a Method of Cumulative Assessment’, International and Comparative Law Review, 2017.
27
‘Middle East & North Africa: Lebanon’, International Crisis Group.
28
‘Hezbollah Says Senior Commander Killed in Israeli Strike’, Al Jazeera, 8 January 2024.
29
‘Israel Assassinates Hamas Leader Saleh Al-Arouri in Lebanon’, Middle East Eye, 2 January 2024.
30
J. Malsin and W. Mauldin, ‘Hezbollah Fires Rocket Barrage Into Israel as Blinken Mounts New De-Escalation Push’, Wall Street Journal, 7 January 2024.
31
E. Fabian, ‘IDF Admits Mount Meron Air Traffic Control Base Damaged in Hezbollah Attack’, The Times of Israel, 7 January 2024,
32
‘Hezbollah Says Senior Commander Killed in Israeli Strike’, Al Jazeera, 8 January 2024.
33
E. Fabian, ‘Hezbollah’s Drone Chief in Southern Lebanon Killed in Reported Israeli Strike’, The Times of Israel, 9 January 2024,
34
‘Hezbollah Launches Drone Attack on Israel in Response to Top Commander’s Killing’,Middle East Monitor, 4 March 2025,
35
‘Hezbollah Missiles Hit Israeli Military Base of Meron Again’, Al-Manar TV Lebanon, 23 January 2024.
36
‘Middle East & North Africa: Lebanon’, International Crisis Group [for all months],
37
A. McCready, et al, ‘Israel’s War on Gaza Updates: Attacks Ramp up between Hezbollah and Israel’, Al Jazeera, 21 September 2024,
38
‘Middle East & North Africa: Lebanon’, International Crisis Group,
39
‘Lebanon: At Least 29 Killed and 66 Injured in Israeli Air Strike on Central Beirut as Ceasefire Agreement Reached – Lebanon’, ReliefWeb, 28 November 2024,
40
L. Chao-Fong et al, ‘IDF Says It Has Destroyed More than 100 Hezbollah Rocket Launchers in Lebanon – as It Happened’ The Guardian, 19 September 2024,
41
D. Estrin, ‘Israel Begins Ground Offensive in Lebanon’, NPR, 1 October 2024.
42
L. Bassam and M. Gebeily, ‘Israel Planted Explosives in Hezbollah’s Taiwan-Made Pagers, Say Sources’, Reuters, 20 September 2024.
43
K. Magramo, et al, ‘Walkie-Talkies Explode in Lebanon Day after Deadly Pager Attack’, CNN, 18 September 2024,
44
‘Hezbollah Blames Israel after Deadly Pager Explosions in Lebanon’, BBC, 18 September 2024.
45
B. Mroue and M. Lidman, ‘Hezbollah Confirms Its Leader Hassan Nasrallah Was Killed in an Israeli Airstrike’, AP News, 28 September 2024.
46
D. Estrin, ‘Israel Begins Ground Offensive in Lebanon’, NPR, 1 October 2024,
47
‘Israel-Lebanon in Maps: Tracking the Conflict with Hezbollah and Iran’, BBC, 27 November 2024.
48
A. McCready, et all, ‘Updates: Fierce Ground Battles in South Lebanon as Israeli Forces Advance | Israel Attacks Lebanon News’, Al Jazeera, 23 November 2024.
49
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Israel, ‘Swords of Iron: IDF Casualties’, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 May 2025,
50
‘Middle East & North Africa: Lebanon’, International Crisis Group.
51
‘The Armed Conflict Survey 2024’, International Institute for Security Studies, 12 December 2024.
52
‘What is Hezbollah’, Council on Foreign Relations, 29 October 2024.
53
K. Robinson, ‘What is Hezbollah? What to know about its origins, structure and history’, PBS, 16 October 2023.
54
C. Thomas and J. Zanotti, ‘Lebanese Hezbollah’, United States Library of Congress, 12 April 2024.
55
C. Thomas and J. Zanotti, ‘Lebanese Hezbollah’, United States Library of Congress, 12 April 2024.
56
‘Bureau of Counterterrorism 2022 Annual Report’, United States Department of State, 2022, 276.
57
‘What is Hezbollah and why has it been fighting Israel in Lebanon?’, BBC, 14 February 2025.
58
‘What is Hezbollah’, Council on Foreign Relations, 29 October 2024.
59
‘What is Hezbollah’, Council on Foreign Relations, 29 October 2024.
60
‘Who is Hezbollah’s new leader Sheikh Naim Qassem?, France 24, 29 October 2024.
61
J. Choukeir, ‘Which Hezbollah and Hamas leaders have been assassinated?’, Reuters, 17 October 2024.
62
‘What is Hezbollah’, Council on Foreign Relations, 29 October 2024,
63
ICTY, ‘Prosecutor v. Boškoski and Tarculovski,’ Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 10 July 2008.
64
M. Moench, ‘Hezbollah media chief killed in Israeli strike in Beirut’, BBC, 17 November 2024,
65
‘Hezbollah announces successor to media head Mohammad Afif Naboulsi’, L’Orient Today, 23 December 2024.
66
S. G. Jones, et al, ‘The Coming Conflict with Hezbollah’, Center for Strategic and International Studies Briefs, March 2024.
67
S. S. Cordell and AJLabs, ‘How does Hezbollah function – and what arsenal does it have?’, Al Jazeera, 1 October 2024.
68
S. S. Cordell and AJLabs, ‘How does Hezbollah function – and what arsenal does it have?’, Al Jazeera, 1 October 2024; M. Drummond, ‘What is Hezbollah and how powerful is its military?’, Sky News, 28 September 2024.
69
ICTY, ‘Prosecutor v. Boškoski and Tarculovski,’ Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 10 July 2008.
70
M. Nashed, ‘Ceasefire between Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Israel: What to know’, Al Jazeera, 26 November 2024
71
‘Middle East & North Africa: Lebanon’, International Crisis Group; J. Deeb, ‘Full Text of the Ceasefire Agreement between Israel and Lebanon’, Middle East Eye, 27 November 2024
72
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, 2024.
73
A. Sewell and M. Lidman, ‘The fragile Israel-Hezbollah truce is holding so far, despite violations’, AP News, 4 January 2025; J. Salhani, ‘Here’s how Israel is repeatedly violating the Lebanon ceasefire’, Al Jazeera, 9 February 2025.
74
E. Fabian, ‘Katz: IDF will stay at 5 points in southern Lebanon regardless of border dispute talks’, The Times of Israel, 14 March 2025,
75
‘Hezbollah warns it could retaliate if Israeli strikes on Lebanon continue’, CBS News, 29 March 2025.

State Parties

Israel
Lebanon

Non-state parties

Hezbollah

Other Actors

UNIFIL

1
‘Article 3 – Conflicts not of an international character’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases,
2
‘Six-Day War’, Britannica, 28 July 2025,
3
R. Berg, ‘Israeli views on Shebaa Farms harden’, BBC News, 25 August 2006.
4
R. Berg, ‘Israeli views on Shebaa Farms harden’, BBC News, 25 August 2006.
5
Y. Berman, ‘Shebaa Farms – nub of conflict’, Ynet News, 8 October 2006.
6
W. L. Ochsenwald and P. Kingston, ‘Lebanese Civil War’, Britannica, 19 July 2025.
7
‘UNFIL Mandate’, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 4 November 2024.
8
‘What is Hezbollah’, Council on Foreign Relations, 29 October 2024.
9
C. Thomas and J. Zanotti, ‘Lebanese Hezbollah’, United States Library of Congress, 12 April 2024
10
M. Mazzetti, et al, ‘Behind the Dismantling of Hezbollah: Decades of Israeli Intelligence’ The New York Times, 29 December 2024,
11
C. Thomas and J. Zanotti, ‘Lebanese Hezbollah’, US Library of Congress, 12 April 2024.
12
L. Bassam and H. Lawson, ‘Lebanon’s Hezbollah Fired Missile at Israeli Vehicle in Shebaa Farms Attack, Says Lebanese Source’ Reuters, 27 July 2020; ‘Israel: Hezbollah’s Use of Inherently Inaccurate Weapons to Launch Unlawful Attacks Violates International Law’, Amnesty International, 20 December 2024; and ‘Military occupation of Lebanon by Israel’, RULAC, 17 August 2022.
13
UNSC, ‘Resolution 1701 (2006)’, UN Doc S/Res/1701 (2006), 11 August 2006.
14
‘What is Hezbollah’, Council on Foreign Relations, 29 October 2024.
15
See M. Sullivan, ‘Hezbollah in Syria: Middle East Security Report 19’, Institute for the Study of War, April 2014.
16
J. Daher, ‘The Consequences of Hezbollah’s military intervention in Syria on the Lebanese Shia population and Relations with Israel’, Online article, Foundation pour le recherche stratégique, 26 September 2017; ‘Non-international armed conflicts in Syria’, RULAC, 10 August 2023.
17
C. Thomas and J. Zanotti, ‘Lebanese Hezbollah’, United States Library of Congress, 12 April 2024.
18
J. Margulies, ‘IDF, Lebanese army clash on Israel’s northern border’, The Jerusalem Post, 23 September 2025.
19
‘Israel: White Phosphorus Used in Gaza, Lebanon’, Human Rights Watch, 12 October 2023.
20
Israel: Strikes on Journalists in Lebanon Apparently Deliberate’, Human Rights Watch, 7 December 2023; ‘Lebanon: Deadly Israeli attack on journalists must be investigated as a war crime’, Amnesty International, 7 December 2023.
21
‘Lebanon’s parliament extends army commander term amid crises’, Reuters, 15 December 2023.
22
‘Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General – on the Closure of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’, United Nations: Secretary-General, 30 December 2023.
23
Y. J. Bob and T. Joffre, ‘Hamas deputy head Saleh al-Arouri killed in alleged Israeli drone strike in Beirut’, The Jerusalem Post, 2 January 2024.
24
‘Hezbollah says Israel kills top commander amid fears of Gaza war escalation’, Al Jazeera, 8 January 2024.
25
P. Beaumont, ‘Israel and Hezbollah edge closer to war as drone hits key Israeli command base’, The Guardian, 9 January 2024.
26
L. B. Ari, ‘Hezbollah regional commander killed in strike on car in southern Lebanon, report says’, Ynet News, 8 February 2024.
27
‘Senior Hezbollah terrorist reportedly among 3 killed in alleged Israeli strike on car’, Israel Hayom, 2 March 2024; E. Fabian, ‘IDF confirms attack on Hezbollah-linked Iranian militia members in Lebanon’, Times of Israel, 2 March 2024; ‘Grandson of Hezbollah chief Nasrallah reportedly killed in Israeli airstrike’, i24News, 3 March 2024.
28
Y. J. Bob, ‘IDF kills key Hezbollah terrorist in southern Lebanon’, The Jerusalem Post, 17 June 2024.
29
L. Bassam and C. Lowe, ‘Israeli strike kills a senior Hezbollah commander in south Lebanon’, Reuters, 3 July 2024.
30
‘Live blog: Fires erupt in southern Lebanon towns from 50+ Israeli strikes’, TRT Global, 21 September 2024.
31
M. Gebeily, et al, ‘Amid Israel-Hezbollah strikes, Lebanon says only US can stop fighting’, Reuters, 25 September 2024.
32
M. Young, ‘Israel Has Assassinated the Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah’, Carnegie Middle East Centre, 29 September 2024.
33
R. Satloff, ‘6 Consequences of Israel Killing Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah’, The Washington Institute, 30 September 2024.
34
M. N. Schmitt, ‘Killing Nasrallah and the Law of Armed Conflict’, Articles of War: Lieber Institute West Point, 1 October 2024.
35
P. Beaumont and W. Christou, ‘Iran vows vengeance after assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’, The Guardian, 28 September 2024.
36
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37
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38
L. Bassam and M. Gebeily, ‘Israel Planted Explosives in Hezbollah’s Taiwan-Made Pagers, Say Sources’, Reuters, 20 September 2024.
39
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40
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41
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42
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43
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44
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45
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46
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47
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48
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49
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50
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51
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52
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53
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54
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55
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56
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57
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58
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59
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60
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61
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62
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63
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64
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65
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66
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67
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68
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Lebanon

Reporting period: July 2023 - June 2025

why a disclaimer ?

Israel’s Military Occupation of Lebanese Territory

International Armed Conflict between Israel and Lebanon

Non-International Armed Conflict between Israel and Hezbollah

State Parties

Non-state parties

Other Actors

Lebanon

Reporting period: July 2023 - June 2025

why a disclaimer ?

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (between 2023 and 2025)

International Armed Conflict

Non-International Armed Conflict

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

Non-state parties

Other Actors