Georgia - Russia - WAR WATCH

Russia remains the occupying power in areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which are internationally recognized as forming part of Georgia. Russia maintains a military presence in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the basis of agreements concluded with these entities but without the consent of Georgia. While Russia and a few other States recognize these entities as independent States, the overwhelming majority of States consider them as being part of Georgia. Russia also exercises its authority over these regions by its control of the separatists.

The law of military occupation is set out in the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs on Land, the 1949 Geneva Conventions (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilians Persons in Time of War and the 1977 Additional Protocol I applicable to International Armed Conflict. Both Georgia and Russia are parties to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I of 1977. Customary international humanitarian law is also applicable during occupation, which complements the protection afforded under treaty law, binding all the parties to the conflict.

Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Since then, it has experienced tension and conflict with secessionist wars fought in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. These conflicts have left thousands of individuals dead, displaced thousands, and created a politically unstable situation, with both territories subject to the de facto authority of separatist governments.¹South Ossetia, which has a population of approximately 35,500, formally declared independence from Georgia during the armed conflict between Georgian forces and South Ossetian separatist forces in 1991–92. The conflict ended in the summer of 1992 when the warring parties agreed on the deployment of joint peacekeeping forces, including Russian troops.²

Similar to South Ossetia, Abkhazia fought a separatist conflict with Georgia in 1992–94. Abkhazia, which has a population of approximately 250,000, sought to declare its independence through promulgation of a constitution in 1994, and then by formal statement in 1999.³ The Georgian-Abkhazian conflict ended upon the signature of the so-called Moscow Agreement in 1994, which also foresaw the deployment of the peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States.Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces (Moscow Agreement), 14 May 1994. Between 1993 and 2008, many resolutions of the United Nations Security Council referred to ‘Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia’ and re-affirmed Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.⁴ While formally part of Georgia, both Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been under the control of separatist governments since then.

After a period of heavy fighting between Georgian Armed Forces and South Ossetian forces, Russian troops entered South Ossetia on 8 August 2008. The fighting soon involved Russian, Georgian, South Ossetian, and Abkhaz forces. During the intervention, Russian troops moved beyond the traditional boundaries of South Ossetia and launched strikes near the Georgian capital. The Russian forces succeeded in defeating the main Georgian forces, forcing a retreat. By August 10, the Russians had consolidated their position in South Ossetia. Russia also entered Georgia through Abkhazia and drove out the Georgian forces therein, taking full control of the region.⁵ In justifying the presence of its forces, Russia claimed that it was acting to protect Russian citizens in the regions.⁶ On 12 August 2008, Georgia and Russia signed the European Union (EU)-mediated ceasefire agreement.⁷

In the aftermath of the 2008 conflict, Abkhazia and South Ossetia reiterated their declaration of independence from Georgia. On 26 August 2008, Russia recognized them as independent States.⁸ Since 2008, only Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, Tuvalu and Syria have recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.⁹ The European Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) condemned the recognition.¹⁰ General international law determines whether a secessionist entity possesses statehood, and this can only occur with the consent of the central government.

Russian troops have been present in the breakaway regions ever since the war. Abkhazia and South Ossetia signed treaties with Russia allowing it to maintain military bases in the regions. Over time, Russia has increased its exercise of control in military, political and economic terms, including by signing the Treaty on Alliance and Strategic Partnership with Abkhazia in 2014 and Treaty on Alliance and Integration with South Ossetia in 2015.N. Kalandarishvili-Mueller, ‘Guest Post: The Status of the Territory Unchanged: Russia’s Treaties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia’, Opinio Juris, 20 April 2015.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia signed treaties with Russia allowing it to maintain military bases in the regions. Russian troops have been present ever since, and Russia has increased its exercise of control in military, political, and economic terms, including by signing the Treaty on Alliance and Strategic Partnership with Abkhazia in 2014 and Treaty on Alliance and Integration with South Ossetia in 2015.¹¹

Discussions over South Ossetia annexation

In late March 2022, the leader of breakaway South Ossetia, Anatoly Bibilov, announced the intention of the region to join Russia following ‘presidential’ elections.¹² A referendum on South Ossetia’s annexation by Russia was initially scheduled to take place on 17 July 2022. However, the newly elected “president”, Alan Gagloev, cancelled the referendum, invoking ‘uncertainty of the legal consequences of the issue submitted to a referendum’.¹³ Nevertheless, in March 2024, the speaker of South Ossetia’s parliament said the region was discussing with Moscow the possibility of joining the Russian Federation. This revived the question of South Ossetia’s further integration into Russia.¹⁴

Abkhazia independence stance

In March 2022, Abkhaz leaders rejected the idea of holding a referendum on integration with the Russian Federation and reaffirmed their intention to secure independence for the breakaway region.¹⁵ Since then, Abkhazia, and in particular the local population, has continued to express its desire for independence.¹⁶

Partial normalization between Georgia and Russia

In May 2023, Russia restored visa-free travel for Georgian citizens and lifted its 2019 ban on direct flights between the two countries. Days later, Georgian Airways resumed direct flights to Russia. Georgia also allows Russians to access Georgia without visa and full work rights for one year. This represented a warming of Russia-Georgia relations during the reporting period, even though formal diplomatic ties remained broken.¹⁷

‘Foreign agent’ bill and related protests, and contested Georgian parliamentary election results

In March 2023, Georgian Dream (GD), the Georgia’s ruling party since 2012, proposed the ‘foreign agent’ bill to the Parliament. The bill, which targeted non-governmental organizations (NGO) and media that receive over 20 percent of funding from abroad, was met with massive protests and widespread international criticism.¹⁸ After initially withdrawing the bill, the ruling party resubmitted it, and it passed on third reading in May 2024. Although vetoed by President Salome Zourabichvili, Gorgia’s parliament eventually overrode the presidential veto in late May 2024 and enacted the bill into law in March 2026.¹⁹

On 26 October 2024, GD won the parliamentary elections,²⁰ amid reports of intimidation and coercion targeting voters and journalists.²¹ The pro-western opposition coalition described the outcome a “constitutional coup”, and videos showing ballot stuffing and voter intimidation circulated online. The results marked a further shift toward Russia and an increasingly authoritarian stance, while polls indicated that up to 80 percent of the population was favourable to joining the European Union (EU).²²

Reinforcement of relations between separatist regions and Russia, and subsequent discontent

In October 2023, Russia and the Abkhaz authorities announced an agreement for a permanent Russian naval base at Ochamchire, Black Sea coast in Abkhazia. This prompted criticism from Georgia, which denounced a “gross violation” of its sovereignty.²³ In January 2024, Abkhaz officials said the base might become operational in 2024, ²⁴ and satellite images have since reportedly shown progress in the construction of the Russian naval base.²⁵

In November and December 2024, Abkhazia entered a serious political crisis over a Russian real-estate investment agreement. Condemning the deal as a mean for Aslan Bzhania, the region de facto “President”, to advance private interests and consolidate his rule, and fearing both inflation in the property market and a further tightening of Moscow’s control, protesters stormed parliament and the presidential administration and called for Bzhania’s resignation.²⁶ As a result, Bzhania resigned in late November, and on 3 December 2024 the Abkhaz parliament unanimously rejected the agreement.²⁷

From late 2024 into early 2025, Russia transferred electricity supplies to Abkhazia during its electricity crisis due to low water levels at the Enguri hydroelectric dam that forced an emergency shutdown.²⁸ In March 2025, Putin engaged to continue supplying electricity to Abkhazia.²⁹ In parallel, in February 2025, Russia resumed passenger flights to Sukhumi (capital of breakaway Abkhazia region) for the first time in about 30 years, with regular flights scheduled from May.³⁰ Later in 2025, Georgia and the EU deplored Russia’s unilateral decision to launch regular commercial passenger flights to Sukhumi and to strengthen rail and maritime passenger traffic with Abkhazia.³¹

International and regional initiatives and their stalemate

In 2025, the Geneva International Discussions and the Ergneti Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism continued, but without achieving a political breakthrough. In particular, Abkhazia and South Ossetia renewed their demand for Georgia to officially commit to not use of force to resolve territorial issues through the signing of a binding agreement, while Russia insisted on the necessity to ensure lasting security in the breakaway regions. Georgia and the EU continued to call on Russia to implement the 2008 ceasefire, permit the return of refugees to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, allow international access, and address de facto integration and “borderisation” activities.³²

As of 16 March 2026, these formats were still active but unresolved.

Military occupation of Georgia by Russia

For a territory to be considered occupied it must be ‘under the authority of the hostile army’.¹ For an occupation to exist hostile foreign forces must exercise effective control. Three elements must be fulfilled for effective control to exist:

The armed forces of a foreign State are physically present in the territory and the territorial State did not consent to their presence.
The presence of the foreign forces prevents the effective local government in place at the time of invasion from exercising its powers.
The foreign forces establish their own authority.

States may use proxy forces to occupy a territory: if a State exercises overall control over de facto local authorities or other local groups that exert effective control over the territory, the State can be considered an occupying force.

Two elements must therefore exist in such a situation: the foreign State has overall control over de facto local authorities; and the de facto authorities exercise effective control over territory.²

Overall control over an organized armed group exists where a State ‘has a role in organizing, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing operational support to that group’.³

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) developed its own test of effective control over territory for the purposes of establishing State’s extra-territorial jurisdiction under Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Its significant indicators are: (i) the number of soldiers deployed by the State in the territory in question; (ii) the extent to which the State’s military, economic and political support for the local subordinate administration ‘provides it with influence and control over the region’.⁴

In its judgment in Georgia v Russia (II), the ECtHR found that Russia exercised effective control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the ‘buffer zone’ from the signature of ceasefire agreement on 12 August 2008 to 10 October 2008 (the day of the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the buffer zone) and beyond. The Court pointed to ‘the strong Russian presence and the South Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities’ dependency on the Russian Federation, on whom their survival depends’), thereby establishing Russia’s extra-territorial jurisdiction under Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights there.⁵

In examining the case, the ECtHR also referred to the existence of Russia’s occupation of these regions after 12 August 2008.⁶ With respect to each alleged violation, the ECtHR also assessed normative conflicts between IHL and IHRL.

Abkhazia

International Crisis Group estimates there are around 5,000 Russian personnel in Abkhazia, including 3,500 military and 1,500 Federal Security Service (FSB) officers and border guards.⁷ Russia spent $465 million over four years to refurbish and develop military installations in the Black Sea coastal area, including Bombora – the largest military airfield in the South Caucasus, in Gudauta – and a naval port in Ochamchire.⁸

On the basis of the 2010 agreement between Russia and Abkhazia (which is valid for 49 years, after which it automatically extends every fifteen years), Russia operates its 7th military base in Abkhazia in Gudauta.⁹ In the Georgia v Russia (II) case, Russia itself acknowledged the creation of this military base after the signing of the agreement with Abkhazia in 2010, stating it hosted ‘3,923 servicemen and 873 items of military equipment’.¹⁰ Reportedly, tanks, fighter jets, and armoured personnel carriers are located at the base. Under another treaty signed between Russia and Abkhazia in 2009, Russia also assists in securing and patrolling the administrative border with Georgia.¹¹

The Treaty on Alliance and Strategic Partnership signed between Russia and Abkhazia on 24 November 2014 aims to incorporate the region into the Russian military, economic, social and legal space and also to create a common security and defence space.¹² This treaty provides for the mutual defense pact and foresees the creation of the Joint Group of Armed Forces to repel aggression. A separate agreement to this end was signed between Russia and Abkhazia in 2015. This deal foresees the joint conduct of military exercises and stipulates that ‘the Joint Group of Armed Forces is composed of the joint Russian military base stationed on Abkhazian territory, as Russia’s component, and two motorized rifle battalions, an artillery group and an aviation group, as well as a special forces detachment as Abkhazia’s component’.¹³

Compared to South Ossetia, fewer Russian citizens occupy high military and security posts in Abkhazia, though there are some notable exceptions. It is estimated that the separatist armed forces of Abkhazia are small, somewhere between 1,000 and 5,000 troops. Reportedly, due to the Russian military presence, investment in equipping separatist forces has declined.¹⁴

More broadly, Russia also supports Abkhazia in other areas, including by provision of financial support.¹⁵ Nearly the entire Abkhazia population holds Russian citizenship.¹⁶ The ECtHR referred to various reports containing the information as to “the relationship of dependency not only in economic and financial, but also in military and political terms between the Russian Federation and Abkhazia.”¹⁷

In sum, Russia occupies Abkhazia through its direct military presence underpinned by the series of agreements with the separatist entity. According to the International Crisis Group, given Russia’s control over Abkhazia’s ‘borders’, roads, and sea, Russia does not need to maintain a heavy permanent presence, ‘as it can move military equipment and troops into and out of the entity at will’.¹⁸ The local separatist armed groups serve as Russian proxies given the high level of coordination with the Russian Armed Forces and the military and financial support provided by Russia. This conclusion is made on the basis of publicly available data, which support the fulfilment of the requirements of an overall control test.

South Ossetia

Since 2008, Russia has established a significant military presence in South Ossetia. In Georgia v Russia (II), Russia itself acknowledged a substantial military presence in South Ossetia after hostilities had ceased, and then also from 23 August 2008 until the creation of a joint military base (comprising the 693rd motor rifle regiment with 4,307 servicemen, 33 tanks, 220 fighting infantry vehicles, 30 artillery systems, and 14 air-defence systems).¹⁹ On the basis of an agreement with South Ossetia, Russia operates the 4th Military Base in Tskhinvali in South Ossetia, which hosts tactical missiles and anti-missile rockets, among other weapons. A small component is located in the second largest city of Java.International Crisis Group, ‘South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition’, Report No 205, 7 June 2010, pp 7–8; B. Piven, ‘Russia Expands Military Footprint Abroad with New Syria Base’, Al Jazeera, 18 September 2015; ‘Russian Military Bases Abroad: Facts and Details’, Sputnik, 7 October 2016. In Georgia v Russia (II), Russia itself acknowledged the creation of the 4th military base after the signing of the agreement with South Ossetia in 2010 and claimed it ‘had held 3,285 servicemen and had 305 items of military equipment’.²⁰ Russian Armed Forces also conduct large military exercises in South Ossetia.²¹

The 2015 Alliance and Integration Treaty between Russia and South Ossetia foresees the formation of a common defence and security space and provides for a mutual defence pact. In fact, under the treaty, Russia ensures the defence and security of South Ossetia, including its border with Georgia.²⁵ As established by the 2015 Alliance and Integration Treaty, an intergovernmental agreement was signed between South Ossetia and Russia in 2017 specifying the modalities of incorporation of some military units of South Ossetia into the Russian Armed Forces. However, the agreement requires that the soldiers who decide to serve in the Russian Armed Forces first resign from the so-called South Ossetian army.²⁶ In fact, the negotiations preceding the conclusion of the 2017 intergovernmental agreement raised the question whether the separate South Ossetian army should be maintained at all. Ultimately, some separate defence structures were preserved.²⁷ Nevertheless, the so-called South Ossetian army is rather small, amounting up to 800 troops. Moreover, a number of senior security officials in South Ossetia are in fact seconded from Russia.²⁸

More broadly, since 2008, Russia has increased its presence in military, political and economic terms. Demonstrative of Russia’s level of control is the fact that it provides direct financial aid to South Ossetia. Since 2008, this aid comprises 99% of South Ossetia’s budget and more than half of the government staff are from Russia.²⁹ The ECtHR referred to various reports containing the information as to ‘the relationship of dependency not only in economic and financial, but also in military and political terms between the Russian Federation and South Ossetia’.³⁰ Russia controls decision making in key spheres such as the border, public order and external relations.³¹

In sum, Russia occupies South Ossetia through the presence of its regular troops underpinned by a series of agreements with the separatist territory. In addition, the local separatist armed groups could also be seen as Russia’s proxies given their rather modest size, high level of coordination with the Russian Armed Forces, command structures staffed by the Russian citizens, and the military and financial support provided by Russia.

Views of the parties to the conflict and the international community

The subjective views of the parties may be an indicator, but are not determinative for the classification of a situation.

Georgia considers that Russia is occupying South Ossetia and Abkhazia.³² Russia denies being an occupying power.

After the 2008 war, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe denounced the Russian use of force as ‘a violation of Council of Europe principles’ and pointed out that it ‘led to the occupation of a significant part of the territory of Georgia’.³³ where the General Assembly points out that ‘under international law, Russia bears responsibility for violations of human rights and humanitarian law in those areas that fall under its de facto control.’ While not expressly calling Russia an occupying power, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe stated in May 2017 that ‘Georgia, as the only sovereign State under international law over its regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, is still prevented from exercising legitimate jurisdiction over these regions due to the illegal actions of the Russian Federation, including its continuing military presence therein’.³⁴

In 2018, the High Representative of the European Union declared that ‘Russian military presence in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia continues in violation of international law’, in response to the 10-year anniversary of the conflict.³⁵ The United States has repeatedly described Abkhazia and South Ossetia as being occupied by Russia.³⁶ The 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, which was signed and became law in May 2017, included a provision referencing the ‘Russian occupied Georgian territories of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia’.³⁷

1
Art 42, 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs on Land.
2
T. Ferraro ‘Determining the Beginning and End of an Occupation Under International Humanitarian Law’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol 94, No 885 (2012) 158ff.
3
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), (Case No IT-94-1-A), 15 July 1999, para 137.
4
Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, ‘Guide on Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Obligations to Respect Human Rights – Concepts of “Jurisdiction” and Imputability’, updated on 31 December 2019, p 17.
5
ECtHR, Georgia v Russia (II), Judgment (Grand Chamber), 21 January 2021, paras 174–75.
6
ECtHR, Georgia v Russia (II), Grand Chamber, Judgment, App no 38263/08, 21 January 2021, paras 52 (headline), 83, 145 (headline), and 173.
7
International Crisis Group, ‘Abkhazia: The Long Road to Reconciliation’, Report No 224, 10 April 2013, p 3.
8
International Crisis Group, ‘Abkhazia: The Long Road to Reconciliation’, Report No 224, 10 April 2013, pp. 3-4; International Crisis Group, ‘Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence’, Report No 202, 26 February 2010, pp 3-4.
9
‘Russia Gains Military Base in Abkhazia’, RFERL, 17 February 2010.
10
ECtHR, Georgia v Russia (II), Judgment (Grand Chamber), 21 January 2021, para 150 and see also para 165.
11
B. Piven, ‘Russia Expands Military Footprint Abroad with New Syria Base’, Al Jazeera, 18 September 2015.
12
‘Moscow, Sokhumi Sign Treaty on “Alliance and Strategic Partnership”’, Civil.Ge Daily News Online, 24 November 2014. See also A. Bellal (ed), The War Report. Armed Conflict in 2014, Oxford University Press, 2015, p 85.
13
‘Law on Ratification of Russia-Abkhazia Agreement on Joint Group of Forces’, Kremlin, 21 November 2016; ‘Russian Parliament Ratifies Agreement on Joint Russia-Abkhazia Group of Forces’, TASS, 2 November 2016.
14
International Crisis Group, ‘Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence’, Report No 202, 26 February 2010, p 5.
15
International Crisis Group, ‘Abkhazia: The Long Road to Reconciliation’, Report No 224, 10 April 2013, pp 6–8.
16
M. Mackinnon, ‘Back to the USSR: Putin and the new Cold War’, The Globe and Mail, 16 March 2018, International Crisis Group, ‘Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence’, Report No 202, 26 February 2010.
17
ECtHR, Georgia v Russia (II), Judgment (Grand Chamber), 21 January 2021, para 167 and cf also paras 166, 168, 174.
18
International Crisis Group, ‘Abkhazia: The Long Road to Reconciliation’, Report No 224, 10 April 2013, p 5.
19
ECtHR, Georgia v Russia (II), Judgment (Grand Chamber), 21 January 2021, para 165 and see para 150.
20
ECtHR, Georgia v Russia (II), Judgment (Grand Chamber), 21 January 2021, para 150 and see para 165.
21
‘Russia Concludes Drills Involving Some 4,000 Troops in South Ossetia’, Sputnik, 26 September 2016.
22
R. Coalson, ‘Russia Steps Up Cooperation with Breakaway Georgian Regions’, RFERL, 30 April 2009; International Crisis Group, ‘South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition’, Report No 205, 7 June 2010, p 7; ECtHR, Georgia v Russia (II), Judgment (Grand Chamber), 21 January 2021, para 172.
23
S. Saari, ‘The New Alliance and Integration Treaty between Russia and South Ossetia: When Does Integration Turn Into Annexation?’, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, March 2015.
24
A. North, ‘Georgia Accuses Russia of Violating International Law Over South Ossetia’, The Guardian, 14 July 2015; Global Security, South Ossetia.
25
‘Russia and South Ossetia to Sign Treaty on Alliance and Integration’, TASS, 18 March 2015; M. Otarashvili, ‘Russia’s Quiet Annexation of South Ossetia’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 11 April 2017.
26
L. Fuller, ‘Putin Gives Green Light For Incorporating Some South Ossetian Units Into Russian Army’, RFERL, 20 March 2017.
27
J. Kucera, ‘South Ossetia Keeps Its Military, For Now’, Eurasianet, 19 January 2017.
28
J. Kucera, ‘South Ossetia Keeps Its Military, For Now’, Eurasianet, 19 January 2017; S. Saari, ‘The New Alliance and Integration Treaty between Russia and South Ossetia: When Does Integration Turn Into Annexation?’, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, March 2015; ECtHR, Georgia v Russia (II), Judgment (Grand Chamber), 21 January 2021, paras 169–70.
29
International Crisis Group, ‘South Ossetia: Rise of a New Politics and Foreign Policy’, 17 February 2012; and ‘South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition’, Report No 205, 7 June 2010.
30
ECtHR, Georgia v Russia (II), Judgment (Grand Chamber), 21 January 2021, para 167 and cf also paras 166, 168, and 174.
31
International Crisis Group, ‘South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition’, Report No 205, 7 June 2010. For a similar assessment of the Russian influence, see N. Kalandarishvili-Mueller, ‘On the Occasion of the Five-year Anniversary of the Russian-Georgian War: Is Georgia Occupied?’, Blog entry, EJIL: Talk!, 1 October 2013.
32
International Court of Justice (ICJ), Case Concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v Russian Federation), Decision on Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 15 October 2008, para 44; ECtHR, Georgia v Russia (II), Admissibility Decision, 13 December 2011, paras 24–25.
33
Resolution 1633 (2008), Parliamentary Assembly, 2 October 2008. See also Resolution 1683 (2009), Parliamentary Assembly, 29 September 2009, para 10
34
Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, The Council of Europe and the Conflict in Georgia, Decision, Doc CM/DEL/DEC(2017)1285/2.1, 1285th Meeting, 3 May 2017.
35
General Secretariat of the Council, Press office, ‘Declaration of the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the 10 years anniversary of the conflict between Russia and Georgia’, 7 August 2018.
36
Ambassador Daniel B. Baer, Violations of the Rights of Residents of Georgia’s Occupied Regions: Statement at the PC, Statement to OSCE Permanent Council, 3 March 2016.
37
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Sec 7070 (C)(1). See also ‘Donald Trump signs legislative act, which recognizes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali as regions occupied by Russia’, Georgia Today, 8 May 2017; A. Wigglesworth, ‘Trump Welcomes Georgia’s Prime Minister’, Los Angeles Times, 8 May 2017.

State Parties

Georgia
Russia, including through its proxies (the separatist authorities)

1
N. Kalandarishvili-Mueller, ‘On the Occasion of the Five-year Anniversary of the Russian-Georgian War: Is Georgia Occupied?’, Blog entry, EJIL: Talk!, 1 October 2013; International Crisis Group, ‘South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition’, Report No 205, 7 June 2010, p 2; Agreement on Principles of Settlement of the Georgian Ossetian Conflict (Sochi Agreement), 24 June 1992; A. Bellal (ed.), The War Report. Armed Conflict in 2014, Oxford University Press, 2015, p 83ff. For an in-depth review, see Independent International Fact Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, Volume II, 2009, p 61ff.
2
Global Security, South Ossetia; ‘South Ossetia Profile’, BBC, 21 April 2006.
3
‘Chronology for Abkhazians in Georgia’, 2004; ‘Abkhazia Profile’, BBC, 10 August 2017.
4
UNSC Resolution 849, 9 July 1993, second preambular para; UNSC Resolution 876, 19 October 1993, operative para 1; UNSCResolution 1808 (2008), operative para 1.
5
A. Bellal (ed.), The War Report. Armed Conflict in 2014, Oxford University Press, 2015, p 83ff; Human Rights Watch, Up in Flames. Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict over South Ossetia, Report, 23 January 2003; Independent International Fact Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, Volume 1, 2009.
6
International Crisis Group, Georgia-Russia: Still Insecure and Dangerous, Europe Policy Briefing No 53, 22 June 2009; Independent International Fact Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, Volume 1, 2009, p 21.
7
‘Six-Point Ceasefire Plan’, 12 August 2008.
8
Institute for War & Peace Reporting, August 2008 Russian-Georgian War: Timeline.
9
G. Lomsadze, ‘Syria Formally Recognizes Abkhazia and South Ossetia’, Eurasianet, 29 May 2018; G. Lomsadze, ‘Abkhazia: Vanuatu Changes Its Mind Again’, Eurasianet, 18 March 2013.
10
‘EU Condemns Moscow’s Recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia’, Spiegel Online, 1 September 2008; OSCE, OSCE Chairman Condemns Russia’s Recognition of South Ossetia, Abkhazia Independence, OSCE Press Release, 26 August 2008.
11
N. Kalandarishvili-Mueller, ‘Guest Post: The Status of the Territory Unchanged: Russia’s Treaties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia‘, Opinio Juris, 20 April 2015.
12
‘South Ossetian Leader Says Breakaway Georgian Region Seeks Vote To Join Russia’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 31 March 2022; G. Menabde, ‘Georgia’s Separatist Region of South Ossetia Plans to Join Russia’, Jamestown, Vol. 19 No. 50, 4 August 2022.
13
‘Georgia’s South Ossetia cancels referendum on joining Russia’, Al Jazeera, 31 May 2022.
14
‘Breakaway Georgian region is discussing becoming part of Russia, says local official’, Reuters, 14 March 2024.
15
Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2023: Abkhazia.
16
‘Protesters storm parliament in Georgia separatist region Abkhazia over deal with Russia’, France 24, 15 Nivemeber 2024; T. Kelmendi and S. Kapanadze, ‘Occupational therapy: Frozen conflicts, Russian aggression and EU enlargement’, European Council of Foreign Relations, 4 August 2025.
17
F. Light, ‘Russia restores visa-free access for Georgians, lifts flight ban; Tbilisi happy’, Reuters, 10 May 2023; ‘Georgia to resume flights to Russia this week, drawing EU and Ukrainian criticism’, Reuters, 20 May 2023.
18
P. Kirby, ‘Georgia drops ‘foreign agents’ law after protests’, BBC News, 9 March 2023; Human Right Watch, ‘Georgia: Drop Repressive ‘Foreign Agents’ Bill’, 26 March 2025.
19
P. Kirby, ‘Georgia drops ‘foreign agents’ law after protests’, BBC News, 9 March 2023 ; F. Light, ‘Georgian parliament passes ‘foreign agent’ bill, prompting US anger, new protests’, Swiss Info, 15 May 2024; F. Light, ‘What is Georgia’s ‘foreign agents’ bill and why does it matter?’, Reuters, 28 May 2024; M. Homan, ‘Georgia House passes bill targeting political spending from ‘hostile’ foreign agents’, Gorgia Recorder, 16 March 2026.
20
P. Sauer, ‘Georgia’s ruling pro-Russia party retains power in blow to EU aspirations’, The Guardian, 27 October 2024.
21
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Georgia: Parliamentary Elections 26 October 2024, Final Report, 20 December 2024.
22
P. Sauer, ‘Georgia’s ruling pro-Russia party retains power in blow to EU aspirations’, The Guardian, 27 October 2024.
23
G. Faulconbridge, ‘Russia plans naval base in Abkhazia, triggering criticism from Georgia’, Reuters, 5 October 2023.
24
‘Russia may launch naval base in Georgian breakaway region in 2024’, Reuters, 12 January 2024.
25
T. Kelmendi and S. Kapanadze, ‘Occupational therapy: Frozen conflicts, Russian aggression and EU enlargement’, European Council of Foreign Relations, 4 August 2025.
26
‘Protesters storm parliament in Georgia separatist region Abkhazia over deal with Russia’, France 24, 15 November 2024; L. Papachristou, F. Lebedev and M. Trevelyan, ‘Protesters demand leader’s ouster in Russian-backed breakaway region of Georgia’, Reuters 16 November 2024; ‘In Georgian breakaway Abkhazia, protesters refuse to leave parliament’, Reuters, 16 November 2024.
27
L. Kelly, ‘New leader takes over after protests in breakaway Georgian region’, Reuters, 20 November 2024; ‘Parliament in breakaway Georgian region votes against investment agreement with Russia’, Reuters, 3 December 2024.
28
‘Russia to start humanitarian supplies of electricity to breakaway Georgian region’, Reuters, 22 December 2024; ‘Russia to supply more electricity to breakaway Georgian region’, Reuters, 6 February 2025.
29
‘Putin promises continued electricity supplies in meeting with breakaway Abkhazia’s leader’, Reuters, 5 March 2025.
30
‘Russia resumes flights to breakaway Georgian region for first time in decades’, Reuters, 7 February 2025.
31
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, ‘Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the 65th Round of the Geneva International Discussions’, 12 November 2025; Delegation of the European Union to the International Organisations in Vienna, EU Statement on the 65th round of the Geneva International Discussions, 27 November 2025.
32
OSCE Chairpersonship, Press communiqué of the Co-Chairs of the Geneva International Discussions, 26 June 2025; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, ‘Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the 65th Round of the Geneva International Discussions’, 12 November 2025; Delegation of the European Union to the International Organisations in Vienna, EU Statement on the 65th round of the Geneva International Discussions, 27 November 2025; G. Menabde, ‘Russia Seeks Georgia’s Concession on Breakaway Regions’, Jamestown, 20 January 2026.

Georgia – Russia

Reporting period: July 2023 - June 2025

Discussions over South Ossetia annexation

Abkhazia independence stance

Partial normalization between Georgia and Russia

‘Foreign agent’ bill and related protests, and contested Georgian parliamentary election results

Reinforcement of relations between separatist regions and Russia, and subsequent discontent

International and regional initiatives and their stalemate

Military occupation of Georgia by Russia

Abkhazia

South Ossetia

Views of the parties to the conflict and the international community

State Parties

Georgia – Russia

Reporting period: July 2023 - June 2025

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (between 2023 and 2025)

Discussions over South Ossetia annexation

Abkhazia independence stance

Partial normalization between Georgia and Russia

‘Foreign agent’ bill and related protests, and contested Georgian parliamentary election results

Reinforcement of relations between separatist regions and Russia, and subsequent discontent

International and regional initiatives and their stalemate

Non-International Armed Conflicts

Abkhazia

South Ossetia

Views of the parties to the conflict and the international community

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties