Snapshot
An international armed conflict (IAC) between Russia and Ukraine, triggered in 2014 by Russia’s intervention and occupation of Crimea, persisted during the period under review, with Russian belligerent occupation of several Ukrainian regions and failed attempts at a peace deal. In 2022 Russia launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine, occupied further Ukrainian territories and conducted prolonged operations, while Ukraine also carried out strikes inside Russia. During the reporting period Ukraine temporarily occupied parts of the Kursk region in Russia. Belarus provided extensive support to Russia without being generally regarded as a party to the armed conflict; the same applies to other States who have provided support in the form of weapon delivery and intelligence sharing. Conversely, the fact that some of its troops are directly involved in military confrontations with Ukraine makes North Korea a co-belligerent alongside Russia.
Classification(s) and Parties to the Conflict(s)
- IAC between the Russian Federation and North Korea, on one side, and Ukraine, on the other
- Military occupation of parts of the territory of Ukraine by the Russian Federation
- Military occupation of part of the Kursk region (Russian Federation) by Ukraine (ended April 2025)
During 2026 the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine continued to cause extensive civilian harm, largely due to Russian attacks on civilians and civilian objects that were systematic or indiscriminate. Civilian casualties in the first half of 2026 were 37 per cent higher than in the same period of 2025, and casualties from short-range drones near the frontline reached their highest monthly level since February 2022. Russia used cluster munitions in an attack on Kyiv in August 2026 and was accused of repeatedly using tear gas in the trenches, in breach of IHL. Double tap strikes persisted, including on a shopping centre in Kryvyi Rih that killed at least sixteen people. Russian forces systematically mistreated detainees, using sexual violence as a form of torture against prisoners of war and civilians. Ukraine continued to use, produce and stockpile anti-personnel mines, and struck Russian oil facilities, ports and merchant vessels.
Classification
Historical Background
First phase of conflict (2014–22)
Following mass protests and a change of government in Ukraine, in early 2014 unidentified forces (later acknowledged as Russian servicemen) took control of Crimea and local de facto authorities organized a referendum and accession process to Russia. In eastern Ukraine, armed groups in Donetsk and Luhansk seized public buildings, declared independence as ‘People’s Republics’, and fought Ukrainian forces. Ceasefire arrangements under the Minsk process failed to end hostilities, which continued with fluctuating intensity. Volodymyr Zelensky was elected President of Ukraine in 2019.
Legal classification (2014–22)
The situation in the Donbas between 2014 and 2022 was commonly treated as a non-international armed conflict between Ukraine, on the one hand, and the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (DPR) and the ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ (LPR), on the other hand. However, multiple judicial and expert assessments have concluded that Russia exercised overall control over the armed groups in eastern Ukraine from mid-2014, making the armed conflict in those regions an international one between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. In parallel, Russia’s direct military involvement on Ukrainian territory and the status of Crimea triggered an international armed conflict and a belligerent occupation of the peninsula by the Russian Federation.
Large-scale invasion from 2022
In 2021, tensions escalated between Russia, on the one hand, and Ukraine and several Western States, on the other. In January 2021, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky adopted a more assertive stance towards Russia, and sought to initiate discussions about the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO. President Putin ordered massive deployments of Russian troops along the Ukrainian border. On 21 February 2022, Russia recognized the ‘independence and sovereignty’ of the DPR and LPR and subsequently launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine from both Russian and Belarusian territory. The Russian offensive expanded across multiple fronts and was later followed by claims to ‘incorporate’ the additional occupied regions of Ukraine in addition to the DPR and LPR. Intense fighting ensued in the east and south, while Ukraine conducted airstrikes into Russian territory. Martial law led to the postponement of scheduled elections in Ukraine.
Foreign involvement
Belarus provided extensive facilitation to Russian operations, though whether it became a party to the armed conflict depends on evidence that direct participation or sufficiently direct connection to ensuing harm could be attributed to it. External military assistance by other States without direct participation (such as by delivering weapons or providing general military intelligence) did not make them parties to the conflict. The same situation applies to the enlistment or conscription of foreign nationals in the armed forces of one of the parties.
Key Developments (2023–2025)
The reporting period saw two major developments:
- Hostilities and territorial control: Hostilities between the Russian Federation and Ukraine continued. Beginning 6 August 2024, a Ukrainian counter-offensive in the Kursk region opened a new front in the north-east of Ukraine and, for the first time, saw combat on Russian territory. Ukrainian forces gained control over parts of Kursk and Belgorod in the Russian Federation, and later reported establishing a military commandant’s office to administer Russian areas under their authority. According to Ukrainian statements, the commandant’s office was intended to ensure order and meet local needs in areas under Ukrainian control. Russian efforts to reverse these gains intensified through late 2024 and early 2025. On 26 April 2025, Russia reported restoring authority over the last populated area of Kursk previously held by Ukraine and announced the creation of a security zone in Ukraine’s Sumy region.
- Foreign involvement: From October 2024, reports indicated the deployment and training of North Korean servicemen in the Kursk region, with visual material showing personnel in Russian uniforms and subsequent accounts of North Korean soldiers captured in combat. On 26 April 2025, Russian officials publicly acknowledged North Korean participation in hostilities in Kursk, and the North Korean state news agency confirmed this role the same day.
International Armed Conflict
The Russian Federation (and support forces) vs Ukraine
During the reporting period, an IAC was ongoing between Russia and Ukraine. From 30 September 2022, following the purported incorporation of the DPR and LPR into the Russian Federation, members of the two regions’ armed formations were granted the status of personnel of the regular Russian armed forces. From that date, these formations qualify as de jure organs of the Russian Federation and their conduct is attributable to Russia irrespective of the degree of control exercised over them.
Since March 2014 Russia has occupied Crimea, and since February 2022 it has occupied extensive areas in southern and eastern Ukraine. Judicial findings have confirmed Russia’s effective control over substantial parts of Ukrainian territory. The purported annexations by Russia of Crimea and Sevastopol in 2014 and of parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia in 2022 do not alter the legal status under international law of these territories nor that of their inhabitants. Accordingly, these areas remain under belligerent occupation irrespective of Russia’s unilateral claims, and the international armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine continues.
For several months between 2024 and 2025, Ukrainian forces reportedly substituted their authority for that of Russian authorities over more than 1,000 square kilometres of Russian territory (encompassing dozens of localities from which Russian forces had withdrawn) and announced the opening of an office to administer the area. On this basis, parts of the Kursk region in the Russian Federation could be considered under belligerent occupation from August 2024 until Russia regained control in April 2025. Neither the continuation of hostilities in the region, nor the fact that the Kursk region was not entirely under the authority of Ukrainian forces, would preclude characterizing as occupied those areas where the latter exercised effective control.
While public details of Russia–DPRK cooperation remain limited, Russia has invoked the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and its clause providing for mutual assistance in case of armed aggression as the legal basis for requesting DPRK support. Although some DPRK personnel were reportedly handed Russian uniforms and were presented as members of Russian ethnic minorities, this is not in itself sufficient evidence of a relinquishment of North Korean authority. On the available facts, DPRK forces have directly engaged Ukrainian forces and thus employed armed force against Ukraine. North Korea therefore qualifies as a party to the international armed conflict with Ukraine, fighting as a co-belligerent alongside Russia. This conclusion is reinforced by subsequent public acknowledgments, both by Russia and by North Korea, of the deployment of DPRK troops.
Parties to the Conflict(s)
State Parties
- Russian Federation
- Ukraine
- Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
Civilian Harm
Reporting period: 2026
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS
Russia appears to have abandoned any pretence of limiting its attacks to military targets. It has continued to perpetrate international crimes in its targeting of civilians and civilian objects. Ukraine has been targeting Russian oil facilities, ports, merchant vessels, and other ostensibly civilian targets in a strategy designed to impose economic and political costs on Russia.
Use of Chemical Weapons
Ukraine has made highly credible accusations that Russia has used tear gas to clear trenches and has reported more than 1,200 such incidents since the beginning of the invasion in 2022. The use of riot-control agents is explicitly prohibited as a method of warfare under the Chemical Weapons Convention and customary IHL.
Use of Armed Drones
In June 2026, the UN Human Rights Office reported that civilian casualties near the frontline caused by short-range drones reached their highest monthly level since 24 February 2022 – 89 killed and 588 injured. In many instances, Russian forces have continued to target civilians in circumstances where they would certainly have known of the protected status of the victims.
Use of Cluster Munitions
Russia used cluster munitions in a ballistic missile attack on Kyiv on 5 August 2026, in what Human Rights Watch said should be investigated as a possible war crime. The attack is said to have killed three people at a sorting centre belonging to Nova Poshta, Ukraine’s largest private courier and mail service. Nova Poshta is a civilian object protected against attack.
Use of Landmines
Ukraine continues to commit the most serious violations in the history of the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention through its use, production, and stockpiling of anti-personnel mines. In 2025, Ukraine attempted to illegally suspend its implementation of the Convention, but this was rejected by the other State Parties as an illegal measure. There is already a massive landmine problem across much of eastern Ukraine, largely the result of use of mines by Russia.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE
Significant numbers of Russian attacks have targeted civilian objects in Ukraine, some of which amount to terror attacks. On 21 August 2026, at least sixteen people were killed in a ‘double-tap’ Russian drone strike on a shopping centre in Kryvyi Rih in the centre of Ukraine. More than one hundred and thirty people, including twenty-two children, were wounded in the strikes.
VIOLATIONS AGAINST PERSONS IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY
Russian soldiers mistreat those they detain on a systematic basis, including through torture and/or other depraved acts of sexual violence.
In a report on sexual violence related to the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine covering more than four years, OHCHR documented 1,004 cases of sexual violence perpetrated in both detention and non-detention contexts. The Office further noted that their findings, while representative, were not a comprehensive account of sexual violence, which in Ukraine is under-reported. OHCHR concluded that sexual violence has been used as a method of torture and other ill-treatment or punishment against both prisoners of war and civilians. The overwhelming majority of the cases it had verified – 89% of the total – were attributed to Russia