Armed conflicts in Yemen

Food Insecurity

Food insecurity in Yemen worsened during the reporting period, with large parts of the population facing acute food insecurity and some areas under Houthi control expected to reach famine conditions. Malnutrition among young children was widespread, and water-borne disease outbreaks increased. The drivers included conflict-related insecurity and displacement, economic collapse, climate shocks, and reduced humanitarian assistance. Airstrikes disrupting ports and Sana’a airport constrained imports and relief, while early 2025 US designation of the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization diverted shipping away from Houthi controlled ports, complicating supply to the north. US funding cuts also reduced life saving services and heightened risks of further emergency level hunger and health facility closures.

Denial of Humanitarian Access and Attacks against Humanitarian Workers

In 2024, numerous incidents involved denial of humanitarian access and threats or attacks against humanitarian workers, largely unattributed, but with a few attributed to the Houthis. All parties reportedly obstructed humanitarian access, with Houthi authorities in particular imposing unjustified bureaucratic requirements that worsened the spread of cholera, while in government-controlled areas factional power struggles within agencies affiliated with the central government also impeded access. The Houthis raided the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Sana’a and confiscated property and documents. Humanitarian access constraints also included arbitrary detention of UN personnel and restrictions on female staff movement, limiting delivery of life-saving services, including healthcare for sexual violence survivors.

Attacks against Health Facilities

In Yemen in 2024, hospitals were reportedly used for military purposes in several cases, attributed primarily to the Houthis and also to the Yemen Armed Forces and affiliated forces. Numerous attacks affecting hospitals were also recorded and attributed to the Yemen Armed Forces, the Houthis, AQAP, and unidentified perpetrators. Such military use raises concerns under precautionary obligations by increasing the risk of harm from attacks to protected persons and objects.

Attack against Electrical Grid

Repeated attacks on electrical generating stations in Yemen caused electricity outages and further damaged critical civilian infrastructure. Under customary IHL, such objects remain protected unless they qualify as military objectives based on their nature, location, purpose, or use.

Attack against Ports

Hostilities in Yemen continued to damage civilian objects and critical civilian infrastructure, including port facilities. The UN Secretary-General reported that repeated damage impaired port capacity, jeopardizing humanitarian and commercial imports on which the country depended. Under customary IHL, port facilities are protected as civilian objects unless they qualify as military objectives.

Houthi Attacks against Commercial Shipping

Houthi armed forces conducted numerous attacks against commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean, with Houthi figures indicating that attacks have increased since 7 October 2023. Attacks on merchant vessels flying neutral flags generally constituted direct attacks against civilian objects and violated the principle of distinction. The Houthis’ claim to exercise belligerent blockade rights against Israeli ports was rejected because naval blockade is generally reserved to States in international armed conflicts (IAC)s, and the Houthis as a non-State actor could not lawfully interfere with neutral navigation, including where ships were not heading to Israeli ports. Many attacks targeted oil, gas, or chemical cargoes, causing or risking major oil spills and breaching the duty to employ means and methods of warfare with due regard for the protection and preservation of the environment.

Indiscriminate Houthi Airstrikes against Israel

Between 1 August 2024 and 31 July 2025, the Houthis launched more than 220 missile and drone attacks against Israel, most of which were intercepted, but some struck populated areas and caused civilian harm and damage to civilian infrastructure. Reported impacts included drones and missiles hitting residential buildings, a playground, and an elementary school, resulting in civilian deaths and injuries. The Samad 3’s guidance and targeting capabilities were unclear and the intended target was uncertain, complicating assessment of whether it struck an intended objective. In several cases there was little indication that a military objective was being targeted, and the strikes were assessed as indiscriminate and a serious violation of IHL.

Disproportionate Israeli and US Airstrikes against Yemen

Israeli and United States airstrikes on Hodeida and other Red Sea ports, electrical generating stations, and Sana’a International Airport from 2024 to 2025 caused extensive damage to civilian infrastructure, including reduced port capacity, electricity outages, destruction of airport facilities and civilian aircraft, and reported civilian deaths and injuries. Israel asserted that port and airport infrastructure was used by the Houthis for weapons supply or smuggling, while other reporting noted limited publicly available information substantiating military use and that access constraints prevented full verification. Given the predictable impact on humanitarian imports and the flow of fuel, food, and medicine, several strikes were considered indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks and possibly war crimes, with subsequent damage to oil installations reportedly contributing to fuel shortages and higher food prices.

Israeli and US Airstrikes against Economic Assets

Israeli and United States airstrikes targeted economic assets in Yemen that were framed as supporting Houthi power. Israel bombed cement factories in Hudaydah and Sana’a governorates, citing their economic value to the Houthis and alleging use for constructing tunnels and other infrastructure. The United States bombed the oil port of Ras Issa with the stated aim of degrading the Houthis’ economic source of power. The approach of treating revenue generating assets as military objectives was criticized as overly expansive, and while cement could be used for military works, the link to military action was characterized as indirect and remote. On this basis, the attacks were assessed as directed against civilian objects in violation of IHL.

Torture of Journalists

Journalists in Yemen reportedly faced torture and ill-treatment in custody in areas controlled by the internationally recognized government, the STC, and the Houthis. The limited public information did not always clarify whether these abuses were motivated by journalists’ conflict reporting, and the grounds for detention were not consistently communicated to victims. In Houthi-controlled areas, strict control of media and internet access, combined with reported threats and arrests of people speaking to the media after US strikes, contributed to a climate in which journalists faced heightened risks of reprisals and custodial abuse.

In Yemen, arbitrary detention of civilians was attributed to most actors, including the Houthis, governmental authorities, and affiliated forces, sometimes accompanied by torture or other ill treatment. Detention of perceived political opponents was widespread in both Houthi-controlled areas and areas controlled by the Southern Transitional Council (STC), with reports of coerced confessions of spying and non-compliance with fair trial guarantees, including denial of legal counsel and access to evidence. Houthi detention of humanitarian workers and UN personnel continued, including abductions in mid-2024 and again in January 2025 that contributed to a pause of UN activities in Sa’ada. Detainees were often held incommunicado or in undisclosed locations, and deaths in custody were reported.

Enforced disappearance in Yemen was attributed to multiple actors, including the Houthis, governmental authorities, and affiliated forces, and was reported as widespread in both Houthi-controlled areas and areas controlled by the STC. Enforced disappearance has been described as a persistent and generalized pattern across the conflict, going beyond isolated incidents and suggesting possible war crimes and crimes against humanity. In Houthi-controlled areas, prolonged incommunicado detention and failure to inform relatives of detainees’ fate reportedly transformed arrests into enforced disappearances, including cases involving perceived political opponents and humanitarian personnel. UN staff abducted in 2024 and 2025 were reportedly held in unknown locations, and deaths in captivity were reported, including one case attributed to torture.

In Yemen in 2024, women and girls faced heightened risks of conflict-related sexual violence that remained dramatically underreported due to stigma, fear of reprisals, and harmful social norms. Verified cases involved both boys and girls. Sexual violence was also reported in the context of Houthi detention, including rape or threats of rape against men and boys. Additional reports concerned sexual violence against children in Houthi summer camps, sexual exploitation of girls recruited into the Zaynabiyat (Houthi female security wing), and forced child marriage incentivized to secure loyalty to the Houthi cause.

Child recruitment in Yemen was reported as widespread, with the Houthis identified as the main recruiter, alongside the Yemen Armed Forces and affiliated armed forces and groups. Verified cases showed children used in combat roles and Houthi recruitment of very young children, which constitutes a war crime under customary IHL. Reports also indicated that girls and children with disabilities were particularly affected and that recruitment practices in Houthi controlled areas had become systematic and institutionalized. Forced recruitment of girls into the Houthi female security wing, the Zaynabiyat, reportedly increased, with girls trained to search homes, disperse crowds, and use small arms. Yemen is a State Party to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, which prohibits compulsory recruitment of children under eighteen and requires Yemen to take all feasible measures to ensure that members of its armed forces under eighteen do not take a direct part in hostilities.