Non-international armed conflict in Chad

Historical Background

Origins and context

Chad is a landlocked State bordering several conflict-affected countries. As a result, concurrent violence in neighbouring border areas and inside Chad is viewed as a threat multiplier. In this context, Boko Haram, active in Nigeria since at least 2009, expanded its operations beyond Nigerian territory from at least 2014, and engaged in violence in Chad after Chadian forces pursued Boko Haram in neighbouring States. These dynamics culminated in the triggering of a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) between Chad and Boko Haram in 2015.

Regional security efforts

Boko Haram’s widened operational footprint prompted the reactivation of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) by the African Union (AU), composed of forces from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, although Niger later withdrew. The MNJTF deployment framework assigns a sector encompassing the Lake Chad region, including Baga Sola, with Chadian contingents tasked with combating Boko Haram on Chadian territory.

Aggravating factors

The security situation around Lake Chad is further compounded by impacts of climate change, extreme poverty, and cross-border violence, as reflected in Chad’s low Human Development Index ranking.

Key Developments (2023–2025)

The reporting period saw several major developments:

1. French Withdrawal from Chad: Chad ended its long-standing security cooperation with France in late 2024, citing a desire to review its strategic partnerships and reaffirm its sovereignty, amid suggestions that it may seek alternative security support provided by Russia. France started withdrawing in December 2024, with its last troops leaving N’Djamena before the end of January 2025.

2. Renewal of MNJTF: Against continued Boko Haram activity, the African Union renewed the MNJTF mandate for a further year from February 2025 and called for a coordinated and sustained regional response, echoed by United States (US) appeals for continued engagement. The European Union (EU) pledged additional funding in support of efforts to tackle Boko Haram.

3. Chad’s Humanitarian Crisis: Ongoing NIACs, intercommunal violence and climate change, leading to desertification, drought, and floods, contributed to a severe and complex humanitarian situation, compounded by health emergencies and underfunding. Displacement pressures encompassed both regional and internal displacement, alongside a sharp increase in Sudanese refugee arrivals in western Chad, particularly after El Fasher fell to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in late October 2025.

4. Intercommunal or Herder/Farmer Violence: Resource competition intensified farmer-herder violence, including recurrent deadly clashes and burning of fields and harm to cattle. Reported patterns indicate increasingly frequent and severe violence, with notable incidents linked to access to land and water.

5. Possible New Armed Groups Alliance and Regional Tensions: The disarmament of the Union of Democratic Forces for Democracy (UFDD), a Chadian armed group founded in 2006 by an ex-government minister with the aim of overthrowing the government of President Idriss Deby, remained uncertain amid concerns of rearmament. Reported efforts to form new coalitions and alliances among other armed groups, including the the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCMSR) and Movement for Peace, Reconstruction and Development (MPRD), did not appear linked to active hostilities during the period. Allegations that Chad supported the RSF, including by facilitating weapons transfers by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), caused continued friction with Sudan, leading to formal complaints and contributing to cross-border incidents and cyber-attacks.