Historical Background
Origins
In February 2011, protests against the regime of Muammar al-Qaddafi broke out across Libya, prompting a violent crackdown. The UN Security Council authorized military intervention to protect civilians under Resolution 1973 of 17 March 2011. The First Libyan Civil War, in which between 12,000 and 15,000 people were killed, ended with the capture and killing of al-Qaddafi in October 2011.
Political transition and the Second Libyan Civil War
Initial transitional progress, including the 2012 election of the General National Congress, gave way to institutional fragmentation as jihadist groups gained ground and rival administrations emerged in Tripoli and Tobruk from 2014. Each was backed by its own coalition of armed groups and foreign patrons: Egypt, Russia and the United Arab Emirates supported the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) under General Khalifa Haftar, while Türkiye supported the Tripoli-based government. Haftar’s offensive against Tripoli, launched in April 2019, escalated into the Second Libyan Civil War. The conflict ended with a nationwide ceasefire agreed in October 2020, which established the 5+5 Joint Military Commission to oversee implementation.
Post-ceasefire political fragmentation
The Government of National Unity (GNU), formed in March 2021 under the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum roadmap and led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dabaiba, was intended to lead the country to elections scheduled for December 2021, but the polls were indefinitely postponed. In March 2022, the eastern-based House of Representatives installed a rival government, later restructured as the Government of National Stability under Prime Minister Osama Hamad, entrenching the east-west political split. Deadly clashes in Tripoli in August 2022 underscored the fragility of the post-ceasefire truce.
Current dynamics
Libya remains divided between the internationally recognized GNU, which controls the north-west with the support of powerful militias and Turkish military bases, and the Haftar family, which controls the east, centre and south with Russian military backing. Disputes over the distribution of oil revenue, control of the Central Bank of Libya, and a proliferation of surplus weaponry continue to drive tension between the rival administrations. Libya also remains a primary transit route for migration to Europe, and Haftar has faced allegations of supplying weapons to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan’s civil war.
Humanitarian situation
Libya has recorded one of the largest global improvements on the Global Peace Index since 2020, and internal displacement fell from around 498,000 people at the outset of the 2011 conflict to close to 107,000 by the end of 2024, the lowest level since 2013. Migrants transiting Libya, however, continue to face grave rights violations while in detention, including forced labour, extortion, torture and sexual assault.
Key Developments
The reporting period saw the following major developments:
- Disputes over oil sector revenue distribution: The long-running contest between the GNU and LAAF-aligned authorities over control of oil export revenue continued to disrupt production and stall economic reform.
- Dispute over control of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL): Rival factions continued to contest control of the CBL, which functions as the government’s fiscal implementing partner, holding State accounts and disbursing public-sector salaries, rather than as a conventional monetary authority.
- Devastating floods in eastern Libya: On 11 September 2023, Storm Daniel caused two dams to collapse near Derna, causing severe flooding and mass civilian casualties.
- UN-backed attempts at holding national elections amid political deadlock: UNSMIL continued to press political actors to implement a roadmap toward long-delayed general elections, without success during the reporting period.
- Rising tension between western and eastern rival forces: Despite the 2020 ceasefire, periodic military build-ups and localized frictions kept tensions between GNU- and LAAF-aligned forces elevated.
- Extension of the Turkish military mission in Libya: Türkiye extended its military presence under its 2019 agreement with the Tripoli-based government, reinforcing GNU-aligned forces.
- Increasing Russian involvement in Libya: Russia deepened its military relationship with the LAAF, including through weapons transfers and defence cooperation.
- Increase in arbitrary arrests, detentions, enforced disappearances and killings of civil society activists and political opposition: Documented cases included the May 2024 disappearance in Benghazi of House of Representatives member Ibrahim al-Dressi following a LAAF-organized rally.
- Developments in the sphere of migration: Libya’s role as a migration transit hub continued to generate friction with neighbouring States and drew renewed scrutiny of detention conditions.
- Militias leaving Tripoli and giving way to regular police forces: Some Tripoli-based militias began ceding security control to formal police structures after a decade of militia dominance in the capital.
- Renewal of UNSMIL and UNSC sanctions: The Security Council renewed UNSMIL’s mandate multiple times during the reporting period, including a shortened three-month renewal in October 2024 amid the mission’s continued leadership vacancy.
- New regional coalition between Algeria, Libya and Tunisia: The Presidents of Libya’s Presidency Council, Tunisia and Algeria met in Tunis in April 2024 to discuss strengthening regional integration.
- Security cooperation between the United States and Libya: AFRICOM officials engaged separately with Prime Minister Dabaiba in Tripoli and General Haftar in Benghazi to discuss expanding military cooperation.
- Investigations by the International Criminal Court: ICC proceedings arising from the Security Council’s 2011 referral of the Libya situation continued.
- Escalating militia violence in Tripoli and anti-Dabaiba protests: Recurrent inter-militia clashes continued through the reporting period, and protests demanding Dabaiba’s resignation in May-June 2025 were met with a violent security response.
- Sudan accuses Haftar of involvement in the Sudanese civil war: In June 2025, the Sudanese army accused the LAAF of coordinating cross-border attacks with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the first direct allegation of Libyan involvement in the Sudanese conflict.
Non-International Armed Conflicts
GNU vs IS-Libya
IS-Libya emerged as a Libyan branch of ISIL in October 2014, taking advantage of the reluctance of Western-based militias to engage it directly. Sirte, briefly under IS-Libya control, was recaptured in December 2016 following a campaign supported by AFRICOM air strikes. IS-Libya’s operational capacity in western Libya declined sharply thereafter, with its most recent operations of note in the west reported in October 2022. No fighting between IS-Libya and GNU forces was recorded during the reporting period, and although the group is assessed to retain sufficient organization to satisfy the IHL threshold, the sustained absence of hostilities led to the conclusion that the NIAC had ended in 2023.
LAAF vs IS-Libya
IS-Libya’s origins lie in the 2014 fragmentation of Islamist militancy following ‘Operation Dignity’. A separate LAAF-led campaign drove IS-Libya from territory it had captured in 2014, significantly weakening the group by 2017. The most recent recorded clash of note between the LAAF and IS-Libya took place in November 2022, when seven IS-Libya fighters were killed. As with the GNU-IS-Libya conflict, sustained absence of further hostilities and no real risk of imminent resumption led to the conclusion that this NIAC had also ended in 2023, notwithstanding IS-Libya’s continued organizational existence.
LAAF vs FACT
FACT, a Chadian rebel group established in 2016 and operating mainly from bases in southern Libya, maintained a non-aggression pact with the LAAF until 2021, when LAAF-supplied training to FACT drew objections from the Chadian government and prompted a shift in LAAF policy. The only recorded clash between the LAAF and FACT during the reporting period occurred on 22 August 2023, when the LAAF conducted air strikes against FACT positions following a ceasefire breach by FACT. No further hostilities between the two have been recorded since, and the NIAC is assessed to have ended in August 2023.
Parties to the Conflicts
State Parties
- Libya [note: exercised through the rival Government of National Unity (GNU) in the west and the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF)/Government of National Stability administration in the east]
Non-State Parties
- Islamic State Libya (IS-Libya)
- Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT)
Foreign Involvement
- Türkiye [military support to the GNU, including forces stationed under the 2019 agreement]
- Russia [military and defence cooperation with the LAAF]
- Egypt [military support to the LAAF]
- United Arab Emirates [military support to the LAAF]
- United States [AFRICOM security engagement with both the GNU and the LAAF]
Other Non-State Actors Involved
Rapid Support Forces (RSF) [alleged recipient of LAAF-linked weapons transfers in the context of Sudan’s civil war]