Mozambique

In the reporting period in Mozambique, there was one non-international armed conflict (NIAC) – Mozambique (and support forces) v. Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISM).

Mozambique is a party to Additional Protocol II of 1977 (AP II), and it is probable this conflict is regulated directly by this Protocol, as well as Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 ¹, and customary international humanitarian law (IHL).²

The province of Cabo Delgado is historically a region of significant potential for the outbreak of conflict.³ In 2007, sections of disaffected youth in the southern districts of the province, predominantly Makua, voiced discontent over local religious authorities, particularly those with close ties to the Islamic Council of Mozambique (CISLAMO).⁴ By 2015, ethnic Mwani militants in Mocímboa da Praia were active in the area, seeking to ban the consumption of alcohol and opposing the enrolment of children in state schools and the right of women to work.⁵ Their cause was fuelled by economic exclusion following the discovery of rubies and natural gas in the area.⁶ There was also said to be resentment over the influence of liberation-era generals from President Filipe Nyusi’s Makonde ethnic group, which had business interests in the province.⁷

In early 2017, authorities initiated the removal of artisanal miners from commercial mining concessions, exacerbating local discontent.⁸ The Cabo Delgado conflict effectively began in October 2017 following an encounter between local law enforcement officials and men affiliated with an Islamist group, designated locally as ‘Al-Shabaab’ and known as Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISM), which had launched a series of attacks on police stations and briefly occupied the port town of Mocímboa da Praia.⁹ From the time of its inception, ISM has demonstrated consistent operational activity across different levels of intensity.¹⁰ The Mozambican military has endeavoured, with varying degrees of success, to contain the group.¹¹On occasion, these efforts involved the deployment of foreign private military companies such as the Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) from South Africa and other security forces including Wagner.¹²

In terms of international intervention, the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), which consists of frontline troops from Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Tanzania, initially deployed in the middle of 2021, concluding its mission on 15 July 2024.¹³ SAMIM, for the most part, operated in parallel with the Rwandan Security Forces (RSF), which remained operational at the time of writing.¹⁴ Rwandan forces were dispatched to Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province in July 2021, a month prior to SAMIM’s deployment, in the wake of an ISM attack on Palma Town that precipitated the suspension of the liquified natural gas (LNG) project located close to the town.¹⁵ Additionally, the Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF) has fought ISM in Cabo Delgado’s Nangade district since July 2021, first as a part of SAMIM and, since October 2022, through a bilateral agreement with Mozambique.¹⁶ Although SAMIM withdrew in July 2024, the TPDF has remained in Mozambique, making Tanzania a key player in the counter-insurgency and stabilisation operations.¹⁷

The origins of the conflict are the subject of competing narratives, but the finding of rubies and natural gas deposits in the region as well as how these resources are governed are widely recognized as contributing factors in its escalation.¹⁸ The discovery of substantial ruby deposits in Cabo Delgado attracted multinationals, including TotalEnergies, individuals seeking financial gain, and drew in miners from throughout East Africa in both regulated and unregulated operations.¹⁹When TotalEnergies assumed control of operations in 2019, the local population was forcibly removed from the site, prompting public demonstrations.²⁰ Despite the signing of a security agreement in August 2020 between the Mozambican government and TotalEnergies, attacks continued in the vicinity of the project site.²¹

In response to an escalating threat from the insurgency and notwithstanding the deployment of a dedicated Joint Task Force of Mozambican police and soldiers, TotalEnergies proceeded to evacuate the area of 500 staff in early January 2021.²² In May 2025, TotalEnergies and its partners announced an intention to restart operations at the LNG project, which by then had lain dormant for almost four years.²³

Since the start of the armed conflict in 2017 and through to October 2024, more than 1.3 million people were internally displaced.²⁴ ISM has enhanced its territorial dominance, taking control of parts of Meluco district from early 2025.²⁵

Developments concerning ISM

The NIAC between Mozambique and ISM continued during the reporting period. At the outset it should be clear that Ansar al Sunnah, Al-Shabaab and ISM are the same non-state armed group. The name Al-Shabaab is a local term that means ‘youth’ and is not a reference to Al-Shabaab Somalia.²⁶ Some reports, however, have referred to the group as Islamic State Mozambique Province.²⁷

Change in ISM leadership

On 22 August 2023, the Mozambican government said its armed forces had killed ISM leader Bonomade Machude Omar (also known as Ibn Omar) alongside two other senior figures within the group.²⁸ Omar had been the military leader of the group since the conflict began in 2017.²⁹ On 13 March 2024, the former Mozambican Minister of Interior, Pascoal Ronda, declared that ISM had undergone a leadership transition and had adopted new strategies in the aftermath of the expulsion from their headquarters and the death of their leaders.³⁰ He further asserted that most of the new leaders were present in the districts of Macomia and Quissanga in the Cabo Delgado province.³¹

Filipe Nyusi, the former Mozambican president, announced on 25 September 2024 that ISM’s new leader was the Tanzanian national Abu Zainabo (known as Ulanga), who considers himself the group’s spiritual leader. He is supported by Sarid Suleimane Arune, Abu Munir (known as Quadrado), Sileimane Nguvo Toto, Mahamudo Ibrahim Dade, and Rafael Mazubo.³² Some of these names, though, are known to be pseudonyms.³³ As stated in the United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team’s February 2025 report on ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals and entities, Abu Zainabo continues to serve as the primary leader of ISM.³⁴

Post-electoral violence since October 2024

Background

Mozambique held elections on 9 October 2024 to elect the president and members of the Assembly (parliament) along with the members of provincial assemblies. On 24 October 2024, the National Elections Commission (Comissão Nacional de Eleições) announced the provisional results, declaring that the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, FRELIMO) had won 195 seats (78 per cent) in the Assembly, with their presidential candidate Daniel Chapo receiving 70.7 per cent in the presidential vote.³⁵

Shortly after the release of the election results, the independent opposition presidential candidate, Venâncio Mondlane, proclaimed victory and denounced the election results as ‘theft’ because of what were described as wide-scale violations, including ballot box stuffing, ‘ghost voters’, and the use of state resources to campaign for FRELIMO.³⁶ Massive protests, strikes, and paralysis in major cities, including Maputo, were triggered by Mondlane’s call for protests from 31 October 2024 onwards.³⁷

In November 2024, the country witnessed a period of widespread unrest, with protests and strikes taking place across the nation.³⁸ These events, which were the most significant in recent history, included a ‘march’ on the capital, Maputo, and other major cities on 7 November 2024, resulting in clashes with the security forces and marking a significant escalation in internal tensions.³⁹ According to UN human rights experts, a minimum of thirty unarmed protesters were deliberately killed.⁴⁰ The situation subsequently worsened, with opposition supporters beginning a week-long demonstration on 4 December 2024, following Mr Mondlane’s call for renewed resistance, and the Constitutional Court’s confirmation of the electoral result on 23 December.⁴¹

The inauguration on 15 January 2025 of Daniel Chapo as president sparked renewed protests across the country.⁴² At least fourteen people died in the protests, bringing the total number of demonstrators killed since October 2024 to more than 300.⁴³ However, from the middle of January 2025 on, protests became more sporadic and the level of violence dropped considerably.⁴⁴ On 21 January 2025, Mr Mondlane told the media that he would suspend the protests for the first 100 days of the Chapo administration, provided that 5,000 people detained during the demonstrations since October were released and that the families of those killed were compensated.⁴⁵ President Chapo and opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane met on 23 March 2025, resulting in Mr Mondlane’s announcement of an end to the violence.⁴⁶

International outcry

The former chief of European diplomacy, Josep Borrell, on 2 November 2024, made an appeal for ‘political dialogue, restraint and calm on all sides’ in Mozambique, and requested that the subsequent stages of the electoral process be conducted in accordance with the rule of law and in a transparent manner.⁴⁷ On 20 November 2024, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) held an extraordinary summit to discuss the situation in Mozambique. It extended its condolences for the ‘lives lost during post-election violence’.⁴⁸

On 27 November 2024, the United States (US), United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, and Switzerland issued a joint statement strongly condemning the handling of the post-electoral protests by Mozambican security forces.⁴⁹ Further, between 24 and 26 December 2024, the African Union, the European Union, and the US repeatedly expressed concern regarding the violence perpetrated by Mozambican security forces against unarmed protesters.⁵⁰ On 28 December 2024, South Africa sent a presidential envoy – former Security Minister Sydney Mufamadi – to confer with President Nyusi on the matter.⁵¹

National political dialogue initiative

On 5 March 2025, an agreement on an ‘inclusive national political dialogue’ was signed in Maputo by Mozambican President Daniel Chapo and nine political parties, including FRELIMO (the Mozambique Liberation Front), PODEMOS (the Optimistic Party for the Development of Mozambique) and RENAMO (the Mozambican National Resistance).⁵² The document they signed includes guidelines for future discussions on matters such as reforming electoral legislation, decentralization and potential constitutional amendments. However, Venâncio Mondlane, the most popular of Mozambique’s opposition politicians and the former presidential candidate, was absent from the signing ceremony.⁵³

On 26 March 2025, the President submitted the Bill approving the ‘Political Commitment for a National and Inclusive Dialogue’, which outlines the budget of the Technical Committee, whose role is to suggest working groups for producing proposals and recommendations on the Agreement’s priorities (constitutional review and governance) to the Assembly.⁵⁴ The Dialogue and Reform Bill was unanimously approved by parliament on 2 April 2025 and promulgated by President Chapo on 14 April 2025.⁵⁵

The Technical Committee, which has 21 members (18 from the nine parties that signed the agreement and 3 from civil society organizations), will have a budget of 91,471,200 Meticais (equivalent to approx. USD1.5 million).⁵⁶ Greater transparency in the appointment of the three civil society representatives is being demanded by the Mais Integridade (More Integrity) Electoral Consortium – a platform of seven Mozambican civil society organizations.⁵⁷

Since the initiation of a national dialogue in March 2025, Mr Mondlane’s position has changed as the following month he set up his own party called the National Alliance for a Free and Autonomous Mozambique (Aliança Nacional para um Moçambique Livre e Autônomo – Anamalala).⁵⁸ Since then, President Chapo and Mr Mondlane have met twice ‘in the framework of the inclusive political dialogue with all strata of society’, with the latest meeting (at the time of writing) taking place on 20 May 2025.⁵⁹

Naparama self-defence militias become involved in post-political violence

The Naparama is a Mozambican community paramilitary group that emerged in the 1980s during the civil war. They combine traditional knowledge and mystical elements in fighting their enemies. Historically, the Naparama consider themselves to be a force that organized spontaneously to defend the people in the face of war. Its members undergo initiation rites designed to give them alleged ‘supernatural protection’ that they believe makes them immune to bullets. In recent months, Mozambican authorities acknowledged a series of attacks on state institutions in parts of northern and central Mozambique, mainly the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Zambezia. These incursions are attributed to groups calling themselves Naparamas. However, it remains unclear whether they are part of the traditional Naparama community paramilitary group or a new movement.⁶⁰

The Naparama mobilized during 2022 to fight ISM in Cabo Delgado. They also participated in anti-government protests. During February 2025, there were reports that the Naparama had beheaded a local official in Zambezia’s Morrumbala town, reportedly after the official collaborated with security forces during the violent repression of post-election demonstrations. On 6 February 2025, it was reported that Mozambican security forces had killed seven Naparama members near Namupla’s Angoche city during protests over the high cost of living.⁶¹

The situation that exists between Naparama and the government should be monitored for the purposes of classification as it might evolve over time due to the fragile political conditions in post-election Mozambique.

Developments regarding Mozambique’s LNG project

On 13 March 2025, the US Export-Import Bank approved a loan of USD4.7 billion to the liquid natural gas (LNG) project run by French oil conglomerate TotalEnergies. The project had been on hold since 2021 following an ISM attack that killed hundreds in Cabo Delgado’s Palma district.⁶² On 14 March 2025, French prosecutors launched an investigation into TotalEnergies over an alleged failure to ensure the safety of contractors during the Palma attack.⁶³ On 20 May 2025, TotalEnergies announced that it would seek approval to restart the Cabo Delgado LNG project by July or August 2025.⁶⁴

Launch of the EU military assistance mission (EUMAM Mozambique)

The EU’s military training and capacity-building partnership with Mozambique initially took the form of the EU Training Mission Mozambique (EUTM), which was formally initiated on 15 October 2021 at the request of the Mozambican government to support its armed forces through a training and capacity-building mission. The programme included the training of select Mozambican units into 11 Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs), with the objective of supporting the armed forces in their efforts to restore safety and security to Cabo Delgado.⁶⁵

On 6 March 2024, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) reached agreement within the framework of the EU’s strategic review of the EUTM to extend the mission until 30 June 2026. On 16 April 2024, the PSC agreed that, between June and September 2024, the mission would transition to a support model, combining advice, mentoring, and specialized training for Mozambique’s QRF, and that it would be renamed the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM Mozambique).⁶⁶ EUMAM Mozambique is helping the QRF of the Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (FADM) establish a self-sufficient operational cycle by June 2026, and covering preparation, deployment, and support all in accordance with IHL and international human rights law.⁶⁷

SAMIM completes withdrawal from Mozambique

Following SADC authorisation, SAMIM was deployed on 15 July 2021 as a regional response to support Mozambique in combatting terrorism and violent extremism. SAMIM comprised troops from eight SADC member states: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.⁶⁸

At the conclusion of the SADC Organ Troika meeting on 11 July 2023, former Namibian President Hage Geingob declared the mission would be renewed only until 15 July 2024.⁶⁹ SAMIM’s drawdown began in December 2023, with Botswana concluding the withdrawal of its troops on 5 April 2024 and Lesotho doing likewise on 14 April 2024. The final troop pull-out took place in July 2024.⁷⁰ On 4 July 2024, at an official ceremony in Pemba, the provincial capital, Mozambican Minister of Defence Cristóvão Chume thanked the mission while acknowledging that insecurity persisted in the province.⁷¹

Bilateral deployments by South Africa and Tanzania

In an endeavour to plug the gap left by SAMIM’s withdrawal, two former troop-contributing nations, South Africa and Tanzania, continued bilateral force deployments.⁷² On 22 April 2024, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa declared that the deployment of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in Cabo Delgado would be extended only until 31 December 2024.⁷³ As per the support-based approach introduced by the ICRC, South Africa was a party to this NIAC until its withdrawal was completed.⁷⁴ As of 24 March 2025, the SANDF was no longer reported to be in Mozambique.⁷⁵

On 1 July 2024, former Mozambican President Nyusi said that Tanzania would also continue to support the fight against ISM with several hundred troops based in the Nangade district.⁷⁶ Tanzanian troops continue to support this mission independently of the SADC withdrawal. As per the ICRC’s support-based approach, Tanzania is a party to this NIAC. Tanzania is consequently bound by the law of NIAC as its military is participating in the pre-existing ongoing NIAC between Mozambique and ISM.⁷⁷

Bilateral extension of Rwandan Security Forces (RSF) deployment

An ISM attack on Palma town in July 2021 led to the suspension of the nearby LNG project and the deployment of Rwandan forces in Cabo Delgado. This deployment occurred approximately one month before the deployment of SAMIM.⁷⁸ Both Rwanda and SAMIM had troops operating alongside each other until SAMIM’s withdrawal in July 2024.⁷⁹

As of May 2024, the frequency and intensity of fighting between the RSF and ISM had increased substantially.⁸⁰ Rwanda’s initial defence posture shifted during 2024,⁸¹ as a possible result of the withdrawal of SAMIM.⁸²

On 27 May 2024, Rwanda announced the deployment of an additional 2,000 troops to Cabo Delgado, seeking both to improve security in the province and to replace the withdrawing SAMIM forces.⁸³ On 3 July 2024, in the face of growing international criticism of Rwanda’s alleged involvement in backing Congolese rebel group M23, the EU postponed a decision on €20 million of financial support to Rwandan troops in Cabo Delgado.⁸⁴ The funds were, however, granted in November 2024.⁸⁵ By the end of the current reporting period, Rwandan forces were still in Mozambique fighting ISM.⁸⁶ In accordance with the ICRC’s support-based approach, Rwanda is a party to this NIAC.⁸⁷

Non-international armed conflict between the FADM (and support forces) and Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISM)

Intensity

During the reporting period, fighting between the FADM (and support forces) and ISM occurred on a regular basis. The FADM was supported during the period under review by Rwanda, Tanzania, SAMIM (up until its withdrawal on 31 July 2024), and South Africa (up until its withdrawal following the end of its mandate on 31 December 2024). Specifically, clashes were reported for 2023 in September,¹ October,² and December;³ and in 2024 in January,⁴ February,⁵ March,⁶ April,⁷ May,⁸ July,⁹August,¹⁰ September,¹¹ and December.¹² Fighting continued to be intense throughout the first half of 2025, with clashes reported during February,¹³ March, ¹⁴ April,¹⁵ May,¹⁶ and June. ¹⁷

Several significant attacks indicate that the military operations launched by ISM can often be considered as ‘sustained and concerted’;¹⁸ for example one on a Mozambican military post on 21 January 2024,¹⁹ which led to the FADM abandoning the post.²⁰ A series of attacks on 10 and 11 May 2024 was particularly intense with twenty-five casualties recorded.²¹ It has been reported that more than 100 ISM fighters engaged in heavy fighting against the FADM and the SANDF in Macomia shortly after SAMIM’s withdrawal from the area.²² ACLED considers the attack to be ‘one of [ISM’s] most daring operations since the attack on Palma in March 2021’.²³ The attack is described as a ‘multi-pronged assault’ in which the fighters attacked from at least three different directions.²⁴ Also, they ambushed and warded off a SANDF convoy 20km away that had been dispatched from Mocomo.²⁵ Clearly, the attack was highly organized. Another notable attack occurred in May 2024, this time between the RSF and ISM, with Rwanda claiming it had killed between fifty and seventy ISM fighters.²⁶

ISM use of IEDs,²⁷ led to an escalation in the type of weapons used by the RSF. During August 2024, the RSF used combat helicopters to bomb ISM forces with a view to reducing the risk of Rwandan soldiers stepping on IEDs planted by ISM.²⁸ Between 24 and 26 September 2024, another significant clash involved a coordinated, joint military operation involving the FADM and the RSF against ISM around Mucojo in the course of which four soldiers and at least ten ISM fighters were killed.²⁹

At least forty soldiers from the FADM were killed in combat during the first five months of 2025.³⁰ May 2025 saw an increase in the frequency of military operations between the FADM and ISM.³¹ The ISM ambushed the FADM on 8 and 14 May 2025, reportedly killing fourteen soldiers and injuring four others in the attacks.³² According to ReliefWeb, May 2025 recorded the sharpest rise in casualties since June 2022.³³

The type of weaponry used by ISM against the FADM and support forces includes rocket-propelled grenade launchers, assault rifles, mortars and light machine guns.³⁴ As noted, during 2024, there was a recorded increase in reliance by ISM on IEDs.³⁵

Fighting between the FADM (and support forces) and ISM has led to an increase in the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs).³⁶ Indeed, internal displacement between January and June 2024 increased almost fivefold compared to 2023.³⁷ UNHCR reported in May 2025 that as a result of the conflict, approximately 710,000 people in Mozambique were internally displaced. ³⁸ The escalation of violence as of July 2024 can be attributed to the operational withdrawal of SAMIM, which has left a gap in protective support.³⁹ The success of their military operations has enabled ISM to expand military control over territory. Its geographical footprint has widened in key coastal and southern districts such as Ancuabe, Chiure and Mecufi.⁴⁰ During May 2025, the ferocity of fighting enabled ISM to tighten control over key areas including Catupa, Chai, Chinda, Diaca and Mbau.⁴¹ Clearly, the nature of the fighting between FADM (and support forces) and ISM involves sustained and concerted attacks, and the stable and expanding military control over territory further confirms that the Tadić criteria for a NIAC remain satisfied. The territorial control exerted by ISM further suggests that the situation meets the additional criteria for the application of AP II (see further under ‘Organization’).

Organization

Despite ISM being formally recognized by Islamic State (IS) in May 2022 after pledging allegiance as early as 2018,⁴² little is known about the practical relationship between ISM and IS senior leadership, despite IS social media occasionally showing support for ISM actions.⁴³ Although it pledged allegiance to IS Central, ISM must independently meet the organizational criteria to qualify as a party to a NIAC.

At the time of reporting, ISM possessed a stable command structure, despite changes in leadership.⁴⁴ Abu Zainabo (known as Ulanga) currently serves as the spiritual leader of ISM,⁴⁵ while Faridi Suleiman Haruni (known as Faride Suleimane Arune) serves as its operational leader. Mozambique’s Minister of Interior, Pascoal Ronda, confirmed the existence of a clear leadership structure for ISM and suggests they are situated in the districts of Macomia and Quissanga.⁴⁶ There is conflicting evidence on whether ISM’s command structure is decentralized;⁴⁷ they strive to keep information on the organizational structure secret.⁴⁸

Despite reports that ISM operates through multiple, fragmented autonomous cells,⁴⁹ the group has stable control over territory in Mozambique,⁵⁰ which suggests a high level of organization. This corresponds with claims that ISM has a centralized and systematized structure, with a defined hierarchy of roles and responsibility. The highest-ranking officials are those who hold the positions of spiritual and military leaders.⁵¹

ISM is organized through a military base structure comprised of multiple cells. These bases are in forest areas, specifically Nangade, Muidumbe and Macomia. Each base has a commander and deputy commander. Below the command level, the structure is horizontal with certain fighters holding command positions, such as those in charge of training, media and finances.⁵²

In addition to its command structure, which allows ISM to exercise discipline over fighters. ISM has a so-called ‘supreme council’,⁵³ and a spiritual leader,⁵⁴ to assist in aligning the actions of the fighters with Sharia law, and is rooted in the Ansar Al Sunna Islamic movement from the 1990s.⁵⁵ The command and base structures further enable ISM to apply IHL.

Military tactics employed by ISM correspond to an ideology to capture territory and to govern in alignment with the purpose of achieving an African Islamic state.⁵⁶ Military tactics evolved significantly between 2020 and 2023. Initially, ISM operated in small mobile groups and capitalized on external support by coordinating its actions with other IS hubs such as the Karrar hub in Somalia.⁵⁷ During 2024, ISM adapted its military tactics and focused on civilian relations as part of its strategy to achieve territorial control.⁵⁸ ISM’s military tactics have become more sophisticated and they now operate in three main groups of roughly 100 fighters, each of which occupies different districts throughout the Macomia province. These groups subdivide into medium-sized cells consisting of thirty to fifty fighters which focus their attention on coastal towns.⁵⁹

One part of the evolved military tactics is a strategy to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the civilian population; several engagements and trading opportunities have been introduced to achieve this goal and bring stability to areas under ISM control.⁶⁰ ISM now tries to reassure civilians that they aim to target government and security forces and not civilians.⁶¹ ISM provides basic services in areas under its control and attempts to lead prayers and distribute food.⁶²

Logistical support is offered by others in the IS regional network and foreign fighters from the region such as Tanzania, Rwanda and South Africa continue to fill its ranks.⁶³ Some reports suggest that tactics include the recruitment of children to fight.⁶⁴ In the drive to recruit local fighters, ISM capitalizes on reports of the corruption and incompetence of the Mozambican government.⁶⁵ Operations are financed by illicit activities such as kidnapping, and smuggling drugs and weapons.⁶⁶ In February 2025, ISM imposed a non-Muslim tax called ‘jizya’, which is levied at checkpoints in Quissanga district.⁶⁷

ISM speaks with one voice through an IS central media apparatus.⁶⁸

Clearly, ISM has a sophisticated organizational structure that meets the requirements for it to be a party to a NIAC. The facts signal that ISM may also meet the higher organizational criteria included in Article 1(1) of AP II.

For the period in review, the Macomia district is considered the stronghold of ISM.⁶⁹ ISM fields up to 400 fighters and has exercised control over the coastal part of Macomia for months without being militarily challenged. ⁷⁰ Control over the coastal area has aided ‘movement and support’ to the group’s logistics.⁷¹ The nature of the control ISM exercises must be assessed to ascertain if control was ‘functional’.⁷² This requires that authority be exercised with a degree of stability which enables the armed group to launch sustained and concerted military operations and to implement AP II.⁷³

On 27 June 2023, a counter-insurgency operation was launched near the administrative post of Quiterajo to dislodge the fighters from this territory. Territorial control changed hands between ISM and FADM during the period under review. The control over Mucojo village in Macomia has shifted over time. ISM took control of it on 21 January 2024 after an offensive against the FADM post. However, security forces retook control on 31 January 2024.⁷⁴ ISM then regained control by 9 February after another attack on the FADM base, the third time control over the village changed hands in a month.⁷⁵ By the beginning of 2025, control was sufficiently stable to allow ISM to engage in service delivery to leverage the villagers’ experience of government shortcomings.⁷⁶ The functional requirement for territorial control as exercised by the ISM in Macomia was present during the period under review.

Another stronghold of ISM in Mozambique is the Chai administrative post, an area that has been under the control of the insurgents since 2018. This area is ‘hilly and heavily forested’ making it difficult for security operatives to dislodge the insurgents. ACLED has noted that ‘the area suggests it is something of a stronghold that ISM can retreat to when it is forced out of other areas’. Further, ACLED reports that ISM has three different military camps within the Chai administrative post. The camps are strategically located, one camp is located to the east of Chai village, a second is located east of Litamanda village, and the third is located around Namarussia village. It is reported that, because of its fertility, members of ISM use the area to cultivate ‘crops including maize, peanuts, beans and cassava’.⁷⁷The produce from farming is used to feed members and ensure the continuity of military operations. Produce may be sold to secure funding to support military operations and is evidence of a form of stable control over the territory.

Since ISM took control of Mujoco and established its stronghold, the nature of its actions arguably equates to sustained and concerted attacks. Also, it can be argued that the ability of ISM to exercise military control over Mucojo is indicative of ISM being under responsible command,⁷⁸ISM’s ability to launch sustained and concerted military attacks,⁷⁹ as well as the territorial control it exercises, gives ISM the ability to apply AP II.⁸⁰

1
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 18 September – 1 October 2023’, Cabo Ligado, 4 October 2023.
2
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 2 – 15 October 2023’, Cabo Ligado, 19 October 2023.
3
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 27 November – 10 December 2023’, Cabo Ligado, 13 December 2023.
4
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 8 – 21 January 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 24 January 2024; ‘Cabo Ligado Update: 22 January – 4 February 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 8 February 2024; T. Bowker, ‘Insurgents seize key Cabo Delgado village from Mozambique military’, Zitamar News, 25 January 2024.
5
A. Abubacar, ‘More than 20 soldiers killed in latest battle for Mucojo, Cabo Delgado’, Zitamar News, 12 February 2024.
6
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 4 – 17 March 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 22 March 2024.
7
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 1 – 14 April 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 18 April 2024; ‘Cabo Ligado Update: 15 – 28 April 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 3 May 2024.
8
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group.
9
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; ‘Cabo Ligado Update: 8 – 21 July 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 24 July 2024.
10
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; ‘Cabo Ligado Update: 7 August – 3 September 2023’, Cabo Ligado, 6 September 2023; W. Dias, Post on X, 23 August 2024; and T. Gould, ‘Up to nine Mozambican soldiers killed in RPG ambush in Macomia’, Zitamar News, 24 August 2023.
11
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 16 – 29 September 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 2 October 2024.
12
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 9 December 2024–12 January 2025’, Cabo Ligado, 15 January 2025.
13
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 21 April – 4 May 2025’, Cabo Ligado, 7 May 2025.
14
‘Sete supostos terroristas abatidos em Cabo Delgado’, Observador, 21 March 2025; ‘Cabo Ligado Update: 10 – 23 March 2025’, Cabo Ligado, 26 March 2025.
15
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 7 – 20 April 2025’, Cabo Ligado, 23 April 2025.
16
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 5 – 18 May 2025’, Cabo Ligado, 21 May 2025.
17
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 2 – 15 June 2025’, Cabo Ligado, 18 June 2025.
18
M. M. Bradley, ‘Additional Protocol II: Elevating the minimum threshold of intensity?’, International Review of the Red Cross, 2020.
19
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 8 – 21 January 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 24 January 2024; T. Bowker, ‘Insurgents seize key Cabo Delgado village from Mozambique military’, Zitamar News, 25 January 2024.
20
T. Bowker, ‘Insurgents seize key Cabo Delgado village from Mozambique military’, Zitamar News, 25 January 2024.
21
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; ‘Cabo Ligado Update: 29 April–12 May 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 16 May 2024.
22
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group.
23
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 29 April – 12 May 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 16 May 2024.
24
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 29 April – 12 May 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 16 May 2024; Cabo Delgado, Post on X, 13 May 2024.
25
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 29 April – 12 May 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 16 May 2024; G. Martin, ‘‘They are attacking my base’’, defenceWeb, 13 May 2024.
26
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 27 May – 23 June 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 27 June 2024; ‘Rwanda’s Intervention in Mozambique: A Turning Point in the Fight Against Jihadist Insurgency’, Tactics Institute for Security & Counter Terrorism, 25 May 2024.
27
‘Mozambique: Access Snapshot – Cabo Delgado Province, as of 31 May 2025’, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 12 June 2025.
28
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 5 – 18 August 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 22 August 2024.
29
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 16 – 29 September 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 2 October 2024.
30
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 19 May – 1 June 2025’, Cabo Ligado, 4 June 2025.
31
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 5 – 18 May 2025’, Cabo Ligado, 21 May 2025.
32
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 5 – 18 May 2025’, Cabo Ligado, 21 May 2025.
33
‘Mozambique: Access Snapshot – Cabo Delgado Province, as of 31 May 2025’, ReliefWeb, 12 June 2025.
34
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 5 – 18 May 2025’, Cabo Ligado, 21 May 2025.
35
‘Republic of Mozambique, Cabo Delgado Province: Protection Analysis Report’, Global Protection Cluster, January 2025.
36
‘Mozambique’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 14 May 2025.
37
‘Assessment of Displacement Dynamics in Mozambique’, Global Data Institute: Displacement Tracking Matrix, April 2025.
38
‘UNHCR: New displacement and funding squeeze intensify Mozambique crisis’, The United Nations Refugee Agency, 23 May 2025.
39
‘Republic of Mozambique, Cabo Delgado Province: Protection Analysis Report’, Global Protection Cluster, January 2025.
40
‘Republic of Mozambique, Cabo Delgado Province: Protection Analysis Report’, Global protection cluster, January 2025.
41
‘Mozambique – Increased violence (DG ECHO, DG ECHO Partners, UN OCHA) (ECHO Daily Flash of 20 June 2025)’, ReliefWeb, 20 June 2025; ‘Mozambique: Access Snapshot – Cabo Delgado Province, as of 31 May 2025’, ReliefWeb, 12 June 2025.
42
‘IntelBrief: Islamic State Resurging in Mozambique’, The Soufan Center, 21 March 2024; P. Bofin, ‘Actor Profiles: Islamic State Mozambique (ISM)’, ACLED, 30 October 2023.
43
T. Gould, et al, ‘The Islamic State in Mozambique: The Cabo Delgado Conflict since 2021’, Online Article, Hudson, 20 February 2024.
44
UNSC, ‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/71/Rev.1, 6 February 2025.
45
UNSC, ‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/71/Rev.1, 6 February 2025.
46
‘Islamic State Group Alters Tactics Under New Leadership in Mozambique’, African Defense Forum, 11 June 2024.
47
‘Islamic State in Mozambique Rearing Its Head Again’, The Soufan center, 15 January 2025.
48
T. Gould et al, ‘The Islamic State in Mozambique: The Cabo Delgado Conflict since 2021’, Online Article, Hudson, 20 February 2024.
49
‘Islamic State in Mozambique Rearing Its Head Again’, The Soufan Center, 15 January 2025; T. Gould, et al, ‘The Islamic State in Mozambique: The Cabo Delgado Conflict since 2021’, Online Article, Hudson, 20 February 2024.
50
‘Islamic State in Mozambique Rearing Its Head Again’, The Soufan Center, 15 January 2025; and L. Karr, ‘Africa File, March 28, 2024: Islamic State Resurgent in Mozambique; al Shabaab’s Ramadan Offensive’, Institute for the Study of War, 28 March 2024.
51
UNSC, ‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/71/Rev.1, 6 February 2025.
52
‘Islamic State in Mozambique Rearing Its Head Again’, The Soufan Center, 15 January 2025.
53
‘Assessing the Northern Mozambique Insurgency’, Combating the Islamic State’s Spread in Africa: Assessment and Recommendations for Mozambique, 1 February 2021.
54
UNSC, ‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/71/Rev.1, 6 February 2025.
55
‘ISIS-Mozambique (A.K.A. Ansar Al-Sunna)’, Counter terrorism guide, April 2025.
56
‘ISIS-Mozambique (A.K.A. Ansar Al-Sunna)’, Counter terrorism guide, April 2025; ‘IntelBrief: Islamic State Resurging in Mozambique’, The Soufan Center, 21 March 2024; P. Bofin, ‘Actor Profiles: Islamic State Mozambique (ISM)’, ACLED, 30 October 2023.
57
P. Bofin, ‘Actor Profiles: Islamic State Mozambique (ISM)’, ACLED, 30 October 2023.
58
L. Karr, ‘Africa File, March 28, 2024: Islamic State Resurgent in Mozambique; al Shabaab’s Ramadan Offensive’, Institute for the Study of War, 28 March 2024.
59
UNSC, ‘Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/556, 22 July 2024.
60
L. Karr, ‘Africa File, March 28, 2024: Islamic State Resurgent in Mozambique; al Shabaab’s Ramadan Offensive’, Institute for the Study of War, 28 March 2024.
61
UNSC, ‘Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2024/556, 22 July 2024; ‘IntelBrief: Islamic State Resurging in Mozambique’, The Soufan Center, 21 March 2024.
62
‘Islamic State in Mozambique Rearing Its Head Again’, The Soufan Center, 15 January 2025; C. Weiss, ‘Islamic State expands da’wah activities in Mozambique’, Long War Journal, 30 April 2024.
63
‘Islamic State in Mozambique Rearing Its Head Again’, The Soufan Center, 15 January 2025; ‘IntelBrief: Islamic State Resurging in Mozambique’, The Soufan center, 21 March 2024.
64
‘Islamic State Group Alters Tactics Under New Leadership in Mozambique’, African Defense Forum, 11 June 2024.
65
‘Islamic State in Mozambique Rearing Its Head Again’, The Soufan Center, 15 January 2025.
66
A. Cascais, ‘Mozambique: Jihadists from abroad pour into Cabo Delgado’, DW, 20 March 2024.
67
T. Gould, ‘Islamic State Mozambique’s war on the church’, Zitamar News, 22 March 2024.
68
‘IntelBrief: Islamic State Resurging in Mozambique’, The Soufan Center, 21 March 2024.
69
P. Bofin, ‘Face-off in Macomia comes to an end’, Zitamar News, 19 July 2023.
70
T. Gould, ‘At least eight military killed in Macomia ambush’, Zitamar News, 5 July 2023.
71
P. Bofin, ‘Face-off in Macomia comes to an end’, Zitamar News, 19 July 2023.
72
M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, December 2020.
73
M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, December 2020.
74
‘Cabo Ligado Monthly: January 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 20 February 2024.
75
‘Cabo Ligado Monthly: February 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 19 March 2024.
76
‘Islamic State in Mozambique Rearing Its Head Again’, The Soufan Center, 15 January 2025; C. Weiss, ‘Islamic State expands da’wah activities in Mozambique’, Long War Journal, 30 April 2024.
77
‘Cabo Ligado Monthly: March 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 15 April 2024.
78
ICTR, ‘Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu’, Chamber I,Judgment, 2 September 1998, par 623; M.M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol II in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, December 2020.
79
SCSL, ‘Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana Allieu Kondewa’, Trial Chamber I, Judgment, 2 August 2007, para 126; M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol ii in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, December 2020.
80
ICTR, ‘Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu’, Chamber I,Judgment, 2 September 1998, par 623; M. M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol ii in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, December 2020.

State Parties

Mozambique (FADM)
Rwanda (RSF)
Tanzania
SAMIM (Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe until 31 July 2024)
South Africa (SANDF) (up until December 2024)

Non-state parties

Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISM)

Foreign Involvement

EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM Mozambique)

1
‘Article 3 – Conflicts not of an international character’, International Committee of the Red Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases
2
M.M. Bradley, ‘Classifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: The ‘Territorial Control’ Requirement Under Additional Protocol ii in an Era of Complex Conflicts’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, December 2020.
3
P. Pigou and J. Opperman, ‘Conflict in Cabo Delgado: From the Frying Pan into the Fire?’, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 15 June 2021; ‘Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado’, International Crisis Group, 11 June 2021.
4
‘Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado’, International Crisis Group, 11 June 2021.
5
‘Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado’, International Crisis Group, 11 June 2021.
6
‘Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado’, International Crisis Group, 11 June 2021.
7
‘Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado’, International Crisis Group, 11 June 2021.
8
‘Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado’, International Crisis Group, 11 June 2021.
9
P. Pigou and J. Opperman, ‘Conflict in Cabo Delgado: From the Frying Pan into the Fire?’, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 15 June 2021; and T. de Almeida, ‘7 years into the conflict, solutions to displacement in Cabo Delgado remain elusive’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 10 October 2024.
10
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group.
11
P. Pigou and J. Opperman, ‘Conflict in Cabo Delgado: From the Frying Pan into the Fire?’, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 15 June 2021; and ‘Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado’, International Crisis Group, 11 June 2021.
12
P. Pigou and J. Opperman, ‘Conflict in Cabo Delgado: From the Frying Pan into the Fire?’, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 15 June 2021; ‘Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado’, International Crisis Group, 11 June 2021; and H. Strydom, ‘The Use of Private Military Companies to Counter the Insurgency in Northern Mozambique’, Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Conflict: International Humanitarian Law and Regional Security, 2024.
13
‘Actor Profile: SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)’, Cabo Ligado, 2 May 2024; P. Bofin, ‘ACLED Report: Rwanda in Mozambique: Limits to civilian protection’, ACLED, 25 April 2025; ‘Withdrawal of the Southern African Development Community Mission In Mozambique (SAMIM) Force Members from Cabo Delgado’, Southern African Development Community, 5 April 2024; and A. Massango, ‘SAMIM formally withdraws from Cabo Delgado’, AIM, 4 July 2024.
14
‘Actor Profile: SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)’, Cabo Ligado, ACLED, 2 May 2024.
15
P. Bofin, ‘ACLED Report: Rwanda in Mozambique: Limits to civilian protection’, ACLED, 25 April 2025.
16
‘Actor Profile: Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF)’, Cabo Ligado, 29 May 2024.
17
‘Actor Profile: Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF)’, Cabo Ligado, 29 May 2024.
18
T. de Almeida, ‘7 years into the conflict, solutions to displacement in Cabo Delgado remain elusive’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 10 October 2024.
19
L. Louw-Vaudran, ‘The many roots of Mozambique’s deadly insurgency’, Institute for Security Studies, 8 September 2022.
20
L. Louw-Vaudran, ‘The many roots of Mozambique’s deadly insurgency’, Institute for Security Studies, 8 September 2022.
21
P. Pigou and J. Opperman, ‘Conflict in Cabo Delgado: From the Frying Pan into the Fire?’, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 15 June 2021.
22
P. Pigou and J. Opperman, ‘Conflict in Cabo Delgado: From the Frying Pan into the Fire?’, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 15 June 2021; ‘Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado’, International Crisis Group, 11 June 2021; and ‘Total declares Force Majeure on Mozambique LNG project’, Mozambique LNG, 16 April 2021.
23
‘TotalEnergies plans to restart Mozambique LNG project by August 2025’, Club of Mozambique, 22 May 2025; and C. Howe, ‘WGC TotalEnergies CEO aims to lift force majeure on Mozambique LNG project’, Reuters, 20 May 2025.
24
T. de Almeida, ‘7 years into the conflict, solutions to displacement in Cabo Delgado remain elusive’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 10 October 2024.
25
UNSC, ‘Twentieth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat’, UN Doc S/2025/72, 31 January 2025; and ‘Cabo Ligado Update: 24 March–6 April 2025’, Cabo Ligado, 9 April 2025.
26
A. Cascais, ‘Mozambique: Jihadists from abroad pour into Cabo Delgado’, DW, 20 March 2024; and ‘Somalia: Al-Shabab Islamist kills dozens in attack on army’, DW, 25 July 2023.
27
P. Bofin, ‘Actor Profiles: Islamic State Mozambique (ISM)’, ACLED, 30 October 2023; and ‘The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 10-Year Plan for Mozambique, 2022-2023’, US Department of State, 22 March 2024.
28
J. Tembe and W. Rose, ‘Most wanted terrorist killed, says Mozambique’, BBC, 25 August 2023; and ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group.
29
J. Tembe and W. Rose, ‘Most wanted terrorist killed, says Mozambique’, BBC, 25 August 2023.
30
‘Mozambique: Government says terrorists have new leadership, new strategy – Watch’, Club of Mozambique, 13 March 2024; and ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group.
31
‘Mozambique: Government says terrorists have new leadership, new strategy – Watch’, Club of Mozambique, 13 March 2024; and ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group.
32
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; A. Massango, ‘Nyusi claims FDS have control of security in Cabo Delgado’, AIM, 25 September 2024; and ‘Mozambique: Nyusi presents the names of terrorist leaders – Notícias’, Club of Mozambique, 27 September 2024.
33
A. Massango, ‘Nyusi claims FDS have control of security in Cabo Delgado’, AIM, 25 September 2024.
34
UNSC, ‘Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities’, UN Doc S/2025/71/Rev.1, 6 February 2025.
35
‘Mozambique – October 2024’, International idea; and ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group.
36
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group.
37
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group.
38
‘What is Driving Mozambique’s Post-electoral Protests?’, International Crisis Group, 15 November 2024; and ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group.
39
‘What is Driving Mozambique’s Post-electoral Protests?’, International Crisis Group, 15 November 2024; ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; ‘Mozambique police fire tear gas at biggest protest yet against ruling party’, Reuters, 7 November 2024; ‘Clashes in Mozambique as opposition protests election ‘fraud’’, Al Jazeera, 7 November 2024; and E. Gudo, ‘Mondlane threatens more demonstrations’, AIM, 7 November 2024.
40
‘What is Driving Mozambique’s Post-electoral Protests?’, International Crisis Group, 15 November 2024; ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; and ‘At least 30 die in Mozambique election protests says rights group’, RFI, 9 November 2024.
41
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; R. Savage, ‘Mozambique’s top court confirms election result after months of protest’, The Guardian, 23 December 2024; and J. Tembe, ‘Mozambique court ruling sparks fresh poll protests’, BBC, 23 December 2024.
42
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; J. Tembe and N. Booty, ‘Mozambique’s new president sworn in despite opposition boycott’, BBC, 15 January 2025; and ‘Mozambique: Daniel Chapo inaugurated after disputed election’, DW, 15 January 2025.
43
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; A. Massango, ‘About 350 shot dead during mass protests’, AIM, 11 February 2025; ‘At least 300 people killed during the post-election violence in Mozambique’, Africa News, 16 April 2025; S. Khan, ‘6 Killed During Inauguration of Mozambique New Parliament’, The Diplomatic Insight, 14 January 2025; and ‘Mozambique: Inauguration Day death toll rises to eleven’, Club of Mozambique, 17 January 2025.
44
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group.
45
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; I. Wafula, ‘Mozambique opposition leader open to serving in rival’s government’, BBC, 21 January 2025; and ‘Venâncio Mondlane Suspends Protests until Proclamation of Results by Constitutional Council’, The Mozambique Times, 16 January 2025.
46
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; and B. Nhamirre, ‘Chapo-Mondlane meeting presents a glimmer of hope for Mozambique’, Institute for Security Studies, 27 March 2025.
47
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; and B. Henriques, ‘General Elections: Borrell Calls for Dialogue, Restraint and Calm on All Sides in Mozambique’, 360 Mozambique, 4 November 2024.
48
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; and ‘Communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government 20th November 2024’, SADC, 21 November 2024.
49
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group.
50
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; ‘AUC Chairperson calls for peaceful resolution of the escalating post-election violence in Mozambique’, African Union, 26 December 2024; ‘Mozambique: Statement by the Spokesperson on the Presidential elections’, European Union External Action, 24 December 2024; and US Embassy Maputo, ‘Constitutional Council Decision on Mozambican Elections’, US Embassy Mozambique, 26 December 2024.
51
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; and P. Fauvet, ‘South Africa willing to help Mozambique find solutions’, AIM, 28 December 2024.
52
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; and P. Fauvet, ‘Agreement on political dialogue signed – but without Venâncio Mondlane’, AIM, 6 March 2025.
53
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; and P. Fauvet, ‘Agreement on political dialogue signed – but without Venâncio Mondlane’, AIM, 6 March 2025.
54
‘Mozambique’s Inclusive Political Dialogue: More than $1.4 million for Technical Committee – Carta’, AIM, 28 March 2025.
55
‘Mozambique: President Chapo enacts law on Political Commitment to Dialogue’, AIM, 14 April 2025; and ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group.
56
‘Mozambique’s Inclusive Political Dialogue: More than $1.4 million for Technical Committee – Carta’, AIM, 28 March 2025.
57
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; and A. Massango, ‘Mais Integridade calls for transparency in appointment of civil society personalities’, AIM, 30 May 2025.
58
‘Mozambique: Venâncio Mondlane sets up new party – Watch’, Club of Mozambique, 4 April 2025; P. Fauvet, ‘Mondlane announces creation of new political party’, AIM, 7 April 2025; B. Henriques, ‘Former Presidential Candidate Venâncio Mondlane Creates ‘Anamalala’ Party’, 360 Mozambique, 4 April 2025; and P. Fauvet, ‘Chapo and Mondlane hold second meeting’, AIM, 21 May 2025.
59
P. Fauvet, ‘Chapo and Mondlane hold second meeting’, AIM, 21 May 2025.
60
‘Mozambique: Perpetrators of new attacks are ‘bandits’ and not ‘Naparamas’ – Watch’, Club of Mozambique, 22 April 2025.
61
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group.
62
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; ‘US backs $4.7bn loan to restart Total Mozambique LNG project’, Quantum Commodity Intelligence, 14 March 2025; and J. Hanlon, ‘Mozambique News Reports and Clippings’, The Open University, 2 July 2020.
63
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; ‘TotalEnergies response to alleged human rights violations at Mozambique LNG project’, Business & Human Rights Resources Centre, 31 March 2025; and ‘An Unprecedented Court Action. Oil Change Response to the Judicial Investigation into TotalEnergies’ Mozambique LNG Project’, Oil Change International, 15 March 2025. The company has repeatedly denied wrongdoing. ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; and ‘Mozambique LNG: TotalEnergies welcomes the launch of official investigations in Mozambique’, TotalEnergies, 26 March 2025.
64
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; A. L. Klein, ‘TotalEnergies to k Mozambique Approval to Resume $20B LNG Project’, Energy Capital Power, 22 May 2025; and ‘TotalEnergies plans to restart Mozambique LNG project by August 2025’, Club of Mozambique, 22 May 2025.
65
‘About EUMAM Moz’, EUMAM Mozambique, 8 January 2025.
66
‘EUMAM Mozambique’, Gobeirno de España.
67
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; ‘About EUMAM Moz’, EUMAM Mozambique, 8 January 2025; and ‘Factsheet: EU Military Assistance Mission Mozambique’, EUMAM Mozambique, 31 October 2024.
68
‘SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) in Brief’, SADC, 10 November 2021.
69
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; ‘Cabo Ligado Weekly: 3 – 9 July 2023’, Cabo Ligado, 12 July 2023; and Namibian President, Post on X, 11 July 2023.
70
‘Cabo Ligado Weekly: 3 – 9 July 2023’, Cabo Ligado, 12 July 2023; and ‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group.
71
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; ‘SAMIM ends anti-terrorism mission in volatile northern Mozambique’, The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 12 July 2024; and ‘Mozambique defence minister thanks SAMIM for Cabo Delgado contribution’, defenceWeb, 11 July 2024.
72
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group.
73
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; and S. Lesedi, ‘South Africa extends military Deployment in Mozambique’, Military Africa, 26 April 2024.
74
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 16, 18-19.
75
L. Maluleke, ‘SANDF: A force stretched to its limits’, Good Governance Africa, 24 March 2025.
76
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; ‘Actor Profile: Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF)’, Cabo Ligado, 29 May 2024; and A. Massango, ‘Tanzanian forces crucial to stopping terrorists, says Nyusi’, AIM, 3 July 2024.
77
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 7 – 20 April 2025 – Cabo Ligado’, Cabo Ligado, 23 April 2025; ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, 2024, 16.
78
P. Bofin, ‘Rwanda in Mozambique: Limits to civilian protection’, ACLED, 23 April 2025.
79
‘Actor Profile: SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)’, Cabo Ligado, 2 May 2024.
80
‘Cabo Ligado Update: 27 May–23 June 2024’, Cabo Ligado, 27 June 2024; L. Serwat and P. Bofin, ‘The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) operations abroad signal a shift in Rwanda’s regional standing’, ACLED, 27 September 2024; and T. Gould, ‘ISM licks its wounds after defeat at Mbau’, Zitamar News, 3 July 2024.
81
‘Terror attacks continue in northern Mozambique’, defenceWeb, 9 May 2025
82
L. Serwat and P. Bofin, ‘The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) operations abroad signal a shift in Rwanda’s regional standing’, ACLED, 27 September 2024.
83
O. Oganga and M. Hill, ‘Rwanda Deploys 2,000 More Troops to Gas-Rich Mozambique Region’, Bloomberg, 28 May 2024; and P. Bofin, ‘ACLED Report: Rwanda in Mozambique: Limits to civilian protection’, ACLED, 25 April 2025.
84
‘Africa: Mozambique’, International Crisis Group; and R. Gras, ‘EU divided over financial support for Rwandan intervention in Mozambique’, The Africa Report, 31 July 2024.
85
‘Suspension of EU military cooperation with Rwanda over findings of Rwandan support for the M23 rebel group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, European Parliament, 18 March 2025; and K. Titeca, ‘The (bad) politics behind the EU’s new €20 million for the Rwandan army’, Democracy in Africa, 16 November 2024.
86
‘Rwanda’s Intervention in Mozambique: A Turning Point in the Fight Against Jihadist Insurgency’, Tactics Institute for Security & Counter Terrorism, 25 May 2024.
87
‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2024, 16.

Mozambique

Reporting period: July 2023 - June 2025

why a disclaimer ?

Non-international armed conflict between the FADM (and support forces) and Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISM)

Intensity

Organization

State Parties

Non-state parties

Foreign Involvement

Mozambique

Reporting period: July 2023 - June 2025

why a disclaimer ?

Overview

Historical background

Key developments (2023-2025)

Non International Armed Conflict

Intensity

Organization

Parties to the Conflict

State Parties

Non-state parties

Foreign Involvement