Mozambique (2026-08-17)

In the reporting period in Mozambique, there was one non-international armed conflict (NIAC) – Mozambique (and support forces) v. Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISM).

Mozambique is a party to Additional Protocol II of 1977 (AP II), and this conflict is regulated directly by the Protocol, as well as by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 ¹, and customary international humanitarian law (IHL).²

The province of Cabo Delgado has long been a region of significant potential for conflict.³ In 2007, sections of disaffected youth in the southern districts of the province, predominantly Makua, voiced discontent over local religious authorities, particularly those with close ties to the Islamic Council of Mozambique (CISLAMO).⁴ By 2015, ethnic Mwani militants in Mocímboa da Praia were active in the area, seeking to ban the consumption of alcohol and opposing the enrolment of children in state schools and the right of women to work.⁵ Their cause was fuelled by economic exclusion following the discovery of rubies and natural gas in the area.⁶ There was also said to be resentment over the influence of liberation-era generals from President Filipe Nyusi’s Makonde ethnic group, which had business interests in the province.⁷

In early 2017, authorities initiated the removal of artisanal miners from commercial mining concessions, exacerbating local discontent.⁸ The Cabo Delgado conflict that continues today effectively began in October 2017 following an encounter between local law enforcement officials and men affiliated with an Islamist group, designated locally as ‘Al-Shabaab’ and known as Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISM), which had launched a series of attacks on police stations and briefly occupied the port town of Mocímboa da Praia.⁹ From the time of its inception, ISM has demonstrated consistent operational activity across different levels of intensity.¹⁰ At the outset it should be clear that Ansar al Sunnah, Al-Shabaab and ISM are the same non-Sstate armed group. The name Al-Shabaab is a local term that means ‘youth’ and is not a reference to Al-Shabaab Somalia.¹¹

Since 2023, leadership figures in ISM have been killed (see previous version of the Mozambique entry on WAR Watch). Bonomade Machude Omar (also known as Ibn Omar) was the leader of ISM from 2017, when the conflict began, to August 2023 when he was killed by the Mozambican armed forces.¹² In March 2024, the former Mozambican Minister of Interior, Pascoal Ronda, declared that ISM had undergone a leadership transition and had adopted new strategies in the aftermath of the expulsion from their headquarters and the death of their leaders.¹³ He further asserted that most of the new leaders were present in the districts of Macomia and Quissanga in the Cabo Delgado province.¹⁴

Filipe Nyusi, the former Mozambican president, announced on 25 September 2024 that ISM’s new leader was the Tanzanian national Abu Zainabo (known as Ulanga), who considers himself the group’s spiritual leader. He is supported by Sarid Suleimane Arune, Abu Munir (known as Quadrado), Sileimane Nguvo Toto, Mahamudo Ibrahim Dade, and Rafael Mazubo.¹⁵ Some of these names, though, are known to be pseudonyms.¹⁶ As stated in the United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team’s February 2025 report on ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals and entities, Abu Zainabo continues to serve as the primary leader of ISM.¹⁷

The Mozambican military has endeavoured, with varying degrees of success, to contain the group.¹⁸On occasion, these efforts involved the deployment of foreign private military companies such as the Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) from South Africa and other security forces including the Wagner Group.¹⁹

In terms of international intervention, the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), which consists of frontline troops from Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Tanzania, initially deployed in the middle of 2021, concluding its mission on 15 July 2024.²⁰ SAMIM, for the most part, operated in parallel with the Rwandan Security Forces (RSF), which remained operational at the time of writing.²¹ Additionally, the Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF) has fought ISM in Cabo Delgado’s Nangade district since July 2021, first as a part of SAMIM and, since October 2022, through a bilateral agreement with Mozambique.²² Although SAMIM withdrew in July 2024, the TPDF has remained in Mozambique, making Tanzania a key player in the counterinsurgency and stabilisation operations.²³ As per the ICRC’s support-based approach, Tanzania is a party to this NIAC. Tanzania is consequently bound by the law of NIAC as its military is participating in the pre-existing ongoing NIAC between Mozambique and ISM.²⁴

In addition to Tanzania, South Africa, for a time, continued bilateral force deployments.²⁵ On 22 April 2024, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa declared that the deployment of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in Cabo Delgado would be extended only until 31 December 2024.²⁶ As per the support-based approach introduced by the ICRC, South Africa was a party to this NIAC until its withdrawal was completed.²⁷ As of 24 March 2025, the SANDF was no longer reported to be in Mozambique.²⁸

An ISM attack on Palma town in July 2021 led to the suspension of the nearby LNG project and the deployment of Rwandan forces in Cabo Delgado. This deployment occurred approximately one month before the deployment of SAMIM.²⁹ Both Rwanda and SAMIM had troops operating alongside each other until SAMIM’s withdrawal in July 2024.³⁰

As of May 2024, the frequency and intensity of fighting between the RSF and ISM had increased substantially.³¹ Rwanda’s initial defence posture shifted during 2024,³² as a possible result of the withdrawal of SAMIM.³³

On 27 May 2024, Rwanda announced the deployment of an additional 2,000 troops to Cabo Delgado, seeking both to improve security in the province and to replace the withdrawing SAMIM forces.³⁴On 3 July 2024, in the face of growing international criticism of Rwanda’s alleged involvement in backing Congolese rebel group M23, the EU postponed a decision on €20 million of financial support to Rwandan troops in Cabo Delgado.³⁵ The funds were, however, granted in November 2024.³⁶

The European Union (EU) also has a presence in Mozambique, although it is not engaged in hostilities. The European Union’s military training and capacity-building partnership with Mozambique initially took the form of the EU Training Mission Mozambique (EUTM), which was formally initiated on 15 October 2021 at the request of the Mozambican government to support its armed forces through a training and capacity-building mission. The programme included the training of select Mozambican units into 11 Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs), with the objective of supporting the armed forces in their efforts to restore safety and security to Cabo Delgado.³⁷

On 6 March 2024, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) reached agreement within the framework of the EU’s strategic review of the EUTM to extend the mission until 30 June 2026. On 16 April 2024, the PSC agreed that, between June and September 2024, the mission would transition to a support model, combining advice, mentoring, and specialized training for Mozambique’s QRF, and that it would be renamed the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM Mozambique).³⁸ EUMAM Mozambique is helping the QRF of the Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (FADM) establish a self-sufficient operational cycle by June 2026, and covering preparation, deployment, and support all in accordance with IHL and international human rights law.³⁹

The origins of the conflict are the subject of competing narratives, but the finding of rubies and natural gas deposits in the region as well as how these resources are governed are widely recognized as contributing factors in its escalation.⁴⁰ The discovery of substantial ruby deposits in Cabo Delgado attracted multinationals, including TotalEnergies, individuals seeking financial gain, and drew in miners from throughout East Africa in both regulated and unregulated operations.⁴¹When TotalEnergies assumed control of operations in 2019, the local population was forcibly removed from the site, prompting public demonstrations.⁴² Despite the signing of a security agreement in August 2020 between the Mozambican government and TotalEnergies, attacks continued in the vicinity of the project site.⁴³

In response to an escalating threat from the insurgency and notwithstanding the deployment of a dedicated Joint Task Force of Mozambican police and soldiers, TotalEnergies proceeded to evacuate the area of 500 staff in early January 2021.⁴⁴ In May 2025, TotalEnergies and its partners announced an intention to restart operations at the LNG project, which by then had lain dormant for almost four years.⁴⁵

Since the start of the armed conflict in 2017 and through to October 2024, more than 1.3 million people were internally displaced.⁴⁶ ISM has enhanced its territorial dominance, taking control of parts of Meluco district from early 2025.⁴⁷

Post-electoral violence since October 2024

Mozambique held elections on 9 October 2024 to elect the president and members of the Assembly (parliament) along with the members of provincial assemblies. On 24 October 2024, the National Elections Commission (Comissão Nacional de Eleições) announced the provisional results, declaring that the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, FRELIMO) had won 195 seats (78 per cent) in the Assembly, with their presidential candidate Daniel Chapo receiving 70.7 per cent in the presidential vote.⁴⁸

Shortly after the release of the election results, the independent opposition presidential candidate, Venâncio Mondlane, proclaimed victory and denounced the election results as ‘theft’ because of what were described as wide-scale violations, including ballot box stuffing, ‘ghost voters’, and the use of state resources to campaign for FRELIMO.⁴⁹ Massive protests, strikes, and paralysis in major cities, including Maputo, were triggered by Mondlane’s call for protests from 31 October 2024 onwards.⁵⁰

In November 2024, the country witnessed a period of widespread unrest, with protests and strikes taking place across the nation.⁵¹ These events, which were the most significant in recent history, included a ‘march’ on the capital, Maputo, and other major cities on 7 November 2024, resulting in clashes with the security forces and marking a significant escalation in internal tensions.⁵² According to UN human rights experts, a minimum of thirty unarmed protesters were deliberately killed.⁵³ The situation subsequently worsened, with opposition supporters beginning a week-long demonstration on 4 December 2024, following Mr Mondlane’s call for renewed resistance, and the Constitutional Court’s confirmation of the electoral result on 23 December.⁵⁴

The inauguration on 15 January 2025 of Daniel Chapo as president sparked renewed protests across the country.⁵⁵ At least fourteen people died in the protests, bringing the total number of demonstrators killed since October 2024 to more than 300.⁵⁶ However, from the middle of January 2025 on, protests became more sporadic and the level of violence dropped considerably.⁵⁷ On 21 January 2025, Mr Mondlane told the media that he would suspend the protests for the first 100 days of the Chapo administration, provided that 5,000 people detained during the demonstrations since October were released and that the families of those killed were compensated.⁵⁸ President Chapo and opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane met on 23 March 2025, resulting in Mr Mondlane’s announcement of an end to the violence.⁵⁹

International outcry

The former chief of European diplomacy, Josep Borrell, on 2 November 2024, made an appeal for ‘political dialogue, restraint and calm on all sides’ in Mozambique, and requested that the subsequent stages of the electoral process be conducted in accordance with the rule of law and in a transparent manner.⁶⁰ On 20 November 2024, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) held an extraordinary summit to discuss the situation in Mozambique. It extended its condolences for the ‘lives lost during post-election violence’.⁶¹

On 27 November 2024, the United States (US), United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, and Switzerland issued a joint statement strongly condemning the handling of the post-electoral protests by Mozambican security forces.⁶² Further, between 24 and 26 December 2024, the African Union, the European Union, and the US repeatedly expressed concern regarding the violence perpetrated by Mozambican security forces against unarmed protesters.⁶³ On 28 December 2024, South Africa sent a presidential envoy – former Security Minister Sydney Mufamadi – to confer with President Nyusi on the matter.⁶⁴

National political dialogue initiative

On 5 March 2025, an agreement on an ‘inclusive national political dialogue’ was signed in Maputo by Mozambican President Daniel Chapo and nine political parties, including FRELIMO (the Mozambique Liberation Front), PODEMOS (the Optimistic Party for the Development of Mozambique) and RENAMO (the Mozambican National Resistance).⁶⁵ The document they signed includes guidelines for future discussions on matters such as reforming electoral legislation, decentralization and potential constitutional amendments. However, Venâncio Mondlane, the most popular of Mozambique’s opposition politicians and the former presidential candidate, was absent from the signing ceremony.⁶⁶

On 26 March 2025, the President submitted the Bill approving the ‘Political Commitment for a National and Inclusive Dialogue’, which outlines the budget of the Technical Committee, whose role is to suggest working groups for producing proposals and recommendations on the Agreement’s priorities (constitutional review and governance) to the Assembly.⁶⁷ The Dialogue and Reform Bill was unanimously approved by parliament on 2 April 2025 and promulgated by President Chapo on 14 April 2025.⁶⁸

The Technical Committee, which has 21 members (18 from the nine parties that signed the agreement and 3 from civil society organizations), will have a budget of 91,471,200 Meticais (equivalent to approx. USD1.5 million).⁶⁹ Greater transparency in the appointment of the three civil society representatives is being demanded by the Mais Integridade (More Integrity) Electoral Consortium – a platform of seven Mozambican civil society organizations.⁷⁰

Since the initiation of a national dialogue in March 2025, Mr Mondlane’s position has changed as the following month he set up his own party called the National Alliance for a Free and Autonomous Mozambique (Aliança Nacional para um Moçambique Livre e Autônomo – Anamalala).⁷¹ Since then, President Chapo and Mr Mondlane have met twice ‘in the framework of the inclusive political dialogue with all strata of society’, with the latest meeting (at the time of writing) taking place on 20 May 2025.⁷²

ANAMOLA: A New Political Party Emerges

In June 2025, the Mozambican government filed charges against Mr Mondlane related to the post-election violence. On 10 June, he was given twenty days to respond to the case.⁷³ In July, the Attorney General’s Office of Mozambique charged Mr Mondlane with five more crimes that, upon conviction, are punishable by up to twenty years in jail.⁷⁴

Although these cases were pending against Mr Mondlane, he was able to register a new political party in August – the National Alliance for a Free and Autonomous Mozambique (ANAMOLA).⁷⁵ Within ten days of the launch, the party had more than 64,000 members.⁷⁶Although the party called to be included in the national dialogue being conducted under the Political Commitment for an Inclusive National Dialogue (see above), in particular the technical committee overseeing political dialogue,⁷⁷ it was not so included. In October, it launched a parallel consultation process.⁷⁸In December 2025, Mondlane reiterated the call for ANAMOLA to be part of the national dialogue, apparently after sensing that the government was more open to allowing it to join.⁷⁹

On 12 March 2026, ANAMOLA submitted a file to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and to Amnesty International, ‘denouncing serious, repeated and systematic human rights violations perpetrated against its members’, going to on allege that hundreds of ANAMOLA members had been subjected to violence and at least fifty-five members were killed in what the party called ‘a systematic pattern of violence targeting’ ANAMOLA members.⁸⁰ On 9 May 2026, Anselmo Vicente, political coordinator of ANAMOLA for the city of Chimoio was killed as he was leaving a meeting.⁸¹ By 11 May 2026, fifty-six ANAMOLA members had reportedly been killed⁸² with that number rising to fifty-seven on 15 May, when Pedro Cahuke, another member, was killed at his home in the southern Gaza province.⁸³ On 14 May 2026, Mondlane filed a formal complaint of political persecution with the Mozambican Attorney General’s Office.⁸⁴

Naparama self-defence militias clash with police

The Naparama is a Mozambican community paramilitary group that emerged in the 1980s during the civil war. They combine traditional knowledge and mystical elements in fighting their enemies. Historically, the Naparama consider themselves to be a force that organized spontaneously to defend the people in the face of war. Its members undergo initiation rites designed to give them alleged ‘supernatural protection’ that they believe makes them immune to bullets. In recent months, Mozambican authorities acknowledged a series of attacks on state institutions in parts of northern and central Mozambique, mainly the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Zambezia. These incursions are attributed to groups calling themselves Naparamas. However, it remains unclear whether they are part of the traditional Naparama community paramilitary group or a new movement.⁸⁵

The Naparama mobilized during 2022 to fight ISM in Cabo Delgado. They also participated in anti-government protests. During February 2025, there were reports that the Naparama had beheaded a local official in Zambezia’s Morrumbala town, reportedly after the official collaborated with security forces during the violent repression of post-election demonstrations.⁸⁶

On 6 February 2025, it was reported that Mozambican security forces had killed seven Naparama members near Namupla’s Angoche city during protests over the high cost of living.⁸⁷

Further clashes between the Naparama militias and Mozambican police occurred in March 2025 in Mutuali in Malema district which is in Nampula province. The police stated that they had killed at least five Naparama fighters, but other sources claim the number was as high as twenty-three. Local sources also suggest that wounded Naparama fighters were not assisted and some were even summarily executed. The clash was reportedly the result of the Naparamas raiding a police camp.⁸⁸

In July 2025, in Nivenevene village, in Chiúre district in Cabo Delgado, Naparamas militias reportedly tortured two policemen to death, later burning their bodies. The Naparamas accused the police of being terrorists who were infiltrating the village ahead of a possible attack from insurgents.⁸⁹

The police and the Naparamas clashed again in December 2025 when Naparama fighters, reportedly supported by ANAMOLA members (see above), attempted to enter buildings guarded by police in in Mogovolas district in Nampula province. According to the police, eight people were killed – one police officer and seven Naparamas – but ANAMOLA disputes, stating that only two people were killed and two others injured.⁹⁰ Kóxukhuro, a local civil society organization, disputed this version of events, claiming that the police killed thirty-eight miners in a targeted operation against small-scale and artisanal mining in the area.⁹¹

The situation that exists between Naparama and the government continues to be monitored for the purposes of classification as it might evolve over time due to the tense relationship between the Naparamas and the Mozambican State.

Developments regarding Mozambique’s LNG project

On 13 March 2025, the US Export-Import Bank approved a loan of USD4.7 billion to the liquid natural gas (LNG) project run by French oil conglomerate TotalEnergies. The project had been on hold since 2021 following an ISM attack that killed hundreds in Cabo Delgado’s Palma district.⁹² On 14 March 2025, French prosecutors launched an investigation into TotalEnergies over an alleged failure to ensure the safety of contractors during the Palma attack.⁹³ On 20 May 2025, TotalEnergies announced that it would seek approval to restart the Cabo Delgado LNG project by July or August 2025.⁹⁴

In June 2025, TotalEnergies was reportedly increasing security around its sites in the Palma district in order to resume its LNG project.⁹⁵ At the end of the same month, CEO of the company, Patrick Pouyanné, announced that it would restart work on its $20 billion LNG project by the end of the European summer season due to the improvement in the security situation.⁹⁶

In October 2025, four years after declaring force majeure on the LNG project, TotalEnergies official lifted it, though the company was still waiting for the approval of the Mozambican government.⁹⁷ And, at the end of January 2026, TotalEnergies announced the ‘full restart’ of the LNG project.⁹⁸

Mozambican Navy Attacks Civilian Fishers

The Mozambican Navy has reportedly been targeting civilian fishers on the Cabo Delgado coast. Several people were killed in July,⁹⁹ August,¹⁰⁰ September,¹⁰¹ and October 2025.¹⁰²

FADM denied the August 2025 attacks¹⁰³ and in October, the Rwandan Security Forces told community members at a meeting in Macomia district that it had raised the concern of targeting of fishers with the Mozambican government but had yet to receive a response.¹⁰⁴ After this meeting, there were no further reports of attacks in 2025.

Another FADM attack on civilian fishers was reported in March 2026. At least thirteen people were killed with several others injured after FADM reportedly opened fire at civilian boast off the coast of the Mocímboa da Praia district in Cabo Delgado.¹⁰⁵ The attack came on the heels of a reported government-imposed restriction on fishing off the Mozambican coast as FADM was fighting ISM at sea.¹⁰⁶

There have been no further reports of civilian fishers being killed since March 2026, but ACLED has reported that fishing boats have been intercepted by both FADM and ISM, with both groups demanding payments of the fishers before they are set free.¹⁰⁷

Kigali Threatens Withdrawal

On 14 March 2026, Rwanda threatened to withdraw from Cabo Delgado should ‘sustainable funding’ not be secured.¹⁰⁸ The threat came on the heels of report that EU funding for the mission was due to expire in May 2026 with no apparent plans to renew it.¹⁰⁹ In March, Mozambican President Daniel Chapo called on the European Union to extend the funding for the mission.¹¹⁰ Within the Union, there is support for Rwanda in Mozambique but a worry that the funding that Rwanda receives could be used in support of M23’s fight in the DRC.¹¹¹ The Wall Street Journal also reported that the threat may have been a response to the US sanctioning of the RSF and four army officers for their support to M23 in the DRC.¹¹² Rwanda has been protecting US company Exxon Mobil’s natural gas project from ISM in Cabo Delgado.¹¹³The veracity of the threat was, however, questioned, especially because Rwanda has its own business interests to protect in Mozambique.¹¹⁴

The threat was repeated in April 2026, with Rwandan President Paul Kagame and other officials suggesting that oil and gas companies operating in Mozambique should find a way to ensure Rwanda had the funding it needed to secure Cabo Delgado.¹¹⁵

On 19 May 2026, Olivier Nduhungirehe, Rwanda’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, announced that Maputo had secured funding for Rwanda to remain in Mozambique, stating that Kigali had chosen to ‘deal exclusively with the Government of Mozambique’.¹¹⁶ Although in May 2026, the European Union had, ostensibly ended funding for the mission, stating on 22 May 2026 that it had not received another request from Rwanda for funding,¹¹⁷ in July 2026 it was reported that President Chapo announced that the European Union would financially contribute to Rwanda’s mission in Cabo Delgado.¹¹⁸

Non-international armed conflict between the FADM (and support forces) and Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISM)

Intensity

Between 2025 and June 2026, fighting between the FADM (supported by Rwandan and Tanzanian armed forces as well as the Mozambican ‘Local Forces’) and ISM occurred on a regular basis and, as was the case throughout 2023 and 2024, continued to be protracted in nature. Fighting continued to be intense throughout 2025, with clashes reported during February,¹ March, ² April,³ May,⁴ June. ⁵ July,⁶ August,⁷ September,⁸ October,⁹ November,¹⁰ and December 2025.¹¹

Fighting continued during 2026. Clashes were reported during January,¹² February,¹³ March,¹⁴April,¹⁵ May,¹⁶ and June 2026.¹⁷

The increased frequency of planned attacks throughout 2025 and 2026¹⁸ indicates that the military operationslaunched by ISM can still be considered as ‘sustained and concerted’;¹⁹

ISM use of IEDs,²⁰ led to an escalation in the type of weapons used by the RSF. During August 2024, the RSF used combat helicopters to bomb ISM forces with a view to reducing the risk of Rwandan soldiers stepping on IEDs planted by ISM.²¹ Between 24 and 26 September 2024, another significant clash involved a coordinated, joint military operation involving the FADM and the RSF against ISM around Mucojo in the course of which four soldiers and at least ten ISM fighters were killed.²² ISM reportedly emplaced three IEDs between 1 and 3 June 2026, two of which were deactivated by security forces in Cabo Delgado.²³

At least forty soldiers from the FADM were killed in combat during the first five months of 2025.²⁴ May 2025 saw an increase in the frequency of military operations between the FADM and ISM.²⁵ The ISM ambushed the FADM on 8 and 14 May 2025, reportedly killing fourteen soldiers and injuring four others in the attacks.²⁶ According to ReliefWeb, May 2025 recorded the sharpest rise in casualties since June 2022.²⁷

The type of weaponry used by ISM against the FADM and support forces includes rocket-propelled grenade launchers, assault rifles, mortars and light machine guns.²⁸ As noted, during 2024, there was a recorded increase in reliance by ISM on IEDs.²⁹ ISM often ambushes the FADM and its support forces to supplement its weapons arsenal.³⁰

Fighting between the FADM (and support forces) and ISM has led to an increase in the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs).³¹ UNHCR reported in May 2025 that as a result of the conflict, approximately 710,000 people in Mozambique were internally displaced. ³² The escalation of violence as of July 2024 can be attributed to the operational withdrawal of SAMIM, which has left a gap in protective support.³³ ISM claimed responsibility for at least twelve attacks in Cabo Delgado during July 2025.³⁴ Fighting between 20 and 25 July 2025 resulted in an estimated 34,000 additional IDPs in the districts of Chiúre, Ancuabe, and Muidumbe.³⁵ The International Organization for Migration estimates that between 20 July and 3 August 2025 more than 57,034 individuals were displaced in Ancuabe, Chiure, and Muidumbe districts.³⁶ Displacement figures peaked again in April 2026. This follows a series of attacks in the Moicoma region between 1 and 17 April 2026.³⁷ Owing to the ferocity of attacks in Ancuabe, around 27,000 civilians were internally displaced from this region between 1 May 2026 and the end of June 2026.³⁸

The success of their military operations has enabled ISM to expand military control over territory. Its geographical footprint has widened in key coastal and southern districts such as Ancuabe, Chiure and Mecufi.³⁹ During May 2025, the ferocity of fighting enabled ISM to tighten control over key areas including Catupa, Chai, Chinda, Diaca and Mbau.⁴⁰ The FADM and RDF increased naval patrols along the coast of Moicoma and Quiterajo, largely in response to the success of ISM and its expansion to coastal areas.⁴¹

The nature of the fighting between FADM (and support forces) and ISM involves sustained and concerted attacks, and the stable and expanding military control over territory further confirms that the Tadić criteria for a NIAC remain satisfied. The territorial control exerted by ISM further suggests that the situation meets the additional criteria for the application of AP II (see further under ‘Organization’).

Organization

Despite ISM being formally recognized by Islamic State (IS) as early as May 2019⁴² or latest in May 2022 after pledging allegiance as early as 2018,⁴³ little is known about the practical relationship between ISM and IS senior leadership, despite IS social media occasionally showing support for ISM actions.⁴⁴ Although it pledged allegiance to IS Central, ISM must independently meet the organizational criteria to qualify as a party to a NIAC.

At the time of reporting, ISM possessed a stable command structure, despite changes in leadership.⁴⁵ Abu Zainabo (known as Ulanga) currently serves as the spiritual leader of ISM,⁴⁶ while Faridi Suleiman Haruni (known as Faride Suleimane Arune) serves as its operational leader. Mozambique’s Minister of Interior, Pascoal Ronda, confirmed the existence of a clear leadership structure for ISM and suggests they are situated in the districts of Macomia and Quissanga.⁴⁷ There is conflicting evidence on whether ISM’s command structure is decentralized;⁴⁸ they strive to keep information on the organizational structure secret.⁴⁹

Despite reports that ISM operates through multiple, fragmented autonomous cells,⁵⁰ the group has stable control over territory in Mozambique,⁵¹ which suggests a high level of organization. This corresponds with claims that ISM has a centralized and systematized structure, with a defined hierarchy of roles and responsibility. The highest-ranking officials are those who hold the positions of spiritual and military leaders.⁵²

ISM is organized through a military base structure comprised of multiple cells. These bases are in forest areas, specifically Nangade, Muidumbe and Macomia. Each base has a commander and deputy commander. Below the command level, the structure is horizontal with certain fighters holding command positions, such as those in charge of training, media and finances.⁵³

In addition to its command structure, which allows ISM to exercise discipline over fighters. ISM has a so-called ‘supreme council’,⁵⁴ and a spiritual leader,⁵⁵ to assist in aligning the actions of the fighters with Sharia law, and is rooted in the Ansar Al Sunna Islamic movement from the 1990s.⁵⁶ The command and base structures further enable ISM to apply IHL.

Military tactics employed by ISM correspond to an ideology to capture territory and to govern in alignment with the purpose of achieving an African Islamic state.⁵⁷ Military tactics evolved significantly between 2020 and 2023. Initially, ISM operated in small mobile groups and capitalized on external support by coordinating its actions with other IS hubs such as the Karrar hub in Somalia.⁵⁸ During 2024, ISM adapted its military tactics and focused on civilian relations as part of its strategy to achieve territorial control.⁵⁹ ISM’s military tactics have become more sophisticated and they now operate in three main groups of roughly 100 fighters, each of which occupies different districts throughout the Macomia province. These groups subdivide into medium-sized cells consisting of thirty to fifty fighters which focus their attention on coastal towns.⁶⁰

One part of the evolved military tactics is a strategy to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the civilian population; several engagements and trading opportunities have been introduced to achieve this goal and bring stability to areas under ISM control.⁶¹ ISM now tries to reassure civilians that they aim to target government and security forces and not civilians.⁶² ISM provides basic services in areas under its control and attempts to lead prayers and distribute food.⁶³

Logistical support is offered by others in the Islamic State regional network and foreign fighters from the region, such as from Tanzania, Rwanda, and South Africa continue to fill its ranks.⁶⁴ Tactics include the recruitment of children to fight.⁶⁵In the drive to recruit local fighters, ISM capitalizes on reports of the corruption and incompetence of the Mozambican government.⁶⁶ Operations are financed by illicit activities such as kidnapping; ⁶⁷ and smuggling drugs and weapons.⁶⁸ In February 2025, ISM imposed a non-Muslim tax called ‘jizya’, which is levied at checkpoints in Quissanga district.⁶⁹

ISM speaks with one voice through an IS central media apparatus.⁷⁰

Clearly, ISM has a sophisticated organizational structure that meets the requirements for it to be a party to a NIAC. The facts signal that ISM may also meet the higher organizational criteria included in Article 1(1) of AP II.

The Macomia district is considered the stronghold of ISM.⁷¹ ISM fields up to 400 fighters and has exercised control over the coastal part of Macomia for months without being militarily challenged. ⁷² Control over the coastal area has aided ‘movement and support’ to the group’s logistics.⁷³ The nature of the control ISM exercises must be assessed to ascertain if control was ‘functional’.⁷⁴ This requires that authority be exercised with a degree of stability which enables the armed group to launch sustained and concerted military operations and to implement AP II.⁷⁵

On 27 June 2023, a counter-insurgency operation was launched near the administrative post of Quiterajo to dislodge the fighters from this territory. Territorial control changed hands between ISM and FADM during the period under review. The control over Mucojo village in Macomia has shifted over time. ISM took control of it on 21 January 2024 after an offensive against the FADM post. However, security forces retook control on 31 January 2024.⁷⁶ ISM then regained control by 9 February after another attack on the FADM base, the third time control over the village changed hands in a month.⁷⁷ By the beginning of 2025, control was sufficiently stable to allow ISM to engage in service delivery to leverage the villagers’ experience of government shortcomings.⁷⁸ The functional requirement for territorial control as exercised by the ISM in Macomia remains fulfilled.

Another stronghold of ISM in Mozambique is the Chai administrative post, an area that has been under the control of the insurgents since 2018. This area is ‘hilly and heavily forested’ making it difficult for security operatives to dislodge the insurgents. ACLED has noted that ‘the area suggests it is something of a stronghold that ISM can retreat to when it is forced out of other areas’. Further, ACLED reports that ISM has three different military camps within the Chai administrative post. The camps are strategically located, one camp is located to the east of Chai village, a second is located east of Litamanda village, and the third is located around Namarussia village. It is reported that, because of its fertility, members of ISM use the area to cultivate ‘crops including maize, peanuts, beans and cassava’.⁷⁹The produce from farming is used to feed members and ensure the continuity of military operations. Produce may be sold to secure funding to support military operations and is evidence of a form of stable control over the territory.

Throughout 2025 and up to June 2026, ISM expanded its geographic footprint into Nampula and Niassa provinces.⁸⁰ But it is unclear if ISM effectively controls territory in these regions.

Since ISM took control of Mujoco and established its stronghold, the nature of its actions arguably equates to sustained and concerted attacks. Also, it can be argued that the ability of ISM to exercise military control over Mucojo is indicative of ISM being under responsible command,⁸¹ISM’s ability to launch sustained and concerted military attacks,⁸² as well as the territorial control it exercises, gives ISM the ability to apply AP II.⁸³

1
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 21 April – 4 May 2025’, Cabo Ligado, 7 May 2025. ↩︎
2
‘Sete supostos terroristas abatidos em Cabo Delgado’, Observador, 21 March 2025; ‘Cabo Ligado Update: 10 – 23 March 2025’, Cabo Ligado, 26 March 2025. ↩︎
3
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 7 – 20 April 2025’, Cabo Ligado, 23 April 2025. ↩︎
4
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 5 – 18 May 2025’, Cabo Ligado, 21 May 2025. ↩︎
5
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 2 – 15 June 2025’, Cabo Ligado, 18 June 2025. ↩︎
6
‘Mozambique — ETT Movement Alert Report 137 — Ancuabe, Chiure and Muidumbe attacks (20 July – 03 August 2025)’, International Organization for Migration, 4 August 2025; ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group, July 2026; ‘Mozambican navy accused of killing fishermen off coastal Macomia’, Zitamar News, 7 July 2025; ‘Cabo Ligado Update: 30 June – 13 July 2025’, ACLED, 16 July 2025; ‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 14 July – 3 August 2025’, ACLED, 7 August 2025 ↩︎
7
‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 4 – 17 August 2025’, ACLED, 21 August 2025; ‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 6 August 2025 (14 July – 3 August 2025)’, Zitamar News, 7 August 2025; ‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor 20 August (4 – 17 August 2025)’, Zitamar News, 21 August 2025; ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group, August 2025 ↩︎
8
‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 1 – 14 September 2025’, ACLED, 7 September 2025; ‘Jihadists in Deadly Attack on Mozambique Port Near Gas Hub’, The Defense Post, 9 September 2025; ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group, September 2025 ↩︎
9
‘Insurgents kill at least two policemen in Mozambique attack’, Eye Witness News, 22 October 2025; ‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor (27 October – 9 November 2025)’, Zitamar News, 12 November 2025; ‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 15 October 2025’, ACLED, 15 October 2025; ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group, October 2025; ‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 15 October 2025 [EN/PT]’, Reliefweb, 21 October 2025 ↩︎
10
‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 26 November 2025’, ACLED, 26 November 2025; ‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor (27 October – 9 November 2025)’, Zitamar News, 12 November 2025; ‘Insurgents kill two people in attacks on two villages in Muidumbe’, Zitamar News, 18 November 2025; ‘Mozambique: One local killed, another wounded as insurgents invade Nampanha’, Macau Business, 17 November 2025 ↩︎
11
‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor (8 December 2025 – 11 January 2026)’, Zitamar News, 15 January 2026; ‘Moçambique: Registado abate de 35 integrantes de grupo terrorista no Distrito de Macomia’, e-Global; ‘Africa: Mozambique’ International Crisis Group, December 2025. ↩︎
12
‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor (8 December 2025 – 11 January 2026)’, Zitamar News, 15 January 2026; ‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 14 January 2026’, ACLED, 14 January 2026; ‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 11 February 2026’, Reliefweb, 12 February 2026; Tv Sucesso Moz, Facebook; ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group, January 2026 ↩︎
13
‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor (23 February – 8 March 2026)’, Zitamar News, 12 March 2026; ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group, February 2026; ‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 11 February 2026’, Reliefweb, 12 February 2026; Tv Sucesso Moz, Facebook; ‘Fresh clashes between government forces and insurgents leave ‘several dead’ in Macomia’, Defence Web, 25 February 2026 ↩︎
14
‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor (23 February – 8 March 2026)’, Zitamar News, 12 March 2026; ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group, March 2026 ↩︎
15
‘Insurgents kill Seven Soldiers in Attack on FADM Position in Mocímboa da Praia’, The Mozambique Times, 27 April 2026; M. Silva, ‘Mozambique: terrorist attacks displace over 500 civilians’, Plataforma Media, 22 April 2026; ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group, April 2026 ↩︎
16
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group, May 2026; ‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 6 May 2026’, ACLED, 6 May 2026 ↩︎
17
‘Ataques em Cabo Delgado: terroristas apostam no recurso a dispositivos explosivos improvisados’, Carta de Moçambique, 23 June 2026; ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group, June 2026; ‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 17 June 2026’, ACLED, 17 June 2026. ↩︎
18
L. J. K. Bonate, ‘Insurgency, Economy and Politics in Cabo Delgado’, Konrad Adenaur Stiftung, 19 June 2026, 2-5 ↩︎
19
M. M. Bradley, ‘Additional Protocol II: Elevating the minimum threshold of intensity?’, International Review of the Red Cross, 2020. ↩︎
20
‘Mozambique: Access Snapshot – Cabo Delgado Province, as of 31 May 2025’, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 12 June 2025. ↩︎
21
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 5 – 18 August 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 22 August 2024. ↩︎
22
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 16 – 29 September 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 2 October 2024. ↩︎
23
‘Ataques em Cabo Delgado: terroristas apostam no recurso a dispositivos explosivos improvisados’, Carta de Moçambique, 23 June 2026. ↩︎
24
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 19 May – 1 June 2025’, Cabo Ligado, 4 June 2025. ↩︎
25
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 5 – 18 May 2025’, Cabo Ligado, 21 May 2025. ↩︎
26
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 5 – 18 May 2025’, Cabo Ligado, 21 May 2025. ↩︎
27
‘Mozambique: Access Snapshot – Cabo Delgado Province, as of 31 May 2025’, ReliefWeb, 12 June 2025. ↩︎
28
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 5 – 18 May 2025’, Cabo Ligado, 21 May 2025. ↩︎
29
‘Republic of Mozambique, Cabo Delgado Province: Protection Analysis Report’, Global Protection Cluster, January 2025. ↩︎
30
‘Insurgents kill at least two policemen in Mozambique attack’, Eye Witness News, 22 October 2025; ‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 26 November 2025’, ACLED, 26 November 2025; ‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor (8 December 2025 – 11 January 2026)’, Zitamar News, 15 January 2026; ‘Insurgents kill Seven Soldiers in Attack on FADM Position in Mocímboa da Praia’, The Mozambique Times, 27 April 2026. ↩︎
31
‘Mozambique’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 14 May 2025Mozambique 2025’, Amnesty International. ↩︎
32
‘UNHCR: New displacement and funding squeeze intensify Mozambique crisis’, The United Nations Refugee Agency, 23 May 2025. ↩︎
33
‘Republic of Mozambique, Cabo Delgado Province: Protection Analysis Report’, Global Protection Cluster, January 2025. ↩︎
34
Cabo Delgado, X, 1 August 2025. ↩︎
35
‘Cabo Delgado. Terroristas reivindicam mais dois ataques e cinco mortos’, Renascença,4 August 2025. ↩︎
36
‘Mozambique — ETT Movement Alert Report 137 — Ancuabe, Chiure and Muidumbe attacks (20 July – 03 August 2025)’, International Organization for Migration, 4 August 2025. ↩︎
37
M. Silva, ‘Mozambique: terrorist attacks displace over 500 civilians’, Plataforma Media, 22 April 2026. ↩︎
38
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group, June 2026. ↩︎
39
‘Republic of Mozambique, Cabo Delgado Province: Protection Analysis Report’, Global protection cluster, January 2025. ↩︎
40
‘Mozambique – Increased violence (DG ECHO, DG ECHO Partners, UN OCHA) (ECHO Daily Flash of 20 June 2025)’, ReliefWeb, 20 June 2025; ‘Mozambique: Access Snapshot – Cabo Delgado Province, as of 31 May 2025’, ReliefWeb, 12 June 2025. ↩︎
41
‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor (8 December 2025 – 11 January 2026)’, Zitamar News, 15 January 2026; ‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 14 January 2026’, ACLED, 14 January 2026; Daniel Nambanedan, TikTok; ‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor (23 February – 8 March 2026)’, Zitamar News, 12 March 2026. ↩︎
42
E. Morier-Genoud, ‘Towards Jihad? Muslims and Politics in Postcolonial Mozambique’, Hurst Publishing, 2023, 136 ↩︎
43
‘IntelBrief: Islamic State Resurging in Mozambique’, The Soufan Center, 21 March 2024; P. Bofin, ‘Actor Profiles: Islamic State Mozambique (ISM)’, ACLED, 30 October 2023. ↩︎
44
T. Gould, et al, ‘The Islamic State in Mozambique: The Cabo Delgado Conflict since 2021’, Online Article, Hudson, 20 February 2024. ↩︎
45
‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/71/Rev.1, 6 February 2025. ↩︎
46
‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/71/Rev.1, 6 February 2025. ↩︎
47
‘Islamic State Group Alters Tactics Under New Leadership in Mozambique’, African Defense Forum, 11 June 2024. ↩︎
48
‘Islamic State in Mozambique Rearing Its Head Again’, The Soufan center, 15 January 2025. ↩︎
49
T. Gould et al, ‘The Islamic State in Mozambique: The Cabo Delgado Conflict since 2021’, Online Article, Hudson, 20 February 2024. ↩︎
50
‘Islamic State in Mozambique Rearing Its Head Again’, The Soufan Center, 15 January 2025; T. Gould, et al, ‘The Islamic State in Mozambique: The Cabo Delgado Conflict since 2021’, Online Article, Hudson, 20 February 2024. ↩︎
51
‘Islamic State in Mozambique Rearing Its Head Again’, The Soufan Center, 15 January 2025; and L. Karr, ‘Africa File, March 28, 2024: Islamic State Resurgent in Mozambique; al Shabaab’s Ramadan Offensive’, Institute for the Study of War, 28 March 2024. ↩︎
52
‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/71/Rev.1, 6 February 2025. ↩︎
53
‘Islamic State in Mozambique Rearing Its Head Again’, The Soufan Center, 15 January 2025. ↩︎
54
‘Assessing the Northern Mozambique Insurgency’, Combating the Islamic State’s Spread in Africa: Assessment and Recommendations for Mozambique, 1 February 2021. ↩︎
55
UNSC, ‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/71/Rev.1, 6 February 2025. ↩︎
56
‘ISIS-Mozambique (A.K.A. Ansar Al-Sunna)’, Counter terrorism guide, April 2025. ↩︎
57
‘ISIS-Mozambique (A.K.A. Ansar Al-Sunna)’, Counter terrorism guide, April 2025; ‘IntelBrief: Islamic State Resurging in Mozambique’, The Soufan Center, 21 March 2024; P. Bofin, ‘Actor Profiles: Islamic State Mozambique (ISM)’, ACLED, 30 October 2023. ↩︎
58
P. Bofin, ‘Actor Profiles: Islamic State Mozambique (ISM)’, ACLED, 30 October 2023. ↩︎
59
L. Karr, ‘Africa File, March 28, 2024: Islamic State Resurgent in Mozambique; al Shabaab’s Ramadan Offensive’, Institute for the Study of War, 28 March 2024. ↩︎
60
UNSC, ‘Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/556, 22 July 2024. ↩︎
61
L. Karr, ‘Africa File, March 28, 2024: Islamic State Resurgent in Mozambique; al Shabaab’s Ramadan Offensive’, Institute for the Study of War, 28 March 2024. ↩︎
62
UNSC, ‘Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/556, 22 July 2024; ‘IntelBrief: Islamic State Resurging in Mozambique’, The Soufan Center, 21 March 2024. ↩︎
63
‘Islamic State in Mozambique Rearing Its Head Again’, The Soufan Center, 15 January 2025; C. Weiss, ‘Islamic State expands da’wah activities in Mozambique’, Long War Journal, 30 April 2024. ↩︎
64
‘Islamic State in Mozambique Rearing Its Head Again’, The Soufan Center, 15 January 2025; ‘IntelBrief: Islamic State Resurging in Mozambique’, The Soufan center, 21 March 2024. ↩︎
65
‘Islamic State Group Alters Tactics Under New Leadership in Mozambique’, African Defense Forum, 11 June 2024; ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group, February 2026; ‘Mozambique and partners underline the importance of timely protection for children associated with armed groups’, UNICEF, 26 June 2026; ‘Fight against the Use of Child Soldiers’, Amani Africa, 19 February 2025; ‘Red Hand Day Highlights the Need to Protect Children from Recruitment and Use in Conflict’, Dallaire Institute, 12 February 2026. ↩︎
66
‘Islamic State in Mozambique Rearing Its Head Again’, The Soufan Center, 15 January 2025. ↩︎
67
‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 4–17 August 2025’, ACLED, 21 August 2025 ↩︎
68
A. Cascais, ‘Mozambique: Jihadists from abroad pour into Cabo Delgado’, DW, 20 March 2024. ↩︎
69
T. Gould, ‘Islamic State Mozambique’s war on the church’, Zitamar News, 22 March 2024. ↩︎
70
‘IntelBrief: Islamic State Resurging in Mozambique’, The Soufan Center, 21 March 2024. ↩︎
71
P. Bofin, ‘Face-off in Macomia comes to an end’, Zitamar News, 19 July 2023. ↩︎
72
T. Gould, ‘At least eight military killed in Macomia ambush’, Zitamar News, 5 July 2023. ↩︎
73
P. Bofin, ‘Face-off in Macomia comes to an end’, Zitamar News, 19 July 2023. ↩︎
74
M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, December 2020. ↩︎
75
M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, December 2020. ↩︎
76
‘Cabo Ligado Monthly: January 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 20 February 2024. ↩︎
77
‘Cabo Ligado Monthly: February 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 19 March 2024. ↩︎
78
‘Islamic State in Mozambique Rearing Its Head Again’, The Soufan Center, 15 January 2025; C. Weiss, ‘Islamic State expands da’wah activities in Mozambique’, Long War Journal, 30 April 2024. ↩︎
79
‘Cabo Ligado Monthly: March 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 15 April 2024. ↩︎
80
‘Cabo Delgado 2026: Operational Dynamics of Rwanda’s Reinforced Deployment and ISM’s Adaptive Hybrid Warfare’, African Security Analysis, 1 March 2026; ‘2026 Mozambique: Cabo Delgado, Nampula & Niassa Provinces Humanitarian Snapshot – as of 31 January [EN]’, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 9 March 2026; B. Nhamirre, ‘Cabo Delgado insurgency persists amid failed military strategy’, Institute for Security Studies, 7 October 2025; C. Mangwiro, ‘Rwandan and Tanzanian forces still needed to stop terrorists in Mozambique, says Chapo’, The Africa Report, 15 January 2026. ↩︎
81
ICTR, ‘Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu’, Chamber I,Judgment, 2 September 1998, par 623; M.M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, December 2020. ↩︎
82
SCSL, ‘Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana Allieu Kondewa’, Trial Chamber I, Judgment, 2 August 2007, para 126; M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol ii in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, December 2020. ↩︎
83
ICTR, ‘Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu’, Chamber I,Judgment, 2 September 1998, par 623; M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol ii in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, December 2020. ↩︎

State Parties

Mozambique (FADM)
Rwanda (RSF)
Tanzania
SAMIM (Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe until 31 July 2024)
South Africa (SANDF) (up until December 2024)

Non-state parties

Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISM)

Foreign Involvement

EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM Mozambique)

Foreign Involvement

EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM Mozambique)

1
‘Article 3 – Conflicts not of an international character’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases ↩︎
2
M.M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol ii in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, December 2020. ↩︎
3
P. Pigou and J. Opperman, ‘Conflict in Cabo Delgado: From the Frying Pan into the Fire?’, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 15 June 2021; ‘Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado’, International Crisis Group, 11 June 2021. ↩︎
4
‘Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado’, International Crisis Group, 11 June 2021. ↩︎
5
‘Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado’, International Crisis Group, 11 June 2021. ↩︎
6
‘Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado’, International Crisis Group, 11 June 2021. ↩︎
7
‘Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado’, International Crisis Group, 11 June 2021. ↩︎
8
‘Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado’, International Crisis Group, 11 June 2021. ↩︎
9
P. Pigou and J. Opperman, ‘Conflict in Cabo Delgado: From the Frying Pan into the Fire?’, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 15 June 2021; and T. de Almeida, ‘7 years into the conflict, solutions to displacement in Cabo Delgado remain elusive’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 10 October 2024. ↩︎
10
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
11
A. Cascais, ‘Mozambique: Jihadists from abroad pour into Cabo Delgado’, Deutsche Welle, 20 March 2024; and ‘Somalia: Al-Shabab Islamist kills dozens in attack on army’, Deutsche Welle, 25 July 2023. ↩︎
12
J. Tembe and W. Rose, ‘Most wanted terrorist killed, says Mozambique’, BBC, 25 August 2023; and ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
13
‘Mozambique: Government says terrorists have new leadership, new strategy – Watch’, Club of Mozambique, 13 March 2024; and ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
14
‘Mozambique: Government says terrorists have new leadership, new strategy – Watch’, Club of Mozambique, 13 March 2024; and ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
15
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; A. Massango, ‘Nyusi claims FDS have control of security in Cabo Delgado’, AIM, 25 September 2024; and ‘Mozambique: Nyusi presents the names of terrorist leaders – Notícias’, Club of Mozambique, 27 September 2024. ↩︎
16
A. Massango, ‘Nyusi claims FDS have control of security in Cabo Delgado’, AIM, 25 September 2024. ↩︎
17
UNSC, ‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/71/Rev.1, 6 February 2025. ↩︎
18
P. Pigou and J. Opperman, ‘Conflict in Cabo Delgado: From the Frying Pan into the Fire?’, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 15 June 2021; and ‘Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado’, International Crisis Group, 11 June 2021. ↩︎
19
P. Pigou and J. Opperman, ‘Conflict in Cabo Delgado: From the Frying Pan into the Fire?’, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 15 June 2021; ‘Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado’, International Crisis Group, 11 June 2021; and H. Strydom, ‘The Use of Private Military Companies to Counter the Insurgency in Northern Mozambique’, Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Conflict: International Humanitarian Law and Regional Security, 2024. ↩︎
20
‘Actor Profile: SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)’, Cabo Ligado, 2 May 2024; P. Bofin, ‘ACLED Report: Rwanda in Mozambique: Limits to civilian protection’, ACLED, 25 April 2025; ‘Withdrawal of the Southern African Development Community Mission In Mozambique (SAMIM) Force Members from Cabo Delgado’, Southern African Development Community, 5 April 2024; and A. Massango, ‘SAMIM formally withdraws from Cabo Delgado’, AIM, 4 July 2024. ↩︎
21
‘Actor Profile: SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)’, Cabo Ligado, ACLED, 2 May 2024. ↩︎
22
‘Actor Profile: Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF)’, Cabo Ligado, 29 May 2024. ↩︎
23
‘Actor Profile: Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF)’, Cabo Ligado, 29 May 2024. ↩︎
24
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 7 – 20 April 2025 – Cabo Ligado’, Cabo Ligado, 23 April 2025; ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, 2024, 16. ↩︎
25
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
26
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; and S. Lesedi, ‘South Africa extends military Deployment in Mozambique’, Military Africa, 26 April 2024. ↩︎
27
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 16, 18-19. ↩︎
28
L. Maluleke, ‘SANDF: A force stretched to its limits’, Good Governance Africa, 24 March 2025. ↩︎
29
P. Bofin, ‘Rwanda in Mozambique: Limits to civilian protection’, ACLED, 23 April 2025. ↩︎
30
‘Actor Profile: SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)’, Cabo Ligado, 2 May 2024. ↩︎
31
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 27 May–23 June 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 27 June 2024; L. Serwat and P. Bofin, ‘The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) operations abroad signal a shift in Rwanda’s regional standing’, ACLED, 27 September 2024; and T. Gould, ‘ISM licks its wounds after defeat at Mbau’, Zitamar News, 3 July 2024. ↩︎
32
‘Terror attacks continue in northern Mozambique’, defenceWeb, 9 May 2025, ↩︎
33
L. Serwat and P. Bofin, ‘The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) operations abroad signal a shift in Rwanda’s regional standing’, ACLED, 27 September 2024. ↩︎
34
O. Oganga and M. Hill, ‘Rwanda Deploys 2,000 More Troops to Gas-Rich Mozambique Region’, Bloomberg, 28 May 2024; and P. Bofin, ‘ACLED Report: Rwanda in Mozambique: Limits to civilian protection’, ACLED, 25 April 2025. ↩︎
35
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; and R. Gras, ‘EU divided over financial support for Rwandan intervention in Mozambique’, The Africa Report, 31 July 2024. ↩︎
36
‘Suspension of EU military cooperation with Rwanda over findings of Rwandan support for the M23 rebel group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, European Parliament, 18 March 2025; and K. Titeca, ‘The (bad) politics behind the EU’s new €20 million for the Rwandan army’, Democracy in Africa, 16 November 2024. In accordance with the ICRC’s support-based approach, Rwanda is a party to this NIAC. ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 16. ↩︎
37
‘About EUMAM Moz’, EUMAM Mozambique, 8 January 2025. ↩︎
38
‘EUMAM Mozambique’, Gobeirno de España. ↩︎
39
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; ‘About EUMAM Moz’, EUMAM Mozambique, 8 January 2025; and ‘Factsheet: EU Military Assistance Mission Mozambique’, EUMAM Mozambique, 31 October 2024. In May 2026, the mandate was extended to 31 December 2026.‘[MB1] EU military training will continue until year-end in Mozambique’, DefenceWeb, 18 May 2026. ↩︎
40
T. de Almeida, ‘7 years into the conflict, solutions to displacement in Cabo Delgado remain elusive’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 10 October 2024. ↩︎
41
L. Louw-Vaudran, ‘The many roots of Mozambique’s deadly insurgency’, Institute for Security Studies, 8 September 2022. ↩︎
42
L. Louw-Vaudran, ‘The many roots of Mozambique’s deadly insurgency’, Institute for Security Studies, 8 September 2022. ↩︎
43
P. Pigou and J. Opperman, ‘Conflict in Cabo Delgado: From the Frying Pan into the Fire?’, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 15 June 2021. ↩︎
44
P. Pigou and J. Opperman, ‘Conflict in Cabo Delgado: From the Frying Pan into the Fire?’, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 15 June 2021; ‘Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado’, International Crisis Group, 11 June 2021; and ‘Total declares Force Majeure on Mozambique LNG project’, Mozambique LNG, 16 April 2021. ↩︎
45
‘TotalEnergies plans to restart Mozambique LNG project by August 2025’, Club of Mozambique, 22 May 2025; and C. Howe, ‘WGC TotalEnergies CEO aims to lift force majeure on Mozambique LNG project’, Reuters, 20 May 2025. ↩︎
46
T. de Almeida, ‘7 years into the conflict, solutions to displacement in Cabo Delgado remain elusive’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 10 October 2024. ↩︎
47
‘Twentieth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat’, UN Doc S/2025/72, 31 January 2025; and ‘Cabo Ligado Update: 24 March–6 April 2025’, Cabo Ligado, 9 April 2025. ↩︎
48
‘Mozambique – October 2024’, International idea; and ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
49
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
50
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
51
‘What is Driving Mozambique’s Post-electoral Protests?’, International Crisis Group, 15 November 2024; and ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
52
‘What is Driving Mozambique’s Post-electoral Protests?’, International Crisis Group, 15 November 2024; ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; ‘Mozambique police fire tear gas at biggest protest yet against ruling party’, Reuters, 7 November 2024; ‘Clashes in Mozambique as opposition protests election ‘fraud’’, Al Jazeera, 7 November 2024; and E. Gudo, ‘Mondlane threatens more demonstrations’, AIM, 7 November 2024. ↩︎
53
‘What is Driving Mozambique’s Post-electoral Protests?’, International Crisis Group, 15 November 2024; ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; and ‘At least 30 die in Mozambique election protests says rights group’, RFI, 9 November 2024. ↩︎
54
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; R. Savage, ‘Mozambique’s top court confirms election result after months of protest’, The Guardian, 23 December 2024; and J. Tembe, ‘Mozambique court ruling sparks fresh poll protests’, BBC, 23 December 2024. ↩︎
55
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; J. Tembe and N. Booty, ‘Mozambique’s new president sworn in despite opposition boycott’, BBC, 15 January 2025; and ‘Mozambique: Daniel Chapo inaugurated after disputed election’, DW, 15 January 2025. ↩︎
56
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; A. Massango, ‘About 350 shot dead during mass protests’, AIM, 11 February 2025; ‘At least 300 people killed during the post-election violence in Mozambique’, Africa News, 16 April 2025; S. Khan, ‘6 Killed During Inauguration of Mozambique New Parliament’, The Diplomatic Insight, 14 January 2025; and ‘Mozambique: Inauguration Day death toll rises to eleven’, Club of Mozambique, 17 January 2025. ↩︎
57
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
58
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; I. Wafula, ‘Mozambique opposition leader open to serving in rival’s government’, BBC, 21 January 2025; and ‘Venâncio Mondlane Suspends Protests until Proclamation of Results by Constitutional Council’, The Mozambique Times, 16 January 2025. ↩︎
59
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; and B. Nhamirre, ‘Chapo-Mondlane meeting presents a glimmer of hope for Mozambique’, Institute for Security Studies, 27 March 2025. ↩︎
60
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; and B. Henriques, ‘General Elections: Borrell Calls for Dialogue, Restraint and Calm on All Sides in Mozambique’, 360 Mozambique, 4 November 2024. ↩︎
61
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; and ‘Communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government 20th November 2024’, SADC, 21 November 2024. ↩︎
62
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
63
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; ‘AUC Chairperson calls for peaceful resolution of the escalating post-election violence in Mozambique’, African Union, 26 December 2024; ‘Mozambique: Statement by the Spokesperson on the Presidential elections’, European Union External Action, 24 December 2024; and US Embassy Maputo, ‘Constitutional Council Decision on Mozambican Elections’, US Embassy Mozambique, 26 December 2024. ↩︎
64
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; and P. Fauvet, ‘South Africa willing to help Mozambique find solutions’, AIM, 28 December 2024. ↩︎
65
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; and P. Fauvet, ‘Agreement on political dialogue signed – but without Venâncio Mondlane’, AIM, 6 March 2025. ↩︎
66
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; and P. Fauvet, ‘Agreement on political dialogue signed – but without Venâncio Mondlane’, AIM, 6 March 2025. ↩︎
67
‘Mozambique’s Inclusive Political Dialogue: More than $1.4 million for Technical Committee – Carta’, AIM, 28 March 2025. ↩︎
68
‘Mozambique: President Chapo enacts law on Political Commitment to Dialogue’, AIM, 14 April 2025; and ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
69
‘Mozambique’s Inclusive Political Dialogue: More than $1.4 million for Technical Committee – Carta’, AIM, 28 March 2025. ↩︎
70
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; and A. Massango, ‘Mais Integridade calls for transparency in appointment of civil society personalities’, AIM, 30 May 2025. ↩︎
71
‘Mozambique: Venâncio Mondlane sets up new party – Watch’, Club of Mozambique, 4 April 2025; P. Fauvet, ‘Mondlane announces creation of new political party’, AIM, 7 April 2025; B. Henriques, ‘Former Presidential Candidate Venâncio Mondlane Creates ‘Anamalala’ Party’, 360 Mozambique, 4 April 2025; and P. Fauvet, ‘Chapo and Mondlane hold second meeting’, AIM, 21 May 2025. ↩︎
72
P. Fauvet, ‘Chapo and Mondlane hold second meeting’, AIM, 21 May 2025. ↩︎
73
‘Mozambique’s Venâncio Mondlane given 20 days to respond to state case’, SABC, 12 June 2025; ‘Mondlane denies that he is a fugitive’, Agência de Informação de Moçambique, 16 June 2025. ↩︎
74
‘Venâncio Mondlane acusado de cinco crimes’, Journal Noticias, 22 July 2025; A. Maolela, ‘Processo político moçambicano: crimes imputados a Venâncio Mondlane têm penas que variam de seis meses a 24 anos de prisão’, Carta de Moçambique, 24 July 2025. ↩︎
75
‘Government Approves Registration of Anamola Party, Led by Venâncio Mondlane’, 360 Mozambique, 17 August 2025. ↩︎
76
‘Mozambique: Mondlane’s Anamola party registers over 64,000 members in ten days’, Club of Mozambique, 29 September 2025. ↩︎
77
‘Mozambique: Mondlane renews call for Anamola’s inclusion in technical commission for inclusive dialogue’, Club of Mozambique, 11 September 2025 ↩︎
78
‘Mozambique: Anamola criticises exclusion from ‘Inclusive Dialogue’, launches parallel consultation process – Watch’, Club of Mozambique, 6 October 2025; ‘Mozambique opposition party condemns exclusion from political dialogue committee’, SABC, 7 October 2025. ↩︎
79
‘Mozambique: Anamola renews call for its legal inclusion in national dialogue’, Club of Mozambique, 12 December 2025. ↩︎
80
P. Fabricus, ‘Opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane carries the cross of Mozambique’s democracy’, Daily Maverick, 2 June 2026. ↩︎
81
A. Massango, ‘Criminal case opened against murderers of Anamola political coordinator’, Agência de Informação de Moçambique, 11 May 2026; P. Fabricus, ‘Opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane carries the cross of Mozambique’s democracy’, Daily Maverick, 2 June 2026. ↩︎
82
‘Mozambique: Government condemns killing of Anamola members, calls for probe’, Club of Mozambique, 20 May 2026 ↩︎
83
A. Cascais, ‘Mozambique: Are ‘death squads’ targeting the opposition?’, Deutsche Welle, 1 June 2026. ↩︎
84
‘Mozambique: Mondlane files complaint over persecution of party members’, Plataforma Media, 14 May 2026. ↩︎
85
‘Mozambique: Perpetrators of new attacks are ‘bandits’ and not ‘Naparamas’ – Watch’, Club of Mozambique, 22 April 2025. ↩︎
86
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
87
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group. ↩︎
88
P. Fauvet, ‘At least five Naparamas killed in clash’, Agência de Informação de Moçambique, 21 March 2025. ↩︎
89
P. Fauvet, ‘Naparamas murder policemen in Chiúre’, Agência de Informação de Moçambique, 30 July 2025. ↩︎
90
‘Mozambique: Eight deaths in clash between police and Naparamas’, Club of Mozambique, 31 December 2025. ↩︎
91
‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 14 January 2026’, ACLED, 14 January 2026. ↩︎
92
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; ‘US backs $4.7bn loan to restart Total Mozambique LNG project’, Quantum Commodity Intelligence, 14 March 2025; and J. Hanlon, ‘Mozambique News Reports and Clippings’, The Open University, 2 July 2020. ↩︎
93
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; ‘TotalEnergies response to alleged human rights violations at Mozambique LNG project’, Business & Human Rights Resources Centre, 31 March 2025; and ‘An Unprecedented Court Action. Oil Change Response to the Judicial Investigation into TotalEnergies’ Mozambique LNG Project’, Oil Change International, 15 March 2025. The company has repeatedly denied wrongdoing. ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; and ‘Mozambique LNG: TotalEnergies welcomes the launch of official investigations in Mozambique’, TotalEnergies, 26 March 2025. ↩︎
94
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; A. L. Klein, ‘TotalEnergies to k Mozambique Approval to Resume $20B LNG Project’, Energy Capital Power, 22 May 2025; and ‘TotalEnergies plans to restart Mozambique LNG project by August 2025’, Club of Mozambique, 22 May 2025. ↩︎
95
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group, June 2025; A. Massango, ‘Total energies preparing to resume LNG project in Cabo Delgado’, Agência de Informação de Moçambique, 7 July 2025. ↩︎
96
B. Enome, ‘TotalEnergies To Resume $20 Billion Mozambique LNG Project, Targets 2029 Production Start’, Arise News, 27 June 2025; ‘Saipem sees Mozambique LNG project restarting by summer’s end’, Baird Maritime, 24 July 2025. ↩︎
97
‘TotalEnergies and partners lift force majeure on $20 billion Mozambique LNG project’, Reuters, 25 October 2025; C. Goko, ‘Mozambique bonds rise after TotalEnergies lifts force majeure on LNG project’, 27 October 2025. ↩︎
98
‘Mozambique LNG announces the full restart of all its activities onshore and offshore in Mozambique’, TotalEnergies, 29 January 2026; ‘Mozambique LNG restarts onshore, offshore activities after force majeure lift’, World Oil, 29 January 2026. ↩︎
99
‘Mozambican navy accused of killing fishermen off coastal Macomia’, Zitamar News, 7 July 2025; ‘Cabo Ligado Update: 30 June – 13 July 2025’, ACLED, 16 July 2025; ‘Cabo Delgado: Alleged extrajudicial killings of fisherfolk by State forces’, Centro para Democracia e Direitos Humanos, 18 September 2025 ↩︎
100
‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 18 – 31 August 2025’, ACLED, 2025; ‘Mozambican navy again accused of killing civilians off Cabo Delgado coast’, Zitamar News, 27 August 2025 ↩︎
101
‘Mozambican navy accused of “massacre” of civilians on Cabo Delgado island’, Zitamar News, 10 September 2025; ‘Who cares about dead fishermen?’, Zitamar News, 16 September 2025; ‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 1 – 14 September 2025’, ACLED, 17 September 2025; ‘Cabo Delgado: Alleged extrajudicial killings of fisherfolk by State forces’, Centro para Democracia e Direitos Humanos, 18 September 2025 ↩︎
102
‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 29 October 2025’, ACLED, 29 October 2025. ↩︎
103
‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 18 – 31 August 2025’, ACLED, 2025; ‘Mozambican navy again accused of killing civilians off Cabo Delgado coast’, Zitamar News, 27 August 2025 ↩︎
104
‘Representantes das aldeias de Mucojo reúnem-se com Forças Ruandesas para discutir problemas locais’, Moza Norte, 23 October 2025. ↩︎
105
‘Mozambique troops accused of killing fishermen in conflict-hit Cabo Delgado’, Africa News, 17 March 2026; ‘Mozambique: Navy Linked to Killing of Fishermen’, Human Rights Watch, 30 March 2026; ‘Mozambique: around 70 fishermen have dies since 2024 in incidents with military’, 19 March 2026. ↩︎
106
‘Mozambique: Navy Linked to Killing of Fishermen’, Human Rights Watch, 30 March 2026; ‘Mozambique: around 70 fishermen have dies since 2024 in incidents with military’, 19 March 2026 ‘Mozambican Navy Accused of Killing Fishermen’, All Africa, 30 March 2026. ↩︎
107
‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 22 April 2026’, ACLED, 22 April 2026; ‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 20 May 2026’, ACLED, 20 May 2026; ‘Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 3 June 2026’, ACLED, June 2026. ↩︎
108
N. Bariyo, ‘Irked by U.S. Sanctions, Rwanda Threatens to Stop Fighting Islamic State’, Wall Street Journal, 31 March 2026; B. Nhamirre et al, ‘Lessons from Rwanda’s threat to withdraw from Cabo Delgado’, Institute for Security Studies, 1 April 2026; ‘Rwanda warns it may withdraw troops from Mozambique’s insurgency-hit Cabo Delgado’, Reuters, 14 March 2026; A. Cascais, ‘Rwanda ties Mozambique troop deployment to EU funding’, Deutsche Welle, 16 April 2026. ↩︎
109
B. Nhamirre et al, ‘Lessons from Rwanda’s threat to withdraw from Cabo Delgado’, Institute for Security Studies, 1 April 2026; ‘Rwanda warns it may withdraw troops from Mozambique’s insurgency-hit Cabo Delgado’, Reuters, 14 March 2026; A. Cascais, ‘Rwanda ties Mozambique troop deployment to EU funding’, Deutsche Welle, 16 April 2026; B. Fox, ‘Mozambique urges EU rethink on ending Rwanda peace-mission cash’, EU Observer, 16 March 2026. ↩︎
110
B. Fox, ‘Mozambique urges EU rethink on ending Rwanda peace-mission cash’, EU Observer, 16 March 2026. ↩︎
111
A. Cascais, ‘Rwanda ties Mozambique troop deployment to EU funding’, Deutsche Welle, 16 April 2026. ↩︎
112
N. Bariyo, ‘Irked by U.S. Sanctions, Rwanda Threatens to Stop Fighting Islamic State’, Wall Street Journal, 31 March 2026; B. Nhamirre et al, ‘Lessons from Rwanda’s threat to withdraw from Cabo Delgado’, Institute for Security Studies, 1 April 2026. ↩︎
113
N. Bariyo, ‘Irked by U.S. Sanctions, Rwanda Threatens to Stop Fighting Islamic State’, Wall Street Journal, 31 March 2026; B. Nhamirre et al, ‘Lessons from Rwanda’s threat to withdraw from Cabo Delgado’, Institute for Security Studies, 1 April 2026. ↩︎
114
A. Cascais, ‘Rwanda ties Mozambique troop deployment to EU funding’, Deutsche Welle, 16 April 2026; B. Nhamirre et al, ‘Lessons from Rwanda’s threat to withdraw from Cabo Delgado’, Institute for Security Studies, 1 April 2026; ‘Rwanda’s Exit From Cabo Delgado Would Leave Security Vacuum’, African Defense Forum, 5 May 2026. ↩︎
115
‘Rwanda Pushes Back on EU Funding Reports, Emphasizes Fair Burden-Sharing in Mozambique Operations’, Taarifa, 2 April 2026; ‘Mozambique: 6,300-strong deployment in Cabo Delgado ‘requires a sustainable financing framework’ – Rwanda’, Club of Mozambique; ‘Mozambique: Opposition criticises government for ‘silence’ over Rwanda President Kagame’s statements’, Club of Mozambique; Jeune Afrique, ‘Rwanda/RDC : interview exclusive de Paul Kagame’, YouTube, 3 April 2026. ↩︎
116
‘Rwanda says Mozambique has secured funds for it to continue Cabo Delgado mission’, Reuters, 19 May 2026; Lesego, ‘Rwanda’s Cabo Delgado deployment has been most effective response to insurgency in northern Mozambique’, Channel Africa, 3 June 2026; ‘Mozambique: Keep Rwandan troops to buy time to reorganise national force – govt’, Club of Mozambique. ↩︎
117
‘Mozambique: Keep Rwandan troops to buy time to reorganise national force – govt’, Club of Mozambique ↩︎
118
A. Massango, ‘EU will contribute to funding Rwandan troops in Cabo Delgado – Chapo’, Agência de Informação de Moçambique, 6 July 2026. ↩︎

Mozambique

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (2025-2026)

Post-electoral violence since October 2024

International outcry

National political dialogue initiative

ANAMOLA: A New Political Party Emerges

Naparama self-defence militias clash with police

Developments regarding Mozambique’s LNG project

Non International Armed Conflict

Intensity

Organization

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

Non-state parties

Foreign Involvement

Other main actors

Foreign Involvement