International armed conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan

Historical Background

Origins and context

Tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan over the al-Fashaga territory have persisted for decades and are rooted in contested border delimitation. Sudan relies on a 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian agreement and the subsequent Gwynn Line, which placed al-Fashaga within Sudan, while Ethiopia has consistently rejected this delimitation and maintained that the disputed area extends further west. The dispute is compounded by reported inconsistencies between the treaty text, mapped boundaries, and what is delineated on the ground, alongside concerns regarding the circumstances of the 1902 agreement and Ethiopia’s limited involvement in later demarcation efforts. 

Attempts at resolution and evolving dynamics

Repeated efforts to settle the dispute have been undermined by shifting internal and regional contexts, including interruptions to earlier demarcation initiatives. From the mid-1990s, taking advantage of Sudan’s entanglement in multiple civil wars, Ethiopian forces and farmers expanded their presence in the area, which was subsequently administered by Ethiopian regional authorities. Subsequent undisclosed understanding reached in the late 2000s was never formally ratified and political instability in both nations resulted in renewal of clashes involving Sudanese armed forces (SAF), Sudanese paramilitaries, and Ethiopian Amhara militias. 

Renewed tensions since 2020

From late 2020, capitalizing on Ethiopia’s focus on the Tigray conflict, the SAF advanced, gradually consolidating Sudanese control over much of al-Fashaga, displacing Ethiopian farmers and sharply worsening bilateral relations. Subsequent diplomatic initiatives and joint mechanisms did not translate into sustained de-escalation. Renewed clashes between Amhara militias, Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) and the SAF were reported in 2023, amid disputed claims of cross-border incursions and Sudan’s growing internal instability. 

Key Developments (2023–2025)

The reporting period saw two major developments: 

1. Influence of Sudan’s conflict: Following the outbreak of the SAF- Rapid Support Forces (RSF) conflict in April 2023, the SAF reportedly regarded al-Fashaga as strategically important to its broader military effort and sought to reinforce its presence there. Sudan also accused Ethiopia of supporting the RSF. As hostilities between the SAF and the RSF moved closer to Ethiopia’s border, Ethiopian officials expressed heightened concerns about regional destabilization, including the possibility of cooperation between the RSF and Fano militias.
2. Persisting border dispute: In response to risks associated with Sudan’s armed conflict between the SAF and the RSF, Ethiopia renewed efforts to de-escalate tensions and to manage the unresolved border dispute. In parallel, Sudanese officials alleged that, in early July 2025, Ethiopian militias backed by the ENDF carried out new incursions into the disputed area and, under ENDF protection, enabled Ethiopian farmers to expel Sudanese farmers, reportedly taking advantage of a power vacuum created by Sudan’s internal conflict. While the most recent local armed confrontations between the ENDF and the SAF reportedly occurred in 2022 or 2023, the dispute over the al-Fashaga region has persisted without indications of SAF withdrawal or of a negotiated solution.