Armed conflicts in Syria

There are ongoing and recently ended international armed conflicts (IAC) in Syria:

Syria (supported by Russia until December 2024) v Combined Joint Task Force of Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) (ended November 2025)
Syria v Israel

Other forms of IAC persist as Syrian territory remains under occupation:

The Golan Heights are under military occupation by Israel
Parts of northern Syria are under military occupation by Türkiye

Additionally, five non-international armed conflicts (NIAC) occurred in Syria during the reporting period, with three coming to an end:

Syria v Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) (ended February 2026)
CJTF-OIR (including Syria since November 2025) and SDF (SDF only until January 2026) v Islamic State
United States v Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) (ended February 2024)
The Syrian National Army (SNA) (as proxy of Türkiye) v SDF (ended May 2025)
Syria v Pro-former government forces (PFGF)

Syria is a State Party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I of 1977, but not to Additional Protocol II. Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law (IHL) applies to all the NIACs in Syria.

Many armed conflicts in Syria are rooted in the broader context of the Arab Spring, a series of pro-democracy uprisings that began in December 2010 and quickly spread throughout North Africa and the Middle East. In Syria, peaceful protests calling for political reform and greater civil liberties emerged in March 2011, directly challenging the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. The government’s violent suppression of these demonstrations marked a critical turning point, triggering a spiral of violence. By at least February 2012, the situation had evolved into armed conflict, and over the following months, a complex set of NIACs emerged across the territory, opposing the Syrian government, led by Bashar Al-Assad and supported by Russian armed forces and Iranian-backed militias. Multiple non-State armed groups, such as Islamic State (IS), the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) were operating in Syria during the civil war.¹

The rise of Islamic State in Syria

In parallel with NIACs, a number of IACs emerged in the Syrian context due to the presence of multiple States on Syrian territory without the government’s consent. Key to this development was the rise of Islamic State in 2013, which rapidly seized swathes of territory across both Iraq and Syria. In response, the United States (US)-led international coalition (the Global Coalition against Islamic State) was established in 2015 under the banner of ‘Operation Inherent Resolve’, initially comprising more than seventy States²The Combined Joint Task Force of Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) includes the United States,³ the United Kingdom (UK),⁴ Canada,⁵ Australia (until December 2024),⁶ Germany,⁷ the Netherlands,⁸ Belgium,⁹ and Italy.¹⁰ CJTF-OIR is a multinational military formation established by the Global Coalition against Islamic State that intervened with the objective of containing and ultimately defeating the group’s influence in the region, including in Syria. It operated on Syrian territory without the consent of the Syrian government¹¹ until November 2025.¹²

Between 2013 and 2019, a significant portion of the territory formerly occupied by Islamic State was reclaimed, predominantly through military operations undertaken by the CJTF-OIR but also with significant support from the SDF¹³ as well as in separate operations by the Syrian government, supported by Russian armed forces,¹⁴ Türkiye, and Iranian-backed militias. Despite Islamic State’s significant territorial defeat, attacks by the group continued to occur at the time of reporting (June 2026).

Türkiye’s military presence in Northern Syria

Since 2016, Türkiye has undertaken a series of unilateral military operations with both air and ground forces targeting the SDF along the Syria-Türkiye border. The Turkish government perceives the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which it designates as a terrorist organization.¹⁵ These military operations were conducted in coordination with Syrian opposition forces, initially involving the Free Syrian Army and, subsequently, its successor, the Syrian National Army (SNA). Over several years, Türkiye has conducted three significant cross-border military campaigns: Operation Euphrates Shield (2016–17), Operation Olive Branch (2018), and Operation Peace Spring (2019).¹⁶ These military interventions have facilitated Türkiye’s establishment of de facto control over certain regions in northern Syria, including the deployment of Turkish officials to administer these occupied areas.¹⁷

The launch of Operation Peace Spring in October 2019, which followed the US withdrawal from the region, further solidified Türkiye’s territorial hold, with the operation aimed at removing SDF forces from the vicinity of its border with Syria. The operation resulted in the seizure of a significant portion of the territory in central area of Syria’s border and the creation of a thirty-two kilometre ‘safe zone’.¹⁸

Since the fall of Assad (see below), Syria and Türkiye have strengthened ties.¹⁹ Türkiye has maintained a presence in Syria but has shared military intelligence and entered into a new defence agreement with the new government.²⁰

Israel’s military presence in the Golan Heights

Since 1967, a further part of Syrian territory, the Golan Heights, has been occupied by Israel.²¹Israel seized control over the Golan Heights from Syria on 10 June 1967, during the final day of the Six-Day War, leading to the displacement of most of the Syrian population on the territory. Following Israel’s seizure of the Golan Heights, Israel established settlements in the area and Jewish populations moved onto the territory. In December 1981, the Israeli Parliament passed legislation, known as the Golan Heights Law, which allows the imposition of Israeli laws, jurisdiction, and administration on the territory it had seized.²²

Syria has continuously contested Israeli presence in the Golan Heights. When the Yom Kippur War broke out in 1973, Syria attempted to regain control of the Golan Heights but failed to do so and Israel captured the city of Quneitra. The following year, the two States signed the Agreement on Disengagement.²³ The United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted Resolution 350 (1974) and created a buffer zone with the permanent presence of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) peacekeeping mission.²⁴ UNDOF is still present, making it one of the longest peacekeeping operations in the UN’s history.²⁵

Between 1987 and 2008, negotiations took place between Syria and Israel, in which Syria consistently demanded a full Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 borders, including the return of the Golan Heights as part of any peace deal. Those negotiations failed to yield agreement between the parties.²⁶

Internationally, no State has formally recognized Israel’s annexation of the region except for the United States (in March 2019).²⁷ In Resolution 497 (1981), the UN Security Council decided that ‘the Israeli decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights is null and void, and without international legal effect’.²⁸The UN General Assembly has reaffirmed that ‘all legislative and administrative measures taken or to be taken by Israel, the occupying Power, that purport to alter the character and legal status of the occupied Syrian Golan are null and void’. ²⁹

Additionally, since 2017, Israel has regularly carried out airstrikes on Syrian territory without the consent of the Syrian government, targeting Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah military assets³⁰ as well as, more recently, the new Syrian government.³¹

Actions of other States within Syria

Beginning in 2020, the overall intensity of hostilities in Syria began to decline, marking a notable shift in the dynamics of the multiple parallel armed conflicts in Syria. A key development contributing to this shift was the bilateral agreement reached in March 2020 between Türkiye and the Russian Federation, aimed at de-escalating the violence in the north-western province of Idlib.³² The agreement followed a sharp escalation in military confrontations between Turkish forces and Syrian government troops (the latter supported by Russia), which had caused significant military and civilian casualties.³³ The ceasefire agreement remained in force despite breaches of the agreement by both sides.

Between March 2020 and mid-2023, the Syrian government, with support from Russian, Iranian, and Hezbollah forces, gradually reasserted control over approximately seventy per cent of its territory.³⁴ Meanwhile, control over the remaining areas was divided among various actors: Turkish forces and affiliated Syrian opposition groups held significant parts of northern Syria, HTS (which subsequently became the government of Syria) maintained influence in parts of Idlib province, and the SDF retained control over substantial territories in the north-east.³⁵

The end of the Assad regime

One of the most significant changes occurred in December 2024, when President Bashar al-Assad’s government collapsed following a large-scale offensive led by HTS, one of Syria’s most powerful armed opposition groups. On 27 November 2024, a coalition of armed groups led by HTS launched the ‘Repelling the Aggression’ campaign against government forces in Aleppo. Simultaneously, Turkish-backed factions of the SNA initiated separate offensives targeting SDF-controlled areas in northern Aleppo. By 8 December, opposition forces had captured Damascus, effectively ending the Assad regime’s decades-long rule and establishing a transitional government under HTS leadership.³⁶

This event transformed the internal dynamics of armed groups operating inside Syria. The operational capacity of Iranian-backed militias has been significantly degraded, suffering both from regular Israeli attacks and the loss of their strategic alliance with the Syrian government.³⁷ In addition, the interim government under HTS leader and interim Syrian President, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has initiated efforts to end hostilities with the various armed opposition groups across the country. In March 2025, an agreement was signed between HTS and the SDF, enacting a nationwide ceasefire and outlining a political merger that formally recognized Kurdish representation as a foundational element of the Syrian State.³⁸ Despite this agreement, the SDF and the new Syrian government clashed several times in 2025, with the violence reaching its peak in January 2026 and ultimately constituting a NIAC (see below). Since January 2026, however, the Syrian government has been making progress in integrating the SDF into the new Syrian State (see below).

Divisions among various groups have, however, led to clashes, particularly between factions affiliated with the interim government and remnants of pro-Assad groups. In early March 2025, there were mass killings of civilians, particularly among the Alawite community, as well as attacks against civilian infrastructure.³⁹ As of March 2025, the level of intensity and organization of the PFGF was such as to amount to a NIAC (see below).

Between 28 and 30 April 2025, a further series of violent incidents occurred between pro-government forces and Druze militias in the predominantly Druze areas in Syria. These incidents killed many, including a significant number of civilians, and involved considerable destruction of buildings, underscoring the challenges facing the interim government in its efforts to exert centralized authority over the various Syrian factions.⁴⁰ Another violent episode between Druze militias and the Syria government (and tribal fighters) occurred in July 2025, although this violence could not be classified as a NIAC (see below).

The change of government also redefined the role of external powers involved in armed conflicts in Syria. Russia’s long-standing military presence, as a strong ally of the former Syrian government, is now in flux, with uncertainty surrounding the future status of its military bases and personnel.⁴¹ Similarly, Iran and Hezbollah lost their direct influence in Syria but appear to be exploring new avenues of engagement with the new authorities.⁴² The withdrawal of Iranian forces from Syrian territory by January 2025 resulted in the absence of further hostilities between Iran and Israel on Syrian territory.⁴³

The HTS is the new sovereign authority of Syria. For the purposes of IHL, the prevailing legal standard for determining governmental status is one of effectiveness. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) affirms that ‘the key condition for the existence of a government is … its ability to exercise effectively functions usually assigned to a government within the confines of a State’s territory, including the maintenance of law and order’.⁴⁴ International recognition or political legitimacy are not determinants under IHL. It adopts a pragmatic approach that prioritizes facts on the ground over formal recognition.

The interim government continues to face political fragmentation, particularly among Syria’s diverse minority groups, which it attempts to mitigate through efforts to forge a more inclusive political transition. Moreover, its territorial control over some parts of Syrian territory is contested. Still, the interim government led by al-Sharaa exercises control over the largest part of Syrian territory by far and performs core governmental functions⁴⁵ and in early 2026, it reclaimed almost all of the territory in north-eastern Syria held by the SDF.⁴⁶ The announcement on 13 March 2025 of a transitional legal framework, valid for five years, and the appointment of a twenty-three-member transitional cabinet support the argument that the interim leadership is operating as both a de facto and a de jure government.⁴⁷ This is further evidenced by its ongoing negotiations with foreign States, including Türkiye,⁴⁸ the European Union,⁴⁹ the United States,⁵⁰ and several member States of the Arab League.⁵¹ As a result, the HTS ceases to exist as a non-State armed group,⁵² This also results in the termination of the NIACs to which the HTS was a party: the NIAC between the HTS and the former Syrian government and the NIAC between the HTS (as non-State armed group) and Islamic State.

Relief from US Sanctions and the Revocation of HTS’s Designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization

On 30 June 2025, the United States terminated a host of sanctions against Syria, with only those which would ‘promote accountability for Assad, his cronies, and others who seek to destabilize Syria or the region’ remaining in place.⁵³ A few days later, on 8 July, the US revoked its designation of HTS as a foreign terrorist organization, a designation in place since 2018.⁵⁴ Ahmed al-Sharaa was also eventually removed from a US ‘“terrorist” sanctions list’ in November 2025, as was Anas Hasan Khattab (now the Minister of Interior of Syria).⁵⁵

On 11 November 2025, the United States announced a 180-day partial suspension of the Caesar Syrian Civilian Protection Act of 2019 (Caesar Act) which sanctioned any foreigner who provided significant support (financial, material, or technological) to the Syrian government. Most sanctions imposed under the Caesar Act were stopped – only certain transactions related to Iran and Russia remained in force.⁵⁶ The Act was repealed by US President Donald Trump on 18 December 2025.⁵⁷ Some actors, including Assad, however, remain sanctioned by the United States.⁵⁸ The move was welcomed by Syria.⁵⁹

In June 2026, US lawmakers submitted a bill to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to repeal two further US Acts related to Syria – the Syria Accountability Act of 2003 (concerning the Syrian government’s support for terrorism, its military presence in Lebanon, and its weapons programme) and the Syria Human Rights Accountability Act of 2012 (signed into law as response to Assad’s crackdown on protestors).⁶⁰

UN Lifts Sanctions on Ahmed al-Sharaa and Anas Hasan Khattab

On 6 November 2025, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2799 lifting sanctions it had placed on Ahmed al-Sharaa and Anas Hasan Khattab.⁶¹

Potential New Terrorist Threat in Syria

On 22 June 2025, the Greek Orthodox Church of the Prophet Elias in Damascus was targeted in a suicide bombing. Twenty-five people were killed and sixty others were injured. Syria blamed Islamic State for the attack, but a group called Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah claimed responsibility. This group emerged after the fall of Assad and has been engaged in sectarian violence and has also been targeting former members of the Assad regime.⁶²

Parliamentary Elections

The first parliamentary elections in Syria since the fall of Assad in December 2024 were due to be held between 15 and 20 September 2025.⁶³ However, due to logistical reasons – a ‘large turnout of citizens wishing to take part in the electoral process’ and the need for further public comment on individuals standing for election – they were postponed ⁶⁴ until 5 October. While elections were reportedly to take place ‘across all electoral districts’,⁶⁵ they did not take place in Suwayda, and two Kurdish-controlled provinces, Raqqa and Hasakah.⁶⁶ The delay in elections in Suwayda was due to safety concerns stemming from July 2025 violence (see below) and in Raqqa and Hasakah until these SDF areas were ‘fully under government control’.⁶⁷ Elections were eventually held in Hasakah in May 2026 after the region was reintegrated into Syria in January 2026 (see below).⁶⁸

Syrians did not vote directly for their representatives – a lack of census data due to the years-long civil war prevented this option.⁶⁹ Instead, Syrian president al-Sharaa appointed an eleven-person ‘Supreme Committee’ to form electoral sub-bodies (which were made up of between 6,000 and 7,000 electors) who then voted for 140 of the 210 seats in parliament. The remaining seventy seats were filled by al-Sharaa directly.⁷⁰ Nineteen of the 140 seats were not filled on election day due to the exclusion of Suwayda, Raqqa, and Hasakah regions⁷¹ but eleven of those empty seats were filled with the May 2026 election in Hasakah.⁷²

SDF Developments: Ceasefires and Integration into the New Syria

In March 2025, the SDF and the Syrian government signed an agreement to integrate the SDF forces into Syria’s new army and to have the civilian institutions and areas under its control integrated into the new Syrian State.⁷³ Under the terms of the agreement, the SDF was also to hand over control of borders, airports, and oil and gas fields to al-Sharaa’s government and Kurds, the group that leads the SDF and a minority group in Syria, would be recognized as ‘an integral part of the Syrian State’.⁷⁴ Finally, the ceasefire also required the SDF to completely stop all hostilities with the SNA and Türkiye.⁷⁵ The agreement was supposed to be implemented by the end of 2025, but by the beginning of January 2026 nothing had happened.⁷⁶

A key sticking point between the SDF and the Syrian government has been a disagreement on how the SDF would be integrated into the new Syrian State. The SDF wanted to remain ‘a cohesive unit’ within the Syrian Army whereas the government wanted to integrate the fighters individually.⁷⁷ A meeting between the two parties and the United States was held in early July,⁷⁸but the violence that broke out in Suwayda in mid-July (see below) and the Syrian government’s response to it ‘complicated’ the implementation of the March agreement⁷⁹ – the Kurdish-led SDF was uneasy with the way in which the Syrian government handled minority groups.⁸⁰

Further delays in implementing the March agreement came in August 2025 when clashes broke out between the SDF and the Syrian government (see below) and when al-Sharaa cancelled a meeting with the SDF that was due to take place in Paris, saying that the future of the country must be decided in Damascus.⁸¹ Despite the clashes, al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi (the commander of the SDF) did meet in late August in Damascus with US Special Envoy Tom Barrack also present at the meeting.⁸² Further clashes between the SDF and the Syrian government occurred in September 2025 (see below) and al-Sharaa accused the SDF of stalling the process.⁸³

After the September clashes and a further clash between the two parties on 6 October killed two and injured several others in Aleppo, the two agreed to a US-brokered ceasefire on 7 October 2025.⁸⁴ Despite more clashes in November (see below),⁸⁵ negotiations on SDF integration seemed to be gaining momentum due to US and Turkish pressure. There was, however, still disagreement on how the SDF would integrate into the new Syrian army.⁸⁶ The deadline for the implementation of the March agreement was December 2025 and in an attempt to meet it, al-Sharaa’s government stated that they were open to integrating the SDF’s 50,000 fighters into three main divisions and several smaller brigades in exchange for the SDF ceding some chains of command and allowing other Syrian army units to be deployed to its territory.⁸⁷Deadly clashes in December and January 2026, however, stalled the process once again (see below).⁸⁸

Following clashes and a lightening blitz in SDF-held territory in the north-east by the Syrian government in January 2026, the two parties agreed to another US-brokered ceasefire on 18 January 2026.⁸⁹ This ceasefire also included an agreement on including SDF institutions as part of Syrian State structures,⁹⁰ apparently closely reflecting Damascus’ demands.⁹¹ Clashes broke out again on 19 January, but a total ceasefire was agreed by al-Sharaa and Abdi on 30 January 2026.⁹² This agreement sets out a phased approach to integration in north-eastern Syria, military withdrawals from cities by both parties, and the handing over of strategic assets and border operations to the Syrian government.⁹³

Progress on integration, though slow, was made throughout the first half of 2026. The handover to the Syrian government by the SDF of prisons and detention camps housing IS fighters and their families in northeastern Syria was rocky but completed in January and February (see below). Also in February, some SDF cities and infrastructure were handed over to the Syrian government.⁹⁴ In March, al-Sharaa appointed a senior SDF military official as the Assistant Minister of Defence for eastern Syria,⁹⁵ and the two sides exchanged prisoners.⁹⁶ In April, citizenship applications of Kurds started being processed⁹⁷ and more prisoners were exchanged.⁹⁸ In May, parliamentary elections were held in Hasakah,⁹⁹ and SDF forces started integrating into the Syrian army.¹⁰⁰

Escapes from and Closures of Prisons and Detention Camps Holding Persons Related to Islamic State

After the January 2026 ceasefire between the SDF and the Syrian government (see above) wherein the SDF agreed to cede territory to the Syrian government and to hand over control to the Syrian government of prisons and detention camps holding people alleged to be members of or connected to Islamic State, between 120 to 200 ‘low-level’ Islamic State detainees escaped from a prison in al-Shaddadi.¹⁰¹The SDF, which was in control of the prison, claimed that it lost control when it was attacked by fighters affiliated with the Syrian government. The Syrian government denied the allegation and blamed the SDF for the escape.¹⁰² Most of the prisoners were quickly recaptured by the Syrian government.¹⁰³

The al-Hol (also spelled al-Hawl) detention camp in north-eastern Syria also came under government control pursuant to the ceasefire with the SDF.¹⁰⁴ This camp reportedly held ‘tens of thousands of family members’ of Islamic State fighters of varying nationalities,¹⁰⁵ with more than half of the population in the camp being under twelve years old.¹⁰⁶ On 22 February 2026, after a mass escape, the Syrian government announced all families within the camp had been relocated and the camp was fully closed.¹⁰⁷

Also in January 2026, the United States started moving Islamic State detainees from prisons and camps in north-eastern Syria to detention facilities in Iraq.¹⁰⁸The transferred prisoners were reportedly Syrian, Iraqi, and third State nationals.¹⁰⁹

US Military Withdrawal from Syria

In February 2026, the US military started withdrawing from its bases in Syria and moving into Kurdish-held Iraq.¹¹⁰ On 13 February, the US fully withdrew from al-Tanf (near Iraq and Jordan) and on 15 February, Syria fully took back control of al-Shaddadi military base which had been operated by the US and the SDF since 2016.¹¹¹ On 23 February, the US started withdrawing from Qasrak base in north-eastern Syria,¹¹² with the last troops and equipment leaving the base on 16 April 2026.¹¹³ This withdrawal saw all US troops withdraw from the country and all former US bases turned over to the Syrian government.

International Armed Conflict between Syria and the CJTF-OIR Ended November 2025

From September 2014 until November 2025, Syria was involved in an IAC with States contributing to the CJTF-OIR.

The CJTF-OIR,¹ is a multinational military formation established by the Global Coalition against Islamic State that intervened with the declared objective of containing and ultimately defeating the group’s influence in the region, including in Syria. It operated and targeted the Islamic State on Syrian territory without the consent of the Syrian government.²

Initially, the situation remained unchanged under the leadership of the new Syrian government. Once established in December 2024, the interim government did not explicitly express its consent to the CJTF-OIR activities on its territory. Nevertheless, in November 2025, the new Syrian government agreed to join the CJTF-OIR.³ Accordingly, the Syrian government consented to CJTF-OIR activities and, by November 2025, there was no longer an IAC taking place between Syria and States contributing to the CJTF-OIR.

1
It includes States such as the US OIR-CJTF, United States, 2 March 2016, the UK GOV.UK, Update: air strikes against Daesh, 27 April 2024, Spain Gobierno de Espana, Operation Support to Iraq, 14 July 2025, France Ministère des Armées, Dossier de Press Chammal, December 2023, Canada OIR-CJTF, Canada, 10 March 2016, Australia (until December 2024) OIR-CJTF, Australia, 2 March 2016, Germany Die Bundesregierung, Bundeswehr setzt Einsatz im Irak fort, 13 September 2023, the Netherlands Ministerue van Defensie, Nederland levert helikopters en troepencommandant voor NAVO-missie Irak, 29 September 2023, Belgium The Brussels Times, Tenth anniversary of Belgium’s involvement in the fight against ISIS, 24 September 2024, and Italian Institute for International Political Studies, In Iraq, Italy and France Are Looking for a Primary Role to Play, 12 October 2021 ↩︎
2
Identical Letters Dated 17 September 2015 From the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary General and the President of the Security Council, UN doc S/2015/719, 21 September 2015 ↩︎
3
C. Lister, ‘The Collapse of ISIS in Syria’, Middle East Institute, 8 June 2026; M. Khurma and G. Cafiero, ‘Syria joining the anti-ISIS coalition is a westward pivot—with opportunities and risks’, Atlantic Council, 21 November 2025; ‘Syria signs up to US-led coalition against ISIL’, Al Jazeera, 11 November 2025. ↩︎

International Armed Conflict between Syria and Israel

Background

Israel and Syria were engaged in two types of international armed conflicts (IACs) during the period under review.

The first type of IAC concerns the Israeli military occupation of Syrian territory, particularly Golan Heights and Mount Hermon.

The second type is an IAC featuring active hostilities which began in July 2025 when Israel launched strikes on Syrian government forces in support of Druze Syrians in Suwayda who were under attack from the Syrian government (see below).

Israeli Occupation of Golan Heights and Mount Hermon

Under IHL, a situation of occupation exists if the territory is ‘under the authority of the hostile army’, even in the absence of resistance.¹ Israel seized control over the Golan Heights from Syria on 10 June 1967, during the final day of the Six-Day War, leading to the displacement of most of the Syrian population on the territory. Israel established settlements in the area and Jewish populations moved onto the territory. In December 1981, the Israeli Parliament passed legislation, known as the Golan Heights Law, which allows the imposition of Israeli laws, jurisdiction, and administration on the territory it had seized.² Syria has consistently demanded a full Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 borders, including the return of the Golan Heights as part of any peace deal but no negotiations on the matter have yet yield an agreement between the parties.³

Immediately following the fall of Assad, the IDF started seizing the demilitarized buffer zone between it and Syria (a move which was internationally condemned).⁴ By March 2025, Israel had seized control over key strategic terrain from the Syrian armed forces.⁵ Between March 2025 and June 2026, Israel continued to push into and occupy several parts of southern Syria.⁶ On 15 June 2026, Israeli Minister of Defence, Israel Katz, declared that Israel would remain in control of the land it has seized in Syria ‘indefinitely’⁷ and on 28 June, the IDF killed ‘several armed terrorists’ in this zone.⁸ The interim Syrian government regularly denounces Israel’s attacks and has publicly called on Israel to withdraw from Syrian territory, while reaffirming its commitment to the 1974 ceasefire agreements.⁹

Active hostilities in the international armed conflict between Syria and Israel

After the fall of Assad in December 2024, Israel bombarded Syria with airstrikes,¹⁰ launching an average of one attack every three to four days between December 2024 and June 2025, largely against military sites used by the former regime, military highways and logistical hubs, and areas adjacent to the occupied Golan Heights.¹¹ In the first half of 2025, Israel launched regular airstrikes across Syria, destroying key strategic military facilities, including airfields, anti-aircraft batteries, missiles, drones, fighter jets, tanks, weapon depots and production sites, and naval facilities. A number of airstrikes were also launched to protect Druze communities that had been involved in fighting new government forces.¹²

Israeli strikes against the armed forces of the new Syrian government were also carried out in July after the Syrian government and Druze clashed in Suwayda (see below). Acting in support of the Druze, Israel struck Syrian tanks and personnel that were approaching Suwayda via the Suwayda-Damascus highway.¹³ On 16 July, Israel struck the headquarters of the Ministry of Defence in Damascus.¹⁴ A final wave of strikes in the context of this flare up occurred on 17 July‘International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law violations committed during the July 2025 violence in Suwayda,¹⁵ and US-brokered talks between Israel and Syria culminated in a ceasefire on 18 July.¹⁶

Despite being in ‘advanced’ talks with Syria on a new security arrangement in August 2025,¹⁷ Israel again struck near Damascus, killing six soldiers on 26 August.¹⁸ In November 2025, Israel launched a ground invasion into and conducted strikes on a village in Beit Jin, killing at least thirteen people.¹⁹

While 2026 started with more US-mediated talks between Syria and Israel,²⁰ in March, Israel carried out more airstrikes on military infrastructure.²¹ This was the last reported strike at the time of reporting (June 2026).

1
‘Article 42 of Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907’, International Committee of the Red Cross International Humanitarian Law Databases. ↩︎
2
UNGA, ‘Verbatim Record of the 5th Meeting’, 2 February 1982. ↩︎
3
G. Golan, ‘Israeli Peacemaking since 1967: Factors behind the Breakthroughs and Failures’, Routledge, 2015, 57–93. ↩︎
4
M. Lidman, ‘As Israel advances on a Syrian buffer zone, it sees peril and opportunity’, Associated Press, 10 December 2024. ↩︎
5
R. Geist Pinfold, ‘Why is Israel Escalating its Strikes Against Syria?’, RUSI, 9 May 2025. ↩︎
6
A. Shaheen and O. Sanadiki, ‘Israel raids a Syrian village and detains suspected militants; 1 person is killed’, Associated Press, 12 June 2025. ↩︎
7
‘Israel to stay ‘indefinitely’ in lands seized in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria’, France 24, 15 June 2026. ↩︎
8
‘Israel says troops killed armed fighters in southern Syria and Lebanon’, Middle East Eye, 28 June 2026; E. Fabian, ‘IDF troops kill 2 gunmen in south Syria buffer zone, military says’, The Times of Israel, 28 June 2026. ↩︎
9
‘Syria interim president seeks pressure on Israel to withdraw from south’, France 24, 4 March 2025. ↩︎
10
‘Israel strengthens hold on Syrian buffer zone’, Associated Press, 10 December 2024 ↩︎
11
M. A. Hussein, ‘Mapping Israel’s expanding air attacks across Syria’, Al Jazeera, 4 June 2025. ↩︎
12
‘Guterres condemns violence against civilians in Syria, urges Israel to stop attacks’, United Nations News,2 May 2025; R. Geist Pinfold, ‘Why is Israel Escalating its Strikes Against Syria?’, RUSI, 9 May 2025. ↩︎
13
‘Israel strikes Syrian city, vows to protect Druze from government forces’, Reuters, 15 July 2025; ‘International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law violations committed during the July 2025 violence in Suwayda, Syria: Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, UN Doc A/HRC/61/CRP.7, 27 March 2026, para 33 ↩︎
14
‘Israel hits Syrian army HQ, near Damascus palace as Suwayda fighting rages’, Al Jazeera, 16 July 2025. ↩︎
15
Syria: Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, UN Doc A/HRC/61/CRP.7, 27 March 2026, para 38; ‘Israel launches heavy airstrikes in Damascus, vowing to protect Druze’, Reuters, 17 July 2025. ↩︎
16
J. Ward, ‘Israel and Syria agree to ceasefire, US ambassador to Turkey says’, Reuters, 19 July 2025. ↩︎
17
L. Haroni, ‘Sharaa claims ‘chances are high’ Syria will reach security agreement with Israel’, The Jerusalem Post, 25 August 2025; ‘Syria’s Sharaa confirms ‘advanced’ talks with Israel on security deal; US envoy meets Netanyahu’, The Times of Israel, 24 August 2025. ↩︎
18
‘Six Syrian soldiers killed in Israeli strikes near Damascus: State media’, Al Jazeera, 26 August 2025; M. Moench, ‘Israeli strikes kill six Syrian troops, Syria says’, BBC, 28 August 2025. ↩︎
19
S. Shaheen, ‘Israeli forces kill at least 13 people in raid on Syrian village, officials and residents say’, PBS, 28 November 2025; A. Shaheen and O. Sanadiki, ‘Israel raids a Syrian village and detains suspected militants; 1 person is killed’, Associated Press, 12 June 2025. ↩︎
20
‘Israel, Syria agree to dedicated communication line in US-brokered talks’, Al Jazeera, 6 January 2026; ‘Joint Statement on the Trilateral Meeting Between the Governments of the United States of America, the State of Israel, and the Syrian Arab Republic’, US Department of State, 6 January 2026. ↩︎
21
‘Israel says it hit Syrian government targets after attacks on Druze civilians’, Reuters, 20 March 2026. ↩︎

Türkiye’s military occupation of northern Syria

Despite the end of Operation Euphrates Shield (to combat Islamic State and curb the SDF’s presence in Syria) in 2017, Türkiye retained its troops in northern Syria, maintaining control and supporting local governance and rebel forces.¹ In the following years, it progressively expanded its presence in northern Syria, consolidating control over border towns and strategically securing its de facto authority over the region (see above). As this was carried out without the consent of the Syrian government, Türkiye’s prolonged presence in northern Syria is a military occupation.

Following the change of the Syrian government, Türkiye further expanded its military activities on the ground, establishing bases, deploying ground troops, and conducting military operations against the SDF beyond the Syrian territory already under its control (see below). Since the fall of Assad, al-Sharaa and Erdoğan have shared close ties and interests for their own countries and the region generally. By June 2026, Türkiye continued to have influence over 100 military outposts in Syria, reportedly seeking to maintain its presence until what it perceives as the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) threat is dealt with.²

In October 2025, Türkiye’s parliament approved an extension for Türkiye’s military to operate in Syria until 2028.³ However, the relationship between the two States had changed somewhat – Türkiye provided the Syrian government with intelligence to support it in a March 2025 clash with the PFGF (see below) and it has trained and armed Syrian police, but Syria has also (successfully) denied some of Türkiye’s requests for integrating its proxies into the new government. Additionally, Türkiye has handed over some of the prisons it was running in Syria to the new government.⁴ In August 2025, the two States signed an agreement under which Türkiye would provide weapons systems and logistical tools to the Syrian army as well as train the army in the use of those systems and tools.⁵ Türkiye further supported Syria’s campaign against the SDF in January 2026 (see below),⁶ and, in May 2026, Syria participated in Türkiye’s Efes military exercise for the first time.⁷

Syria has not, however, publicly expressed its consent for Türkiye’s military presence and military operations on its territory. In February 2026, Türkiye’s Defence Minister, Yaser Guler, stated that Türkiye had ‘no agenda for withdrawing or leaving’ Syria. According to one analyst, it would not be possible for al-Sharaa’s government to contest Türkiye’s presence in Syria.⁸ Thus, until more conclusive evidence of consent can be established, the situation in northern Syria that is under Türkiye’s effective control continues to be viewed as an occupation.

1
A. Stein et al, ‘How Turkey Is Governing in Northern Aleppo’, Syria Deeply, 20 July 2017. ↩︎
2
A. Aydıntaşbaş, ‘Turkey’s search for a Middle East order’, Brookings Institute, 16 June 2026; E. Tsurkov, ‘Uneasy Allies: The Real Relationship Between Turkey and Syria’s New Rulers’, New Lines Magazine, 10 June 2026. ↩︎
3
‘Turkish Parliament approves Erdogan’s longest military mandate to operate in Syria’, Nordic Monitor, 24 October 2025; P. Iddon, ‘No exit in sight: Why Turkey is keeping troops in Syria and Iraq’, The New Arab, 16 February 2026. ↩︎
4
E. Tsurkov, ‘Uneasy Allies: The Real Relationship Between Turkey and Syria’s New Rulers’, New Lines Magazine, 10 June 2026. ↩︎
5
T. Gumrukcu, ‘Turkey to help Syria with weapon systems, equipment under new accord, source says’, Reuters, 14 August 2025. ↩︎
6
P. Iddon, ‘No exit in sight: Why Turkey is keeping troops in Syria and Iraq’, The New Arab, 16 February 2026. ↩︎
7
A. Helou, ‘Syria joins Turkey’s Efes 2026, one of nine nations participating for first time’, Breaking Defense, 26 May 2026. ↩︎
8
P. Iddon, ‘No exit in sight: Why Turkey is keeping troops in Syria and Iraq’, The New Arab, 16 February 2026. ↩︎

International armed conflict between Syria and Jordan Ended December 2025

In December 2025, Jordan launched airstrikes in southern Syria, targeting drug smuggling networks in the region.¹ As the motive of the attack, the intensity, and duration are irrelevant for determining the existence of an IAC and a unilateral strike was executed by Jordan into sovereign Syrian territory, these actions by Jordan triggered a short-lived IAC.

1
J. Genn, ‘Jordanian army strikes near Sweida after intercepting arms, drugs smugglers near border’, The Jerusalem Post, 24 December 2025; ‘Jordanian army launches strikes on drug smuggling networks in Syria: State TV’, Al Arabiya, 25 December 2025. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between Syria and the SDF Ended February 2026

Background

A Kurdish-led (but not only Kurdish) force that was formed primarily to counter IS, the SDF became the official military in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (also known as Rojava) with the military defeat of Islamic State in March 2019.¹ Seeking at first to have the region declared semi-autonomous from Assad’s Syria, in October 2019 Turkish forces advanced into the region, forcing the SDF to turn to Russia and Assad’s government for support.² Assad’s government and the SDF subsequently cooperated on security, military, and economic issues, including against Turkish forces. During this cooperation, the SDF was able to hold on to some territory in northeastern Syria. When Assad’s government fell in December 2024, the withdrawal of Assad-regime forces, Russian forces, and Iranian forces that had been working with the SDF in the territory it controlled forced the SDF into negotiations with al-Sharaa and the new Syrian government.³

As of March 2025, the SDF remained in control of most of Hasakah, half of Raqqa, parts of Deir Ez-Zor and Aleppo.⁴ This constituted more than 46,000km² of Syrian territory and covered a number of prisons where Islamic State fighters and their families were being detained (see above).⁵ By January 2026, one quarter of Syrian territory was still under the control of the SDF.⁶ Since the fall of Assad, the SDF and the new Syrian government have engaged in talks to integrate the north-eastern region of Syria into the new Syria (see above) but also in armed clashes in the latter half of 2025 and early 2026.

Intensity

Following the Syrian government’s clashes with Druze armed groups in Suwayda in July 2025 (see below), the Kurdish-led SDF apparently lost faith in the promised protections of minorities in the new Syria.⁷ Clashes between Syria and the SDF broke out on 2 August 2025 when the SDF struck a Syrian government military position near Manjib in northern Syria, injuring four army personnel and three civilians.⁸ The SDF said it was responding to an ‘unprovoked artillery assault’ in civilian areas from factions within the Syrian government.⁹ More clashes (reportedly involving heavy weapons¹⁰ occurred in Deir Hafer in Aleppo province on 4 August,¹¹ in Aleppo city on 11 August,¹² in Tell Maaz on 12 August (killing one government soldier), and along the Euphrates River on 13 August.¹³

Deadly clashes with heavy weaponry occurred in September 2025.¹⁴ Hostilities escalated in December 2025.¹⁵ On the evening of 15/16 December, the Syrian government reportedly used heavy weapons and artillery against the SDF near Tishreen Dam in Aleppo province.¹⁶ Two SDF fighters were reportedly injured.¹⁷ A deadly clash involving mortars and heavy weaponry took place on 22 December. At least three civilians were killed and a further thirty-one people were injured, including six Syrian Internal Security Forces (ISF) personnel.¹⁸ Fighting, however, had stopped by the evening of 22December.¹⁹ It is clear from this assessment that the violence equated to protracted armed violence as early as August 2025.

The most intense clashes between the two started on 6 January 2026 when two SDF suicide drones struck government police vehicles, killing police officers and civilians.²⁰ The SDF claimed the vehicle was involved in a car crash despite visual evidence to the contrary.²¹ Heavy fighting broke out in Aleppo between the two parties with heavy shelling, mortar shelling, rockets, and drones being deployed by both sides.²² Fighting continued over the next few days.²³

A US-brokered ceasefire was due to come into effect on 9 January 2026 but the SDF reneged on it that morning, carrying out more attacks and reportedly killing three Syrian soldiers.²⁴ By 10 January, the Syrian government managed to take back control of the neighbourhoods in Aleppo where the fighting was taking place, busing hundreds of SDF fighters to SDF territory in eastern Syria.²⁵ On the same day, the SDF, in rural parts of the Aleppo province, launched at least thirteen suicide drones toward Aleppo city with at least seven reaching their targets.²⁶ At least thirty people had been killed by 10 January, and more than 150,000 people were displaced.²⁷ More clashes came after this when the Syrian government embarked on lightening offensives to seize territory in north-eastern Syria.²⁸ During this offensive, non-Kurdish members of the SDF defected.²⁹

A four-day ceasefire was announced on 18 January,³⁰ but clashes broke out again the next day.³¹ A final ceasefire was agreed on 30 January 2026.³² Since this date, there have been no further clashes and there has been progress in integrating the SDF into the new Syrian State (see above).

The intensity of violence generated by the engagements between the SDF and the Syrian government satisfied the necessary requirements under IHL from as early as August 2025 up until the agreed ceasefire of 30 January 2026. The steep drop in intensity as of this date signals that the notion of intensity is no longer met and the NIAC has ended.

Organization

Formed in 2015, the SDF comprises a coalition of eight distinct militias, united under a single organizational entity to coordinate and mount military operations, particularly in partnership with the CJTF-OIR against Islamic State. It is mainly composed of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), alongside Arab, Turkmen, Assyrian, and Armenian components.³³

The SDF has inherited a robust and identifiable tiered command and control structure from the YPG, including a Military Council representing leaders of all member groups, a General Commander, a General Command body, and a Military Discipline Committee. While decision-making mechanisms emphasize collective leadership, these structures still reflect a functional and accountable chain of command.³⁴

The SDF’s internal structure is built on clearly established training protocols and a robust military infrastructure, ensuring discipline, professionalism, and cohesion among its ranks. This includes regularized military education and internal enforcement of disciplinary norms.³⁵ Training and discipline enable the SDF to adhere to IHL. It has acquired significant quantities of military equipment through both battlefield gains and direct support from external actors.³⁶

The SDF has also demonstrated its ability to exercise significant control over territory in Syria. Following the territorial defeat of Islamic State in March 2019, the SDF was designated the official military force of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), a political entity exercising de facto authority over significant regions in northern Syria.³⁷ In these territories, the AANES has established functioning State-like institutions, including policing, a judiciary, education systems, local governance mechanisms, and a resource-based economic framework. The SDF, as its military arm, provides security, controls detention facilities and camps, and engages in sustained military operations to defend these areas from external threats.³⁸

The AANES and SDF have demonstrated the capacity to engage coherently with external actors, including States in the region and the eighty-two members of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.³⁹ It also has a website where it posts press releases and communications.⁴⁰ This ability to ‘speak with one voice’ further evidences the existence of a centralized political-military apparatus and reinforces the SDF’s status as a highly organized armed group.

On the basis of the foregoing, it is clear that the SDF, prior to the re-integration efforts, possessed the level of organization required under IHL to be considered a non-State armed group party to a NIAC. Accordingly, during the reporting period a new short-lived NIAC between Syria and the SDF broke out.

As discussed above, an agreement signed between the new Syrian government and the SDF on 10 March 2025 was the first step towards integrating the SDF into the new Syrian State. After the military defeat of the SDF in January 2026, hostilities came to a halt and a new integration agreement between the two parties was signed. As of June 2026, progress has been made with respect to this integration.

A NIAC ends in one of two ways, namely if one of the parties to the NIAC ceases to be sufficiently organized, or if the intensity of the fighting drops persistently. As of January 2026, there was a steep drop in the level of fighting between the parties such that the armed violence was no longer regular and intense. The reintegration process has been successful to the extent that the SDF’s organizational structure has also ceased to exist, therefore, the NIAC between Syria and the SDF has ended.

1
W. van Wilgenburg, ‘Syrian Democratic Forces (Syria)’, European Council on Foreign Relations; E. C. Bullard, ‘Syrian Democratic Forces’, EBSCO, 2021. ↩︎
2
W. van Wilgenburg, ‘Syrian Democratic Forces (Syria)’, European Council on Foreign Relations; M. A. Ibrahim, ‘The rise and fall of the Syrian Democratic Forces’, Syria Direct, 16 October 2019. ↩︎
3
‘Where Does Assad’s Fall Leave the SDF?’, Jusoor, 16 January 2025. ↩︎
4
Country of Origin Information, ‘Syria: Country Focus: Areas under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)’, European Union Agency for Asylum, 25 March 2025. ↩︎
5
D. Gritten and L. Sinjab, ‘Kurdish-led SDF agrees to integrate with Syrian government forces’, BBC, 11 March 2025. ↩︎
6
C. Lister, ‘How Damascus and the SDF came to blows in Aleppo — and what might come next’, Middle East Institute, 13 January 2026. ↩︎
7
C. Lister, ‘How Damascus and the SDF came to blows in Aleppo — and what might come next’, Middle East Institute, 13 January 2026; ‘Syrian Arab tribes declare ‘general mobilization’ against SDF’, The Cradle, 12 August 2025. ↩︎
8
‘Syrian government, Kurdish-led SDF trade blame over northern Syria attack’, Al Jazeera, 2 August 2025; ‘Fresh clashes break out in Syria as the interim government struggles to ease tensions’, NPR, 4 August 2025. ↩︎
9
‘Syrian government, Kurdish-led SDF trade blame over northern Syria attack’, Al Jazeera, 2 August 2025. ↩︎
10
‘Middle East & North Africa: Syria’, International Crisis Group, August 2025.) ↩︎
11
‘Fresh clashes break out in Syria as the interim government struggles to ease tensions’, NPR, 4 August 2025. ↩︎
12
‘Middle East & North Africa: Syria’, International Crisis Group, August 2025; ‘“SDF” and “Syrian Defense Ministry” Trade Accusations Over Agreement Violations in Aleppo’, Enab Baladi, 12 August 2025. ↩︎
13
‘Clashes Between Syrian Ministry of Defense Forces and the SDF in Deir Ezzor, Eastern Syria’, Enab Baladi, 14 August 2025. ↩︎
14
‘SDF, Syrian government agreement on the line after deadly Aleppo clashes’, The New Arab, 12 September 2025. ↩︎
15
E. Kourdi et al, ‘Deadly clashes erupt between Syrian army and Kurdish-led SDF amid integration talks’, CNN, 22 December 2025; ‘At least two killed in Aleppo clashes between Syrian army, Kurdish-led SDF’, Al Jazeera, 22 December 2025. ↩︎
16
‘Clashes Between the Army and the SDF Near the Tishreen Dam’, The Syrian Observer, 17 December 2025. ↩︎
17
S. J. Frantzman, ‘SDF blames Damascus-linked groups for deadly drone attack in Syria’, The Jerusalem Post, 17 December 2025. ↩︎
18
E. Kourdi et al, ‘Deadly clashes erupt between Syrian army and Kurdish-led SDF amid integration talks’, CNN, 22 December 2025; ‘At least two killed in Aleppo clashes between Syrian army, Kurdish-led SDF’, Al Jazeera, 22 December 2025. ↩︎
19
‘At least two killed in Aleppo clashes between Syrian army, Kurdish-led SDF’, Al Jazeera, 22 December 2025. ↩︎
20
C. Lister, ‘How Damascus and the SDF came to blows in Aleppo — and what might come next’, Middle East Institute, 13 January 2026. ↩︎
21
C. Lister, ‘How Damascus and the SDF came to blows in Aleppo — and what might come next’, Middle East Institute, 13 January 2026; Charles Lister, X, 5 January 2026. ↩︎
22
S. Khalid and F. Najjar, ‘Updates: Seven killed in fighting between Syrian army, SDF forces in Aleppo’, Al Jazeera, 6 January 2026. ↩︎
23
C. Lister, ‘How Damascus and the SDF came to blows in Aleppo — and what might come next’, Middle East Institute, 13 January 2026. ↩︎
24
C. Lister, ‘How Damascus and the SDF came to blows in Aleppo — and what might come next’, Middle East Institute, 13 January 2026; N. Hawach, ‘Aleppo Escalation Puts Damascus–SDF Integration Agreement under Further Strain’, International Crisis Group, 9 January 2026. ↩︎
25
C. Lister, ‘How Damascus and the SDF came to blows in Aleppo — and what might come next’, Middle East Institute, 13 January 2026; ‘Last Kurdish forces leave Aleppo after ceasefire deal reached’, BBC, 11 January 2026. ↩︎
26
C. Lister, ‘How Damascus and the SDF came to blows in Aleppo — and what might come next’, Middle East Institute, 13 January 2026; ‘Syrian Arab Army warns SDF organization of escalating drone attacks on Aleppo’, Syrian Arab News Agency, 10 January 2026. ↩︎
27
‘Last SDF fighters leave Syria’s Aleppo after days of deadly clashes’, Al Jazeera, 11 January 2026. ↩︎
28
‘Preventing Further Escalation in Syria’s North East’, International Crisis Group, 20 January 2026; ‘Syrian forces seize major oil, gas fields in eastern Syria, security sources say’, Reuters, 18 January 2026. ↩︎
29
‘Middle East & North Africa: Syria’, International Crisis Group, January 2026; T. Chouiref, ‘FACTBOX – Full terms of ceasefire, integration agreement between Syrian government, SDF’, AA, 18 January 2026, Updated 19 January 2026. ↩︎
30
E. Mohamed, ‘Syrian government, SDF agree on a four-day ceasefire’, Al Jazeera, 20 January 2026; T. Chouiref, ‘FACTBOX – Full terms of ceasefire, integration agreement between Syrian government, SDF’, AA, 18 January 2026, Updated 19 January 2026. ↩︎
31
D. Gritten and R. Hagan, ‘Clashes reported after Syria and Kurdish-led forces agree ceasefire’, BBC, 19 January 2026; U. Jamal et al, ‘Syria updates: SDF, government trade ceasefire violation accusations’, Al Jazeera, 19 January 2026. ↩︎
32
‘An Opportunity for Calm in North-eastern Syria’, International Crisis Group, 30 January 2026; ‘Kurdish-led SDF agrees integration with Syrian government forces’, Al Jazeera, 30 January 2026; H. Khalil, ‘Syrian government reaches deal with Kurdish-led forces’, BBC, 30 January 2026. ↩︎
33
W. van Wilgenburg, ‘Syrian Democratic Forces (Syria)’, European Council on Foreign Relations; E. C. Bullard, ‘Syrian Democratic Forces’, EBSCO, 2021. ↩︎
34
D. Vestenskov and A. Høj Fierro, Internal Kurdish Coherence, Scandinavian Military Studies, 2019, 30–31. ↩︎
35
M. Knights and W. van Wilgenburg, ‘Accidental Allies: The US–Syrian Democratic Forces Partnership Against the Islamic State’, Bloomsbury, 2022, 33–36. ↩︎
36
D. Vestenskov and A. Høj Fierro, ‘Internal Kurdish Coherence’, Scandinavian Military Studies, 2019, 30–31. ↩︎
37
‘Country Guidance: Syria’, European Union Agency for Asylum, 15 April 2024, 23. ↩︎
38
M. Nicholasen, ‘Survival and Self-Determination in Northeast Syria’, Epicenter, 10 April 2024. ↩︎
39
W. Smith, ‘The End of the Road for the Syrian Democratic Forces’, London School of Economics and Political Science, 28 March 2025. ↩︎
40
Syrian Defense Forces Press Center. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict involving the CJTF-OIR and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) against Islamic State

Background

The US-led international coalition (the Global Coalition against Islamic State) was established in 2015 under the banner of ‘Operation Inherent Resolve’, initially comprising more than seventy States.¹ CJTF-OIR is a multinational military formation established by the Global Coalition against Islamic State that intervened with the declared objective of containing and ultimately defeating the group’s influence in the region, including in Syria. It operated on Syrian territory without the consent of the Syrian government² until November 2025.³ Between 2013 and 2019, a significant portion of the territory formerly occupied by Islamic State was reclaimed, predominantly through military operations undertaken by the CJTF-OIR but also with significant support from the SDF.⁴ As part of Operation Inherent Resolve, the CJTF-OIR conducted ‘partner defeat’ operations against Islamic State with the SDF.⁵

Considering that States contributing to the CJTF-OIR and the SDF have closely collaborated in their fight against Islamic State since the beginning of the NIAC against the group, the question arises whether it is sufficiently close and coordinated to warrant treating them as co-belligerents or parties on the same side of a NIAC.⁶ According to the ICRC, for an alliance to become party to a NIAC, and to aggregate violence generated by such an alliance under IHL, all non-State actors party to the alliance must meet the organizational criteria under IHL.⁷

Since 2017, the SDF, supported by the CJTF-OIR, has been involved in military raids against Islamic State and continued to participate in partnered operations with the CJTF-OIR until at least November 2025 when the SDF carried out its last reported attack, with air cover from the United States, against Islamic State in Syria.⁸There is significant evidence that the CJTF-OIR has provided ongoing and essential military support to the SDF, including weapons, intelligence, logistics, training, and air support. Hence, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the level of coordination and mutual support aligns with the level of support necessary to be regarded as parties (‘co-belligerent’) to the same NIAC.⁹ This means that in assessing the threshold of intensity, the activities of both the SDF and the CJTF-OIR against Islamic State can be aggregated.

Though largely defeated in 2019, Islamic State continued to carry out attacks in Syria during the reporting period. In addition, during the reporting period the parties to this NIAC changed. In November 2025, the new Syrian State agreed to join the CJTF-OIR,¹⁰ making this no longer an armed conflict taking place in Syria without the Syrian government’s consent (see above). In addition, in late January 2026, the SDF started being integrated into the new Syrian State, including the Syrian armed forces (see above).¹¹ Additionally, while the United States had withdrawn all troops in Syria by April 2026 (see above), they conducted an airstrike in Syria against Islamic State in June 2026.¹² Accordingly, by June 2026, there were only two parties to the NIAC – the CJTF-OIR (including Syria) and Islamic State.

Intensity

It is problematic to attribute indicators of violence to any specific members of a coalition, but it is possible to aggregate the violence generated between the enemies, if multiple States and/or organized armed groups who are sufficiently organized fight in a coalition against an enemy.¹³ This section thus assesses whether the violence generated in the NIAC between the the CJTF-OIR (including Syria) and Islamic State continued to equate to protracted armed violence.

Despite its significant loss of control over Syrian and Iraqi territory in 2019, Islamic State continues to control territory in Syria, in particular in the eastern province of Deir Ez Zor.¹⁴After the fall of Assad, Islamic State was able to seize weapons and supplies from government depots.¹⁵

The resurgence of Islamic State attacks since 2023 demonstrates its ongoing ability to carry out sustained operations in Syria. Between October and December 2024, the CJTF-OIR and the SDF carried out a number of strikes in Syria that killed more than 100 Islamic State fighters and destroyed weapons, communications equipment, and logistics nodes.¹⁶ On 8 December 2024, following the fall of Assad, the United States mounted seventy-five strikes on Islamic State targets throughout central Syria.¹⁷ Between January and June 2025, more than 100 attacks in areas controlled by the SDF were reported, leading to casualties among SDF fighters and civilians.¹⁸ Attacks on IS by member States of CJTF-OIR were further carried out in August,¹⁹ September,²⁰ November,²¹ and December 2025.²² In December 2025, an Islamic State gunman ambushed US and Syrian security personnel in Palmyra killing two US soldiers and a civilian US interpreter and injuring three other US soldiers and two Syrian soldiers. The lone gunman was killed by ‘partner forces’ in the skirmish that followed.²³ Further attacks (some retaliatory in nature) were conducted against Islamic State by the United States in January,²⁴ February,²⁵ and June 2026.²⁶ The June 2026 attack was carried out by the United States, despite its ground forces officially leaving Syria in April 2026 (see above).

The SDF carried out two reported attacks against Islamic State, in November 2025. The first was on 3 November 2025, when the SDF (with US air cover) mounted a raid in Tal-al-Saman, arresting five Islamic State members.²⁷ In another SDF attack on 21 November, two government soldiers were killed. The SDF, however, claimed that they were targeting Islamic State and alleged that the Syrian government was directly coordinating with Islamic State.²⁸ Finally, while there has been an overall decline in Islamic State attacks in Syria in 2026C.²⁹ the group mounted attacks in February,³⁰ March,³¹ April,³² May,³³ and June 2026.³⁴ The attacks in March, however, were largely defensive and indicative of ‘weaker planning capacity’ of the group,³⁵ and analysts assert that Islamic State-related violence in Syria is ‘low’.³⁶

As of June 2026, the violence between the CJTF-OIR and ISIL remained sufficiently regular and intense for a NIAC to continue to exist.

Organization

CJTF-OIR

According to the ICRC, for an alliance to become party to a NIAC, and to aggregate violence generated by such an alliance under IHL, all non-State actors that are members of the alliance must meet the organizational criteria under IHL.³⁷ Therefore, the threshold of organization of all members of the CJTF-OIR alliance must individually be examined to meet the minimum requirements demanded by IHL.

The CJTF-OIR coalition is predominantly composed of States, whose organizational level can be assumed. Since November 2025, Syria has been part of the coalition, and as such, now also a party to this NIAC. A dominant organized armed group up until end of January was the SDF. There may be others, including non-State actors referred to as militias who might be sufficiently organized but information on this is either scarce or not available in the public domain.

SDF

The SDF were sufficiently organized to constitute a party to a NIAC (see above). However, during the reporting period, the SDF was absorbed into the new Syrian State (see above). As of end-January 2026, the SDF was thus no longer party to this NIAC.

Islamic State

An offshoot of Al-Qaida, Islamic State is a transnational non-State armed group with a radical Sunni neo-Salafist approach to Islam.³⁸ First emerging and operating in Iraq as the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), carrying out attacks against US and Iraqi armed forces, in April 2013, during the Syrian civil war, it became the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIL). In June 2014, it simply took on the name Islamic State and in the process officially broke itself off from Al-Qaida.³⁹ The founder of the group was Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (also known as Ibrahim al-Badri al-Samarrai) and the group had a ‘pyramid-like structure’ with unified leadership.⁴⁰

Between 2014 and 2017, Islamic State was able to seize control of large parts of Iraq and Syria, connecting the two on their shared border as well as seize weapons the United States had provided to Iraq.⁴¹ By April 2015, it controlled around 138,000km² of territory across Syria and Iraq, with approximately eight million people living under the group’s control.⁴² It also had 35,000 members from around eighty States by this time,⁴³ and was able to launch ‘sophisticated attacks’ around the world.⁴⁴ Within Syria, Islamic State’s religious police had headquarters that receive and store reports from local religious police on any violations of its interpretation of Sharia law.⁴⁵ It also had a court system to enforce its religious laws.⁴⁶ In addition, due to its State-like structure, Islamic State was able to generate its own funds, through taxing those within its territories and through selling oil on the black market.⁴⁷

At the height of its powers, Islamic State was able to produce its own weapons on an industrial scale.⁴⁸ Islamic State was also able to speak with one voice during this time. In 2014, the group’s media branch, al-Hayat Media Center, released professionally produced videos in nineteen languages on social media platforms.⁴⁹ The al-Hayat Media Center, a ‘centralized and coordinated media structure’ for IS was also used to recruit fighters worldwide.⁵⁰ In addition, the group published five magazines in seven different languages, operated an online radio, released an app for phones called ‘The Dawn’, and released a manual for its fighters and supporters to evade geolocation.⁵¹

By 2018, Islamic State had lost control of large parts of its territory in Iraq and Syria and though its control diminished, its influence did not.⁵² The group was largely militarily defeated in 2019 when the SDF captured some of the last remaining Islamic State leaders in Baghuz, Syria.⁵³ After this event, the spokesperson for the SDF declared that while Islamic State’s ‘standing army’ was ‘finished on the ground’, the group continued to be a threat globally.⁵⁴

While there were fewer attacks in Syria and Iraq after this event, they were not altogether diminished,⁵⁵ with the group still engaging in guerrilla tactics in Syria in 2021⁵⁶ and 2024,⁵⁷ with one 2026 report stating that the group has ‘fully shifted to guerilla warfare, deploying small, mobile units’ in attacks. The planning capacity of group also appears to have weakened.⁵⁸

The relative resurgence in Syria was arguably attributable to new leadership; after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed by a US airstrike in Syria in 2019,⁵⁹ Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (also known as Mohammed Abdul Rahman al-Mawli al-Salbi) became the leader of Islamic State, overseeing new attacks in Iraq and Syria in 2020.⁶⁰ New leadership was, according to the US Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘committed to enabling international operations’.⁶¹

Despite the group still being able to carry out attacks, its capacities have hugely diminished since 2019. In 2025, the group’s attacks declined by half, and fell by a further seventy-two per cent in January 2026.⁶² The group has been unable to recover from this decline.⁶³ Further, according to Syrian intelligence, Islamic State’s organization has been reduced to ‘scattered individuals’ who share an ‘ideological bond, but without any organizational structure that would enable them to pose a serious threat to the security of Syria or the region’.⁶⁴ Another source described Islamic State presence in Syria in 2026 as more ‘symbolic’ than threatening.⁶⁵ The organization of the group has indeed changed.

Islamic State has also lost successive key leadership figures. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed by a US airstrike in Syria in October 2019. Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi was killed in by a US raid in Syria in February 2022.⁶⁶ Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi became the third Caliph of the group in March 2022,⁶⁷ but was killed in November of that year, with Islamic State announcing Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi as the new leader.⁶⁸ He was killed by Türkiye in August 2023 and Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi was named as his successor⁶⁹ and remains the leader today. Other leadership figures were also killed or detained during the reporting period.⁷⁰ These attacks and deaths have reportedly ‘diminished’ the group’s ability to plan and execute coordinated attacks.⁷¹

While once centralized, the group is now largely decentralized, with smaller branches operating autonomously after the death of Abu-al Hussein al-Husseini al Hashimi in August 2023.⁷² These cells recruit and act without waiting for orders.S⁷³ The types of attacks have also changed, with the group engaging more in guerilla tactics with smaller, more mobile units.⁷⁴ The targets of its attacks are now religious sects and political figures, signalling a focus on degrading and undermining the new Syrian State.⁷⁵

The group still appears to be able to sustain itself financially and to recruit new members.⁷⁶ At the end of 2024, it was estimated by the US Treasury that IS still had access to about US$10 million and was continuing to fundraise for its operations.⁷⁷ However, some cells appear to be financially struggling, with some fighters seeking out settlements with the Syrian government because of this. Recruitment campaigns are targeting young boys and men who are facing economic hardship or who grew up in displacement camps.⁷⁸ In December 2025, Islamic State is said to still number around 3,000 fighters in Syria and Iraq.⁷⁹

On the basis of the foregoing, it is clear that Islamic State continues to possess the level of organization required under IHL to be considered a non-State armed group party to a NIAC. Accordingly, though the parties to this NIAC have changed, the CJTF-OIR (now including Syria) remains in a NIAC against Islamic State.

1
‘Our Mission’, The Global Coalition. ↩︎
2
‘Identical Letters Dated 17 September 2015 From the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary General and the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc S/2015/719, 21 September 2015 ↩︎
3
‘Syria signs up to US-led coalition against ISIL’, Al Jazeera, 11 November 2025. ↩︎
4
‘Islamic State defeated in final Syria victory: SDF, Al Jazeera,23 March 2019. ↩︎
5
‘Who We Are’, The Global Coalition. ↩︎
6
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 16–17. ↩︎
7
‘International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts: Recommitting to Protection in Armed Conflict on the 70^th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions’, International Committee of the Red Cross, October 2019, 40 – 41. ↩︎
8
J. Genn, ‘Syrian Democratic Forces arrest five ISIS cell members in Raqqa raid’, The Jerusalem Post, 3 November 2025. ↩︎
9
‘Coalition Forces Coordinate, Work With Syrian Partner Forces’, US Central Command, 10 April 2025; ‘Syrian Democratic Forces, Enabled by CENTCOM Forces, Capture ISIS Cell Leader’, US Central Command, 8 March 2025. ↩︎
10
C. Lister, ‘The Collapse of ISIS in Syria’, Middle East Institute, 8 June 2026; M. Khurma and G. Cafiero, ‘Syria joining the anti-ISIS coalition is a westward pivot—with opportunities and risks’, Atlantic Council, 21 November 2025; ‘Syria signs up to US-led coalition against ISIL’, Al Jazeera, 11 November 2025. ↩︎
11
C. Lister, ‘The Collapse of ISIS in Syria’, Middle East Institute, 8 June 2026. ↩︎
12
‘US military says it killed senior ISIS leader in airstrike on Syria last week’, The Times of Israel, 24 June 2026; ‘US forces killed ISIS leader in Syria airstrike, Central Command says’, NBC News, 24 June 2026. ↩︎
13
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 17; J. Nikolic et al, ‘Aggregated intensity: classifying coalitions of non-State armed groups’, International Committee of the Red Cross: Humanitarian Law and Policy, 7 October 2020; S. D’Cunha, et al, ‘Defining armed conflict: some clarity in the fog of war’, International Committee of the Red Cross: Humanitarian Law and Policy, 2 May 2024. ↩︎
14
‘Twentieth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by Islamic State (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat’, UN Doc S/2025/72, 31 January 2025, para 6. ↩︎
15
O. Qereman, ‘Syrian Kurdish forces oppose handing jihadist jails to Islamist rulers’, Reuters, 21 January 2025; ‘Operation Inherent Resolve and other US Government Activities related to Iraq & Syria (1 October – 31 December 2024)’, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, February 2025, 11. ↩︎
16
‘Operation Inherent Resolve and other US Government Activities related to Iraq & Syria (1 October – 31 December 2024)’, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, February 2025, 12. ↩︎
17
C. Lister, ‘The Collapse of ISIS in Syria’, Middle East Institute, 8 June 2026. ↩︎
18
‘Amid efforts by Coalition to decrease its military presence in eastern Euphrates’, The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 5 June 2025. ↩︎
19
S. J. Frantzman, ‘CENTCOM’s ISIS leader strike indicates laser focus trying to remove ISIS from Syria – analysis’, The Jerusalem Post, 21 August 2025; J. Schogol, ‘US forces kill ISIS ‘key financier’ in Syria raid’, Task & Purpose, 21 August 2025. ↩︎
20
N. Slayton, ‘US forces kill ISIS commander in charge of international attacks’, Task & Purpose, 19 September 2025. ↩︎
21
J. Genn, ‘Syrian Democratic Forces arrest five ISIS cell members in Raqqa raid’, The Jerusalem Post, 3 November 2025. ↩︎
22
J. Lukiv, ‘US carries out ‘massive’ strike against IS in Syria’, BBC, 20 December 2025. ↩︎
23
D. Jordan, ‘Three Americans killed by IS gunman in Syria, US military says’, BBC, 15 December 2025; P. H. Blackburn et al, ‘US identifies two soldiers killed in ambush in Syria’, CNN, 15 December 2025. ↩︎
24
Z. Rasheed, ‘US launches new attacks against ISIL in Syria over deadly ambush’, Al Jazeera, 10 January 2026; ‘US carries out ‘large scale’ retaliation strikes against Islamic State group in Syria’, France 24, 10 January 2026. ↩︎
25
‘US army launches retaliatory strikes on dozens of ISIL targets in Syria’, Al Jazeera, 14 February 2026. ↩︎
26
‘US military says it killed senior ISIS leader in airstrike on Syria last week’, The Times of Israel, 24 June 2026; ‘US forces killed ISIS leader in Syria airstrike, Central Command says’, NBC News, 24 June 2026. ↩︎
27
J. Genn, ‘Syrian Democratic Forces arrest five ISIS cell members in Raqqa raid’, The Jerusalem Post, 3 November 2025. ↩︎
28
‘Raqqa clashes spark mutual accusations between Syrian army and SDF’, Enab Baladi, 21 November 2025; ‘SDF says Damascus-linked groups attacked positions in Deir ez-Zor’, RUDAW, 22 November 2025. ↩︎
29
Lister, ‘The Collapse of ISIS in Syria’, Middle East Institute, 8 June 2026. ↩︎
30
‘ISIS declares ‘new phase’ as attacks challenge Sharaa’s authority’, The Arab Weekly, 22 February 2026. ↩︎
31
‘Middle East & North Africa: Syria’, International Crisis Group, March 2026. ↩︎
32
‘Sleeper Cell Report March 2026 – ISIS activity continues after February’s vow to attack new Syrian government’, Rojava Information Center, 26 April 2026. ↩︎
33
‘ISIS Claims Responsibility for Attack on Syrian Army Bus in Hassekah’, The Syrian Observer, 13 May 2026; ‘ISIS Claims Deadly Attack on Syrian Government Forces’, Asharq Al Awsat, 12 May 2026. ↩︎
34
‘Not Resurgence, but Recalibration: ISIS in Syria’, Soufan Center, 23 June 2026; M. Al Abdullah, ‘Is the new Syrian state ISIL’s main target?’, International Crisis Group, 24 June 2026. ↩︎
35
S. al-Kanj, ‘ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria’, Asharq al-Awsat, 22 April 2026. ↩︎
36
‘Not Resurgence, but Recalibration: ISIS in Syria’, Soufan Center, 23 June 2026. ↩︎
37
‘International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts: Recommitting to Protection in Armed Conflict on the 70^th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions’, International Committee of the Red Cross, October 2019, 40–41. ↩︎
38
M.-M. Ould Mohamedou, ‘Islamic State (IS)’, Geneva Graduate Institute, 2022, 1. ↩︎
39
M.-M. Ould Mohamedou, ‘Islamic State (IS)’, Geneva Graduate Institute, 2022, 2; J. Jefferis, ‘ISIS Administrative and Territorial Organization’, European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2021. ↩︎
40
M. Qasem, ‘ISIS’s dream of establishing ‘caliphate’ recedes further into the distance’, Salaam Times, 30 January 2025. ↩︎
41
M.-M. Ould Mohamedou, ‘Islamic State (IS)’, Geneva Graduate Institute, 2022, 2; R. Callimachi, ‘ISIS Caliphate Crumbles as Last Village in Syria Falls’, The New York Times, 23 March 2019. ↩︎
42
J. Jefferis, ‘ISIS Administrative and Territorial Organization’, European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2021. ↩︎
43
M.-M. Ould Mohamedou, ‘Islamic State (IS)’, Geneva Graduate Institute, 2022, 2. ↩︎
44
‘Not Resurgence, but Recalibration: ISIS in Syria’, Soufan Center, 23 June 2026. ↩︎
45
J. Jefferis, ‘ISIS Administrative and Territorial Organization’, European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2021. ↩︎
46
J. Jefferis, ‘ISIS Administrative and Territorial Organization’, European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2021. ↩︎
47
R. Callimachi, ‘ISIS Caliphate Crumbles as Last Village in Syria Falls’, The New York Times, 23 March 2019. ↩︎
48
‘Standardisation and Quality Control in Islamic State’s Military Production: Weapon Manufacturing in the East Mosul Sector’, Conflict Armament Research, December 2016; E. Schmitt, ‘Papers Offer a Peek at ISIS’ Drones, Lethal and Largely Off-the-Shelf’, The New York Times, 31 January 2017. ↩︎
49
M.-M. Ould Mohamedou, ‘Islamic State (IS)’, Geneva Graduate Institute, 2022, 3; B. Aragó, ‘Media Jihad’, European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2017. ↩︎
50
Emran, ‘ISIS’s media decline mirrors its battlefield and leadership losses’, Salaam Times, 23 May 2025. ↩︎
51
M.-M. Ould Mohamedou, ‘Islamic State (IS)’, Geneva Graduate Institute, 2022, 3. ↩︎
52
M.-M. Ould Mohamedou, ‘Islamic State (IS)’, Geneva Graduate Institute, 2022, 3; R. Callimachi, ‘ISIS Caliphate Crumbles as Last Village in Syria Falls’, The New York Times, 23 March 2019. ↩︎
53
C. P. Clarke and C. J. O’Leary, ‘The Islamic State Five Years After the Collapse of the Caliphate’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 29 March 2024. ↩︎
54
R. Callimachi, ‘ISIS Caliphate Crumbles as Last Village in Syria Falls’, The New York Times, 23 March 2019. ↩︎
55
R. Callimachi, ‘ISIS Caliphate Crumbles as Last Village in Syria Falls’, The New York Times, 23 March 2019. ↩︎
56
R. Callimachi, ‘Described as Defeated, Islamic State Punches Back With Guerrilla Tactics’, The New York Times, 21 January 2021. ↩︎
57
C. P. Clarke and C. J. O’Leary, ‘The Islamic State Five Years After the Collapse of the Caliphate’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 29 March 2024; C. Lister, ‘The Collapse of ISIS in Syria’, Middle East Institute, 8 June 2026. ↩︎
58
S. al-Kanj, ‘ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria’, Asharq al-Awsat, 22 April 2026. ↩︎
59
P. Barker et al, ‘ISIS Leader al-Baghdadi Is Dead, Trump Says’, The New York Times, 27 October 2019. ↩︎
60
M.-M. Ould Mohamedou, ‘Islamic State (IS)’, Geneva Graduate Institute, 2022, 1 and 3. ↩︎
61
‘Operation Inherent Resolve and other US Government Activities related to Iraq & Syria (1 October – 31 December 2024)’, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, February 2025, 11. ↩︎
62
C. Lister, ‘The Collapse of ISIS in Syria’, Middle East Institute, 8 June 2026. ↩︎
63
C. Lister, ‘The Collapse of ISIS in Syria’, Middle East Institute, 8 June 2026. ↩︎
64
C. Lister, ‘The Collapse of ISIS in Syria’, Middle East Institute, 8 June 2026. ↩︎
65
S. al-Kanj, ‘ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria’, Asharq al-Awsat, 22 April 2026. ↩︎
66
‘US officials share details of raid that killed ISIL leader’, Al Jazeera, 3 February 2022. ↩︎
67
‘Islamic state confirms death of its leader, names new chief’, Reuters, 10 March 2022. ↩︎
68
‘ISIL announces death of its leader’, Al Jazeera, 30 November 2022. ↩︎
69
‘ISIL confirms death of leader Abu Hussein al-Qurashi, names successor’, Al Jazeera, 3 August 2023. ↩︎
70
‘Syria says key ISIL leader Taha al-Zoubi captured near Damascus’, Al Jazeera, 24 December 2025; G. Al Sayed and B. Finley, ‘Senior Islamic State leader killed by US airstrike in northwest Syria’, ABC News, 24 June 2026. ↩︎
71
‘Operation Inherent Resolve and other US Government Activities related to Iraq & Syria (1 October – 31 December 2024)’, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, February 2025, 11. ↩︎
72
‘ISIL confirms death of leader Abu Hussein al-Qurashi, names successor’, Al Jazeera, 3 August 2023. ↩︎
73
. al-Kanj, ‘ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria’, Asharq al-Awsat, 22 April 2026. ↩︎
74
R. Callimachi, ‘Described as Defeated, Islamic State Punches Back With Guerrilla Tactics’, The New York Times, 21 January 2021. ↩︎
75
‘Not Resurgence, but Recalibration: ISIS in Syria’, Soufan Center, 23 June 2026. ↩︎
76
S. al-Kanj, ‘ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria’, Asharq al-Awsat, 22 April 2026. ↩︎
77
‘Operation Inherent Resolve and other US Government Activities related to Iraq & Syria (1 October – 31 December 2024)’, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, February 2025, 12. ↩︎
78
S. al-Kanj, ‘ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria’, Asharq al-Awsat, 22 April 2026. ↩︎
79
‘Counter-Terrorism: Briefing on the Secretary-General’s Strategic-Level Report on ISIL/Da’esh’, Security Council Report, 3 February 2026. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict involving Türkiye and the Syrian National Army (SNA) against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Ended May 2025

Background

In 2017, Türkiye united the thirty factions from the Free Syrian Army (FSA), an organized armed group it had been supporting in Syria since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, to lead Türkiye’s counterterrorism efforts against Islamic State in Syria and to combat to combat Kurdish armed forces in Syria.¹

Since October 2019, there were regular confrontations between the SDF and the Turkish-backed SNA with some clashes erupting during the reporting period.

However, on 29 January 2025, the new Syrian government announced that armed groups within Syria, including the SNA, would be dissolved and absorbed into the new Syrian State.² By June 2026, SNA factions had been folded into the new Syrian State.³

Intensity

This section assesses whether the violence generated in this pre-existing NIAC between the Türkiye with the SNA as a proxy and the SDF continued to equate to protracted armed violence.

The SNA and the SDF clashed in late 2024 and early 2025. In November 2024, the groups clashed in Azaz-al-Bab-Jarablus, Afrin, and Tel Abayad. Nineteen fighters (drawn from both sides) were killed while five were injured and four civilians were killed with twenty-six injured.⁴

In late November 2024, the SNA launched an offensive to capture towns in SDF-held territory, displacing tens of thousands of Kurdish people.⁵ This led to clashes with the SDF and resulted in the SDF losing territory.⁶ Fighting also occurred in December, with the SNA wresting control of Manbij from the SDF.⁷ The SNA carried out strikes on the Tishreen Dam within SDF territory and engaged in ‘fierce clashes’ with the SDF near the dam as well.⁸ Fighting continued into January,⁹ and February 2025,¹⁰ bringing the death toll to 600 people (civilians and combatants) by mid-February.¹¹

Although there were clashes in March and April of 2025, their frequency dropped significantly,¹² and no new clashes have been reported since then. The cessation of hostilities can be attributed to the SNA and the SDF being absorbed into the new Syria State (see above), a factor which also indicates that there is no real risk of resumption of hostilities.

The armed violence between the SNA and the SDF was protracted enough up until April 2025 to meet the intensity requirement for a NIAC. However, after this period no new clashes were reported in the public domain up until the date of reporting, 30 June 2026. It is clear that the notion of intensity is no longer met.

Organization

SDF

The SDF is sufficiently organized to constitute a party to this NIAC (see above).

SNA

The SNA emerged from the FSA which was originally formed in July 2011 by defectors from the Syrian armed forces. The FSA evolved into a coalition of affiliated rebel factions actively participating in hostilities against both the Syrian government and IS. Following its gradual weakening in 2016, Türkiye began to reassemble a coalition of armed groups, many of whom were former FSA fighters, under the banner of the SNA to create a more cohesive opposing force. Despite its decentralized nature, the different factions of the SNA all formally operate under the supervision of the Syrian Interim Government (SIG), an alternative government formed by a coalition of Syrian opposition organisations. This overarching hierarchical structure leaves significant decision-making autonomy to the leaders of the different factions.¹³ In response to internal rivalries, Türkiye reportedly implemented a restructuring plan for the SNA, including a centralized command structure.

Further attesting to its organizational capacity is the SNA’s efforts to regulate the conduct of its members. Notably, in 2018, it adopted a Code of Conduct, signifying the presence of internal norms and disciplinary mechanisms.¹⁴ Additionally, the signing of joint declarations, which commit to protecting civilian infrastructure and ensuring humanitarian access, reflects the SNA’s capacity to bind its members and express collective policy positions in alignment with IHL.¹⁵

The SNA reportedly controls two areas in Syria along the Turkish border¹⁶ and continues to conduct military operations to establish its control further. On 30 November 2024, the SNA, backed by Türkiye, launched an operation to regain control over territories under the control of the SDF. While the operation involved intense and violent clashes between the SNA and SDF, leading to significant death and destruction on both sides as well as civilians, it managed to push the SDF to withdraw from certain parts of northern Syria.¹⁷ This attests to the SNA’s continued military presence and the capacity to conduct sustained operations across various fronts. Moreover, with an estimated strength of approximately 70,000 fighters across over forty factions, the SNA demonstrates a degree of permanence and coordination testifying also to its organized nature.¹⁸

Based on the foregoing, it can be concluded that despite its decentralized nature and internal divisions, the SNA retains sufficient unity and coordination to be considered an organized armed group under IHL.

SNA as a Turkish Proxy

For an organized armed group to be considered the proxy of a State, that State must exercise ‘overall control’ over the group.¹⁹ Overall control is more than merely equipping and financing an organized armed group; it requires a State to assist in the coordination and general planning of the organized armed group’s military activities.²⁰

Evidence demonstrates that Türkiye provides ongoing and essential military support to the SNA, including weapons, intelligence, logistics, training, and air support. Türkiye also reportedly pays the salaries of fighters and creates new organizational structures for the SNA.²¹While the SNA formally answers to the SIG, ‘all major decisions’ of the SNA are ‘made by Turkish intelligence’ which ‘coordinate the distribution of ongoing military responsibilities, make all decisions, and inform the Syrian commanders, who then carry out the orders’.²²

From the foregoing it is clear that Türkiye both ‘has a role in organising, coordinating or planning the military actions’ of the SNA as well as a role in ‘financing, training and equipping or providing operational support to that group’, making the SNA a Turkish proxy.

SNA and SDF absorbed into the Syrian State

The SNA and the SDF were both absorbed into the new Syrian State in 2025 and 2026 respectively (see above). As a result, neither party to this NIAC exists any longer. This means that the NIAC has come to an end and can be declassified.‘Final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)’, UN Doc S/2025/385, 15 June 2025, para 120. Fighting ended by April 2025 and as the SNA and SDF have both ceased to exist, there is no real risk of resumption. This means that the NIAC has come to an end and is declassified.

1
L. Kemal, ‘From rebel factions to an army: Efforts to tame the Syrian National Army’, Atlantic Council, 18 June 2024. ↩︎
2
A. Sharawi, ‘Ahmad al Sharaa’s Victory Conference: Syria’s new era and an exclusive translation of Sharaa’s speech’, FDD’s Long War Journal, 30 January 2025. ↩︎
3
‘Syria’s Defense Ministry Appoints Former Opposition Commanders in Advisory and Air Force Posts’, Enab Baladi, 10 October 2025; K. Khaddour, ‘An Army of “Sons of the Regions”: Syria’s Post-Assad Military Order’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1 June 2026. ↩︎
4
‘Tensions rise between Turkish-backed factions, Kurdish forces in northern Syria’, Bianet, 25 November 2024. ↩︎
5
P. Iddon, ‘After Aleppo, what will happen to the Kurds of northwest Syria?’, The New Arab, 4 December 2024. ↩︎
6
P. Iddon, ‘Why fighting is raging in north Syria between the Turkish-backed SNA and Kurdish-led SDF’, The New Arab, 21 January 2025. ↩︎
7
‘Explainer: Turkish and SNA offensive on Manbij’, Rojava Information Center, 7 December 2024. ↩︎
8
‘Clashes erupt near Syria’s Tishrin Dam as Turkish-backed SNA and Kurdish-led SDF battle for control’, The New Arab, 26 December 2024. ↩︎
9
P. Iddon, ‘Why fighting is raging in north Syria between the Turkish-backed SNA and Kurdish-led SDF’, The New Arab, 21 January 2025; ‘280 dead as Turkey-backed SNA battle Kurdish-led SDF for control of Syria’s strategic Tishrin dam’, The New Arab, 7 January 2025. ↩︎
10
‘Syria Update #19: 22 February 2025’, Etana Syria, 20 February 2025. ↩︎
11
‘Middle East & North Africa: February 2025’, International Crisis Group, February 2025. ↩︎
12
L. Nevola et al, ‘Middle East Overview: May 2025’, ACLED, 8 May 2025. ↩︎
13
Ö. Özkizilcik, ‘The Syrian National Army (SNA): Structure, Functions, and Three Scenarios for its Relationship with Damascus’, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Discussion Paper, October 2020. ↩︎
14
L. Kemal, ‘From rebel factions to an army: Efforts to tame the Syrian National Army’, Atlantic Council, 18 June 2024. ↩︎
15
‘Syria’, Geneva Call, 10 June 2025. ↩︎
16
‘Syria Update #24: 8 May 2025’, Etana, 7 May 2025. ↩︎
17
H. J. Barkey, ‘What Role Is Turkey Playing in Syria’s Civil War?’, Council on Foreign Relations, 6 December 2024. ↩︎
18
‘The Military Balance’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, vol. 123, 2023, 356. ↩︎
19
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 12. ↩︎
20
ICTY, ‘Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić’, Judgement, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, para 131; ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 12. ↩︎
21
E. Yüksel, ‘Strategies of Turkish proxy warfare in northern Syria: Chapter 4: Key characteristics of Turkish use of Syrian Proxies’, Clingendael, November 2019; E. Tsurkov, ‘The Gangs of Northern Syria: Life Under Turkey’s Proxies’, New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, December 2022, 5–6. ↩︎
22
E. Tsurkov, ‘The Gangs of Northern Syria: Life Under Turkey’s Proxies’, New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, December 2022, 5. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between the United States and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) Ended March 2024

Background

The situation in Gaza marked an increase in violent confrontations between US forces and Iran-linked militia groups, operating under the banner of IRI.¹ The IRI is a generic name that is used to indicate unity among Iranian-backed militias. It emerged in 2023 as a result of Israeli operations in Gaza and has carried out attacks on US targets in Iraq and Syria.²

Intensity

The IRI has conducted regular attacks against US military positions in Syria since October 2023, including the Ain Asad Airbase, the Hemo base in north-eastern Syria, the US base stationed in the Koniko gas field,³ and the Kharab al-Jir base in north-eastern Syria.⁴

The most destructive attack claimed by the IRI occurred on US forces stationed in north-eastern Jordan near the Syrian border on 28 January 2024, killing three US soldiers and injuring forty-seven others.⁵ Between October 2023 and late January 2024, the IRI reportedly launched more than 150 coordinated rocket and drone attacks targeting US military personnel and infrastructure across Iraq and Syria.⁶

US armed forces responded to these attacks with a series of airstrikes against the militia’s strategic locations, including weapon and ammunition facilities, safe houses and training areas. On 27 October 2023, US forces conducted sixteen airstrikes: twelve in Iraq and four in Syria.⁷ A further series of airstrikes, employing long-range bombers and precision munitions, was conducted in early February 2024, against command-and-control operations centres, intelligence centres, rockets, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicle storage, and logistics and munition supply chain facilities. At least eighty-five targets were reportedly hit during these operations.⁸

The frequency of reported violent confrontations between the US forces and the IRI progressively declined after February 2024.⁹ In August and November 2024, sporadic violent confrontations continued to be reported during which US and coalition personnel sustained injuries.¹⁰

Since the change of government in Syria and thus the withdrawal of Iranian presence in Syria, no incidents have been reported between the US forces and the IRI in Syria. The NIAC has therefore been declassified.

Organization

The IRI has a decentralized and fragmented structure, with a wide range of loosely aligned armed groups, such as Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HHN), Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS). Each of these constituent factions demonstrates a sufficient degree of organization to individually meet the IHL threshold of organization.¹¹ They have clearly established hierarchical and compartmentalized military leadership and administrative structures with which they have been capable of carrying out complex military operations. They have all received significant financial and material support, including drones, sniper rifles, rockets, and systems for launching anti-missiles, as well as training in using these materials.

Despite maintaining some operational autonomy and distinct chains of command, there is sufficient coordination to consider them as a single party to a NIAC.¹² Notably, on 18 October 2023, the IRI executed simultaneous strikes on the Ain Asad Airbase in Syria and the Harir US Base in Iraq.¹³ Additionally, under the IRI’s branding, these factions have established a shared information network to present themselves as a unified front and promote a common narrative.¹⁴

Although supported materially and financially by Iran, there is insufficient and conclusive factual evidence to conclude that these factions have operated under its direct control and command. Evidence suggests that Iran significantly contributes to the group’s equipment, financing, and training, and shares strategic and ideological aims with these groups, but evidence is lacking to show that it is involved in the general planning of their military activities.¹⁵

In conclusion, the factual patterns between October 2023 and February 2024 met the intensity threshold, and the parties to the conflict were sufficiently organized for the situation to be classified as a NIAC. But given the sustained absence of hostilities, the NIAC no longer exists.

1
S. Eissa et al,‘Regional Overview Middle East: July 2024’, ACLED, 9 August 2024. ↩︎
2
H. Malik and M. Knights, ‘Profile: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 21 October 2023; J. Salhani, ‘Who are the Islamic Resistance in Iraq?’, Al Jazeera, 10 February 2024. ↩︎
3
‘US Military Base in Syria’s Koniko Gas Field reportedly Hit by Missile Attack’, Global Defense News, 9 October 2024. ↩︎
4
‘Rockets fired from northern Iraq target US-led coalition base in Syria’, France 24, 22 April 2024. ↩︎
5
C. T. Lopez, ‘3 US Service Members Killed, Others Injured in Jordan Following Drone Attack’, US Department of War, 29 January 2024. ↩︎
6
C. Schaer, ‘US troops in the Middle East: Soldiers in the line of fire’, Deutsche Welle, 30 January 2024. ↩︎
7
J. Gregory and F. Gardner, ‘US strikes Syria bases used by Iran-linked groups’, BBC News, 27 October 2023. ↩︎
8
‘CENTCOM Statement on US Strikes in Iraq and Syria’, US Central Command, 2 February 2024. ↩︎
9
S. Eissa, ‘Regional Overview Middle East: July 2024’, ACLED, 9 August 2024. ↩︎
10
‘US Central Command Forces Strike Iranian Aligned Targets in Syria in Response to Attacks on US Personnel on 12 November’, US Central Command, 12 November 2024. ↩︎
11
See ‘Armed conflicts in Iraq ↩︎
12
‘The Roots of Restraint in War’, The International Committee of the Red Cross, 2018, 45-47. ↩︎
13
N.Şaban, ‘Analyzing Iranian-Orchestrated Attacks on US Bases in Syria and Iraq Post Gaza War, OMRAN Strategic Studies, 7 March 2024. ↩︎
14
See the IRI Telegram channel established on 18 October 2023. ↩︎
15
I. Rudolf, ‘All the Mahdi’s Men: Contextualising Nuances Within Iraq’s Islamic Resistance’, Routledge, 18 May 2024. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between Syria and pro-former government fighters (PFGF)

Background

Since the change of government in December 2024, clashes have persisted between the newly formed interim government and remnants of the former government’s security forces, largely stemming from the interim government’s efforts to disarm various factions of the PFGF, which resisted disarmament and challenged the authority of the new government.¹

Intensity

On 6 March 2025, PFGF fighters attacked forces from the new Syrian government in Beit Ana, killing government fighters and injuring fifteen others. Another attack by PFGF fighters killed eighteen more government fighters. In response, the Syrian government launched an operation to find those responsible, cordoning off Beit Ana and Al Dailya villages and bringing in and using helicopter gunships and artillery. Government reinforcements from Jablah also reportedly came under attack and several villages along the M1 highway were sieged and surrounded by PFGF fighters. Further reinforcements were sent to Jablah and the PFGF launched several attacks on military sites throughout the city. Violence also spread to the Homs-Tartus highway. The clashes continued and the PFGF reportedly captured nine government fighters; they were later found dead in a remote area.² Syrian forces announced that they had thwarted the PFGF by the evening of 6 March.³

This violence also led to massacres of Alawite civilians between 7 and 9 March.⁴

Organization

While recorded incidents involved significant levels of violence, available evidence suggests that the groups engaged were initially not hierarchically organized, and it is unclear whether they acted pursuant to any formal orders.

A notable shift in the organizational dynamics of the PFGF became apparent during the events of March 2025. At that time, coordination among different factions of the PFGF began to emerge. Although the structure and personnel of the former government are no longer followed, similar patterns of combined military and intelligence operations were observed.⁵ Estimates suggest the group has between 2,000 and 4,000 fighters.⁶ Operations in March 2025 demonstrated a discernible level of coordination. Furthermore, the Council for the Liberation of Syria’s claim of responsibility for these attacks reflects the group’s ability to act and communicate with a unified voice.

On this basis, it is concluded that, notwithstanding the PFGF’s previously decentralized nature, the group has retained sufficient unity and coordination since March 2025 to be classified as an organized armed group under IHL. Consequently, the situation between the PFGF and the interim Syrian government since that time constituted a NIAC within the meaning of IHL.

1
‘Violations against Civilians in Coastal and Western Central Syria in January–March 2025: Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, UN Doc A/HRC/59/CRP.4, 11 August 2025, paras 14–16. ↩︎
2
‘Violations against Civilians in Coastal and Western Central Syria in January–March 2025: Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, UN Doc A/HRC/59/CRP.4, 11 August 2025, paras 49–58. ↩︎
3
‘Syrian forces in deadly clashes with Assad-linked fighters in Latakia’, Al Jazeera, 6 March 2025. ↩︎
4
‘Violations against Civilians in Coastal and Western Central Syria in January – March 2025: Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, UN Doc A/HRC/59/CRP.4, 11 August 2025, paras 69–81. ↩︎
5
‘Violations against Civilians in Coastal and Western Central Syria in January–March 2025: Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, UN Doc A/HRC/59/CRP.4, 11 August 2025, paras 26–27. ↩︎
6
‘Violations against Civilians in Coastal and Western Central Syria in January–March 2025: Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, UN Doc A/HRC/59/CRP.4, 11 August 2025, para 27 and p 55. ↩︎

Non-international armed conflict between Israel and Hezbollah (spillover) Ended January 2025

Since 2013, Hezbollah has formally deployed fighters to support the Assad government on Syrian territory, and it has frequently engaged in confrontations with the Israeli armed forces since then. In July 2019, Hezbollah declared it had started relocating troops nearer to the Lebanese border, while still keeping a limited presence in Syria,¹resulting in a reduction in violent incidents between the two parties on Syrian territory.

The situation, however, took a notable turn on 8 October 2023, following the events unfolding in Gaza. Hezbollah conducted regular attacks, targeting the locations of the IDF military along the border with Lebanon, including within Israeli-occupied territory in Syria.² Such cross-border incidents involving Hezbollah and the IDF persisted throughout the reporting period;³ providing sufficient evidence to classify the situation as a spillover of the NIAC between the two parties in Lebanon.⁴

As of January 2025, the situation no longer constitutes an armed conflict.

1
Milddle East Monitor, Hezbollah withdraws troops from Syria to the Lebanon border, 16 July 2019 ↩︎
2
Al Jazeera, Hezbollah ‘treads carefully’ as it shells Israeli position, 9 October 2023. ↩︎
3
ACLED, Mapping the 25 August Israel and Hezbollah attacks, 30 August 2024; A. Mehvar, Q&A: Behind the data on the Israel-Hezbollah war, ACLED, 1 November 2024 ↩︎
4
See ‘Armed conflicts in Israel’ and ‘Armed conflicts in Lebanon’. ↩︎

Syria and Tribal Fighters v. Druze Suwayda-based armed groups

Background

Bedouin and Druze peoples in Suwayda, in southern Syria, reportedly have a ‘longstanding feud’ in the area that often escalates into violence.¹¹⁴ Another episode of this violence broke out in July 2025.

On 11 July 2025, a Druze merchant was attacked and robbed by Bedouin fighters on the Damascus-Suwayda highway in southern Syria.¹¹⁵ Druze fighters retaliated by kidnapping members of the Bedouin tribe, who retaliated by setting up roadblocks and launching attacks in Suwayda. ¹¹⁶

The fighting escalated and government forces (the Syrian Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces (ISF)) were deployed to ‘restore order’ but became involved in clashes. They were joined by tribal fighters (both Bedouin and non-Bedouin) from outside Suwayda that had been mobilized due to the violence.¹¹⁷

Intensity

This section assesses whether the violence generated by the fighting between Syria and tribal fighters and Druze Suwayda-based armed groups equates to protracted armed violence. The first armed clashes reported during this violence took place between tribal fighters (both Bedouin and non-Bedouin) and Druze Suwayda-based armed groups on 13 July 2025.¹¹⁸ Druze Suwayda-based armed groups reportedly surrounded Maqwas neighbourhood – a largely Bedouin neighbourhood¹¹⁹ – and exchanged heavy gunfire and mortar shelling with tribal fighters.¹²⁰ By the evening of 13 July, fighting in Maqwas seemed to have died down.¹²¹

On 14 July, the Syrian government announced it was deploying forces to restore order in Suwayda.¹²² It deployed fighters, tanks,¹²³ rocket launchers, and unmanned drones.¹²⁴ On their way to Suwayda, these forces were joined by tribal fighters from outside of Suwayda. Druze Suwayda-based armed groups confronted these two groups¹²⁵ and several ISF personnel were killed, sixteen soldiers were killed, and five unspecified others were captured. On 15 July, government forces and tribal fighters reached Suwayda.¹²⁶

On 16 July, a ceasefire between all fighting parties was announced, although compliance varied among the different Druze armed groups. The Syrian government announced that ‘local leaders’ would take control of security in the city.¹²⁷ This suggests the Syrian government’s own assessment that the situation did not amount to a NIAC.

Some Druze factions attacked Bedouin civilians on 16 July. Government forces and tribal fighters withdrew from Suwayda on 16 July. More ‘limited but intense clashes’ between Druze armed groups and tribal fighters that had mobilized and entered Suwayda from across southern Syria took place in Suwayda on 17 and 18 July. These clashes reportedly involved drones, mortars, and heavy machine guns. Some government forces were also reportedly involved in these clashes but they had removed their uniforms.¹²⁸

On 19 July, a final ceasefire was announced. By 20 July, most tribal fighters had withdrawn from Suwayda, and the government had deployed ISF personnel to northern and western Suwayda.‘¹²⁹

A conservative estimate of the number of people killed is 1,707 and almost 200,000 people displaced. Of those killed, 1,342 were Druze, 140 Bedouin, and 225 Syrian government forces (although most of the government forces were killed by Israeli strikes (see above)).¹³⁰

Despite a high death toll and initial displacement number, the clashes were short-lived (displaced persons could return within days) and the Syrian government itself only deployed armed forces to establish law and order after which it withdrew. The notion of intensity was not met as demanded by IHL.

Organization

Although multiple non-State actors and splinter factions are operated in Suwayda during the violence, these groups were established for the same purpose – to protect the Druze community in Suwayda.¹³¹ The Druze armed groups seemed to have had a single leader during the violence – Sheikh Abu Salman Hikmat al Hijri.¹³²

During the July violence, Druze armed groups coordinated operations and attacks across multiple localities against Syrian government forces and tribal fighters. These groups also created a joint operations room in order to coordinate their actions. According to the UN, the groups that participated were Rijal al-Karama (Men of Dignity), the Suwayda Military Council, Liwa al-Jabal, and other unnamed local militias affiliated with Sheikh al-Hijri’s network. Local police that were recruited from the Druze community and individual Druze civilians also took up arms.¹³³ For a coalition to exist these groups must individually qualify as organized armed groups not merely self-defence groups that co-operated for a brief period of time.

Rijal al-Karama (Men of Dignity)

Labelled ‘the most organized’ faction among Druze factions,¹³⁴ Rijal al-Karama (the Men of Dignity) was established in Suwayda 2014 by Sheikh Wahid al-Balous.¹³⁵ It is considered the largest Druze organization in Suwayda with between 5,000 and 8,000 members.¹³⁶

The leader of the group has changed several times since its incorporation. Al-Balous was the leader until he was killed in September 2015 by a car bomb.¹³⁷ Thereafter, Wahid’s brother, Raafat al-Balous, assumed leadership until he had to step down in February 2017 due to health issues.¹³⁸He organized the group around new core principles prompting some members to leave.¹³⁹Leadership changed again in August 2025, when Mazid Khaddaj (also known as Abu Diab Khadaj) was announced as the new leader.¹⁴⁰

The group has a spokesperson, Bassam Abu Fakhr (also known as Abu Taymour).¹⁴¹

According to one report, fifty members from this group were killed in the July violence.¹⁴²

This group is, however, a self-defence group and there is insufficient evidence to qualify it as sufficiently organized under IHL. It can thus not become a party to a NIAC. In sum, neither the requisite level of intensity nor the organization required for a coalition of Druze militias was meet. As such, this event did not constitute a NIAC.

State Parties

United States
Israel
Syria
Türkiye
States contributing to the Combined Joint Task Force of Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), including the United Kingdom, Spain, Canada, Australia (at least until December 2024), Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy.

Non-state parties

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) [until February 2026]
Islamic State (IS)
Syrian National Army (SNA) [until May 2025]
Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) [until February 2024]
Pro-former government fighters (PFGF)

1
UNGA, ‘Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, UN Doc A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Conflict in Syria’, Council on Foreign Relations, 14 May 2025. ↩︎
2
.‘Our Mission’, The Global Coalition. ↩︎
3
‘United States of America’ Operation Inherent Resolve, 2 March 2016. ↩︎
4
Ministry of Defence, ‘Update: air strikes against Daesh’, Gov.UK, 27 April 2024, Updated 13 January 2026. Spain,‘Operation Support to Iraq’, Gobierno de Espana: Ministerio de Defensa. France,‘Dossier de Press Chammal’, Ministère des Armées, December 2023. ↩︎
5
‘Canada’, 10 March 2016. ↩︎
6
‘Australia’, Operation Inherent Resolve, 2 March 2016. ↩︎
7
‘Bundeswehr setzt Einsatz im Irak fort’, Die Bundesregierung, 13 September 2023 ↩︎
8
‘Nederland levert helikopters en troepencommandant voor NAVO-missie Irak’, Ministerue van Defensie, 9 September 2023. ↩︎
9
‘Tenth anniversary of Belgium’s involvement in the fight against ISIS’, The Brussels Times, 24 September 2024. ↩︎
10
F. S. Schiavi, ‘In Iraq, Italy and France Are Looking for a Primary Role to Play’, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 12 October 2021. ↩︎
11
‘Identical Letters Dated 17 September 2015 From the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary General and the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc S/2015/719, 21 September 2015. ↩︎
12
M. Khurma and G. Cafiero, ‘Syria joining the anti-ISIS coalition is a westward pivot—with opportunities and risks’, Atlantic Council, 21 November 2025; ‘Syria signs up to US-led coalition against ISIL’, Al Jazeera, 11 November 2025. ↩︎
13
‘Islamic State defeated in final Syria victory: SDF, Al Jazeera,23 March 2019. ↩︎
14
‘Syria’s Assad wrote to Putin over military support: statement’, Reuters,30 September 2015. ↩︎
15
‘PKK’, Republic of Türkiye. ↩︎
16
‘Turkey’s military operations in Syria and its impact on relations with the EU’, European Parliament, November 2019. ↩︎
17
H. Haid, ‘Post-ISIS Governance in Jarablus: A Turkish-led Strategy’, Research Paper, Chatham House, 26 September 2017; A. Stein et al, ‘How Turkey Is Governing in Northern Aleppo’, Syria Deeply, 20 July 2017. ↩︎
18
‘Turkey’s Syria offensive explained in four maps’, BBC, 14 October 2019. ↩︎
19
A. Aydıntaşbaş, ‘Turkey’s search for a Middle East order’, Brookings Institute, 16 June 2026; E. Tsurkov, ‘Uneasy Allies: The Real Relationship Between Turkey and Syria’s New Rulers’, New Lines Magazine, 10 June 2026. ↩︎
20
‘Turkish Parliament approves Erdogan’s longest military mandate to operate in Syria’, Nordic Monitor, 24 October 2025. ↩︎
21
See UNSC, Resolution 497 (1981), 17 December 1981; UNGA, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 2015 (A/Res/70/91), 15 December 2015; ICRC, What does the law say about the responsibilities of the Occupying Power in the occupied Palestinian territory?, 26 July 2024. ↩︎
22
UNGA, Verbatim Record of the 5th Meeting, 2 February 1982 ↩︎
23
‘Separation of Forces Agreement between Israel and Syria’, United Nations Peacemaker, 31 May 1974 ↩︎
24
UNGA Resolution 350 (1974), 31 May 1974. ↩︎
25
UNDOF, Mandate, December 2024‘Security Council extends critical stabilisation force in Syria’, United Nations News, 25 June 2026. ↩︎
26
G. Golan, Israeli Peacemaking since 1967: Factors behind the Breakthroughs and Failures (Routledge 2015), pp 57–93. ↩︎
27
‘Golan Heights: Trump signs order recognising occupied area as Israeli’, BBC News, 25 March 2019. ↩︎
28
UNSC, ‘Resolution 497 (1981)’, 17 December 1981. ↩︎
29
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 2015 (A/Res/70/91), 15 December 2015; The Syrian Golan – draft General Assembly Resolution (A/79/L.19) (adopted), 22 November 2024. ↩︎
30
‘Real-time Updates’, Tel Aviv University, The Institute for National Security Studies, 6 June 2025. ↩︎
31
O. Sanadiki and A. Sewell, ‘Israel strikes military tanks in southern Syria’, PBS, 14 July 2025; ‘Israel says it hit Syrian government targets after attacks on Druze civilians’, Reuters, 20 March 2026. ↩︎
32
‘Syria war: Idlib ceasefire between Russia and Turkey begins’, BBC,6 March 2020. ↩︎
33
S. Firth, ‘Civilians bear the brunt of escalating violence in Syria’s Idlib’, Al Jazeera, 23 August 2021. ↩︎
34
Z. Mehchy et al, ‘Assessing control and power dynamics in Syria’, Chatham House, November 2020. ↩︎
35
Z. Mehchy et al, ‘Assessing control and power dynamics in Syria’, Chatham House, November 2020. ↩︎
36
A. Belkaïd, The fall of the house of Assad, Le Monde diplomatique, January 2025; S. Belhadj Klaz, The Collapse of the Syrian Regime or How the Intelligence Services Disintegrated the Army, 16 December 2024. ↩︎
37
R. Geist Pinfold, ‘Why is Israel Escalating its Strikes Against Syria?’, RUSI, 9 May 2025. ↩︎
38
W. Christou, ‘Syrian government reaches deal with Kurdish-led SDF to integrate north-east region’, The Guardian, 10 March 2025. ↩︎
39
Statement by the President of the UN Security Council, 14 March 2025. ↩︎
40
W. Christou, ‘Deadly Syria clashes continue for second day outside Damascus’, 30 April 2025. ↩︎
41
B. Roger, Emmanuel Grynszpan, Frédéric Bobin, The fall of Bashar al-Assad, a blow for Russia in Africa, Le Monde, 21 December 2024 ↩︎
42
S. Adar et al., The Fall of the Assad Regime: Regional and International Power Shifts, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 25 February 2025. ↩︎
43
M. Brennan, J. LaPorta, O. V. Gazis, J. Jacobs, E. Watson, Israel launches strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites and other targets; Iran launches retaliatory drone strike, CBN news, 13 June 2024; The New Arab, Israel says killed top Iran commander and aide to the supreme leader, 17 June 2025 ↩︎
44
‘Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Commentary of 2025: Article 2 – Application of the Convention’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases, para 234. ↩︎
45
P. Loft and C. Mills, ‘Syria after Assad: Consequences and interim authorities 2025’, House of Commons Library, 13 March 2025. ↩︎
46
C. Lister, ‘Integration or conflict in northeastern Syria? Ten key points to consider’, Middle East Institute, 29 January 2026; ‘Syrian army enters Kurdish city of Hasakah as ceasefire takes hold’, Al Jazeera, 3 February 2026. ↩︎
47
‘Highlights of the Noon Briefing By Stéphane Dujarric Spokesperson for Secretary-General António Guterres’, United Nations Secretary-General, 13 March 2025. ↩︎
48
‘Syria’s al-Sharaa meets Erdogan in Turkiye as sanctions lifted’, Al Jazeera, 24 May 2025. ↩︎
49
‘Syria – Decision to lift european economic sanctions’, Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Etrangère, 20 May 2025. ↩︎
50
‘Ending the Syria Sanctions Program for the Benefit of the Syrian People’, US Department of State, 30 June 2025. ↩︎
51
‘Eight Arab countries vow to support ‘peaceful transition process’ in Syria’, Al Jazeera, 14 December, 2024; ‘Syria: Briefing and Consultations’, Security Council Report, 20 May 2025. ↩︎
52
‘Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea. Geneva, 12 August 1949; Article 3 – Conflicts not of an international character’, International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary of 2017, para 511. ↩︎
53
‘Termination of Syria Sanctions’, US Department of State, 30 June 2025; ‘Syria Sanctions’, US Department of State. ↩︎
54
‘US revokes ‘terrorist’ designation for Syrian president’s former group HTS’, Al Jazeera, 7 July 2025; ‘US to revoke ‘terrorist’ designation for Syria’s HTS’, France 24, 8 July 2025. ↩︎
55
‘US removes Syrian president from global ‘terrorist’ sanctions list’, Al Jazeera, 7 November 2025. ↩︎
56
‘US Government Expands Sanctions Relief for Syria and Suspends the Caesar Act’, Curtis, 12 November 2025. ↩︎
57
‘US Repeals the Caesar Act in Latest Move to Ease Syria Sanctions’, Curtis, 19 December 2025. ↩︎
58
‘US Repeals the Caesar Act in Latest Move to Ease Syria Sanctions’, Curtis, 19 December 2025. ↩︎
59
‘Syria welcomes permanent repeal of sweeping US sanctions imposed during Assad regime’, PBS, 19 December 2025. ↩︎
60
‘US Bill Seeks to Repeal Two Syria Sanctions Laws’, Enab Baladi, 11 June 2026; D. Coote, ‘Senate committee advances bill to repeal Assad-era sanctions on Syria’, United Press International, 18 June 2026. ↩︎
61
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2799 (2025)’, 6 November 2025. ↩︎
62
A. Y. Zelin, ‘The Damascus Church Attack: Who Is Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah?’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 25 June 2025; V. Mishra, ‘UN condemns ‘heinous’ terrorist attack at Damascus church that killed dozens’, United Nations News, 23 June 2025; D. Garofalo, ‘Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah’s Micro-insurgency in Syria’, Jamestown Foundation, 15 January 2026. ↩︎
63
T. M. Heron, ‘Explainer: Syria’s parliamentary election, the first poll since Assad’, BBC Monitoring, 12 September 2025. ↩︎
64
‘Briefing: Syria postpones parliamentary polls until end of September’, BBC Monitoring, 15 September 2025 ↩︎
65
C. Magee, ‘Syria sets October date for first election since al-Assad’s fall’, Al Jazeera, 21 September 2025. ↩︎
66
D. Gritten, ‘Syria holds first elections since Assad, but not in all provinces’, BBC, 5 October 2025; C. Magee, ‘Syria sets October date for first election since al-Assad’s fall’, Al Jazeera, 21 September 2025. ↩︎
67
J. Shelton, ‘Syria delays election in Sweida and Kurdish areas’, Deutsche Welle, 23 August 2025. ↩︎
68
H. Al Abdo and K. Chehayeb, ‘Syria holds legislative elections in Kurdish-majority northeast’, PBS, 24 May 2026. ↩︎
69
J. Salhani, ‘Everything you need to know about Syria’s first post-Assad elections’, Al Jazeera, 5 October 2025. ↩︎
70
T. M. Heron, ‘Explainer: Syria’s parliamentary election, the first poll since Assad’, BBC Monitoring, 12 September 2025. ↩︎
71
C. Schaer, ‘Syria’s election after dictatorship: What you need to know’, Deutsche Welle, 5 October 2025. ↩︎
72
H. Al Abdo and K. Chehayeb, ‘Syria holds legislative elections in Kurdish-majority northeast’, PBS, 24 May 2026. ↩︎
73
D. Gritten and L. Sinjab, ‘Kurdish-led SDF agrees to integrate with Syrian government forces’, BBC, 11 March 2025; C. Lister, ‘How Damascus and the SDF came to blows in Aleppo — and what might come next’, Middle East Institute, 13 January 2026. ↩︎
74
D. Gritten and L. Sinjab, ‘Kurdish-led SDF agrees to integrate with Syrian government forces’, BBC, 11 March 2025. ↩︎
75
C. Lister, ‘How Damascus and the SDF came to blows in Aleppo — and what might come next’, Middle East Institute, 13 January 2026. ↩︎
76
W. van Wilgenburg, ‘The SDF’s Approach to Integration Talks in Syria and the Risk of Expanded Conflict’, Washington Institute, 15 January 2026. ↩︎
77
A. Sewell, ‘Syria’s government and Kurds still at odds over merging forces after latest talks, US envoy says’, Associated Press, 10 July 2025. ↩︎
78
‘Syrian government, Kurdish-led SDF trade blame over northern Syria attack’, Al Jazeera, 2 August 2025. ↩︎
79
‘Syrian Arab tribes declare ‘general mobilization’ against SDF’, The Cradle, 12 August 2025. ↩︎
80
C. Lister, ‘How Damascus and the SDF came to blows in Aleppo — and what might come next’, Middle East Institute, 13 January 2026; ‘Syrian Arab tribes declare ‘general mobilization’ against SDF’, The Cradle, 12 August 2025. ↩︎
81
‘Syria backs out of Paris talks with Kurdish-led fighters: State TV’, Al Jazeera, 9 August 2025. ↩︎
82
‘Syria’s Sharaa to meet SDF leader during US envoy Barrack visit’, The New Arab, 26 August 2025. ↩︎
83
‘Middle East & North Africa: September 2025’, International Crisis Group, September 2025. ↩︎
84
‘Clashes End in Aleppo’s Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh Neighborhoods in northern Syria’, Enab Baladi, 7 October 2025; A. Rogers, ‘Ceasefire declared between Syrian forces, Kurdish fighters after one killed’, Al Jazeera, 7 October 2025; ‘Syrian army and SDF reach ceasefire deal in Aleppo city following clashes’, Reuters, 7 October 2025. ↩︎
85
‘SDF, Damascus-aligned groups clash in Aleppo and Deir ez-Zor’, Shafaq News, 23 November 2025. ↩︎
86
Syria Studies Unit, ‘Negotiations to Integrate the SDF into the Syrian Army: A Road to Peace or War?’, Emirates Policy Center, 24 November 2025. ↩︎
87
S. Al-Khalidi et al, ‘Syria, Kurdish forces race to save integration deal ahead of deadline’, Reuters, 19 December 2025. ↩︎
88
S. al-Ahmed, ‘Will Damascus-SDF negotiations lead to agreement or escalation?’, Middle East Institute, 24 January 2025. ↩︎
89
‘Preventing Further Escalation in Syria’s North East’, International Crisis Group, 20 January 2026. ↩︎
90
‘Preventing Further Escalation in Syria’s North East’, International Crisis Group, 20 January 2026. ↩︎
91
‘Middle East & North Africa: Syria’, International Crisis Group, January 2026. ↩︎
92
‘An Opportunity for Calm in North-eastern Syria’, International Crisis Group, 30 January 2026; ‘Kurdish-led SDF agrees integration with Syrian government forces’, Al Jazeera, 30 January 2026. ↩︎
93
‘An Opportunity for Calm in North-eastern Syria’, International Crisis Group, 30 January 2026. ↩︎
94
M. Sıo, ‘Syrian government delegation arrives at Qamishli airport to implement handover deal with SDF’, AA, 8 February 2026; ‘Syrian forces deploy in Hasakah under ceasefire agreement with SDF’, Al Jazeera, 2 February 2026. ↩︎
95
‘Syria appoints Kurdish military official assistant defense minister’, Le Monde, 10 March 2026; ‘Syria Appoints Kurdish SDF Official Sipan Hamo as Assistant Defense Minister’, Kurdistan 24, 10 March 2026. ↩︎
96
‘Syria, SDF to swap 100 prisoners in latest post-ceasefire deal’, RUDAW, 10 March 2026. ↩︎
97
‘10,000 Kurds Apply for Syrian Citizenship’, Asharq Al Awsat, 24 May 2026. ↩︎
98
‘Exchange figures between SDF and Interim Government as part of implementing January 29 agreement’, Hawar News Agency, 12 April 2026; ‘Release of hundreds of prisoners and detainees in northeast Syria under the exchange agreement with the Syrian government’, Syriac Press, 12 April 2026. ↩︎
99
H. Al Abdo and K. Chehayeb, ‘Syria holds legislative elections in Kurdish-majority northeast’, PBS, 24 May 2026. ↩︎
100
‘Kurdish troops join Syria’s army as unification efforts gather pace’, The New Arab, 3 May 2026. ↩︎
101
E. Schmitt, ‘US Transfers Thousands of ISIS Prisoners to Iraq From Syria’, The New York Times, 13 February 2026; L. Tondo and D. Sabbagh, ‘More than 100 Islamic State inmates escape jail amid clashes in north-east Syria’, The Guardian, 20 January 2026. ↩︎
102
L. Tondo and D. Sabbagh, ‘More than 100 Islamic State inmates escape jail amid clashes in north-east Syria’, The Guardian, 20 January 2026. ↩︎
103
E. Schmitt, ‘US Transfers Thousands of ISIS Prisoners to Iraq From Syria’, The New York Times, 13 February 2026. ↩︎
104
E. Schmitt, ‘US Transfers Thousands of ISIS Prisoners to Iraq From Syria’, The New York Times, 13 February 2026. ↩︎
105
E. Schmitt, ‘US Transfers Thousands of ISIS Prisoners to Iraq From Syria’, The New York Times, 13 February 2026; ‘Syria confirms mass escape of suspected IS group jihadists’ relatives from detention camp’, France 24, 25 February 2026. ↩︎
106
N. Ebrahim et al, ‘Syria reports ‘mass escape’ from detention camp holding ISIS-linked families amid reports thousands fled’, CNN, 25 February 2026. ↩︎
107
‘Syria moves out last residents of ISIL-linked desert camp’, Al Jazeera, 22 February 2026; ‘Northeast Syria: Camp Closures Leave Thousands Stranded’, Human Rights Watch, 23 February 2026. ↩︎
108
N. Ebrahim and E. Kourdi, ‘Why the fate of ISIS prisoners in Syria is back on the radar’, CNN, 22 January 2026. ↩︎
109
‘Iraq: Alleged ISIS Detainees Transferred from Syria at Risk of Abuse’, Human Rights Watch, 17 February 2026. ↩︎
110
‘US military begins withdrawing from key base in northeastern Syria’, Al Jazeera, 23 February 2026; F. Dalatey and O. Qereman, ‘US military begins withdrawing from main base in northeast Syria, Syrian sources say’, Reuters, 23 February 2026. ↩︎
111
B. Drenon, ‘US to withdraw troops from Syria as tensions mount with Iran’, BBC, 19 February 2026. ↩︎
112
‘US military begins withdrawing from key base in northeastern Syria’, Al Jazeera, 23 February 2026. ↩︎
113
R. Soylu, ‘US military fully withdraws from Syria after 10 years’, Middle East Eye, 16 April 2026. ↩︎
114
H. Hassan, ‘How Foreign Agendas Hijacked a Local Crisis in Syria’, New Line Magazines, 24 July 2025; ‘Israel hits Syrian army HQ, near Damascus palace as Suwayda fighting rages’, Al Jazeera, 16 July 2025; ‘Syria announces ceasefire in Druze city of Suwayda after deadly clashes’, Al Jazeera, 15 July 2025; ‘Humanitarian Access Blocked as Suwayda Battles Push Civilians to Brink’, Impact Policies, 16 July 2025; ‘More than 80 killed in violent clashes in predominantly Druze Syrian city’, France 24, 14 July 2025. ↩︎
115
H. Hassan, ‘How Foreign Agendas Hijacked a Local Crisis in Syria’, New Line Magazines, 24 July 2025; ‘International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law violations committed during the July 2025 violence in Suwayda, Syria: Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, UN Doc A/HRC/61/CRP.7, 27 March 2026, para 26; ‘Humanitarian Access Blocked as Suwayda Battles Push Civilians to Brink’, Impact Policies, 16 July 2025; V. Bourne and D. Gritten, ‘Dozens killed in clashes between Druze and Bedouin in southern Syria’, BBC, 14 July 2025; ‘Kidnappings and clashes shake Suwayda amid mounting tensions in southern Syria’, Syriac Press, 14 July 2025; ‘Over 80 killed as sectarian violence worsens in Suwayda, drawing in Syrian government forces and Israeli strikes’, Syriac Press, 14 July 2025. ↩︎
116
‘International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law violations committed during the July 2025 violence in Suwayda, Syria: Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, UN Doc A/HRC/61/CRP.7, 27 March 2026, para 26; ‘Humanitarian Access Blocked as Suwayda Battles Push Civilians to Brink’, Impact Policies, 16 July 2025. ↩︎
117
‘International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law violations committed during the July 2025 violence in Suwayda, Syria: Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, UN Doc A/HRC/61/CRP.7, 27 March 2026, para 27. ↩︎
118
‘International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law violations committed during the July 2025 violence in Suwayda, Syria: Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, UN Doc A/HRC/61/CRP.7, 27 March 2026, fn 29 and para 26. ↩︎
119
V. Bourne and D. Gritten, ‘Dozens killed in clashes between Druze and Bedouin in southern Syria’, BBC, 14 July 2025. ↩︎
120
‘International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law violations committed during the July 2025 violence in Suwayda, Syria: Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, UN Doc A/HRC/61/CRP.7, 27 March 2026, para 26; V. Bourne and D. Gritten, ‘Dozens killed in clashes between Druze and Bedouin in southern Syria’, BBC, 14 July 2025. ↩︎
121
‘International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law violations committed during the July 2025 violence in Suwayda, Syria: Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, UN Doc A/HRC/61/CRP.7, 27 March 2026, para 28. ↩︎
122
R. Aouir, ‘Syria: Dozens killed in clashes between Druze militias and Bedouin groups’, Middle East Eye, 14 July 2025. ↩︎
123
H. Hassan, ‘How Foreign Agendas Hijacked a Local Crisis in Syria’, New Line Magazines, 24 July 2025. ↩︎
124
‘Over 80 killed as sectarian violence worsens in Suwayda, drawing in Syrian government forces and Israeli strikes’, Syriac Press, 14 July 2025. ↩︎
125
‘International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law violations committed during the July 2025 violence in Suwayda, Syria: Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, UN Doc A/HRC/61/CRP.7, 27 March 2026, para 32. ↩︎
126
‘International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law violations committed during the July 2025 violence in Suwayda, Syria: Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, UN Doc A/HRC/61/CRP.7, 27 March 2026, paras 32 and 34. ↩︎
127
‘Syrian forces withdraw from Suwayda as mediation restores calm’, Al Jazeera, 17 July 2025. ↩︎
128
‘International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law violations committed during the July 2025 violence in Suwayda, Syria: Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, UN Doc A/HRC/61/CRP.7, 27 March 2026, paras 39, and 41-43. ↩︎
129
International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law violations committed during the July 2025 violence in Suwayda, Syria: Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, UN Doc A/HRC/61/CRP.7, 27 March 2026, paras 45-46; ‘Syria clears Bedouin fighters from Suwayda city, declares halt to clashes’, Al Jazeera, 20 July 2025; ‘Syrian security forces deploy in Suwayda; US brokers Israel-Syria ceasefire’, Al Jazeera, 19 July 2025; ‘Syria declares new Suwayda ceasefire, deploys forces to ‘restore security’’, Al Jazeera, 19 July 2025. ↩︎
130
‘International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law violations committed during the July 2025 violence in Suwayda, Syria: Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, UN Doc A/HRC/61/CRP.7, 27 March 2026, paras 48–50. ↩︎
131
‘The Druze in Suwayda: Ideological Divisions, Fragmented Leadership, and a Multiple Armed factions’, Alma Research and Education Center, 13 May 2026. ↩︎
132
‘International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law violations committed during the July 2025 violence in Suwayda, Syria: Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, UN Doc A/HRC/61/CRP.7, 27 March 2026, para 35. ↩︎
133
‘International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law violations committed during the July 2025 violence in Suwayda, Syria: Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, UN Doc A/HRC/61/CRP.7, 27 March 2026, fn 37. ↩︎
134
W. Al Nofal, ‘Suwayda factions: Uprooting ‘the gangs’ or consolidating power?’, Syria Direct, 13 September 2022. ↩︎
135
‘The Druze in Suwayda: Ideological Divisions, Fragmented Leadership, and a Multiple Armed factions’, Alma Research and Education Center, 13 May 2026; W. Al Nofal, ‘Suwayda factions: Uprooting ‘the gangs’ or consolidating power?’, Syria Direct, 13 September 2022; A. J. Al-Tamimi, ‘The New Druze Militia Factions of Suwayda Province’, Middle East Forum, 8 August 2015. ↩︎
136
‘The Druze in Suwayda: Ideological Divisions, Fragmented Leadership, and a Multiple Armed factions’, Alma Research and Education Center, 13 May 2026; ‘Briefing: Syria’s Druze leaders divided over approach to new government’, BBC Monitoring, 10 April 2025. ↩︎
137
W. Al Nofal, ‘Suwayda factions: Uprooting ‘the gangs’ or consolidating power?’, Syria Direct, 13 September 2022. ↩︎
138
‘In Suwayda, the Druze “National Guard” Incorporates Men of Dignity as Sheikh al-Hijri Calls for Separation from Syria’, Enab Baladi, 25 August 2025; S. Franjieh, ‘Unravelling the factions, sheikhs, and fighters of Sweida’, Al Majalla, 24 July 2025. Yahya al-Hajjar was then appointed as the leader.‘The Druze in Suwayda: Ideological Divisions, Fragmented Leadership, and a Multiple Armed factions’, Alma Research and Education Center, 13 May 2026; ‘Briefing: Syria’s Druze leaders divided over approach to new government’, BBC Monitoring, 10 April 2025; R. Ghadban, ‘Syria’s Druze Stand Alone’, Carnegie Middle East Center, 14 May 2025. ↩︎
139
S. Franjieh, ‘Unravelling the factions, sheikhs, and fighters of Sweida’, Al Majalla, 24 July 2025. ↩︎
140
‘In Suwayda, the Druze “National Guard” Incorporates Men of Dignity as Sheikh al-Hijri Calls for Separation from Syria’, Enab Baladi, 25 August 2025; A. Sharawi, ‘Profiles of militias in newly formed Druze national guard in Suwayda, Syria’, FDD’s Long War Journal, 5 September 2025. ↩︎
141
W. Al Nofal, ‘Suwayda factions: Uprooting ‘the gangs’ or consolidating power?’, Syria Direct, 13 September 2022. ↩︎
142
S. Franjieh, ‘Unravelling the factions, sheikhs, and fighters of Sweida’, Al Majalla, 24 July 2025. ↩︎

Syria

Overview

Historical background

The rise of Islamic State in Syria

Türkiye’s military presence in Northern Syria

Israel’s military presence in the Golan Heights

Actions of other States within Syria

Key developments (between June 2023 and June 2026)

The end of the Assad regime

Relief from US Sanctions and the Revocation of HTS’s Designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization

International Armed Conflicts

Israeli Occupation of Golan Heights and Mount Hermon

Active hostilities in the international armed conflict between Syria and Israel

Non-International Armed Conflicts

Below the Threshold situations

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

Non-state parties